Cloudera Security
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About this Guide

This guide is intended for system administrators who want to secure a cluster using data encryption, user authentication, and authorization techniques. It provides conceptual overviews and how-to information about setting up various Hadoop components for optimal security, including how to setup a gateway to restrict access. This guide assumes that you have basic knowledge of Linux and systems administration practices, in general.
Cloudera Security Overview

As a system designed to support vast amounts and types of data, Cloudera clusters must meet ever-evolving security requirements imposed by regulating agencies, governments, industries, and the general public. Cloudera clusters comprise both Hadoop core and ecosystem components, all of which must be protected from a variety of threats to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all the cluster’s services and data. This overview provides introductions to:

Security Requirements

Goals for data management systems, such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability, require that the system be secured across several dimensions. These can be characterized in terms of both general operational goals and technical concepts, as shown in the figure below:

- **Perimeter** Access to the cluster must be protected from a variety of threats coming from internal and external networks and from a variety of actors. Network isolation can be provided by proper configuration of firewalls, routers, subnets, and the proper use of public and private IP addresses, for example. Authentication mechanisms ensure that people, processes, and applications properly identify themselves to the cluster and prove they are who they say they are, before gaining access to the cluster.

- **Data** Data in the cluster must always be protected from unauthorized exposure. Similarly, communications between the nodes in the cluster must be protected. Encryption mechanisms ensure that even if network packets are intercepted or hard-disk drives are physically removed from the system by bad actors, the contents are not usable.

- **Access** Access to any specific service or item of data within the cluster must be specifically granted. Authorization mechanisms ensure that once users have authenticated themselves to the cluster, they can only see the data and use the processes to which they have been granted specific permission.

- **Visibility** Visibility means that the history of data changes is transparent and capable of meeting data governance policies. Auditing mechanisms ensure that all actions on data and its lineage—source, changes over time, and so on—are documented as they occur.

Securing the cluster to meet specific organizational goals involves using security features inherent to the Hadoop ecosystem as well as using external security infrastructure. The various security mechanisms can be applied in a range of levels.

Security Levels

The figure below shows the range of security levels that can be implemented for a Cloudera cluster, from non-secure (0) to most secure (3). As the sensitivity and volume of data on the cluster increases, so should the security level you choose for the cluster.
With level 3 security, your Cloudera cluster is ready for full compliance with various industry and regulatory mandates and is ready for audit when necessary. The table below describes the levels in more detail:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Non-secure</td>
<td>No security configured. Non-secure clusters should never be used in production environments because they are vulnerable to any and all attacks and exploits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Configured for authentication, authorization, and auditing. Authentication is first configured to ensure that users and services can access the cluster only after proving their identities. Next, authorization mechanisms are applied to assign privileges to users and user groups. Auditing procedures keep track of who accesses the cluster (and how).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>Sensitive data is encrypted. Key management systems handle encryption keys. Auditing has been setup for data in metastores. System metadata is reviewed and updated regularly. Ideally, cluster has been setup so that lineage for any data object can be traced (data governance).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Most</td>
<td>The secure enterprise data hub (EDH) is one in which all data, both data-at-rest and data-in-transit, is encrypted and the key management system is fault-tolerant. Auditing mechanisms comply with industry, government, and regulatory standards (PCI, HIPAA, NIST, for example), and extend from the EDH to the other systems that integrate with it. Cluster administrators are well-trained, security procedures have been certified by an expert, and the cluster can pass technical review.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Authentication Mechanisms for Cloudera Clusters

Authentication is a basic security requirement for any computing environment. Users, services, and other processes must prove their identity to the system (authenticate) before they can use it to whatever degree they have been authorized. (Authorization is handled in many different ways, from access control lists to role-based access controls (RBAC) using Sentry, and is the subject of the Authorization Mechanisms for Cloudera Clusters on page 26 in this guide.)

Hadoop clusters and CDH applications can integrate strong authentication provided by your organization’s Kerberos deployment. Users and application processes must present credentials to the system before they are allowed access. Cloudera Manager Server, CDH nodes, and Cloudera Enterprise components (including Cloudera Navigator, Apache Hive, Hue, and Impala, which support external clients) can all make use of Kerberos authentication.

Better still, Kerberos credentials can be stored and managed in your organization’s Active Directory (or other LDAP-compliant) directory instance. See Configuring Authentication for more information.
Basic Kerberos Concepts

This section describes how Hadoop uses Kerberos principals and keytabs for user authentication. It also briefly describes how Hadoop uses delegation tokens to authenticate jobs at execution time, to avoid overwhelming the KDC with authentication requests for each job.

Kerberos Principals

A user in Kerberos is called a principal, which is made up of three distinct components: the primary, instance, and realm. A Kerberos principal is used in a Kerberos-secured system to represent a unique identity. The first component of the principal is called the primary, or sometimes the user component. The primary component is an arbitrary string and may be the operating system username of the user or the name of a service. The primary component is followed by an optional section called the instance, which is used to create principals that are used by users in special roles or to define the host on which a service runs, for example. An instance, if it exists, is separated from the primary by a slash and then the content is used to disambiguate multiple principals for a single user or service. The final component of the principal is the realm. The realm is similar to a domain in DNS in that it logically defines a related group of objects, although rather than hostnames as in DNS, the Kerberos realm defines a group of principals. Each realm can have its own settings including the location of the KDC on the network and supported encryption algorithms. Large organizations commonly create distinct realms to delegate administration of a realm to a group within the enterprise. Realms, by convention, are written in uppercase characters.

Kerberos assigns tickets to Kerberos principals to enable them to access Kerberos-secured Hadoop services. For the Hadoop daemon principals, the principal names should be of the format `username/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM`. In this guide, `username` in the principal refers to the username of an existing Unix account that is used by Hadoop daemons, such as hdfs or mapred. Human users who want to access the Hadoop cluster also need to have Kerberos principals; in this case, `username` refers to the username of the user’s Unix account, such as joe or jane. Single-component principal names (such as `joe@YOUR-REALM.COM`) are acceptable for client user accounts. Hadoop does not support more than two-component principal names.

Kerberos Keytabs

A keytab is a file containing pairs of Kerberos principals and an encrypted copy of that principal's key. A keytab file for a Hadoop daemon is unique to each host since the principal names include the hostname. This file is used to authenticate a principal on a host to Kerberos without human interaction or storing a password in a plain text file. Because having access to the keytab file for a principal allows one to act as that principal, access to the keytab files should be tightly secured. They should be readable by a minimal set of users, should be stored on local disk, and should not be included in host backups, unless access to those backups is as secure as access to the local host.

Delegation Tokens

Users in a Hadoop cluster authenticate themselves to the NameNode using their Kerberos credentials. However, once the user is authenticated, each job subsequently submitted must also be checked to ensure it comes from an authenticated user. Since there could be a time gap between a job being submitted and the job being executed, during which the user could have logged off, user credentials are passed to the NameNode using delegation tokens that can be used for authentication in the future.

Delegation tokens are a secret key shared with the NameNode, that can be used to impersonate a user to get a job executed. While these tokens can be renewed, new tokens can only be obtained by clients authenticating to the NameNode using Kerberos credentials. By default, delegation tokens are only valid for a day. However, since jobs can last longer than a day, each token specifies a JobTracker as a renewer which is allowed to renew the delegation token once a day, until the job completes, or for a maximum period of 7 days. When the job is complete, the JobTracker requests the NameNode to cancel the delegation token.

Token Format

The NameNode uses a random masterKey to generate delegation tokens. All active tokens are stored in memory with their expiry date (maxDate). Delegation tokens can either expire when the current time exceeds the expiry date, or, they can be canceled by the owner of the token. Expired or canceled tokens are then deleted from memory. The
sequenceNumber serves as a unique ID for the tokens. The following section describes how the Delegation Token is used for authentication.

\[
\text{TokenID} = \{\text{ownerID, renewerID, issueDate, maxDate, sequenceNumber}\}
\]

\[
\text{TokenAuthenticator} = \text{HMAC-SHA1}(\text{masterKey, TokenID})
\]

\[
\text{Delegation Token} = \{\text{TokenID, TokenAuthenticator}\}
\]

Authentication Process

To begin the authentication process, the client first sends the TokenID to the NameNode. The NameNode uses this TokenID and the masterKey to once again generate the corresponding TokenAuthenticator, and consequently, the Delegation Token. If the NameNode finds that the token already exists in memory, and that the current time is less than the expiry date (maxDate) of the token, then the token is considered valid. If valid, the client and the NameNode will then authenticate each other by using the TokenAuthenticator that they possess as the secret key, and MD5 as the protocol. Since the client and NameNode do not actually exchange TokenAuthenticators during the process, even if authentication fails, the tokens are not compromised.

Token Renewal

Delegation tokens must be renewed periodically by the designated renewer (renewerID). For example, if a JobTracker is the designated renewer, the JobTracker will first authenticate itself to the NameNode. It will then send the token to be authenticated to the NameNode. The NameNode verifies the following information before renewing the token:

- The JobTracker requesting renewal is the same as the one identified in the token by renewerID.
- The TokenAuthenticator generated by the NameNode using the TokenID and the masterKey matches the one previously stored by the NameNode.
- The current time must be less than the time specified by maxDate.

If the token renewal request is successful, the NameNode sets the new expiry date to \(\min(\text{current time} + \text{renew period, maxDate})\). If the NameNode was restarted at any time, it will have lost all previous tokens from memory. In this case, the token will be saved to memory once again, this time with a new expiry date. Hence, designated renewers must renew all tokens with the NameNode after a restart, and before relaunching any failed tasks.

A designated renewer can also revive an expired or canceled token as long as the current time does not exceed maxDate. The NameNode cannot tell the difference between a token that was canceled, or has expired, and one that was erased from memory due to a restart, since only the masterKey persists in memory. The masterKey must be updated regularly.

Types of Kerberos Deployments

Kerberos provides strong security benefits including capabilities that render intercepted authentication packets unusable by an attacker. It virtually eliminates the threat of impersonation by never sending a user’s credentials in cleartext over the network. Several components of the Hadoop ecosystem are converging to use Kerberos authentication with the option to manage and store credentials in LDAP or AD. Microsoft’s Active Directory (AD) is an LDAP directory that also provides Kerberos authentication for added security. Before you configure Kerberos on your cluster, ensure you have a working KDC (MIT KDC or Active Directory), set up. You can then use Cloudera Manager’s Kerberos wizard to automate several aspects of configuring Kerberos authentication on your cluster.

Without Kerberos enabled, Hadoop only checks to ensure that a user and their group membership is valid in the context of HDFS. However, it makes no effort to verify that the user is who they say they are.

With Kerberos enabled, users must first authenticate themselves to a Kerberos Key Distribution Centre (KDC) to obtain a valid Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT). The TGT is then used by Hadoop services to verify the user’s identity. With Kerberos, a user is not only authenticated on the system they are logged into, but they are also authenticated to the network. Any subsequent interactions with other services that have been configured to allow Kerberos authentication for user access, are also secured.

This section describes the architectural options that are available for deploying Hadoop security in enterprise environments. Each option includes a high-level description of the approach along with a list of pros and cons. There are three options currently available:
Local MIT KDC

This approach uses an MIT KDC that is local to the cluster. Users and services will have to authenticate with this local KDC before they can interact with the CDH components on the cluster.

Architecture Summary:

- An MIT KDC and a distinct Kerberos realm is deployed locally to the CDH cluster. The local MIT KDC is typically deployed on a Utility host. Additional replicated MIT KDCs for high-availability are optional.
- All cluster hosts must be configured to use the local MIT Kerberos realm using the `krb5.conf` file.
- All **service and user principals** must be created in the local MIT KDC and Kerberos realm.
- The local MIT KDC will authenticate both the service principals (using keytab files) and user principals (using passwords).
- Cloudera Manager connects to the local MIT KDC to create and manage the principals for the CDH services running on the cluster. To do this Cloudera Manager uses an admin principal and keytab that is created during the security setup. This step has been automated by the Kerberos wizard. Instructions for manually creating the Cloudera Manager admin principal are provided in the Cloudera Manager security documentation.
- Typically, the local MIT KDC administrator is responsible for creating all other user principals. If you use the Kerberos wizard, Cloudera Manager will create these principals and associated keytab files for you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The authentication mechanism is isolated from the rest of the enterprise.</td>
<td>This mechanism is not integrated with central authentication system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is fairly easy to setup, especially if you use the Cloudera Manager Kerberos wizard that automates creation and distribution of service principals and keytab files.</td>
<td>User and service principals must be created in the local MIT KDC, which can be time-consuming.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Local MIT KDC with Active Directory Integration

This approach uses an MIT KDC and Kerberos realm that is local to the cluster. However, Active Directory stores the user principals that will access the cluster in a central realm. Users will have to authenticate with this central AD realm to obtain TGTs before they can interact with CDH services on the cluster. Note that CDH service principals reside only in the local KDC realm.

#### Architecture Summary:

- An MIT KDC and a distinct Kerberos realm is deployed locally to the CDH cluster. The local MIT KDC is typically deployed on a Utility host and additional replicated MIT KDCs for high-availability are optional.
- All cluster hosts are configured with both Kerberos realms (local and central AD) using the `krb5.conf` file. The default realm should be the local MIT Kerberos realm.
- **Service principals** should be created in the local MIT KDC and the local Kerberos realm. Cloudera Manager connects to the local MIT KDC to create and manage the principals for the CDH services running on the cluster. To do this, Cloudera Manager uses an admin principal and keytab that is created during the security setup. This step has been automated by the Kerberos wizard. Instructions for manually creating the Cloudera Manager admin principal are provided in the Cloudera Manager security documentation.
- A one-way, cross-realm trust must be set up from the local Kerberos realm to the central AD realm containing the **user principals** that require access to the CDH cluster. There is no need to create the service principals in the central AD realm and no need to create user principals in the local realm.

---

### Table: Cons vs. Pros

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The local MIT KDC can be a single point of failure for the cluster unless replicated KDCs can be configured for high-availability.</td>
<td>The local MIT KDC is yet another authentication system to manage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The local MIT KDC can be a single point of failure (SPOF) for the cluster. Replicated KDCs can be configured for high-availability.

The local MIT KDC serves as a shield for the central Active Directory from the many hosts and services in a CDH cluster. Service restarts in a large cluster create many simultaneous authentication requests. If Active Directory is unable to handle the spike in load, then the cluster can effectively cause a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack.

This is fairly easy to setup, especially if you use the Cloudera Manager Kerberos wizard that automates creation and distribution of service principals and keytab files.

Active Directory administrators will only need to be involved to configure the cross-realm trust during setup.
Cons

Pros
Integration with central Active Directory for user principal authentication results in a more complete authentication solution.

Allows for incremental configuration. Hadoop security can be configured and verified using local MIT KDC independently of integrating with Active Directory.

Direct to Active Directory

This approach uses the central Active Directory as the KDC. No local KDC is required. Before you decide upon an AD KDC deployment, make sure you are aware of the following possible ramifications of that decision.

Considerations when using an Active Directory KDC

Performance:

As your cluster grows, so will the volume of Authentication Service (AS) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) interaction between the services on each cluster server. Consider evaluating the volume of this interaction against the Active Directory domain controllers you have configured for the cluster before rolling this feature out to a production environment. If cluster performance suffers, over time it might become necessary to dedicate a set of AD domain controllers to larger deployments. Cloudera recommends you use a dedicated AD instance for every 100 nodes in your cluster. However, note that this recommendation may not apply to high-volume clusters, or cases where the AD host is also being used for LDAP lookups.

Network Proximity:

By default, Kerberos uses UDP for client/server communication. Often, AD services are in a different network than project application services such as Hadoop. If the domain controllers supporting a cluster for Kerberos are not in the same subnet, or they’re separated by a firewall, consider using the `udp_preference_limit = 1` setting in the `libdefaults` section of the `krb5.conf` used by cluster services. Cloudera strongly recommends against using AD domain controller (KDC) servers that are separated from the cluster by a WAN connection, as latency in this service will significantly impact cluster performance.

Process:

Troubleshooting the cluster’s operations, especially for Kerberos-enabled services, will need to include AD administration resources. Evaluate your organizational processes for engaging the AD administration team, and how to escalate in case a cluster outage occurs due to issues with Kerberos authentication against AD services. In some situations it might be necessary to enable Kerberos event logging to address desktop and KDC issues within windows environments.

Also note that if you decommission any Cloudera Manager roles or nodes, the related AD accounts will need to be deleted manually. This is required because Cloudera Manager will not delete existing entries in Active Directory.

Architecture Summary

- All service and user principals are created in the Active Directory KDC.
- All cluster hosts are configured with the central AD Kerberos realm using `krb5.conf`.
- Cloudera Manager connects to the Active Directory KDC to create and manage the principals for the CDH services running on the cluster. To do this, Cloudera Manager uses a principal that has the privileges to create other accounts within the given Organisational Unit (OU). This step has been automated by the Kerberos wizard. Instructions for manually creating the Cloudera Manager admin principal are provided in the Cloudera Manager security documentation.
- All service and user principals are authenticated by the Active Directory KDC.
Note: If it is not possible to create the Cloudera Manager admin principal with the required privileges in the Active Directory KDC, then the CDH services principals will need to be created manually. The corresponding keytab files should then be stored securely on the Cloudera Manager Server host. Cloudera Manager’s Custom Kerberos Keytab Retrieval script can be used to retrieve the keytab files from the local filesystem.

Identity Integration with Active Directory

A core requirement for enabling Kerberos security in the platform is that users have accounts on all cluster processing nodes. Commercial products such as Centrify or Quest Authentication Services (QAS) provide integration of all cluster hosts for user and group resolution to Active Directory. These tools support automated Kerberos authentication on login by users to a Linux host with AD. For sites not using Active Directory, or sites wanting to use an open source solution, the Site Security Services Daemon (SSSD) can be used with either AD or OpenLDAP compatible directory services and MIT Kerberos for the same needs.

For third-party providers, you may have to purchase licenses from the respective vendors. This procedure requires some planning as it takes time to procure these licenses and deploy these products on a cluster. Care should be taken to ensure that the identity management product does not associate the service principal names (SPNs) with the host...
principals when the computers are joined to the AD domain. For example, Centrify by default associates the HTTP SPN with the host principal. So the HTTP SPN should be specifically excluded when the hosts are joined to the domain.

You will also need to complete the following setup tasks in AD:

- **Active Directory Organizational Unit (OU) and OU user** - A separate OU in Active Directory should be created along with an account that has privileges to create additional accounts in that OU.

- **Enable SSL for AD** - Cloudera Manager should be able to connect to AD on the LDAPS (TCP 636) port.

- **Principals and Keytabs** - In a direct-to-AD deployment that is set up using the Kerberos wizard, by default, all required principals and keytabs will be created, deployed and managed by Cloudera Manager. However, if for some reason you cannot allow Cloudera Manager to manage your direct-to-AD deployment, then unique accounts should be manually created in AD for each service running on each host and keytab files must be provided for the same. These accounts should have the AD User Principal Name (UPN) set to `service/fqdn@REALM`, and the Service Principal Name (SPN) set to `service/fqdn`. The principal name in the keytab files should be the UPN of the account. The keytab files should follow the naming convention: `servicename_fqdn.keytab`. The following principals and keytab files must be created for each host they run on: [Hadoop Users in Cloudera Manager and CDH](#) on page 175.

- **AD Bind Account** - Create an AD account that will be used for LDAP bindings in Hue, Cloudera Manager and Cloudera Navigator.

- **AD Groups for Privileged Users** - Create AD groups and add members for the authorized users, HDFS admins and HDFS superuser groups.
  
  - Authorized users – A group consisting of all users that need access to the cluster
  - HDFS admins – Groups of users that will run HDFS administrative commands
  - HDFS super users – Group of users that require superuser privilege, that is, read/write access to all data and directories in HDFS

  Putting regular users into the HDFS superuser group is not recommended. Instead, an account that administrators escalate issues to, should be part of the HDFS superuser group.

- **AD Groups for Role-Based Access to Cloudera Manager and Cloudera Navigator** - Create AD groups and add members to these groups so you can later configure role-based access to Cloudera Manager and Cloudera Navigator.

  Cloudera Manager roles and their definitions are available here: [Cloudera Manager User Roles](#) on page 339. Cloudera Navigator roles and their definitions are available here: [Cloudera Navigator Data Management User Roles](#) on page 342

- **AD Test Users and Groups** - At least one existing AD user and the group that the user belongs to should be provided to test whether authorization rules work as expected.

Securing Keytab Distribution using TLS/SSL

The Kerberos keytab file is transmitted among the hosts in the Cloudera Manager cluster, between Cloudera Manager Server and Cloudera Manager Agent hosts. To keep this sensitive data secure, configure Cloudera Manager Server and the Cloudera Manager Agent hosts for encrypted communications using TLS/SSL. See [Encrypting Data in Transit](#) on page 192 for details.

Configuring Kerberos Authentication on a Cluster

Before you use the following sections to configure Kerberos on your cluster, ensure you have a working KDC (MIT KDC or Active Directory), set up.

- To use the Cloudera Manager wizard, see [Enabling Kerberos Authentication Using the Wizard](#) on page 49.
- For command-line configuration, see [Enabling Kerberos Authentication Without the Wizard](#) on page 67.
Authentication Mechanisms used by Hadoop Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Authentication Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>Kerberos, SPNEGO (HttpFS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MapReduce</td>
<td>Kerberos (also see HDFS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARN</td>
<td>Kerberos (also see HDFS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accumulo</td>
<td>Kerberos (partial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flume</td>
<td>Kerberos (starting CDH 5.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBase</td>
<td>Kerberos (HBase Thrift and REST clients must perform their own user authentication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HiveServer</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HiveServer2</td>
<td>Kerberos, LDAP, Custom/pluggable authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hive Metastore</td>
<td>Kerberos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>Kerberos, LDAP, SAML, Custom/pluggable authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala</td>
<td>Kerberos, LDAP, SPNEGO (Impala Web Console)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oozie</td>
<td>Kerberos, SPNEGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig</td>
<td>Kerberos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search</td>
<td>Kerberos, SPNEGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentry</td>
<td>Kerberos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spark</td>
<td>Kerberos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sqoop</td>
<td>Kerberos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sqoop2</td>
<td>Kerberos (starting CDH 5.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zookeeper</td>
<td>Kerberos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager</td>
<td>Kerberos, LDAP, SAML</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Navigator</td>
<td>See Cloudera Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backup and Disaster Recovery</td>
<td>See Cloudera Manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Encryption Overview

Cloudera provides various mechanisms to protect data persisted to disk or other storage media (data-at-rest) and to protect data as it moves among processes in the cluster or over the network (data-in-transit).

Data-at-rest encryption is more generally known as data encryption and has long been mandatory for many government, financial, and regulatory entities to meet privacy and other security requirements. For example, the card payment industry has adopted the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) for information security. Other examples include requirements imposed by United States government’s Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). These are just a few examples.

To help organizations comply with regulations such as these, Cloudera provides mechanisms to support data at rest and data in transit, all of which can be centrally deployed and managed for the cluster using Cloudera Manager Server. This section provides an overview and includes the following topics:
Protecting Data At-Rest

Protecting data at rest typically means encrypting the data when it is stored on disk and letting authorized users and processes—to decrypt the data when needed for the application or task at hand. With data-at-rest encryption, encryption keys must be distributed and managed, keys should be rotated or changed on a regular basis (to reduce the risk of having keys compromised), and many other factors complicate the process.

However, encrypting data alone may not be sufficient. For example, administrators and others with sufficient privileges may have access to personally identifiable information (PII) in log files, audit data, or SQL queries. Depending on the specific use case—in a hospital or financial environment, the PII may need to be redacted from all such files, to ensure that users with privileges on the logs and queries that might contain sensitive data are nonetheless unable to view that data when they should not.

Cloudera provides complementary approaches to encrypting data at rest, and provides mechanisms to mask PII in log files, audit data, and SQL queries.

Encryption Options Available

Cloudera provides several mechanisms to ensure that sensitive data is secure. CDH provides transparent HDFS encryption, ensuring that all sensitive data is encrypted before being stored on disk. HDFS encryption when combined with the enterprise-grade encryption key management of Navigator Key Trustee enables regulatory compliance for most enterprises. For Cloudera Enterprise, HDFS encryption can be augmented by Navigator Encrypt to secure metadata, in addition to data. Cloudera clusters that use these solutions run as usual and have very low performance impact, given that data nodes are encrypted in parallel. As the cluster grows, encryption grows with it.

Additionally, this transparent encryption is optimized for the Intel chipset for high performance. Intel chipsets include AES-NI co-processors, which provide special capabilities that make encryption workloads run extremely fast. Cloudera leverages the latest Intel advances for even faster performance.

The Key Trustee KMS, used in conjunction with Key Trustee Server and Key HSM, provides HSM-based protection of stored key material. The Key Trustee KMS generates encryption zone key material locally on the KMS and then encrypts this key material using an HSM-generated key. Navigator HSM KMS services, in contrast, rely on the HSM for all encryption zone key generation and storage. When using the Navigator HSM KMS, encryption zone key material originates on the HSM and never leaves the HSM. This allows for the highest level of key isolation, but requires some overhead for network calls to the HSM for key generation, encryption and decryption operations. The Key Trustee KMS remains the recommended key management solution for HDFS encryption for most production scenarios.

The figure below shows an example deployment that uses:

- Cloudera Transparent HDFS Encryption to encrypt data stored on HDFS
- Navigator Encrypt for all other data (including metadata, logs, and spill data) associated with Cloudera Manager, Cloudera Navigator, Hive, and HBase
- Navigator Key Trustee for robust, fault-tolerant key management
In addition to applying encryption to the data layer of a Cloudera cluster, encryption can also be applied at the network layer, to encrypt communications among nodes of the cluster. See Configuring Encryption on page 192 for more information.

Encryption does not prevent administrators with full access to the cluster from viewing sensitive data. To obfuscate sensitive data, including PII, the cluster can be configured for data redaction.

Data Redaction for Cloudera Clusters

Redaction is a process that obscures data. It can help organizations comply with industry regulations and standards, such as PCI (Payment Card Industry) and HIPAA, by obfuscating personally identifiable information (PII) so that it is not usable except by those whose jobs require such access. For example, HIPAA legislation requires that patient PII not be available to anyone other than appropriate physician (and the patient), and that any patient’s PII cannot be used to determine or associate an individual’s identity with health data. Data redaction is one process that can help ensure this privacy, by transforming PII to meaningless patterns—for example, transforming U.S. social security numbers to XXX-XX-XXXX strings.

Data redaction works separately from Cloudera encryption techniques, which do not preclude administrators with full access to the cluster from viewing sensitive user data. It ensures that cluster administrators, data analysts, and others cannot see PII or other sensitive data that is not within their job domain and at the same time, it does not prevent users with appropriate permissions from accessing data to which they have privileges.

See How to Enable Sensitive Data Redaction for details.

Protecting Data In-Transit

For data-in-transit, implementing data protection and encryption is relatively easy. Wire encryption is built into the Hadoop stack, such as SSL, and typically does not require external systems. This data-in-transit encryption is built using session-level, one-time keys, by means of a session handshake with immediate and subsequent transmission. Thus, data-in-transit avoids much of the key management issues associated with data-at-rest due the temporal nature of the keys, but it does rely on proper authentication; a certificate compromise is an issue with authentication, but can compromise wire encryption. As the name implies, data-in-transit covers the secure transfer and intermediate storage of data. This applies to all process-to-process communication, within the same node or between nodes. There are three primary communication channels:

- **HDFS Transparent Encryption**: Data encrypted using HDFS Transparent Encryption is protected end-to-end. Any data written to and from HDFS can only be encrypted or decrypted by the client. HDFS does not have access to the unencrypted data or the encryption keys. This supports both, at-rest encryption as well as in-transit encryption.
• **Data Transfer:** The first channel is data transfer, including the reading and writing of data blocks to HDFS. Hadoop uses a SASL-enabled wrapper around its native direct TCP/IP-based transport, called DataTransportProtocol, to secure the I/O streams within an DIGEST-MD5 envelope (For steps, see Configuring Encrypted HDFS Data Transport on page 234). This procedure also employs secured HadoopRPC (see Remote Procedure Calls) for the key exchange. The HttpFS REST interface, however, does not provide secure communication between the client and HDFS, only secured authentication using SPNEGO.

For the transfer of data between DataNodes during the shuffle phase of a MapReduce job (that is, moving intermediate results between the Map and Reduce portions of the job), Hadoop secures the communication channel with HTTP Secure (HTTPS) using Transport Layer Security (TLS). See Encrypted Shuffle and Encrypted Web UIs on page 227.

• **Remote Procedure Calls:** The second channel is system calls to remote procedures (RPC) to the various systems and frameworks within a Hadoop cluster. Like data transfer activities, Hadoop has its own native protocol for RPC, called HadoopRPC, which is used for Hadoop API client communication, intra-Hadoop services communication, as well as monitoring, heartbeats, and other non-data, non-user activity. HadoopRPC is SASL-enabled for secured transport and defaults to Kerberos and DIGEST-MD5 depending on the type of communication and security settings. For steps, see Configuring Encrypted HDFS Data Transport on page 234.

• **User Interfaces:** The third channel includes the various web-based user interfaces within a Hadoop cluster. For secured transport, the solution is straightforward; these interfaces employ HTTPS.

**TLS/SSL Certificates Overview**

Certificates can be signed in one three different ways:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Usage Note</th>
<th>Usage Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public CA-signed certificates</td>
<td><strong>Recommended.</strong> Using certificates signed by a trusted public CA simplifies deployment because the default Java client already trusts most public CAs. Obtain certificates from one of the trusted well-known (public) CAs, such as Symantec and Comodo, as detailed in Generate TLS Certificates on page 197.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal CA-signed certificates</td>
<td>Obtain certificates from your organization's internal CA if your organization has its own. Using an internal CA can reduce costs (although cluster configuration may require establishing the trust chain for certificates signed by an internal CA, depending on your IT infrastructure). See Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager on page 196 for information about establishing trust as part of configuring a Cloudera Manager cluster.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-signed certificates</td>
<td>Not recommended for production deployments. Using self-signed certificates requires configuring each client to trust the specific certificate (in addition to generating and distributing the certificates). However, self-signed certificates are fine for non-production (testing or proof-of-concept) deployments. See How to Use Self-Signed Certificates for TLS on page 474 for details.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For more information on setting up SSL/TLS certificates, see Encrypting Data in Transit on page 192.

**TLS/SSL Encryption for CDH Components**

Cloudera recommends securing a cluster using Kerberos authentication before enabling encryption such as SSL on a cluster. If you enable SSL for a cluster that does not already have Kerberos authentication configured, a warning will be displayed.

Hadoop services differ in their use of SSL as follows:

- HDFS, MapReduce, and YARN daemons act as both SSL servers and clients.
- HBase daemons act as SSL servers only.
- Oozie daemons act as SSL servers only.
- Hue acts as an SSL client to all of the above.
Daemons that act as SSL servers load the keystores when starting up. When a client connects to an SSL server daemon, the server transmits the certificate loaded at startup time to the client, which then uses its truststore to validate the server’s certificate.

For information on setting up SSL/TLS for CDH services, see Configuring TLS/SSL Encryption for CDH Services on page 205.

**Data Protection within Hadoop Projects**

The table below lists the various encryption capabilities that can be leveraged by CDH components and Cloudera Manager.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Encryption for Data-in-Transit</th>
<th>Encryption for Data-at-Rest (HDFS Encryption + Navigator Encrypt + Navigator Key Trustee)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>SASL (RPC), SASL (DataTransferProtocol)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MapReduce</td>
<td>SASL (RPC), HTTPS (encrypted shuffle)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARN</td>
<td>SASL (RPC)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accumulo</td>
<td>Partial - Only for RPCs and Web UI (Not directly configurable in Cloudera Manager)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flume</td>
<td>TLS (Avro RPC)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBase</td>
<td>SASL - For web interfaces, inter-component replication, the HBase shell and the REST, Thrift 1 and Thrift 2 interfaces</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HiveServer2</td>
<td>SASL (Thrift), SASL (JDBC), TLS (JDBC, ODBC)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>TLS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala</td>
<td>TLS or SASL between impalad and clients, but not between daemons</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oozie</td>
<td>TLS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search</td>
<td>TLS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentry</td>
<td>SASL (RPC)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spark</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sqoop</td>
<td>Partial - Depends on the RDBMS database driver in use</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sqoop2</td>
<td>Partial - You can encrypt the JDBC connection depending on the RDBMS database driver</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZooKeeper</td>
<td>SASL (RPC)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager</td>
<td>TLS - Does not include monitoring</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Navigator</td>
<td>TLS - Also see Cloudera Manager</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backup and Disaster Recovery</td>
<td>TLS - Also see Cloudera Manager</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Authorization is one of the fundamental security requirements of any computing environment. Its goal is to ensure that only the appropriate people or processes can access, view, use, control, or change specific resources, services, or data. In any cluster deployed to meet specific workloads using various CDH components (Hive, HDFS, Impala, and so on), different authorization mechanisms can ensure that only authorized users or processes can access data, systems, and other resources as needed. Ideally, authorization mechanisms can leverage the authentication mechanisms, so that when users login to a system—a cluster, for example—they are transparently authorized based on their identity across the system for the applications, data, and other resources they are authorized to use.

For example, Cloudera CDH clusters can be configured to leverage the user and group accounts that exist in the organization’s Active Directory (or other LDAP-accessible directory) instance.

The various possible configurations and integrations are discussed later in this guide.

**Authorization Mechanisms in Hadoop**

Hadoop supports several authorization mechanisms, including:

- Traditional POSIX-style permissions on files and directories. Each directory and file has a single owner and group with basic permissions that can be set to read, write, execute (at the file level). Directories have an additional permission that enables access to child directories.
- Access Control Lists (ACL) for management of services and resources. For example, Apache HBase uses ACLs to authorize various operations (READ, WRITE, CREATE, ADMIN) by column, column family, and column family qualifier. HBase ACLs are granted and revoked to users and groups. Fine-grained permissions can be applied to HDFS files using HDFS Extended ACLs on page 343 which enable setting different permissions for specific named users and named groups.
- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) for certain services with advanced access controls to data. Apache Sentry provides role-based access control for the cluster, including access to Hive, Impala, and Solr services. Cloudera recommends using the database-backed Sentry Service to configure permissions rather than using policy files. However, both approaches are supported. See Authorization With Apache Sentry on page 351 for more information.

**POSIX Permissions**

Most services running on Hadoop clusters, such as the command-line interface (CLI) or client applications that use Hadoop API, directly access data stored within HDFS. HDFS uses POSIX-style permissions for directories and files; each directory and file is assigned a single owner and group. Each assignment has a basic set of permissions available; file permissions are read, write, and execute, and directories have an additional permission to determine access to child directories.

Ownership and group membership for a given HDFS asset determines a user’s privileges. If a given user fails either of these criteria, they are denied access. For services that may attempt to access more than one file, such as MapReduce, Cloudera Search, and others, data access is determined separately for each file access attempt. File permissions in HDFS are managed by the NameNode.

**Access Control Lists**

Hadoop also maintains general access controls for the services themselves in addition to the data within each service and in HDFS. Service access control lists (ACL) are typically defined within the global hadoop-policy.xml file and range from NameNode access to client-to-DataNode communication. In the context of MapReduce and YARN, user and group identifiers form the basis for determining permission for job submission or modification.

In addition, with MapReduce and YARN, jobs can be submitted using queues controlled by a scheduler, which is one of the components comprising the resource management capabilities within the cluster. Administrators define permissions to individual queues using ACLs. ACLs can also be defined on a job-by-job basis. Like HDFS permissions, local user accounts and groups must exist on each executing server, otherwise the queues will be unusable except by superuser accounts.
Apache HBase also uses ACLs for data-level authorization. HBase ACLs authorize various operations (READ, WRITE, CREATE, ADMIN) by column, column family, and column family qualifier. HBase ACLs are granted and revoked to both users and groups. Local user accounts are required for proper authorization, similar to HDFS permissions.

Apache ZooKeeper also maintains ACLs to the information stored within the DataNodes of a ZooKeeper data tree.

**Role-Based Access Control with Apache Sentry**

For fine-grained access to data accessible using schema—that is, data structures described by the Apache Hive Metastore and used by computing engines like Hive and Impala, as well as collections and indices within Cloudera Search—CDH supports Apache Sentry, which offers a role-based privilege model for this data and its given schema. Apache Sentry is a role-based authorization module for Hadoop. Sentry lets you configure explicit privileges for authenticated users and applications on a Hadoop cluster. Sentry is integrated natively with Apache Hive, Apache Solr, HDFS (for Hive table data), Hive Metastore/HCatalog, and Impala.

Sentry comprises a pluggable authorization engine for Hadoop components. It lets you define authorization rules to validate requests for access to resources from users or applications. The authorization holds the rules and privileges, but it’s the engines that apply the rules at runtime.

**Architecture Overview**

**Sentry Components**

The subsystems involved in the authorization process:

- **Sentry Server**—An RPC server that manages authorization metadata stored in a database. It supports interfaces to securely retrieve and manipulate the metadata.
- **Data Engine**
  
  This is a data processing application such as Hive or Impala that needs to authorize access to data or metadata resources. The data engine loads the Sentry plugin and all client requests for accessing resources are intercepted and routed to the Sentry plugin for validation.

- **Sentry Plugin**
  
  The Sentry plugin runs in the data engine. It offers interfaces to manipulate authorization metadata stored in the Sentry Server, and includes the authorization policy engine that evaluates access requests using the authorization metadata retrieved from the server.

**Key Concepts**

- **Authentication** - Verifying credentials to reliably identify a user
- **Authorization** - Limiting the user’s access to a given resource
- **User** - Individual identified by underlying authentication system
- **Group** - A set of users, maintained by the authentication system
- **Privilege** - An instruction or rule that allows access to an object
- **Role** - A set of privileges; a template to combine multiple access rules
- **Authorization models** - Defines the objects to be subject to authorization rules and the granularity of actions allowed. For example, in the SQL model, the objects can be databases or tables, and the actions are SELECT, INSERT, and CREATE. For the Search model, the objects are indexes, collections and documents; the access modes are query and update.
User Identity and Group Mapping

Sentry relies on underlying authentication systems such as Kerberos or LDAP to identify the user. It also uses the group mapping mechanism configured in Hadoop to ensure that Sentry sees the same group mapping as other components of the Hadoop ecosystem.

Consider users Alice and Bob who belong to an Active Directory (AD) group called finance-department. Bob also belongs to a group called finance-managers. In Sentry, you first create roles and then grant privileges to these roles. For example, you can create a role called Analyst and grant SELECT on tables Customer and Sales to this role.

The next step is to join these authentication entities (users and groups) to authorization entities (roles). This can be done by granting the Analyst role to the finance-department group. Now Bob and Alice who are members of the finance-department group get SELECT privilege to the Customer and Sales tables.

Role-based access control (RBAC) is a powerful mechanism to manage authorization for a large set of users and data objects in a typical enterprise. New data objects get added or removed, users join, move, or leave organisations all the time. RBAC makes managing this a lot easier. Hence, as an extension of the discussed previously, if Carol joins the Finance Department, all you need to do is add her to the finance-department group in AD. This will give Carol access to data from the Sales and Customer tables.

Unified Authorization

Another important aspect of Sentry is the unified authorization. The access control rules once defined, work across multiple data access tools. For example, being granted the Analyst role in the previous example will allow Bob, Alice, and others in the finance-department group to access table data from SQL engines such as Hive and Impala, as well as using MapReduce, Pig applications or metadata access using HCatalog.

Sentry Integration with the Hadoop Ecosystem

As illustrated above, Apache Sentry works with multiple Hadoop components. At the heart you have the Sentry Server which stores authorization metadata and provides APIs for tools to retrieve and modify this metadata securely.

Note that the Sentry Server only facilitates the metadata. The actual authorization decision is made by a policy engine which runs in data processing applications such as Hive or Impala. Each component loads the Sentry plugin which includes the service client for dealing with the Sentry service and the policy engine to validate the authorization request.
**Hive and Sentry**

Consider an example where Hive gets a request to access an object in a certain mode by a client. If Bob submits the following Hive query:

```sql
select * from production.sales
```

Hive will identify that user Bob is requesting `SELECT` access to the Sales table. At this point Hive will ask the Sentry plugin to validate Bob’s access request. The plugin will retrieve Bob’s privileges related to the Sales table and the policy engine will determine if the request is valid.

Hive works with both, the Sentry service and policy files. Cloudera recommends you use the Sentry service which makes it easier to manage user privileges. For more details and instructions, see [Managing the Sentry Service](#) on page 356.

**Impala and Sentry**

Authorization processing in Impala is similar to that in Hive. The main difference is caching of privileges. Impala’s Catalog server manages caching schema metadata and propagating it to all Impala server nodes. This Catalog server caches Sentry metadata as well. As a result, authorization validation in Impala happens locally and much faster.
For detailed documentation, see Enabling Sentry Authorization for Impala on page 416.

Sentry-HDFS Synchronization

Sentry-HDFS authorization is focused on Hive warehouse data - that is, any data that is part of a table in Hive or Impala. The real objective of this integration is to expand the same authorization checks to Hive warehouse data being accessed from any other components such as Pig, MapReduce or Spark. At this point, this feature does not replace HDFS ACLs. Tables that are not associated with Sentry will retain their old ACLs.

The mapping of Sentry privileges to HDFS ACL permissions is as follows:

- SELECT privilege -> Read access on the file.
- INSERT privilege -> Write access on the file.
- ALL privilege -> Read and Write access on the file.

The NameNode loads a Sentry plugin that caches Sentry privileges as well Hive metadata. This helps HDFS to keep file permissions and Hive tables privileges in sync. The Sentry plugin periodically polls the Sentry and Metastore to keep the metadata changes in sync.

For example, if Bob runs a Pig job that is reading from the Sales table data files, Pig will try to get the file handle from HDFS. At that point the Sentry plugin on the NameNode will figure out that the file is part of Hive data and overlay Sentry privileges on top of the file ACLs. As a result, HDFS will enforce the same privileges for this Pig client that Hive would apply for a SQL query.
For HDFS-Sentry synchronization to work, you must use the Sentry service, not policy file authorization. See Synchronizing HDFS ACLs and Sentry Permissions on page 388, for more details.

**Search and Sentry**

Sentry can apply a range of restrictions to various Search tasks, such as accessing data or creating collections. These restrictions are consistently applied, regardless of the way users attempt to complete actions. For example, restricting access to data in a collection restricts that access whether queries come from the command line, from a browser, or through the admin console.

With Search, Sentry stores its privilege policies in a policy file (for example, sentry-provider.ini) which is stored in an HDFS location such as hdfs://ha-nn-uri/user/solr/sentry/sentry-provider.ini.

Sentry with Search does not support multiple policy files for multiple databases. However, you must use a separate policy file for each Sentry-enabled service. For example, Hive and Search were using policy file authorization, using a combined Hive and Search policy file would result in an invalid configuration and failed authorization on both services.

**Note:** While Hive and Impala are compatible with the database-backed Sentry service, Search still uses Sentry’s policy file authorization. Note that it is possible for a single cluster to use both, the Sentry service (for Hive and Impala as described above) and Sentry policy files (for Solr).

For detailed documentation, see Configuring Sentry Authorization for Cloudera Search on page 427.

**Authorization Administration**

The Sentry Server supports APIs to securely manipulate roles and privileges. Both Hive and Impala support SQL statements to manage privileges natively. Sentry assumes that HiveServer2 and Impala run as superusers, usually called hive and impala. To initiate top-level permissions for Sentry, an admin must login as a superuser. You can use either Beeline or the Impala shell to execute the following sample statement:

```sql
GRANT ROLE Analyst TO GROUP finance-managers
```

**Using Hue to Manage Sentry Permissions**

Hue supports a Security app to manage Sentry authorization. This allows users to explore and change table permissions. Here is a video blog that demonstrates its functionality.

**Integration with Authentication Mechanisms for Identity Management**

Like many distributed systems, Hadoop projects and workloads often consist of a collection of processes working in concert. In some instances, the initial user process conducts authorization throughout the entirety of the workload or job’s lifecycle. But for processes that spawn additional processes, authorization can pose challenges. In this case, the spawned processes are set to execute as if they were the authenticated user, that is, setuid, and thus only have the privileges of that user. The overarching system requires a mapping to the authenticated principal and the user account must exist on the local host system for the setuid to succeed.

**Important:**

- Cloudera strongly recommends against using Hadoop’s LdapGroupsMapping provider. LdapGroupsMapping should only be used in cases where OS-level integration is not possible. Production clusters require an identity provider that works well with all applications, not just Hadoop. Hence, often the preferred mechanism is to use tools such as SSSD, VAS or Centrify to replicate LDAP groups.
- Cloudera does not support the use of Winbind in production environments. Winbind uses an inefficient approach to user/group mapping, which may lead to low performance or cluster failures as the size of the cluster, and the number of users and groups increases.

Irrespective of the mechanism used, user/group mappings must be applied consistently across all cluster hosts for ease with maintenance.
**System and Service Authorization** - Several Hadoop services are limited to inter-service interactions and are not intended for end-user access. These services do support authentication to protect against unauthorized or malicious users. However, any user or, more typically, another service that has login credentials and can authenticate to the service is authorized to perform all actions allowed by the target service. Examples include ZooKeeper, which is used by internal systems such as YARN, Cloudera Search, and HBase, and Flume, which is configured directly by Hadoop administrators and thus offers no user controls.

The authenticated Kerberos principals for these “system” services are checked each time they access other services such as HDFS, HBase, and MapReduce, and therefore must be authorized to use those resources. Thus, the fact that Flume does not have an explicit authorization model does not imply that Flume has unrestricted access to HDFS and other services; the Flume service principals still must be authorized for specific locations of the HDFS file system. Hadoop administrators can establish separate system users for a services such as Flume to segment and impose access rights to only the parts of the file system for a specific Flume application.

**Authorization within Hadoop Projects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Authorization Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>File Permissions, Sentry*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MapReduce</td>
<td>File Permissions, Sentry*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARN</td>
<td>File Permissions, Sentry*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accumulo</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flume</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBase</td>
<td>HBase ACLs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HiveServer2</td>
<td>File Permissions, Sentry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>Hue authorization mechanisms (assigning permissions to Hue apps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala</td>
<td>Sentry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oozie</td>
<td>ACLs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig</td>
<td>File Permissions, Sentry*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search</td>
<td>File Permissions, Sentry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentry</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spark</td>
<td>File Permissions, Sentry*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sqoop</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sqoop2</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZooKeeper</td>
<td>ACLs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager</td>
<td>Cloudera Manager roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Navigator</td>
<td>Cloudera Navigator roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backup and Disaster Recovery</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sentry HDFS plug-in; when enabled, Sentry enforces its own access permissions over files that are part of tables defined in the Hive Metastore.

**Auditing and Data Lineage**

Organizations of all kinds want to understand where data in their clusters is coming from and how it is used. Cloudera Navigator Data Management component is a fully integrated data management and security tool for the Hadoop
platform that has been designed to meet compliance, data governance, and auditing needs of global enterprises. Without Cloudera Navigator, Hadoop clusters rely primarily on log files for auditing. However, log files are not an enterprise-class real-time auditing or monitoring solution. For example, log files can be corrupted by a system crash during a write commit.

**Cloudera Navigator Data Management**

Cloudera Navigator captures a complete and immutable record of all system activity. An audit trail can be used to determine the particulars—the who, what, where, and when—of a data breach or attempted breach. Auditing can be used to not only identify a rogue administrator who deleted user data, for example, but can also be used to recover data from a backup. Enterprises that must prove they are in compliance with HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act), PCI (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard), or other regulations associated with sensitive or personally identifiable data (PII) are required to produce auditing records when asked by government or other officials, such as banking regulators.

Auditing also serves to provide a historical record of data and context for data forensics. Data stewards and curators can use auditing reports to determine consumption and use patterns across various data sets by different user communities, for optimizing data access.

This section provides a brief overview of functionality of Cloudera Navigator. For complete details, see Cloudera Navigator Data Management.

**Auditing**

While Hadoop has historically lacked centralized cross-component audit capabilities, products such as Cloudera Navigator add secured, real-time audit components to key data and access frameworks. Using Cloudera Navigator, administrators can configure, collect, and view audit events, to understand who accessed what data and how.

Cloudera Navigator also lets administrators generate reports that list the HDFS access permissions granted to groups. Cloudera Navigator tracks access permissions and actual accesses to all entities in HDFS, Hive, HBase, Impala, Sentry, and Solr, and the Cloudera Navigator Metadata Server itself to help answer questions such as - who has access to which entities, which entities were accessed by a user, when was an entity accessed and by whom, what entities were accessed using a service, and which device was used to access. Cloudera Navigator auditing supports tracking access to:

- HDFS entities accessed by HDFS, Hive, HBase, Impala, and Solr services
- HBase and Impala
- Hive metadata
- Sentry
- Solr
- Cloudera Navigator Metadata Server

Data collected from these services also provides visibility into usage patterns for users, ability to see point-in-time permissions and how they have changed (leveraging Sentry), and review and verify HDFS permissions. Cloudera Navigator also provides out-of-the-box integration with leading enterprise metadata, lineage, and SIEM applications.
Metadata Management

Cloudera Navigator features complete metadata storage and supports data discovery. It consolidates technical metadata for all cluster data and enables automatic tagging of data based on the external sources entering the cluster. The consolidated metadata store is searchable through the Cloudera Navigator console, a web-based unified interface.

In addition, Cloudera Navigator supports user-defined metadata that can be applied to files, tables, and individual columns, to identify data assets for business context. The result is that data stewards can devise appropriate classification schemes for specific business purposes and data is more easily discovered and located by users.

Furthermore, policies can be used to automatically classify and applying metadata to cluster data based on arrival, scheduled interval, or other trigger.

Lineage

Cloudera Navigator lineage is a visualization tool for tracing data and its transformations from upstream to downstream through the cluster. Lineage can show the transforms that produced upstream data sources and the effect the data has on downstream artifacts, to the column level. Cloudera Navigator tracks lineage of HDFS files, datasets, and directories, Hive tables and columns, MapReduce and YARN jobs, Hive queries, Impala queries, Pig scripts, Oozie workflows, Spark jobs, and Sqoop jobs.
Integration within the Enterprise

Monitoring and reporting are only part a subset of enterprise auditing infrastructure capabilities. Enterprise policies may mandate that audit data route be able to integrate with existing enterprise SIEM (security information and event management) applications and other tools. Toward that end, Cloudera Navigator can deliver or export audit data through several mechanisms:

- Using syslog as a mediator between raw-event stream generated by Hadoop cluster and the SIEM tools.
- Using a REST API for custom enterprise tools.
- Exporting data to CSV or other text file.

Auditing and Components

The table below details auditing capabilities of Cloudera Manager and CDH components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Auditing Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>Events captured by Cloudera Navigator (including <a href="#">security events</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MapReduce</td>
<td>Inferred through HDFS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARN</td>
<td>Inferred through HDFS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accumulo</td>
<td>Log Files - Partial inclusion of security events; does not include non-bulk writes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flume</td>
<td>Log Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBase</td>
<td>Audit events captured by Cloudera Navigator (including <a href="#">security events</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HiveServer2</td>
<td>Audit events captured by Cloudera Navigator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>Inferred through underlying components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala</td>
<td>Audit events captured by Cloudera Navigator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafka</td>
<td>Log Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oozie</td>
<td>Log Files</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Auditing Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pig</td>
<td>Inferred through HDFS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search</td>
<td>Log Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentry</td>
<td>Audit events captured by Cloudera Navigator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spark</td>
<td>Inferred through HDFS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sqoop</td>
<td>Log Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sqoop2</td>
<td>Log Files (including security events)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZooKeeper</td>
<td>Log Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager</td>
<td>Audit events captured by Cloudera Navigator (partial capture of security events)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Navigator</td>
<td>Audit events captured by Cloudera Navigator itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backup and Disaster Recovery</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Security Events**

Security events include a machine readable log of the following activities:

- User data read
- User data written
- Permission changes
- Configuration changes
- Login attempts
- Escalation of privileges
- Session Tracking
- Key Operations (Key Trustee)
Configuring Authentication

Authentication is a process that requires users and services to prove their identity when trying to access a system resource. Organizations typically manage user identity and authentication through various time-tested technologies, including Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) directory services and Kerberos authentication.

Cloudera clusters support integration with both of these technologies. For example, organizations with existing LDAP directory services (Microsoft Active Directory, OpenLDAP) can integrate the organization’s existing user and group management instead of creating new accounts throughout the cluster. For authentication, Cloudera supports integration with MIT Kerberos and with Microsoft Active Directory. Kerberos provides so-called strong authentication, which means that cryptographic mechanisms—rather than passwords—are used to authenticate user identity.

These systems are not mutually exclusive. For example, Microsoft Active Directory is an LDAP directory service that also provides Kerberos authentication services, and Kerberos credentials can be stored and managed in an LDAP directory service. Cloudera Manager Server, CDH nodes, and Cloudera Enterprise components (including Cloudera Navigator, Apache Hive, Hue, and Impala, which support external clients) can all make use of Kerberos authentication.

**Note:** Cloudera does not provide a Kerberos implementation. Whether you use the Cloudera Manager wizard or the command-line, configuring the cluster to use Kerberos (MIT Kerberos, Active Directory) or LDAP (OpenLDAP, Active Directory) requires these external systems to exist and be operational.

You must have administrator privileges on the Kerberos instance’s Key Distribution Center (KDC) or the active participation of your organization’s KDC administrator during the configuration process.

**Note:** Integrating clusters to use Microsoft Active Directory as a KDC requires the Windows registry setting for `AllowTgtSessionKey` to be disabled (set to 0). If this registry key has already been enabled, users and credentials are not created when they should be, despite the "Successful" message. Before using the wizard or the manual setup, check the value of `AllowTgtSessionKey` on the Active Directory instance and reset to 0 if necessary. See [Registry Key to Allow Session Keys to Be Sent in Kerberos Ticket-Granting-Ticket](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-Server-2008/ee858773(v=ws.10)) at Microsoft for details.

Configuring Authentication in Cloudera Manager

Cloudera clusters can be configured to use Kerberos for authentication using either manual commands, or by using the Cloudera Manager wizard. Introduced in Cloudera Manager 5.1, the wizard streamlines the configuration process by automating many of the configuration and deployment tasks, such as:

- Creating kerberos principals and keytabs and deploying to each host in the cluster.
- Configuring properties in all configuration files—`core-site.xml`, `hdfs-site.xml`, `mapred-site.xml`, and `taskcontroller.cfg`—across all hosts in the cluster.
- Configuring properties in the `oozie-site.xml` and `hue.ini` files to use Kerberos authentication for Oozie and Hue.

Even on a small cluster, these tasks are onerous and error-prone, so Cloudera recommends using the wizard.

**Important:** Cloudera recommends integrating Kerberos authentication clusters that have already been configured for TLS/SSL encryption. During the Kerberos integration process, the Cloudera Manager Server sends sensitive information such as Kerberos keytab files over the network to the various nodes in the cluster, and such sensitive data is best sent over encrypted connections. See [Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager](#) on page 196.
### Cloudera Manager Kerberos Wizard Overview

Using the details about the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) that you provide, the Cloudera Manager wizard creates new principal and keytab files for CDH services and distributes them to the hosts in the cluster. The wizard also distributes the configured `krb5.conf` file to all nodes in the cluster, stops all services, deploys the client configurations, and restarts all services on the cluster.

The Cloudera Manager wizard also creates keytab files for `hdfs` user and `mapred` user and deploys them to all hosts in the cluster. The wizard also creates keytab files for `oozie` and `hue` users and deploys to appropriate hosts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keytab file for...</th>
<th>Principals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hdfs</td>
<td><code>hdfs, host</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mapred</td>
<td><code>mapred, host</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oozie</td>
<td><code>oozie, HTTP</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hue</td>
<td><code>hue</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The host principal is the same in both `hdfs` and `mapred` keytab files.

After making the configuration changes and deploying to the appropriate nodes in the cluster, Cloudera Manager starts all NameNode, DataNode, Secondary NameNode, JobTracker, TaskTracker, Oozie Server, and Hue roles to stand up the cluster.

- To use the Cloudera Manager wizard, see [Enabling Kerberos Authentication Using the Wizard](#) on page 49.
- For command-line configuration, see [Enabling Kerberos Authentication Without the Wizard](#) on page 67.

### Cloudera Manager User Accounts

**Minimum Required Role:** **User Administrator** (also provided by Full Administrator)

Access to Cloudera Manager features is controlled by user accounts. A user account identifies how a user is authenticated and determines what privileges are granted to the user.

When you are logged in to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, the username you are logged in as is located at the far right of the top navigation bar—for example, if you are logged in as `admin` you will see `admin`.

A user with the User Administrator or Full Administrator role manages user accounts through the Administration > Users page. View active user sessions on the User Sessions tab.

#### User Authentication

Cloudera Manager provides several mechanisms for authenticating users. You can configure Cloudera Manager to authenticate users against the Cloudera Manager database or against an external authentication service. The external authentication service can be an LDAP server (Active Directory or an OpenLDAP compatible directory), or you can specify another external service. Cloudera Manager also supports using the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) to enable single sign-on.

If you are using LDAP or another external service, you can configure Cloudera Manager so that it can use both methods of authentication (internal database and external service), and you can determine the order in which it performs these searches. If you select an external authentication mechanism, Full Administrator users can always authenticate against the Cloudera Manager database. This prevents locking everyone out if the authentication settings are misconfigured, such as with a bad LDAP URL.

With external authentication, you can restrict login access to members of specific groups, and can specify groups whose members are automatically given Full Administrator access to Cloudera Manager.

Users accounts in the Cloudera Manager database page show Cloudera Manager in the User Type column. User accounts in an LDAP directory or other external authentication mechanism show External in the User Type column.
User Roles

User accounts include the user’s role, which determines the Cloudera Manager features visible to the user and the actions the user can perform. All tasks in the Cloudera Manager documentation indicate which role is required to perform the task. For more information about user roles, see Cloudera Manager User Roles on page 339.

Determining the Role of the Currently Logged in User

1. Click the logged-in username at the far right of the top navigation bar.
2. Select My Profile. The role displays. For example:

   ![My Profile](image)

   **Username**  admin
   **Roles**  Full Administrator
   **Previous Successful Login**  Jun 26, 2017 1:21:46 PM PDT
   **Please contact your security administrator if the date or time is incorrect.**

Changing the Logged-In Internal User Password

1. Click the logged-in username at the far right of the top navigation bar and select Change Password.
2. Enter the current password and a new password twice, and then click OK.

Adding an Internal User Account

1. Select Administration > Users.
2. Click the Add User button.
3. Enter a username and password.
4. In the Role drop-down menu, select a role for the new user.
5. Click Add.

Assigning User Roles

1. Select Administration > Users.
2. Check the checkbox next to one or more usernames.
4. In the drop-down menu, select the role.
5. Click the Assign Role button.
Changing an Internal User Account Password

1. Select **Administration > Users**.
2. Click the **Change Password** button next to a username with User Type **Cloudera Manager**.
3. Type the new password and repeat it to confirm.
4. Click the **Update** button to make the change.

Deleting Internal User Accounts

1. Select **Administration > Users**.
2. Check the checkbox next to one or more usernames with User Type **Cloudera Manager**.
3. Select **Actions for Selected > Delete**.
4. Click the **OK** button. (There is no confirmation of the action.)

Viewing User Sessions

1. Select **Administration > Users**.
2. Click the tab **User Sessions**.

Configuring External Authentication for Cloudera Manager

**Minimum Required Role:** **User Administrator** *(also provided by Full Administrator)*

> **Important:** This feature is available only with a Cloudera Enterprise license. It is not available in Cloudera Express. For information on Cloudera Enterprise licenses, see **Managing Licenses**.

Cloudera Manager supports user authentication against an internal database and against an external service. The following sections describe how to configure the supported external services.

Configuring Authentication Using Active Directory

1. Log in to Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select **Administration > Settings**.
3. Select **External Authentication** for the **Category** filter to display the settings.
4. For **Authentication Backend Order**, select the order in which Cloudera Manager should look up authentication credentials for login attempts.
5. For **External Authentication Type**, select **Active Directory**.
6. In the **LDAP URL** property, provide the URL of the Active Directory server.
7. In the **Active Directory Domain** property, provide the domain to authenticate against.

   **LDAP URL** and **Active Directory** are the only settings required to allow anyone in Active Directory to log in to Cloudera Manager.

   For example, if you set LDAP URL to `ldap://adserver.example.com` and the Active Directory Domain to `ADREALM.EXAMPLE.COM`, users can log into Cloudera Manager using just their username, such as `sampleuser`. They no longer require the complete string: `sampleuser@ADREALM.EXAMPLE.COM`.

8. In the **LDAP User Groups** property, optionally provide a comma-separated list of case-sensitive LDAP group names. If this list is provided, only users who are members of one or more of the groups in the list will be allowed to log into Cloudera Manager. If this property is left empty, all authenticated LDAP users will be able to log into Cloudera Manager. For example, if there is a group called `CN=ClouderaManagerUsers,OU=Groups,DC=corp,DC=com`, add the group name `ClouderaManagerUsers` to the **LDAP User Groups** list to allow members of that group to log in to Cloudera Manager.

9. To automatically assign a role to users when they log in, provide a comma-separated list of LDAP group names in the following properties:
   - LDAP Full Administrator Groups
   - LDAP User Administrator Groups
• LDAP Cluster Administrator Groups
• LDAP BDR Administrator Groups
• LDAP Configurator Groups
• LDAP Key Administrator Groups
• LDAP Navigator Administrator Groups
• LDAP Operator Groups
• LDAP Limited Operator Groups
• LDAP Auditor Groups

If you specify groups in these properties, users must also be a member of at least one of the groups specified in the LDAP User Groups property or they will not be allowed to log in. If these properties are left empty, users will be assigned to the Read-Only role and any other role assignment must be performed manually by an Administrator.

**Note:** Users added to LDAP groups are not automatically assigned user roles from the internal Cloudera Manager database so they are granted Read-Only access.

10. **Restart** the Cloudera Manager Server.

### Configuring Authentication Using an LDAP-compliant Identity Service

An LDAP-compliant identity/directory service, such as OpenLDAP, provides different options for enabling Cloudera Manager to look-up user accounts and groups in the directory:

- Use a single Distinguished Name (DN) as a base and provide a pattern (**Distinguished Name Pattern**) for matching user names in the directory, or
- Search filter options let you search for a particular user based on somewhat broader search criteria – for example Cloudera Manager users could be members of different groups or organizational units (OUs), so a single pattern does not find all those users. Search filter options also let you find all the groups to which a user belongs, to help determine if that user should have login or admin access.

1. Log in to Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select **Administration > Settings**.
3. Select **External Authentication** for the **Category** filter to display the settings.
4. For **Authentication Backend Order**, select the order in which Cloudera Manager should look up authentication credentials for login attempts.
5. For **External Authentication Type**, select **LDAP**.
6. In the **LDAP URL** property, provide the URL of the LDAP server and (optionally) the base Distinguished Name (DN) (the search base) as part of the URL — for example `ldap://ldap-server.corp.com/dc=corp,dc=com`.
7. If your server does not allow anonymous binding, provide the user DN and password to be used to bind to the directory. These are the **LDAP Bind User Distinguished Name** and **LDAP Bind Password** properties. By default, Cloudera Manager assumes anonymous binding.
8. Use one of the following methods to search for users and groups:
   - You can search using User or Group search filters, using the **LDAP User Search Base**, **LDAP User Search Filter**, **LDAP Group Search Base** and **LDAP Group Search Filter** settings. These allow you to combine a base DN with a search filter to allow a greater range of search targets.

   For example, if you want to authenticate users who may be in one of multiple OUs, the search filter mechanism will allow this. You can specify the User Search Base DN as `dc=corp,dc=com` and the user search filter as `uid={0}`. Then Cloudera Manager will search for the user anywhere in the tree starting from the Base DN. Suppose you have two OUs—`ou=Engineering` and `ou=Operations`—Cloudera Manager will find User "foo" if it exists in either of these OUs, that is, `uid=foo,ou=Engineering,dc=corp,dc=com` or `uid=foo,ou=Operations,dc=corp,dc=com`.

   You can use a user search filter along with a DN pattern, so that the search filter provides a fallback if the DN pattern search fails.
The Groups filters let you search to determine if a DN or username is a member of a target group. In this case, the filter you provide can be something like `member={0}` where `{0}` will be replaced with the DN of the user you are authenticating. For a filter requiring the username, `{1}` may be used, as `memberUid={1}`. This will return a list of groups the user belongs to, which will be compared to the list in the group properties discussed in step 8 of Configuring Authentication Using Active Directory on page 40.

**OR**

- Alternatively, specify a single base Distinguished Name (DN) and then provide a "Distinguished Name Pattern" in the **LDAP Distinguished Name Pattern** property.

  Use `{0}` in the pattern to indicate where the username should go. For example, to search for a distinguished name where the `uid` attribute is the username, you might provide a pattern similar to `uid={0},ou=People,dc=corp,dc=com`. Cloudera Manager substitutes the name provided at login into this pattern and performs a search for that specific user. So if a user provides the username "foo" at the Cloudera Manager login page, Cloudera Manager will search for the DN `uid=foo,ou=People,dc=corp,dc=com`.

  If you provided a base DN along with the URL, the pattern only needs to specify the rest of the DN pattern. For example, if the URL you provide is `ldap://ldap-server.corp.com/dc=corp,dc=com` and the pattern is `uid={0},ou=People`, then the search DN will be `uid=foo,ou=People,dc=corp,dc=com`.

9. **Restart** the Cloudera Manager Server.

**Configuring Cloudera Manager to Use LDAPS**

If the LDAP server certificate has been signed by a trusted Certificate Authority, steps 1 and 2 below may not be necessary.

1. Copy the CA certificate file to the Cloudera Manager Server host.
2. Import the CA certificate(s) from the CA certificate file to the local truststore. The default truststore is located in the `$JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts` file. This contains the default CA information shipped with the JDK. Create an alternate default file called `jssecacerts` in the same location as the `cacerts` file. You can now safely append CA certificates for any private or public CAs not present in the default `cacerts` file, while keeping the original file intact.

   For our example, we will follow this recommendation by copying the default `cacerts` file into the new `jssecacerts` file, and then importing the CA certificate to this alternate truststore.

   ```bash
   cp $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts
   $ /usr/java/latest/bin/keytool -import -alias nt_domain_name -keystore /usr/java/latest/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts -file path_to_CA_cert
   ```

   **Note:** The default password for the `cacerts` store is `changeit`. The `-alias` does not always need to be the domain name.

   Alternatively, you can use the Java options: `javax.net.ssl.trustStore` and `javax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword`. Open the `/etc/default/cloudera-scm-server` file and add the following options:

   ```bash
   export CMF_JAVA_OPTS="-Xmx2G -XX:MaxPermSize=256m -XX:+HeapDumpOnOutOfMemoryError -XX:HeapDumpPath=/tmp -Djavax.net.ssl.trustStore=/usr/java/default/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts -Djavax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword=changeit"
   ```

3. Configure the LDAP URL property to use `ldaps://ldap_server` instead of `ldap://ldap_server`.
4. **Restart** the Cloudera Manager Server.
Configuring Authentication Using an External Program

Cloudera Manager can use a custom external authentication program. Typically, this may be a custom script that interacts with a custom authentication service. Cloudera Manager will call the external program with the username as the first command line argument. The password is passed over stdin. Cloudera Manager assumes the program will return the following exit codes identifying the user role for a successful authentication:

- 0 - Read-Only
- 1 - Full Administrator
- 2 - Limited Operator
- 3 - Operator
- 4 - Configurator
- 5 - Cluster Administrator
- 6 - BDR Administrator
- 7 - Navigator Administrator
- 8 - User Administrator
- 9 - Auditor
- 10 - Key Administrator

and a negative value is returned for a failure to authenticate.

To configure authentication using an external program:

1. Log in to Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select Administration > Settings.
3. Select External Authentication for the Category filter to display the settings.
4. For External Authentication Type, select External Program.
5. Provide a path to the external program in the External Authentication Program Path property.

Configuring Authentication Using SAML

Cloudera Manager supports the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), an XML-based open standard data format for exchanging authentication and authorization data between parties, in particular, between an identity provider (IDP) and a service provider (SP). The SAML specification defines three roles: the principal (typically a user), the IDP, and the SP. In the use case addressed by SAML, the principal (user agent) requests a service from the service provider. The service provider requests and obtains an identity assertion from the IDP. On the basis of this assertion, the SP can make an access control decision—in other words it can decide whether to perform some service for the connected principal.

The primary SAML use case is called web browser single sign-on (SSO). A user wielding a user agent (usually a web browser) requests a web resource protected by a SAML SP. The SP, wanting to know the identity of the requesting user, issues an authentication request to a SAML IDP through the user agent. In the context of this terminology, Cloudera Manager operates as a SP. This topic discusses the Cloudera Manager part of the configuration process; it assumes that you are familiar with SAML and SAML configuration in a general sense, and that you have a functioning IDP already deployed.

Note:

- Cloudera Manager supports both SP- and IDP-initiated SSO.
- The logout action in Cloudera Manager will send a single-logout request to the IDP.
- SAML authentication has been tested with specific configurations of CA Single Sign-On (formerly SiteMinder) and Shibboleth. While SAML is a standard, there is a great deal of variability in configuration between different IDP products, so it is possible that other IDP implementations, or other configurations of CA Single Sign-On and Shibboleth, may not interoperate with Cloudera Manager.
- To bypass SSO if SAML configuration is incorrect or not working, you can login using a Cloudera Manager local account using the URL: http://cm_host:7180/cmf/localLogin
Setting up Cloudera Manager to use SAML requires the following steps.

Preparing Files
You will need to prepare the following files and information, and provide these to Cloudera Manager:

- A Java keystore containing a private key for Cloudera Manager to use to sign/encrypt SAML messages. For guidance on creating Java keystores, see Understanding Keystores and Truststores on page 194.
- The SAML metadata XML file from your IDP. This file must contain the public certificates needed to verify the sign/encrypt key used by your IDP per the SAML Metadata Interoperability Profile. For example, if you are using the Shibboleth IdP, the metadata file is available at: https://<IdPHOST>:8080/idp/shibboleth.

**Note:** For guidance on how to obtain the metadata XML file from your IDP, either contact your IDP administrator or consult the documentation for the version of the IDP you are using.

- The entity ID that should be used to identify the Cloudera Manager instance
- How the user ID is passed in the SAML authentication response:
  - As an attribute. If so, what identifier is used.
  - As the NameID.
- The method by which the Cloudera Manager role will be established:
  - From an attribute in the authentication response:
    - What identifier will be used for the attribute
    - What values will be passed to indicate each role
  - From an external script that will be called for each use:
    - The script takes user ID as $1
    - The script sets an exit code to reflect successful authentication of the assigned role:
      - 0 - Full Administrator
      - 1 - Read-Only
      - 2 - Limited Operator
      - 3 - Operator
      - 4 - Configurator
      - 5 - Cluster Administrator
      - 6 - BDR Administrator
      - 7 - Navigator Administrator
      - 8 - User Administrator
      - 9 - Auditor
      - 10 - Key Administrator

      and a negative value is returned for a failure to authenticate.

Configuring Cloudera Manager

1. Log in to Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select Administration > Settings.
3. Select External Authentication for the Category filter to display the settings.
4. Set the External Authentication Type property to SAML (the Authentication Backend Order property is ignored for SAML).
5. Set the Path to SAML IDP Metadata File property to point to the IDP metadata file.
6. Set the Path to SAML Keystore File property to point to the Java keystore prepared earlier.
7. In the SAML Keystore Password property, set the keystore password.
8. In the **Alias of SAML Sign/Encrypt Private Key** property, set the alias used to identify the private key for Cloudera Manager to use.

9. In the **SAML Sign/Encrypt Private Key Password** property, set the private key password.

10. Set the **SAML Entity ID** property if:
   - There is more than one Cloudera Manager instance being used with the same IDP (each instance needs a different entity ID).
   - Entity IDs are assigned by organizational policy.

11. In the **Source of User ID in SAML Response** property, set whether the user ID will be obtained from an attribute or the NameID.

   If an attribute will be used, set the attribute name in the **SAML attribute identifier for user ID** property. The default value is the normal OID used for user IDs and so may not need to be changed.

12. In the **SAML Role assignment mechanism** property, set whether the role assignment will be done from an attribute or an external script.
   - If an attribute will be used:
     - In the **SAML attribute identifier for user role** property, set the attribute name if necessary. The default value is the normal OID used for OrganizationalUnits and so may not need to be changed.
     - In the **SAML Attribute Values for Roles** property, set which attribute values will be used to indicate the user role.
   - If an external script will be used, set the path to that script in the **Path to SAML Role Assignment Script** property. Make sure that the script is executable (an executable binary is fine - it doesn’t need to be a shell script).

13. Save the changes. Cloudera Manager will run a set of validations that ensure it can find the metadata XML and the keystore, and that the passwords are correct. If you see a validation error, correct the problem before proceeding.

14. **Restart** the Cloudera Manager Server.

**Configuring the IDP**

After the Cloudera Manager Server is restarted, it will attempt to redirect to the IDP login page instead of showing the normal CM page. This may or may not succeed, depending on how the IDP is configured. In either case, the IDP will need to be configured to recognize CM before authentication will actually succeed. The details of this process are specific to each IDP implementation - refer to your IDP documentation for details. If you are using the Shibboleth IdP, information on configuring the IdP to communicate with a Service Provider is available [here](#).

2. Inspect the metadata file and ensure that any URLs contained in the file can be resolved by users’ web browsers. The IDP will redirect web browsers to these URLs at various points in the process. If the browser cannot resolve them, authentication will fail. If the URLs are incorrect, you can manually fix the XML file or set the Entity Base URL in the CM configuration to the right value, and then re-download the file.
3. Provide this metadata file to your IDP using whatever mechanism your IDP provides.
4. Ensure that the IDP has access to whatever public certificates are necessary to validate the private key that was provided to Cloudera Manager earlier.
5. Ensure that the IDP is configured to provide the User ID and Role using the attribute names that Cloudera Manager was configured to expect, if relevant.
6. Ensure the changes to the IDP configuration have taken effect (a restart may be necessary).

**Verifying Authentication and Authorization**

1. Return to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and refresh the login page.
2. Attempt to log in with credentials for a user that is entitled. The authentication should complete and you should see the **Home > Status** tab.
3. If authentication fails, you will see an IDP provided error message. Cloudera Manager is not involved in this part of the process, and you must ensure the IDP is working correctly to complete the authentication.
4. If authentication succeeds but the user is not authorized to use Cloudera Manager, they will be taken to an error page by Cloudera Manager that explains the situation. If an user who should be authorized sees this error, then you will need to verify their role configuration, and ensure that it is being properly communicated to Cloudera Manager, whether by attribute or external script. The Cloudera Manager log will provide details on failures to establish a user’s role. If any errors occur during role mapping, Cloudera Manager will assume the user is unauthorized.

Kerberos Concepts - Principals, Keytabs and Delegation Tokens

This section describes how Hadoop uses Kerberos principals and keytabs for user authentication. It also briefly describes how Hadoop uses delegation tokens to authenticate jobs at execution time, to avoid overwhelming the KDC with authentication requests for each job.

Kerberos Principals

A user in Kerberos is called a principal, which is made up of three distinct components: the primary, instance, and realm. A Kerberos principal is used in a Kerberos-secured system to represent a unique identity. The first component of the principal is called the primary, or sometimes the user component. The primary component is an arbitrary string and may be the operating system username of the user or the name of a service. The primary component is followed by an optional section called the instance, which is used to create principals that are used by users in special roles or to define the host on which a service runs, for example. An instance, if it exists, is separated from the primary by a slash and then the content is used to disambiguate multiple principals for a single user or service. The final component of the principal is the realm. The realm is similar to a domain in DNS in that it logically defines a related group of objects, although rather than hostnames as in DNS, the Kerberos realm defines a group of principals. Each realm can have its own settings including the location of the KDC on the network and supported encryption algorithms. Large organizations commonly create distinct realms to delegate administration of a realm to a group within the enterprise. Realms, by convention, are written in uppercase characters.

Kerberos assigns tickets to Kerberos principals to enable them to access Kerberos-secured Hadoop services. For the Hadoop daemon principals, the principal names should be of the format service/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM. Here, service in the service/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM principal refers to the username of an existing Unix account that is used by Hadoop daemons, such as hdfs or mapred.

Human users who want to access the Hadoop cluster also need to have Kerberos principals of the format, username@YOUR-REALM.COM; in this case, username refers to the username of the user's Unix account, such as joe or jane. Single-component principal names (such as joe@YOUR-REALM.COM) are typical for client user accounts. Hadoop does not support more than two-component principal names.

Kerberos Principals

Each user and service that needs to authenticate to Kerberos needs a principal, an entity that uniquely identifies the user or service in the context of possibly multiple Kerberos servers and related subsystems. A principal includes up to three pieces of identifying information, starting with the user or service name (called a primary). Typically, the primary portion of the principal consists of the user account name from the operating system, such as jcarlos for the user's Unix account or hdfs for the Linux account associated with the service daemon on the host underlying cluster node.

Principals for users typically consist solely of the primary and the Kerberos realm name. The realm is a logical grouping of principals tied to the same Key Distribution Center (KDC) which is configured with many of the same properties, such as supported encryption algorithms. Large organizations may use realms as means of delegating administration to various groups or teams for specific sets of users or functions and distributing the authentication-processing tasks across multiple servers.

Standard practice is to use your organization's domain name as the Kerberos realm name (in all uppercase characters) to easily distinguish it as part of a Kerberos principal, as shown in this user principal pattern:

username@REALM.EXAMPLE.COM
The combination of the primary and the realm name can distinguish one user from another. For example, jcarlos@SOME-REALM.EXAMPLE.COM and jcarlos@ANOTHER-REALM.EXAMPLE.COM may be unique individuals within the same organization.

For service role instance identities, the primary is the Unix account name used by Hadoop daemons (hdfs, mapred, and so on) followed by an instance name that identifies the specific host on which the service runs. For example, hdfs/hostname.fqdn.example.com@SOME-REALM.EXAMPLE.COM is an example of the principal for an HDFS service instance. The forward slash (/) separates the primary and the instance names using this basic pattern:

```
service-name/hostname.fqdn.example.com@REALM.EXAMPLE.COM
```

The HTTP principal needed for Hadoop web service interfaces does not have a Unix local account for its primary but rather is HTTP.

An instance name can also identify users with special roles, such as administrators. For example, the principal jcarlos@SOME-REALM.COM and the principal jcarlos/admin@SOME-REALM.COM each have their own passwords and privileges, and they may or may not be the same individual.

For example, the principal for the HDFS service role instance running on a cluster in an organization with realms for each geographical location might be as follows:

```
hdfs/hostname.fqdn.example.com@OAKLAND.EXAMPLE.COM
```

Generally, the service name is the Unix account name used by the given service role instance, such as hdfs or mapred, as shown above. The HTTP principal for securing web authentication to Hadoop service web interfaces has no Unix account, so the primary for the principal is HTTP.

Kerberos Keytabs

A keytab is a file that contains the principal and the encrypted key for the principal. A keytab file for a Hadoop daemon is unique to each host since the principal names include the hostname. This file is used to authenticate a principal on a host to Kerberos without human interaction or storing a password in a plain text file. Because having access to the keytab file for a principal allows one to act as that principal, access to the keytab files should be tightly secured.

They should be readable by a minimal set of users, should be stored on local disk, and should not be included in host backups, unless access to those backups is as secure as access to the local host.

Delegation Tokens

Users in a Hadoop cluster authenticate themselves to the NameNode using their Kerberos credentials. However, once the user is authenticated, each job subsequently submitted must also be checked to ensure it comes from an authenticated user. Since there could be a time gap between a job being submitted and the job being executed, during which the user could have logged off, user credentials are passed to the NameNode using delegation tokens that can be used for authentication in the future.

Delegation tokens are a secret key shared with the NameNode, that can be used to impersonate a user to get a job executed. While these tokens can be renewed, new tokens can only be obtained by clients authenticating to the NameNode using Kerberos credentials. By default, delegation tokens are only valid for a day. However, since jobs can last longer than a day, each token specifies a NodeManager as a renewer which is allowed to renew the delegation token once a day, until the job completes, or for a maximum period of 7 days. When the job is complete, the NodeManager requests the NameNode to cancel the delegation token.

Token Format

The NameNode uses a random masterKey to generate delegation tokens. All active tokens are stored in memory with their expiry date [maxDate]. Delegation tokens can either expire when the current time exceeds the expiry date, or, they can be canceled by the owner of the token. Expired or canceled tokens are then deleted from memory. The
sequenceNumber serves as a unique ID for the tokens. The following section describes how the Delegation Token is used for authentication.

\[
\text{TokenID} = \{\text{ownerID, renewerID, issueDate, maxDate, sequenceNumber}\}
\]

\[
\text{TokenAuthenticator} = \text{HMAC-SHA1(masterKey, TokenID)}
\]

Delegation Token = \{TokenID, TokenAuthenticator\}

\section*{Authentication Process}

To begin the authentication process, the client first sends the TokenID to the NameNode. The NameNode uses this TokenID and the masterKey to once again generate the corresponding TokenAuthenticator, and consequently, the Delegation Token. If the NameNode finds that the token already exists in memory, and that the current time is less than the expiry date (maxDate) of the token, then the token is considered valid. If valid, the client and the NameNode will then authenticate each other by using the TokenAuthenticator that they possess as the secret key, and MD5 as the protocol. Since the client and NameNode do not actually exchange TokenAuthenticators during the process, even if authentication fails, the tokens are not compromised.

\section*{Token Renewal}

Delegation tokens must be renewed periodically by the designated renewer (renewerID). For example, if a NodeManager is the designated renewer, the NodeManager will first authenticate itself to the NameNode. It will then send the token to be authenticated to the NameNode. The NameNode verifies the following information before renewing the token:

- The NodeManager requesting renewal is the same as the one identified in the token by renewerID.
- The TokenAuthenticator generated by the NameNode using the TokenID and the masterKey matches the one previously stored by the NameNode.
- The current time must be less than the time specified by maxDate.

If the token renewal request is successful, the NameNode sets the new expiry date to \(\min(\text{current time} + \text{renew period}, \text{maxDate})\). The tokens are persisted into NameNode metadata (FSImage and edit logs). If the NameNode was restarted at any time, it will have lost all previous tokens from memory. In this case, the token will be loaded into memory again from the NameNode metadata. Token renewals and cancellation persist, so NameNode restart does not impact the lifetime of the tokens.

A designated renewer can renew tokens as long as the token is not expired. The designated renewer can also cancel tokens. Shortly (by default, one hour) after the token is expired, or immediately after it is canceled, it is removed from the NameNode. Afterward, the NameNode cannot distinguish between a token that was canceled, or has expired.

\section*{Delegation Tokens}

Users in a Hadoop cluster authenticate themselves to the NameNode using their Kerberos credentials. However, once the user is authenticated, each job subsequently submitted must also be checked to ensure it comes from an authenticated user. Since there could be a time gap between a job being submitted and the job being executed, during which the user could have logged off, user credentials are passed to the NameNode using delegation tokens that can be used for authentication in the future.

Delegation tokens are a secret key shared with the NameNode, that can be used to impersonate a user to get a job executed. While these tokens can be renewed, new tokens can only be obtained by clients authenticating to the NameNode using Kerberos credentials. By default, delegation tokens are only valid for a day. However, since jobs can last longer than a day, each token specifies a NodeManager as a renewer which is allowed to renew the delegation token once a day, until the job completes, or for a maximum period of 7 days. When the job is complete, the NodeManager requests the NameNode to cancel the delegation token.

\section*{Token Format}

The NameNode uses a random masterKey to generate delegation tokens. All active tokens are stored in memory with their expiry date (maxDate). Delegation tokens can either expire when the current time exceeds the expiry date, or, they can be canceled by the owner of the token. Expired or canceled tokens are then deleted from memory. The
sequenceNumber serves as a unique ID for the tokens. The following section describes how the Delegation Token is used for authentication.

| TokenID = (ownerID, renewerID, issueDate, maxDate, sequenceNumber) |
| Delegation Token = (TokenID, TokenAuthenticator) |

### Authentication Process

To begin the authentication process, the client first sends the TokenID to the NameNode. The NameNode uses this TokenID and the masterKey to once again generate the corresponding TokenAuthenticator, and consequently, the Delegation Token. If the NameNode finds that the token already exists in memory, and that the current time is less than the expiry date (maxDate) of the token, then the token is considered valid. If valid, the client and the NameNode will then authenticate each other by using the TokenAuthenticator that they possess as the secret key, and MD5 as the protocol. Since the client and NameNode do not actually exchange TokenAuthenticators during the process, even if authentication fails, the tokens are not compromised.

### Token Renewal

Delegation tokens must be renewed periodically by the designated renewer (renewerID). For example, if a NodeManager is the designated renewer, the JobTracker will first authenticate itself to the NameNode. It will then send the token to be authenticated to the NameNode. The NameNode verifies the following information before renewing the token:

- The JobTracker requesting renewal is the same as the one identified in the token by renewerID.
- The TokenAuthenticator generated by the NameNode using the TokenID and the masterKey matches the one previously stored by the NameNode.
- The current time must be less than the time specified by maxDate.

If the token renewal request is successful, the NameNode sets the new expiry date to \( \text{min(current time+renew period, maxDate)} \). If the NameNode was restarted at any time, it will have lost all previous tokens from memory. In this case, the token will be saved to memory once again, this time with a new expiry date. Hence, designated renewers must renew all tokens with the NameNode after a restart, and before relaunching any failed tasks.

A designated renewer can also revive an expired or canceled token as long as the current time does not exceed maxDate. The NameNode cannot tell the difference between a token that was canceled, or has expired, and one that was erased from memory due to a restart, since only the masterKey persists in memory. The masterKey must be updated regularly.

### Enabling Kerberos Authentication Using the Wizard

**Required Role:** Cluster Administrator or Full Administrator

Cloudera Manager provides a wizard for integrating your organization’s Kerberos instance with your cluster to provide authentication services.

Kerberos must already be deployed in your organization and the Kerberos key distribution center (KDC) must be ready to use, with a realm established. For Hue and Oozie, the Kerberos realm must support renewable tickets.

**Important:** Before integrating Kerberos with your cluster, configure TLS/SSL encryption between Cloudera Manager Server and all Cloudera Manager Agent host systems in the cluster. During the Kerberos integration process, Cloudera Manager Server sends keytab files to the Cloudera Manager Agent hosts, and TLS/SSL encrypts the network communication so these files are protected. See Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager on page 196 for details.

Cloudera Manager clusters can be integrated with MIT Kerberos or with Microsoft Active Directory:

- See MIT Kerberos home and MIT Kerberos 5 Release 1.8.6 documentation for more information about MIT Kerberos.
For Active Directory, you must have administrative privileges to the Active Directory instance for initial setup and for on-going management, or you will need to have the help of your AD administrator prior to and during the integration process. For example, administrative access is needed to access the Active Directory KDC, create principals, and troubleshoot Kerberos TGT/TGS-ticket-renewal and take care of any other issues that may arise.

Kerberos client OS-specific packages must be installed on all cluster hosts and client hosts that will authenticate using Kerberos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OS</th>
<th>Packages Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| RHEL 7 Compatible, RHEL 6 Compatible, RHEL 5 Compatible | • openldap-clients on the Cloudera Manager Server host  
                                                                   • krb5-workstation, krb5-libs on ALL hosts |
| SLES                    | • openldap2-client on the Cloudera Manager Server host 
                                                                   • krb5-client on ALL hosts |
| Ubuntu or Debian        | • ldap-utils on the Cloudera Manager Server host        
                                                                   • krb5-user on ALL hosts |
| Windows                 | • krb5-workstation, krb5-libs on ALL hosts             |

See Before you Begin Using the Wizard on page 53 for more information.

Cloudera supports the Kerberos version that ships with each supported operating system listed in CDH and Cloudera Manager Supported Operating Systems.

Step 1: Install Cloudera Manager and CDH

If you have not already done so, Cloudera strongly recommends that you install and configure the Cloudera Manager Server and Cloudera Manager Agents and CDH to set up a fully-functional CDH cluster before you begin doing the following steps to implement Hadoop security features.

Overview of the User Accounts and Groups in CDH and Cloudera Manager to Support Security

User Accounts and Groups in CDH and Cloudera Manager Required to Support Security:

When you install the CDH packages and the Cloudera Manager Agents on your cluster hosts, Cloudera Manager takes some steps to provide system security such as creating the following Unix accounts and setting directory permissions as shown in the following table. These Unix accounts and directory permissions work with the Hadoop Kerberos security requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This User</th>
<th>Runs These Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hdfs</td>
<td>NameNode, DataNodes, and Secondary Node</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mapred</td>
<td>JobTracker and TaskTrackers (MR1) and Job History Server (YARN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yarn</td>
<td>ResourceManager and NodeManagers (YARN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oozie</td>
<td>Oozie Server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hue</td>
<td>Hue Server, Beeswax Server, Authorization Manager, and Job Designer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hdfs user also acts as the HDFS superuser.
When you install the Cloudera Manager Server on the server host, a new Unix user account called `cloudera-scm` is created automatically to support security. The Cloudera Manager Server uses this account to create host principals and deploy the keytabs on your cluster.

Depending on whether you installed CDH and Cloudera Manager at the same time or not, use one of the following sections for information on configuring directory ownerships on cluster hosts:

**If you installed CDH and Cloudera Manager at the Same Time**

If you have a new installation and you installed CDH and Cloudera Manager at the same time, when you started the Cloudera Manager Agents on your cluster hosts, the Cloudera Manager Agent on each host automatically configured the directory owners shown in the following table to support security. Assuming the owners are configured as shown, the Hadoop daemons can then automatically set the permissions for each of the directories specified by the properties shown below to make sure they are properly restricted. It’s critical that the owners are configured exactly as shown below, so do not change them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory Specified in this Property</th>
<th>Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dfs.name.dir</td>
<td>hdfs:hadoop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dfs.data.dir</td>
<td>hdfs:hadoop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mapred.local.dir</td>
<td>mapred:hadoop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mapred.system.dir in HDFS</td>
<td>mapred:hadoop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs</td>
<td>yarn:yarn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yarn.nodemanager.log-dirs</td>
<td>yarn:yarn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oozie.service.StoreService.jdbc.url</td>
<td>oozie:oozie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[[database]] name</td>
<td>hue:hue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>javax.jdo.option.ConnectionURL</td>
<td>hue:hue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**If you Installed and Used CDH Before Installing Cloudera Manager**

If you have been using HDFS and running MapReduce jobs in an existing installation of CDH before you installed Cloudera Manager, you must manually configure the owners of the directories shown in the table above. Doing so enables the Hadoop daemons to automatically set the permissions for each of the directories. It’s critical that you manually configure the owners exactly as shown above.

**Step 2: If You are Using AES-256 Encryption, Install the JCE Policy File**

If you are using CentOS or Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.5 or higher, which use AES-256 encryption by default for tickets, you must install the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction Policy File on all cluster and Hadoop user hosts. There are 2 ways to do this:

- In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, navigate to the **Hosts** page. Both, the **Add New Hosts to Cluster** wizard and the **Re-run Upgrade Wizard** will give you the option to have Cloudera Manager install the JCE Policy file for you.
- You can follow the JCE Policy File installation instructions in the **README.txt** file included in the **jce_policy-x.zip** file.

Alternatively, you can configure Kerberos to not use AES-256 by removing `aes256-cts:normal` from the `supported_enctypes` field of the `kdc.conf` or `krb5.conf` file. Note that after changing the `kdc.conf` file, you’ll need to restart both the KDC and the kadmin server for those changes to take affect. You may also need to recreate or change the password of the relevant principals, including potentially the Ticket Granting Ticket principal (`krbtgt/REALM@REALM`). If AES-256 is still used after all of those steps, it’s because the `aes256-cts:normal` setting existed when the Kerberos database was created. To fix this, create a new Kerberos database and then restart both the KDC and the kadmin server.
To verify the type of encryption used in your cluster:

1. **For MIT KDC**: On the local KDC host, type this command in the kadmin.local or kadmin shell to create a test principal:

   \[ \text{kadmin: addprinc test} \]

   **For Active Directory**: Create a new AD account with the name, test.

2. On a cluster host, type this command to start a Kerberos session as test:

   \$ kinit test

3. On a cluster host, type this command to view the encryption type in use:

   \$ klist -e

   If AES is being used, output like the following is displayed after you type the klist command (note that AES-256 is included in the output):

   ```
   Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_0
   Default principal: test@Cloudera Manager
   Valid starting     Expires            Service principal
   05/19/11 13:25:04  05/20/11 13:25:04  krbtgt/Cloudera Manager@Cloudera Manager
   Etype (skey, tkt): AES-256 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC, AES-256 CTS mode with
   96-bit SHA-1 HMAC
   ```

### Step 3: Get or Create a Kerberos Principal for the Cloudera Manager Server

In order to create and deploy the host principals and keytabs on your cluster, the Cloudera Manager Server must have the correct Kerberos principal. Specifically, the Cloudera Manager Server must have a Kerberos principal that has privileges to create other accounts.

To get or create the Kerberos principal for the Cloudera Manager Server, you can do either of the following:

- Ask your Kerberos administrator to create a Kerberos administrator principal for the Cloudera Manager Server.
- Create the Kerberos principal for the Cloudera Manager Server yourself by using the following instructions in this step.

If for some reason, you cannot create a Cloudera Manager administrator principal on your KDC with the privileges to create other principals and keytabs for CDH services, then these will need to be created manually, and then retrieved by Cloudera Manager. See, [Using a Custom Kerberos Keytab Retrieval Script](#) on page 64.

### Creating the Cloudera Manager Principal

The following instructions illustrate an example of creating the Cloudera Manager Server principal for MIT KDC and Active Directory KDC. (If you are using another version of Kerberos, refer to your Kerberos documentation for instructions.)

#### If you are using Active Directory:

1. Create an Organizational Unit (OU) in your AD setup where all the principals used by your CDH cluster will reside.

2. Add a new user account to Active Directory, for example, `<username>@YOUR-REALM.COM`. The password for this user should be set to never expire.

3. Use AD's Delegate Control wizard to allow this new user to **Create, Delete and Manage User Accounts**.

#### If you are using MIT KDC:

Typically, principals with the second component of `admin` in the principal name (for example, `username/admin@YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.com`) **have administrator privileges**. This is why `admin` is shown in the following example.
Note: If you are running kadmin and the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) on the same host, use `kadmin.local` in the following steps. If the Kerberos KDC is running on a remote host, you must use `kadmin` instead of `kadmin.local`.

In the `kadmin.local` or `kadmin` shell, type the following command to create the Cloudera Manager Server principal, replacing `YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COM` with the name of your realm:

```
  kadmin:  addprinc -pw <Password> cloudera-scm/admin@YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COM
```

Step 4: Enabling Kerberos Using the Wizard

Minimum Required Role: **Full Administrator**

To start the Kerberos wizard:

1. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and click ▼ to the right of the cluster for which you want to enable Kerberos authentication.
2. Select **Enable Kerberos**.

Before you Begin Using the Wizard

The Welcome page lists steps you should have completed before starting the wizard.

- Set up a working KDC. Cloudera Manager supports authentication with MIT KDC and Active Directory.
- Configure the KDC to allow renewable tickets with non-zero ticket lifetimes.

  Active Directory allows renewable tickets with non-zero lifetimes by default. You can verify this by checking Domain Security Settings > Account Policies > Kerberos Policy in Active Directory.

  For MIT KDC, make sure you have the following lines in the `kdc.conf`.

  ```
  max_life = 1d
  max_renewable_life = 7d
  ```

- If you are using Active Directory, make sure LDAP over TLS/SSL (LDAPS) is enabled for the Domain Controllers.
- Install the OS-specific packages for your cluster listed in the table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OS</th>
<th>Packages Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| RHEL 7 Compatible, RHEL 6 Compatible, RHEL 5 Compatible | - openldap-clients on the Cloudera Manager Server host  
|                            | - krb5-workstation, krb5-libs on ALL hosts            |
| SLES                       | - openldap2-client on the Cloudera Manager Server host  
|                            | - krb5-client on ALL hosts                             |
| Ubuntu or Debian           | - ldap-utils on the Cloudera Manager Server host        
|                            | - krb5-user on ALL hosts                               |
| Windows                    | - krb5-workstation, krb5-libs on ALL hosts             |

- Create an account for Cloudera Manager that has the permissions to create other accounts in the KDC. This should have been completed as part of **Step 3: Get or Create a Kerberos Principal for the Cloudera Manager Server** on page 52.
Important:
If YARN Resource Manager HA has been enabled in a non-secure cluster, before enabling Kerberos you must clear the StateStore znode in ZooKeeper, as follows:

1. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console home page, click to the right of the YARN service and select **Stop**.
2. When you see a **Finished** status, the service has stopped.
3. Go to the YARN service and select **Actions > Format State Store**.
4. When the command completes, click **Close**.

Once you are able to check all the items on this list, click **Continue**.

**KDC Information**

On this page, select the KDC type you are using, MIT KDC or Active Directory, and complete the fields as applicable to enable Cloudera Manager to generate principals/accounts for the CDH services running on the cluster.

**Note:**
- If you are using AD and have multiple Domain Controllers behind a Load Balancer, enter the name of the Load Balancer in the **KDC Server Host** field and any one of the Domain Controllers in **Active Directory Domain Controller Override**. Hadoop daemons will use the Load Balancer for authentication, but Cloudera Manager will use the override for creating accounts.
- If you have multiple Domain Controllers (in case of AD) or MIT KDC servers, only enter the name of any one of them in the **KDC Server Host** field. Cloudera Manager will use that server only for creating accounts. If you choose to use Cloudera Manager to manage krb5.conf, you can specify the rest of the Domain Controllers using Safety Valve as explained below.
- Make sure the entries for the **Kerberos Encryption Types** field matches what your KDC supports.
- If you are using an Active Directory KDC, you can configure Active Directory account properties such as objectClass and accountExpires directly from the Cloudera Manager UI. You can also enable Cloudera Manager to delete existing AD accounts so that new ones can be created when Kerberos credentials are being regenerated. See [Managing Active Directory Account Properties](#) on page 62.

Click **Continue** to proceed.

**KRBS Configuration**

**Manage krb5.conf through Cloudera Manager** allows you to choose whether Cloudera Manager should deploy the krb5.conf on your cluster or not. If left unchecked, you must ensure that the krb5.conf is deployed on all hosts in the cluster, including the Cloudera Manager Server's host.

If you check **Manage krb5.conf through Cloudera Manager**, this page will let you configure the properties that will be emitted in it. In particular, the safety valves on this page can be used to configure cross-realm authentication. More information can be found at [Configuring a Cluster-dedicated MIT KDC with Cross-Realm Trust](#) on page 181.

**Note:** Cloudera Manager is unable to use a non-default realm. You must specify the default realm.

Click **Continue** to proceed.

**Import KDC Account Manager Credentials**

Enter the username and password for the user that can create principals for CDH cluster in the KDC. This is the user/principal you created in **Step 3: Get or Create a Kerberos Principal for the Cloudera Manager Server** on page 52. Cloudera Manager encrypts the username and password into a keytab and uses it as needed to create new principals.
Note: The username entered should have the realm portion in upper-case only as shown in the example in the UI.

Note: Enter the REALM portion of the principal in upper-case only to conform to Kerberos convention.

Note:
Many enterprises employ policies that require all passwords to be changed after a particular number of days. If you must change the password in Cloudera Manager for the Account Manager, then:

1. In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, select Administration > Security.
2. Go to the Kerberos Credentials tab and click Import Kerberos Account Manager Credentials.
3. In the Import Kerberos Account Manager Credentials dialog box, enter the username and password for the user that can create principals for CDH cluster in the KDC.

Click Continue to proceed.

(Optional) Configuring Custom Kerberos Principals

Starting with Cloudera Manager 5.4, you can configure custom service principals for CDH services. Before you begin making configuration changes, see Configuring a Cluster with Custom Kerberos Principals on page 60 for some additional configuration changes required and limitations.

Configure HDFS DataNode Ports

On this page, specify the privileged ports needed by the DataNode’s Transceiver Protocol and the HTTP Web UI in a secure cluster.

Use the checkbox to confirm you are ready to restart the cluster. Click Continue.

Enabling Kerberos

This page lets you track the progress made by the wizard as it first stops all services on your cluster, deploys the krb5.conf, generates keytabs for other CDH services, deploys client configuration and finally restarts all services. Click Continue.

Congratulations

The final page lists the cluster(s) for which Kerberos has been successfully enabled. Click Finish to return to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console home page.

Step 5: Create the HDFS Superuser

To be able to create home directories for users, you will need access to the HDFS superuser account. (CDH automatically created the HDFS superuser account on each cluster host during CDH installation.) When you enabled Kerberos for the HDFS service, you lost access to the default HDFS superuser account using sudo -u hdfs commands. Cloudera recommends you use a different user account as the superuser, not the default hdfs account.

Designating a Non-Default Superuser Group

To designate a different group of superusers instead of using the default hdfs account, follow these steps:

1. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and navigate to the HDFS service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > HDFS (Service-Wide).
5. Locate the Superuser Group property and change the value to the appropriate group name for your environment.
   For example, <superuser>.
6. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.
7. Restart the HDFS service.

To enable your access to the superuser account now that Kerberos is enabled, you must now create a Kerberos principal or an Active Directory user whose first component is `<superuser>`:

**If you are using Active Directory**
Add a new user account to Active Directory, `<superuser>@YOUR-REALM.COM`. The password for this account should be set to never expire.

**If you are using MIT KDC**

1. In the `kadmin.local` or `kadmin` shell, type the following command to create a Kerberos principal called `<superuser>`:

   ```bash
   kadmin:  addprinc <superuser>@YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COM
   ```

   This command prompts you to create a password for the `<superuser>` principal. You should use a strong password because having access to this principal provides superuser access to all of the files in HDFS.

2. To run commands as the HDFS superuser, you must obtain Kerberos credentials for the `<superuser>` principal. To do so, run the following command and provide the appropriate password when prompted.

   ```bash
   $ kinit <superuser>@YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COM
   ```

**Step 6: Get or Create a Kerberos Principal for Each User Account**

Now that Kerberos is configured and enabled on your cluster, you and every other Hadoop user must have a Kerberos principal or keytab to obtain Kerberos credentials to be allowed to access the cluster and use the Hadoop services. In the next step of this procedure, you will need to create your own Kerberos principals to verify that Kerberos security is working on your cluster. If you and the other Hadoop users already have a Kerberos principal or keytab, or if your Kerberos administrator can provide them, you can skip ahead to the next step.

The following instructions explain how to create a Kerberos principal for a user account.

**If you are using Active Directory**
Add a new AD user account for each new user that should have access to the cluster. You do not need to make any changes to existing user accounts.

**If you are using MIT KDC**

1. In the `kadmin.local` or `kadmin` shell, use the following command to create user principals by replacing `YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COM` with the name of your realm, and replacing `USERNAME` with a username:

   ```bash
   kadmin:  addprinc USERNAME@YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COM
   ```

2. Enter and re-enter a password when prompted.

**Step 7: Prepare the Cluster for Each User**

Before you and other users can access the cluster, there are a few tasks you must do to prepare the hosts for each user.

1. Make sure all hosts in the cluster have a Linux user account with the same name as the first component of that user’s principal name. For example, the Linux account `joe` should exist on every box if the user’s principal name is `joe@YOUR-REALM.COM`. You can use LDAP for this step if it is available in your organization.
Note: Each account must have a user ID that is greater than or equal to 1000. In the `/etc/hadoop/conf/taskcontroller.cfg` file, the default setting for the `banned.users` property is `mapred`, `hdfs`, and `bin` to prevent jobs from being submitted using those user accounts. The default setting for the `min.user.id` property is 1000 to prevent jobs from being submitted with a user ID less than 1000, which are conventionally Unix super users.

2. Create a subdirectory under `/user` on HDFS for each user account (for example, `/user/joe`). Change the owner and group of that directory to be the user.

```bash
$ hadoop fs -mkdir /user/joe
$ hadoop fs -chown joe /user/joe
```

Note: `sudo -u hdfs` is not included in the commands above. This is because it is not required if Kerberos is enabled on your cluster. You will, however, need to have Kerberos credentials for the HDFS super user to successfully run these commands. For information on gaining access to the HDFS super user account, see Step 13: Create the HDFS Superuser Principal on page 75.

**Step 8: Verify that Kerberos Security is Working**

After you have Kerberos credentials, you can verify that Kerberos security is working on your cluster by trying to run MapReduce jobs. To confirm, try launching a sleep or a pi job from the provided Hadoop examples (/usr/lib/hadoop/hadoop-examples.jar).

Note: This section assumes you have a fully-functional CDH cluster and you have been able to access HDFS and run MapReduce jobs before you followed these instructions to configure and enable Kerberos on your cluster. If you have not already done so, you should at a minimum use the Cloudera Manager Admin Console to generate a client configuration file to enable you to access the cluster. For instructions, see Deploying Client Configuration Files.

To verify that Kerberos security is working:

1. Acquire Kerberos credentials for your user account.

   ```bash
   $ kinit USERNAME@YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COM
   ```

2. Enter a password when prompted.

3. Submit a sample pi calculation as a test MapReduce job. Use the following command if you use a package-based setup for Cloudera Manager:

   ```bash
   $ hadoop jar /usr/lib/hadoop-0.20-mapreduce/hadoop-examples.jar pi 10 10000
   Number of Maps = 10
   Samples per Map = 10000
   ...
   Job Finished in 38.572 seconds
   Estimated value of Pi is 3.14120000000000000000
   ```

   If you have a parcel-based setup, use the following command instead:

   ```bash
   $ hadoop jar /opt/cloudera/parcels/CDH/lib/hadoop-0.20-mapreduce/hadoop-examples.jar pi 10 10000
   Number of Maps = 10
   Samples per Map = 10000
   ...
   Job Finished in 30.958 seconds
   Estimated value of Pi is 3.14120000000000000000
   ```
You have now verified that Kerberos security is working on your cluster.

**Important:**
Running a MapReduce job will fail if you do not have a valid Kerberos ticket in your credentials cache. You can examine the Kerberos tickets currently in your credentials cache by running the `klist` command. You can obtain a ticket by running the `kinit` command and either specifying a keytab file containing credentials, or entering the password for your principal. If you do not have a valid ticket, you will receive an error such as:

```
11/01/04 12:08:12 WARN ipc.Client: Exception encountered while connecting to the server:
java.security.sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate failed
[Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Failed to find any
Kerberos tgt)]
Bad connection to FS. command aborted. exception: Call to
nn-host/10.0.0.2:8020 failed on local exception:
java.io.IOException: javax.security.sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate
failed
[Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided
(Mechanism level: Failed to find any Kerberos tgt)]
```

Step 9: (Optional) Enable Authentication for HTTP Web Consoles for Hadoop Roles

**Minimum Required Role:** Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

Authentication for access to the HDFS, MapReduce, and YARN roles’ web consoles can be enabled using a configuration option for the appropriate service. To enable this authentication:

1. From the Clusters tab, select the service (HDFS, MapReduce, or YARN) for which you want to enable authentication.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > service name Service-Wide.
5. Type Enable Kerberos in the Search box.
7. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
8. When the command finishes, restart all roles of that service.

Enabling SPNEGO as an Authentication Backend for Hue

1. In Cloudera Manager, set the authentication backend to SpnegoDjangoBackend.
   a. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console. From the Clusters tab, select the Hue service.
   b. Click the Configuration tab.
   c. Select Scope > Service-Wide.
   d. Select Category > Security.
   e. Locate the Authentication Backend property and select desktop.auth.backend.SpnegoDjangoBackend.
   f. Click Save Changes.
2. Restart the Hue service.
3. If you are using an external load balancer, perform the following steps, otherwise skip the remaining steps. Cloudera Manager creates these configuration automatically:
   a. On the host running the Hue Kerberos Ticket Renewer, switch to the KT_RENEWER process directory. For example:
      ```
      cd /var/run/cloudera-scm-agent/process`
      
      ls -lrt /var/run/cloudera-scm-agent/process/ `ls -lrt /var/run/cloudera-scm-agent/process/`
      
      awk '{print $9}' | grep KT_RENEWER | tail -1
      ```
b. Verify that the Hue keytab includes the HTTP principal.

```
klist -kte ./hue.keytab
```

```
Keytab name: FILE:./hue.keytab
KVNO Timestamp Principal
---- ----------------- --------------------------------------------------------
1 03/09/15 20:20:35 hue/host-10-16-8-168.openstacklocal@EXAMPLE.CLOUDERA.COM
(aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
1 03/09/15 20:20:36 HTTP/host-10-16-8-168.openstacklocal@EXAMPLE.CLOUDERA.COM
(aes128-cts-hmac-shal-96)
```

c. Copy the hue.keytab file to /var/lib/hue and change ownership to the hue user and group.

```
$ cp ./hue.keytab /var/lib/hue/
$ chown hue:hue /var/lib/hue/hue.keytab
```

d. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console. From the Clusters tab, select the Hue service.
e. Click the Configuration tab.
f. Select Scope > Service-Wide.
g. Select Category > Advanced.
h. Locate the Hue Service Environment Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) property and add the following line:

```
KRB5_KTNAME=/var/lib/hue/hue.keytab
```
i. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
j. Restart the Hue service.

**Enabling Kerberos Authentication for Single User Mode or Non-Default Users**

The steps described in this topic are only applicable in the following cases:

- You are running the Cloudera Manager in the **single user mode**. In this case, configure all the services described in the table below.

  OR

- You are running one or more CDH services with non-default users. This means if you have modified the default value for the **System User** property for any service in Cloudera Manager, you must only perform the command (as described below) corresponding to that service, to be able to successfully run jobs with the non-default user.

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#### Configuring Authentication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Configuration Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MapReduce</td>
<td>Configure the mapred.system.dir directory to be owned by the mapred user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><code>sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chown mapred:hadoop ${{mapred.system.dir}}</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>By default,</strong> <code>mapred.system.dir</code> is <code>/tmp/mapred/system</code>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBase</td>
<td>Give the hbase user ownership of the HBase root directory:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><code>sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chown -R hbase ${{hbase.rootdir}}</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>By default,</strong> <code>hbase.rootdir</code> is <code>/hbase</code>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hive</td>
<td>Give the hive user ownership of the <code>/user/hive</code> directory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><code>sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chown hive /user/hive</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For every NodeManager host, for each path in `yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs`, run:

```
rm -rf ${yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs}/usercache/*
```

This removes the `/usercache` directory that contains intermediate data stored for previous jobs.

---

## Configuring a Cluster with Custom Kerberos Principals

By default, the Cloudera Manager [Kerberos wizard](https://docs.cloudera.com/security/introduction.html) configures CDH services to use the same Kerberos principals as the default process users. For example, the `hdfs principal` for the HDFS service, and the `hive principal` for the Hive service. The advantage to this is that when Kerberos is enabled, no HDFS directory permissions need to be changed for the new principals. However, starting with Cloudera Manager 5.4, you can configure custom service principals for CDH services.

### Important Considerations

- Using different Kerberos principals for different services will make it easier to track the HDFS directories being accessed by each service.
- If you are using `ShellBasedUnixGroupsMapping` to obtain user-group mappings, ensure you have the UNIX accounts for the principals present on all hosts of the cluster.

### Configuring Directory Permissions

Configure the following HDFS directories to give their corresponding custom service principals read, write and execute permissions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>HDFS Directory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accumulo</td>
<td>• HDFS Directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <code>/user/principal</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBase</td>
<td>HBase Root Directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hive</td>
<td>• Hive Warehouse Directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <code>/user/principal</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala</td>
<td><code>/user/principal</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MapReduce v1</td>
<td><code>/tmp/mapred</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oozie</td>
<td>Oozie ShareLib Root Directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solr</td>
<td>HDFS Data Directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spark on YARN</td>
<td>• <code>/user/principal</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Spark History Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Spark Jar Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sqoop2</td>
<td><code>/user/principal</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Configuring CDH Services

The following services will require additional settings if you are using custom principals:

- **HDFS** - If you have enabled synchronization of HDFS and Sentry permissions, add the Hive and Impala principals to the [Sentry Authorization Provider Group](https://docs.cloudera.com/security/introduction.html) property.
  1. Go to the HDFS service.
  2. Click Configuration.
  3. Select `Scope` > `HDFS Service-Wide.`
5. Locate the Sentry Authorization Provider Group property and add the custom Hive and Impala principals.
6. Click Save Changes.

- **YARN** - The principals used by YARN daemons should be part of hadoop group so that they are allowed to read JobHistory Server data.
- **Impala** - If you are running the Hue service with a custom principal, configure Impala to allow the Hue principal to impersonate other users.
  
  1. Go to the Impala service.
  2. Click Configuration.
  3. Select Scope > Impala (Service-Wide).
  4. Select Category > Policy File-Based Sentry.
  5. Locate the Proxy User Configuration property and add the custom Hue principal.
  6. Click Save Changes.

- **Hive** - If the Sentry service is enabled, allow the Kerberos principals used by Hive, Impala, Hue, HDFS and the Service Monitor to bypass Sentry authorization in the Hive metastore.
  
  1. Go to the Hive service.
  2. Click Configuration.
  3. Select Scope > Impala (Service-Wide).
  4. Select Category > Policy File-Based Sentry.
  5. Locate the Bypass Sentry Authorization Users property and add the custom Hive, Impala, Hue and HDFS principals to the list.
  6. Click Save Changes.

- **Spark on YARN** - The principal used by the Spark service should be part of the spark group.
- **Sentry** - Allow the Hive, Impala, Hue and HDFS principals to connect to the Sentry service.
  
  1. Go to the Sentry service.
  2. Click Configuration.
  3. Search for the Allowed Connecting Users property and add the custom Hive, Impala, Hue and HDFS principals to the list.
  4. Search for the Admin Groups property and include the groups to which the Hive, Impala, and Hue principals belong.
  5. Click Save Changes.

- **Cloudera Management Service** - Configure the Reports Manager principal and the Navigator principal for HDFS as HDFS superusers.
  
  1. Go to the Cloudera Management Service.
  2. Click Configuration.
  3. Search for kerberos.
  4. Locate the Reports Manager Kerberos Principal property and set it to a principal with administrative and superuser privileges on all HDFS services.
  5. Locate the Navigator Kerberos Principal for HDFS property and set it to a principal with administrative and superuser privileges on all HDFS services.
  6. Click Save Changes.

**Incompatibilities**
The following features do not work with custom principals:

- Llama must always use the default Kerberos principal llama.
- If you are using MapReduce v1, the Activity Monitor and Cloudera Navigator should use the same principal as the Hue service.
• If you are using the Java KeyStore KMS or KeyTrustee KMS with a custom principal, you will need to add the proxy user for the custom principal to the `kms-site.xml` safety valve.

For example, if you’ve replaced the default `oozie` principal with `oozieprinc`, add the `hadoop.kms.proxyuser.oozieprinc.groups` and `hadoop.kms.proxyuser.oozieprinc.hosts` properties to the `kms-site.xml` safety valve.

Managing Kerberos Credentials Using Cloudera Manager

Minimum Required Role: **Full Administrator**

As soon as you enable Hadoop secure authentication for HDFS and MapReduce service instances, Cloudera Manager starts creating the Kerberos principals for each of the role instances. The amount of time this process will take depends on the number of hosts and HDFS and MapReduce role instances on your cluster. The process can take from a few seconds for a small cluster to several minutes for a larger cluster. After the process is completed, you can use the Cloudera Manager Admin Console to view the list of Kerberos principals that Cloudera Manager has created for the cluster. Make sure there are principals for each of the hosts and HDFS and MapReduce role instances on your cluster. If there are no principals after 10 minutes, then there is most likely a problem with the principal creation. See the [Troubleshooting Authentication Issues](#) on page 480 section for more information. If necessary, you can use Cloudera Manager to regenerate the principals.

**Important:**

- Regenerate principals using the Cloudera Manager Admin Console only, and not directly using `kadmin` shell.
- Do not regenerate the principals for your cluster unless you have made a global configuration change, such as changing the encryption type.
- If you are using an MIT KDC, be sure to read [Configuring a Cluster-dedicated MIT KDC with Cross-Realm Trust](#) on page 181 to avoid making your existing host keytabs invalid.

Managing Active Directory Account Properties

If you are using an Active Directory KDC, Cloudera Manager 5.8 (and higher) will allow you to configure Active Directory accounts and customize the credential regeneration process using the Cloudera Manager Admin Console. You can also use Cloudera Manager to configure the encryption types to be used by your Active Directory account. Once you modify any Active Directory account properties, you must regenerate Kerberos credentials to reflect those changes. The credential regeneration process requires you to delete existing accounts before new ones are created.

By default, Cloudera Manager does not delete accounts in Active Directory. Hence, to regenerate Kerberos principals contained in Active Directory, you need to manually delete the existing Active Directory accounts. You can either delete and regenerate all existing Active Directory accounts, or only delete those with the `userPrincipalName` (or login name) that you will later manually select for regeneration. If the accounts haven’t already been deleted manually, the regeneration process will throw an error message saying that deletion of accounts is required before you proceed.

Modifying Active Directory Account Properties Using Cloudera Manager

If you are using an Active Directory KDC, you can configure Active Directory account properties such as `objectClass` and `accountExpires` directly from the Cloudera Manager Admin Console. Any changes to these properties will be reflected in the regenerated Kerberos credentials. To configure AD account properties:

1. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and click the **Administration** tab.
2. Select **Administration** > **Settings**.
3. Click the **Kerberos** category.
4. Locate the **Active Directory Account Properties** and edit as required. By default, the property will be set to:

```
accountExpires=0,objectClass=top,objectClass=person,objectClass=organizationalPerson,objectClass=user
```
5. Locate the **Active Directory Password Properties** and edit the field as needed. By default, the property will be set to:

```
length=12, minLowerCaseLetters=2, minUpperCaseLetters=2, minDigits=2, minSpaces=0, minSpecialChars=0, specialChars=?.!$%^*()-_+=~
```

6. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.

7. **Regenerate Kerberos credentials** with the new properties.

---

**Enabling Credential Regeneration for Active Directory Accounts Using Cloudera Manager**

To avoid having to delete accounts manually, use the following steps to set the **Active Directory Delete Accounts on Credential Regeneration** property to allow Cloudera Manager to automatically delete existing Active Directory accounts when new ones are created during regeneration. If this property is left unchecked (which is the default), Cloudera Manager will not be able to regenerate credentials automatically.

1. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and click the **Administration** tab.
2. Select **Administration > Settings**.
3. Click the **Kerberos** category.
4. Locate the **Active Directory Delete Accounts on Credential Regeneration** and check this property.
5. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.

---

**Configuring Encryption Types for Active Directory KDC Using Cloudera Manager**

Cloudera Manager allows you to configure the encryption types (or `enctype`) used by an Active Directory KDC to protect its data. Cloudera supports the following encryption types:

- `rc4-hmac`
- `aes128-cts`
- `aes256-cts`
- `des-cbc-crc`
- `des-cbc-md5`

To configure encryption types for an Active Directory KDC:

1. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and click the **Administration** tab.
2. Select **Administration > Settings**.
3. Click the **Kerberos** category.
4. Locate the **Kerberos Encryption Types** and click **+** to add the encryption types you want Active Directory to use. Make sure they are on Cloudera’s **list** of supported `enctype`s.
5. Check the checkbox for the **Active Directory Set Encryption Types** property. This will automatically set the Cloudera Manager AD account to use the encryption types configured in the previous step.
6. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.

---

**Moving Kerberos Principals to Another OU Within Active Directory**

If you have a Kerberized cluster configured with an Active Directory KDC, you can use the following steps to move the Kerberos principals from one AD Organizational Unit (OU) to another.

1. Create the new OU on the Active Directory Server.
2. Use AD’s Delegate Control wizard to set the permissions on the new OU such that the configured Cloudera Manager admin account has the ability to **Create, Delete and Manage User Accounts** within this OU.
3. **Stop the cluster**.
4. **Stop the Cloudera Management Service**.
5. In Active Directory, move all the Cloudera Manager and CDH components’ user accounts to the new OU.
6. Go to Cloudera Manager and go to **Administration > Security**.
7. Go to the **Kerberos Credentials** tab and click **Configuration**.
8. Select **Scope > Settings**.
9. Select Category > Kerberos.
10. Locate the Active Directory Suffix property and edit the value to reflect the new OU name.
11. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.

Viewing and Regenerating Kerberos Credentials Using Cloudera Manager (MIT and AD)

Use the following instructions to regenerate the principals for your cluster.

2. The currently configured Kerberos principals are displayed under the Kerberos Credentials tab. If you are running HDFS, the hdfs/hostname and host/hostname principals are listed. If you are running MapReduce, the mapred/hostname and host/hostname principals are listed. The principals for other running services are also listed.
3. Only if necessary, select the principals you want to regenerate.
4. Click Regenerate.

Running the Security Inspector

The Security Inspector uses the Host Inspector to run a security-related set of commands on the hosts in your cluster. It reports on matters such as how Java is configured for encryption and on the default realms configured on each host:

2. Click Security Inspector. Cloudera Manager begins several tasks to inspect the managed hosts.
3. After the inspection completes, click Download Result Data or Show Inspector Results to review the results.

Using a Custom Kerberos Keytab Retrieval Script

The Cloudera Manager Kerberos setup procedure requires you to create an administrator account for the Cloudera Manager user. Cloudera Manager then connects to your KDC and uses this admin account to generate principals and keytabs for the remaining CDH services. If for some reason, you cannot create a Cloudera Manager administrator account on your KDC with the privileges to create other principals and keytabs for CDH services, then these will need to be created manually.

Cloudera Manager gives you the option to use a custom script to retrieve keytabs from the local filesystem. To use a custom Kerberos keytab retrieval script:

1. The KDC administrators should create the required principals and keytabs, and store them securely on the Cloudera Manager Server host.
2. Create the keytab retrieval script. Your script should take two arguments: a full principal name for which it should retrieve a keytab, and a destination to which it can write the keytab. The script must be executable by the Cloudera Manager admin user, cloudera-scm. Depending on the principal name input by Cloudera Manager, the script should locate the corresponding keytab on the Cloudera Manager Server host (stored in step 1), and copy it into a location accessible to the cloudera-scm user. Here is a simple example:

```bash
#!/bin/bash
# Cloudera Manager will input a destination path
DEST="$1"
# Cloudera Manager will input the principal name in the format: <service>/<fqdn>@REALM
PRINC="$2"
# Assuming the '<service>_<fqdn>@REALM.keytab' naming convention for keytab files
IN=$(echo $PRINC | sed -e 's////_/')
SRC="/keytabs/$IN.keytab"
# Copy the keytab to the destination input by Cloudera Manager
cp -v $SRC $DEST
```

Note that the script will change according to the keytab naming convention followed by your organization.

3. Configure the location for the script in Cloudera Manager:
a. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin console.

b. Select Administration > Settings.

c. Select Category > Kerberos.

d. Locate the Custom Kerberos Keytab Retrieval Script and set it to point to the script created in step 2.

e. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.

4. Once the Custom Kerberos Keytab Retrieval Script property is set, whenever Cloudera Manager needs a keytab, it will ignore all other Kerberos configuration and run the keytab retrieval script to copy the required keytab to the desired destination.

5. Cloudera Manager can now distribute the keytab to the services that need access to it.

Note: The Cloudera Navigator web server accesses HDFS and Hue using the keytabs corresponding to those principals; however the custom script does not move these additional keytabs to the Navigator Metadata Server. To complete the setup for Navigator, move keytabs for HDFS and Hue principals to the Navigator home directory on the Navigator Metadata Server host manually (typically /var/lib/cloudera-scm-navigator).

Mapping Kerberos Principals to Short Names

Kerberos user principals typically have the format username@REALM, whereas Hadoop usernames are typically just username. To translate Kerberos principals to Hadoop usernames, Hadoop uses rules defined in the hadoop.security.auth_to_local property. The default setting strips the @REALM portion from the Kerberos principal, where REALM is the Kerberos realm defined by the default_realm setting in the NameNode krb5.conf file.

If you configure your cluster’s Kerberos realm to trust other realms, such as a trust between your cluster’s realm and a central Active Directory or MIT Kerberos realm, you must identify the trusted realms in Cloudera Manager so it can automatically generate the appropriate rules. If you do not do so, user accounts in those realms cannot access the cluster.

To specify trusted realms using Cloudera Manager:

1. Go to the HDFS Service > Configuration tab.

2. Select Scope > HDFS (Service-Wide).


4. In the Search field, type Kerberos Realms to find the Trusted Kerberos Realms and Additional Rules to Map Kerberos Principals to Short Names settings.

5. Add realms that are trusted by the cluster’s Kerberos realm. Realm names, including Active Directory realms, must be specified in uppercase letters (for example, CORP.EXAMPLE.COM). To add multiple realms, use the + button.

6. Click Save Changes.

The auto-generated mapping rules strip the Kerberos realm (for example, @CORP.EXAMPLE.COM) for each realm specified in the Trusted Kerberos Realms setting. To customize the mapping rules, specify additional rules in the Additional Rules to Map Kerberos Principals to Short Names setting, one rule per line. Only enter rules in this field; Cloudera Manager automatically surrounds the rules with the appropriate XML tags for the generated core-site.xml file. For more information on creating custom rules, including how to translate mixed-case Kerberos principals to lowercase Hadoop usernames, see Mapping Rule Syntax on page 109.

If you specify custom mapping rules for a Kerberos realm using the Additional Rules to Map Kerberos Principals to Short Names setting, ensure that the same realm is not specified in the Trusted Kerberos Realms setting. If it is, the auto-generated rule (which only strips the realm from the principal and does no additional transformations) takes precedent, and the custom rule is ignored.

For these changes to take effect, you must restart the cluster and redeploy the client configuration. On the Cloudera Manager Home > Status tab, click the cluster-wide button ☰ and select Deploy Client Configuration.
Moving Kerberos Principals to Another OU Within Active Directory

If you have a Kerberized cluster configured with an Active Directory KDC, you can use the following steps to move the Kerberos principals from one AD Organizational Unit (OU) to another.

1. Create the new OU on the Active Directory Server.
2. Use AD's Delegate Control wizard to set the permissions on the new OU such that the configured Cloudera Manager admin account has the ability to Create, Delete and Manage User Accounts within this OU.
3. Stop the cluster.
4. Stop the Cloudera Management Service.
5. In Active Directory, move all the Cloudera Manager and CDH components' user accounts to the new OU.
6. Go to Cloudera Manager and go to Administration > Security.
7. Go to the Kerberos Credentials tab and click Configuration.
8. Select Scope > Settings.
9. Select Category > Kerberos.
10. Locate the Active Directory Suffix property and edit the value to reflect the new OU name.
11. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.

Using Auth-to-Local Rules to Isolate Cluster Users

By default, the Hadoop auth-to-local rules map a principal of the form <username>/<hostname>@<REALM> to <username>. This means if there are multiple clusters in the same realm, then principals associated with hosts of one cluster would map to the same user in all other clusters.

For example, if you have two clusters, cluster1-host-[1..4].example.com and cluster2-host-[1..4].example.com, that are part of the same Kerberos realm, EXAMPLE.COM, then the cluster2 principal, hdfs/cluster2-host1.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM, will map to the hdfs user even on cluster1 hosts.

To prevent this, use auth-to-local rules as follows to ensure only principals containing hostnames of cluster1 are mapped to legitimate users.

1. Go to the HDFS Service > Configuration tab.
2. Select Scope > HDFS (Service-Wide).
4. In the Search field, type Additional Rules to find the Additional Rules to Map Kerberos Principals to Short Names settings.
5. Add the following mapping rules before the rules generated from the list of trusted realms and the default rule:

```
RULE:[2:$1/$2@$0](hdfs/cluster1-host1.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM)s/(.*)@EXAMPLE.COM/hdfs/
RULE:[2:$1/$2@$0](hdfs/cluster1-host2.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM)s/(.*)@EXAMPLE.COM/hdfs/
RULE:[2:$1/$2@$0](hdfs/cluster1-host3.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM)s/(.*)@EXAMPLE.COM/hdfs/
RULE:[2:$1/$2@$0](hdfs/cluster1-host4.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM)s/(.*)@EXAMPLE.COM/hdfs/
RULE:[2:$1/$2@$0](hdfs.*@EXAMPLE.COM)s/(.*)@EXAMPLE.COM/nobody/
```

In the example, the principal hdfs/<hostname>@REALM is mapped to the hdfs user if <hostname> is one of the cluster hosts. Otherwise it gets mapped to nobody, thus ensuring that principals from other clusters do not have access to cluster1.

If the cluster hosts can be represented with a regular expression, that expression can be used to make the configuration easier and more conducive to scaling. For example:

```
RULE:[2:$1/$2@$0](hdfs/cluster1-host[1-4].example.com@EXAMPLE.COM)s/(.*)@EXAMPLE.COM/hdfs/
RULE:[2:$1/$2@$0](hdfs.*@EXAMPLE.COM)s/(.*)@EXAMPLE.COM/nobody/
```

6. Click Save Changes.
7. Restart the HDFS service and any dependent services.
Enabling Kerberos Authentication Without the Wizard

**Required Role: Full Administrator** (for some steps), **Configurator**, or **Cluster Manager**

Whether you integrate Cloudera Manager cluster with Kerberos using the wizard or by following the manual steps below, the same requirements and pre-requisites apply. See [Enabling Kerberos Authentication Using the Wizard](#) on page 49 for details. Also see [Step 4: Enabling Kerberos Using the Wizard](#) on page 53 for Kerberos version information.

The following are the general steps for integrating Kerberos with Cloudera Manager:

**Step 1: Install Cloudera Manager and CDH**

If you have not already done so, Cloudera strongly recommends that you install and configure the Cloudera Manager Server and Cloudera Manager Agents and CDH to set up a fully-functional CDH cluster *before* you begin performing the steps to implement Kerberos authentication.

**User Accounts and Groups in CDH and Cloudera Manager Required to Support Security:**

When you install the CDH packages and the Cloudera Manager Agents on your cluster hosts, Cloudera Manager takes some steps to provide system security such as creating the following Unix accounts and setting directory permissions as shown in the following table. These Unix accounts and directory permissions work with the Hadoop Kerberos security requirements.

![Note: Cloudera Manager 5.3 introduces a new single user mode. In single user mode, the Cloudera Manager Agent and all the processes run by services managed by Cloudera Manager are started as a single configured user and group. See Configuring Single User Mode for more information.](#)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This User</th>
<th>Runs These Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hdfs</td>
<td>NameNode, DataNodes, and Secondary Node</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mapred</td>
<td>JobTracker and TaskTrackers (MR1) and Job History Server (YARN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yarn</td>
<td>ResourceManager and NodeManagers (YARN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oozie</td>
<td>Oozie Server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hue</td>
<td>Hue Server, Beeswax Server, Authorization Manager, and Job Designer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hdfs user also acts as the HDFS superuser.

When you install the Cloudera Manager Server on the server host, a new Unix user account called `cloudera-scm` is created automatically to support security. The Cloudera Manager Server uses this account to create and deploy the host principals and keytabs on your cluster.

Depending on whether you installed CDH and Cloudera Manager at the same time or not, use one of the following sections for information on configuring directory ownerships on cluster hosts:

**If you installed CDH and Cloudera Manager at the Same Time**

If you have a new installation and you installed CDH and Cloudera Manager at the same time, when you started the Cloudera Manager Agents on your cluster hosts, the Cloudera Manager Agent on each host automatically configured the directory owners shown in the following table to support security. Assuming the owners are configured as shown, the Hadoop daemons can then automatically set the permissions for each of the directories specified by the properties shown below to make sure they are properly restricted. It's critical that the owners are configured exactly as shown below, so do not change them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory Specified in this Property</th>
<th>Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dfs.name.dir</td>
<td>hdfs:hadoop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dfs.data.dir</td>
<td>hdfs:hadoop</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Configuring Authentication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory Specified in this Property</th>
<th>Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mapred.local.dir</td>
<td>mapred:hadoop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mapred.system.dir in HDFS</td>
<td>mapred:hadoop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs</td>
<td>yarn:yarn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yarn.nodemanager.log-dirs</td>
<td>yarn:yarn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oozie.service.StoreService.jdbc.url (if using Derby)</td>
<td>oozie:oozie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[[database]] name</td>
<td>hue:hue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>javax.jdo.option.ConnectionURL</td>
<td>hue:hue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you Installed and Used CDH Before Installing Cloudera Manager

If you have been using HDFS and running MapReduce jobs in an existing installation of CDH before you installed Cloudera Manager, you must manually configure the owners of the directories shown in the table above. Doing so enables the Hadoop daemons to automatically set the permissions for each of the directories. It’s critical that you manually configure the owners exactly as shown above.

Step 2: If You are Using AES-256 Encryption, Install the JCE Policy File

If you are using CentOS or RHEL 5.5 or higher, which use AES-256 encryption by default for tickets, you must install the [Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction Policy File](https://github.com/Cloudera/security/blob/master/jce_policy-x.zip) on all cluster and Hadoop user hosts. There are 2 ways to do this:

- In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, navigate to the Hosts page. Both, the Add New Hosts to Cluster wizard and the Re-run Upgrade Wizard will give you the option to have Cloudera Manager install the JCE Policy file for you.
- You can follow the JCE Policy File installation instructions in the README.txt file included in the jce_policy-x.zip file.

Alternatively, you can configure Kerberos to not use AES-256 by removing `aes256-cts:normal` from the supported_enc_types field of the kdc.conf or krb5.conf file. Note that after changing the kdc.conf file, you’ll need to restart both the KDC and the kadmin server for those changes to take affect. You may also need to recreate or change the password of the relevant principals, including potentially the Ticket Granting Ticket principal (for example, krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM). If AES-256 is still used after all of those steps, it’s because the `aes256-cts:normal` setting existed when the Kerberos database was created. To fix this, create a new Kerberos database and then restart both the KDC and the kadmin server.

To verify the type of encryption used in your cluster:

1. On the local KDC host, type this command in the kadmin.local or kadmin shell to create a test principal:
   ```
   kadmin:  addprinc test
   ```

2. On a cluster host, type this command to start a Kerberos session as the test principal:
   ```
   $ kinit test
   ```

3. After successfully running the previous command, type this command to view the encryption type in use:
   ```
   $ klist -e
   ```
If AES is being used, output like the following is displayed after you type the `klist` command (note that AES-256 is included in the output):

```
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_0
Default principal: test@EXAMPLE.COM
Valid starting  Expires             Service principal
05/19/11 13:25:04  05/20/11 13:25:04 krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
  Etype (skey, tkt): AES-256 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC, AES-256 CTS mode with
  96-bit SHA-1 HMAC
```

Step 3: Get or Create a Kerberos Principal for the Cloudera Manager Server

In order to create and deploy the host principals and keytabs on your cluster, the Cloudera Manager Server must have the correct Kerberos principal. Specifically, the Cloudera Manager Server must have a Kerberos principal that has administrator privileges. Typically, principals with the second component of `admin` in the principal name (for example, `username/admin@EXAMPLE.COM`) have administrator privileges. This is why `admin` is shown in the following instructions and examples.

To get or create the Kerberos principal for the Cloudera Manager Server, you can do either of the following:

- Ask your Kerberos administrator to create a Kerberos administrator principal for the Cloudera Manager Server.
- Create the Kerberos principal for the Cloudera Manager Server yourself by using the following instructions in this step.

Creating the Cloudera Manager Principal

If you are using Active Directory

1. Create an Organizational Unit (OU) in your AD where all the principals used by your CDH cluster will reside.
2. Add a new AD user, for example, `<username>@EXAMPLE.COM`. The password for this user should be set to never expire.
3. Use AD's Delegate Control wizard to allow this new user to Create, Delete and Manage User Accounts.

If you are using MIT KDC

The instructions in this section illustrate an example of creating the Cloudera Manager Server principal for MIT Kerberos. (If you are using another version of Kerberos, refer to your Kerberos documentation for instructions.)

```
Note: If you are running `kadmin` and the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) on the same host, use `kadmin.local` in the following steps. If the Kerberos KDC is running on a remote host, you must use `kadmin` instead of `kadmin.local`.
```

In the `kadmin.local` or `kadmin` shell, type the following command to create the Cloudera Manager Server principal, replacing `EXAMPLE.COM` with the name of your realm:

```
  kadmin: addprinc -pw <Password> cloudera-scm/admin@EXAMPLE.COM
```

Step 4: Import KDC Account Manager Credentials

1. In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, select Administration > Security.
2. Go to the Kerberos Credentials tab and click Import Kerberos Account Manager Credentials.
3. In the Import Kerberos Account Manager Credentials dialog box, enter the username and password for the user that can create principals for CDH cluster in the KDC. This is the user/principal you created in Step 3: Get or Create a Kerberos Principal for the Cloudera Manager Server on page 69. Cloudera Manager encrypts the username and password into a keytab and uses it as needed to create new principals.
Note: The username entered should have the realm portion in upper-case only as shown in the example in the UI.

Click Close when complete.

Note: Many enterprises employ policies that require all passwords to be changed after a particular number of days. If you must change the password in Cloudera Manager for the Account Manager, then immediately re-run the steps provided in this procedure.

Step 5: Configure the Kerberos Default Realm in the Cloudera Manager Admin Console

**Minimum Required Role:** Full Administrator

**Important:** Hadoop requires a default Kerberos realm be configured in the `libdefaults` property in the `/etc/krb5.conf` file on every host in the cluster:

```
[libdefaults]
default_realm = EXAMPLE.COM
```

1. In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, select Administration > Settings.
2. Under the Category filter, click Kerberos.
3. In the Kerberos Security Realm field, enter the name of your default Kerberos realm. Use the same realm name configured in the `/etc/krb5.conf` file. For example, EXAMPLE.COM:

   ![Kerberos Security Realm](EXAMPLE.COM)

4. Click Save Changes.

Step 6: Stop All Services

**Minimum Required Role:** Operator (also provided by Configurator, Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

Before you enable security in CDH, you must stop all Hadoop daemons in your cluster and then change some configuration properties. You must stop all daemons in the cluster because after one Hadoop daemon has been restarted with the configuration properties set to enable security. Daemons running without security enabled will be unable to communicate with that daemon. This requirement to stop all daemons makes it impossible to do a rolling upgrade to enable security on a Hadoop cluster.

Stop all running services, and the Cloudera Management service, as follows:

**Stopping All Services**

1. On the Home > Status tab, click

   ![Stop Button]

   to the right of the cluster name and select Stop.

2. Click Stop in the confirmation screen. The Command Details window shows the progress of stopping services. When All services successfully stopped appears, the task is complete and you can close the Command Details window.
Stopping the Cloudera Management Service

1. On the Home > Status tab, click to the right of Cloudera Management Service and select Stop.

2. Click Stop to confirm. The Command Details window shows the progress of stopping the roles.

3. When Command completed with *n*/n successful subcommands appears, the task is complete. Click Close.

Step 7: Enable Hadoop Security

Minimum Required Role: Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

To enable Hadoop security for the cluster, you enable it on an HDFS service. After you do so, the Cloudera Manager Server automatically enables Hadoop security on the MapReduce and YARN services associated with that HDFS service.

1. Go to the HDFS Service > Configuration tab.

2. In the Search field, type Hadoop Secure to show the Hadoop security properties (found under the Service-Wide > Security category).

3. Click the value for the Hadoop Secure Authentication property and select the kerberos option to enable Hadoop security on the selected HDFS service.

4. Click the value for the Hadoop Secure Authorization property and select the checkbox to enable service-level authorization on the selected HDFS service. You can specify comma-separated lists of users and groups authorized to use Hadoop services or perform admin operations using the following properties under the Service-Wide > Security section:
   - Authorized Users: Comma-separated list of users authorized to use Hadoop services.
   - Authorized Groups: Comma-separated list of groups authorized to use Hadoop services.
   - Authorized Admin Users: Comma-separated list of users authorized to perform admin operations on Hadoop.
   - Authorized Admin Groups: Comma-separated list of groups authorized to perform admin operations on Hadoop.

   **Important:** For Cloudera Manager’s Monitoring services to work, the hue user should always be added as an authorized user.

5. In the Search field, type DataNode Transceiver to find the DataNode Transceiver Port property.

6. Click the value for the DataNode Transceiver Port property and specify a privileged port number (below 1024). Cloudera recommends 1004.

   **Note:** If there is more than one DataNode Role Group, you must specify a privileged port number for each DataNode Transceiver Port property.

7. In the Search field, type DataNode HTTP to find the DataNode HTTP Web UI Port property and specify a privileged port number (below 1024). Cloudera recommends 1006.

   **Note:** These port numbers for the two DataNode properties must be below 1024 to provide part of the security mechanism to make it impossible for a user to run a MapReduce task that impersonates a DataNode. The port numbers for the NameNode and Secondary NameNode can be anything you want, but the default port numbers are good ones to use.

8. In the Search field type Data Directory Permissions to find the DataNode Data Directory Permissions property.

9. Reset the value for the DataNode Data Directory Permissions property to the default value of 700 if not already set to that.

10. Make sure you have changed the DataNode Transceiver Port, DataNode Data Directory Permissions and DataNode HTTP Web UI Port properties for every DataNode role group.
11. Click **Save Changes** to save the configuration settings.

**To enable ZooKeeper security:**
1. Go to the **ZooKeeper Service > Configuration** tab and click **View and Edit**.
2. Click the value for **Enable Kerberos Authentication** property.
3. Click **Save Changes** to save the configuration settings.

**To enable HBase security:**
1. Go to the **HBase Service > Configuration** tab and click **View and Edit**.
2. In the Search field, type HBase Secure to show the Hadoop security properties (found under the **Service-Wide > Security** category).
3. Click the value for the **HBase Secure Authorization** property and select the checkbox to enable authorization on the selected HBase service.
4. Click the value for the **HBase Secure Authentication** property and select kerberos to enable authorization on the selected HBase service.
5. Click **Save Changes** to save the configuration settings.

**(CDH 4.3 or later) To enable Solr security:**
1. Go to the **Solr Service > Configuration** tab and click **View and Edit**.
2. In the Search field, type Solr Secure to show the Solr security properties (found under the **Service-Wide > Security** category).
3. Click the value for the **Solr Secure Authentication** property and select kerberos to enable authorization on the selected Solr service.
4. Click **Save Changes** to save the configuration settings.

**Note:** If you use the Cloudera Manager Admin Console to generate a client configuration file after you enable Hadoop security on your cluster, the generated configuration file will not contain the Kerberos principal and keytab file that end users need to authenticate. Users must obtain Kerberos principal and keytab file from your Kerberos administrator and then run the `kinit` command themselves.

---

**Step 8: Wait for the Generate Credentials Command to Finish**

**Minimum Required Role:** **Configurator** (also provided by **Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator**)

After you enable security for any of the services in Cloudera Manager, a command called Generate Credentials will be triggered automatically. You can watch the progress of the command on the top right corner of the screen that shows the running commands. Wait for this command to finish (indicated by a grey box containing "0" in it).

**Step 9: Enable Hue to Work with Hadoop Security using Cloudera Manager**

**Minimum Required Role:** **Cluster Administrator** (also provided by **Full Administrator**)

For Hue to work properly with a secure Kerberos cluster deployed with Cloudera Manager, you must add the **Kerberos Ticket Renewer** to the Hue service. You can do so in Cloudera Manager by adding a Kerberos Ticket Renewer role instance on each host with a Hue Server role.

The Hue Kerberos Ticket Renewer only renews tickets for the Hue service principal, `hue/<hostname>@<YOUR-REALM.COM>`. The Hue principal impersonates other users for applications within Hue such as the Job Browser, File Browser and so on.

Core Hadoop services such as HDFS and MapReduce do not use the Hue Kerberos Ticket Renewer. They obtain tickets at startup and use those tickets to obtain Delegation Tokens for various access privileges. Each service handles its own ticket renewal as needed.

**Adding a Kerberos Ticket Renewer role instance in Cloudera Manager:**
1. Go to the **Hue** service.
2. Click the **Instances** tab.
3. Click the **Add Role Instances** button.
4. Assign the **Kerberos Ticket Renewer** role instance to the same host as the Hue server.

   When the wizard status is **Finished**, the Kerberos Ticket Renewer role instance is configured. The Hue service now works with the secure Hadoop cluster.

5. Repeat these steps for each Hue Server role.

**Troubleshooting the Kerberos Ticket Renewer:**

If the Hue Kerberos Ticket Renewer does not start, check the configuration of your Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC). Look at the ticket renewal property, `maxrenewlife`, to ensure that the principals, `hue/<hostname>` and `krbtgt`, are renewable. If these principals are not renewable, run the following commands on the KDC to enable them:

```bash
kadmin.local: modprinc -maxrenewlife 90day krbtgt/YOUR_REALM.COM
kadmin.local: modprinc -maxrenewlife 90day +allow_renewable hue/<hostname>@YOUR-REALM.COM
```

**Step 10: (Flume Only) Use Substitution Variables for the Kerberos Principal and Keytab**

**Minimum Required Role: Configurator** (also provided by **Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator**)

As described in Flume **security configuration**, if you are using Flume on a secure cluster you must configure the HDFS sink or HBase sink with the following configuration options in the `flume.conf` file:

- `kerberosPrincipal` - fully qualified principal.
- `kerberosKeytab` - location on the local host of the keytab containing the user and host keys for the above principal

Since Cloudera Manager generates the Flume keytab files for you, and the locations of the keytab files cannot be known beforehand, substitution variables are required for Flume. Cloudera Manager provides two Flume substitution variables called `$KERBEROS_PRINCIPAL` and `$KERBEROS_KEYTAB` to configure the principal name and the keytab file path respectively on each host.

**HDFS Sink Example**

The following example shows an HDFS sink configuration in the `flume.conf` file (the majority of the HDFS sink configuration options have been omitted):

```properties
agent.sinks.sink-1.type = HDFS
agent.sinks.sink-1.hadoop.kerberosPrincipal = flume/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM
agent.sinks.sink-1.hadoop.kerberosKeytab = /etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.keytab
agent.sinks.sink-1.hadoop.proxyUser = weblogs
```

The text below shows the same configuration options with the substitution variables:

```properties
agent.sinks.sink-1.type = hdfs
agent.sinks.sink-1.hadoop.kerberosPrincipal = $KERBEROS_PRINCIPAL
agent.sinks.sink-1.hadoop.kerberosKeytab = $KERBEROS_KEYTAB
agent.sinks.sink-1.hadoop.proxyUser = weblogs
```

**HBase Sink Example**

The following example shows an HBase sink configuration in the `flume.conf` file (the majority of the HBase sink configuration options have been omitted):

```properties
agent.sinks.sink-1.type = hbase
agent.sinks.sink-1.kerberosPrincipal = flume/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM
agent.sinks.sink-1.kerberosKeytab = /etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.keytab
```
Configuring Authentication

The text below shows the same configuration options with the substitution variables:

```plaintext
agent.sinks.sink-1.type = hbase
agent.sinks.sink-1.kerberosPrincipal = $KERBEROS_PRINCIPAL
agent.sinks.sink-1.kerberosKeytab = $KERBEROS_KEYTAB
```

Use the Flume Substitution Variables for the Kerberos Principal and Keytab

Complete the following steps to have Cloudera Manager add these variables to the `flume.conf` file on every host that Cloudera Manager manages.

1. Go to the Flume service > Configuration page in Cloudera Manager.
2. Click Agent.
3. In the Configuration File property, add the configuration options with the substitution variables. For example:

   ```plaintext
   agent.sinks.sink-1.type = hdfs
   agent.sinks.sink-1.hdfs.kerberosPrincipal = $KERBEROS_PRINCIPAL
   agent.sinks.sink-1.hdfs.kerberosKeytab = $KERBEROS_KEYTAB
   agent.sinks.sink-1.hdfs.proxyUser = weblogs
   ```

4. Click Save.

Step 11: Start All Services

Minimum Required Role: Operator (also provided by Configurator, Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

Start all services on your cluster:

Starting All Services

1. On the Home > Status tab, click

   ![Dropdown menu]

   to the right of the cluster name and select Start.

2. Click Start that appears in the next screen to confirm. The Command Details window shows the progress of starting services.

   When All services successfully started appears, the task is complete and you can close the Command Details window.

Starting the Cloudera Management Service

1. On the Home > Status tab, click

   ![Dropdown menu]

   to the right of Cloudera Management Service and select Start.

2. Click Start to confirm. The Command Details window shows the progress of starting the roles.

   3. When Command completed with n/n successful subcommands appears, the task is complete. Click Close.

Step 12: Deploy Client Configurations

Minimum Required Role: Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

1. On the Home > Status tab, click

   ![Dropdown menu]

   to the right of the cluster name and select Deploy Client Configuration.

2. Click Deploy Client Configuration.
Step 13: Create the HDFS Superuser Principal

To be able to create home directories for users, you will need access to the HDFS superuser account. (CDH automatically created the HDFS superuser account on each cluster host during CDH installation.) When you enabled Kerberos for the HDFS service, you lost access to the default HDFS superuser account using `sudo -u hdfs` commands. Cloudera recommends you use a different user account as the superuser, not the default `hdfs` account.

Designating a Non-Default Superuser Group

To designate a different group of superusers instead of using the default `hdfs` account, follow these steps:

1. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and navigate to the HDFS service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > HDFS (Service-Wide).
5. Locate the Superuser Group property and change the value to the appropriate group name for your environment. For example, `<superuser>`.
6. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
7. Restart the HDFS service.

To enable your access to the superuser account now that Kerberos is enabled, you must now create a Kerberos principal for an Active Directory user whose first component is `<superuser>`:

If you are using Active Directory

Add a new user account to Active Directory, `<superuser>@YOUR-REALM.COM`. The password for this account should be set to never expire.

If you are using MIT KDC

1. In the `kadmin.local` or `kadmin` shell, type the following command to create a Kerberos principal called `<superuser>`:

   ```bash
   kadmin: addprinc <superuser>@YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COM
   ```

   This command prompts you to create a password for the `<superuser>` principal. You should use a strong password because having access to this principal provides superuser access to all of the files in HDFS.

2. To run commands as the HDFS superuser, you must obtain Kerberos credentials for the `<superuser>` principal. To do so, run the following command and provide the appropriate password when prompted.

   ```bash
   $ kinit <superuser>@YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COM
   ```

Step 14: Get or Create a Kerberos Principal for Each User Account

Now that Kerberos is configured and enabled on your cluster, you and every other Hadoop user must have a Kerberos principal or keytab to obtain Kerberos credentials to be allowed to access the cluster and use the Hadoop services. In the next step of this procedure, you need to create your own Kerberos principals to verify that Kerberos security is working on your cluster. If you and the other Hadoop users already have a Kerberos principal or keytab, or if your Kerberos administrator can provide them, you can skip ahead to the next step.

The following instructions explain how to create a Kerberos principal for a user account.

If you are using Active Directory

Add a new AD user account, `<username>@EXAMPLE.COM` for each Cloudera Manager service that should use Kerberos authentication. The password for these service accounts should be set to never expire.
If you are using MIT KDC

1. In the kadmin.local or kadmin shell, use the following command to create a principal for your account by replacing EXAMPLE.COM with the name of your realm, and replacing username with a username:

   ```
   kadmin:  addprinc username@EXAMPLE.COM
   ```

2. When prompted, enter the password twice.

Step 15: Prepare the Cluster for Each User

Before you and other users can access the cluster, there are a few tasks you must do to prepare the hosts for each user.

1. Make sure all hosts in the cluster have a Unix user account with the same name as the first component of that user’s principal name. For example, the Unix account joe should exist on every box if the user’s principal name is joe@YOUR-REALM.COM. You can use LDAP for this step if it is available in your organization.

   **Note:** Each account must have a user ID that is greater than or equal to 1000. In the `/etc/hadoop/conf/taskcontroller.cfg` file, the default setting for the banned.users property is mapred, hdfs, and bin to prevent jobs from being submitted from those user accounts. The default setting for the min.user.id property is 1000 to prevent jobs from being submitted with a user ID less than 1000, which are conventionally Unix super users.

2. Create a subdirectory under /user on HDFS for each user account (for example, /user/joe). Change the owner and group of that directory to be the user.

   ```
   $ hadoop fs -mkdir /user/joe
   $ hadoop fs -chown joe /user/joe
   ```

   **Note:** `sudo -u hdfs` is not included in the commands above. This is because it is not required if Kerberos is enabled on your cluster. You will, however, need to have Kerberos credentials for the HDFS super user to successfully run these commands. For information on gaining access to the HDFS super user account, see Step 13: Create the HDFS Superuser Principal on page 75.

Step 16: Verify that Kerberos Security is Working

After you have Kerberos credentials, you can verify that Kerberos security is working on your cluster by trying to run MapReduce jobs. To confirm, try launching a sleep or a pi job from the provided Hadoop examples (/usr/lib/hadoop/hadoop-examples.jar).

**Note:**

This section assumes you have a fully-functional CDH cluster and you have been able to access HDFS and run MapReduce jobs before you followed these instructions to configure and enable Kerberos on your cluster. If you have not already done so, you should at a minimum use the Cloudera Manager Admin Console to generate a client configuration file to enable you to access the cluster. For instructions, see Deploying Client Configuration Files.

To verify that Kerberos security is working:

1. Acquire Kerberos credentials for your user account.

   ```
   $ kinit USERNAME@YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COM
   ```

2. Enter a password when prompted.
3. Submit a sample pi calculation as a test MapReduce job. Use the following command if you use a package-based setup for Cloudera Manager:

```bash
$ hadoop jar /usr/lib/hadoop-0.20/hadoop-0.20.2*examples.jar pi 10 10000
Number of Maps = 10
Samples per Map = 10000
... Job Finished in 38.572 seconds
Estimated value of Pi is 3.14120000000000000000
```

If you have a parcel-based setup, use the following command instead:

```bash
$ hadoop jar /opt/cloudera/parcels/CDH/lib/hadoop-0.20-mapreduce/hadoop-examples.jar pi 10 10000
Number of Maps = 10
Samples per Map = 10000
... Job Finished in 30.958 seconds
Estimated value of Pi is 3.14120000000000000000
```

You have now verified that Kerberos security is working on your cluster.

**Important:**

Running a MapReduce job will fail if you do not have a valid Kerberos ticket in your credentials cache. You can examine the Kerberos tickets currently in your credentials cache by running the `klist` command. You can obtain a ticket by running the `kinit` command and either specifying a keytab file containing credentials, or entering the password for your principal. If you do not have a valid ticket, you will receive an error such as:

```
11/01/04 12:08:12 WARN ipc.Client: Exception encountered while connecting to the server: java.security.sasl.SaslException:GSS initiate failed
  [Caused by GSSEXception: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Failed to find any Kerberos tgt)]
```

**Step 17: (Optional) Require Authentication for HTTP Web Consoles**

**Required Role:** Configurator, Cluster Administrator, or Full Administrator

Access to the web consoles for HTTP services, such as HDFS, MapReduce, and YARN roles can be restricted to only those users with valid Kerberos credentials. After configuring the cluster services as detailed below, the web service and the browser negotiate the authentication process using SPNEGO.

To require authentication for HTTP services on the cluster, including Web UIs:

1. From the Clusters tab, select the service (HDFS, MapReduce, or YARN) for which you want to enable authentication.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Under the Scope filter, click service_name (Service-Wide).
4. Under the Category filter, click Security to display the security configuration options.
5. In the Enable Kerberos Authentication for HTTP Web-Consoles setting, click the box to activate authentication requirement for the selected service_name (Service-Wide).
6. Click Save Changes to save the change.

Cloudera Manager generates new credentials for the service. When the process finishes, restart all roles for that service.
Repeat this process for the other services for which you want to require Kerberos authentication.

Configure your browser to support authentication to the HTTP services by following the appropriate steps for your browser in How to Configure Browsers for Kerberos Authentication on page 448.

Configuring Authentication for Cloudera Navigator Data Management

Users access Cloudera Navigator by means of a role-based privilege user account created in one of two different ways:

- User account created in Cloudera Manager’s internal user management system. This approach is best for creating the administrator account for setting up the system because only Full Administrator or Navigator Administrator user roles can be assigned to users created this way.
- User accounts managed by an external service, specifically, your organization’s Active Directory or LDAP service. This approach lets you assign Cloudera Navigator user roles to groups comprising the user accounts that should have those privileges.

The Cloudera Manager Full Administrator and Navigator Administrator user accounts are granted full access to Cloudera Navigator features and enable the administrator to configure the external authentication service for Cloudera Navigator users.

Configuring External Authentication for the Cloudera Navigator Data Management Component

**Minimum Required Role:** Navigator Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

**Important:** This feature is available only with a Cloudera Enterprise license. It is not available in Cloudera Express. For information on Cloudera Enterprise licenses, see Managing Licenses.

Cloudera Navigator supports user authentication against Cloudera Manager user accounts and against an external service. The external service can be either LDAP or Active Directory. User authentication against Cloudera Manager user accounts requires users to have one of two Cloudera Manager user roles, either Full Administrator or Navigator Administrator. External authentication enables you to assign Cloudera Navigator user roles to LDAP or Active Directory groups to which the appropriate users belong.

For more information about Cloudera Manager user accounts, see Cloudera Manager User Accounts on page 38. For more information about Cloudera Navigator user roles, see Cloudera Navigator Data Management User Roles on page 342.

The following sections describe how to configure the supported external directory services.
Configuring Cloudera Navigator Authentication Using Active Directory

**Important:**
Cloudera Navigator has its own role-based access control and user management scheme. If you want to use LDAP/AD authentication, Cloudera Navigator roles must be explicitly assigned to AD users to allow them to log in to Navigator. To assign roles to AD users, log in to Cloudera Navigator for the first time using a Cloudera Manager admin user. Any non-externally authenticated Cloudera Manager user that has Full Administrator or Navigator Administrator privileges will have admin access to Cloudera Navigator. You can use this account to set up user groups and assign Cloudera Navigator roles to AD users.

Hence, Cloudera recommends that the **Authentication Backend Order** property be set initially to **Cloudera Manager then External**. Otherwise, the external authentication system will be checked first, and if the same user credentials also exist in the specified LDAP or Active Directory, the user will be authenticated there, and will not be authenticated as a Cloudera Manager administrator. Since no user roles will have been set up yet for the users in the external authentication system, the user’s attempt to log in will fail. Once the groups and user roles for Cloudera Navigator are set up, the **Authentication Backend Order** can be changed to **External then Cloudera Manager** or **External Only**, if desired.

To configure Cloudera Navigator to use AD authentication:

1. Select **Clusters > Cloudera Management Service**.
2. Click the **Configuration** tab.
3. Select **Scope > Navigator Metadata Server**.
4. Select **Category > External Authentication**.
5. In the **Authentication Backend Order** field, select the order in which Cloudera Navigator should attempt its authentication. You can choose to authenticate users using just one of the methods (using Cloudera Manager user accounts is the default), or you can set it so that if the user cannot be authenticated by the first method, it will attempt using the second method.
6. In the **External Authentication Type** property, select **Active Directory**.
7. In the **LDAP URL** property, provide the URL of the LDAP/Active Directory server to authenticate against. The URL has the form: `[ldap|ldaps]://hostname:port`. If a port is not specified, the default LDAP port is used (389 for LDAP and 636 for LDAPS). For more details on the LDAP URL format, see [RFC 2255](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2255).
8. For the **Bind Distinguished Name** property, you require the userPrincipalName (UPN) of the user to bind as. For example, if the UPN is `sampleuser@EXAMPLE.COM`, the **Bind Distinguished Name** provided can be either `sampleuser` or the complete UPN, `sampleuser@EXAMPLE.COM`. This is used to connect to Active Directory for searching groups and to get other user information.
9. In the **LDAP Bind Password**, enter the password for the bind user entered above.
10. In the **Active Directory NT Domain** property, provide the NT domain to authenticate against.
11. Click **Save Changes**.
12. After changing the configuration settings, restart the **Navigator Metadata Service**: click the **Instances** tab on the **Cloudera Management Service** page, check **Navigator Metadata Service**, and click **Actions for Selected > Restart**.

Configuring Cloudera Navigator Authentication Using an OpenLDAP-compatible Server

For an OpenLDAP-compatible directory, you have several options for searching for users and groups:

- You can specify a single base Distinguished Name (DN) and then provide a "Distinguished Name Pattern" to use to match a specific user in the LDAP directory.
- Search filter options let you search for a particular user based on somewhat broader search criteria – for example Cloudera Navigator users could be members of different groups or organizational units (OUs), so a single pattern does not find all those users. Search filter options also let you find all the groups to which a user belongs, to help determine if that user should be allowed to log in.

1. Select **Clusters > Cloudera Management Service**.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Click the Configuration tab.
5. Select Category > External Authentication.
6. In the Authentication Backend Order field, select the order in which Cloudera Navigator should attempt its authentication. You can choose to authenticate users using just one of the methods (using Cloudera Manager user accounts is the default), or you can set it so that if the user cannot be authenticated by the first method, it will attempt using the second method.
7. In the External Authentication Type, select LDAP.
8. In the LDAP URL property, provide the URL of the LDAP server and (optionally) the base Distinguished Name (DN) (the search base) as part of the URL — for example ldap://ldap-server.corp.com/dc=corp,dc=com.
9. In the LDAP Bind User Distinguished Name property, enter the user's sAMAccountName. This is used to connect to the LDAP server for searching groups and to get other user information.
10. In the LDAP Bind Password property, enter the password for the bind user entered above.
11. To use a single "Distinguished Name Pattern", provide a pattern in the LDAP Distinguished Name Pattern property. Use {0} in the pattern to indicate where the username should go. For example, to search for a distinguished name where the uid attribute is the username, you might provide a pattern similar to uid={0},ou=People,dc=corp,dc=com. Cloudera Navigator substitutes the name provided at login into this pattern and performs a search for that specific user. So if a user provides the username "foo" at the Cloudera Navigator login page, Cloudera Navigator will search for the DN uid=foo,ou=People,dc=corp,dc=com.
12. You can also search using User or Group search filters, using the LDAP User Search Base, LDAP User Search Filter, LDAP Group Search Base and LDAP Group Search Filter settings. These allow you to combine a base DN with a search filter to allow a greater range of search targets.
   For example, if you want to authenticate users who may be in one of multiple OUs, the search filter mechanism will allow this. You can specify the User Search Base DN as dc=corp,dc=com and the user search filter as uid={0}. Then Cloudera Navigator will search for the user anywhere in the tree starting from the Base DN. Suppose you have two OUs—ou=Engineering and ou=Operations—Cloudera Navigator will find User "foo" if it exists in either of these OUs, that is, uid=foo,ou=Engineering,dc=corp,dc=com or uid=foo,ou=Operations,dc=corp,dc=com.
   You can use a user search filter along with a DN pattern, so that the search filter provides a fallback if the DN pattern search fails.
   The Groups filters let you search to determine if a DN or username is a member of a target group. In this case, the filter you provide can be something like member={0} where {0} will be replaced with the DN of the user you are authenticating. For a filter requiring the username, {1} may be used, as memberUid={1}. This will return a list of groups to which the user belongs.
13. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.

Configuring Cloudera Navigator to Use LDAPS

If the LDAP server certificate has been signed by a trusted Certificate Authority (that is, VeriSign, GeoTrust, and so on), steps 1 and 2 below may not be necessary.

1. Copy the CA certificate file to the Cloudera Navigator Server host.
2. Import the CA certificate(s) from the CA certificate file to the local truststore. The default truststore is located in the $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts file. This contains the default CA information shipped with the JDK. Create an alternate default file called jssecacerts in the same location as the cacerts file. You can now
safely append CA certificates for any private or public CAs not present in the default cacerts file, while keeping the original file intact.

For our example, we will follow this recommendation by copying the default cacerts file into the new jssecacerts file, and then importing the CA certificate to this alternate truststore.

```
$ cp $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts \
$JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/jssecacerts

$ /usr/java/latest/bin/keytool -import -alias nt_domain_name \
-keystore /usr/java/latest/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts -file path_to_cert
```

**Note:**
- The default password for the cacerts store is changeit.
- The alias can be any name (not just the domain name).

3. Configure the **LDAP URL** property to use ldaps://ldap_server instead of ldap://ldap_server.

### Configuring Cloudera Navigator Authentication Using SAML

Cloudera Navigator supports the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), an XML-based open standard data format for exchanging authentication and authorization data between parties, in particular, between an identity provider (IDP) and a service provider (SP). The SAML specification defines three roles: the principal (typically a user), the IDP, and the SP. In the use case addressed by SAML, the principal (user agent) requests a service from the service provider. The service provider requests and obtains an identity assertion from the IDP. On the basis of this assertion, the SP can make an access control decision—in other words it can decide whether to perform some service for the connected principal.

The primary SAML use case is called web browser single sign-on (SSO). A user wielding a user agent (usually a web browser) requests a web resource protected by a SAML SP. The SP, wanting to know the identity of the requesting user, issues an authentication request to a SAML IDP through the user agent. In the context of this terminology, Cloudera Navigator operates as a SP. This topic discusses the Cloudera Navigator part of the configuration process; it assumes that you are familiar with SAML and SAML configuration in a general sense, and that you have a functioning IDP already deployed.

Setting up Cloudera Navigator to use SAML requires the following steps.

### Preparing Files

You will need to prepare the following files and information, and provide these to Cloudera Navigator:

- A Java keystore containing a private key for Cloudera Navigator to use to sign/encrypt SAML messages.
- The SAML metadata XML file from your IDP. This file must contain the public certificates needed to verify the sign/encrypt key used by your IDP per the SAML Metadata Interoperability Profile.
- The entity ID that should be used to identify the Navigator Metadata Server instance.
- How the user ID that is passed in the SAML authentication response:
  - As an attribute. If so, what identifier is used.
  - As the NameID.
- The method by which the Cloudera Navigator role will be established:
  - From an attribute in the authentication response:
    - What identifier will be used for the attribute
    - What values will be passed to indicate each role
  - From an external script that will be called for each use:
    - The script takes user ID as $1
– The script must assign an exit code to reflect successful authentication of the assigned role:
  – 0 - Full Administrator
  – 1 - User Administrator
  – 2 - Auditing Viewer
  – 4 - Lineage Viewer
  – 8 - Metadata Administrator
  – 16 - Policy Viewer
  – 32 - Policy Administrator
  – 64 - Custom Metadata Administrator
  – A negative value is returned for a failure to authenticate

To assign more than one role, add the numbers for the roles. For example, to assign the Policy Viewer and User Administrator roles, the exit code should be 17.

Configuring Cloudera Navigator

1. Select Clusters > Cloudera Management Service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
4. Select Category > External Authentication.
5. Type SAML in the Search box.
6. Set the External Authentication Type property to SAML (the Authentication Backend Order property is ignored for SAML).
7. Set the Path to SAML IDP Metadata File property to point to the IDP metadata file.
8. Set the Path to SAML Keystore File property to point to the Java keystore file containing the Cloudera Navigator private key (prepared above).
9. In the SAML Keystore Password property, set the SAML keystore password.
10. In the Alias of SAML Sign/Encrypt Private Key property, set the alias used to identify the private key for Cloudera Navigator to use.
11. In the SAML Sign/Encrypt Private Key Password property, set the password for the sign/encrypt private key.
12. Set the SAML Entity ID property if:
   • There is more than one Cloudera Navigator instance being used with the same IDP (each instance needs a different entity ID).
   • Entity IDs are assigned by organizational policy.

   The entity ID value should be unique to the current Navigator Metadata Server installation.
13. In the Source of User ID in SAML Response property, set whether the user ID will be obtained from an attribute or the NameID.

   If an attribute will be used, set the attribute name in the SAML Attribute Identifier for User ID property. The default value is the normal OID used for user IDs and so may not need to be changed.
14. In the SAML Role Assignment Mechanism property, set whether the role assignment will be done from an attribute or an external script.

   • If an attribute will be used:
     – In the SAML Attribute Identifier for User Role property, set the attribute name if necessary. The default value is the normal OID used for OrganizationalUnits and so may not need to be changed.
     – In the SAML Attribute Values for Roles property, set which attribute values will be used to indicate the user role.

   • If an external script will be used, set the path to that script in the Path to SAML Role Assignment Script property. Make sure that the script is executable (an executable binary is fine - it doesn’t need to be a shell script).
15. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.
16. **Restart** the Navigator Metadata Server role.

### Configuring the IDP

After the Cloudera Navigator is restarted, it will attempt to redirect to the IDP login page instead of showing the normal Cloudera Navigator login page. This may or may not succeed, depending on how the IDP is configured. In either case, the IDP will need to be configured to recognize Cloudera Navigator before authentication will actually succeed. The details of this process are specific to each IDP implementation - refer to your IDP documentation for details.

2. Inspect the metadata file and ensure that any URLs contained in the file can be resolved by users' web browsers. The IDP will redirect web browsers to these URLs at various points in the process. If the browser cannot resolve them, authentication will fail. If the URLs are incorrect, you can manually fix the XML file or set the **SAML Entity Base URL** property in the Navigator Metadata Server configuration to the right value, and then re-download the file.
3. Provide this metadata file to your IDP using whatever mechanism your IDP provides.
4. Ensure that the IDP has access to whatever public certificates are necessary to validate the private key that was provided by Cloudera Navigator earlier.
5. Ensure that the IDP is configured to provide the User ID and Role using the attribute names that Cloudera Navigator was configured to expect, if relevant.
6. Ensure the changes to the IDP configuration have taken effect (a restart may be necessary).

### Verifying Authentication and Authorization

2. Attempt to log in with credentials for a user that is entitled. The authentication should complete and you should see the Home page.
3. If authentication fails, you will see an IDP provided error message. Cloudera Navigator is not involved in this part of the process, and you must ensure the IDP is working correctly to complete the authentication.
4. If authentication succeeds but the user is not authorized to use Cloudera Navigator, they will be taken to an error page that explains the situation. If a user who should be authorized sees this error, then you will need to verify their role configuration, and ensure that it is being properly communicated to the Navigator Metadata Server, whether by attribute or external script. The Cloudera Navigator log will provide details on failures to establish a user’s role. If any errors occur during role mapping, Cloudera Navigator will assume the user is unauthorized.

### Bypassing SAML SSO

You can bypass SAML SSO by directly accessing the Cloudera Navigator login page at [http://hostname:7187/locallogin.html](http://hostname:7187/locallogin.html). You can turn off this bypass by setting the **Skip Authorization Check** property ([nav.auth.skip_saml_auth_check](cloudera-navigator.properties)) in the **Navigator Metadata Server Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve)** for cloudera-navigator.properties.

### Managing Users and Groups for the Cloudera Navigator Data Management Component

**Required Role:** Any one of the following: [Cloudera Navigator User Administrator](cloudera-navigator.properties) or [Full Administrator](cloudera-navigator.properties); or [Cloudera Manager Navigator Administrator](cloudera-navigator.properties) or [Full Administrator](cloudera-navigator.properties).

Users granted the Cloudera Manager role of Navigator Administrator who log in to Cloudera Navigator console are essentially the same as the Full Administrator (in the context of Cloudera Navigator user roles).

Cloudera Navigator supports user authentication against Cloudera Manager user accounts and against an external LDAP or Active Directory service. External authentication enables you to assign Cloudera Navigator user roles to LDAP or Active Directory groups containing the appropriate users for each user role.

**Assigning Cloudera Navigator User Roles to LDAP or Active Directory Groups**

The steps below assume that Cloudera Manager has been configured to integrate with Active Directory or other LDAP directory service as detailed in **Configuring External Authentication for Cloudera Navigator**. The steps also assume that user groups in the directory service have been granted permissions associated with the appropriate Cloudera Navigator...
Configuring Authentication

user roles. If not, assign Cloudera Navigator users to such groups in the directory service now. Cloudera Navigator user roles are as follows:

- Full Administrator
- User Administrator
- Auditing Viewer
- Lineage Viewer
- Metadata Administrator
- Policy Viewer
- Policy Administrator

Each role and its permissions is described in Cloudera Navigator User Roles. Plan out the user group-to-role mapping in advance—you must know the names of the Active Directory or LDAP user groups you want to configure.

To add or remove Cloudera Navigator user roles to LDAP or Active Directory user groups, perform the following steps:

1. Log in to Cloudera Navigator with the credentials of a user having one or more of the following user roles:
   - Cloudera Manager Full Administrator
   - Cloudera Manager Navigator Administrator
   - Cloudera Navigator Full Administrator
   - Cloudera Navigator User Administrator

2. Click the Administration tab in the upper right.

3. Click the Role Management tab.

4. Search for an LDAP or Active Directory group by entering its name (or the first portion of the name) in the search field and pressing Enter or Return.
   - Select All Groups to search among all groups in the external directory.
   - Select Groups with Navigator Roles to display only external directory groups that have already been assigned one or more Cloudera Navigator user roles.

5. From the LDAP or Active Directory groups displayed, select the group to which you want to assign a Cloudera Navigator user role or roles. If roles have already been assigned to the group, they are listed beneath the name of the group in the main panel.

6. Click Manage Role Assignment in the upper right.

7. Click the checkbox for each Cloudera Navigator user role you want assigned to that Active Directory or LDAP group. Uncheck any already-assigned roles that you want to remove from the group.

8. Click Save.

Changes to user role assignments take effect the next time the user logs in to Cloudera Navigator.

Configuring Authentication in CDH Using the Command Line

The security features in CDH 5 enable Hadoop to prevent malicious user impersonation. The Hadoop daemons leverage Kerberos to perform user authentication on all remote procedure calls (RPCs). Group resolution is performed on the Hadoop master nodes, NameNode, JobTracker and ResourceManager to guarantee that group membership cannot be manipulated by users. Map tasks are run under the user account of the user who submitted the job, ensuring isolation there. In addition to these features, new authorization mechanisms have been introduced to HDFS and MapReduce to enable more control over user access to data.

The security features in CDH 5 meet the needs of most Hadoop customers because typically the cluster is accessible only to trusted personnel. In particular, Hadoop’s current threat model assumes that users cannot:

1. Have root access to cluster machines.
2. Have root access to shared client machines.
3. Read or modify packets on the network of the cluster.
CDH 5 supports encryption of all user data sent over the network. For configuration instructions, see Configuring Encrypted Shuffle, Encrypted Web UIs, and Encrypted HDFS Transport.

Note also that there is no built-in support for on-disk encryption.

Enabling Kerberos Authentication for Hadoop Using the Command Line

Important:
These instructions assume you know how to install and configure Kerberos, you already have a working Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) and realm setup, and that you’ve installed the Kerberos user packages on all cluster machines and machines which will be used to access the cluster. Furthermore, Oozie and Hue require that the realm support renewable tickets. For more information about installing and configuring Kerberos, see:
- MIT Kerberos Home
- MIT Kerberos Documentation
- Kerberos Explained
- Microsoft Kerberos Overview
- Microsoft Kerberos in Windows Server 2008
- Microsoft Kerberos in Windows Server 2003

Kerberos security in CDH 5 has been tested with the following version of MIT Kerberos 5:
- krb5-1.6.1 on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 and CentOS 5

Kerberos security in CDH 5 is supported with the following versions of MIT Kerberos 5:
- krb5-1.6.3 on SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (SLES) 11 Service Pack 1
- krb5-1.8.1 on Ubuntu
- krb5-1.8.2 on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 and CentOS 6
- krb5-1.9 on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.1

Note: The krb5-server package includes a logrotate policy file to rotate log files monthly. To take advantage of this, install the logrotate package. No additional configuration is necessary.

If you want to enable Kerberos SPNEGO-based authentication for the Hadoop web interfaces, see the Hadoop Auth, Java HTTP SPNEGO Documentation.

Here are the general steps to configuring secure Hadoop, each of which is described in more detail in the following sections:

Step 1: Install CDH 5
Cloudera strongly recommends that you set up a fully-functional CDH 5 cluster before you begin configuring it to use Hadoop’s security features. When a secure Hadoop cluster is not configured correctly, the resulting error messages are in a preliminary state, so it’s best to start implementing security after you are sure your Hadoop cluster is working properly without security.

For information about installing and configuring Hadoop and CDH 5 components, and deploying them on a cluster, see Cloudera Installation.
Step 2: Verify User Accounts and Groups in CDH 5 Due to Security

Note: CDH 5 introduces a new version of MapReduce: MapReduce 2.0 (MRv2) built on the YARN framework. In this document, we refer to this new version as YARN. CDH 5 also provides an implementation of the previous version of MapReduce, referred to as MRv1 in this document.

- If you are using MRv1, see Step 2a (MRv1 only): Verify User Accounts and Groups in MRv1 on page 86 for configuration information.
- If you are using YARN, see Step 2b (YARN only): Verify User Accounts and Groups in YARN on page 87 for configuration information.

Step 2a (MRv1 only): Verify User Accounts and Groups in MRv1

Note: If you are using YARN, skip this step and proceed to Step 2b (YARN only): Verify User Accounts and Groups in YARN.

During CDH 5 package installation of MRv1, the following Unix user accounts are automatically created to support security:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This User</th>
<th>Runs These Hadoop Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hdfs</td>
<td>HDFS: NameNode, DataNodes, Secondary NameNode (or Standby NameNode if you are using HA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mapred</td>
<td>MRv1: JobTracker and TaskTrackers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hdfs user also acts as the HDFS superuser.

The hadoop user no longer exists in CDH 5. If you currently use the hadoop user to run applications as an HDFS super-user, you should instead use the new hdfs user, or create a separate Unix account for your application such as myhadoopapp.

MRv1: Directory Ownership in the Local File System

Because the HDFS and MapReduce services run as different users, you must be sure to configure the correct directory ownership of the following files on the local filesystem of each host:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File System</th>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>dfs.namenode.name.dir (dfs.name.dir is deprecated but will also work)</td>
<td>hdfs:hdfs</td>
<td>drwx------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>dfs.datanode.data.dir (dfs.data.dir is deprecated but will also work)</td>
<td>hdfs:hdfs</td>
<td>drwx------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>mapred.local.dir</td>
<td>mapred:mapred</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See also Deploying MapReduce v1 (MRv1) on a Cluster.

1 In CDH 5, package installation and the Hadoop daemons will automatically configure the correct permissions for you if you configure the directory ownership correctly as shown in the table above.
You must also configure the following permissions for the HDFS and MapReduce log directories (the default locations in /var/log/hadoop-hdfs and /var/log/hadoop-0.20-mapreduce), and the MAPRED_LOG_DIR/userlogs/directory:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File System</th>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>HDFS_LOG_DIR</td>
<td>hdfs:hdfs</td>
<td>drwxrwxr-x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>MAPRED_LOG_DIR</td>
<td>mapred:mapred</td>
<td>drwxrwxr-x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>userlogs directory in MAPRED_LOG_DIR</td>
<td>mapred:anygroup</td>
<td>permissions will be set automatically at daemon start time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MRv1: Directory Ownership on HDFS**

The following directories on HDFS must also be configured as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File System</th>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>mapreduce.jobtracker.system.dir</td>
<td>mapred:hadoop</td>
<td>drwx------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(mapred.system.dir is deprecated but will also work)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>/ (root directory)</td>
<td>hdfs:hadoop</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MRv1: Changing the Directory Ownership on HDFS**

- If Hadoop security is enabled, use kinit hdfs to obtain Kerberos credentials for the hdfs user by running the following commands before changing the directory ownership on HDFS:

  ```
  $ sudo -u hdfs kinit -k -t hdfs.keytab hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
  ```

  If kinit hdfs does not work initially, run kinit -R after running kinit to obtain credentials. (For more information, see Troubleshooting Authentication Issues on page 480). To change the directory ownership on HDFS, run the following commands. Replace the example /mapred/system directory in the commands below with the HDFS directory specified by the mapreduce.jobtracker.system.dir (or mapred.system.dir) property in the conf/mapred-site.xml file:

  ```
  $ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chown mapred:hadoop /mapred/system
  $ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chown hdfs:hadoop /
  $ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chmod -R 700 /mapred/system
  $ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chmod 755 /
  ```

- In addition (whether or not Hadoop security is enabled) create the /tmp directory. For instructions on creating /tmp and setting its permissions, see these instructions.

**Step 2b (YARN only): Verify User Accounts and Groups in YARN**

*Note:* If you are using MRv1, skip this step and proceed to Step 3: If you are Using AES-256 Encryption, Install the JCE Policy File on page 89.

During CDH 5 package installation of MapReduce 2.0 (YARN), the following Unix user accounts are automatically created to support security:

2 When starting up, MapReduce sets the permissions for the mapreduce.jobtracker.system.dir (or mapred.system.dir) directory in HDFS, assuming the user mapred owns that directory.
This User | Runs These Hadoop Programs
--- | ---
hdfs | HDFS: NameNode, DataNodes, Standby NameNode (if you are using HA)
yarn | YARN: ResourceManager, NodeManager
mapred | YARN: MapReduce JobHistory Server

**Important:** The HDFS and YARN daemons must run as different Unix users; for example, hdfs and yarn. The MapReduce JobHistory server must run as user mapred. Having all of these users share a common Unix group is recommended; for example, hadoop.

### YARN: Directory Ownership in the Local Filesystem

Because the HDFS and MapReduce services run as different users, you must be sure to configure the correct directory ownership of the following files on the local filesystem of each host:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File System</th>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Permissions (see Footnote 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>dfs.namenode.name.dir (dfs.name.dir is deprecated but will also work)</td>
<td>hdfs:hdfs</td>
<td>drwx------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>dfs.datanode.data.dir (dfs.data.dir is deprecated but will also work)</td>
<td>hdfs:hdfs</td>
<td>drwx------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs</td>
<td>yarn:yarn</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>yarn.nodemanager.log-dirs</td>
<td>yarn:yarn</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>container-executor</td>
<td>root:yarn</td>
<td>--Sr-s---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>conf/container-executor.cfg</td>
<td>root:yarn</td>
<td>r--------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Important:** Configuration changes to the Linux container executor could result in local NodeManager directories (such as usercache) being left with incorrect permissions. To avoid this, when making changes using either Cloudera Manager or the command line, first manually remove the existing NodeManager local directories from all configured local directories (yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs), and let the NodeManager recreate the directory structure.

You must also configure the following permissions for the HDFS, YARN and MapReduce log directories (the default locations in /var/log/hadoop-hdfs, /var/log/hadoop-yarn and /var/log/hadoop-mapreduce):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File System</th>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>HDFS_LOG_DIR</td>
<td>hdfs:hdfs</td>
<td>drwxrwxr-x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>$YARN_LOG_DIR</td>
<td>yarn:yarn</td>
<td>drwxrwxr-x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

In CDH 5, package installation and the Hadoop daemons will automatically configure the correct permissions for you if you configure the directory ownership correctly as shown in the two tables above. See also Deploying MapReduce v2 (YARN) on a Cluster.
YARN: Directory Ownership on HDFS

The following directories on HDFS must also be configured as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File System</th>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>/ (root directory)</td>
<td>hdfs:hadoop</td>
<td>drwxr-x-x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>yarn.nodemanager.remote-app-log-dir</td>
<td>yarn:hadoop</td>
<td>drwxrwxrwxt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>mapreduce.jobhistory.intermediate-done-dir</td>
<td>mapred:hadoop</td>
<td>drwxrwxrwxt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>mapreduce.jobhistory.done-dir</td>
<td>mapred:hadoop</td>
<td>drwxr-x---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

YARN: Changing the Directory Ownership on HDFS

If Hadoop security is enabled, use `kinit hdfs` to obtain Kerberos credentials for the `hdfs` user by running the following commands:

```
$ sudo -u hdfs kinit -k -t hdfs.keytab hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
$ hadoop fs -chown hdfs:hadoop /
$ hadoop fs -chmod 755 /
```

If `kinit hdfs` does not work initially, run `kinit -R` after running `kinit` to obtain credentials. See Troubleshooting Authentication Issues on page 480. To change the directory ownership on HDFS, run the following commands:

```
$ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chown hdfs:hadoop /
$ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chown yarn:hadoop [yarn.nodemanager.remote-app-log-dir]
$ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chmod 1777 [yarn.nodemanager.remote-app-log-dir]
$ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chown mapred:hadoop [mapreduce.jobhistory.intermediate-done-dir]
$ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chmod 1777 [mapreduce.jobhistory.intermediate-done-dir]
$ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chown mapred:hadoop [mapreduce.jobhistory.done-dir]
$ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chmod 750 [mapreduce.jobhistory.done-dir]
```

- In addition (whether or not Hadoop security is enabled) create the `/tmp` directory. For instructions on creating `/tmp` and setting its permissions, see Step 7: If Necessary, Create the HDFS /tmp Directory.
- In addition (whether or not Hadoop security is enabled), change permissions on the `/user/history` Directory. See Step 8: Create the history Directory and Set Permissions.

Step 3: If you are Using AES-256 Encryption, Install the JCE Policy File

If you are using CentOS/Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.6 or higher, or Ubuntu, which use AES-256 encryption by default for tickets, you must install the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction Policy File on all cluster and Hadoop user machines. For JCE Policy File installation instructions, see the README.txt file included in the jce_policy-x.zip file.

Alternatively, you can configure Kerberos to not use AES-256 by removing `aes256-cts:normal` from the `supported_enctypes` field of the `kdc.conf` or `krb5.conf` file. After changing the `kdc.conf` file, you must restart both the KDC and the kadmin server for those changes to take effect. You may also need to re-create or change the password of the relevant principals, including potentially the Ticket Granting Ticket principal (`krbtgt/REALM@REALM`). If AES-256 is still used after completing steps, the `aes256-cts:normal` setting existed when the Kerberos database was created. To fix this, create a new Kerberos database and then restart both the KDC and the kadmin server.

3 In CDH 5, package installation and the Hadoop daemons will automatically configure the correct permissions for you if you configure the directory ownership correctly as shown in the two tables above. See also Deploying MapReduce v2 (YARN) on a Cluster.
To verify the type of encryption used in your cluster:

1. On the local KDC host, type this command to create a test principal:

   ```
   $ kadmin -q "addprinc test"
   ```

2. On a cluster host, type this command to start a Kerberos session as test:

   ```
   $ kinit test
   ```

3. On a cluster host, type this command to view the encryption type in use:

   ```
   $ klist -e
   ```

   If AES is being used, output like the following is displayed after you type the `klist` command; note that AES-256 is included in the output:

   ```
   Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_0
   Default principal: test@SCM
   Valid starting     Expires            Service principal
   05/19/11 13:25:04  05/20/11 13:25:04  krbtgt/SCM@SCM
   Etype (skey, tkt): AES-256 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC, AES-256 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC
   ```

Step 4: Create and Deploy the Kerberos Principals and Keytab Files

A Kerberos principal is used in a Kerberos-secured system to represent a unique identity. Kerberos assigns tickets to Kerberos principals to enable them to access Kerberos-secured Hadoop services. For Hadoop, the principals should be of the format `username/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM`. In this guide, the term `username` in the `username/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM` principal refers to the username of an existing Unix account, such as `hdfs` or `mapred`.

A keytab is a file containing pairs of Kerberos principals and an encrypted copy of that principal’s key. The keytab files are unique to each host since their keys include the hostname. This file is used to authenticate a principal on a host to Kerberos without human interaction or storing a password in a plain text file. Because having access to the keytab file for a principal allows one to act as that principal, access to the keytab files should be tightly secured. They should be readable by a minimal set of users, should be stored on local disk, and should not be included in machine backups, unless access to those backups is as secure as access to the local machine.

---

**Important:**

For both MRv1 and YARN deployments: On every machine in your cluster, there must be a keytab file for the `hdfs` user and a keytab file for the `mapred` user. The `hdfs` keytab file must contain entries for the `hdfs` principal and a HTTP principal, and the `mapred` keytab file must contain entries for the `mapred` principal and a HTTP principal. On each respective machine, the HTTP principal will be the same in both keytab files.

In addition, for YARN deployments only: On every machine in your cluster, there must be a keytab file for the `yarn` user. The `yarn` keytab file must contain entries for the `yarn` principal and a HTTP principal. On each respective machine, the HTTP principal in the `yarn` keytab file will be the same as the HTTP principal in the `hdfs` and `mapred` keytab files.

---

**Note:**

The following instructions illustrate an example of creating keytab files for MIT Kerberos. If you are using another version of Kerberos, refer to your Kerberos documentation for instructions. You may use either `kadmin` or `kadmin.local` to run these commands.
When to Use kadmin.local and kadmin

When creating the Kerberos principals and keytabs, you can use kadmin.local or kadmin depending on your access and account:

- If you have root access to the KDC machine, but you do not have a Kerberos admin account, use kadmin.local.
- If you do not have root access to the KDC machine, but you do have a Kerberos admin account, use kadmin.
- If you have both root access to the KDC machine and a Kerberos admin account, you can use either one.

To start kadmin.local (on the KDC machine) or kadmin from any machine, run this command:

$ sudo kadmin.local

OR:

$ kadmin

Note:
In this guide, kadmin is shown as the prompt for commands in the kadmin shell, but you can type the same commands at the kadmin.local prompt in the kadmin.local shell.

Note:
Running kadmin.local may prompt you for a password because it is being run via sudo. You should provide your Unix password. Running kadmin may prompt you for a password because you need Kerberos admin privileges. You should provide your Kerberos admin password.

To create the Kerberos principals

Important:
If you plan to use Oozie, Impala, or the Hue Kerberos ticket renewer in your cluster, you must configure your KDC to allow tickets to be renewed, and you must configure krb5.conf to request renewable tickets. Typically, you can do this by adding the max_renewable_life setting to your realm in kdc.conf, and by adding the renew_lifetime parameter to the libdefaults section of krb5.conf. For more information about renewable tickets, see the Kerberos documentation.

Do the following steps for every host in your cluster. Run the commands in the kadmin.local or kadmin shell, replacing the fully.qualified.domain.name in the commands with the fully qualified domain name of each host. Replace YOUR-REALM.COM with the name of the Kerberos realm your Hadoop cluster is in.

1. In the kadmin.local or kadmin shell, create the hdfs principal. This principal is used for the NameNode, Secondary NameNode, and DataNodes.

   kadmin: addprinc -randkey hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM

Note:
If your Kerberos administrator or company has a policy about principal names that does not allow you to use the format shown above, you can work around that issue by configuring the <kerberos principal> to <short name> mapping that is built into Hadoop. For more information, see Configuring the Mapping from Kerberos Principals to Short Names.
Configuring Authentication

2. Create the `mapred` principal. If you are using MRv1, the `mapred` principal is used for the JobTracker and TaskTrackers. If you are using YARN, the `mapred` principal is used for the MapReduce Job History Server.

   ```
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey mapred/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

3. YARN only: Create the `yarn` principal. This principal is used for the ResourceManager and NodeManager.

   ```
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey yarn/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

4. Create the `HTTP` principal.

   ```
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

**Important:**
The HTTP principal must be in the format `HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM`. The first component of the principal must be the literal string "HTTP". This format is standard for HTTP principals in SPNEGO and is hard-coded in Hadoop. It cannot be deviated from.

To create the Kerberos keytab files

**Important:**
The instructions in this section for creating keytab files require using the Kerberos `norandkey` option in the `xst` command. If your version of Kerberos does not support the `norandkey` option, or if you cannot use `kadmin.local`, then use these alternate instructions to create appropriate Kerberos keytab files. After using those alternate instructions to create the keytab files, continue with the next section To deploy the Kerberos keytab files.

Do the following steps for every host in your cluster. Run the commands in the `kadmin.local` or `kadmin` shell, replacing the `fully.qualified.domain.name` in the commands with the fully qualified domain name of each host:

1. Create the `hdfs` keytab file that will contain the `hdfs` principal and `HTTP` principal. This keytab file is used for the NameNode, Secondary NameNode, and DataNodes.

   ```
   kadmin: xst -norandkey -k hdfs.keytab hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name
   HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

2. Create the `mapred` keytab file that will contain the `mapred` principal and `HTTP` principal. If you are using MRv1, the `mapred` keytab file is used for the JobTracker and TaskTrackers. If you are using YARN, the `mapred` keytab file is used for the MapReduce Job History Server.

   ```
   kadmin: xst -norandkey -k mapred.keytab mapred/fully.qualified.domain.name
   HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

3. YARN only: Create the `yarn` keytab file that will contain the `yarn` principal and `HTTP` principal. This keytab file is used for the ResourceManager and NodeManager.

   ```
   kadmin: xst -norandkey -k yarn.keytab yarn/fully.qualified.domain.name
   HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

4. Use `klist` to display the keytab file entries; a correctly-created `hdfs` keytab file should look something like this:

   ```
   $ klist -e -k -t hdfs.keytab
   Keytab name: WRFILE:hdfs.keytab
   slot KVNO Principal
   ```
To deploy the Kerberos keytab files

On every node in the cluster, repeat the following steps to deploy the hdfs.keytab and mapred.keytab files. If you are using YARN, you will also deploy the yarn.keytab file.

1. On the host machine, copy or move the keytab files to a directory that Hadoop can access, such as /etc/hadoop/conf.
   
a. If you are using MRv1:

   ```bash
   $ sudo mv hdfs.keytab mapred.keytab /etc/hadoop/conf/
   ```

   If you are using YARN:

   ```bash
   $ sudo mv hdfs.keytab mapred.keytab yarn.keytab /etc/hadoop/conf/
   ```

   b. Make sure that the hdfs.keytab file is only readable by the hdfs user, and that the mapred.keytab file is only readable by the mapred user.

   ```bash
   $ sudo chown hdfs:hadoop /etc/hadoop/conf/hdfs.keytab
   $ sudo chown mapred:hadoop /etc/hadoop/conf/mapred.keytab
   $ sudo chmod 400 /etc/hadoop/conf/*.keytab
   ```

   **Note:**

   To enable you to use the same configuration files on every host, Cloudera recommends that you use the same name for the keytab files on every host.

   c. YARN only: Make sure that the yarn.keytab file is only readable by the yarn user.

   ```bash
   $ sudo chown yarn:hadoop /etc/hadoop/conf/yarn.keytab
   $ sudo chmod 400 /etc/hadoop/conf/yarn.keytab
   ```

   **Important:**

   If the NameNode, Secondary NameNode, DataNode, JobTracker, TaskTrackers, HttpFS, or Oozie services are configured to use Kerberos HTTP SPNEGO authentication, and two or more of these services are running on the same host, then all of the running services must use the same HTTP principal and keytab file used for their HTTP endpoints.

Step 5: Shut Down the Cluster

To enable security in CDH, you must stop all Hadoop daemons in your cluster and then change some configuration properties. You must stop all daemons in the cluster because after one Hadoop daemon has been restarted with the configuration properties set to enable security, daemons running without security enabled will be unable to communicate.
with that daemon. This requirement to shut down all daemons makes it impossible to do a rolling upgrade to enable security on a Hadoop cluster.

To shut down the cluster, run the following command on every node in your cluster (as root):

```
$ for x in `cd /etc/init.d ; ls hadoop-*` ; do sudo service $x stop ; done
```

**Step 6: Enable Hadoop Security**

Cloudera recommends that all of the Hadoop configuration files throughout the cluster have the same contents.

To enable Hadoop security, add the following properties to the `core-site.xml` file on every machine in the cluster:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.authentication</name>
  <value>kerberos</value> <!-- A value of "simple" would disable security. -->
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.authorization</name>
  <value>true</value>
</property>
```

**Enabling Service-Level Authorization for Hadoop Services**

Service-level authorizations prevent users from accessing a cluster at the course-grained level. For example, when Authorized Users and Authorized Groups are setup properly, an unauthorized user cannot use the hdfs shell to list the contents of HDFS. This also limits the exposure of world-readable files to an explicit set of users instead of all authenticated users, which could be, for example, every user in Active Directory.

The `hadoop-policy.xml` file maintains access control lists (ACL) for Hadoop services. Each ACL consists of comma-separated lists of users and groups separated by a space. For example:

```
user_a,user_b group_a,group_b
```

If you only want to specify a set of users, add a comma-separated list of users followed by a blank space. Similarly, to specify only authorized groups, use a blank space at the beginning. A * can be used to give access to all users.

For example, to give users, ann, bob, and groups, group_a, group_b access to Hadoop's DataNodeProtocol service, modify the `security.datanode.protocol.acl` property in `hadoop-policy.xml`. Similarly, to give all users access to the InterTrackerProtocol service, modify `security.inter.tracker.protocol.acl` as follows:

```xml
<property>
  <name>security.datanode.protocol.acl</name>
  <value>ann,bob group_a,group_b</value>
  <description>ACL for DatanodeProtocol, which is used by datanodes to communicate with the namenode.</description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>security.inter.tracker.protocol.acl</name>
  <value>*</value>
  <description>ACL for InterTrackerProtocol, which is used by tasktrackers to communicate with the jobtracker.</description>
</property>
```

For more details, see [Service-Level Authorization in Hadoop](#).

**Step 7: Configure Secure HDFS**

When following the instructions in this section to configure the properties in the `hdfs-site.xml` file, keep the following important guidelines in mind:

- The properties for each daemon (NameNode, Secondary NameNode, and DataNode) must specify both the HDFS and HTTP principals, as well as the path to the HDFS keytab file.
• The Kerberos principals for the NameNode, Secondary NameNode, and DataNode are configured in the hdfs-site.xml file. The same hdfs-site.xml file with all three of these principals must be installed on every host machine in the cluster. That is, it is not sufficient to have the NameNode principal configured on the NameNode host machine only. This is because, for example, the DataNode must know the principal name of the NameNode in order to send heartbeats to it. Kerberos authentication is bi-directional.

• The special string _HOST in the properties is replaced at run-time by the fully qualified domain name of the host machine where the daemon is running. This requires that reverse DNS is properly working on all the hosts configured this way. You may use _HOST only as the entirety of the second component of a principal name. For example, hdfs/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM is valid, but hdfs._HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM and hdfs/_HOST.example.com@YOUR-REALM.COM are not.

• When performing the _HOST substitution for the Kerberos principal names, the NameNode determines its own hostname based on the configured value of fs.default.name, whereas the DataNodes determine their hostnames based on the result of reverse DNS resolution on the DataNode hosts. Likewise, the JobTracker uses the configured value of mapred.job.tracker to determine its hostname whereas the TaskTrackers, like the DataNodes, use reverse DNS.

• The dfs.datanode.address and dfs.datanode.http.address port numbers for the DataNode must be below 1024, because this provides part of the security mechanism to make it impossible for a user to run a map task which impersonates a DataNode. The port numbers for the NameNode and Secondary NameNode can be anything you want, but the default port numbers are good ones to use.

To configure secure HDFS

Add the following properties to the hdfs-site.xml file on every machine in the cluster. Replace these example values shown below with the correct settings for your site: path to the HDFS keytab, YOUR-REALM.COM, fully qualified domain name of NN, and fully qualified domain name of 2NN

```xml
<!-- General HDFS security config -->
<property>
  <name>dfs.block.access.token.enable</name>
  <value>true</value>
</property>

<!-- NameNode security config -->
<property>
  <name>dfs.namenode.keytab.file</name>
  <value>/etc/hadoop/conf/hdfs.keytab</value> <!-- path to the HDFS keytab -->
</property>

<property>
  <name>dfs.namenode.kerberos.principal</name>
  <value>hdfs/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>dfs.namenode.kerberos.internal.spnego.principal</name>
  <value>HTTP/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>

<!-- Secondary NameNode security config -->
<property>
  <name>dfs.secondary.namenode.keytab.file</name>
  <value>/etc/hadoop/conf/hdfs.keytab</value> <!-- path to the HDFS keytab -->
</property>

<property>
  <name>dfs.secondary.namenode.kerberos.principal</name>
  <value>hdfs/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>dfs.secondary.namenode.kerberos.internal.spnego.principal</name>
  <value>HTTP/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>

<!-- DataNode security config -->
<property>
  <name>dfs.datanode.data.dir.perm</name>
  <value>700</value>
</property>
```
To enable TLS/SSL for HDFS

Add the following property to hdfs-site.xml on every machine in your cluster.

To configure security for Quorum-based Storage:

Add the following Quorum-based Storage configuration properties to the hdfs-site.xml file on all of the machines in the cluster:
Note:
If you already have principals and keytabs created for the machines where the JournalNodes are running, then you should reuse those principals and keytabs in the configuration properties above. You will likely have these principals and keytabs already created if you are collocating a JournalNode on a machine with another HDFS daemon.

Optional Step 9: Configure secure WebHDFS

Note:
If you are not using WebHDFS, you can skip this step.

Security for WebHDFS is disabled by default. If you want use WebHDFS with a secure cluster, this is the time to enable and configure it.

To configure secure WebHDFS:

1. If you have not already done so, enable WebHDFS by adding the following property to the hdfs-site.xml file on every machine in the cluster.

```xml
<property>
  <name>dfs.webhdfs.enabled</name>
  <value>true</value>
</property>
```

2. Add the following properties to the hdfs-site.xml file on every machine in the cluster. Replace the example values shown below with the correct settings for your site.

```xml
<property>
  <name>dfs.web.authentication.kerberos.principal</name>
  <value>HTTP/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>dfs.web.authentication.kerberos.keytab</name>
  <value>/etc/hadoop/conf/HTTP.keytab</value> <!-- path to the HTTP keytab -->
</property>
```

Optional Step 10: Configuring a secure HDFS NFS Gateway

To deploy a Kerberized HDFS NFS gateway, add the following configuration properties to hdfs-site.xml on the NFS server.

```xml
<property>
  <name>dfs.nfs.keytab.file</name>
  <value>/etc/hadoop/conf/hdfs.keytab</value> <!-- path to the HDFS or NFS gateway keytab -->
</property>

<property>
  <name>dfs.nfs.kerberos.principal</name>
  <value>hdfs/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>
```

Potential Insecurities with a Kerberized NFS Gateway

When configuring an NFS gateway in a secure cluster, the gateway accesses the contents of HDFS using the HDFS service principals. However, authorization for end users is handled by comparing the end user's UID/GID against the UID/GID of the files on the NFS mount. No Kerberos is involved in authenticating the user first.
Because HDFS metadata doesn’t have any UIDs/GIDs, only names and groups, the NFS gateway maps user names and group names to UIDs and GIDs. The user names and group names used for this mapping are derived from the local users of the host where the NFS gateway is running. The mapped IDs are then presented to the NFS client for authorization. The NFS client performs the authorization locally, comparing the UID/GID presented by the NFS Gateway to the IDs of the users on the remote host.

The main risk with this procedure is that it’s quite possible to create local users with UIDs that were previously associated with any superusers. For example, users with access to HDFS can view the directories that belong to the hdfs user, and they can also access the underlying metadata to obtain the associated UID. Assuming the directories owned by hdfs have their UID set to xyz, a malicious user could create a new local user on the NFS gateway host with the UID set to xyz. This local user will now be able to freely access the hdfs user’s files.

Solutions:

- Set the NFS Gateway property, **Allowed Hosts and Privileges**, to allow only those NFS clients that are trusted and managed by the Hadoop administrators.

  1. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and navigate to the HDFS service.
  2. Click the **Configuration** tab.
  3. Select **Scope > NFS Gateway**.
  4. Select **Category > Main**.
  5. Locate the **Allowed Hosts and Privileges** property and set it to a list of trusted host names and access privileges (ro - read-only, rw - read/write). For example:

```plaintext
192.168.0.0/22 rw
host1.example.org ro
```

The current default setting of this property is * rw, which is a security risk because it lets everybody map the NFS export in read-write mode.

- Specify a user with restricted privileges for the **dfs.nfs.kerberos.principal** property, so that the NFS gateway has limited access to the NFS contents. The current default setting for this property is hdfs/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>, which gives the NFS gateway unrestricted access to HDFS.

**Step 11: Set Variables for Secure DataNodes**

In order to allow DataNodes to start on a secure Hadoop cluster, you must set the following variables on all DataNodes in `/etc/default/hadoop-hdfs-datanode`.

```plaintext
export HADOOP_SECURE_DN_USER=hdfs
export HADOOP_SECURE_DN_PID_DIR=/var/lib/hadoop-hdfs
export HADOOP_SECURE_DN_LOG_DIR=/var/log/hadoop-hdfs
export JSVC_HOME=/usr/lib/bigtop-utils/
```

**Note:**

Depending on the version of Linux you are using, you may not have the `/usr/lib/bigtop-utils` directory on your system. If that is the case, set the `JSVC_HOME` variable to the `/usr/libexec/bigtop-utils` directory by using this command:

```plaintext
export JSVC_HOME=/usr/libexec/bigtop-utils
```

**Step 12: Start up the NameNode**

You are now ready to start the NameNode. Use the `service` command to run the `/etc/init.d` script.

```
$ sudo service hadoop-hdfs-namenode start
```
You’ll see some extra information in the logs such as:

```
10/10/25 17:01:46 INFO security.UserGroupInformation: Login successful for user hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM using keytab file /etc/hadoop/conf/hdfs.keytab
```

and:

```
12/05/23 18:18:31 INFO http.HttpServer: Adding Kerberos (SPNEGO) filter to getDelegationToken
12/05/23 18:18:31 INFO http.HttpServer: Adding Kerberos (SPNEGO) filter to renewDelegationToken
12/05/23 18:18:31 INFO http.HttpServer: Adding Kerberos (SPNEGO) filter to cancelDelegationToken
12/05/23 18:18:31 INFO http.HttpServer: Adding Kerberos (SPNEGO) filter to fsck
12/05/23 18:18:31 INFO http.HttpServer: Adding Kerberos (SPNEGO) filter to getimage
12/05/23 18:18:31 INFO http.HttpServer: Jetty bound to port 50070
12/05/23 18:18:31 INFO mortbay.log: jetty-6.1.26
12/05/23 18:18:31 INFO server.KerberosAuthenticationHandler: Login using keytab /etc/hadoop/conf/hdfs.keytab, for principal HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
12/05/23 18:18:31 INFO server.KerberosAuthenticationHandler: Initialized, principal [HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM] from keytab [/etc/hadoop/conf/hdfs.keytab]
```

You can verify that the NameNode is working properly by opening a web browser to `http://machine:50070/` where `machine` is the name of the machine where the NameNode is running.

Cloudera also recommends testing that the NameNode is working properly by performing a metadata-only HDFS operation, which will now require correct Kerberos credentials. For example:

```
$ hadoop fs -ls
```

**Information about the kinit Command**

**Important:**

Running the `hadoop fs -ls` command will fail if you do not have a valid Kerberos ticket in your credentials cache. You can examine the Kerberos tickets currently in your credentials cache by running the `klist` command. You can obtain a ticket by running the `kinit` command and either specifying a keytab file containing credentials, or entering the password for your principal. If you do not have a valid ticket, you will receive an error such as:

```
11/01/04 12:08:12 WARN ipc.Client: Exception encountered while connecting to the server : javax.security.sasl.Sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate failed [Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Failed to find any Kerberos tgt)]
```

**Note:**

The `kinit` command must either be on the path for user accounts running the Hadoop client, or else the `hadoop.kerberos.kinit.command` parameter in `core-site.xml` must be manually configured to the absolute path to the `kinit` command.
Note:
If you are running MIT Kerberos 1.8.1 or higher, a bug in versions of the Oracle JDK 6 Update 26 and higher causes Java to be unable to read the Kerberos credentials cache even after you have successfully obtained a Kerberos ticket using `kinit`. To workaround this bug, run `kinit -R` after running `kinit` initially to obtain credentials. Doing so will cause the ticket to be renewed, and the credentials cache rewritten in a format which Java can read. For more information about this problem, see Troubleshooting.

Step 12: Start up a DataNode

Begin by starting one DataNode only to make sure it can properly connect to the NameNode. Use the `service` command to run the `/etc/init.d` script.

```bash
$ sudo service hadoop-hdfs-datanode start
```

You’ll see some extra information in the logs such as:

```
10/10/25 17:21:41 INFO security.UserGroupInformation:
Login successful for user hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM using keytab file /etc/hadoop/conf/hdfs.keytab
```

If you can get a single DataNode running and you can see it registering with the NameNode in the logs, then start up all the DataNodes. You should now be able to do all HDFS operations.

Step 14: Set the Sticky Bit on HDFS Directories

This step is optional but strongly recommended for security. In CDH 5, HDFS file permissions have support for the sticky bit. The sticky bit can be set on directories, preventing anyone except the superuser, directory owner, or file owner from deleting or moving the files within the directory. Setting the sticky bit for a file has no effect. This is useful for directories such as `/tmp` which previously had to be set to be world-writable. To set the sticky bit on the `/tmp` directory, run the following command:

```bash
$ sudo -u hdfs kinit -k -t hdfs.keytab hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
$ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -chmod 1777 /tmp
```

After running this command, the permissions on `/tmp` will appear as shown below. (Note the "t" instead of the final ":x:"

```bash
$ hadoop fs -ls /
Found 2 items
drwxrwxrwt - hdfs supergroup 0 2011-02-14 15:55 /tmp
drwxr-xr-x - hdfs supergroup 0 2011-02-14 14:01 /user
```

Step 15: Start up the Secondary NameNode (if used)

At this point, you should be able to start the Secondary NameNode if you are using one:

```bash
$ sudo service hadoop-hdfs-secondarynamenode start
```

Note:
If you are using HDFS HA, do not use the Secondary NameNode. See Configuring HDFS High Availability for instructions on configuring and deploying the Standby NameNode.
You’ll see some extra information in the logs such as:

```
10/10/26 12:03:18 INFO security.UserGroupInformation: Login successful for user hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM using keytab file /etc/hadoop/conf/hdfs.keytab
```

and:

```
12/05/23 18:33:06 INFO http.HttpServer: Adding Kerberos (SPNEGO) filter to getimage
12/05/23 18:33:06 INFO http.HttpServer: Jetty bound to port 50090
12/05/23 18:33:06 INFO mortbay.log: jetty-6.1.26
12/05/23 18:33:06 INFO server.KerberosAuthenticationHandler: Login using keytab /etc/hadoop/conf/hdfs.keytab, for principal HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
12/05/23 18:33:06 INFO server.KerberosAuthenticationHandler: Initialized, principal [HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM] from keytab [/etc/hadoop/conf/hdfs.keytab]
```

You should make sure that the Secondary NameNode not only starts, but that it is successfully checkpointing.

If you’re using the `service` command to start the Secondary NameNode from the `/etc/init.d` scripts, Cloudera recommends setting the property `fs.checkpoint.period` in the `hdfs-site.xml` file to a very low value (such as 5), and then monitoring the Secondary NameNode logs for a successful startup and checkpoint. Once you are satisfied that the Secondary NameNode is checkpointing properly, you should reset the `fs.checkpoint.period` to a reasonable value, or return it to the default, and then restart the Secondary NameNode.

You can make the Secondary NameNode perform a checkpoint by doing the following:

```
$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs secondarynamenode -checkpoint force
```

Note that this will not cause a running Secondary NameNode to checkpoint, but rather will start up a Secondary NameNode that will immediately perform a checkpoint and then shut down. This can be useful for debugging.

---

Note:

If you encounter errors during Secondary NameNode checkpointing, it may be helpful to enable Kerberos debugging output. For instructions, see [Enabling Debugging Output for the Sun Kerberos Classes](#).

---

**Step 16: Configure Either MRv1 Security or YARN Security**

At this point, you are ready to configure either MRv1 Security or YARN Security.

- If you are using MRv1, do the steps in [Configuring MRv1 Security](#) to configure, start, and test secure MRv1.
- If you are using YARN, do the steps in [Configuring YARN Security](#) to configure, start, and test secure YARN.

**Configuring MRv1 Security**

If you are using YARN, skip this section and see [Configuring YARN Security](#).

If you are using MRv1, do the following steps to configure, start, and test secure MRv1.

1. **Step 1: Configure Secure MRv1** on page 101
2. **Step 2: Start up the JobTracker** on page 103
3. **Step 3: Start up a TaskTracker** on page 103
4. **Step 4: Try Running a Map/Reduce Job** on page 103

**Step 1: Configure Secure MRv1**

Keep the following important information in mind when configuring secure MapReduce:

- The properties for JobTracker and TaskTracker must specify the `mapred` principal, as well as the path to the `mapred` keytab file.
The Kerberos principals for the JobTracker and TaskTracker are configured in the *mapred-site.xml* file. The same *mapred-site.xml* file with both of these principals must be installed on every host machine in the cluster. That is, it is not sufficient to have the JobTracker principal configured on the JobTracker host machine only. This is because, for example, the TaskTracker must know the principal name of the JobTracker to securely register with the JobTracker. Kerberos authentication is bi-directional.

Do not use `${user.name}` in the value of the `mapred.local.dir` or `hadoop.log.dir` properties in *mapred-site.xml*. Doing so can prevent tasks from launching on a secure cluster.

Make sure that each user who will be running MRv1 jobs exists on all cluster hosts (that is, on every host that hosts any MRv1 daemon).

Make sure the value specified for `mapred.local.dir` is identical in *mapred-site.xml* and *taskcontroller.cfg*. If the values are different, this error message is returned.

Make sure the value specified in *taskcontroller.cfg* for `hadoop.log.dir` is the same as what the Hadoop daemons are using, which is `/var/log/hadoop-0.20-mapreduce` by default and can be configured in *mapred-site.xml*. If the values are different, this error message is returned.

To configure secure MapReduce:

1. Add the following properties to the *mapred-site.xml* file on every machine in the cluster:

   ```xml
   <!-- JobTracker security configs -->
   <property>
     <name>mapreduce.jobtracker.kerberos.principal</name>
     <value>mapred/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
   </property>
   <property>
     <name>mapreduce.jobtracker.keytab.file</name>
     <value>/etc/hadoop/conf/mapred.keytab</value> <!-- path to the MapReduce keytab -->
   </property>
   
   <!-- TaskTracker security configs -->
   <property>
     <name>mapreduce.tasktracker.kerberos.principal</name>
     <value>mapred/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
   </property>
   <property>
     <name>mapreduce.tasktracker.keytab.file</name>
     <value>/etc/hadoop/conf/mapred.keytab</value> <!-- path to the MapReduce keytab -->
   </property>
   
   <!-- TaskController settings -->
   <property>
     <name>mapred.task.tracker.task-controller</name>
     <value>org.apache.hadoop.mapred.LinuxTaskController</value>
   </property>
   <property>
     <name>mapreduce.tasktracker.group</name>
     <value>mapred</value>
   </property>
   ```

2. Create a file called *taskcontroller.cfg* that contains the following information:

   ```
   hadoop.log.dir=<Path to Hadoop log directory. Should be same value used to start the TaskTracker. This is required to set proper permissions on the log files so that they can be written to by the user's tasks and read by the TaskTracker for serving on the web UI.>
   mapreduce.tasktracker.group=mapred
   banned.users=mapred,hdfs,bin
   min.user.id=1000
   ```
Note: The default setting for the banned.users property in the taskcontroller.cfg file is mapred, hdfs, and bin to prevent jobs from being submitted using those user accounts. The default setting for the min.user.id property is 1000 to prevent jobs from being submitted with a user ID less than 1000, which are conventionally Unix super users. Some operating systems such as CentOS 5 use a default value of 500 and above for user IDs, not 1000. If this is the case on your system, change the default setting for the min.user.id property to 500. If there are user accounts on your cluster that have a user ID less than the value specified for the min.user.id property, the TaskTracker returns an error code of 255.

3. The path to the taskcontroller.cfg file is determined relative to the location of the task-controller binary. Specifically, the path is <path of task-controller binary>/../../conf/taskcontroller.cfg. If you installed the CDH 5 package, this path will always correspond to /etc/hadoop/conf/taskcontroller.cfg.

Note: For more information about the task-controller program, see Information about Other Hadoop Security Programs.

Important: The same mapred-site.xml file and the same hdfs-site.xml file must both be installed on every host machine in the cluster so that the NameNode, Secondary NameNode, DataNode, JobTracker and TaskTracker can all connect securely with each other.

Step 2: Start up the JobTracker
You are now ready to start the JobTracker.

If you're using the /etc/init.d/hadoop-0.20-mapreduce-jobtracker script, then you can use the service command to run it now:

```
$ sudo service hadoop-0.20-mapreduce-jobtracker start
```

You can verify that the JobTracker is working properly by opening a web browser to http://machine:50030/ where machine is the name of the machine where the JobTracker is running.

Step 3: Start up a TaskTracker
You are now ready to start a TaskTracker.

If you're using the /etc/init.d/hadoop-0.20-mapreduce-tasktracker script, then you can use the service command to run it now:

```
$ sudo service hadoop-0.20-mapreduce-tasktracker start
```

Step 4: Try Running a Map/Reduce Job
You should now be able to run Map/Reduce jobs. To confirm, try launching a sleep or a pi job from the provided Hadoop examples (/usr/lib/hadoop-0.20-mapreduce/hadoop-examples.jar). You need Kerberos credentials to do so.

Important: Remember that the user who launches the job must exist on every host.
Configuring YARN Security

This page explains how to configure, start, and test secure YARN. For instructions on MapReduce 1, see Configuring MRv1 Security.

1. Configure Secure YARN.
2. Start up the ResourceManager.
3. Start up the NodeManager.
4. Start up the MapReduce Job History Server.
5. Try Running a Map/Reduce YARN Job.

Step 1: Configure Secure YARN

Before you start:

- The Kerberos principals for the ResourceManager and NodeManager are configured in the yarn-site.xml file. The same yarn-site.xml file must be installed on every host machine in the cluster.
- Make sure that each user who runs YARN jobs exists on all cluster nodes (that is, on every node that hosts any YARN daemon).

To configure secure YARN:

1. Add the following properties to the yarn-site.xml file on every machine in the cluster:

```
<!-- ResourceManager security configs -->
<property>
  <name>yarn.resourcemanager.keytab</name>
  <value>/etc/hadoop/conf/yarn.keytab</value> <!-- path to the YARN keytab -->
</property>

<!-- NodeManager security configs -->
<property>
  <name>yarn.nodemanager.keytab</name>
  <value>/etc/hadoop/conf/yarn.keytab</value> <!-- path to the YARN keytab -->
</property>

<!-- To enable TLS/SSL -->
<property>
  <name>yarn.http.policy</name>
  <value>HTTPS_ONLY</value>
</property>
```

2. Add the following properties to the mapred-site.xml file on every machine in the cluster:

```
<!-- MapReduce JobHistory Server security configs -->
<property>
  <name>mapreduce.jobhistory.address</name>
  <value>host:port</value> <!-- Host and port of the MapReduce JobHistory Server; default port is 10020 -->
</property>
```
3. Create a file called `container-executor.cfg` for the Linux Container Executor program that contains the following information:

```properties
yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs=<comma-separated list of paths to local NodeManager directories. Should be same values specified in yarn-site.xml. Required to validate paths passed to container-executor in order.>
yarn.nodemanager.linux-container-executor.group=yarn
yarn.nodemanager.log-dirs=<comma-separated list of paths to local NodeManager log directories. Should be same values specified in yarn-site.xml. Required to set proper permissions on the log files so that they can be written to by the user's containers and read by the NodeManager for log aggregation.>
banned.users=hdfs,yarn,mapred,bin
min.user.id=1000
```

**Note:**
In the `container-executor.cfg` file, the default setting for the `banned.users` property is `hdfs, yarn, mapred, and bin` to prevent jobs from being submitted using those user accounts. The default setting for the `min.user.id` property is 1000 to prevent jobs from being submitted with a user ID less than 1000, which are conventionally Unix super users. Some operating systems such as CentOS 5 use a default value of 500 and above for user IDs, not 1000. If this is the case on your system, change the default setting for the `min.user.id` property to 500. If there are user accounts on your cluster that have a user ID less than the value specified for the `min.user.id` property, the NodeManager returns an error code of 255.

4. The path to the `container-executor.cfg` file is determined relative to the location of the container-executor binary. Specifically, the path is `<dirname of container-executor binary>/../etc/hadoop/container-executor.cfg`. If you installed the CDH 5 package, this path will always correspond to `/etc/hadoop/conf/container-executor.cfg`.

**Note:**
The `container-executor` program requires that the paths including and leading up to the directories specified in `yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs` and `yarn.nodemanager.log-dirs` to be set to 755 permissions as shown in this table on permissions on directories.

5. Verify that the ownership and permissions of the `container-executor` program corresponds to:

```
---Sr-s--- 1 root yarn 36264 May 20 15:30 container-executor
```

**Note:** For more information about the Linux Container Executor program, see Information about Other Hadoop Security Programs.
Step 2: Start the ResourceManager

You are now ready to start the ResourceManager.

**Note:** Always start ResourceManager before starting NodeManager.

If you're using the `/etc/init.d/hadoop-yarn-resourcemanager` script, then you can use the `service` command to run it now:

```
$ sudo service hadoop-yarn-resourcemanager start
```

You can verify that the ResourceManager is working properly by opening a web browser to `http://host:8088/` where `host` is the name of the machine where the ResourceManager is running.

Step 3: Start the NodeManager

You are now ready to start the NodeManager.

If you're using the `/etc/init.d/hadoop-yarn-nodemanager` script, then you can use the `service` command to run it now:

```
$ sudo service hadoop-yarn-nodemanager start
```

You can verify that the NodeManager is working properly by opening a web browser to `http://host:8042/` where `host` is the name of the machine where the NodeManager is running.

Step 4: Start the MapReduce Job History Server

You are now ready to start the MapReduce JobHistory Server.

If you're using the `/etc/init.d/hadoop-mapreduce-historyserver` script, then you can use the `service` command to run it now:

```
$ sudo service hadoop-mapreduce-historyserver start
```

You can verify that the MapReduce JobHistory Server is working properly by opening a web browser to `http://host:19888/` where `host` is the name of the machine where the MapReduce JobHistory Server is running.

Step 5: Try Running a Map/Reduce YARN Job

You should now be able to run Map/Reduce jobs. To confirm, try launching a sleep or a pi job from the provided Hadoop examples (`/usr/lib/hadoop-mapreduce/hadoop-mapreduce-examples.jar`). You need Kerberos credentials to do so.

**Important:** The user who launches the job must exist on every node.

To try running a MapReduce job using YARN, set the `HADOOP_MAPRED_HOME` environment variable and then submit the job. For example:

```
$ export HADOOP_MAPRED_HOME=/usr/lib/hadoop-mapreduce
$ /usr/bin/hadoop jar /usr/lib/hadoop-mapreduce/hadoop-mapreduce-examples.jar pi 10 10000
```

Step 6: (Optional) Configure YARN for Long-running Applications

Long-running applications such as Spark Streaming jobs will need additional configuration since the default settings only allow the hdfs user’s delegation tokens a maximum lifetime of 7 days which is not always sufficient.
You can work around this by configuring the ResourceManager as a proxy user for the corresponding HDFS NameNode so that the ResourceManager can request new tokens when the existing ones are past their maximum lifetime. YARN will then be able to continue performing localization and log-aggregation on behalf of the hdfs user.

Set the following property in `yarn-site.xml` to true:

```xml
<property>
    <name>yarn.resourcemanager.proxy-user-privileges.enabled</name>
    <value>true</value>
</property>
```

Configure the following properties in `core-site.xml` on the HDFS NameNode. You can use a more restrictive configuration by specifying hosts/groups instead of `*` as in the example below.

```xml
<property>
    <name>hadoop.proxyuser.yarn.hosts</name>
    <value>*</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.proxyuser.yarn.groups</name>
    <value>*</value>
</property>
```

### FUSE Kerberos Configuration

This section describes how to use FUSE (Filesystem in Userspace) and CDH with Kerberos security on your Hadoop cluster. FUSE enables you to mount HDFS, which makes HDFS files accessible just as if they were UNIX files.

**To use FUSE and CDH with Kerberos security, follow these guidelines:**

- For each HDFS user, make sure that there is a UNIX user with the same name. If there isn't, some files in the FUSE mount point will appear to be owned by a non-existent user. Although this is harmless, it can cause confusion.
- When using Kerberos authentication, users must run `kinit` before accessing the FUSE mount point. Failure to do this will result in I/O errors when the user attempts to access the mount point. For security reasons, it is not possible to list the files in the mount point without first running `kinit`.
- When a user runs `kinit`, all processes that run as that user can use the Kerberos credentials. It is not necessary to run `kinit` in the same shell as the process accessing the FUSE mount point.

### Using `kadmin` to Create Kerberos Keytab Files

If your version of Kerberos does not support the Kerberos `-norandkey` option in the `xst` command, or if you must use `kadmin` because you cannot use `kadmin.local`, then you can use the following procedure to create Kerberos keytab files. Using the `-norandkey` option when creating keytabs is optional and a convenience, but it is not required.

**Important:**

**For both MRv1 and YARN deployments:** *On every machine in your cluster, there must be a keytab file for the `hdfs` user and a keytab file for the `mapred` user. The `hdfs` keytab file must contain entries for the `hdfs principal` and an `HTTP principal`, and the `mapred` keytab file must contain entries for the `mapred principal` and an `HTTP principal`. On each respective machine, the `HTTP principal` will be the same in both keytab files.*

**In addition, for YARN deployments only:** *On every machine in your cluster, there must be a keytab file for the `yarn` user. The `yarn` keytab file must contain entries for the `yarn principal` and an `HTTP principal`. On each respective machine, the `HTTP principal` in the `yarn` keytab file will be the same as the `HTTP principal` in the `hdfs` and `mapred` keytab files.*

For instructions, see [To create the Kerberos keytab files](#) on page 108.
To create the Kerberos keytab files

Do the following steps for every host in your cluster, replacing the `fully.qualified.domain.name` in the commands with the fully qualified domain name of each host:

1. Create the `hdfs` keytab file, which contains an entry for the `hdfs` principal. This keytab file is used for the NameNode, Secondary NameNode, and DataNodes.

   ```bash
   $ kadmin
   kadmin: xst -k hdfs-unmerged.keytab hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

2. Create the `mapred` keytab file, which contains an entry for the `mapred` principal. If you are using MRv1, the `mapred` keytab file is used for the JobTracker and TaskTrackers. If you are using YARN, the `mapred` keytab file is used for the MapReduce Job History Server.

   ```bash
   kadmin: xst -k mapred-unmerged.keytab mapred/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

3. **YARN only**: Create the `yarn` keytab file, which contains an entry for the `yarn` principal. This keytab file is used for the ResourceManager and NodeManager.

   ```bash
   kadmin: xst -k yarn-unmerged.keytab yarn/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

4. Create the `http` keytab file, which contains an entry for the `HTTP` principal.

   ```bash
   kadmin: xst -k http.keytab HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

5. Use the `ktutil` command to merge the previously-created keytabs:

   ```bash
   $ ktutil
   ktutil: rkt hdfs-unmerged.keytab
   ktutil: rkt http.keytab
   ktutil: wkt hdfs.keytab
   ktutil: clear
   ktutil: rkt mapred-unmerged.keytab
   ktutil: rkt http.keytab
   ktutil: wkt mapred.keytab
   ktutil: clear
   ktutil: rkt yarn-unmerged.keytab
   ktutil: rkt http.keytab
   ktutil: wkt yarn.keytab
   ```

This procedure creates three new files: `hdfs.keytab`, `mapred.keytab`, and `yarn.keytab`. These files contain entries for the `hdfs` and `HTTP` principals, the `mapred` and `HTTP` principals, and the `yarn` and `HTTP` principals respectively.

6. Use `klist` to display the keytab file entries. For example, a correctly-created `hdfs` keytab file should look something like this:

   ```bash
   $ klist -e -k -t hdfs.keytab
   Keytab name: WRFILE:hdfs.keytab
   slot KVNO Principal
   -------------------------------
   1 7 HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM (DES cbc mode with CRC-32)
   2 7 HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM (Triple DES cbc mode with...
7. To verify that you have performed the merge procedure correctly, make sure you can obtain credentials as both the hdfs and HTTP principals using the single merged keytab:

```
$ kinit -k -t hdfs.keytab hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
$ kinit -k -t hdfs.keytab HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
```

If either of these commands fails with an error message such as "kinit: Key table entry not found while getting initial credentials", then something has gone wrong during the merge procedure. Go back to step 1 of this document and verify that you performed all the steps correctly.

8. To continue the procedure of configuring Hadoop security in CDH 5, follow the instructions in the section To deploy the Kerberos keytab files.

Configuring the Mapping from Kerberos Principals to Short Names

You configure the mapping from Kerberos principals to short names in the `hadoop.security.auth_to_local` property setting in the `core-site.xml` file. Kerberos has this support natively, and Hadoop’s implementation reuses Kerberos’s configuration language to specify the mapping.

A mapping consists of a set of rules that are evaluated in the order listed in the `hadoop.security.auth_to_local` property. The first rule that matches a principal name is used to map that principal name to a short name. Any later rules in the list that match the same principal name are ignored.

You specify the mapping rules on separate lines in the `hadoop.security.auth_to_local` property as follows:

```
<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.auth_to_local</name>
  <value>
    RULE: [<principal translation>](<acceptance filter>)<short name substitution>
    RULE: [<principal translation>](<acceptance filter>)<short name substitution>
    DEFAULT
  </value>
</property>
```

Mapping Rule Syntax

To specify a mapping rule, use the prefix string `RULE:` followed by three sections—principal translation, acceptance filter, and short name substitution—described in more detail below. The syntax of a mapping rule is:

```
RULE: [<principal translation>] (<acceptance filter>) <short name substitution>
```

Principal Translation

The first section of a rule, `<principal translation>`, performs the matching of the principal name to the rule. If there is a match, the principal translation also does the initial translation of the principal name to a short name. In the `<principal translation>` section, you specify the number of components in the principal name and the pattern you want to use to translate those principal component(s) and realm into a short name. In Kerberos terminology, a principal name is a set of components separated by slash (/) characters.

The principal translation is composed of two parts that are both specified within "[]" using the following syntax:

```
[<number of components in principal name>:<initial specification of short name>]
```

where:

<number of components in principal name> – This first part specifies the number of components in the principal name (not including the realm) and must be 1 or 2. A value of 1 specifies principal names that have a single component
example, hdfs), and 2 specifies principal names that have two components (for example, hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name). A principal name that has only one component will only match single-component rules, and a principal name that has two components will only match two-component rules.

**<initial specification of short name>** – This second part specifies a pattern for translating the principal component(s) and the realm into a short name. The variable $0 translates the realm, $1 translates the first component, and $2 translates the second component.

Here are some examples of principal translation sections. These examples use atm@YOUR-REALM.COM and atm/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM as principal name inputs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This Principal Translation</th>
<th>Translates <a href="mailto:atm@YOUR-REALM.COM">atm@YOUR-REALM.COM</a> into this short name</th>
<th>Translates atm/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM into this short name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1:$1@$0]</td>
<td><a href="mailto:atm@YOUR-REALM.COM">atm@YOUR-REALM.COM</a></td>
<td>Rule does not match(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1:$1]</td>
<td>atm</td>
<td>Rule does not match(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1:$1.foo]</td>
<td>atm.foo</td>
<td>Rule does not match(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2:$1/$2@$0]</td>
<td>Rule does not match(^2) atm/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2:$1/$2]</td>
<td>Rule does not match(^2) atm/fully.qualified.domain.name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2:$1@$0]</td>
<td>Rule does not match(^2) <a href="mailto:atm@YOUR-REALM.COM">atm@YOUR-REALM.COM</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2:$1]</td>
<td>Rule does not match(^2) atm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Footnotes:

\(^1\) Rule does not match because there are two components in principal name atm/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM

\(^2\) Rule does not match because there is one component in principal name atm@YOUR-REALM.COM

**Acceptance Filter**

The second section of a rule, (**acceptance filter**), matches the translated short name from the principal translation (that is, the output from the first section). The acceptance filter is specified in "( )" characters and is a standard regular expression. A rule matches only if the specified regular expression matches the entire translated short name from the principal translation. That is, there's an implied ^ at the beginning of the pattern and an implied $ at the end.

**Short Name Substitution**

The third and final section of a rule is the (**short name substitution**). If there is a match in the second section, the acceptance filter, the (**short name substitution**) section does a final translation of the short name from the first section. This translation is a sed replacement expression (s/.../.../g) that translates the short name from the first section into the final short name string. The short name substitution section is optional. In many cases, it is sufficient to use the first two sections only.

**Converting Principal Names to Lowercase**

In some organizations, naming conventions result in mixed-case usernames (for example, John.Doe) or even uppercase usernames (for example, JDOE) in Active Directory or LDAP. This can cause a conflict when the Linux username and HDFS home directory are lowercase.

To convert principal names to lowercase, append /L to the rule.

**Example Rules**

Suppose all of your service principals are either of the form App.service-name/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM or
App.service-name@YOUR-REALM.COM, and you want to map these to the short name string service-name. To do this, your rule set would be:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.auth_to_local</name>
  <value>
    RULE:[1:$1](App\.(.*)\)/$1/g
    RULE:[2:$1](App\.(.*)\)/$1/g
    DEFAULT
  </value>
</property>
```

The first $1 in each rule is a reference to the first component of the full principal name, and the second $1 is a regular expression back-reference to text that is matched by (.*).

In the following example, suppose your company’s naming scheme for user accounts in Active Directory is FirstnameLastname (for example, JohnDoe), but user home directories in HDFS are /user/firstnamelastname. The following rule set converts user accounts in the CORP.EXAMPLE.COM domain to lowercase.

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.auth_to_local</name>
  <value>
    RULE:[2:$1@$0](HTTP@QCORP.EXAMPLE.COM$)s/@QCORP.EXAMPLE.COM$//
    RULE:[1:$1@$0](.*@QCORP.EXAMPLE.COM$)s/@QCORP.EXAMPLE.COM$///L
    RULE:[2:$1@$0](.*@QCORP.EXAMPLE.COM$)s/@QCORP.EXAMPLE.COM$///L
    DEFAULT
  </value>
</property>
```

In this example, the JohnDoe@CORP.EXAMPLE.COM principal becomes the johndoe HDFS user.

**Default Rule**

You can specify an optional default rule called DEFAULT (see example above). The default rule reduces a principal name down to its first component only. For example, the default rule reduces the principal names atm@YOUR-REALM.COM or atm/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM down to atm, assuming that the default domain is YOUR-REALM.COM.

The default rule applies only if the principal is in the default realm.

If a principal name does not match any of the specified rules, the mapping for that principal name will fail.

**Testing Mapping Rules**

You can test mapping rules for a long principal name by running:

```
$ hadoop org.apache.hadoop.security.HadoopKerberosName name1 name2 name3
```

**Enabling Debugging Output for the Sun Kerberos Classes**

Initially getting a secure Hadoop cluster configured properly can be tricky, especially for those who are not yet familiar with Kerberos. To help with this, it can be useful to enable debugging output for the Sun Kerberos classes. To do so, set the HADOOP_OPTS environment variable to the following:

```
HADOOP_OPTS="-Dsun.security.krb5.debug=true"
```

**Configuring Authentication for Other Components**

The pages in this section provide configuration steps for many components that may or may not be configured by default during Kerberos configuration. Some components use native authentication rather than or in addition to Kerberos.
Flume Authentication

Flume agents have the ability to store data on an HDFS filesystem configured with Hadoop security. The Kerberos system and protocols authenticate communications between clients and services. Hadoop clients include users and MapReduce jobs on behalf of users, and the services include HDFS and MapReduce. Flume acts as a Kerberos principal (user) and needs Kerberos credentials to interact with the Kerberos security-enabled service. Authenticating a user or a service can be done using a Kerberos keytab file. This file contains a key that is used to obtain a ticket-granting ticket (TGT). The TGT is used to mutually authenticate the client and the service using the Kerberos KDC.

The following sections describe how to use Flume 1.3.x and CDH 5 with Kerberos security on your Hadoop cluster:

**Important:**

To enable Flume to work with Kerberos security on your Hadoop cluster, make sure you perform the installation and configuration steps in Configuring Hadoop Security in CDH 5.

**Note:**

These instructions have been tested with CDH 5 and MIT Kerberos 5 only. The following instructions describe an example of how to configure a Flume agent to be a client as the user flume to a secure HDFS service. This section does not describe how to secure the communications between Flume agents, which is not currently implemented.

Configuring Flume's Security Properties

**Contents:**

*Writing as a single user for all HDFS sinks in a given Flume agent*

The Hadoop services require a three-part principal that has the form of username/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM. Cloudera recommends using flume as the first component and the fully qualified domain name of the host machine as the second. Assuming that Kerberos and security-enabled Hadoop have been properly configured on the Hadoop cluster itself, you must add the following parameters to the Flume agent's flume.conf configuration file, which is typically located at /etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.conf:

```plaintext
agentName.sinks.sinkName.hdfs.kerberosPrincipal = flume/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
agentName.sinks.sinkName.hdfs.kerberosKeytab = /etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.keytab
```

where:

- `agentName` is the name of the Flume agent being configured, which in this release defaults to the value "agent".
- `sinkName` is the name of the HDFS sink that is being configured. The respective sink's `type` must be `HDFS`. These properties can also be set using the substitution strings `$KERBEROS_PRINCIPAL` and `$KERBEROS_KEYTAB`, respectively.

In the previous example, `flume` is the first component of the principal name, `fully.qualified.domain.name` is the second, and `YOUR-REALM.COM` is the name of the Kerberos realm your Hadoop cluster is in. The `/etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.keytab` file contains the keys necessary for `flume/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM` to authenticate with other services.

Flume and Hadoop also provide a simple keyword, `_HOST`, that gets expanded to be the fully qualified domain name of the host machine where the service is running. This allows you to have one `flume.conf` file with the same `hdfs.kerberosPrincipal` value on all of your agent host machines.

```plaintext
agentName.sinks.sinkName.hdfs.kerberosPrincipal = flume/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM
```
Writing as different users across multiple HDFS sinks in a single Flume agent

In this release, support has been added for secure impersonation of Hadoop users (similar to "sudo" in UNIX). This is implemented in a way similar to how Oozie implements secure user impersonation.

The following steps to set up secure impersonation from Flume to HDFS assume your cluster is configured using Kerberos. (However, impersonation also works on non-Kerberos secured clusters, and Kerberos-specific aspects should be omitted in that case.)

1. Configure Hadoop to allow impersonation. Add the following configuration properties to your `core-site.xml`.

   ```xml
   <property>
     <name>hadoop.proxyuser.flume.groups</name>
     <value>group1,group2</value>
     <description>Allow the flume user to impersonate any members of group1 and group2</description>
   </property>
   <property>
     <name>hadoop.proxyuser.flume.hosts</name>
     <value>host1,host2</value>
     <description>Allow the flume user to connect only from host1 and host2 to impersonate a user</description>
   </property>
   
   You can use the wildcard character * to enable impersonation of any user from any host. For more information, see Secure Impersonation.

2. Set up a Kerberos keytab for the Kerberos principal and host Flume is connecting to HDFS from. This user must match the Hadoop configuration in the preceding step. For instructions, see Configuring Hadoop Security in CDH 5.

3. Configure the HDFS sink with the following configuration options:
   4. `hdfs.kerberosPrincipal` - fully qualified principal. Note: _HOST will be replaced by the hostname of the local machine (only in-between the / and @ characters)
   5. `hdfs.kerberosKeytab` - location on the local machine of the keytab containing the user and host keys for the above principal
   6. `hdfs.proxyUser` - the proxy user to impersonate

   Example snippet (the majority of the HDFS sink configuration options have been omitted):

   ```
   agent.sinks.sink-1.type = HDFS
   agent.sinks.sink-1.hdfs.kerberosPrincipal = flume/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM
   agent.sinks.sink-1.hdfs.kerberosKeytab = /etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.keytab
   agent.sinks.sink-1.hdfs.proxyUser = weblogs
   
   agent.sinks.sink-2.type = HDFS
   agent.sinks.sink-2.hdfs.kerberosPrincipal = flume/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM
   agent.sinks.sink-2.hdfs.kerberosKeytab = /etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.keytab
   agent.sinks.sink-2.hdfs.proxyUser = applogs
   ```

   In the above example, the flume Kerberos principal impersonates the user weblogs in sink-1 and the user applogs in sink-2. This will only be allowed if the Kerberos KDC authorizes impersonation of the specified proxy user by the specified principal.

Limitations

At this time, Flume does not support using multiple Kerberos principals or keytabs in the same agent. Therefore, if you want to create files as multiple users on HDFS, then impersonation must be configured, and exactly one principal must be configured in Hadoop to allow impersonation of all desired accounts. In addition, the same keytab path must be used across all HDFS sinks in the same agent. If you attempt to configure multiple principals or keytabs in the same agent, Flume will emit the following error message:

```text
Cannot use multiple kerberos principals in the same agent. Must restart agent to use new principal or keytab.
```
Configuring Kerberos for Flume Thrift Source and Sink Using Cloudera Manager

The Thrift source can be configured to start in secure mode by enabling Kerberos authentication. To communicate with a secure Thrift source, the Thrift sink should also be operating in secure mode.

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the Flume service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Agent.
4. Select Category > Main.
5. Edit the Configuration File property and add the Thrift source and sink properties listed in the tables below to the configuration file.

### Table 1: Thrift Source Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kerberos</td>
<td>Set to true to enable Kerberos authentication. The agent-principal and agent-keytab properties are required for successful authentication. The Thrift source in secure mode, will accept connections only from Thrift sinks that have Kerberos-enabled and are successfully authenticated to the KDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agent-principal</td>
<td>The Kerberos principal used by the Thrift Source to authenticate to the KDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agent-keytab</td>
<td>The path to the keytab file used by the Thrift Source in combination with the agent-principal to authenticate to the KDC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Thrift Sink Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kerberos</td>
<td>Set to true to enable Kerberos authentication. In Kerberos mode, client-principal, client-keytab and server-principal are required for successful authentication and communication to a Kerberos enabled Thrift Source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-principal</td>
<td>The principal used by the Thrift Sink to authenticate to the Kerberos KDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-keytab</td>
<td>The path to the keytab file used by the Thrift Sink in combination with the client-principal to authenticate to the KDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server-principal</td>
<td>The principal of the Thrift Source to which this Thrift Sink connects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Since Cloudera Manager generates the Flume keytab files for you, and the locations of the keytab files cannot be known beforehand, substitution variables are required for Flume. Cloudera Manager provides two Flume substitution variables called $KERBEROS_PRINCIPAL and $KERBEROS_KEYTAB to configure the principal name and the keytab file path respectively on each host.

Make sure you are configuring these properties for each Thrift source and sink instance managed by Cloudera Manager. For example, for agent a1, source r1, and sink k1, you would add the following properties:

```
# Kerberos properties for Thrift source s1
a1.sources.r1.kerberos=true
a1.sources.r1.agent-principal=<source_principal>
a1.sources.r1.agent-keytab=<path/to/source/keytab>
```
Configuring Kerberos for Flume Thrift Source and Sink Using the Command Line

The Thrift source can be configured to start in secure mode by enabling Kerberos authentication. To communicate with a secure Thrift source, the Thrift sink should also be operating in secure mode.

The following tables list the properties that must be configured in the `/etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.conf` file to enable Kerberos for Flume's Thrift source and sink instances.

**Table 3: Thrift Source Properties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kerberos</td>
<td>Set to <code>true</code> to enable Kerberos authentication. The <code>agent-principal</code> and <code>agent-keytab</code> properties are required for successful authentication. The Thrift source in secure mode, will accept connections only from Thrift sinks that have Kerberos-enabled and are successfully authenticated to the KDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agent-principal</td>
<td>The Kerberos principal used by the Thrift Source to authenticate to the KDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agent-keytab</td>
<td>The path to the keytab file used by the Thrift Source in combination with the <code>agent-principal</code> to authenticate to the KDC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4: Thrift Sink Properties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kerberos</td>
<td>Set to <code>true</code> to enable Kerberos authentication. In Kerberos mode, <code>client-principal</code>, <code>client-keytab</code> and <code>server-principal</code> are required for successful authentication and communication to a Kerberos enabled Thrift Source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-principal</td>
<td>The principal used by the Thrift Sink to authenticate to the Kerberos KDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-keytab</td>
<td>The path to the keytab file used by the Thrift Sink in combination with the <code>client-principal</code> to authenticate to the KDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server-principal</td>
<td>The principal of the Thrift Source to which this Thrift Sink connects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Make sure you are configuring these properties for each Thrift source and sink instance. For example, for agent `a1`, source `r1`, and sink `k1`, you would add the following properties:

```bash
# Kerberos properties for Thrift sink k1
a1.sinks.k1.kerberos=true
a1.sinks.k1.client-principal=<sink_principal>
a1.sinks.k1.client-keytab=<path/to/sink/keytab>
a1.sinks.k1.server-principal=<path/to/source/keytab>
```

```
# Kerberos properties for Thrift source r1
a1.sources.r1.kerberos=true
a1.sources.r1.agent-principal=<source_principal>
a1.sources.r1.agent-keytab=<path/to/source/keytab>
```
Configure these sets of properties for as many instances of the Thrift source and sink as needed to enable Kerberos.

**Flume Account Requirements**

This section provides an overview of the account and credential requirements for Flume to write to a Kerberized HDFS. Note the distinctions between the Flume agent machine, DataNode machine, and NameNode machine, as well as the flume Unix user account versus the flume Hadoop/Kerberos user account.

- Each Flume agent machine that writes to HDFS (using a configured HDFS sink) needs a Kerberos principal of the form:

  ``flume/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM``

  where `fully.qualified.domain.name` is the fully qualified domain name of the given Flume agent host machine, and `YOUR-REALM.COM` is the Kerberos realm.

- Each Flume agent machine that writes to HDFS does *not* need to have a flume Unix user account to write files owned by the flume Hadoop/Kerberos user. Only the keytab for the flume Hadoop/Kerberos user is required on the Flume agent machine.

- DataNode machines do *not* need Flume Kerberos keytabs and do also do *not* need the flume Unix user account.

- TaskTracker (MRv1) or NodeManager (YARN) machines need a flume Unix user account if and only if MapReduce jobs are being run as the flume Hadoop/Kerberos user.

- The NameNode machine needs to be able to resolve the groups of the flume user. The groups of the flume user on the NameNode machine are mapped to the Hadoop groups used for authorizing access.

  - The NameNode machine does *not* need a Flume Kerberos keytab.

**Testing the Flume HDFS Sink Configuration**

To test whether your Flume HDFS sink is properly configured to connect to your secure HDFS cluster, you must run data through Flume. An easy way to do this is to configure a Netcat source, a Memory channel, and an HDFS sink. Start Flume with that configuration, and use the `nc` command (available freely online and with many UNIX distributions) to send events to the Netcat source port. The resulting events should appear on HDFS in the configured location. If the events do not appear, check the Flume log at `/var/log/flume-ng/flume.log` for any error messages related to Kerberos.

**Writing to a Secure HBase Cluster**

Before you write to a secure HBase cluster, be aware of the following:

- Flume must be configured to use Kerberos security as documented above, and HBase must be configured to use Kerberos security as documented in HBase Security Configuration.

- The `hbase-site.xml` file, which must be configured to use Kerberos security, must be in Flume’s classpath or `HBASE_HOME/conf`.

- `HBaseSink` `org.apache.flume.sink.hbase.HBaseSink` supports secure HBase, but `AsyncHBaseSink` `org.apache.flume.sink.hbase.AsyncHBaseSink` does not.

- The Flume HBase sink takes the `kerberosPrincipal` and `kerberosKeytab` parameters:

  - `kerberosPrincipal` — specifies the Kerberos principal to be used
  - `kerberosKeytab` — specifies the path to the Kerberos keytab

  These are defined as:

  ```
  agent.sinks.hbaseSink.kerberosPrincipal = flume/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
  agent.sinks.hbaseSink.kerberosKeytab = /etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.keytab
  ```

  - You can use the `$KERBEROS_PRINCIPAL` and `$KERBEROS_KEYTAB` substitution variables to configure the principal name and the keytab file path. See the following documentation for steps on how to configure the substitution variables: Use Substitution Variables for the Kerberos Principal and Keytab.
If HBase is running with the AccessController coprocessor, the `flume` user (or whichever user the agent is running as) must have permissions to write to the same table and the column family that the sink is configured to write to. You can grant permissions using the `grant` command from HBase shell as explained in HBase Security Configuration.

The Flume HBase Sink does not currently support impersonation; it will write to HBase as the user the agent is being run as.

If you want to use HDFS Sink and HBase Sink to write to HDFS and HBase from the same agent respectively, both sinks have to use the same principal and keytab. If you want to use different credentials, the sinks have to be on different agents.

Each Flume agent machine that writes to HBase (using a configured HBase sink) needs a Kerberos principal of the form:

```
flume/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
```

where `fully.qualified.domain.name` is the fully qualified domain name of the given Flume agent host machine, and `YOUR-REALM.COM` is the Kerberos realm.

HBase Authentication

To configure HBase security, complete the following tasks:

1. **Configure HBase Authentication**: You must establish a mechanism for HBase servers and clients to securely identify themselves with HDFS, ZooKeeper, and each other. This ensures that hosts are who they claim to be.

   **Note:**
   
   - To enable HBase to work with Kerberos security, you must perform the installation and configuration steps in Configuring Hadoop Security in CDH 5 and ZooKeeper Security Configuration.
   
   - Although an HBase Thrift server can connect to a secured Hadoop cluster, access is not secured from clients to the HBase Thrift server. To encrypt communication between clients and the HBase Thrift Server, see Configuring TLS/SSL for HBase Thrift Server on page 209.

The following sections describe how to use Apache HBase and CDH 5 with Kerberos security:

- Configuring Kerberos Authentication for HBase on page 117
- Configuring Secure HBase Replication on page 123
- Configuring the HBase Client TGT Renewal Period on page 124

2. **Configure HBase Authorization**: You must establish rules for the resources that clients are allowed to access. For more information, see Configuring HBase Authorization on page 434.

Using the Hue HBase App

Hue includes an HBase App that allows you to interact with HBase through a Thrift proxy server. Because Hue sits between the Thrift server and the client, the Thrift server assumes that all HBase operations come from the `hue` user and not the client. To ensure that users in Hue are only allowed to perform HBase operations assigned to their own credentials, and not those of the `hue` user, you must enable HBase impersonation. For more information about the how to enable doAs Impersonation for the HBase Browser Application, see Enabling the HBase Browser Application with doAs Impersonation.

Configuring Kerberos Authentication for HBase

Using Kerberos for authentication for the HBase component requires that you also use Kerberos authentication for ZooKeeper. This means that HBase Master, RegionServer, and client hosts must each have a Kerberos principal for authenticating to the ZooKeeper ensemble. The steps below provide the details. Before you start, be sure that:
• Kerberos is enabled for the cluster, as detailed in Enabling Kerberos Authentication Using the Wizard.
• Kerberos principals for Cloudera Manager Server, HBase, and ZooKeeper hosts exist and are available for use. See Managing Kerberos Credentials Using Cloudera Manager on page 62 for details.

Cloudera Manager automatically configures authentication between HBase to ZooKeeper and sets up the HBase Thrift gateway to support impersonation (doAs). However, you must manually configure the HBase REST service for Kerberos (it currently uses Simple authentication by default, instead of Kerberos). See Configure HBase REST Server for Kerberos Authentication on page 118 for details.

Note: Impersonation (doAs) cannot be used with Thrift framed transport (TFramedTransport) because SASL does not work with Thrift framed transport.

You can use either Cloudera Manager or the command line to configure Kerberos authentication for HBase. Using Cloudera Manager simplifies the process, but both approaches are detailed below. This page includes these topics:

Configuring Kerberos Authentication for HBase Using Cloudera Manager

Cloudera Manager simplifies the task of configuring Kerberos authentication for HBase.

Configure HBase REST Server for Kerberos Authentication

Currently, the HBase REST Server uses Simple (rather than Kerberos) authentication by default. You must manually modify the setting using the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, as follows:

1. Log on to Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select Clusters > HBASE.
3. Click the Configuration tab.
4. Under the Scope filter, click HBase (Service-Wide).
5. Under the Category filter, click Security.
6. Find the HBase REST Authentication property (type "HBase Secure" in the Search box, if necessary), and confirm (or enter) the principal to use for HBase.
7. Select kerberos as the authentication type.
8. Click Save Changes.
9. Restart the role.
10. Restart the service. Select Restart from the Actions drop-down menu adjacent to HBASE-n (Cluster).
7. Click **kerberos** to select Kerberos instead of simple authentication.
8. Click **Save Changes**.
9. Restart the role.
10. Restart the service. Select **Restart** from the **Actions** drop-down menu adjacent to HBASE-n (Cluster).

**Configuring Kerberos Authentication for HBase Using the Command Line**

**Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See [Cloudera Documentation](https://www.cloudera.com) for information specific to other releases.

**Configure HBase Servers to Authenticate with a Secure HDFS Cluster Using the Command Line**

To configure HBase servers to authenticate with a secure HDFS cluster, do the following:

**Enable HBase Authentication**

Set the `hbase.security.authentication` property to `kerberos` in `hbase-site.xml` on every host acting as an HBase master, RegionServer, or client. In CDH 5, `hbase.rpc.engine` is automatically detected and does not need to be set.

```
<property>
  <name>hbase.security.authentication</name>
  <value>kerberos</value>
</property>
```

**Configure HBase Kerberos Principals**

To run on a secure HDFS cluster, HBase must authenticate itself to the HDFS services. HBase acts as a Kerberos principal and needs Kerberos credentials to interact with the Kerberos-enabled HDFS daemons. You can authenticate a service by using a keytab file, which contains a key that allows the service to authenticate to the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC).

1. Create a service principal for the HBase server using the following syntax. This principal is used to authenticate the HBase server with the HDFS services. Cloudera recommends using `hbase` as the username.

   ```
   $ kadmin
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey hbase/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

   `-r--------  1 hbase hbase    1343 2012-01-09 10:39  hbase.keytab
   `fully.qualified.domain.name is the host where the HBase server is running, and YOUR-REALM is the name of your Kerberos realm.

2. Create a keytab file for the HBase server.

   ```
   $ kadmin
   kadmin: xst -k hbase.keytab hbase/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

3. Copy the `hbase.keytab` file to the `/etc/hbase/conf` directory on the HBase server host. The owner of the `hbase.keytab` file should be the `hbase` user, and the file should have owner-only read permissions—that is, assign the file 0400 permissions and make it owned by `hbase:hbase`.

4. To test that the keytab file was created properly, try to obtain Kerberos credentials as the HBase principal using only the keytab file. Substitute your `fully.qualified.domain.name` and `realm` in the following command:

   ```
   $ kinit -k -t /etc/hbase/conf/hbase.keytab
   hbase/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```
5. In the /etc/hbase/conf/hbase-site.xml configuration file on all cluster hosts running the HBase daemon, add the following lines:

```xml
<property>
    <name>hbase.regionserver.kerberos.principal</name>
    <value>hbase/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hbase.regionserver.keytab.file</name>
    <value>/etc/hbase/conf/hbase.keytab</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hbase.master.kerberos.principal</name>
    <value>hbase/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hbase.master.keytab.file</name>
    <value>/etc/hbase/conf/hbase.keytab</value>
</property>
```

Configure HBase Servers and Clients to Authenticate with a Secure ZooKeeper

To run a secure HBase, you must also use a secure ZooKeeper. To use a secure ZooKeeper, each HBase host machine (Master, RegionServer, and client) must have a principal that allows it to authenticate with your secure ZooKeeper ensemble. The steps below assume that:

- ZooKeeper has been secured per the steps in ZooKeeper Security Configuration.
- ZooKeeper is not managed by HBase.
- You have successfully completed steps above (Enable HBase Authentication, Configure HBase Kerberos Principals) and have principal and keytab files in place for every HBase server and client.

To configure HBase Servers and clients to authenticate to ZooKeeper, you must:

Configure HBase JVMs (all Masters, RegionServers, and clients) to Use JAAS

1. On each host, set up a Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) by creating a /etc/hbase/conf/zk-jaas.conf file that contains the following:

   ```java
   Client {
       com.sun.security.auth.module.Krb5LoginModule required
       useKeyTab=true
       useTicketCache=false
       keyTab="/etc/hbase/conf/hbase.keytab"
       principal="hbase/fully.qualified.domain.name@<YOUR-REALM>";
   }
   ```

2. Modify the hbase-env.sh file on HBase server and client hosts to include the following:

   ```bash
   export HBASE_OPTS=-Djava.security.auth.login.config=/etc/hbase/conf/zk-jaas.conf
   export HBASE_MANAGES_ZK=false
   ```

3. Restart the HBase cluster.

Configure the HBase Servers (Masters and RegionServers) to Use Authentication to Connect to ZooKeeper

**Note:** These steps are required for command-line configuration only. Cloudera Manager does this automatically.
1. Update your hbase-site.xml on each HBase server host with the following properties:

```xml
<configuration>
  <property>
    <name>hbase.zookeeper.quorum</name>
    <value>$ZK_NODES</value>
  </property>
  <property>
    <name>hbase.cluster.distributed</name>
    <value>true</value>
  </property>
</configuration>
```

$ZK_NODES is the comma-separated list of hostnames of the ZooKeeper Quorum hosts that you configured according to the instructions in ZooKeeper Security Configuration.

2. Add the following lines to the ZooKeeper configuration file zoo.cfg:

```bash
kerberos.removeHostFromPrincipal=true
kerberos.removeRealmFromPrincipal=true
```

3. Restart ZooKeeper.

Configure Authentication for the HBase REST and Thrift Gateways

By default, the REST gateway does not support impersonation, but accesses HBase as a statically configured user. The actual user who initiated the request is not tracked. With impersonation, the REST gateway user is a proxy user. The HBase server records the actual user who initiates each request and uses this information to apply authorization.

1. Enable support for proxy users by adding the following properties to hbase-site.xml. Substitute the REST gateway proxy user for $USER, and the allowed group list for $GROUPS.

```xml
<property>
  <name>hbase.security.authorization</name>
  <value>true</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hadoop.proxyuser.$USER.groups</name>
  <value>$GROUPS</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hadoop.proxyuser.$USER.hosts</name>
  <value>$GROUPS</value>
</property>
```

2. Enable REST gateway impersonation by adding the following to the hbase-site.xml file for every REST gateway:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hbase.rest.authentication.type</name>
  <value>kerberos</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hbase.rest.authentication.kerberos.principal</name>
  <value>HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@<YOUR-REALM/value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hbase.rest.authentication.kerberos.keytab</name>
  <value>/etc/hbase/conf/hbase.keytab</value>
</property>
```

3. Add the following properties to hbase-site.xml for each Thrift gateway, replacing the Kerberos principal with a valid value:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hbase.thrift.keytab.file</name>
  <value>/etc/hbase/conf/hbase.keytab</value>
</property>
```
The value for the property `hbase.thrift.security.qop` can be one of the following:

- `auth-conf` — Authentication, integrity, and confidentiality checking
- `auth-int` — Authentication and integrity checking
- `auth` — Authentication checking only

4. To use the Thrift API principal to interact with HBase, add the `hbase.thrift.kerberos.principal` to the `acl` table. For example, to provide administrative access to the Thrift API principal `thrift_server`, run an HBase Shell command like the following:

```
  hbase> grant 'thrift_server', 'RWCA'
```

5. Optional: Configure HTTPS transport for Thrift by configuring the following parameters, substituting the placeholders with actual values:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hbase.thrift.ssl.enabled</name>
  <value>true</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hbase.thrift.ssl.keystore.store</name>
  <value>LOCATION_OF_KEYSTORE</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hbase.thrift.ssl.keystore.password</name>
  <value>KEYSTORE_PASSWORD</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hbase.thrift.ssl.keystore.keypassword</name>
  <value>LOCATION_OF_KEYSTORE_KEY_PASSWORD</value>
</property>
```

The Thrift gateway authenticates with HBase using the supplied credential. No authentication is performed by the Thrift gateway itself. All client access through the Thrift gateway uses the gateway's credential, and all clients have its privileges.

Configure doAs Impersonation for the HBase Thrift Gateway

**Note:** If you use framed transport, you cannot use doAs impersonation, because SASL does not work with Thrift framed transport.

doAs Impersonation provides a flexible way to use the same client to impersonate multiple principals. doAs is supported only in Thrift 1, not Thrift 2.

Enable doAs support by adding the following properties to `hbase-site.xml` on each Thrift gateway:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hbase.regionserver.thrift.http</name>
  <value>true</value>
</property>
```
See the demo client for information on using doAs impersonation in your client applications.

Start HBase

If the configuration worked, you see something similar to the following in the HBase Master and RegionServer logs when you start the cluster:

```java
INFO zookeeper.ZooKeeper: Initiating client connection, connectString=ZK_QUORUM_SERVER:2181, sessionTimeout=180000, watcher=master:60000
INFO zookeeper.ClientCnxn: Opening socket connection to server /ZK_QUORUM_SERVER:2181
INFO zookeeper.RecoverableZooKeeper: The identifier of this process is PID@ZK_QUORUM_SERVER
INFO zookeeper.Login: successfully logged in.
INFO client.ZooKeeperSaslClient: Client will use GSSAPI as SASL mechanism.
INFO zookeeper.ClientCnxn: Socket connection established to ZK_QUORUM_SERVER:2181, initiating session
INFO zookeeper.Login: TGT valid starting at: Sun Apr 08 22:43:59 UTC 2012
INFO zookeeper.ClientCnxn: Session establishment complete on server ZK_QUORUM_SERVER:2181, sessionid = 0x134106594320000, negotiated timeout = 180000
```

Configuring Secure HBase Replication

If you are using HBase Replication and you want to make it secure, read this section for instructions. Before proceeding, you should already have configured HBase Replication by following the instructions in the HBase Replication section of the CDH 5 Installation Guide.

To configure secure HBase replication, you must configure cross realm support for Kerberos, ZooKeeper, and Hadoop.

Note: HBase peer-to-peer replication from a non-Kerberized cluster to a Kerberized cluster is not supported.

To configure secure HBase replication:

1. Create krbtgt principals for the two realms. For example, if you have two realms called ONE.COM and TWO.COM, you need to add the following principals: krbtgt/ONE.COM@TWO.COM and krbtgt/TWO.COM@ONE.COM. Add these two principals at both realms. There must be at least one common encryption mode between these two realms.

   ```bash
   kadmin: addprinc -e "<enc_type_list>" krbtgt/ONE.COM@TWO.COM
   kadmin: addprinc -e "<enc_type_list>" krbtgt/TWO.COM@ONE.COM
   ```

2. Add rules for creating short names in Zookeeper. To do this, add a system level property in java.env, defined in the conf directory. Here is an example rule that illustrates how to add support for the realm called ONE.COM, and have two members in the principal (such as service/instance@ONE.COM):

   ```bash
   -Dzookeeper.security.auth_to_local=RULE:[2:\$1\$0] {.@\QONE.COM\E$}@\QONE.COM\E$/DEFAULT
   ```

   The above code example adds support for the ONE.COM realm in a different realm. So, in the case of replication, you must add a rule for the primary cluster realm in the replica cluster realm. DEFAULT is for defining the default rule.
3. Add rules for creating short names in the Hadoop processes. To do this, add the hadoop.security.auth_to_local property in the core-site.xml file in the replica cluster. For example, to add support for the ONE.COM realm:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.auth_to_local</name>
  <value>
    RULE: \[2:$1@$0\](.*@\QONE.COM\E$)s/@\QONE.COM\E$//
    DEFAULT
  </value>
</property>
```

For more information about adding rules, see Configuring the Mapping from Kerberos Principals to Short Names.

Configuring the HBase Client TGT Renewal Period

An HBase client user must also have a Kerberos principal which typically has a password that only the user knows. You should configure the maxrenewlife setting for the client's principal to a value that allows the user enough time to finish HBase client processes before the ticket granting ticket (TGT) expires. For example, if the HBase client processes require up to four days to complete, you should create the user's principal and configure the maxrenewlife setting by using this command:

```
kadmin: addprinc -maxrenewlife 4days
```

HCatalog Authentication

This section describes how to configure HCatalog in CDH 5 with Kerberos security in a Hadoop cluster:

- **Before You Start** on page 124
- **Step 1: Create the HTTP keytab file** on page 124
- **Step 2: Configure WebHCat to Use Security** on page 124
- **Step 3: Create Proxy Users** on page 125
- **Step 4: Verify the Configuration** on page 125

For more information about HCatalog see Installing and Using HCatalog.

Before You Start

Secure Web HCatalog requires a running remote Hive metastore service configured in secure mode. See Hive MetaStoreServer Security Configuration for instructions. Running secure WebHCat with an embedded repository is not supported.

Step 1: Create the HTTP keytab file

You need to create a keytab file for WebHCat. Follow these steps:

1. Create the file:

```
kadmin: addprinc -randkey HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
kadmin: xst -k HTTP.keytab HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name
```

2. Move the file into the WebHCat configuration directory and restrict its access exclusively to the hcatalog user:

```
$ mv HTTP.keytab /etc/webhcat/conf/
$ chown hcatalog /etc/webhcat/conf/HTTP.keytab
$ chmod 400 /etc/webhcat/conf/HTTP.keytab
```

Step 2: Configure WebHCat to Use Security

Create or edit the WebHCat configuration file webhcat-site.xml in the configuration directory and set following properties:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>templeton.kerberos.secret</td>
<td>Any random value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>templeton.kerberos.keytab</td>
<td>/etc/webhcat/conf/HTTP.keytab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>templeton.kerberos.principal</td>
<td>HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example configuration:

```xml
<property>
  <name>templeton.kerberos.secret</name>
  <value>SuperS3c3tV@lue!</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>templeton.kerberos.keytab</name>
  <value>/etc/webhcat/conf/HTTP.keytab</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>templeton.kerberos.principal</name>
  <value>HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>
```

Step 3: Create Proxy Users

WebHCat needs access to your NameNode to work properly, and so you must configure Hadoop to allow impersonation from the hcatalog user. To do this, edit your core-site.xml configuration file and set the hadoop.proxyuser.HTTP.hosts and hadoop.proxyuser.HTTP.groups properties to specify the hosts from which HCatalog can do the impersonation and what users can be impersonated. You can use the value * for "any".

Example configuration:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.proxyuser.HTTP.hosts</name>
  <value>*</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.proxyuser.HTTP.groups</name>
  <value>*</value>
</property>
```

Step 4: Verify the Configuration

After restarting WebHCat you can verify that it is working by using curl (you may need to run kinit first):

```
$ curl --negotiate -i -u : 'http://fully.qualified.domain.name:50111/templeton/v1/ddl/database'
```

Hive Authentication

Hive authentication involves configuring Hive metastore, HiveServer2, and all Hive clients to use your deployment of LDAP/Active Directory Kerberos on your cluster.

Here is a summary of the status of Hive authentication in CDH 5:

- HiveServer2 supports authentication of the Thrift client using Kerberos or user/password validation backed by LDAP. For configuration instructions, see [HiveServer2 Security Configuration](#).
- Earlier versions of HiveServer do not support Kerberos authentication for clients. However, the Hive MetaStoreServer does support Kerberos authentication for Thrift clients. For configuration instructions, see [Hive MetaStoreServer Security Configuration](#).

See also: [Using Hive to Run Queries on a Secure HBase Server](#) on page 133
For authorization, Hive uses Apache Sentry to enable role-based, fine-grained authorization for HiveServer2. See Apache Sentry Overview.

Important: Cloudera does not support Apache Ranger or Hive’s native authorization frameworks for configuring access control in Hive. Use Cloudera-supported Apache Sentry instead.

HiveServer2 Security Configuration

HiveServer2 supports authentication of the Thrift client using the following methods:

- Kerberos authentication
- LDAP authentication

Starting with CDH 5.7, clusters running LDAP-enabled HiveServer2 deployments also accept Kerberos authentication. This ensures that users are not forced to enter usernames/passwords manually, and are able to take advantage of the multiple authentication schemes SASL offers. In CDH 5.6 and lower, HiveServer2 stops accepting delegation tokens when any alternate authentication is enabled.

Kerberos authentication is supported between the Thrift client and HiveServer2, and between HiveServer2 and secure HDFS. LDAP authentication is supported only between the Thrift client and HiveServer2.

To configure HiveServer2 to use one of these authentication modes, configure the `hive.server2.authentication` configuration property.

Enabling Kerberos Authentication for HiveServer2

If you configure HiveServer2 to use Kerberos authentication, HiveServer2 acquires a Kerberos ticket during startup. HiveServer2 requires a principal and keytab file specified in the configuration. Client applications (for example, JDBC or Beeline) must have a valid Kerberos ticket before initiating a connection to HiveServer2.

Configuring HiveServer2 for Kerberos-Secured Clusters

To enable Kerberos Authentication for HiveServer2, add the following properties in the `/etc/hive/conf/hive-site.xml` file:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.authentication</name>
  <value>KERBEROS</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hive.server2.authentication.kerberos.principal</name>
  <value>hive/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hive.server2.authentication.kerberos.keytab</name>
  <value>/etc/hive/conf/hive.keytab</value>
</property>
```

where:

- `hive.server2.authentication` is a client-facing property that controls the type of authentication HiveServer2 uses for connections to clients. In this case, HiveServer2 uses Kerberos to authenticate incoming clients.
- The `_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM` value in the example above is the Kerberos principal for the host where HiveServer2 is running. The string `_HOST` in the properties is replaced at run time by the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the host machine where the daemon is running. Reverse DNS must be working on all the hosts configured this way. Replace `YOUR-REALM.COM` with the name of the Kerberos realm your Hadoop cluster is in.
- The `/etc/hive/conf/hive.keytab` value in the example above is a keytab file for that principal.

If you configure HiveServer2 to use both Kerberos authentication and secure impersonation, JDBC clients and Beeline can specify an alternate session user. If these clients have proxy user privileges, HiveServer2 impersonates the alternate user instead of the one connecting. The alternate user can be specified by the JDBC connection string `proxyUser=userName`
Configuring JDBC Clients for Kerberos Authentication with HiveServer2 (Using the Apache Hive Driver in Beeline)

JDBC-based clients must include `principal=<hive.server2.authentication.principal>` in the JDBC connection string. For example:

```java
String url = 
"jdbc:hive2://node1:10000/default;principal=hive/HiveServer2Host@YOUR-REALM.COM"
Connection con = DriverManager.getConnection(url);
```

where `hive` is the principal configured in `hive-site.xml` and `HiveServer2Host` is the host where HiveServer2 is running.

For JDBC clients using the Cloudera JDBC driver, see Cloudera JDBC Driver for Hive. For ODBC clients, see Cloudera ODBC Driver for Apache Hive.

Using Beeline to Connect to a Secure HiveServer2

Use the following command to start beeline and connect to a secure HiveServer2 process. In this example, the HiveServer2 process is running on localhost at port 10000:

```bash
$ /usr/lib/hive/bin/beeline
beeline> !connect
jdbc:hive2://localhost:10000/default;principal=hive/HiveServer2Host@YOUR-REALM.COM
0: jdbc:hive2://localhost:10000/default>
```

For more information about the Beeline CLI, see Using the Beeline CLI.

For instructions on encrypting communication with the ODBC/JDBC drivers, see Configuring Encrypted Communication Between HiveServer2 and Client Drivers on page 211.

Using LDAP Username/Password Authentication with HiveServer2

As an alternative to Kerberos authentication, you can configure HiveServer2 to use user and password validation backed by LDAP. The client sends a username and password during connection initiation. HiveServer2 validates these credentials using an external LDAP service.

You can enable LDAP Authentication with HiveServer2 using Active Directory or OpenLDAP.

**Important:** When using LDAP username/password authentication with HiveServer2, you must enable encrypted communication between HiveServer2 and its client drivers to avoid sending cleartext passwords. For instructions, see Configuring Encrypted Communication Between HiveServer2 and Client Drivers on page 211. To avoid sending LDAP credentials over a network in cleartext, see Configuring LDAPS Authentication with HiveServer2 on page 129.

Enabling LDAP Authentication with HiveServer2 using Active Directory

- **For managed clusters, use Cloudera Manager:**
  1. In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, click Hive in the list of components, and then select the Configuration tab.
  2. Type "ldap" in the Search text box to locate the LDAP configuration fields.
  3. Check Enable LDAP Authentication.
  4. Enter the LDAP URL in the format `ldap[s]://<host>[:<port>]`
  5. Enter the Active Directory Domain for your environment.
  6. Click Save Changes.

- **For unmanaged clusters, use the command line:**
Add the following properties to the `hive-site.xml`:

```
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.authentication</name>
  <value>LDAP</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.authentication.ldap.url</name>
  <value>LDAP_URL</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.authentication.ldap.Domain</name>
  <value>AD_DOMAIN_ADDRESS</value>
</property>
```

Where:

- The `LDAP_URL` value is the access URL for your LDAP server. For example, `ldap[s]://host:<port>`.

Enabling LDAP Authentication with HiveServer2 using OpenLDAP

To enable LDAP authentication using OpenLDAP, include the following properties in `hive-site.xml`:

```
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.authentication</name>
  <value>LDAP</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.authentication.ldap.url</name>
  <value>LDAP_URL</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.authentication.ldap.baseDN</name>
  <value>LDAP_BaseDN</value>
</property>
```

where:

- The `LDAP_URL` value is the access URL for your LDAP server.
- The `LDAP_BaseDN` value is the base LDAP DN for your LDAP server; for example, `ou=People,dc=example,dc=com`.

Configuring JDBC Clients for LDAP Authentication with HiveServer2

The JDBC client requires a connection URL as shown below. JDBC-based clients must include `user=LDAP_Userid;password=LDAP_Password` in the JDBC connection string. For example:

```java
String url = "jdbc:hive2://node1:10000/default;user=LDAP_Userid;password=LDAP_Password"
Connection con = DriverManager.getConnection(url);
```

where the `LDAP_Userid` value is the user ID and `LDAP_Password` is the password of the client user.

For ODBC Clients, see [Cloudera ODBC Driver for Apache Hive](https://www.cloudera.com/documentation/enterprise/6-5-x/index.html).

Enabling LDAP Authentication for HiveServer2 in Hue

Enable LDAP authentication with HiveServer2 by setting the following properties under the `[beeswax]` section in `hue.ini`.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>auth_username</th>
<th>LDAP username of Hue user to be authenticated.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>auth_password</td>
<td>LDAP password of Hue user to be authenticated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hive uses these login details to authenticate to LDAP. The Hive service trusts that Hue has validated the user being impersonated.

Configuring LDAPS Authentication with HiveServer2

HiveServer2 supports LDAP username/password authentication for clients. Clients send LDAP credentials to HiveServer2 which in turn verifies them against the configured LDAP provider, such as OpenLDAP or Microsoft Active Directory. Most implementations now support LDAPS (LDAP over TLS/SSL), an authentication protocol that uses TLS/SSL to encrypt communication between the LDAP service and its client (in this case, HiveServer2) to avoid sending LDAP credentials in cleartext.

To configure the LDAPS service with HiveServer2:

1. Import the LDAP server CA certificate or the server certificate into a truststore on the HiveServer2 host. If you import the CA certificate, HiveServer2 will trust any server with a certificate issued by the LDAP server’s CA. If you only import the server certificate, HiveServer2 trusts only that server. See Understanding Keystores and Truststores on page 194 for more details.
2. Make sure the truststore file is readable by the hive user.
3. Set the hive.server2.authentication.ldap.url configuration property in hive-site.xml to the LDAPS URL. For example, ldaps://sample.myhost.com.

Note: The URL scheme should be ldaps and not ldap.

4. If this is a managed cluster, in Cloudera Manager, go to the Hive service and select Configuration. Under Category, select Security. In the right panel, search for HiveServer2 TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File, and add the path to the truststore file that you created in step 1.

   If you are using an unmanaged cluster, set the environment variable HADOOP_OPTS as follows:

   ```
   HADOOP_OPTS="-Djavax.net.ssl.trustStore=<trustStore-file-path>
   -Djavax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword=<trustStore-password>"
   ```

5. Restart HiveServer2.

Pluggable Authentication

Pluggable authentication allows you to provide a custom authentication provider for HiveServer2.

To enable pluggable authentication:

1. Set the following properties in /etc/hive/conf/hive-site.xml:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.authentication</name>
  <value>CUSTOM</value>
  <description>Client authentication types.
  NONE: no authentication check
  LDAP: LDAP/AD based authentication
  KERBEROS: Kerberos/GSSAPI authentication
  CUSTOM: Custom authentication provider
  (Use with property hive.server2.custom.authentication.class)
</description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hive.server2.custom.authentication.class</name>
  <value>pluggable-auth-class-name</value>
  <description>Custom authentication class. Used when property 'hive.server2.authentication' is set to 'CUSTOM'. Provided class must be a proper implementation of the interface org.apache.hive.service.auth.PasswdAuthenticationProvider. HiveServer2 will call its Authenticate(user, passed) method to authenticate requests. The implementation may optionally extend the Hadoop's org.apache.hadoop.conf.Configured class to grab Hive's Configuration object.
</description>
</property>
```
2. Make the class available in the CLASSPATH of HiveServer2.

**Trusted Delegation with HiveServer2**

HiveServer2 determines the identity of the connecting user from the authentication subsystem (Kerberos or LDAP). Any new session started for this connection runs on behalf of this connecting user. If the server is configured to proxy the user at the Hadoop level, then all MapReduce jobs and HDFS accesses will be performed with the identity of the connecting user. If Apache Sentry is configured, then this connecting userid can also be used to verify access rights to underlying tables and views.

Users with Hadoop superuser privileges can request an alternate user for the given session. HiveServer2 checks that the connecting user can proxy the requested userid, and if so, runs the new session as the alternate user. For example, the Hadoop superuser hue can request that a connection's session be run as user bob.

Alternate users for new JDBC client connections are specified by adding the hive.server2.proxy.user=alternate_user_id property to the JDBC connection URL. For example, a JDBC connection string that lets user hue run a session as user bob would be as follows:

```
# Login as super user Hue
kinit hue -k -t hue.keytab hue@MY-REALM.COM
# Connect using following JDBC connection string
# jdbc:hive2://myHost.myOrg.com:10000/default;principal=hive/_HOST@MY-REALM.COM;hive.server2.proxy.user=bob
```

The connecting user must have Hadoop-level proxy privileges over the alternate user.

**HiveServer2 Impersonation**

---

**Important:** This is not the recommended method to implement HiveServer2 authorization. Cloudera recommends you use Sentry to implement this instead.

Impersonation in HiveServer2 allows users to execute queries and access HDFS files as the connected user rather than the super user who started the HiveServer2 daemon. This enforces an access control policy at the file level using HDFS file permissions or ACLs. Keeping impersonation enabled means Sentry does not have end-to-end control over the authorization process. While Sentry can enforce access control policies on tables and views in the Hive warehouse, it has no control over permissions on the underlying table files in HDFS. Hence, even if users do not have the Sentry privileges required to access a table in the warehouse, as long as they have permission to access the corresponding table file in HDFS, any jobs or queries submitted will bypass Sentry authorization checks and execute successfully.

To configure Sentry correctly, restrict ownership of the Hive warehouse to hive:hive and disable Hive impersonation as described [here](#).

**To enable impersonation in HiveServer2:**

1. Add the following property to the /etc/hive/conf/hive-site.xml file and set the value to true. (The default value is false.)

   ```xml
   <property>
   <name>hive.server2.enable.impersonation</name>
   <description>Enable user impersonation for HiveServer2</description>
   <value>true</value>
   </property>
   ```

2. In HDFS or MapReduce configurations, add the following property to the core-site.xml file:

   ```xml
   <property>
   <name>hadoop.proxyuser.hive.hosts</name>
   <value>*</value>
   </property>
   ```
See also File System Permissions.

Securing the Hive Metastore

Note: This is not the recommended method to protect the Hive Metastore. Cloudera recommends you use Sentry to implement this instead.

To prevent users from accessing the Hive metastore and the Hive metastore database using any method other than through HiveServer2, the following actions are recommended:

- Add a firewall rule on the metastore service host to allow access to the metastore port only from the HiveServer2 host. You can do this using iptables.
- Grant access to the metastore database only from the metastore service host. This is specified for MySQL as:

  ```
  GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON metastore.* TO 'hive'@'metastorehost';
  ```

  where metastorehost is the host where the metastore service is running.

- Make sure users who are not admins cannot log on to the host on which HiveServer2 runs.

Disabling the Hive Security Configuration

Hive’s security related metadata is stored in the configuration file `hive-site.xml`. The following sections describe how to disable security for the Hive service.

Disable Client/Server Authentication

To disable client/server authentication, set `hive.server2.authentication` to NONE. For example,

```
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.authentication</name>
  <value>NONE</value>
  <description>
    Client authentication types.
    NONE: no authentication check
    LDAP: LDAP/AD based authentication
    KERBEROS: Kerberos/GSSAPI authentication
    CUSTOM: Custom authentication provider
    (Use with property hive.server2.custom.authentication.class)
  </description>
</property>
```

Disable Hive Metastore security

To disable Hive Metastore security, perform the following steps:

- Set the `hive.metastore.sasl.enabled` property to false in all configurations, the metastore service side as well as for all clients of the metastore. For example, these might include HiveServer2, Impala, Pig and so on.
- Remove or comment the following parameters in `hive-site.xml` for the metastore service. Note that this is a server-only change.
  ```
  - hive.metastore.kerberos.keytab.file
  - hive.metastore.kerberos.principal
  ```
Configuring Authentication

Disable Underlying Hadoop Security

If you also want to disable the underlying Hadoop security, remove or comment out the following parameters in `hive-site.xml`.

- `hive.server2.authentication.kerberos.keytab`
- `hive.server2.authentication.kerberos.principal`

Hive Metastore Server Security Configuration

**Important:**
This section describes how to configure security for the Hive metastore server. If you are using HiveServer2, see HiveServer2 Security Configuration.

Here is a summary of Hive metastore server security in CDH 5:

- No additional configuration is required to run Hive on top of a security-enabled Hadoop cluster in standalone mode using a local or embedded metastore.
- HiveServer does not support Kerberos authentication for clients. While it is possible to run HiveServer with a secured Hadoop cluster, doing so creates a security hole since HiveServer does not authenticate the Thrift clients that connect to it. Instead, you can use HiveServer2 HiveServer2 Security Configuration.
- The Hive metastore server supports Kerberos authentication for Thrift clients. For example, you can configure a standalone Hive metastore server instance to force clients to authenticate with Kerberos by setting the following properties in the `hive-site.xml` configuration file used by the metastore server:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hive.metastore.sasl.enabled</name>
  <value>true</value>
  <description>If true, the metastore thrift interface will be secured with SASL. Clients must authenticate with Kerberos.</description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hive.metastore.kerberos.keytab.file</name>
  <value>/etc/hive/conf/hive.keytab</value>
  <description>The path to the Kerberos Keytab file containing the metastore thrift server’s service principal.</description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hive.metastore.kerberos.principal</name>
  <value>hive/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
  <description>The service principal for the metastore thrift server. The special string _HOST will be replaced automatically with the correct host name.</description>
</property>
```

**Note:**
The values shown above for the `hive.metastore.kerberos.keytab.file` and `hive.metastore.kerberos.principal` properties are examples which you will need to replace with the appropriate values for your cluster. Also note that the Hive keytab file should have its access permissions set to 600 and be owned by the same account that is used to run the Metastore server, which is the `hive` user by default.

- Requests to access the metadata are fulfilled by the Hive metastore impersonating the requesting user. This includes read access to the list of databases, tables, properties of each table such as their HDFS location and file type. You can restrict access to the Hive metastore service by allowing it to impersonate only a subset of Kerberos users. This can be done by setting the `hadoop.proxyuser.hive.groups` property in `core-site.xml` on the Hive metastore host.
For example, if you want to give the hive user permission to impersonate members of groups hive and user1:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.proxyuser.hive.groups</name>
  <value>hive, user1</value>
</property>
```

In this example, the Hive metastore can impersonate users belonging to only the hive and user1 groups. Connection requests from users not belonging to these groups will be rejected.

Using Hive to Run Queries on a Secure HBase Server

To use Hive to run queries on a secure HBase Server, you must set the following HIVE_OPTS environment variable:

```bash
env HIVE_OPTS="-hiveconf hbase.security.authentication=kerberos -hiveconf hbase.master.kerberos.principal=hbase/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM -hiveconf hbase.regionserver.kerberos.principal=hbase/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM -hiveconf hbase.zookeeper.quorum=zookeeper1,zookeeper2,zookeeper3" hive
```

where:

- You replace YOUR-REALM with the name of your Kerberos realm
- You replace zookeeper1, zookeeper2, zookeeper3 with the names of your ZooKeeper servers. The hbase.zookeeper.quorum property is configured in the hbase-site.xml file.
- The special string _HOST is replaced at run-time by the fully qualified domain name of the host machine where the HBase Master or RegionServer is running. This requires that reverse DNS is properly working on all the hosts configured this way.

In the following, _HOST is the name of the host where the HBase Master is running:

```bash
-hiveconf hbase.master.kerberos.principal=hbase/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM
```

In the following, _HOST is the hostname of the HBase RegionServer that the application is connecting to:

```bash
-hiveconf hbase.regionserver.kerberos.principal=hbase/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM
```

Note:
You can also set the HIVE_OPTS environment variable in your shell profile.

HttpFS Authentication

This section describes how to configure HttpFS CDH 5 with Kerberos security on a Hadoop cluster:

- Configuring the HttpFS Server to Support Kerberos Security on page 134
- Using curl to access an URL Protected by Kerberos HTTP SPNEGO on page 135


Important:
To enable HttpFS to work with Kerberos security on your Hadoop cluster, make sure you perform the installation and configuration steps in Configuring Hadoop Security in CDH 5.
Important:
If the NameNode, Secondary NameNode, DataNode, JobTracker, TaskTrackers, ResourceManager, NodeManagers, HttpFS, or Oozie services are configured to use Kerberos HTTP SPNEGO authentication, and two or more of these services are running on the same host, then all of the running services must use the same HTTP principal and keytab file used for their HTTP endpoints.

Configuring the HttpFS Server to Support Kerberos Security

1. Create an HttpFS service user principal that is used to authenticate with the Hadoop cluster. The syntax of the principal is: httpfs/<fully.qualified.domain.name>@<YOUR-REALM> where:
   - fully.qualified.domain.name is the host where the HttpFS server is running
   - YOUR-REALM is the name of your Kerberos realm

   ```bash
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey httpfs/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

2. Create a HTTP service user principal that is used to authenticate user requests coming to the HttpFS HTTP web-services. The syntax of the principal is: HTTP/<fully.qualified.domain.name>@<YOUR-REALM> where:
   - 'fully.qualified.domain.name' is the host where the HttpFS server is running
   - YOUR-REALM is the name of your Kerberos realm

   ```bash
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

   Important:
The HTTP/ component of the HTTP service user principal must be upper case as shown in the syntax and example above.

3. Create keytab files with both principals.

   ```bash
   $ kadmin
   kadmin: xst -k httpfs.keytab httpfs/fully.qualified.domain.name
   kadmin: xst -k http.keytab HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

4. Merge the two keytab files into a single keytab file:

   ```bash
   $ ktutil
   ktutil: rkt httpfs.keytab
   ktutil: rkt http.keytab
   ktutil: wkt httpfs-http.keytab
   ```

5. Test that credentials in the merged keytab file work. For example:

   ```bash
   $ klist -e -k -t httpfs-http.keytab
   ```

6. Copy the httpfs-http.keytab file to the HttpFS configuration directory. The owner of the httpfs-http.keytab file should be the httpfs user and the file should have owner-only read permissions.

7. Edit the HttpFS server httpfs-site.xml configuration file in the HttpFS configuration directory by setting the following properties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>httpfs.authentication.type</td>
<td>kerberos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>httpfs.hadoop.authentication.type</td>
<td>kerberos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>httpfs.authentication.kerberos.principal</td>
<td>HTTP/&lt;HTTPFS-HOSTNAME&gt;@&lt;YOUR-REALM.COM&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>httpfs.authentication.kerberos.keytab</td>
<td>/etc/hadoop-httpfs/conf/httpfs-http.keytab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>httpfs.hadoop.authentication.kerberos.principal</td>
<td>httpfs/&lt;HTTPFS-HOSTNAME&gt;@&lt;YOUR-REALM.COM&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>httpfs.hadoop.authentication.kerberos.keytab</td>
<td>/etc/hadoop-httpfs/conf/httpfs-http.keytab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>httpfs.authentication.kerberos.name.rules</td>
<td>Use the value configured for 'hadoop.security.auth_to_local' in 'core-site.xml'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Important:**
You must restart the HttpFS server to have the configuration changes take effect.

Using curl to access an URL Protected by Kerberos HTTP SPNEGO

**Important:**
Your version of curl must support GSS and be capable of running curl -V.

To configure curl to access an URL protected by Kerberos HTTP SPNEGO:

1. Run **curl** -V:

   ```bash
   $ curl -V
   curl 7.19.7 (universal-apple-darwin10.0) libcurl/7.19.7 OpenSSL/0.9.81
   zlib/1.2.3
   Protocols: tftp ftp telnet dict ldap http file https ftps
   Features: GSS-Negotiate IPv6 Largefile NTLM SSL libz
   ```

2. Login to the KDC using **kinit**.

   ```bash
   $ kinit
   Please enter the password for tucu@LOCALHOST:
   ```

3. Use **curl** to fetch the protected URL:

   ```bash
   $ curl --cacert
   /path/to/truststore.pem --negotiate -u : -b ~/cookiejar.txt -c
   ~/cookiejar.txt https://localhost:14000/webhdfs/v1/?op=liststatus
   ```

   where:
   - The **--cacert** option is required if you are using TLS/SSL certificates that curl does not recognize by default.
   - The **--negotiate** option enables SPNEGO in curl.
   - The **-u :** option is required but the username is ignored (the principal that has been specified for kinit is used).
   - The **-b** and **-c** options are used to store and send HTTP cookies.
   - Cloudera does not recommend using the **-k** or **--insecure** option as it turns off curl's ability to verify the certificate.

Hue Authentication

This page describes properties in the Hue configuration file, hue.ini, that support authentication and Hue security in general.
Configuring Authentication

For information on configuring Hue with Kerberos, encrypting session communication, and enabling single sign-on with SAML, see:

- Configuring Kerberos Authentication for Hue on page 138
- Integrating Hue with LDAP on page 140
- Configuring Hue for SAML on page 147

Enabling LDAP Authentication with HiveServer2 and Impala

LDAP authentication with HiveServer2 and Impala can be enabled by setting the following properties under their respective sections in `hue.ini`, `[beeswax]` and `[impala]`:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>auth_username</td>
<td>LDAP username of Hue user to be authenticated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>auth_password</td>
<td>LDAP password of Hue user to be authenticated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These login details are only used by Impala and Hive to authenticate to LDAP. The Impala and Hive services trust Hue to have already validated the user being impersonated, rather than simply passing on the credentials.

Securing Sessions

When a session expires, the screen blurs and the user is automatically logged out of the Hue Web UI. Logging on returns the user to same location.

Session Timeout

User sessions are controlled with the `ttl` (time-to-live) property under `[desktop]>[[session]]` in `hue.ini`. After n seconds, the session expires whether active or not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ttl</td>
<td>The cookie with the users session ID expires after n seconds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Default: <code>ttl=1209600</code> which is 60<em>60</em>24*14 seconds or 2 weeks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Idle Session Timeout

Idle sessions are controlled with the `idle_session_timeout` property under `[desktop]>[[auth]]` in `hue.ini`. Sessions that are idle for n seconds, expire. You can disable this property by setting it to a negative value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>idle_session_timeout</td>
<td>User session IDs expire after idle for n seconds. A negative value means idle sessions do not expire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><code>idle_session_timeout=900</code> means that sessions expire after being idle for 15 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><code>idle_session_timeout=-1</code> means that idle sessions do not expire (until ttl)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secure Login

Login properties are set in `hue.ini` under `[desktop]>[[auth]]`. They are based on `django-axes 1.5.0`.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>change_default_password</td>
<td>If true, users must change password on first login.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Must enable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><code>backend=desktop.auth.backend.AllowFirstUserDjangoBackend</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expires_after</td>
<td>User accounts are disabled n seconds after logout. If negative, user sessions never expire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expire_superusers</td>
<td>Apply <code>expires_after</code> to superusers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>login_cooloff_time</td>
<td>Failed logins are forgotten after n seconds.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**login_failure_limit**
Number of login attempts allowed before a record is created for failed logins.

**login_lock_out_at_failure**
If true, lock out IP after exceeding login_failure_limit.
- If login_lock_out_by_combination_user_and_ip=true, lock out IP and user.
- If login_lock_out_use_user_agent=true, also lock out user agent.

**login_lock_out_by_combination_user_and_ip**
If true, lock out IP and user.

**login_lock_out_use_user_agent**
If true, lock out user agent (such as a browser).

---

### Secure Cookies

Secure session cookies can be enabled by specifying the `secure` configuration property under the `[desktop]>[[session]]` section in `hue.ini`. Additionally, you can set the `http_only` flag for cookies containing users' session IDs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| `secure`          | The cookie with the user session ID is secure. Should only be enabled with HTTPS.  
                    | Default: false                                                              |
| `http_only`       | The cookie with the user session ID uses the HTTP only flag.                
                    | Default: true                                                               |
|                   | *If the HttpOnly flag is included in the HTTP response header, the cookie cannot be accessed through a client side script.* |
| `expire_at_browser_close` | Use session-length cookies. Logs out the user when the browser window is closed.  
                         | Default: false                                                              |

### Allowed HTTP Methods

You can specify the HTTP request methods that the server should respond to using the `http_allowed_methods` property under the `[desktop]` section in `hue.ini`.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>http_allowed_methods</code></td>
<td>options, get, head, post, put, delete, connect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Restricting the Cipher List

Cipher list support with HTTPS can be restricted by specifying the `ssl_cipher_list` configuration property under the `[desktop]` section in `hue.ini`.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl_cipher_list</code></td>
<td>!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!EXPORT:!SSLv2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### URL Redirect Whitelist

Restrict the domains or pages to which Hue can redirect users. The `redirect_whitelist` property can be found under the `[desktop]` section in `hue.ini`.

| Property          | For example, to restrict users to your local domain and FQDN, the following value can be used: `^\/.+$|^http:\/\//www.mydomain.com\/.+$` |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `redirect_whitelist` | For example, to restrict users to your local domain and FQDN, the following value can be used: `^\/.+$|^http:\/\//www.mydomain.com\/.+$` |

### Oozie Permissions

Access to the Oozie dashboard and editor can be individually controlled in the Hue Web UI under **User Admin > Groups**.
### Groups Property in UI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>oozie.dashboard_jobs_access</td>
<td>Enable Oozie Dashboard read-only access for all jobs. Default: true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oozie.disable_editor_access</td>
<td>Disable Oozie Editor access. Default: false</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Configuring Kerberos Authentication for Hue

**To configure the Hue server to support Hadoop security using Kerberos:**

1. Create a Hue user principal in the same realm as the Hadoop cluster of the form:

   ```
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey hue/hue.server.fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

   where: hue is the principal the Hue server is running as, hue.server.fully.qualified.domain.name is the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of your Hue server, YOUR-REALM.COM is the name of the Kerberos realm your Hadoop cluster is in

2. Create a keytab file for the Hue principal using the same procedure that you used to create the keytab for the hdfs or mapred principal for a specific host. You should name this file hue.keytab and put this keytab file in the directory `/etc/hue` on the machine running the Hue server. Like all keytab files, this file should have the most limited set of permissions possible. It should be owned by the user running the hue server (usually hue) and should have the permission 400.

3. To test that the keytab file was created properly, try to obtain Kerberos credentials as the Hue principal using only the keytab file. Substitute your FQDN and realm in the following command:

   ```
   $ kinit -k -t /etc/hue/hue.keytab
   hue/hue.server.fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

4. In the `/etc/hue/hue.ini` configuration file, add the following lines in the sections shown. Replace the `kinit_path` value, `/usr/kerberos/bin/kinit`, shown below with the correct path on the user’s system.

   ```ini
   [desktop]
   [[kerberos]]
   # Path to Hue's Kerberos keytab file
   hue_keytab=/etc/hue/hue.keytab
   # Kerberos principal name for Hue
   hue_principal=hue/FQDN@REALM
   # add kinit path for non root users
   kinit_path=/usr/kerberos/bin/kinit
   
   [beeswax]
   # If Kerberos security is enabled, use fully qualified domain name (FQDN)
   ## hive_server_host=<FQDN of Hive Server>
   # Hive configuration directory, where hive-site.xml is located
   ## hive_conf_dir=/etc/hive/conf
   
   [impala]
   ## server_host=localhost
   # The following property is required when impalad and Hue
   # are not running on the same host
   ## impala_principal=impala/impalad.hostname.domainname.com
   
   [search]
   # URL of the Solr Server
   ## solr_url=http://localhost:8983/solr/
   # Requires FQDN in solr_url if enabled
   ## security_enabled=false
   
   [hadoop]
   [[hdfs_clusters]]
   ```
### Configuring Authentication

```ini
[[default]]
# Enter the host and port on which you are running the Hadoop NameNode
namenode_host=FQDN
hdfs_port=8020
http_port=50070
security_enabled=true

# Thrift plugin port for the name node
## thrift_port=10090

# Configuration for YARN (MR2)
# ---------------------------------------------
[[yarn_clusters]]

[[default]]
# Enter the host on which you are running the ResourceManager
## resourcemanager_host=localhost
# Change this if your YARN cluster is Kerberos-secured
## security_enabled=false

# Thrift plug-in port for the JobTracker
## thrift_port=9290

[liboozie]
# The URL where the Oozie service runs on. This is required in order for users to submit jobs.
## oozie_url=http://localhost:11000/oozie
# Requires FQDN in oozie_url if enabled
## security_enabled=false
```  

**Important:**

In the `/etc/hue/hue.ini` file, verify the following:

- Make sure the `jobtracker_host` property is set to the fully qualified domain name of the host running the JobTracker. The JobTracker hostname must be fully qualified in a secured environment.
- Make sure the `fs.defaultfs` property under each `[[hdfs_clusters]]` section contains the fully-qualified domain name of the file system access point, which is typically the NameNode.
- Make sure the `hive_conf_dir` property under the `[beeswax]` section points to a directory containing a valid `hive-site.xml` (either the original or a synced copy).
- Make sure the FQDN specified for HiveServer2 is the same as the FQDN specified for the `hue_principal` configuration property. Without this, HiveServer2 will not work with security enabled.

Also note that HiveServer2 currently does not support SSL when using Kerberos.

5. In the `/etc/hadoop/conf/core-site.xml` configuration file on all of your cluster nodes, add the following lines:

```xml
<!-- Hue security configuration -->
<property>
  <name>hue.kerberos.principal.shortname</name>
  <value>hue</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.proxyuser.hue.groups</name>
  <value>*</value> <!-- A group which all users of Hue belong to, or the wildcard value "*" -->
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.proxyuser.hue.hosts</name>
</property>
```
Important:
Make sure you change the /etc/hadoop/conf/core-site.xml configuration file on all of your cluster nodes.

6. If Hue is configured to communicate to Hadoop using HttpFS, then you must add the following properties to httpfs-site.xml:

```xml
<property>
  <name>httpfs.proxyuser.hue.hosts</name>
  <value>fully.qualified.domain.name</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>httpfs.proxyuser.hue.groups</name>
  <value>*</value>
</property>
```

7. Add the following properties to the Oozie server oozie-site.xml configuration file in the Oozie configuration directory:

```xml
<property>
  <name>oozie.service.ProxyUserService.proxyuser.hue.hosts</name>
  <value>*</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>oozie.service.ProxyUserService.proxyuser.hue.groups</name>
  <value>*</value>
</property>
```

8. Restart the JobTracker to load the changes from the core-site.xml file.

```
$ sudo service hadoop-0.20-mapreduce-jobtracker restart
```

9. Restart Oozie to load the changes from the oozie-site.xml file.

```
$ sudo service oozie restart
```

10. Restart the NameNode, JobTracker, and all DataNodes to load the changes from the core-site.xml file.

```
$ sudo service hadoop-0.20-(namenode|jobtracker|datanode) restart
```

Integrating Hue with LDAP

**Warning:** This page is deprecated and will be removed in C5.13. See the Hue Guide for new docs and videos on Authenticating and Synchronizing Hue with LDAP.

This topic explains how to configure Hue so that it authenticates against an LDAP directory server. When Hue is integrated with LDAP, users can authenticate with their existing credentials and transparently inherit existing groups.

When authenticating with LDAP, Hue validates login credentials against an LDAP directory service if configured with the LDAP authentication backend:

```
[desktop]
[[auth]]
backend=desktop.auth.backend.LdapBackend
```
The LDAP authentication backend automatically creates users in Hue that do not exist. Hue imports these users (but never passwords) to properly authenticate.

To limit users to a predefined list, disable automatic user import by setting `create_users_on_login=false` under `[desktop] > [[ldap]]` in `hue.ini`.

```
[desktop]
[[ldap]]
create_users_on_login=false
```

There are two ways to authenticate with a directory service through Hue:

- **Search Bind**: Hue searches for credentials to bind to the LDAP server
- **Direct Bind**: Hue directly binds to the LDAP server with given credentials

Specify the authentication mechanism with `search_bind_authentication` under `[desktop] > [[ldap]]` in `hue.ini`.

| search_bind_authentication | Uses search bind authentication by default. Set this property to false to use direct bind authentication.
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------
| Default: true              |                                                              |

**Search Bind**

Search bind authentication performs an `ldapsearch` against the directory service and binds with the found distinguished name (DN) and password. This is the default method used by Hue with LDAP.

You can define how Hue uses search to bind to the LDAP server with the following properties under `[desktop] > [[ldap]] > [[users]]` in `hue.ini`.

| user_filter | General LDAP filter to restrict search.
|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Default: "objectclass=*" |                                                                                     |

| user_name_attr | The username to be searched against. Typical attributes to search for include: uid, sAMAccountName.
|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Default: sAMAccountName |                                                                                               |

With the above configuration, the LDAP search filter takes on the form:

```
(&(objectClass=*)(sAMAccountName=<user entered username>))
```

**Important**: When `search_bind_authentication=true`, Hue does an LDAP search with `bind_dn` (bind distinguished name) and `bind_password`. Hue searches the subtree beginning from the `base_dn` (base distinguished name) and looks for an entry whose attribute, specified in `user_name_attr`, has the same value as the short name given on login. You can limit the search with `user_filter`.

**Direct Bind**

Direct bind authentication binds to the LDAP server with the username and password provided at login.

You can define how Hue directly binds to the LDAP server with the following properties under `[desktop] > [[ldap]]` in `hue.ini`.

| nt_domain | The NT domain to connect to (only for use with Active Directory). Typically maps to the user email address or ID in conjunction with the domain. This AD-specific property allows Hue to authenticate without having to follow LDAP references to other partitions.
|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If provided, Hue binds with **User Principal Names** (UPNs).

Default: mycompany.com

| ldap_username_pattern | Provides a template for the DN that is sent to the directory service when authenticating. The `<username>` parameter is replaced with the username provided at login. Default: "uid=<username>,ou=People,dc=mycompany,dc=com"

### Important

When `search_bind_authentication=false`, Hue does a direct bind to the LDAP server with the credentials provided (and not with `bind_dn` and `bind_password`). Direct bind works in two ways, depending on whether the `nt_domain` property is specified in `hue.ini`:

- **nt_domain is specified**: Hue forms the User Principal Name (UPN) by concatenating the short name given at login with the `nt_domain`, for example, `<short name>@<nt_domain>`. Hue uses the UPN to connect to the Active Directory service and ignores `ldap_username_pattern`.
- **nt_domain is not specified**: This is used to connect to all other directory services (can handle Active Directory, but `nt_domain` is the preferred way for AD). In this case, `ldap_username_pattern` is used and it should take on the form `cn=<username>,dc=example,dc=com` where `<username>` is replaced with the username given at login.

### Importing LDAP Users and Groups

If an LDAP user needs to be part of a certain group and be given a particular set of permissions, you can import this user with the User Admin interface in Hue.

Groups can also be imported using the User Admin interface, and users can be added to this group. As in the image below, not only can groups be discovered using DN and rDN search, but users that are members of the group or members of its subordinate groups can be imported as well.
You have the following options available when importing a user/group:

- **Distinguished name**: If checked, the username provided must be a full distinguished name (for example, `uid=hue,ou=People,dc=gethue,dc=com`). Otherwise, the **Username** provided should be a fragment of a Relative Distinguished Name (rDN) (for example, the username `hue` maps to the rDN `uid=hue`). Hue performs an LDAP search using the same methods and configurations as described above. That is, Hue takes the provided username and creates a search filter using the `user_filter` and `user_name_attr` configurations.

- **Create home directory**: If checked, when the user is imported, their home directory in HDFS is automatically created if it doesn’t already exist.

**Important**: When managing LDAP entries, the User Admin app always performs an LDAP search and always uses `bind_dn`, `bind_password`, `base_dn`, as defined in `hue.ini`.

**Synchronizing LDAP Users and Groups**

Users and groups can be synchronized with the directory service using the User Admin interface or using a command line utility. The image from the **Importing LDAP Users and Groups** section uses the words **Add/Sync** to indicate that when a user or group that already exists in Hue is being added, it is, in fact, synchronized instead. In the case of importing users for a particular group, new users are imported and existing users are synchronized.

**Note**: Users that have been deleted from the directory service are not deleted from Hue. Those users can be manually deactivated from Hue using the User Admin interface.

**Attributes Synchronized**

Currently, only the first name, last name, and email address are synchronized. Hue looks for the LDAP attributes `givenName`, `sn`, and `mail` when synchronizing. The `user_name_attr` configuration property is used to appropriately choose the username in Hue. For instance, if `user_name_attr` is set to `uid`, then the "uid" returned by the directory service is used as the username of the user in Hue.

**User Admin interface**

The **Sync LDAP users/groups** button in the User Admin interface will automatically synchronize all users and groups.
Configuring Authentication

Synchronize Using a Command-Line Interface

For example, to synchronize users and groups using a command-line interface:

```
<hue root>/build/env/bin/bin/hue sync_ldap_users_and_groups
```

Configuring Hue for Authentication against Multiple LDAP/Active Directory Servers

Hue also supports the ability to authenticate against multiple LDAP servers. Before attempting LDAP authentication against multiple servers, ensure you have configured LDAP synchronization for each server, as described in the previous section. As long as users and groups are synced across LDAP and Hue, authentication should work.

To configure multiple servers, determine the correct parameters for each server as described in the Integrating Hue with LDAP on page 140 section above. In the hue.ini file, create a configuration section for each LDAP server under `[[[ldap_servers]]]` named for the respective LDAP server, with the format `[[[<ldap_server>]]]`.

If you are using Cloudera Manager, you can add the configuration section using an Advanced Configuration Snippet:

1. Go to the Hue Service.
2. Click Configuration.
3. Select Category > Advanced.
4. Locate the Hue Service Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for hue_safety_valve.ini property and add a code snippet for each LDAP server. For example, for the server AD1.TEST.COM:

```ini
[desktop]
[[ldap]]
[[[ldap_servers]]]
[[[AD1.TEST.COM]]]
ldap_url=ldap://w2k8-ad1
search_bind_authentication=true
create_users_on_login=true
base_dn="cn=users,dc=ad1,dc=test,dc=com"
bind_dn="cn=Administrator,cn=users,dc=ad1,dc=test,dc=com"
bind_password="Password1"

[[[AD2.TEST.COM]]]
ldap_url=ldap://w2k8-ad2
search_bind_authentication=true
create_users_on_login=true
base_dn="cn=users,dc=ad2,dc=test,dc=com"
bind_dn="cn=Administrator,cn=users,dc=ad2,dc=test,dc=com"
bind_password="Password1"
```

5. Click Save Changes.
6. Restart the Hue service.

LDAPS/StartTLS support

Secure communication with LDAP is provided using the TLS/SSL and StartTLS protocols. They allow Hue to validate the directory service it is going to converse with. Hence, if a Certificate Authority certificate file is provided, Hue will communicate using LDAPS. You can specify the path to the CA certificate under:

```ini
[desktop]
[[ldap]]
ldap_cert=/etc/hue/ca.crt
```

The StartTLS protocol can be used as well:

```ini
[desktop]
[[ldap]]
use_start_tls=true
```

Troubleshooting LDAP Authentication Failures in Hue

The first step to diagnosing an LDAP issue is to run the `ldapsearch` command on the user or group that is involved in the authentication failure. The `ldapsearch` command gives you a snapshot of the state of the directory for a user or group. You can use the command to make sure the user or group has been configured as expected. The rest of this
section will walk you through the Hue configuration required for some common deployment scenarios. Once you have made sure that hue.ini was configured properly, enable LDAP debugging to be able to audit LDAP actions in the Hue logs.

**Hue Configuration for Common Deployment Scenarios**

The following sections contain samples from the Hue configuration file, hue.ini, for common deployment scenarios. These are followed by the output of the ldapsearch command for a user or group in each scenario. Use these to make sure your configuration matches what is expected.

**Hue Authentication against Active Directory using NT Domain**

```
[[ldap]]
ldap_url=ldap://w2k12-ad1
nt_domain=test.com
base_dn="cn=users,dc=test,dc=com"
bind_dn="Administrator@test.com"
bind_password="Password1"

[[[users]]]
user_name_attr=sAMAccountName
user_filter="objectclass=*"

[[[groups]]]
group_name_attr=cn
group_filter="objectclass=*"
```

**ldapsearch result for the username, sampleuser:**

```
ldapsearch -x -LLL -H ldap://w2k12-ad1 -D "Administrator@test.com" -w Password1 -b "cn=users,dc=test,dc=com" "(&(objectclass=*)(sAMAccountName=sampleuser))"
dn: CN=Sample User,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: user
cn: Sample User
sn: Sample
givenName: Sample
distinguishedName: CN=Sample User,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM
displayName: Sample User
uSNCreated: 12762
memberOf: CN=endusers,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM
memberOf: CN=admins,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM
memberOf: CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM
name: Sample User
sAMAccountName: sampleuser
sAMAccountType: 805306368
userPrincipalName: sampleuser@TEST.COM
....... 
```

**ldapsearch result for the group, samplegroup:**

```
ldapsearch -x -LLL -H ldap://w2k12-ad1 -D "Administrator@test.com" -w Password1 -b "cn=users,dc=test,dc=com" "(&objectclass*)(cn=samplegroup))"
dn: CN=endusers,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM
objectClass: top
objectClass: group
cn: endusers
member: CN=Test User1,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM
member: CN=Sample User,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM
distinguishedName: CN=endusers,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM
sAMAccountName: endusers
sAMAccountType: 268435456
....... 
```
The following command returns a list of all member domains for group, `samplegroup`:

```
ldapsearch -x -LLL -H ldap://w2k12-ad1 -D "Administrator@test.com" -w Password1 -b "cn=users,dc=test,dc=com" "(&(objectclass=*)(cn=samplegroup))" member
```

dn: CN=endusers,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM
member: CN=Test User1,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM
member: CN=Sample User,CN=Users,DC=TEST,DC=COM

**Hue Search Bind Authentication against an LDAP server**

Make sure you have configured the `ldap_url` property to perform Search Bind Authentication against an LDAP server.

```
[[ldap]]
ldap_url=ldap://ldap.test.com
base_dn="dc=test,dc=com"
```

The `ldapsearch` result for `sampleuser`:

```
ldapsearch -x -LLL -H ldap://ldap.test.com -b "dc=test,dc=com" "(uid=sampleuser)"
```

dn: uid=sampleuser,ou=people,dc=test,dc=com
uid: sampleuser
displayName: Sample User
cn: Sample User
givenName: Sample
sn: User
initials: CH
mail: sampleuser@test.com
homeDirectory: /home/sampleuser
loginShell: /bin/bash
gecos: Sample User, , , ,
objectClass: inetOrgPerson

The `ldapsearch` result for group, `samplegroup`:

```
ldapsearch -x -LLL -H ldap://ldap.test.com -b "dc=test,dc=com" "(cn=samplegroup)"
```

dn: cn=admins,ou=people,dc=test,dc=com
objectClass: groupOfNames
cn: admins
description: Group of Names
member: uid=sampleuser,ou=people,dc=test,dc=com
member: uid=hue,ou=people,dc=test,dc=com

The following command returns a list of all member domains for group, `samplegroup`:

```
ldapsearch -x -LLL -H ldap://ldap.test.com -b "dc=test,dc=com" "(cn=samplegroup)" member
```

dn: cn=admins,ou=people,dc=test,dc=com
member: uid=sampleuser,ou=people,dc=test,dc=com
member: uid=hue,ou=people,dc=test,dc=com

**Enabling LDAP Debugging in Hue**

Once you have confirmed that the `ldapsearch` command works as expected, enable LDAP debugging in Hue to view Hue server logs in Cloudera Manager. Starting with CDH 5.4, you can view three different levels of LDAP actions in the Hue server logs. To enable debugging, set the following options in the `[[ldap]]` section of the `hue.ini` file:

- **debug** - This enables `python-ldap` debugging. To enable, set to `true`.
- **debug_level** - Sets the debug level of the underlying LDAP C library. Set to a value between 0 and 255.
- **trace_level** - Sets the trace level for logging method calls. Set to a value between 0 and 9.

**Enabling LDAP Debugging in Hue Using Cloudera Manager**

1. Go to the **Hue Service > Configuration** and click **Advanced** in the **Category**.
2. Add the following after setting the values appropriately to the **Hue Service Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve)** for `hue_safety_valve.ini`

```ini
[desktop]
[[ldap]]
debug=true
debug_level=255
trace_level=9
```

3. Add the following to the **Hue Service Environment Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve).**

```ini
DESKTOP_DEBUG=true
DEBUG=true
```

4. Save and restart Hue. You should now be able to view LDAP actions in the following logs:

- `/var/log/hue/runruncpserver.log`
- `/var/run/cloudera-scm-agent/process/<id>-hue-HUE_SERVER/logs`

## Configuring Hue for SAML

**Warning:** This page is deprecated and will be removed in C5.13. See the Hue Guide for new docs on how to **Authenticate Hue with SAML.**

This page explains how to configure Hue to work with SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) for Single Sign-on (SSO) authentication. The **SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO** profile has three components:

- **User Agent** - Browser that represents you, the user, seeking resources.
- **Service Provider (SP)** - Service (Hue) that sends authentication requests to SAML.
- **Identity Provider (IdP)** - SAML service that authenticates users.

When a user requests access to an application, Hue sends an authentication request from the browser to the Identity Provider. The Identity Provider authenticates the user, sends a response, and redirects the browser back to Hue. You can use any Identity Provider (such as Shibboleth).

**Note:** This page addresses both managed and unmanaged deployments. Currently, Hue is the only service that can be configured with Cloudera Manager.

## Summary Steps for Configuring Hue with SAML

### Prerequisite
Ensure you have an Identity Provider (such as Shibboleth) configured before starting.

### Install Libraries

- **Step 1**: Install `git`, `gcc`, `python-devel`, `swig` and `openssl`.
- **Step 2**: Install `xmlsec1` and `xmlsec1-openssl` and disable cipher algorithms.
- **Step 3**: Install `djangosaml` and `pysaml2`.

### Configure Hue

- **Step 4**: Copy metadata from your Identity Provider’s SAML server and save it in an XML file.
- **Step 5**: Configure Hue to work with SAML (in `hue.ini`) and restart the Hue server.

### Configure SAML

- **Step 6**: Copy metadata from the Hue server and send it to the Identity Provider.

## Detailed Steps for Configuring Hue with SAML

### Prerequisite
The instructions on this page assume that you have an Identity Provider set up and running.
See the upstream Hue blog post, [SSO with Hue: new SAML backend](https://example.com), for a demo on configuring Hue for single sign-on (SSO) authentication with SAML 2.0 on the backend and [Shibboleth](https://example.com) as the Identity Provider.

**Step 1: Install swig and openssl packages**

1. Install git, gcc, python-devel, swig and openssl. Use `yum` for RHEL/CentOS/OL and `zypper` for SLES:

   ```
   <package manager> install git gcc python-devel swig openssl
   ```

2. [CDH 5.5.x and higher] Disable the cipher algorithms, MD5, RC4, and DH by appending the following code to the file, `/usr/java/<your_jdk_version>-cloudera/jre/lib/security/java.security`:

   ```
   jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=MD5, RC4, DH
   ```

   See [Troubleshooting](https://example.com) on page 151 below.

**Step 2: Install xmlsec1 and xmlsec1-openssl packages**

![Important: Ensure that the xmlsec1 package is executable by the user, hue.]

Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL, CentOS) and Oracle oraLinux (OL):

1. Download and install the EPEL repository to get the xmlsec1 package:

   - RHEL/CentOs/OEL 7:
     ```
     wget http://dl.fedoraproject.org/pub/epel/7/x86_64/e/epel-release-7-6.noarch.rpm
     rpm -ivh epel-release-7-6.noarch.rpm
     ```

   - RHEL/CentOs/OEL 6:
     ```
     wget http://download.fedoraproject.org/pub/epel/6/x86_64/epel-release-6-8.noarch.rpm
     rpm -ivh epel-release-6-8.noarch.rpm
     ```

   - RHEL/CentOs/OEL 5:
     ```
     wget http://download.fedoraproject.org/pub/epel/5/x86_64/epel-release-5-4.noarch.rpm
     rpm -ivh epel-release-5-4.noarch.rpm
     ```

2. Install xmlsec1 and xmlsec1-openssl:

   ```
   yum install xmlsec1 xmlsec1-openssl
   ```

SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (SLES):

Download the xmlsec1 package from [http://www.aleksey.com/xmlsec/](http://www.aleksey.com/xmlsec/) and install:

```
tar -xvzf xmlsec1-<version>.tar.gz
cd xmlsec1-<version>
./configure & & make
sudo make install
```

**Step 3: Install djangosaml and pysaml2 libraries**

![Important: CDH 5.4.x and higher include the djangosaml and pysaml2 libraries. Do not install.]

The libraries, djangosaml2 and pysaml2, support SAML in Hue. They depend on the xmlsec1 package to be installed and executable by the user, hue.

```
bUILD/ENV/BIN/PIP INSTALL -E GIT+HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/ABEC/PYSAML2@HEAD#Egg=PYSAML2
```

**Step 4: Copy Metadata from the SAML Server into an XML File**

The Service Provider (Hue) and the Identity Provider (SAML) use a metadata file to confirm each other’s veracity. Hue stores metadata from the SAML server, and SAML stores metadata from Hue server (see Step 6: Configure SAML on page 151).

Read the documentation of your Identity Provider for details on how to procure the XML metadata of the SAML server. Paste the metadata into an XML file. When configuring Hue, set the property, metadata_file, to the path of this file.

For example, if your Identity Provider is Shibboleth, visit https://<identity_provider_host>:8443/idp/shibboleth, copy the metadata content, and paste it into the Hue metadata file.

**Note:** You may have to edit the metadata you copy from your Identity Provider. For example, the Identity Provider’s port number (8443) might be missing from its URL.

**Step 5: Configure Hue and Restart the Hue Server**

To enable support for SAML, configure Hue with the necessary SAML parameters and values.

Users with unmanaged CDH deployments must manually edit /etc/hue/conf/hue.ini and restart the hue service:

```
sudo service hue restart
```

Users with managed CDH deployments must set these parameters in Cloudera Manager:

1. Go to the Hue service and click on the Configuration tab.
2. Filter by Scope > HUE-n (Service-Wide) and Category > Advanced.
3. Locate the property, Hue Service Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for hue_safety_valve.ini.
4. Input your SAML properties and values in the edit box. See the SAML configuration example below.
5. Click Save Changes.
6. Select Actions > Restart to restart the Hue service (which also restarts the Hue server).

**Note:** Hue logically merges the Hue Service and Hue Server snippets in Cloudera Manager with hue.ini. Hue does not actually write them to hue.ini.

**Example of a SAML configuration in hue.ini:**

```
[desktop]
redirect_whitelist="^\/*$","https:\/\saml.example.com\/*$"
[[auth]]
backend=libsaml.backend.SAML2Backend

[libsaml]
xmlsec_binary=/usr/bin/xmlsec1
metadata_file=/opt/cloudera/security/saml/idp-metadata.xml
key_file=/opt/cloudera/security/saml/idp.key
cert_file=/opt/cloudera/security/saml/idp.crt
username_source=nameid
name_id_format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:unspecified"
extntity_id=hueserver1
#user_attribute_mapping='"mail":"username","uid":"uid"
#required_attributes='"uid", "mail"
#base_url=https://hue.example.com:8888
```
Table 5: SAML parameters in /etc/hue/conf/hue.ini under the sections, [desktop] and [libsaml]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAML Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>authn_requests_signed</td>
<td>Boolean, that when True, signs Hue-initiated authentication requests with an X.509 certificate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>backend</td>
<td>Hard-coded value set to the SAML backend library packaged with Hue (libsaml.backend.SAML2Backend).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>base_url</td>
<td>URL that the SAML Identity Provider uses for responses. Typically used in Load balanced Hue environments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cert_file</td>
<td>Path to the X.509 certificate to be sent along with the encrypted metadata. File format must be .PEM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>create_users_on_login</td>
<td>Boolean, that when True, creates users from OpenId, upon successful login.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entity_id</td>
<td>Service provider ID. Can also accept a pattern where '&lt;base_url&gt;' is replaced with the server URL base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>key_file</td>
<td>Path to the private key used to encrypt the metadata. File format must be .PEM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>key_file_password</td>
<td>Password used to decrypt the X.509 certificate in memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logout_enabled</td>
<td>Boolean, that when True, enables single logout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logout_requests_signed</td>
<td>Boolean, that when True, signs Hue-initiated logout requests with an X.509 certificate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metadata_file</td>
<td>Path to the readable metadata XML file that you copy from Identity Provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>name_id_format</td>
<td>The format of the NameID that Hue requests from the SAML server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>optional_attributes</td>
<td>Comma-separated list of optional attributes that Hue requests from the Identity Provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>required_attributes</td>
<td>Comma-separated list of attributes that Hue requests from the Identity Provider. For example, 'uid':'username', 'email':'email'.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| redirect_whitelist            | Fully qualified domain name of the SAML server: 
"^\./.*$",^https:\/\/<SAML_server_FQDN>\./.*$". |
| user_attribute_mapping        | Map of Identity Provider attributes to Hue django user attributes. For example, {'uid':'username', 'email':'email'}. |
| username_source               | Determines if username should be deremined from nameid or attributes. |
| xmlsec_binary                 | Path to the xmlsec_binary, an executable to sign, verify, encrypt, and decrypt SAML requests and assertions. It must be executable by the user, hue. |

- redirect_whitelist:

  Hue uses the property, redirect_whitelist, to protect itself from redirecting to unapproved URLs.

  Set the parameter, redirect_whitelist, in the [desktop] section of hue.ini, to the fully qualified domain name of the SAML server so that Hue can redirect to the SAML server for authentication.

  ```
  redirect_whitelist=^\./.*$,"^https:\/\/<SAML_server_fully_qualified_domain_name>\./.*$"
  ```

- backend
Point the property, `backend`, to the SAML backend (packaged with Hue). The `backend` property is in `hue.ini` under `[desktop] > [[auth]]` and should be configured as follows:

```ini
backend=libsaml.backend.SAML2Backend
```

- **xmlsec_binary**
  
  Find the path to the XML Security (xmlsec) library that you installed in Step 2:

  ```bash
  which xmlsec1
  ```

  Point the parameter, `xmlsec_binary`, to the `xmlsec1` path:

  ```ini
  xmlsec_binary=/usr/bin/xmlsec1
  ```

- **metadata_file**
  
  In Step 3, you created an XML file with metadata from your Identity Provider. Point the parameter, `metadata_file`, to the path of that file:

  ```ini
  metadata_file=/path/to/<your_idp_metadata_file>.xml
  ```

- **key_file and cert_file**
  
  To enable communication between Hue and the Identity Provider, you need a private key and certificate. The private key signs requests sent to the Identity Provider and the certificate file encrypts and decrypts messages from the Identity Provider.

  Copy these files from the Identity Provider and set `key_file` and `cert_file` to their respective paths. Both files are in PEM format and must be named with the `.PEM` extension.

  ```plaintext
  Note: The key and certificate files specified by the `key_file` and `cert_file` parameters in `hue.ini` must be `.PEM` files.
  ```

  Users with **password-protected certificates** can set the property, `key_file_password` in `hue.ini`. Hue uses the password to decrypt the SAML certificate in memory and passes it to `xmlsec1` through a named pipe. The decrypted certificate never touches the disk. This only works for POSIX-compatible platforms.

**Step 6: Configure SAML**

After Hue is configured and restarted, copy the metadata generated by Hue server and send it to your Identity Provider so they can configure the SAML server.

1. Ensure Hue is configured, restarted, and running.
3. Copy the metadata and send it to your Identity Provider.
4. Ensure that your Identity Provider configures the SAML server with the Hue metadata (just as you configured the Hue server with SAML metadata).

**Troubleshooting**

To enable **DEBUG** messages for all the logs in the directory, `/var/log/hue`, choose one of these methods:

- In the Hue Web UI, go to the **Home** page, select **Server Logs**, and check the box by **Force Debug Level**. Debug is enabled on-the-fly.
- In Cloudera Manager, go to **Hue > Configuration**, search for and set **Enable Django Debug Mode**, click **Save Changes**, and **Restart** the Hue service.
At the command line, open /etc/hue/conf/hue.ini, scroll to [desktop], and set django_debug_mode=true.

Restart the Hue service:

```
sudo service hue restart
```

**SAML SSL Error**

OpenSSL might fail in CDH 5.5.x and higher with this message:

```
SSLError: [Errno bad handshake] [('SSL routines', 'SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM', 'dh key too small')]
```

To resolve, append the following code to the file, /usr/java/<your_jdk_version>-cloudera/jre/lib/security/java.security:

```
jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=MD5, RC4, DH
```

**SAML Decrypt Error**

The following error is an indication that you are using a slightly different SAML protocol from what Hue expects:

```
Error: ('failed to decrypt', -1)
```

To resolve:

1. Download and rename Python script, `fix-xmlsec1.txt`.

```
```

2. Change permissions as appropriate, for example:

```
chmod 755 fix-xmlsec1.py
```


4. Run `fix-xmlsec1.py`.

This script repairs the known issue whereby xmlsec1 is not compiled with RetrievalMethod and cannot find the location of the encrypted key. SAML2 responses would sometimes place EncryptedKey outside of the EncryptedData tree. This script moves EncryptedKey under EncryptedData.

**Impala Authentication**

Authentication is the mechanism to ensure that only specified hosts and users can connect to Impala. It also verifies that when clients connect to Impala, they are connected to a legitimate server. This feature prevents spoofing such as impersonation (setting up a phony client system with the same account and group names as a legitimate user) and man-in-the-middle attacks (intercepting application requests before they reach Impala and eavesdropping on sensitive information in the requests or the results).

Impala supports authentication using either Kerberos or LDAP.

**Note:** Regardless of the authentication mechanism used, Impala always creates HDFS directories and data files owned by the same user (typically `impala`). To implement user-level access to different databases, tables, columns, partitions, and so on, use the Sentry authorization feature, as explained in Enabling Sentry Authorization for Impala on page 416.

Once you are finished setting up authentication, move on to authorization, which involves specifying what databases, tables, HDFS directories, and so on can be accessed by particular users when they connect through Impala. See Enabling Sentry Authorization for Impala on page 416 for details.
Enabling Kerberos Authentication for Impala

Impala supports Kerberos authentication. For background information on enabling Kerberos authentication, see the topic on Configuring Hadoop Security in the CDH 5 Security Guide.

When using Impala in a managed environment, Cloudera Manager automatically completes Kerberos configuration. In an unmanaged environment, create a Kerberos principal for each host running impalad or statestored. Cloudera recommends using a consistent format, such as impala/_HOST@Your-Realm, but you can use any three-part Kerberos server principal.

In Impala 2.0 and later, user() returns the full Kerberos principal string, such as user@example.com, in a Kerberized environment.

**Note:** Regardless of the authentication mechanism used, Impala always creates HDFS directories and data files owned by the same user (typically impala). To implement user-level access to different databases, tables, columns, partitions, and so on, use the Sentry authorization feature, as explained in Enabling Sentry Authorization for Impala on page 416.

An alternative form of authentication you can use is LDAP, described in Enabling LDAP Authentication for Impala on page 156.

Requirements for Using Impala with Kerberos

On version 5 of Red Hat Enterprise Linux and comparable distributions, some additional setup is needed for the impala-shell interpreter to connect to a Kerberos-enabled Impala cluster:

```
sudo yum install python-devel openssl-devel python-pip
sudo pip-python install ssl
```

**Important:**

- If you plan to use Impala in your cluster, you must configure your KDC to allow tickets to be renewed, and you must configure krb5.conf to request renewable tickets. Typically, you can do this by adding the max_renewable_life setting to your realm in kdc.conf, and by adding the renew_lifetime parameter to the libdefaults section of krb5.conf.

  For more information about renewable tickets, see the Kerberos documentation.

- The Impala Web UI does not support Kerberos authentication.

- You cannot use the Impala resource management feature on a cluster that has Kerberos authentication enabled.

Start all impalad and statestored daemons with the --principal and --keytab-file flags set to the principal and full path name of the keytab file containing the credentials for the principal.

Impala supports the Cloudera ODBC driver and the Kerberos interface provided. To use Kerberos through the ODBC driver, the host type must be set depending on the level of the ODBD driver:

- SecImpala for the ODBC 1.0 driver.
- SecBeeswax for the ODBC 1.2 driver.
- Blank for the ODBC 2.0 driver or higher, when connecting to a secure cluster.
- HS2NoSasl for the ODBC 2.0 driver or higher, when connecting to a non-secure cluster.

To enable Kerberos in the Impala shell, start the impala-shell command using the -k flag.

To enable Impala to work with Kerberos security on your Hadoop cluster, make sure you perform the installation and configuration steps in Authentication in the CDH 5 Security Guide.
Configuring Impala to Support Kerberos Security

Enabling Kerberos authentication for Impala involves steps that can be summarized as follows:

- Creating service principals for Impala and the HTTP service. Principal names take the form: `serviceName/fully.qualified.domain.name@KERBEROS.REALM`
- Creating, merging, and distributing key tab files for these principals.
- Editing `/etc/default/impala` (in cluster not managed by Cloudera Manager), or editing the Security settings in the Cloudera Manager interface, to accommodate Kerberos authentication.

**Enabling Kerberos for Impala**

1. Create an Impala service principal, specifying the name of the OS user that the Impala daemons run under, the fully qualified domain name of each node running `impalad`, and the realm name. For example:

   ```bash
   $ kadmin
   kadmin: addprinc -requires_preauth -randkey
   impala/impala_host.example.com@TEST.EXAMPLE.COM
   ```

2. Create an HTTP service principal. For example:

   ```bash
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey HTTP/impala_host.example.com@TEST.EXAMPLE.COM
   ```

   **Note:** The HTTP component of the service principal must be uppercase as shown in the preceding example.

3. Create keytab files with both principals. For example:

   ```bash
   kadmin: xst -k impala.keytab impala/impala_host.example.com
   kadmin: xst -k http.keytab HTTP/impala_host.example.com
   kadmin: quit
   ```

4. Use `ktutil` to read the contents of the two keytab files and then write those contents to a new file. For example:

   ```bash
   $ ktutil
   ktutil: rkt impala.keytab
   ktutil: rkt http.keytab
   ktutil: wkt impala-http.keytab
   ktutil: quit
   ```

5. (Optional) Test that credentials in the merged keytab file are valid, and that the “renew until” date is in the future. For example:

   ```bash
   $ klist -e -k -t impala-http.keytab
   ```

6. Copy the `impala-http.keytab` file to the Impala configuration directory. Change the permissions to be only read for the file owner and change the file owner to the impala user. By default, the Impala user and group are both named `impala`. For example:

   ```bash
   $ cp impala-http.keytab /etc/impala/conf
   $ cd /etc/impala/conf
   $ chmod 400 impala-http.keytab
   $ chown impala:impala impala-http.keytab
   ```
7. Add Kerberos options to the Impala defaults file, `/etc/default/impala`. Add the options for both the `impald` and `statestored` daemons, using the `IMPALA_SERVER_ARGS` and `IMPALA_STATE_STORE_ARGS` variables. For example, you might add:

```bash
-kerberos_reinit_interval=60
-principal=impala_1/impala_host.example.com@TEST.EXAMPLE.COM
-keytab_file=/var/run/cloudera-scm-agent/process/3212-impala-IMPALAD/impala.keytab
```

For more information on changing the Impala defaults specified in `/etc/default/impala`, see Modifying Impala Startup Options.

**Note:** Restart `impald` and `statestored` for these configuration changes to take effect.

### Enabling Kerberos for Impala with a Proxy Server

A common configuration for Impala with High Availability is to use a proxy server to submit requests to the actual `impald` daemons on different hosts in the cluster. This configuration avoids connection problems in case of machine failure, because the proxy server can route new requests through one of the remaining hosts in the cluster. This configuration also helps with load balancing, because the additional overhead of being the “coordinator node” for each query is spread across multiple hosts.

Although you can set up a proxy server with or without Kerberos authentication, typically users set up a secure Kerberized configuration. For information about setting up a proxy server for Impala, including Kerberos-specific steps, see Using Impala through a Proxy for High Availability.

### Enabling Impala Delegation for Kerberos Users

See Configuring Impala Delegation for Hue and BI Tools on page 159 for details about the delegation feature that lets certain users submit queries using the credentials of other users.

### Using TLS/SSL with Business Intelligence Tools

You can use Kerberos authentication, TLS/SSL encryption, or both to secure connections from JDBC and ODBC applications to Impala. See Configuring Impala to Work with JDBC and Configuring Impala to Work with ODBC for details.

Prior to CDH 5.7 / Impala 2.5, the Hive JDBC driver did not support connections that use both Kerberos authentication and SSL encryption. If your cluster is running an older release that has this restriction, to use both of these security features with Impala through a JDBC application, use the Cloudera JDBC Connector as the JDBC driver.

### Enabling Access to Internal Impala APIs for Kerberos Users

For applications that need direct access to Impala APIs, without going through the HiveServer2 or Beeswax interfaces, you can specify a list of Kerberos users who are allowed to call those APIs. By default, the `impala` and `hdfs` users are the only ones authorized for this kind of access. Any users not explicitly authorized through the `internal_principals_whitelist` configuration setting are blocked from accessing the APIs. This setting applies to all the Impala-related daemons, although currently it is primarily used for HDFS to control the behavior of the catalog server.

### Mapping Kerberos Principals to Short Names for Impala

In Hadoop Security, Impala recognizes the `auth_to_local` setting, specified through the HDFS configuration setting `hadoop.security.auth_to_local` or the Cloudera Manager setting Additional Rules to Map Kerberos Principals to Short Names. This feature is disabled by default, to avoid an unexpected change in security-related behavior. To enable it:

- For clusters not managed by Cloudera Manager, specify `--load_auth_to_local_rules=true` in the `impalad` and `catalogd` configuration settings.

- For clusters managed by Cloudera Manager, select the Use HDFS Rules to Map Kerberos Principals to Short Names checkbox to enable the service-wide `load_auth_to_local_rules` configuration setting. Then restart the Impala service.
See [Using Auth-to-Local Rules to Isolate Cluster Users](#) for general information about this feature.

**Kerberos-Related Memory Overhead for Large Clusters**

On a kerberized cluster with high memory utilization, `kinit` commands executed after every `kerberos_reinit_interval` may cause out-of-memory errors, because executing the command involves a fork of the Impala process. The error looks similar to the following:

```
Failed to obtain Kerberos ticket for principal: <varname>principal_details</varname>
Failed to execute shell cmd: 'kinit -k -t <varname>keytab_details</varname>',
error was: Error(12): Cannot allocate memory
```

The following command changes the `vm.overcommit_memory` setting immediately on a running host. However, this setting is reset when the host is restarted.

```
echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/overcommit_memory
```

To change the setting in a persistent way, add the following line to the `/etc/sysctl.conf` file:

```
vm.overcommit_memory=1
```

Then run `sysctl -p`. No reboot is needed.

**Enabling LDAP Authentication for Impala**

Authentication is the process of allowing only specified named users to access the server (in this case, the Impala server). This feature is crucial for any production deployment, to prevent misuse, tampering, or excessive load on the server. Impala uses LDAP for authentication, verifying the credentials of each user who connects through `impala-shell`, Hue, a Business Intelligence tool, JDBC or ODBC application, etc.

**Note:** Regardless of the authentication mechanism used, Impala always creates HDFS directories and data files owned by the same user (typically `impala`). To implement user-level access to different databases, tables, columns, partitions, and so on, use the Sentry authorization feature, as explained in [Enabling Sentry Authorization for Impala](#) on page 416.

An alternative form of authentication you can use is Kerberos, described in [Enabling Kerberos Authentication for Impala](#) on page 153.

**Requirements for Using Impala with LDAP**

Authentication against LDAP servers is available in Impala 1.2.2 and higher. Impala 1.4.0 added the support for secure LDAP authentication through SSL and TLS.

The Impala LDAP support lets you use Impala with systems such as Active Directory that use LDAP behind the scenes.

**Consideration for Connections Between Impala Components**

Only the connections between clients and Impala can be authenticated by LDAP.

You must use the Kerberos authentication mechanism for connections between internal Impala components, such as between the `impalad`, `statestored`, and `catalogd` daemons. See [Enabling Kerberos Authentication for Impala](#) on page 153 on how to set up Kerberos for Impala.

**Enabling LDAP in Command Line Interface**

To enable LDAP authentication via a command line interface, start the `impalad` with the following startup options for:
--enable_ldap_auth

Enables LDAP-based authentication between the client and Impala.

--ldap_uri

Sets the URI of the LDAP server to use. Typically, the URI is prefixed with ldap://. You can specify secure SSL-based LDAP transport by using the prefix ldaps://. The URI can optionally specify the port, for example: ldap://ldap_server.example.com:389 or ldaps://ldap_server.example.com:636. (389 and 636 are the default ports for non-SSL and SSL LDAP connections, respectively.)

Support for Custom Bind Strings

When Impala connects to LDAP it issues a bind call to the LDAP server to authenticate as the connected user. Impala clients, including the Impala shell, provide the short name of the user to Impala. This is necessary so that Impala can use Sentry for role-based access, which uses short names.

However, LDAP servers often require more complex, structured usernames for authentication. Impala supports three ways of transforming the short name (for example, 'henry') to a more complicated string. If necessary, specify one of the following configuration options when starting the impalad daemon.

--ldap_domain

Replaces the username with a string username@ldap_domain.

--ldap_baseDN

Replaces the username with a “distinguished name” (DN) of the form: uid=userid,ldap_baseDN. (This is equivalent to a Hive option).

--ldap_bind_pattern

This is the most general option, and replaces the username with the string ldap_bind_pattern where all instances of the string #UID are replaced with userid. For example, an ldap_bind_pattern of "user=#UID,OU=foo,CN=bar" with a username of henry will construct a bind name of "user=henry,OU=foo,CN=bar".

The above options are mutually exclusive, and Impala does not start if more than one of these options are specified.

Secure LDAP Connections

To avoid sending credentials over the wire in cleartext, you must configure a secure connection between both the client and Impala, and between Impala and the LDAP server. The secure connection could use SSL or TLS.

Secure LDAP connections through SSL:

For SSL-enabled LDAP connections, specify a prefix of ldaps:// instead of ldap://. Also, the default port for SSL-enabled LDAP connections is 636 instead of 389.

Secure LDAP connections through TLS:

TLS, the successor to the SSL protocol, is supported by most modern LDAP servers. Unlike SSL connections, TLS connections can be made on the same server port as non-TLS connections. To secure all connections using TLS, specify the following flags as startup options to the impalad daemon:

--ldap_tls

Tells Impala to start a TLS connection to the LDAP server, and to fail authentication if it cannot be done.

--ldap_ca_certificate="/path/to/certificate.pem"

Specifies the location of the certificate in standard .PEM format. Store this certificate on the local filesystem, in a location that only the impala user and other trusted users can read.

Enabling LDAP in Cloudera Manager

To enable LDAP authentication in Cloudera Manager:

1. In the Impala service, click the Configuration tab.
2. In the search box, type ldap.
3. Specify the values for the option fields. Each field lists the corresponding Impala startup flag. See the sections above for the corresponding flag if you need more information on a particular field.
4. Click Save Changes.
5. Restart the Impala service.

LDAP Authentication for impala-shell

To connect to Impala using LDAP authentication, you specify command-line options to the `impala-shell` command interpreter and enter the password when prompted.

\[ -l \]

Enables LDAP authentication.

\[ -u \]

Sets the user. Per Active Directory, the user is the short username, not the full LDAP distinguished name. If your LDAP settings include a search base, use the \(--ldap_bind_pattern\) on the `impalad` daemon to translate the short user name from `impala-shell` automatically to the fully qualified name.

`impala-shell` automatically prompts for the password.

See Configuring Impala to Work with JDBC for the format to use with the JDBC connection string for servers using LDAP authentication.

Enabling LDAP for Impala in Hue

1. Go to the Hue service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Hue Server.
4. Select Category > Advanced.
5. Add the following properties to the Hue Server Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for `hue_safety_valve_server.ini` property.

```
[impala]
auth_username=<LDAP username of Hue user to be authenticated>
auth_password=<LDAP password of Hue user to be authenticated>
```

6. Click Save Changes.

Enabling Impala Delegation for LDAP Users

See Configuring Impala Delegation for Hue and BI Tools on page 159 for details about the delegation feature that lets certain users submit queries using the credentials of other users.

LDAP Restrictions for Impala

The LDAP support is preliminary. It currently has only been tested against Active Directory.

Using Multiple Authentication Methods with Impala

Impala 2.0 and later automatically handles both Kerberos and LDAP authentication. Each `impalad` daemon can accept both Kerberos and LDAP requests through the same port. No special actions need to be taken if some users authenticate through Kerberos and some through LDAP.

Prior to Impala 2.0, you had to configure each `impalad` to listen on a specific port depending on the kind of authentication, then configure your network load balancer to forward each kind of request to a DataNode that was set up with the appropriate authentication type. Once the initial request was made using either Kerberos or LDAP authentication, Impala automatically handled the process of coordinating the work across multiple nodes and transmitting intermediate results back to the coordinator node.
Configuring Impala Delegation for Hue and BI Tools

When users submit Impala queries through a separate application, such as Hue or a business intelligence tool, typically all requests are treated as coming from the same user. In Impala 1.2 and higher, Impala supports “delegation” where users whose names you specify can delegate the execution of a query to another user. The query runs with the privileges of the delegated user, not the original authenticated user.

The name of the delegated user is passed using the HiveServer2 protocol configuration property \texttt{impala.doas.user} when the client connects to Impala.

Currently, the delegation feature is available only for Impala queries submitted through application interfaces such as Hue and BI tools. For example, Impala cannot issue queries using the privileges of the HDFS user.

The delegation feature is enabled by the startup option for \texttt{impalad}: \texttt{--authorized_proxy_user_config}. The syntax for the option is:

```
--authorized_proxy_user_config=authenticated_user1=delegated_user1,delegated_user2,...;authenticated_user2=...;
```

- The list of authorized users are delimited with ;
- The list of delegated users are delimited with , by default.
- Use the \texttt{--authorized_proxy_user_config_delimiter} startup option to override the default user delimiter (the comma character) to another character.
- Wildcard (*) is supported to delegated to any users, e.g. \texttt{--authorized_proxy_user_config=hue=*}. Make sure to use single quotes or escape characters to ensure that any * characters do not undergo wildcard expansion when specified in command-line arguments.

When you start Impala with the \texttt{--authorized_proxy_user_config=authenticated_user=delegated_user} option:

- Authentication is based on the user on the left hand side (\texttt{authenticated_user})
- Authorization is based on the right hand side user(s) (\texttt{delegated_user}).
- When opening a client connection, the client must provide a delegated username via the HiveServer2 protocol property, \texttt{impala.doas.user} or \texttt{DelegationUID}.
- It is not necessary for \texttt{authenticated_user} to have the permission to access/edit files.
- It is not necessary for the delegated users to have access to the service via Kerberos.
- \texttt{delegated_user} must exist in the OS.
- In Impala, \texttt{user()} returns \texttt{authenticated_user} and \texttt{effective_user()} returns the delegated user that the client specified.

The user delegation process works as follows:

1. The Impalad daemon starts with the following option:
   - \texttt{--authorized_proxy_user_config=authenticated_user=delegated_user}
2. A client connects to Impala via the HiveServer2 protocol with the \texttt{impala.doas.user} configuration property, e.g. connected user is \texttt{authenticated_user} with \texttt{impala.doas.user=delegated_user}.
3. The client user \texttt{authenticated_user} sends a request to Impala as the delegated user \texttt{delegated_user}.
4. Impala checks if \texttt{delegated_user} is in the list of authorized delegate users for the user \texttt{authenticated_user}.
5. If the user is an authorized delegated user for \texttt{authenticated_user}, the request is executed as the delegate user \texttt{delegated_user}.

See this Cloudera blog post for background information about the delegation capability in HiveServer2.

To set up authentication for the delegated users:

- On the server side, configure either user/password authentication through LDAP, or Kerberos authentication, for all the delegated users. See Enabling LDAP Authentication for Impala on page 156 or Enabling Kerberos Authentication for Impala on page 153 for details.
Enabling Delegation in Cloudera Manager

To enable delegation in Cloudera Manager:

1. Navigate to Clusters > Impala > Configuration > Policy File-Based Sentry.
2. In the Proxy User Configuration field, type the semicolon-separated list of key=value pairs of authorized proxy users to the user(s) they can impersonate. The list of delegated users are delimited with a comma, e.g. hue=user1, user2.
   
   The user names should be given in the short form. The names are case-sensitive.
3. Click Save Changes and then restart Impala service.

Llama Authentication

Note:

The use of the Llama component for integrated resource management within YARN is no longer supported with and higher. The Llama support code is removed entirely in and higher.

For clusters running Impala alongside other data management components, you define static service pools to define the resources available to Impala and other components. Then within the area allocated for Impala, you can create dynamic service pools, each with its own settings for the Impala admission control feature.

This section describes how to configure Llama in CDH 5 with Kerberos security in a Hadoop cluster.

Note: Llama has been tested only in a Cloudera Manager deployment. For information on using Cloudera Manager to configure Llama and Impala, see Installing Impala.

Configuring Llama to Support Kerberos Security

1. Create a Llama service user principal using the syntax: llama/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.
   This principal is used to authenticate with the Hadoop cluster, where fully.qualified.domain.name is the host where Llama is running and YOUR-REALM is the name of your Kerberos realm:
   
   $ kadmin
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey
   llama/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM

2. Create a keytab file with the Llama principal:
   
   $ kadmin
   kadmin: xst -k llama.keytab llama/fully.qualified.domain.name

3. Test that the credentials in the keytab file work. For example:
   
   $ klist -e -k -t llama.keytab

4. Copy the llama.keytab file to the Llama configuration directory. The owner of the llama.keytab file should be the llama user and the file should have owner-only read permissions.
5. Edit the Llama llama-site.xml configuration file in the Llama configuration directory by setting the following properties:
6. Restart Llama to make the configuration changes take effect.

Oozie Authentication

This section describes how to configure Oozie CDH 5 with Kerberos security on a Hadoop cluster:

- Configuring Kerberos Authentication for the Oozie Server on page 161
- Configuring Oozie HA with Kerberos on page 162

### Configuring Kerberos Authentication for the Oozie Server

1. Create a Oozie service user principal using the syntax:
   
   `oozie/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM`

   This principal is used to authenticate with the Hadoop cluster where `fully.qualified.domain.name` is the host where the Oozie server is running and `YOUR-REALM` is the name of your Kerberos realm.

   ```
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey oozie/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

2. Create a HTTP service user principal using the syntax:
   
   `HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM`

   This principal is used to authenticate user requests coming to the Oozie web-services where `fully.qualified.domain.name` is the host where the Oozie server is running `YOUR-REALM` is the name of your Kerberos realm.

   ```
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

   **Important:**

   The `HTTP/` component of the HTTP service user principal must be upper case as shown in the syntax and example above.
3. Create keytab files with both principals.

   $ kadmin
   kadmin: xst -k oozie.keytab oozie/fully.qualified.domain.name
   kadmin: xst -k http.keytab HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name

4. Merge the two keytab files into a single keytab file:

   $ ktutil
   ktutil: rkt oozie.keytab
   ktutil: rkt http.keytab
   ktutil: wkt oozie-http.keytab

5. Test that credentials in the merged keytab file work. For example:

   $ klist -e -k -t oozie-http.keytab

6. Copy the oozie-http.keytab file to the Oozie configuration directory. The owner of the oozie-http.keytab file should be the oozie user and the file should have owner-only read permissions.

7. Edit the Oozie server oozie-site.xml configuration file in the Oozie configuration directory by setting the following properties:

   **Important:** You must restart the Oozie server to have the configuration changes take effect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>oozie.service.HadoopAccessorService.kerberos.enabled</td>
<td>true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local.realm</td>
<td>&lt;REALM&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oozie.service.HadoopAccessorService.keytab.file</td>
<td>/etc/oozie/conf/oozie-http.keytab for a package installation, or &lt;EXPANDED_DIR&gt;/conf/oozie-http.keytab for a tarball installation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oozie.service.HadoopAccessorService.kerberos.principal</td>
<td>oozie/&lt;fully.qualified.domain.name&gt;@&lt;YOUR-REALM.COM&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oozie.authentication.type</td>
<td>kerberos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oozie.authentication.kerberos.principal</td>
<td>HTTP/&lt;fully.qualified.domain.name&gt;@&lt;YOUR-REALM.COM&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oozie.authentication.kerberos.name.rules</td>
<td>Use the value configured for hadoop.security.auth_to_local in core-site.xml</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Configuring Oozie HA with Kerberos

**Important:**
- If you use Cloudera Manager, do not use these command-line instructions. Use the Cloudera Manager Kerberos wizard instead, which automates the steps described in this section. If you have already enabled Kerberos, Cloudera Manager will automatically generate Kerberos credentials for the new Oozie server. It will also regenerate credentials for any existing servers.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.0. If you use a lower version of CDH, see the documentation for that version located at Cloudera Documentation.
In CDH 5, you can configure multiple active Oozie servers against the same database, providing high availability for Oozie. For instructions on setting up Oozie HA, see Oozie High Availability.

Let's assume a setup with three hosts running Oozie servers: host1.example.com, host2.example.com, and host3.example.com. The Load Balancer which directs traffic to the Oozie servers is running on oozie.example.com. Perform the following steps to configure Kerberos authentication on this Oozie HA-enabled deployment:

1. Assuming your Kerberos realm is EXAMPLE.COM, create the following Kerberos principals:
   - oozie/host1.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
   - oozie/host2.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
   - oozie/host3.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
   - HTTP/host1.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
   - HTTP/host2.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
   - HTTP/host3.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
   - **For the Load Balancer:** HTTP/oozie.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM

2. On each host, create a keytab file with the corresponding oozie and HTTP principals from the list above. Each keytab file should also have the Load Balancer's HTTP principal. For example, the keytab file on host1 would comprise:
   - oozie/host1.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
   - HTTP/host1.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
   - HTTP/oozie.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM

3. On each host, configure the following properties in oozie-site.xml:

   ```xml
   <property>
     <name>oozie.authentication.kerberos.principal</name>
     <value>HTTP/<hostname>@$EXAMPLE.COM</value>
     <description>
       Indicates the Kerberos principal to be used for HTTP endpoint. The principal MUST start with 'HTTP/' as per Kerberos HTTP SPNEGO specification.
     </description>
   </property>

   <property>
     <name>oozie.authentication.kerberos.keytab</name>
     <value>${oozie.service.HadoopAccessorService.keytab.file}</value>
     <description>
       Location of the keytab file with the credentials for the principal. Referring to the same keytab file Oozie uses for its Kerberos credentials for Hadoop.
     </description>
   </property>
   ```

Solr Authentication

This section describes how to configure Solr to enable authentication.

When authentication is enabled, only specified hosts and users can connect to Solr. Authentication also verifies that clients connect to legitimate servers. This feature prevents spoofing such as impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks. Search supports Kerberos and LDAP authentication.

Cloudera Search supports a variety of combinations of authentication protocols:

**Table 6: Authentication Protocol Combinations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solr Authentication</th>
<th>Use Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No authentication</td>
<td>Insecure cluster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Use Case: Solr Authentication

The Hadoop cluster has Kerberos turned on and every user (or client) connecting to Solr has a Kerberos principal. Kerberos only

The Hadoop cluster has Kerberos turned on. External Solr users (or clients) do not have Kerberos principals but do have identities in the LDAP server. Client authentication using LDAP requires that Kerberos is enabled for the cluster. Using LDAP alone is not supported.

Once you are finished setting up authentication, configure Sentry authorization. Authorization involves specifying which resources can be accessed by particular users when they connect through Search. See Configuring Sentry Authorization for Cloudera Search on page 427 for details.

Enabling Kerberos Authentication for Solr

Solr supports Kerberos authentication. All necessary packages are installed when you install Search. To enable Kerberos, create principals and keytabs and then modify default configurations.

The following instructions only apply to configuring Kerberos in an unmanaged environment. Kerberos configuration is automatically handled by Cloudera Manager if you are using in a Cloudera Manager environment.

To create principals and keytabs

Repeat this process on all Solr server hosts.

1. Create a Solr service user principal using the syntax: `solr/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM`. This principal is used to authenticate with the Hadoop cluster. where: `fully.qualified.domain.name` is the host where the Solr server is running, `YOUR-REALM` is the name of your Kerberos realm.

   ```
   $ kadmin
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey solr/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

2. Create a HTTP service user principal using the syntax: `HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM`. This principal is used to authenticate user requests coming to the Solr web-services. where: `fully.qualified.domain.name` is the host where the Solr server is running, `YOUR-REALM` is the name of your Kerberos realm.

   ```
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   ```

   **Note:**
   
   The HTTP/ component of the HTTP service user principal must be upper case as shown in the syntax and example above.

3. Create keytab files with both principals.

   ```
   kadmin: xst -norandkey -k solr.keytab solr/fully.qualified.domain.name HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

4. Test that credentials in the merged keytab file work. For example:

   ```
   $ klist -e -k -t solr.keytab
   ```

5. Copy the `solr.keytab` file to the Solr configuration directory. The owner of the `solr.keytab` file should be the `solr` user and the file should have owner-only read permissions.

To modify default configurations

Repeat this process on all Solr server hosts.

1. Ensure that the following properties appear in `/etc/default/solr` or `/opt/cloudera/parcels/CDH-*`/etc/default/solr and that they are uncommented. Modify these properties to match your environment. The relevant properties to be uncommented and modified are:
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE=kerberos
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_SIMPLE_ALLOW_ANON=true
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_KERBEROS_KEYTAB=/etc/solr/conf/solr.keytab
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_KERBEROS_PRINCIPAL=HTTP/localhost@LOCALHOST
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_KERBEROS_NAME_RULES=DEFAULT
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_JAAS_CONF=/etc/solr/conf/jaas.conf

Note: Modify the values for these properties to match your environment. For example, the SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_KERBEROS_PRINCIPAL=HTTP/localhost@LOCALHOST must include the principal instance and Kerberos realm for your environment. That is often different from localhost@LOCALHOST.

2. Set hadoop.security.auth_to_local to match the value specified by SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_KERBEROS_NAME_RULES in /etc/default/solr or /opt/cloudera/parcels/CDH-*/*etc/default/solr.

Note: For information on how to configure the rules, see Configuring the Mapping from Kerberos Principals to Short Names. For additional information on using Solr with HDFS, see Configuring Solr for Use with HDFS.

3. If using applications that use the solrj library, set up the Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS).
   a. Create a jaas.conf file in the Solr configuration directory containing the following settings. This file and its location must match the SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_JAAS_CONF value. Make sure that you substitute a value for principal that matches your particular environment.

Client {  
   com.sun.security.auth.module.Krb5LoginModule required
   useKeyTab=true
   useTicketCache=false
   keyTab="/etc/solr/conf/solr.keytab"
   principal="solr/fully.qualified.domain.name@<YOUR-REALM>";
}

Enabling LDAP Authentication for Solr

Before continuing, make sure that you have completed the steps in Enabling Kerberos Authentication for Solr on page 164. Solr supports LDAP authentication for external Solr client including:

- Command-line tools
- curl
- Web browsers
- Solr Java clients

In some cases, Solr does not support LDAP authentication. Use Kerberos authentication instead in these cases. Solr does not support LDAP authentication with:

- Search indexing components including the MapReduce indexer, Lily HBase indexer, or Flume.
- Solr internal requests such as those for replication or querying.
- Hadoop delegation token management requests such as GETDELEGATIONTOKEN or RENEWDELEGATIONTOKEN.

Configuring LDAP Authentication for Solr using Cloudera Manager

You can configure LDAP-based authentication using Cloudera Manager at the Solr service level.

1. Go to the Solr service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Solr
4. Select Category > Security
5. Select Enable LDAP.
6. Enter the LDAP URI in the LDAP URI property.
7. Configure only one of the following mutually exclusive parameters:

- LDAP BaseDN: Replaces the username with a "distinguished name" (DN) of the form: uid=userid,ldap_baseDN. Typically used for OpenLDAP server installation.

- OR -

- Active Directory Domain: Replaces the username with a string username@ldap_domain. Typically used for Active Directory server installation.

Configuring LDAP Authentication for Solr Using the Command Line

To enable LDAP authentication using the command line, configure the following environment variables in /etc/default/solr:

```bash
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_HTTP_SCHEMES=Negotiate,Basic
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_HTTP_DELEGATION_MGMT_SCHEMES=Negotiate
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_HTTP_BASIC_HANDLER=ldap
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_HTTP_NEGOTIATE_HANDLER=kerberos
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_LDAP_PROVIDER_URL=ldap://www.example.com

# Specify value only one of SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_LDAP_BASE_DN or
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_LDAP_BIND_DOMAIN property.
SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_LDAP_BASE_DN=ou=Users,dc=example,dc=com
# SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_LDAP_BIND_DOMAIN=##### Required when using 'Start TLS' extension
# SOLR_AUTHENTICATION_LDAP_ENABLE_START_TLS=false
```

Securing LDAP Connections

You can secure communications using LDAP-based encryption.

To avoid sending credentials over the wire in clear-text, you must configure a secure connection between both the client and Solr, and between Solr and the LDAP server. The secure connection could use SSL or TLS.

Secure LDAP connections through SSL:

For SSL-enabled LDAP connections, specify a prefix of ldaps:// instead of ldap://. Also, the default port for SSL-enabled LDAP connections is 636 instead of 389.

Secure LDAP connections through TLS:

TLS, the successor to the SSL protocol, is supported by most modern LDAP servers. Unlike SSL connections, TLS connections can be made on the same server port as non-TLS connections. You can enable xxx using Cloudera Manager.

1. Go to the Solr service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Solr
4. Select Category > Security
5. Select Enable LDAP TLS.
6. Import the LDAP server security certificate in the Solr Trust Store file:
   a. Enter the location for the Solr Trust Store File in Solr TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File.
   b. Enter the password for the Solr Trust Store File in Solr TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store Password.

LDAP Client Configuration

Some HTTP clients such as curl or the Apache HttpClient library must be configured to use a particular scheme. For example:

- curl tool supports using Kerberos or username/password authentication. Kerberos is activated using the --negotiate flag and username/password based authentication is activated using the --basic and -u flags.
- Apache HttpClient library can be configured to use specific authentication scheme. For more information, see the HTTP authentication chapter of Apache's HttpClient Tutorial.
Typically, web browsers automatically choose a preferred authentication scheme. For more information, see the HTTP authentication topic in The Chromium Projects.

To use LDAP authentication with Solr Java clients, `HttpClientConfigurer` needs to configured for Solr. This can either be done programmatically or using Java system properties.

For example, programmatic initialization might appear as:

```java
import org.apache.solr.client.solrj.impl.HttpClientUtil;
import org.apache.solr.client.solrj.impl.PreemptiveBasicAuthConfigurer;
import org.apache.solr.common.params.ModifiableSolrParams;

/**
 * This method initializes the Solr client to use LDAP authentication
 * This configuration is applicable to all Solr clients.
 * @param ldapUserName LDAP user name
 * @param ldapPassword LDAP user password
 */
public static void initialize(String ldapUserName, String ldapPassword) {
    HttpClientUtil.setConfigurer(new PreemptiveBasicAuthConfigurer());
    ModifiableSolrParams params = new ModifiableSolrParams();
    params.set(HttpClientUtil.PROP_BASIC_AUTH_USER, ldapUserName);
    params.set(HttpClientUtil.PROP_BASIC_AUTH_PASS, ldapPassword);
    // Configure the JVM default parameters.
    PreemptiveBasicAuthConfigurer.setDefaultSolrParams(params);
}
```

For configuration using system properties, configure the following system properties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>solr.httpclient.configurer</code></td>
<td>Fully qualified classname of <code>HttpClientConfigurer</code> implementation. For example, <code>org.apache.solr.client.solrj.impl.PreemptiveBasicAuthConfigurer</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>solr.httpclient.config</code></td>
<td>Http client configuration properties file path. For example, <code>ldap-credentials.properties</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, the entry in `ldap-credentials.properties` might appear as:

```properties
httpBasicAuthUser=user1
httpBasicAuthPassword=passwd
```

**Using Kerberos with Solr**

The process of enabling Solr clients to authenticate with a secure Solr is specific to the client. This section demonstrates:

- Using Kerberos and curl
- Using solrctl
- Configuring SolrJ Library Usage
- This enables technologies including:
  - Command line solutions
  - Java applications
  - The MapReduceIndexerTool
- Configuring Flume Morphline Solr Sink Usage
Secure Solr requires that the CDH components that it interacts with are also secure. Secure Solr interacts with HDFS, ZooKeeper and optionally HBase, MapReduce, and Flume.

**Using Kerberos and curl**

You can use Kerberos authentication with clients such as curl. To use curl, begin by acquiring valid Kerberos credentials and then run the desired command. For example, you might use commands similar to the following:

```
$ kinit -kt username.keytab username
```

**Note:** Depending on the tool used to connect, additional arguments may be required. For example, with curl, --negotiate and -u are required. The username and password specified with -u is not actually checked because Kerberos is used. As a result, any value such as foo:bar or even just : is acceptable. While any value can be provided for -u, note that the option is required. Omitting -u results in a 401 Unauthorized error, even though the -u value is not actually used.

**Using solrctl**

If you are using solrctl to manage your deployment in an environment that requires Kerberos authentication, you must have valid Kerberos credentials, which you can get using kinit. For more information on solrctl, see solrctl Reference

**Configuring SolrJ Library Usage**

If using applications that use the solrj library, begin by establishing a Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) configuration file.

**Create a JAAS file:**

- If you have already used kinit to get credentials, you can have the client use those credentials. In such a case, modify your jaas-client.conf file to appear as follows:

  ```
  Client {
  com.sun.security.auth.module.Krb5LoginModule required
  useKeyTab=false
  useTicketCache=true
  principal="user/fully.qualified.domain.name@<YOUR-REALM>";
  }
  ```

  where `user/fully.qualified.domain.name@<YOUR-REALM>` is replaced with your credentials.

- If you want the client application to authenticate using a keytab, modify jaas-client.conf as follows:

  ```
  Client {
  com.sun.security.auth.module.Krb5LoginModule required
  useKeyTab=true
  keyTab="/path/to/user.keytab"
  storeKey=true
  useTicketCache=false
  principal="user/fully.qualified.domain.name@EXAMPLE.COM";
  }
  ```

  Replace `/path/to/user.keytab` with the keytab file you want to use and `user/fully.qualified.domain.name@EXAMPLE.COM` with the principal in the keytab. If the principal omits the hostname, omit it in the jaas-client.conf file as well (for example, jdoe@EXAMPLE.COM).

**Use the JAAS file to enable solutions:**

- Command line solutions
Set the property when invoking the program. For example, if you were using a jar, you might use:

```
java -Djava.security.auth.login.config=/home/user/jaas-client.conf -jar app.jar
```

- **Java applications**

  Set the Java system property `java.security.auth.login.config`. For example, if the JAAS configuration file is located on the filesystem as `/home/user/jaas-client.conf`. The Java system property `java.security.auth.login.config` must be set to point to this file. Setting a Java system property can be done programmatically, for example using a call such as:

  ```
  System.setProperty("java.security.auth.login.config", "/home/user/jaas-client.conf");
  ```

- **The MapReduceIndexerTool**

  The MapReduceIndexerTool uses SolrJ to pass the JAAS configuration file. Using the MapReduceIndexerTool in a secure environment requires the use of the `HADOOP_OPTS` variable to specify the JAAS configuration file. For example, you might issue a command such as the following:

  ```
  HADOOP_OPTS="-Djava.security.auth.login.config=/home/user/jaas.conf" \
  hadoop jar MapReduceIndexerTool
  ```

- **Configuring the hbase-indexer CLI**

  Certain hbase-indexer CLI commands such as `replication-status` attempt to read ZooKeeper hosts owned by HBase. To successfully use these commands in Solr in a secure environment, specify a JAAS configuration file with the HBase principal in the `HBASE_INDEXER_OPTS` environment variable. For example, you might issue a command such as the following:

  ```
  HBASE_INDEXER_OPTS="-Djava.security.auth.login.config=/home/user/hbase-jaas.conf" \
  hbase-indexer replication-status
  ```

### Configuring Flume Morphline Solr Sink Usage

Repeat this process on all Flume hosts:

1. If you have not created a keytab file, do so now at `/etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.keytab`. This file should contain the service principal `flume/<fully.qualified.domain.name>@<YOUR-REALM>`. See [Flume Authentication](#) on page 112 for more information.

2. Create a JAAS configuration file for flume at `/etc/flume-ng/conf/jaas-client.conf`. The file should appear as follows:

   ```
   Client {
   com.sun.security.auth.module.Krb5LoginModule required
   useKeyTab=true
   useTicketCache=false
   keyTab="/etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.keytab"
   principal="flume/<fully.qualified.domain.name>@<YOUR-REALM>";
   }
   ```

3. Add the flume JAAS configuration to the `JAVA_OPTS` in `/etc/flume-ng/conf/flume-env.sh`. For example, you might change:

   ```
   JAVA_OPTS="-Xmx500m"
   ```

to:

   ```
   JAVA_OPTS="-Xmx500m -Djava.security.auth.login.config=/etc/flume-ng/conf/jaas-client.conf"
   ```
Spark Authentication

Spark has an internal mechanism that authenticates executors with the driver controlling a given application. This mechanism is enabled using the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, as detailed in Enabling Spark Authentication. When Spark on YARN is running on a secure cluster, users must authenticate to Kerberos before submitting jobs, as detailed in Running Spark Applications on Secure Clusters.

Enabling Spark Authentication

Minimum Required Role: Security Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

Spark has an internal mechanism that authenticates executors with the driver controlling a given application. This mechanism is enabled using the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, as detailed below. Cluster administrators can enable the spark.authenticate mechanism to authenticate the various processes that support a Spark application.

To enable this feature on the cluster:

1. Log into the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select Clusters > Spark (or Clusters > Spark_on_YARN).
3. Click the Configuration menu.
4. Scroll down to the Spark Authentication setting, or search for spark.authenticate to find it.
5. In the Spark Authentication setting, click the checkbox next to the Spark (Service-Wide) property to activate the setting.
6. Click Save Changes.

Note: If your cluster supports Spark 2, you must make the same change to the Spark 2 setting. For example:

7. Restart YARN:
   - Select Clusters > YARN.
   - Select Restart from the Actions drop-down selector.

8. Re-deploy the client configurations:
   - Select Clusters > Cluster_name
   - Select Deploy Client Configurations from the Actions drop-down selector.

Running Spark Applications on Secure Clusters

Secure clusters are clusters that use Kerberos for authentication. For secure clusters, Spark History Server automatically uses Kerberos, so there’s nothing to configure.

Users running Spark applications must first authenticate to Kerberos, using kinit, as follows:

$ kinit
idap@EXAMPLE-REALM.COM: 's password:

After authenticating to Kerberos, users can submit their applications using spark-submit as usual, as shown below. This command submits one of the default Spark sample jobs using an environment variable as part of the path, so modify as needed for your own use:

$ spark-submit --class org.apache.spark.examples.SparkPi --master yarn \
--deploy-mode cluster $SPARK_HOME/lib/spark-examples.jar 10
Configuring Spark on YARN for Long-Running Applications

Long-running applications such as Spark Streaming jobs must be able to write to HDFS, which means that the hdfs user may need to delegate tokens possibly beyond the default lifetime. This workload type requires passing Kerberos principal and keytab to the spark-submit script using the --principal and --keytab parameters. The keytab is copied to the host running the ApplicationMaster, and the Kerberos login is renewed periodically by using the principal and keytab to generate the required delegation tokens needed for HDFS.

**Note:** For secure distribution of the keytab to the ApplicationMaster host, the cluster should be configured for TLS/SSL communication for YARN and HDFS encryption.

Create the Spark Principal and Keytab File

These are needed for long-running applications running on Spark on YARN cluster mode only.

1. Create the spark principal and spark.keytab file:

   ```
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey spark/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   kadmin: xst -k spark.keytab spark/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

   See Step 4: Create and Deploy the Kerberos Principals and Keytab Files on page 90 for more information about Kerberos and its use with Cloudera clusters.

Sqoop 2 Authentication

This section describes how to configure Sqoop 2 with Kerberos security in a Hadoop cluster.

**Note:** Sqoop 2 is being deprecated. Cloudera recommends using Sqoop 1.

Create the Sqoop 2 Principal and Keytab File

You need to create a sqoop2.keytab file for Sqoop 2. Follow these steps:

1. Create the principal and keytab file:

   ```
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey sqoop2/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
   kadmin: xst -k sqoop2.keytab sqoop2/fully.qualified.domain.name
   ```

2. Move the file into the Sqoop 2 configuration directory and restrict its access exclusively to the sqoop2 user:

   ```
   $ mv sqoop2.keytab /etc/sqoop2/conf/
   $ chown sqoop2 /etc/sqoop2/conf/sqoop2.keytab
   $ chmod 400 /etc/sqoop2/conf/sqoop2.keytab
   ```

   For more details on creating Kerberos principals and keytabs, see Step 4: Create and Deploy the Kerberos Principals and Keytab Files on page 90.

Configure Sqoop 2 to Use Kerberos

Edit the Sqoop 2 configuration file sqoop.properties file in the /etc/sqoop2/conf directory and add the following properties:

```
org.apache.sqoop.authentication.type=KERBEROS
org.apache.sqoop.authentication.handler=org.apache.sqoop.security.KerberosAuthenticationHandler
org.apache.sqoop.authentication.kerberos.principal=sqoop2/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM
org.apache.sqoop.authentication.kerberos.keytab=/etc/sqoop2/conf/sqoop2.keytab
```
Sqoop 1, Pig, and Whirr Security

Here is a summary of some security features for other CDH 5 components.

Pig
Supports security with no configuration required.

Sqoop 1
Sqoop1 does not support:
- TLS/SSL connections to Oracle, MySQL, or other databases
- Kerberos authentication to external databases

Whirr
Whirr does not support security in CDH 5.

ZooKeeper Authentication

As of Cloudera Manager 5.11, ZooKeeper supports mutual server-to-server (quorum peer) authentication using SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer), which provides a layer around Kerberos authentication. Server to server authentication among ZooKeeper servers in an ensemble mitigates the risk of spoofing by a rogue server on an unsecured network. For more information about quorum peer authentication and how the feature leverages ZooKeeper's SASL support, see the Cloudera Engineering Blog post, Hardening Apache ZooKeeper Security.

Client-to-server SASL-based authentication has been supported since Cloudera Manager/CDH 5.2 (ZooKeeper 3.4.0+). Follow the steps in Configuring ZooKeeper Server for Kerberos Authentication on page 172 and Configuring ZooKeeper Client Shell for Kerberos Authentication on page 173 to configure ZooKeeper to use this mechanism.

To configure client-server or server-server authentication for ZooKeeper, follow the appropriate steps below:

Requirements
Configuring ZooKeeper to use Kerberos for client-server or server-server authentication requires that your organization's Kerberos instance (MIT Kerberos, Microsoft Active Directory) be up and running, and reachable by the ZooKeeper server or client during the configuration processes detailed below. See Configuring Hadoop Security in CDH 5 for details.

Before enabling mutual authentication, the ZooKeeper servers in the cluster must be configured to authenticate using Kerberos.

Note: Cloudera recommends that you ensure your ZooKeeper ensemble is working properly, before you attempt to integrate Kerberos authentication. See ZooKeeper Installation for details.

Configuring ZooKeeper Server for Kerberos Authentication
You can configure the ZooKeeper server for Kerberos authentication in Cloudera Manager or through the command line.

Using Cloudera Manager to Configure ZooKeeper Server for Kerberos Authentication
To set up the ZooKeeper server for Kerberos authentication in Cloudera Manager, complete the following steps:

1. In Cloudera Manager, open the ZooKeeper service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Enter Kerberos in the in the Search bar.
4. Find the Enable Kerberos Authentication property and select the check-box next to the ZooKeeper services that you want to configure for Kerberos authentication.
Using the Command Line to Configure ZooKeeper Server for Kerberos Authentication

Follow the steps below for each ZooKeeper server in the ensemble. To maintain consistency across ZooKeeper servers in the ensemble, use the same name for the keytab file you deploy to each server, for example, `zookeeper.keytab`. Each keytab file will contain its respective host's fully-qualified domain name (FQDN).

1. Create a service principal for the ZooKeeper server using the fully-qualified domain name (FQDN) of the host on which ZooKeeper server is running and the name of your Kerberos realm using the pattern `zookeeper/fqdn.example.com@YOUR-REALM`. This principal will be used to authenticate the ZooKeeper server with the Hadoop cluster. Create this service principal as follows:

   ```
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey zookeeper/fqdn.example.com@YOUR-REALM
   ```

2. Create a keytab file for the ZooKeeper server:

   ```
   $ kadmin
   kadmin: xst -k zookeeper.keytab zookeeper/fqdn.example.com@YOUR-REALM
   ```

   **Note:** For consistency across ZooKeeper Servers, use the same name for the keytab file you create for each subsequent ZooKeeper Server host system you configure using these steps, for example, `zookeeper.keytab`.

3. Copy the `zookeeper.keytab` file to the ZooKeeper configuration directory on the ZooKeeper server host, using the appropriate ZooKeeper configuration directory: `/etc/zookeeper/conf/`. The `zookeeper.keytab` file should be owned by the `zookeeper` user, with owner-only read permissions.

4. Add the following lines to the ZooKeeper configuration file `zoo.cfg`:

   ```
   authProvider.1=org.apache.zookeeper.server.auth.SASLAuthenticationProvider
   jaasLoginRenew=3600000
   ```

5. Set up the Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) by creating a `jaas.conf` file in the ZooKeeper configuration directory with the settings shown below, replacing `fqdn.example.com` with the ZooKeeper server's hostname.

   ```
   Server {
   com.sun.security.auth.module.Krb5LoginModule required
   useKeyTab=true
   keyTab="/etc/zookeeper/conf/zookeeper.keytab"
   storeKey=true
   useTicketCache=false
   principal="zookeeper/fqdn.example.com
   @YOUR-REALM";
   }
   ```

6. Add the following setting to the `java.env` file located in the ZooKeeper configuration directory, creating the file if necessary:

   ```
   export JVMFLAGS="-Djava.security.auth.login.config=/etc/zookeeper/conf/jaas.conf"
   ```

7. Repeat these steps for each ZooKeeper server in the ensemble.

8. Restart the ZooKeeper server to have the configuration changes take effect. See ZooKeeper Installation for details.

Configuring ZooKeeper Client Shell for Kerberos Authentication

In addition to configuring ZooKeeper Server hosts to use Kerberos for authentication, you should also configure the ZooKeeper client shell (the ZooKeeper CLI) to authenticate to the ZooKeeper service using Kerberos credentials. As with the ZooKeeper Server, you must create a Kerberos principal for the client, as detailed below:
Configuring Authentication

1. Create a Kerberos principal for the zookeeper-client, zkcli@YOUR-REALM, replacing YOUR-REALM with the name of your organization’s Kerberos realm:

   ```bash
   kadmin: addprinc -randkey zkcli@YOUR-REALM
   ```

2. Create a keytab file for the ZooKeeper client shell using the -norandkey option.

   **Note:** Not all versions of kadmin support the -norandkey option, in which case, simply omit this option from the command. Using the kadmin command without the -norandkey option invalidates previously exported keytabs and generates a new password.

   ```bash
   $ kadmin
   kadmin: xst -norandkey -k zkcli.keytab zkcli@YOUR-REALM
   ```

3. On the host running the ZooKeeper client shell, set up JAAS (Java Authentication and Authorization Service) in the configuration directory appropriate for your installation type:

   - Package installation: /etc/zookeeper/conf/
   - Tarball installation: EXPANDED_DIR/conf

4. Create a jaas.conf file containing the following settings:

   ```java
   Client {
   com.sun.security.auth.module.Krb5LoginModule required
   useKeyTab=true
   keyTab="/path/to/zkcli.keytab"
   storeKey=true
   useTicketCache=false
   principal="zkcli@YOUR-REALM";
   }
   ```

5. In this same configuration directory, add the following setting to the java.env file, creating the file if necessary.

   ```bash
   export JVMFLAGS="-Djava.security.auth.login.config=/etc/zookeeper/conf/jaas.conf"
   ```

Verifying the Configuration

After enabling Kerberos authentication and restarting the ZooKeeper cluster, you can verify that the authentication is working correctly by following these steps:

1. Start the ZooKeeper client, passing to it the name of a ZooKeeper server:

   ```bash
   zookeeper-client -server fqdn.example.com:port
   ```

2. From the ZooKeeper CLI, create a protected znode using your ZooKeeper client principal:

   ```bash
   create /znode1 znode1data sasl:zkcli@{{YOUR-REALM}}:cdwra
   ```

3. Verify the znode is created and the ACL is set correctly:

   ```bash
   getAcl /znode1
   ```

   The getAcl command returns the znode’s scheme and permissions values. Verify that these are as expected.

Enabling Server-Server Mutual Authentication

As of Cloudera Manager 5.11, support for mutual authentication between ZooKeeper Servers can be enabled through the Cloudera Manager Admin Console. For secured networks, server-to-server authentication is considered an optional security enhancement, so the capability is disabled by default:
Server-to-server SASL authentication requires all servers in the ZooKeeper ensemble to authenticate using Kerberos, as detailed in Configuring ZooKeeper Server for Kerberos Authentication on page 172.

Assuming your cluster is already configured to authenticate using Kerberos, you can enable mutual authentication as follows:

1. Log into the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select Clusters > ZOOKEEPER-n.
3. Click the Configuration tab.
4. Select Category > Security under the Filters menu to display the security properties.
5. Click the Enable Server to Server SASL Authentication box to select it.
6. Click Save.
7. Select Restart from the Actions drop-down to restart the cluster with this setting.

To disable server-to-server SASL authentication, simply return to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console page shown above, de-select Enable Server to Server SASL Authentication (by clicking the checked box), and restart the cluster.

Hadoop Users in Cloudera Manager and CDH

A number of special users are created by default when installing and using CDH and Cloudera Manager. Given below is a list of users and groups as of the latest release. Also listed are the corresponding Kerberos principals and keytab files that should be created when you configure Kerberos security on your cluster.

**Note:** Cloudera Manager 5.3 introduces a new single user mode. In single user mode, the Cloudera Manager Agent and all the processes run by services managed by Cloudera Manager are started as a single configured user and group. See Configuring Single User Mode for more information.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component (Version)</th>
<th>Unix User ID</th>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager (all versions)</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>Cloudera Manager processes such as the Cloudera Manager Server and the monitoring roles run as this user. The Cloudera Manager keytab file must be named cmf.keytab since that name is hard-coded in Cloudera Manager.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accumulo (Accumulo 1.4.3 and higher)</td>
<td>accumulo</td>
<td>accumulo</td>
<td>Accumulo processes run as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Avro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No special users.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Flume (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>flume</td>
<td>flume</td>
<td>The sink that writes to HDFS as this user must have write privileges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache HBase (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>hbase</td>
<td>hbase</td>
<td>The Master and the RegionServer processes run as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDFS (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>hdfs</td>
<td>hdfs, hadoop</td>
<td>The NameNode and DataNodes run as this user, and the HDFS root directory as well as the directories used for edit logs should be owned by it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Hive (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>hive</td>
<td>hive</td>
<td>The HiveServer2 process and the Hive Metastore processes run as this user. A user must be defined for Hive access to its Metastore DB (for example, MySQL or Postgres) but it can be any identifier and does not correspond to a Unix uid. This is javax.jdo.option.ConnectionUserName in hive-site.xml.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache HCatalog (CDH 4.2 and higher, CDH 5)</td>
<td>hive</td>
<td>hive</td>
<td>The WebHCat service (for REST access to Hive functionality) runs as the hive user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HttpFS (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>httpfs</td>
<td>httpfs</td>
<td>The HttpFS service runs as this user. See HttpFS Security Configuration for instructions on how to generate the merged httpfs-http.keytab file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>hue</td>
<td>hue</td>
<td>Hue services run as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue Load Balancer (Cloudera Manager 5.5 and higher)</td>
<td>apache</td>
<td>apache</td>
<td>The Hue Load balancer has a dependency on the apache2 package that uses the apache user name. Cloudera Manager does not run processes using this user ID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala</td>
<td>impala</td>
<td>impala, hive</td>
<td>Impala services run as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component (Version)</td>
<td>Unix User ID</td>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Kafka (Cloudera Distribution of Kafka 1.2.0)</td>
<td>kafka</td>
<td>kafka</td>
<td>Kafka brokers and mirror makers run as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java KeyStore KMS (CDH 5.2.1 and higher)</td>
<td>kms</td>
<td>kms</td>
<td>The Java KeyStore KMS service runs as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Trustee KMS (CDH 5.3 and higher)</td>
<td>kms</td>
<td>kms</td>
<td>The Key Trustee KMS service runs as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Trustee Server (CDH 5.4 and higher)</td>
<td>keytrustee</td>
<td>keytrustee</td>
<td>The Key Trustee Server service runs as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kudu</td>
<td>kudu</td>
<td>kudu</td>
<td>Kudu services run as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llama (CDH 5)</td>
<td>llama</td>
<td>llama</td>
<td>Llama runs as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Mahout</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No special users.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MapReduce (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>mapred</td>
<td>mapred, hadoop</td>
<td>Without Kerberos, the JobTracker and tasks run as this user. The LinuxTaskController binary is owned by this user for Kerberos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Oozie (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>oozie</td>
<td>oozie</td>
<td>The Oozie service runs as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parquet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No special users.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Pig</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No special users.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Search (CDH 4.3 and higher, CDH 5)</td>
<td>solr</td>
<td>solr</td>
<td>The Solr processes run as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Spark (CDH 5)</td>
<td>spark</td>
<td>spark</td>
<td>The Spark History Server process runs as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Sentry (CDH 5.1 and higher)</td>
<td>sentry</td>
<td>sentry</td>
<td>The Sentry service runs as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Sqoop (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>sqoop</td>
<td>sqoop</td>
<td>This user is only for the Sqoop1 Metastore, a configuration option that is not recommended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Sqoop2 (CDH 4.2 and higher, CDH 5)</td>
<td>sqoop2</td>
<td>sqoop, sqoop2</td>
<td>The Sqoop2 service runs as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Whirr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No special users.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARN (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>yarn</td>
<td>yarn, hadoop</td>
<td>Without Kerberos, all YARN services and applications run as this user. The LinuxContainerExecutor binary is owned by this user for Kerberos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache ZooKeeper (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>zookeeper</td>
<td>zookeeper</td>
<td>The ZooKeeper processes run as this user. It is not configurable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Keytabs and Keytab File Permissions

**Note:**

The Kerberos principal names should be of the format, `username/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM`, where the term `username` refers to the username of an existing UNIX account, such as `hdfs` or `mapred`. The table below lists the usernames to be used for the Kerberos principal names. For example, the Kerberos principal for Apache Flume would be `flume/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM`.

For keytabs with multiple principals, Cloudera Manager merges them appropriately from individual keytabs. If you do not use Cloudera Manager, you must merge the keytabs manually.

## Table 9: Clusters Managed by Cloudera Manager

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component (Unix User ID)</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Kerberos Principals</th>
<th>Filename (*keytab)</th>
<th>Keytab File Owner</th>
<th>Keytab File Group</th>
<th>File Permission (octal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager (cloudera-scm)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cmf</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Management Service (cloudera-scm)</td>
<td>cloudera-mgmt-REPORTSMANAGER</td>
<td>hdfs</td>
<td>headlamp</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Management Service (cloudera-scm)</td>
<td>cloudera-mgmt-SERVICEMONITOR, cloudera-mgmt-ACTIVITYMONITOR</td>
<td>hue</td>
<td>cmon</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Management Service (cloudera-scm)</td>
<td>cloudera-mgmt-HOSTMONITOR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Accumulo (accumulo)</td>
<td>accumulo16ACCUMULO16_MASTER</td>
<td>accumulo</td>
<td>accumulo16</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accumulo16ACCUMULO16_TRACER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accumulo16ACCUMULO16_MONITOR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accumulo16-ACCUMULO16_GC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accumulo16ACCUMULO16_TSERVER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flume (flume)</td>
<td>flume-AGENT</td>
<td>flume</td>
<td>flume</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBase (hbase)</td>
<td>hbase-HBASETHRIFTSERVER</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hbase-REGIONSERVER</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hbase-HBASERESTSERVER</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hbase-MASTER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDFS (hdfs)</td>
<td>hdfs-NAMENODE</td>
<td>hdfs, HTTP</td>
<td>hdfs</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hdfs-DATANODE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hdfs-SECONDARYNAMENODE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component (Unix User ID)</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Kerberos Principals</td>
<td>Filename (*.keytab)</td>
<td>Keytab File Owner</td>
<td>Keytab File Group</td>
<td>File Permission (octal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hive (hive)</td>
<td>hive-HIVESERVER2</td>
<td>hive</td>
<td>hive</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hive-WEBHCAT</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hive-HIVEMETASTORE</td>
<td>hive</td>
<td>hive</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HttpFS (httpfs)</td>
<td>hdfs-HTTPFS</td>
<td>httpfs</td>
<td>httpfs</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue (hue)</td>
<td>hue-KT_RENEWER</td>
<td>hue</td>
<td>hue</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala (impala)</td>
<td>impala-STATESTORE</td>
<td>impala</td>
<td>impala</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>impala-CATALOGSERVER</td>
<td>impala</td>
<td>impala</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>impala-IMPALAD</td>
<td>impala-impala</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java KeyStore KMS (kms)</td>
<td>kms-KMS</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>kms</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Kafka (kafka)</td>
<td>kafka-KAFKA_BROKER</td>
<td>kafka</td>
<td>kafka</td>
<td>kafka</td>
<td>kafka</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Kafka (kafka)</td>
<td>kafka-KAFKA_MIRROR MAKER</td>
<td>kafka</td>
<td>kafka</td>
<td>kafka</td>
<td>kafka</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Trustee KMS (kms)</td>
<td>keytrustee-KMS_KEYTRUSTEE</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>keytrustee</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llama (llama)</td>
<td>impala-LLAMA</td>
<td>llama, HTTP</td>
<td>llama</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MapReduce (mapred)</td>
<td>mapreduce-JOBTRACKER</td>
<td>mapred</td>
<td>mapred</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oozie (oozie)</td>
<td>oozie-OOzie_SERVER</td>
<td>oozie</td>
<td>oozie</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search (solr)</td>
<td>solr-SOLR_SERVER</td>
<td>solr</td>
<td>solr</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentry (sentry)</td>
<td>sentry-SENTRY_SERVER</td>
<td>sentry</td>
<td>sentry</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spark (spark)</td>
<td>spark_on_yarn-SPARK_YARN_HISTORY_SERVER</td>
<td>spark</td>
<td>spark</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARN (yarn)</td>
<td>yarn-NODEMANAGER</td>
<td>yarn, HTTP</td>
<td>yarn</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yarn-RESOURCENMANAGER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yarn-JOBHISTORY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZooKeeper (zookeeper)</td>
<td>zookeeper-server</td>
<td>zookeeper</td>
<td>zookeeper</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: CDH Clusters Not Managed by Cloudera Manager
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component (Unix User ID)</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Kerberos Principals</th>
<th>Filename (*.keytab)</th>
<th>Keytab File Owner</th>
<th>Keytab File Group</th>
<th>File Permission (octal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>accumulo16-ACCUMULO16_GC</td>
<td>flume-AGENT</td>
<td>flume</td>
<td>flume</td>
<td>flume</td>
<td>flume</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accumulo16-ACCUMULO16_TSERVER</td>
<td>hbase-HBASETHIRTSERVER</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>hbase</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hbase-HBASERESTSERVER</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hbase-MASTER</td>
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<tr>
<td>hdfs-NAMENODE</td>
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<td>hdfs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>hdfs-DATANODE</td>
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<td>hdfs-SECONDARYNAMENODE</td>
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<td>hive-HIVESERVER2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hive-HIVEMETASTORE</td>
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<td>hive</td>
<td>hive</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>httpfs-HTTPFS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>hue-KT_RENEWER</td>
<td>hue</td>
<td>hue</td>
<td>hue</td>
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<td>impala-IMPALAD</td>
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<td>mapreduce-JOBTRACKER</td>
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<td>mapred</td>
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<td>mapreduce-TASKTRACKER</td>
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<tr>
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<td>oozie, HTTP</td>
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<td>oozie</td>
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<td>sentry</td>
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<td>sentry</td>
<td>sentry</td>
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<tr>
<td>spark_on_yarn-SPARK_YARN_HISTORY_SERVER</td>
<td>spark</td>
<td>spark</td>
<td>spark</td>
<td>spark</td>
<td>spark</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Configuring a Cluster-dedicated MIT KDC with Cross-Realm Trust

If you use Cloudera Manager to enable Hadoop security on your cluster, the Cloudera Manager Server will create several principals and then generate keytabs for those principals. Cloudera Manager will then deploy the keytab files on every host in the cluster. See [Hadoop Users in Cloudera Manager and CDH](#) on page 175 for a complete listing of the principals created by Cloudera Manager.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component (Unix User ID)</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Kerberos Principals</th>
<th>Filename (*.keytab)</th>
<th>Keytab File Owner</th>
<th>Keytab File Group</th>
<th>File Permission (octal)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YARN (yarn)</td>
<td>yarn-NODEMANAGER</td>
<td>yarn, HTTP</td>
<td>yarn</td>
<td>yarn</td>
<td>hadoop</td>
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<td>yarn-RESOURCENAMEAGER</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yarn-JOBHISTORY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZooKeeper (zookeeper)</td>
<td>zookeeper-server</td>
<td>zookeeper</td>
<td>zookeeper</td>
<td>zookeeper</td>
<td>zookeeper</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### When to use kadmin.local and kadmin

When performing the Kerberos commands in this document, you can use `kadmin.local` or `kadmin` depending on your access and account:

- If you can log on to the KDC host directly, and have root access or a Kerberos admin account, use the `kadmin.local` command.
- When accessing the KDC from a remote host, use the `kadmin` command.

To start `kadmin.local` on the KDC host:

```bash
$ sudo kadmin.local
```

To run `kadmin` from any host:

```bash
$ kadmin
```

### Note:
- In this guide, `kadmin` is shown as the prompt for commands in the `kadmin` shell, but you can type the same commands at the `kadmin.local` prompt in the `kadmin.local` shell.
- Running `kadmin.local` may prompt you for a password because it is being run using `sudo`. You should provide your Unix password. Running `kadmin` may prompt you for a password because you need Kerberos admin privileges. You should provide your Kerberos admin password.

### Setting up a Cluster-Dedicated KDC and Default Realm for the Hadoop Cluster

Cloudera has tested the following configuration approaches to Kerberos security for clusters managed by Cloudera Manager. For administration teams that are just getting started with Kerberos security, we recommend starting with these approaches to the configuration of KDC services for a number of reasons.

The number of Service Principal Names (SPNs) that are created and managed by the Cloudera Manager server for a CDH cluster can be significant, so it is important to realize the potential impact on cluster uptime and overall operations.
if you choose to manage keytabs manually instead. The Cloudera Manager server manages the creation of service keytabs on the proper hosts based on the current configuration of the database. Manual keytab management can be error prone and introduce delays when deploying or moving services within the cluster, especially under time-sensitive conditions.

Cloudera Manager creates SPNs within a KDC that it can access with the kadmin command based on configuration of the /etc/krb5.conf file on the Cloudera Manager host. SPNs are created with the format service-name/host.fqdn.name@EXAMPLE.COM where service-name is the relevant CDH service name such as hue or hbase or hdfs.

If your site already has a working KDC, and any existing principals share the same name as any of the principals that Cloudera Manager creates, the Cloudera Manager Server generates a new randomized key for those principals, and consequently causes existing keytabs to become invalid.

This is why Cloudera recommends using a dedicated local MIT Kerberos KDC and realm for the Hadoop cluster. You can set up a one-way cross-realm trust from the cluster-dedicated KDC and realm to your existing central MIT Kerberos KDC, or to an existing Active Directory realm. Using this method, there is no need to create Hadoop service principals in the central MIT Kerberos KDC or in Active Directory, but principals (users) in the central MIT KDC or in Active Directory can be authenticated to Hadoop. The steps to implement this approach are as follows:

1. Install and configure a cluster-dedicated MIT Kerberos KDC that will be managed by Cloudera Manager for creating and storing the service principals for your Hadoop cluster.

   **Note:** The krb5-server package includes a logrotate policy file to rotate log files monthly. To take advantage of this, install the logrotate package. No additional configuration is necessary.

2. See the example kdc.conf and krb5.conf files in Sample Kerberos Configuration Files on page 492 for configuration considerations for the KDC and Kerberos clients.

3. Configure a default Kerberos realm for the cluster you want Cloudera Manager to manage and set up one-way cross-realm trust between the cluster-dedicated KDC and either your central KDC or Active Directory. Follow the appropriate instructions below for your deployment: Using a Cluster-Dedicated KDC with a Central MIT KDC on page 182 or Using a Cluster-Dedicated MIT KDC with Active Directory on page 184.

Cloudera strongly recommends the method above because:

- It requires minimal configuration in Active Directory.
- It is comparatively easy to script the creation of many principals and keytabs. A principal and keytab must be created for every daemon in the cluster, and in a large cluster this can be extremely onerous to do directly in Active Directory.
- There is no need to involve central Active Directory administrators to get service principals created.
- It allows for incremental configuration. The Hadoop administrator can completely configure and verify the functionality the cluster independently of integrating with Active Directory.

Using a Cluster-Dedicated KDC with a Central MIT KDC

**Important:** If you plan to use Oozie or the Hue Kerberos Ticket Renewer in your cluster, you must configure your KDC to allow tickets to be renewed, and you must configure krb5.conf to request renewable tickets. Typically, you can do this by adding the max_renewable_life setting to your realm in kdc.conf, and by adding the renew_lifetime parameter to the libdefaults section of krb5.conf. For more information about renewable tickets, see the Kerberos documentation. This is demonstrated in the Sample Kerberos Configuration Files on page 492.

1. In the /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf file on the local dedicated KDC server host, configure the default realm for the Hadoop cluster by substituting your Kerberos realm in the following realms property:

   ```
   [realms]
   HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM = {
   ```
2. In the /etc/krb5.conf file on all cluster hosts and all Hadoop client user hosts, configure the default realm for the Hadoop cluster by substituting your Kerberos realm in the following realms property. Also specify the local dedicated KDC server hostname in the /etc/krb5.conf file (for example, kdc01.example.com).

```
[libdefaults]
default_realm = HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM
[realms]
HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM = {
  kdc = kdc01.hadoop.example.com:88
  admin_server = kdc01.hadoop.example.com:749
  default_domain = hadoop.example.com
}
EXAMPLE.COM = {
  kdc = kdc01.example.com:88
  admin_server = kdc01.example.com:749
  default_domain = example.com
}
```

3. To set up the cross-realm trust in the cluster-dedicated KDC, type the following command in the kadmin.local or kadmin shell on the cluster-dedicated KDC host to create a krbtgt principal. Substitute your cluster-dedicated KDC realm for HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM, and substitute your central KDC realm for EXAMPLE.COM. Enter a trust password when prompted. Note the password because you will need to enter the exact same password in the central KDC in the next step.

```
kadmin:  addprinc krbtgt/HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
```

4. Each of your Hadoop client users must also place this information in their local core-site.xml file. The easiest way to do so is by using the Cloudera Manager Admin Console to generate a client configuration file.

5. To set up the cross-realm trust in the central KDC, type the same command in the kadmin.local or kadmin shell on the central KDC host to create the exact same krbtgt principal and password.

```
kadmin:  addprinc krbtgt/HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
```

6. To properly translate principal names from the central KDC realm into the cluster-dedicated KDC realm for the Hadoop cluster, configure the Trusted Kerberos Realms property of the HDFS service.

   a. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
   b. Go to the HDFS service.
   c. Click the Configuration tab.
   d. Select Scope > HDFS (Service Wide)
   e. Select Category > Security.
   f. Type Kerberos in the Search box.
   g. Edit the Trusted Kerberos Realms property to add the name of your central KDC realm. If you need to use more advanced mappings which do more than just allow principals from another domain, you may enter them in the Additional Rules to Map Kerberos Principals to Short Names property. For more information about name mapping rules, see Configuring the Mapping from Kerberos Principals to Short Names on page 109.

7. Each of your Hadoop client users must also place this information in their local core-site.xml file. The easiest way to do so is by using the Cloudera Manager Admin Console to generate a client configuration file.
8. Proceed to Step 2: If you are Using AES-256 Encryption, Install the JCE Policy File on page 68. Later in this procedure, you will restart the services to have the configuration changes in core-site.xml take effect.

Using a Cluster-Dedicated MIT KDC with Active Directory

Important: If you are using Cloudera Manager, ensure you have installed the openldap-clients package on the Cloudera Manager Server host before you begin configuring Kerberos authentication.

On the Active Directory Server

1. On the Active Directory server host, type the following command to add the local realm trust to Active Directory:

   netdom trust HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM /Domain:EXAMPLE.COM /add /realm /passwordt:TrustPassword

2. On the Active Directory server host, type the following command to set the proper encryption type:

   Windows 2003 RC2
   Windows 2003 server installations do not support AES encryption for Kerberos. Therefore RC4 should be used. Please see the Microsoft reference documentation for more information.

   ktpass /MITRealmName HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM /TrustEncryp RC4

   Windows 2008

   ksetup /SetEncTypeAttr HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM <enc_type>

   Where the <enc_type> parameter can be replaced with parameter strings for AES, DES, or RC4 encryption modes. For example, for AES encryption, replace <enc_type> with AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 or AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 and for RC4 encryption, replace with RC4-HMAC-MD5. See the Microsoft reference documentation for more information.

   Important: Make sure that the encryption type you specify is supported on both your version of Windows Active Directory and your version of MIT Kerberos.

On the MIT KDC Server

1. In the /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf file on the local dedicated KDC server host, configure the default realm for the Hadoop cluster by substituting your Kerberos realm in the following realms property:

   [realms]
   HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM = {

2. Each of your Hadoop client users must also place this information in their local core-site.xml file. The easiest way to do so is by using the Cloudera Manager Admin Console to generate a client configuration file.

3. On the local MIT KDC server host, type the following command in the kadmin.local or kadmin shell to add the cross-realm krbtgt principal:

   kadmin: addprinc -e "<keysalt_list>" krbtgt/HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM

   where the <keysalt_list> parameter specifies the types of keys and their salt to be used for encryption of the password for this cross-realm krbtgt principal. It can be set to AES, or RC4 keytypes with a salt value of :normal. Note that DES is deprecated and should no longer be used. You can specify multiple keysalt types using the parameter in the command above. Make sure that at least one of the encryption types corresponds to the encryption types found in the tickets granted by the KDC in the remote realm. For an example of the values to use, see the examples based on the Active Directory functional domain level, below.
Examples by Active Directory Domain or Forest "Functional level"

Active Directory will, based on the Domain or Forest functional level, use encryption types supported by that release of the Windows Server operating system. It is not possible to use AES encryption types with an AD 2003 functional level. If you notice that DES encryption types are being used when authenticating or requesting service tickets to Active Directory then it might be necessary to enable weak encryption types in the /etc/krb5.conf. See Sample Kerberos Configuration Files on page 492 for an example.

- Windows 2003

```bash
kadmin: addprinc -e "rc4-hmac:normal" krbtgt/HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
```

- Windows 2008

```bash
kadmin: addprinc -e "aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal rc4-hmac:normal"
krbtgt/HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
```

**Note:** The cross-realm krbtgt principal that you add in this step must have **at least one entry** that uses the same encryption type as the tickets that are issued by the remote KDC. If there are no matching encryption types, principals in the local realm can successfully access the Hadoop cluster, but principals in the remote realm are unable to.

### On All Cluster Hosts

1. In the /etc/krb5.conf file on all cluster hosts and all Hadoop client user hosts, configure both Kerberos realms. Note that default_realm should be configured as the local MIT Kerberos realm for the cluster. Your krb5.conf may contain more configuration properties than those demonstrated below. This example is provided to clarify configuration parameters. See Sample Kerberos Configuration Files on page 492 for more information.

```ini
[libdefaults]
default_realm = HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM
[realms]
EXAMPLE.COM = {
    kdc = dc01.example.com:88
    admin_server = dc01.example.com:749
}
HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM = {
    kdc = kdc01.hadoop.example.com:88
    admin_server = kdc01.hadoop.example.com:749
}
[domain_realm]
.hadoop.example.com = HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM
.hadoop.example.com = HADOOP.EXAMPLE.COM
.example.com = EXAMPLE.COM
.example.com = EXAMPLE.COM
```

2. Use one of the following methods to properly translate principal names from the Active Directory realm into the cluster-dedicated KDC realm for the Hadoop cluster.

   - **Using Cloudera Manager:** Configure the Trusted Kerberos realms property of the HDFS service:
     1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
     2. Go to the HDFS service.
     3. Click the Configuration tab.
     4. Select Scope > HDFS (Service Wide)
     5. Select Category > Security.
     6. Type Kerberos in the Search box.
     7. Edit the Trusted Kerberos Realms property to add the name of your central KDC realm. If you need to use more advanced mappings which do more than just allow principals from another domain, you may enter them in the Additional Rules to Map Kerberos Principals to Short Names property. For more
Configuring the Mapping from Kerberos Principals to Short Names on page 109.

Using the Command Line: Configure the hadoop.security.auth_to_local setting in the core-site.xml file on all of the cluster hosts. The following example translates all principal names with the realm EXAMPLE.COM into the first component of the principal name only. It also preserves the standard translation for the default realm (the cluster realm).

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.auth_to_local</name>
  <value>
    RULE:[1:$1@$0](^.*@EXAMPLE\..COM$)s/^(.*)@EXAMPLE\..COM$/\1/g
    RULE:[2:$1@$0](^.*@EXAMPLE\..COM$)s/^(.*)@EXAMPLE\..COM$/\1/g
    DEFAULT
  </value>
</property>
```

Integrating Hadoop Security with Active Directory

Considerations when using an Active Directory KDC

Performance:

As your cluster grows, so will the volume of Authentication Service (AS) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) interaction between the services on each cluster server. Consider evaluating the volume of this interaction between the services and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) interaction between the services on each cluster server. Consider evaluating the volume of this interaction against the Active Directory domain controllers you have configured for the cluster before rolling this feature out to a production environment. If cluster performance suffers, over time it might become necessary to dedicate a set of AD domain controllers to larger deployments. Cloudera recommends you use a dedicated AD instance for every 100 nodes in your cluster. However, note that this recommendation may not apply to high-volume clusters, or cases where the AD host is also being used for LDAP lookups.

Network Proximity:

By default, Kerberos uses UDP for client/server communication. Often, AD services are in a different network than project application services such as Hadoop. If the domain controllers supporting a cluster for Kerberos are not in the same subnet, or they’re separated by a firewall, consider using the udp_preference_limit = 1 setting in the [libdefaults] section of the krb5.conf used by cluster services. Cloudera strongly recommends against using AD domain controller (KDC) servers that are separated from the cluster by a WAN connection, as latency in this service will significantly impact cluster performance.

Process:

Troubleshooting the cluster’s operations, especially for Kerberos-enabled services, will need to include AD administration resources. Evaluate your organizational processes for engaging the AD administration team, and how to escalate in case a cluster outage occurs due to issues with Kerberos authentication against AD services. In some situations it might be necessary to enable Kerberos event logging to address desktop and KDC issues within windows environments.

Also note that if you decommission any Cloudera Manager roles or nodes, the related AD accounts will need to be deleted manually. This is required because Cloudera Manager will not delete existing entries in Active Directory.

Important: With CDH 5.1 and higher, clusters managed by Cloudera Manager 5.1 (and higher) do not require a local MIT KDC and are able to integrate directly with an Active Directory KDC. Cloudera recommends you use a direct-to-AD setup. For instructions, see Enabling Kerberos Authentication Using the Wizard on page 49.

If direct integration with AD is not currently possible, use the following instructions to configure a local MIT KDC to trust your AD server:

1. Run an MIT Kerberos KDC and realm local to the cluster and create all service principals in this realm.
2. Set up one-way cross-realm trust from this realm to the Active Directory realm. Using this method, there is no need to create service principals in Active Directory, but Active Directory principals (users) can be authenticated to Hadoop. See Configuring a Local MIT Kerberos Realm to Trust Active Directory on page 187.

Configuring a Local MIT Kerberos Realm to Trust Active Directory

On the Active Directory Server

1. Add the local realm trust to Active Directory with this command:

```
```

2. Set the proper encryption type with this command:

   On Windows 2003 RC2:

   ```
ktpass /MITRealmName YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COMPANY.COM /TrustEncryp <enc_type>
   ```

   On Windows 2008:

   ```
ksetup /SetEncTypeAttr YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COMPANY.COM <enc_type>
   ```

   The `<enc_type>` parameter specifies AES, DES, or RC4 encryption. Refer to the documentation for your version of Windows Active Directory to find the `<enc_type>` parameter string to use.

3. Get and verify the list of encryption types set with this command:

   On Windows 2008:

   ```
ksetup /GetEncTypeAttr YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COMPANY.COM
   ```

   **Important:** Make sure the encryption type you specify is supported on both your version of Windows Active Directory and your version of MIT Kerberos.

On the MIT KDC Server

Type the following command in the kadmin.local or kadmin shell to add the cross-realm krbtgt principal. Use the same password you used in the `netdom` command on the Active Directory Server.

```
kadmin: addprinc -e "<enc_type_list>"
krbtgt/YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COMPANY.COM@AD-REALM.COMPANY.COM
```

where the `<enc_type_list>` parameter specifies the types of encryption this cross-realm krbtgt principal will support: either AES, DES, or RC4 encryption. You can specify multiple encryption types using the parameter in the command above, what’s important is that at least one of the encryption types corresponds to the encryption type found in the tickets granted by the KDC in the remote realm. For example:

```
kadmin: addprinc -e "rc4-hmac:normal des3-hmac-sha1:normal"
krbtgt/YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COMPANY.COM@AD-REALMCOMPANY.COM
```

**Note:** The cross-realm krbtgt principal that you add in this step must have at least one entry that uses the same encryption type as the tickets that are issued by the remote KDC. If no entries have the same encryption type, then the problem you will see is that authenticating as a principal in the local realm will allow you to successfully run Hadoop commands, but authenticating as a principal in the remote realm will not allow you to run Hadoop commands.
On All of the Cluster Hosts

1. Verify that both Kerberos realms are configured on all of the cluster hosts. Note that the default realm and the domain realm should remain set as the MIT Kerberos realm which is local to the cluster.

   [realms]
   AD-REALM.CORP.FOO.COM = {
     kdc = ad.corp.foo.com:88
     admin_server = ad.corp.foo.com:749
     default_domain = foo.com
   }
   CLUSTER-REALM.CORP.FOO.COM = {
     kdc = cluster01.corp.foo.com:88
     admin_server = cluster01.corp.foo.com:749
     default_domain = foo.com
   }

2. To properly translate principal names from the Active Directory realm into local names within Hadoop, you must configure the hadoop.security.auth_to_local setting in the core-site.xml file on all of the cluster machines. The following example translates all principal names with the realm AD-REALM.CORP.FOO.COM into the first component of the principal name only. It also preserves the standard translation for the default realm (the cluster realm).

   <property>
   <name>hadoop.security.auth_to_local</name>
   <value>
     RULE: [1:$$0] (^.*@AD-REALM\.CORP\.FOO\.COM$) s/^(.*)@AD-REALM\.CORP\.FOO\.COM$/$1/g
     RULE: [2:$$0] (^.*@AD-REALM\.CORP\.FOO\.COM$) s/^{.*}@AD-REALM\.CORP\.FOO\.COM$/$1/g
     DEFAULT
   </value>
   </property>

   For more information about name mapping rules, see Configuring the Mapping from Kerberos Principals to Short Names on page 109.

Integrating Hadoop Security with Alternate Authentication

One of the ramifications of enabling security on a Hadoop cluster is that every user who interacts with the cluster must have a Kerberos principal configured. For some of the services, specifically Oozie and Hadoop (for example, JobTracker and TaskTracker), it can be convenient to run a mixed form of authentication where Kerberos authentication is used for API or command line access while some other form of authentication (for example, SSO and LDAP) is used for accessing Web UIs. Using an alternate authentication deployment is considered an advanced topic because only a partial implementation is provided in this release: you will have to implement some of the code yourself.

**Note:** The following instructions assume you already have a Kerberos-enabled cluster.

Proceed as follows:

- Configuring the AuthenticationFilter to use Kerberos on page 189
- Creating an AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler Subclass on page 189
- Enabling Your AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler Subclass on page 189

See also the Example Implementation for Oozie on page 190.
Configuring the AuthenticationFilter to use Kerberos

First, you must do all of the steps in the Server Side Configuration section of the Hadoop documentation to configure AuthenticationFilter to use Kerberos. You must configure AuthenticationFilter to use Kerberos before doing the steps below.

Creating an AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler Subclass

An AuthenticationHandler is installed on the server-side to handle authenticating clients and creating an AuthenticationToken.

2. When a client sends a request, the authenticate method will be called. For browsers, AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler will call the alternateAuthenticate method, which is what you need to implement to interact with the desired authentication mechanism. For non-browsers, AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler will follow the Kerberos SPNEGO sequence (this is provided for you).
3. The alternateAuthenticate(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) method in your subclass should following these rules:
   - Return null if the authentication is still in progress; the response object can be used to interact with the client.
   - Throw an AuthenticationException if the authentication failed.
   - Return an AuthenticationToken if the authentication completed successfully.

Enabling Your AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler Subclass

You can enable the alternate authentication on Hadoop Web UIs, Oozie Web UIs, or both. You will need to include a JAR containing your subclass on the classpath of Hadoop or Oozie. All Kerberos-related configuration properties will still apply.

Enabling Your AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler Subclass on Hadoop Web UIs

1. Stop Hadoop by running the following command on every node in your cluster (as root):

   ```
   $ for x in `cd /etc/init.d ; ls hadoop-*` ; do sudo service $x stop ; done
   ```

2. Set the following property in core-site.xml, where org.my.subclass.of.AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler is the classname of your subclass:

   ```
   <property>
   <name>hadoop.http.authentication.type</name>
   <value>org.my.subclass.of.AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler</value>
   </property>
   ```

3. (Optional) You can also specify which user-agents you do not want to be considered as browsers by setting the following property as required (default value is shown). Note that all Java-based programs (such as Hadoop client) will use java as their user-agent.

   ```
   <property>
   <name>hadoop.http.authentication.alt-kerberos.non-browser.user-agents</name>
   <value>java,curl,wget,perl</value>
   </property>
   ```

4. Copy the JAR containing your subclass into /usr/lib/hadoop/lib/.
5. Start Hadoop by running the following command:

   ```
   $ for x in `cd /etc/init.d ; ls hadoop-*` ; do sudo service $x start ; done
   ```
Enabling Your AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler Subclass on Oozie Web UI

Note:
These instructions assume you have already performed the installation and configuration steps in Oozie Security Configuration.

1. Stop the Oozie Server:
   ```bash
   sudo /sbin/service oozie stop
   ```

2. Set the following property in oozie-site.xml, where org.my.subclass.of.AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler is the classname of your subclass:
   ```xml
   <property>
   <name>oozie.authentication.type</name>
   <value>org.my.subclass.of.AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler</value>
   </property>
   ```

3. (Optional) You can also specify which user-agents you do not want to be considered as browsers by setting the following property as required (default value is shown). Note that all Java-based programs (such as Hadoop client) will use java as their user-agent.
   ```xml
   <property>
   <name>oozie.authentication.alt-kerberos.non-browser.user-agents</name>
   <value>java,curl,wget,perl</value>
   </property>
   ```

4. Copy the JAR containing your subclass into /var/lib/oozie.

5. Start the Oozie Server:
   ```bash
   sudo /sbin/service oozie start
   ```

Example Implementation for Oozie

Warning:
The example implementation is NOT SECURE. Its purpose is to be as simple as possible, as an example of how to write your own AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler subclass.

It should NOT be used in a production environment

An example implementation of AltKerberosAuthenticationHandler is included (though not built by default) with Oozie. Also included is a simple Login Server with two implementations. The first one will authenticate any user who is using a username and password that are identical, such as foo:foo. The second one can be configured against an LDAP server to use LDAP for authentication.

You can read comprehensive documentation on the example at Creating Custom Authentication.
Important:

If you installed Oozie from the CDH packages and are deploying `oozie-login.war` alongside `oozie.war`, you will also need to run the following commands after you copy the `oozie-login.war` file to `/usr/lib/oozie/oozie-server` (if using YARN or `/usr/lib/oozie/oozie-server-0.20` if using MRv1) because it does not automatically be expanded:

```bash
jar xvf oozie-login.war
mkdir oozie-login
mv META-INF oozie-login/
mv WEB-INF oozie-login/
```

Authenticating Kerberos Principals in Java Code

This topic provides an example of how to authenticate a Kerberos principal in a Java application using the `org.apache.hadoop.security.UserGroupInformation` class.

The following code snippet authenticates the `cloudera` principal using the `cloudera.keytab` file:

```java
// Authenticating Kerberos principal
System.out.println("Principal Authentication: ");
final String user = "cloudera@CLOUDERA.COM";
final String keyPath = "cloudera.keytab";
UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytab(user, keyPath);
```
Configuring Encryption

Encryption is a process that uses digital keys to encode various components—text, files, databases, passwords, applications, or network packets, for example—so that only the appropriate entity (user, system process, and so on) can decode (decrypt) the item and view, modify, or add to the data. For Cloudera CDH components, encryption can be applied at various layers of the cluster, as shown in the table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Layer</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>Applied by the HDFS client software, <a href="#">HDFS Transparent Encryption</a> lets you encrypt specific folders contained in HDFS. To securely store the required encryption keys, Cloudera recommends using Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server in conjunction with HDFS encryption. See <a href="#">Enabling HDFS Encryption Using Navigator Key Trustee Server</a> on page 300 for details. Data stored temporarily on the local filesystem outside HDFS by CDH components (including Impala, MapReduce, YARN, or HBase) can also be encrypted. See <a href="#">Configuring Encryption for Data Spills</a> on page 334 for details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating System</td>
<td>At the Linux OS filesystem layer, encryption can be applied to an entire volume. For example, <a href="#">Cloudera Navigator Encrypt</a> can encrypt data inside and outside HDFS, such as temp/spill files, configuration files, and databases that store metadata associated with a CDH cluster. Navigator Encrypt requires a license for Cloudera Navigator and must be configured to use <a href="#">Navigator Key Trustee Server</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network</td>
<td>Network communications between client processes and server processes (HTTP, RPC, or TCP/IP services) can be encrypted using industry-standard TLS/SSL as detailed in <a href="#">Encrypting Data in Transit</a> on page 192. See Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager on page 196 for a step-by-step configuration guide.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generally, the mechanisms listed in the table above can be grouped into two broad types of encryption:

- Data in transit (also known as network encryption over TLS/SSL or 'wire' encryption)
- Data at rest encryption using two complementary mechanisms, [HDFS Transparent Encryption](#) and [Cloudera Navigator Encrypt](#)

**Note:** For information about data at rest encryption for cloud-based storage such as Amazon S3, see [How to Configure Encryption for Amazon S3](#) in the Security How-To section of this guide.

To configure either type of encryption for your Cloudera cluster, continue reading:

**Encrypting Data in Transit**

[Transport Layer Security (TLS)](#) is an industry standard set of cryptographic protocols for securing communications over a network. TLS evolved from Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). Because the SSL terminology is still widely used, Cloudera software and documentation refer to TLS as TLS/SSL, but the actual protocol used is TLS. SSL is not used in Cloudera software.

In addition to TLS/SSL encryption, HDFS and HBase transfer data using remote procedure calls (RPCs). To secure this transfer, you must enable RPC encryption.

For instructions on enabling TLS/SSL and RPC encryption, see the following topics:
TLS/SSL and Its Use of Certificates

TLS/SSL provides privacy and data integrity between applications communicating over a network by encrypting the packets transmitted between endpoints (ports on a host, for example). Configuring TLS/SSL for any system typically involves creating a private key and public key for use by server and client processes to negotiate an encrypted connection at runtime. In addition, TLS/SSL can use certificates to verify the trustworthiness of keys presented during the negotiation to prevent spoofing and mitigate other potential security issues.

Setting up Cloudera clusters to use TLS/SSL requires creating private key, public key, and storing these securely in a keystore, among other tasks. Although adding a certificate to the keystore may be the last task in the process, the lead time required to obtain a certificate depends on the type of certificate you plan to use for the cluster.

Certificates Overview

A certificate is digitally signed, typically by a certificate authority (CA) that indirectly (through a chain of trust) verifies the authenticity of the public key presented during the negotiation. Certificates can be signed in one of the three different ways shown in the table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Usage Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public CA-signed certificates</td>
<td><strong>Recommended.</strong> This type of certificate is signed by a public certificate authority (CA), such as Symantec or Comodo. Public CAs are trusted third-parties whose certificates can be verified through publicly accessible chains of trust. Using this type of certificate can simplify deployment because security infrastructure, such as root CAs, are already contained in the Java JDK and its default truststore. See <a href="#">Generate TLS Certificates</a> on page 197 for details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal CA-signed certificates</td>
<td>This type of certificate is signed by your organization's internal CA. Organizations using OpenSSL Certificate Authority, Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Service, or another internal CA system can use this type of certificate. See <a href="#">How to Configure TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager</a> for details about using internal CA-signed certificates for configuration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-signed certificates</td>
<td>Not recommended for production deployments. Self-signed certificates are acceptable for use in non-production deployments, such as for proof-of-concept setups. See <a href="#">Using Self-signed Certificates for TLS</a> for details.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the process of configuring TLS/SSL for the cluster, you typically obtain a certificate for each host in the cluster, and re-use the certificate obtained in a given format (JKS, PEM) as needed for the various services (daemon roles) supported by the host. For information about converting formats, see [How to Convert Certificate Encodings](#) (DER, JKS, PEM) for TLS/SSL. As an alternative to creating discrete certificates for each host in the cluster, as of Cloudera Manager/CDH 5.9, all Cloudera cluster components support wildcard domains and SubjectAlternateName certificates.

Wildcard Domain Certificates and SAN Certificates Support

Cloudera Manager and CDH (as of release 5.9) support use of wildcard domain certificates and SAN certificates.

A wildcard certificate—a certificate with the common name *, as in *.example.com, rather than a specific host name—can be used for any number of first level sub-domains within a single domain name. For example, a wildcard certificate can be used with host-1.example.com, host-2.example, host-3.example.com, and so on.

Certificates obtained from public CAs are not free, so using wildcard certificates can reduce costs. Using wildcard certificates also makes it easier to enable encryption for transient clusters and for clusters that need to expand and shrink, since the same certificate and keystore can be re-used.

**Important:** Be aware that using wildcard domain certificates has some security risks. Specifically, because all nodes use the same certificate, a breach of any one machine can result in a breach of all machines.

A SubjectAlternativeName or SAN certificate is a certificate that uses the SubjectAlternativeName extension to associate the resulting certificate with multiple specific host names. In the context of clusters, SAN certificates are used in
Wildcard certificates can be used by all hosts within a given domain. Using wildcard certificates for all hosts in the cluster can reduce costs but also exposes greater potential risk.

SubjectAlternativeName (SAN) certificates are bound to a set of specific DNS names. A single SAN certificate can be used for all hosts or a subset of the cluster. SAN certificates are used in Cloudera Manager high-availability (HA) configurations.

Renew Certificates Before Expiration Dates

The signed certificates you obtain from a public CA (or those you obtain from an internal CA) have an expiration date, such as that shown in this excerpt:

```
openssl x509 -in cacert.pem -text -noout
```

```
Certificate: 
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 1148583097083032316 (0x9f65de69ceef2f8c)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=US, ST=MD, L=Baltimore, CN=Test CA/emailAddress=test@example.com
Validity
Not Before: Jan 24 14:24:11 2017 GMT
Not After : Feb 23 14:24:11 2018 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=MD, L=Baltimore, CN=Test CA/emailAddress=test@example.com
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (4096 bit)
Modulus:
00:b1:7f:29:be:78:02:b8:56:54:2d:2c:cg:ff:6d:
... 
39:fe:9e:52:ff:be:9e:9f:99:20:9b:
59:85:9f:
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
```

Expired certificates cause most cluster operations to fail. Cloudera Manager Agent hosts, for example, will not be able to validate the Cloudera Manager Server host and will fail to launch the cluster nodes. Administrators should note expiration dates of all certificates when they deploy the certificates to the cluster nodes and set up reminders to allow enough time to renew.

Tip: Use OpenSSL to check the expiration dates for certificates already deployed:

```
openssl x509 -enddate -noout -in /opt/cloudera/security/pki/$(hostname -f)-server.cert.pem
```

Understanding Keystores and Truststores

Configuring Cloudera Manager Server and cluster components to use TLS/SSL requires obtaining keys, certificates, and related security artifacts. The following provides a brief overview.

Java Keystore and Truststore

All clients in a Cloudera Manager cluster configured for TLS/SSL need access to the truststore to validate certificates presented during TLS/SSL session negotiation. The certificates assure the client or server process that the issuing authority for the certificate is part of a legitimate chain of trust.

The standard Oracle Java JDK distribution includes a default truststore (cacerts) that contains root certificates for many well-known CAs, including Symantec. Rather than using the default truststore, Cloudera recommends using the alternative truststore, jssecacerts. The alternative truststore is created by copying cacerts to that filename (jssecacerts). Certificates can be added to this truststore when needed for additional roles or services. This alternative truststore is loaded by Hadoop daemons at startup.

The private keys are maintained in the keystore.
Note: For detailed information about the Java keystore and truststore, see Oracle documentation:

- **Keytool—Key and Certificate Management Tool**
- **JSSE Reference Guide for Java**

Although the keystore and truststore in some environments may comprise the same file, as configured for Cloudera Manager Server and CDH clusters, the keystore and truststore are distinct files. For Cloudera Manager Server clusters, each host should have its own keystore, while several hosts can share the same truststore. This table summarizes the general differences between keystore and the truststore in Cloudera Manager Server clusters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keystore</th>
<th>Truststore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Used by the server side of a TLS/SSL client-server connection.</td>
<td>Used by the client side of a TLS/SSL client-server connection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typically contains 1 private key for the host system.</td>
<td>Contains no keys of any kind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contains the certificate for the host's private key.</td>
<td>Contains root certificates for well-known public certificate authorities. May contain certificates for intermediary certificate authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Password protected. Use the same password for the key and its keystore.</td>
<td>Password-protection not needed. However, if password has been used for the truststore, never use the same password as used for a key and keystore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Password stored in a plaintext file read permissions granted to a specific group only (OS filesystem permissions set to 0440, hadoop:hadoop).</td>
<td>Password (if there is one for the truststore) stored in a plaintext file readable by all (OS filesystem permissions set to 0440).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No default. Provide a keystore name and password when you create the private key and CSR for any host system.</td>
<td>For Java JDK, cacerts is the default unless the alternative default jssecacerts is available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must be owned by hadoop user and group so that HDFS, MapReduce, YARN can access the private key.</td>
<td>HDFS, MapReduce, and YARN need client access to truststore.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The details in the table above are specific to the Java KeyStore (JKS) format, which is used by Java-based cluster services such as Cloudera Manager Server, Cloudera Management Service, and many (but not all) CDH components and services. See **Certificate Formats (JKS, PEM) and Cluster Components** on page 196 for information about certificate and key file type used various processes.

**CDH Services as TLS/SSL Servers and Clients**

Cluster services function as a TLS/SSL server, client, or both:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Client</th>
<th>Server</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HBase</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hive</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue (Hue is a TLS/SSL client of HDFS, MapReduce, YARN, HBase, and Oozie.)</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MapReduce</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oozie</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARN</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Daemons that function as TLS/SSL servers load the keystores when starting up. When a client connects to an TLS/SSL server daemon, the server transmits the certificate loaded at startup time to the client, and the client then uses its truststore to validate the certificate presented by the server.

Certificate Formats (JKS, PEM) and Cluster Components

Cloudera Manager Server, Cloudera Management Service, and many other CDH services use JKS formatted keystores and certificates. Cloudera Manager Agent, Hue, Key Trustee Server, Impala, and other Python or C++ based services require PEM formatted certificates and keystores rather than Java. Specifically, PEM certificates conform to PKCS #8, which requires individual Base64-encoded text files for certificate and password-protected private key file. The table summarizes certificate types required by several components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>JKS</th>
<th>PEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HBase</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDFS</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hive (Hive clients and HiveServer 2)</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MapReduce</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oozie</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solr</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARN</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>☒</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For more information, see:

- How to Convert Certificate Encodings (DER, JKS, PEM) for TLS/SSL
- OpenSSL Cryptography and TLS/SSL Toolkit

Recommended Keystore and Truststore Configuration

Cloudera recommends the following for keystores and truststores for Cloudera Manager clusters:

- Create a separate keystore for each host. Each keystore should have a name that helps identify it as to the type of host—server or agent, for example. The keystore contains the private key and should be password protected.
- Create a single truststore that can be used by the entire cluster. This truststore contains the root CA and intermediate CAs used to authenticate certificates presented during TLS/SSL handshake. The truststore does not need to be password protected. (See How To Add Root and Intermediary CAs to Truststore for more information about the truststore for TLS/SSL and Cloudera clusters.)

The steps included in Generate TLS Certificates on page 197 follow this approach.

Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager

When you configure authentication and authorization on a cluster, Cloudera Manager Server sends sensitive information over the network to cluster hosts, such as Kerberos keytabs and configuration files that contain passwords. To secure this transfer, you must configure TLS encryption between Cloudera Manager Server and all cluster hosts.

TLS encryption is also used to secure client connections to the Cloudera Manager Admin Interface, using HTTPS.

Cloudera Manager also supports TLS authentication. Without certificate authentication, a malicious user can add a host to Cloudera Manager by installing the Cloudera Manager Agent software and configuring it to communicate with Cloudera Manager Server. To prevent this, you must install certificates on each agent host and configure Cloudera Manager Server to trust those certificates.
This guide shows how to configure and enable TLS encryption and certificate authentication for Cloudera Manager. The provided examples use an internal certificate authority (CA) to sign all TLS certificates, so this guide also shows you how to establish trust with the CA. (For certificates signed by a trusted public CA, establishing trust is not necessary, because the Java Development Kit (JDK) already trusts them.)

Use this guide to enable TLS encryption and certificate authentication for Cloudera Manager:

**Generate TLS Certificates**

The following procedure assumes that an internal certificate authority (CA) is used, and shows how to establish trust for that internal CA. If you are using a trusted public CA (such as Symantec, GeoTrust, Comodo, and others), you do not need to explicitly establish trust for the issued certificates, unless you are using an older JDK and a newer public CA. Older JDKs might not trust newer public CAs by default.

**On Each Cluster Host:**

Complete the following procedure on each cluster host, including the Cloudera Manager Server host.

1. Configure your environment to set `JAVA_HOME` to the Oracle JDK. For example:

   ```
   export JAVA_HOME=/usr/java/jdk1.8.0_162
   ```

   If you log out of the host before completing this procedure, make sure to set `JAVA_HOME` again when you log in to complete the steps.

2. Create the `/opt/cloudera/security/pki` directory:

   ```
   sudo mkdir -p /opt/cloudera/security/pki
   ```

   If you choose to use a different directory, make sure you use the same directory on all cluster hosts to simplify management and maintenance.

3. Use the `keytool` utility to generate a Java keystore and certificate signing request (CSR). Replace the OU, O, L, ST, and C entries with the values for your environment. When prompted, use the same password for the keystore password and key password. Cloudera Manager does not support using different passwords for the key and keystore.

   ```
   ```

   ```
   ```

   **Note:** You must ensure that your Issuing Authority will issue the certificates with the extensions CDH requires.

4. Submit the CSR files (for example, `cm01.example.com.csr`) to your certificate authority to obtain a server certificate.

   For security purposes, many commercial CAs ignore requested extensions in a CSR. Make sure that you inform the CA that you require certificates with both server and client authentication options.

   If possible, obtain the certificate in PEM (Base64 ASCII) format. The certificate file is in PEM format if it looks similar to this (some lines omitted):

   ```
   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   MIIDAzCCAesCAQAwgY0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlh
   MRIwEAYDVQQHEwlQYWxvIEFsdG8xETAPBgNVBAoTCENsZb3VkJvHMRQxEgYDVQQL
   ```
If your issued certificate is in binary (DER) format, convert it to PEM format.

5. After you have received the signed certificate, copy the signed certificate to the following location:

```
/opt/cloudera/security/pki/$(hostname -f).pem
```

6. Inspect the signed certificate to verify that both server and client authentication options are present, as well as the subject alternative name:

```
openssl x509 -in /opt/cloudera/security/pki/$(hostname -f).pem -noout -text
```

Look for output similar to the following to verify the server and client authentication options:

```
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
    TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
```

Look for output similar to the following to validate the subject alternative name:

```
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
    DNS:hostname.example.com
```

**Important:**

If the certificate does not have the DNS field, re-submit the CSR to the CA, and request that they generate a certificate that keeps the Subject Alternative Name field intact.

If the certificate does not have both TLS Web Server Authentication and TLS Web Client Authentication listed in the X509v3 Extended Key Usage section, re-submit the CSR to the CA, and request that they generate a certificate that can be used for both server and client authentication.

7. Copy the root and intermediate CA certificates to `/opt/cloudera/security/pki/rootca.pem` and `/opt/cloudera/security/pki/intca.pem` on each host. If you have a concatenated file containing the root CA and an intermediate CA certificate, split the file along the `END CERTIFICATE-BEGIN CERTIFICATE` boundary into individual files. If there are multiple intermediate CA certificates, use unique file names such as `intca-1.pem`, `intca-2.pem`, and so on.

8. Copy the JDK `cacerts` file to `jssecacerts` as follows:

```
sudo cp $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts
```

**Note:** The default password for the `cacerts` file is `changeit`. The same applies to the `jssecacerts` file if you copied it from the `cacerts` before changing the password. Cloudera recommends changing these passwords by running the following commands:

```
$JAVA_HOME/bin/keytool -storepass -keystore
$JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts

$JAVA_HOME/bin/keytool -storepass -keystore
$JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts
```
The Oracle JDK uses the `jssecacerts` file for its default truststore if it exists. Otherwise, it uses the `cacerts` file. Creating the `jssecacerts` file allows you to trust an internal CA without modifying the `cacerts` file that is included with the JDK.

**Note:** If you upgrade your JDK, make sure to copy your existing `jssecacerts` file to the new JDK (under `$JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security`).

9. Import the root CA certificate into the JDK truststore.

```
sudo $JAVA_HOME/bin/keytool -importcert -alias rootca -keystore
$JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts -file /opt/cloudera/security/pki/rootca.pem
```

If you see a message like the following, enter `yes` to continue:

```
Trust this certificate? [no]: yes
```

You must see the following response verifying that the certificate has been properly imported:

```
Certificate was added to keystore
```

10. Append the intermediate CA certificate to the signed host certificate, and then import it into the keystore. Make sure that you use the append operator (`>>`) and not the overwrite operator (`>`):

```
sudo cat /opt/cloudera/security/pki/intca.pem >> /opt/cloudera/security/pki/$(hostname -f).pem
```

If you see a message like the following, enter `yes` to continue:

```
... is not trusted. Install reply anyway? [no]: yes
```

You must see the following response verifying that the certificate has been properly imported:

```
Certificate reply was installed in keystore
```

If you do not see this response, contact Cloudera Support.

11. Create symbolic links (symlink) for the certificate and keystore files:

```
sudo ln -s /opt/cloudera/security/pki/$(hostname -f).pem
/opt/cloudera/security/pki/agent.pem
```

This allows you to use the same `/etc/cloudera-scm-agent/config.ini` file on all agent hosts rather than maintaining a file for each agent.

On the Cloudera Manager Server Host

On the Cloudera Manager Server host, create an additional symlink for the keystore file:

```
sudo ln -s /opt/cloudera/security/pki/$(hostname -f).jks
/opt/cloudera/security/pki/server.jks
```

Configure TLS for the Cloudera Manager Admin Console

**Minimum Required Role:** Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)
Use the following procedure to enable TLS encryption for the Cloudera Manager Server admin interface. Make sure you have generated the host certificate as described in Generate TLS Certificates on page 197.

**Step 1: Enable HTTPS for the Cloudera Manager Admin Console**

1. Log in to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select Administration > Settings.
4. Configure the following TLS settings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager TLS/SSL Server JKS Keystore File Location</td>
<td>The complete path to the keystore file. For example: <code>/opt/cloudera/security/pki/server.jks</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager TLS/SSL Server JKS Keystore File Password</td>
<td>The password for the <code>/opt/cloudera/security/jks/server.jks</code> keystore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use TLS Encryption for Admin Console</td>
<td>Check this box to enable TLS encryption for Cloudera Manager.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Enter a Reason for Change, then click Save Changes to save the settings.

**Step 2: Specify SSL Truststore Properties for Cloudera Management Services**

When enabling TLS for the Cloudera Manager Server admin interface, you must set the Java truststore location and password in the Cloudera Management Services configuration. Otherwise, roles such as Host Monitor and Service Monitor cannot connect to Cloudera Manager Server and will not start.

Configure the path and password for the `JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts` truststore that you created earlier. Make sure that you have created this file on all hosts, including the Cloudera Management Service hosts, as instructed in Generate TLS Certificates on page 197.

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Administration Console and go to the Cloudera Management Service service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Cloudera Management Service (Service-Wide).
5. Edit the following TLS/SSL properties according to your cluster configuration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TLS/SSL Client Truststore File Location</td>
<td>The path to the client truststore file used in HTTPS communication. This truststore contains certificates of trusted servers, or of Certificate Authorities trusted to identify servers. For this example, set the value to: <code>&lt;JAVA_HOME&gt;/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager Server TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store Password</td>
<td>The password for the truststore file.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
Step 3: Restart Cloudera Manager and Services

You must restart both Cloudera Manager Server and the Cloudera Management Service for TLS encryption to work. Otherwise, the Cloudera Management Services (such as Host Monitor and Service Monitor) cannot communicate with Cloudera Manager Server.

1. Restart the Cloudera Manager Server by running the following command on the Cloudera Manager Server host:

   - RHEL 7 compatible:
     
     ```bash
     sudo systemctl restart cloudera-scm-server
     ```
   
   - RHEL 6 compatible, SLES, Ubuntu:
     
     ```bash
     sudo service cloudera-scm-server restart
     ```

2. After the restart completes, connect to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console using the HTTPS URL (for example: `https://cm01.example.com:7183`). If you used an internal CA-signed certificate, you must configure your browser to trust the certificate. Otherwise, you will see a warning in your browser any time you access the Cloudera Manager Administration Console. By default, certificates issued by public commercial CAs are trusted by most browsers, and no additional configuration is necessary if your certificate is signed by one of them.

3. Restart the Cloudera Management Service (`Cloudera Management Service > Actions > Restart`).

Configure TLS for Cloudera Manager Agents

Minimum Required Role: **Cluster Administrator** (also provided by **Full Administrator**)

Use the following procedure to encrypt the communication between Cloudera Manager Server and Cloudera Manager Agents:

**Step 1: Enable TLS Encryption for Agents in Cloudera Manager**

Configure the TLS properties for Cloudera Manager Agents.

1. Log in to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select **Administration > Settings**.
3. Select the **Security** category.
4. Select the **Use TLS Encryption for Agents** option.
5. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.

**Step 2: Enable TLS on Cloudera Manager Agent Hosts**

To enable TLS between the Cloudera Manager agents and Cloudera Manager, you must specify values for the TLS properties in the `/etc/cloudera-scm-agent/config.ini` configuration file on all agent hosts.

1. On each agent host (including the Cloudera Manager Server host, which also has an agent), open the `/etc/cloudera-scm-agent/config.ini` configuration file and set the `use_tls` parameter in the `[Security]` section as follows:

   ```ini
   use_tls=1
   ```

   Alternatively, you can edit the `config.ini` file on one host, and then copy it to the other hosts because this file by default does not contain host-specific information. If you have modified properties such as `listening_hostname` or `listening_ip address` in `config.ini`, you must edit the file individually on each host.

**Step 3: Restart Cloudera Manager Server and Agents**

1. Restart the Cloudera Manager Server by running the following command on the Cloudera Manager Server host:
Configuring Encryption

- RHEL 7 compatible:
  
  ```bash
  sudo systemctl restart cloudera-scm-server
  ```

- RHEL 6 compatible, SLES, Ubuntu:
  
  ```bash
  sudo service cloudera-scm-server restart
  ```

2. On each agent host (including the Cloudera Manager Server host), restart the Cloudera Manager agent service:

- RHEL 7 compatible:
  
  ```bash
  sudo systemctl restart cloudera-scm-agent
  ```

- RHEL 6 compatible, SLES, Ubuntu:
  
  ```bash
  sudo service cloudera-scm-agent restart
  ```

Step 4: Verify that the Cloudera Manager Server and Agents are Communicating

In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, go to **Hosts > All Hosts**. If you see successful heartbeats reported in the **Last Heartbeat** column after restarting the agents, TLS encryption is working properly.

Enable Server Certificate Verification on Cloudera Manager Agents

**Minimum Required Role:** **Cluster Administrator** (also provided by **Full Administrator**)

If you have completed the previous sections, communication between Cloudera Manager server and the agents is encrypted, but the certificate authenticity is not verified. For full security, you must configure the agents to verify the Cloudera Manager server certificate. If you are using a server certificate signed by an internal certificate authority (CA), you must configure the agents to trust that CA:

1. On each agent host (including the Cloudera Manager Server host), open the
   `/etc/cloudera-scm-agent/config.ini` configuration file, and then uncomment and set the following property:

   ```ini
   verify_cert_file=/opt/cloudera/security/pki/rootca.pem
   ```

   Alternatively, you can edit the `config.ini` file on one host, and then copy it to the other hosts because this file by default does not contain host-specific information. If you have modified properties such as `listening_hostname` or `listening_ip address` in `config.ini`, you must edit the file individually on each host.

2. Restart the Cloudera Manager agents. On each agent host (including the Cloudera Manager Server host), run the following command:

   ```bash
   sudo systemctl restart cloudera-scm-agent
   ```

3. Verify that the Cloudera Manager server and agents are communicating. In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, go to **Hosts > All Hosts**. If you see successful heartbeats reported in the **Last Heartbeat** column after restarting the agents and management service, TLS verification is working properly. If not, check the agent log `(/var/log/cloudera-scm-agent/cloudera-scm-agent.log)` for errors.
Configure Agent Certificate Authentication

**Important:** Perform this procedure on each agent host, including the Cloudera Manager Server host, which also has an agent.

Without certificate authentication, a malicious user can add a host to Cloudera Manager by installing the Cloudera Manager agent software and configuring it to communicate with Cloudera Manager Server. To prevent this, you must configure Cloudera Manager to trust the agent certificates.

**Step 1: Export the Private Key to a File**

On each Cloudera Manager Agent host, use the `keytool` utility to export the private key and certificate to a PKCS12 file, which can then be split up into individual key and certificate files using the `openssl` command:

1. Export the private key and certificate:

   ```
   ```

2. Use the `openssl` command to export the private key into its own file:

   ```
   ```

3. Create a symbolic link for the `.key` file:

   ```
sudo ln -s /opt/cloudera/security/pki/$(hostname -f).key /opt/cloudera/security/pki/agent.key
   ```

   This allows you to use the same `/etc/cloudera-scm-agent/config.ini` file on all agent hosts rather than maintaining a file for each agent.

**Step 2: Create a Password File**

The Cloudera Manager agent obtains the password from a text file, not from a command line parameter or environment variable. The password file allows you to use file permissions to protect the password. For example, run the following commands on each Cloudera Manager Agent host, or run them on one host and copy the file to the other hosts:

Create and secure the file containing the password used to protect the private key of the Agent:

1. Use a text editor to create a file called `/etc/cloudera-scm-agent/agentkey.pw` that contains the password.
2. Change ownership of the file to `root`:

   ```
sudo chown root:root /etc/cloudera-scm-agent/agentkey.pw
   ```

3. Change the permissions of the file:

   ```
sudo chmod 440 /etc/cloudera-scm-agent/agentkey.pw
   ```

**Step 3: Configure the Agent to Use Private Keys and Certificates**

On a Cloudera Manager Agent, open the `/etc/cloudera-scm-agent/config.ini` configuration file, uncomment and edit the following properties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Example Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>client_key_file</td>
<td><code>/opt/cloudera/security/pki/agent.key</code></td>
<td>Path to the private key file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client_keypw_file</td>
<td><code>/etc/cloudera-scm-agent/agentkey.pw</code></td>
<td>Path to the private key password file.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Step 4: Enable Agent Certificate Authentication

1. Log in to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select **Administration > Settings**.
3. Click the **Security** category.
4. Configure the following TLS settings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Setting</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use TLS Authentication of Agents to Server</td>
<td>Select this option to enable TLS authentication of agents to the server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File</td>
<td>Specify the full filesystem path to the <code>jssecacerts</code> file located on the Cloudera Manager Server host. For this example, set the value to: <code>&lt;JAVA_HOME&gt;/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts</code> Replace <code>&lt;JAVA_HOME&gt;</code> with the path to the Oracle JDK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store Password</td>
<td>Specify the password for the <code>jssecacerts</code> truststore.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.

### Step 5: Restart Cloudera Manager Server and Agents

1. On the Cloudera Manager server host, restart the Cloudera Manager server:
   - RHEL 7 compatible:
     ```
sudo systemctl restart cloudera-scm-server
     ```
   - RHEL 6 compatible, SLES, Ubuntu:
     ```
sudo service cloudera-scm-server restart
     ```
2. On every agent host, restart the Cloudera Manager agent:
   - RHEL 7 compatible:
     ```
sudo systemctl restart cloudera-scm-agent
     ```
   - RHEL 6 compatible, SLES, Ubuntu:
     ```
sudo service cloudera-scm-agent restart
     ```

### Step 6: Verify that Cloudera Manager Server and Agents are Communicating

In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, go to **Hosts > All Hosts**. If you see successful heartbeats reported in the **Last Heartbeat** column after restarting the agents and server, TLS certificate authentication is working properly. If not, check the agent log (`/var/log/cloudera-scm-agent/cloudera-scm-agent.log`) for errors.
For example, you might see the following error:

WrongHost: Peer certificate commonName does not match host, expected 192.0.2.155, got cdh-1.example.com
[02/May/2018 15:04:15 +0000] 4655 MainThread agent        ERROR    Heartbeating to 192.0.2.155:7182 failed

For this scenario, make sure that your DNS and /etc/hosts file are configured correctly, and that your server_host parameter in /etc/cloudera-scm-agent/config.ini uses the Cloudera Manager Server hostname, and not IP address.

Configuring TLS/SSL Encryption for CDH Services

In addition to configuring Cloudera Manager cluster to use TLS/SSL (as detailed in Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager on page 196), the various CDH services running on the cluster should also be configured to use TLS/SSL. The process of configuring TLS/SSL varies by component, so follow the steps below as needed for your system. Before trying to configure TLS/SSL, however, be sure your cluster meets prerequisites.

In general, all the roles on any given node in the cluster can use the same certificates, assuming the certificates are in the appropriate format (JKS, PEM) and that the configuration properly points to the location. If you follow the steps in How to Configure TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager to create your CSRs and use the symbolic link for the path to the certificates, you will be setting up the certificates in the cluster for optimal reuse.

Note: TLS/SSL for Hadoop core services—HDFS, MapReduce, and YARN—must be enabled as a group. TLS/SSL for other components such as HBase, Hue, and Oozie can be enabled independently.

Not all components support TLS/SSL, nor do all external engines support TLS/SSL. Unless explicitly listed in this guide, the component you want to configure may not currently support TLS/SSL. For example, Sqoop does not currently support TLS/SSL to Oracle, MySQL, or other databases.

Prerequisites

Cloudera recommends that the cluster and all services use Kerberos for authentication. If you enable TLS/SSL for a cluster that has not been configured to use Kerberos, a warning displays. You should integrate the cluster with your Kerberos deployment before proceeding.

The steps below require the cluster to have TLS enabled to ensure that Cloudera Manager Server certificate and Cloudera Manager Agent certificates are properly configured and already in place. In addition, you should have the certificates and keys needed by the specific CDH server ready.

If the cluster meets these requirements, you can configure the specific CDH service to use TLS/SSL, as detailed in this section.

Configuring TLS/SSL for HDFS, YARN and MapReduce

Required Role: Configurator, Cluster Administrator, or Full Administrator

TLS/SSL for the core Hadoop services—HDFS, MapReduce, and YARN—must be enabled as a group. Because most clusters run either MapReduce or YARN, not both, you will typically enable HDFS and YARN, or HDFS and MapReduce. Enabling TLS/SSL on HDFS is required before it can be enabled on either MapReduce or YARN.

Note: If you enable TLS/SSL for HDFS, you must also enable it for MapReduce or YARN.

The steps below include enabling Kerberos authentication for HTTP Web-Consoles. Enabling TLS/SSL for the core Hadoop services on a cluster without enabling authentication displays a warning.
Configuring Encryption

Before You Begin

- Before enabling TLS/SSL, keystores containing certificates bound to the appropriate domain names will need to be accessible on all hosts on which at least one HDFS, MapReduce, or YARN daemon role is running.
- Since HDFS, MapReduce, and YARN daemons act as TLS/SSL clients as well as TLS/SSL servers, they must have access to truststores. In many cases, the most practical approach is to deploy truststores to all hosts in the cluster, as it may not be desirable to determine in advance the set of hosts on which clients will run.
- Keystores for HDFS, MapReduce and YARN must be owned by the hadoop group, and have permissions 0440 (that is, readable by owner and group). Truststores must have permissions 0444 (that is, readable by all).
- Cloudera Manager supports TLS/SSL configuration for HDFS, MapReduce and YARN at the service level. For each of these services, you must specify absolute paths to the keystore and truststore files. These settings apply to all hosts on which daemon roles of the service in question run. Therefore, the paths you choose must be valid on all hosts.

An implication of this is that the keystore file names for a given service must be the same on all hosts. If, for example, you have obtained separate certificates for HDFS daemons on hosts node1.example.com and node2.example.com, you might have chosen to store these certificates in files called hdfs-node1.keystore and hdfs-node2.keystore (respectively). When deploying these keystores, you must give them both the same name on the target host — for example, hdfs.keystore.

- Multiple daemons running on a host can share a certificate. For example, in case there is a DataNode and an Oozie server running on the same host, they can use the same certificate.

Configuring TLS/SSL for HDFS

1. Go to the HDFS service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > HDFS (Service-Wide).
5. In the Search field, type TLS/SSL to show the TLS/SSL properties (found under the Service-Wide > Security category).
6. Edit the following properties according to your cluster configuration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hadoop TLS/SSL Server Keystore File Location</td>
<td>Path to the keystore file containing the server certificate and private key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadoop TLS/SSL Server Keystore File Password</td>
<td>Password for the server keystore file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadoop TLS/SSL Server Keystore Key Password</td>
<td>Password that protects the private key contained in the server keystore.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. If you are not using the default truststore, configure TLS/SSL client truststore properties:

   ! Important: The HDFS properties below define a cluster-wide default truststore that can be overridden by YARN and MapReduce (see the Configuring TLS/SSL for YARN and MapReduce section below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cluster-Wide Default TLS/SSL Client Truststore Location</td>
<td>Path to the client truststore file. This truststore contains certificates of trusted servers, or of Certificate Authorities trusted to identify servers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster-Wide Default TLS/SSL Client Truststore Password</td>
<td>Password for the client truststore file.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. *(Optional)* Cloudera recommends you enable web UI authentication for the HDFS service. Web UI authentication uses SPNEGO. After enabling this, you cannot access the Hadoop web consoles without a valid Kerberos ticket and proper client-side configuration. For more information, see How to Configure Browsers for Kerberos Authentication on page 448.

To enable web UI authentication, enter web consoles in the Search field to bring up the Enable Authentication for HTTP Web-Consoles property (found under the Service-Wide>Security category). Check the property to enable web UI authentication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enable Authentication for HTTP Web-Consoles</th>
<th>Enables authentication for Hadoop HTTP web-consoles for all roles of this service.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Note: This is effective only if security is enabled for the HDFS service." /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Click Save Changes.

10. Follow the procedure described in the following Configuring TLS/SSL for YARN and MapReduce section, at the end of which you will be instructed to restart all the affected services (HDFS, MapReduce and YARN).

### Configuring TLS/SSL for YARN or MapReduce

Perform the following steps to configure TLS/SSL for the YARN or MapReduce services:

1. Go to the YARN or MapReduce service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > service name (Service-Wide).
5. Locate the <property name> property or search for it by typing its name in the Search box.
6. In the Search field, type TLS/SSL to show the TLS/SSL properties (found under the Service-Wide > Security category).
7. Edit the following properties according to your cluster configuration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hadoop TLS/SSL Server Keystore File Location</td>
<td>Path to the keystore file containing the server certificate and private key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadoop TLS/SSL Server Keystore File Password</td>
<td>Password for the server keystore file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadoop TLS/SSL Server Keystore Key Password</td>
<td>Password that protects the private key contained in the server keystore.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Configure the following TLS/SSL client truststore properties for MRv1 or YARN only if you want to override the cluster-wide defaults set by the HDFS properties configured above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TLS/SSL Client Truststore File Location</td>
<td>Path to the client truststore file. This truststore contains certificates of trusted servers, or of Certificate Authorities trusted to identify servers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS/SSL Client Truststore File Password</td>
<td>Password for the client truststore file.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Cloudera recommends you enable Web UI authentication for the service in question.

Enter web consoles in the Search field to bring up the Enable Authentication for HTTP Web-Consoles property (found under the Service-Wide>Security category). Check the property to enable web UI authentication.
Enables authentication for Hadoop HTTP web-consoles for all roles of this service.

Note: This is effective only if security is enabled for the HDFS service.

10. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
11. Go to the HDFS service
12. Click the Configuration tab.
13. Type Hadoop SSL Enabled in the Search box.
14. Select the Hadoop SSL Enabled property to enable SSL communication for HDFS, MapReduce, and YARN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hadoop TLS/SSL Enabled</td>
<td>Enable TLS/SSL encryption for HDFS, MapReduce, and YARN web UIs, as well as encrypted shuffle for MapReduce and YARN.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
16. Restart all affected services (HDFS, MapReduce and YARN), as well as their dependent services.

Configuring TLS/SSL for HBase

Required Role: Configurator, Cluster Administrator, or Full Administrator

Before You Begin

- Before enabling TLS/SSL, ensure that keystores containing certificates bound to the appropriate domain names will need to be accessible on all hosts on which at least one HBase daemon role is running.
- Keystores for HBase must be owned by the hbase group, and have permissions 0440 (that is, readable by owner and group).
- You must specify absolute paths to the keystore and truststore files. These settings apply to all hosts on which daemon roles of the HBase service run. Therefore, the paths you choose must be valid on all hosts.
- Cloudera Manager supports the TLS/SSL configuration for HBase at the service level. Ensure you specify absolute paths to the keystore and truststore files. These settings apply to all hosts on which daemon roles of the service in question run. Therefore, the paths you choose must be valid on all hosts.

An implication of this is that the keystore file names for a given service must be the same on all hosts. If, for example, you have obtained separate certificates for HBase daemons on hosts node1.example.com and node2.example.com, you might have chosen to store these certificates in files called hbase-node1.keystore and hbase-node2.keystore (respectively). When deploying these keystores, you must give them both the same name on the target host — for example, hbase.keystore.

Configuring TLS/SSL for HBase Web UIs

The steps for configuring and enabling TLS/SSL for HBase are similar to those for HDFS, YARN and MapReduce:

1. Go to the HBase service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > HBASE (Service-Wide).
5. In the Search field, type TLS/SSL to show the HBase TLS/SSL properties.
6. Edit the following TLS/SSL properties according to your cluster configuration:
### Configuring Encryption

#### Configuring TLS/SSL for HBase REST Server

1. Go to the **HBase service**
2. Click the **Configuration** tab.
3. Select **Scope > HBase REST Server**.
4. Select **Category > Security**.
5. In the Search field, type **TLS/SSL REST** to show the HBase REST TLS/SSL properties.
6. Edit the following TLS/SSL properties according to your cluster configuration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable TLS/SSL for HBase REST Server</td>
<td>Encrypt communication between clients and HBase REST Server using Transport Layer Security (TLS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBase REST Server TLS/SSL Server JKS Keystore File Location</td>
<td>The path to the TLS/SSL keystore file containing the server certificate and private key used for TLS/SSL. Used when HBase REST Server is acting as a TLS/SSL server. The keystore must be in JKS format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBase REST Server TLS/SSL Server JKS Keystore File Password</td>
<td>The password for the HBase REST Server JKS keystore file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBase REST Server TLS/SSL Server JKS Keystore Key Password</td>
<td>The password that protects the private key contained in the JKS keystore used when HBase REST Server is acting as a TLS/SSL server.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Click **Save Changes**.
8. Restart the HBase service.

#### Configuring TLS/SSL for HBase Thrift Server

1. Go to the **HBase service**
2. Click the **Configuration** tab.
3. Select **Scope > HBase Thrift Server**.
4. Select **Category > Security**.
5. In the Search field, type **TLS/SSL Thrift** to show the HBase Thrift TLS/SSL properties.
6. Edit the following TLS/SSL properties according to your cluster configuration:
Configuring TLS/SSL for Flume Thrift Source and Sink

This topic describes how to enable TLS/SSL communication between Flume's Thrift source and sink.

The following tables list the properties that must be configured to enable TLS/SSL communication between Flume's Thrift source and sink instances.

Table 12: Thrift Source TLS/SSL Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ssl</td>
<td>Set to <code>true</code> to enable TLS/SSL encryption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keystore</td>
<td>Path to a Java keystore file. Required for TLS/SSL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keystore-password</td>
<td>Password for the Java keystore. Required for TLS/SSL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keystore-type</td>
<td>The type of the Java keystore. This can be JKS or PKCS12.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Thrift Sink TLS/SSL Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ssl</td>
<td>Set to <code>true</code> to enable TLS/SSL for this ThriftSink.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>truststore</td>
<td>(Optional) The path to a custom Java truststore file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>truststore-password</td>
<td>(Optional) The password for the specified truststore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>truststore-type</td>
<td>(Optional) The type of the Java truststore. This can be JKS or any other supported Java truststore type.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Make sure you are configuring TLS/SSL for each Thrift source and sink instance. For example, to the existing `flume.conf` file, for agent `a1`, source `r1`, and sink `k1`, you would add the following properties:

```conf
# TLS/SSL properties for Thrift source s1
a1.sources.r1.ssl=true
a1.sources.r1.keystore=<path/to/keystore>
```
Configure these sets of properties for more instances of the Thrift source and sink as required. You can use either Cloudera Manager or the command line to edit the flume.conf file.

**Using Cloudera Manager**

**Minimum Required Role:** Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the Flume service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Agent.
4. Select Category > Main.
5. Edit the Configuration File property and add the Thrift source and sink properties for each Thrift source and sink instance as described above to the configuration file.
6. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
7. Restart the Flume service.

**Using the Command Line**

Go to the /etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.conf file and add the Thrift source and sink properties for each Thrift source and sink instance as described above.

**Configuring Encrypted Communication Between HiveServer2 and Client Drivers**

Starting with CDH 5.5, encryption for HiveServer2 clients has been decoupled from the authentication mechanism. This means you can use either SASL QOP or TLS/SSL to encrypt traffic between HiveServer2 and its clients, irrespective of whether Kerberos is being used for authentication. Previously, the JDBC client drivers only supported SASL QOP encryption on Kerberos-authenticated connections.

SASL QOP encryption is better suited for encrypting RPC communication and may result in performance issues when dealing with large amounts of data. Move to using TLS/SSL encryption to avoid such issues.

This topic describes how to set up encrypted communication between HiveServer2 and its JDBC/ODBC client drivers.

**Configuring Encrypted Client/Server Communication Using TLS/SSL**

You can use either the Cloudera Manager or the command-line instructions described below to enable TLS/SSL encryption for JDBC/ODBC client connections to HiveServer2. For background information on setting up TLS/SSL truststores and keystores, see Encrypting Data in Transit on page 192.

**Note:** Cloudera Manager and CDH components support either TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, or TLS 1.2, but not SSL 3.0. References to SSL continue only because of its widespread use in technical jargon.

**Using Cloudera Manager**

The steps for configuring and enabling TLS/SSL for Hive are as follows:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the Hive service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Hive (Service-Wide).
5. In the Search field, type TLS/SSL to show the Hive properties.
6. Edit the following properties according to your cluster configuration.
### Table 14: Hive TLS/SSL Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable TLS/SSL for HiveServer2</td>
<td>Enable support for encrypted client-server communication using Transport Layer Security (TLS) for HiveServer2 connections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HiveServer2 TLS/SSL Server JKS Keystore File Location</td>
<td>Path to the TLS keystore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HiveServer2 TLS/SSL Server JKS Keystore File Password</td>
<td>Password for the TLS keystore.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.
8. Restart the Hive service.

**Using the Command Line**

- To enable TLS/SSL, add the following configuration parameters to `hive-site.xml`:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.use.SSL</name>
  <value>true</value>
  <description>enable/disable SSL</description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hive.server2.keystore.path</name>
  <value>keystore-file-path</value>
  <description>path to keystore file</description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hive.server2.keystore.password</name>
  <value>keystore-file-password</value>
  <description>keystore password</description>
</property>
```

- The **keystore** must contain the server’s certificate.
- The JDBC client must add the following properties in the connection URL when connecting to a HiveServer2 using TLS/SSL:

```text
;ssl=true[;sslTrustStore=<Trust-Store-Path>;trustStorePassword=<Trust-Store-password>]
```

- Make sure one of the following is true:
  - **Either**: `sslTrustStore` points to the truststore file containing the server’s certificate; for example:

```text
jdbc:hive2://localhost:10000/default;ssl=true;\nsslTrustStore=/home/usr1/ssl/trust_store.jks;trustStorePassword=xyz
```

  - **or**: the Trust Store arguments are set using the Java system properties `javax.net.ssl.trustStore` and `javax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword`; for example:

```text
java -Djavax.net.ssl.trustStore=/home/usr1/ssl/trust_store.jks -Djavax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword=xyz MyClass jdbc:hive2://localhost:10000/default;ssl=true
```

For more information on using self-signed certificates and the Trust Store, see the Oracle Java SE [keytool](https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/technotes/faq/security.html) page.
Configuring Encrypted Client/Server Communication Using SASL QOP

Traffic between the Hive JDBC or ODBC drivers and HiveServer2 can be encrypted using plain SASL QOP encryption which allows you to preserve data integrity (using checksums to validate message integrity) and confidentiality (by encrypting messages). This can be enabled by setting the `hive.server2.thrift.sasl.qop` property in `hive-site.xml`. For example,

```xml
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.thrift.sasl.qop</name>
  <value>auth-conf</value>
  <description>Sasl QOP value; one of 'auth', 'auth-int' and 'auth-conf'</description>
</property>
```

Valid settings for the `value` field are:

- **auth**: Authentication only (default)
- **auth-int**: Authentication with integrity protection
- **auth-conf**: Authentication with confidentiality protection

The parameter value that you specify above in the HiveServer2 configuration, should match that specified in the Beeline client connection JDBC URL. For example:

```sql
```

Configuring TLS/SSL for Hue

**Hue as a TLS/SSL Client**

**Minimum Required Role:** Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

Hue acts as a TLS/SSL client when communicating with other services such as core Hadoop, HBase, Oozie and Amazon S3. This means Hue must authenticate HDFS, MapReduce, YARN daemons, the HBase Thrift server, and so on. To do so, Hue needs the certificate chains of their hosts in its truststore.

The Hue truststore is a single PEM file that contains the CA root, and all intermediate certificates, to authenticate the certificate installed on each TLS/SSL-enabled server. These servers host the various services with which Hue communicates.

**Note:** A certificate is specific to a host. It is signed by a certificate authority (CA) and tells the requesting client (Hue) that "this host" is the same one as represented by the host public key. Hue uses chain of signing authorities in its truststore to validate the CA that signed the host certificate.

**Creating a Hue Truststore File in PEM Format**

Server certificates are stored in JKS format and must be converted to PEM. To create the Hue truststore, extract each certificate from its keystore with `keytool`, convert to PEM format with `openssl`, and add to the truststore.

1. Extract the certificate from the keystore of each TLS/SSL-enabled server with which Hue communicates.
   
   For example, `hadoop-server.keystore` contains server certificate, `foo-1.example.com`, and password, `example123`.
   
   ```bash
   keytool -exportcert -keystore hadoop-server.keystore -alias foo-1.example.com -storepass example123 -file foo-1.cert
   ```

2. Convert each certificate into a PEM file.
   
   ```bash
   openssl x509 -inform der -in foo-1.cert > foo-1.pem
   ```
3. Concatenate all the PEM certificates into one PEM file.

```bash
cat foo-1.pem foo-2.pem foo-n.pem ... > hue_trustore.pem
```

**Note:** Ensure the final PEM truststore is deployed in a location that is accessible by the Hue service.

Configuring Hue as a TLS/SSL Client with Cloudera Manager

1. Go to the Hue service and click the Configuration tab.
3. Find the property, Hue TLS/SSL Server CA Certificate (PEM Format), or ssl_cacerts.
4. Enter the path to `<hue_truststore>.pem` on the host running the Hue web server.
5. Click Save Changes.
6. Select Actions > Restart to restart the Hue service.

Configuring Hue as a TLS/SSL Client at the Command Line

For unmanaged deployments only, manually set `ssl_cacerts` in `hue.ini` to the path of the `<hue_truststore>.pem` file:

```ini
[desktop]
# Path to default Certificate Authority certificates.
ssl_cacerts=/etc/hue/<hue_truststore>.pem
```

**Hue as a TLS/SSL Server**

Hue and other Python-based services expect certificates and keys to be stored in PEM format. You can manage such services with the `openssl` tool. To configure Hue to use HTTPS, generate a private key and certificate as described in Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager on page 196 and reuse a host’s existing Java keystore by converting it to the PEM format. See Converting JKS Key and Certificate to PEM on page 453.

Enabling TLS/SSL for the Hue Server with Cloudera Manager

**Minimum Required Role:** Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

1. Go to the Hue service and click Configuration.
3. Edit the following TLS/SSL properties according to your cluster configuration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable TLS/SSL for Hue</td>
<td>Encrypt communication between clients and Hue with TLS/SSL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue TLS/SSL Server Certificate File (PEM Format)</td>
<td>Path to TLS/SSL certificate on host running Hue web server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ssl_certificate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue TLS/SSL Server Private Key File (PEM Format)</td>
<td>Path to TLS/SSL private key on host running Hue web server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ssl_private_key</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hue TLS/SSL Private Key Password</td>
<td>Password for private key in Hue TLS/SSL Server Certificate and Private Key file.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
You can also store `ssl_password` more securely in a script and set this parameter instead:

```
ssl_password_script=<your_hue_passwords_script.sh>
```

For more, see Storing Hue Passwords in a Script on page 216.

To apply this configuration property to other role groups as needed, edit the value for the appropriate role group. See Modifying Configuration Properties Using Cloudera Manager.

4. Click Save Changes.
5. Select Actions > Restart to restart the Hue service.

For more details on configuring Hue with TLS/SSL, see this blog post.

Enabling TLS/SSL for the Hue Server at the Command Line

1. Enable secure session cookies in `hue.ini` under `[desktop]>[session]`.

```
[desktop]
    [[session]]
    secure=true
```

2. Edit the following properties in `hue.ini` under `[desktop]`.

```
[desktop]
    ssl_certificate=/path/to/server.cert
    ssl_private_key=/path/to/server.key
    ssl_password=<private_key_password>
```

You can store `ssl_password` more securely in a script and set this parameter instead:

```
ssl_password_script=<your_hue_passwords_script.sh>
```

For more, see Storing Hue Passwords in a Script on page 216.

Enabling Hue TLS/SSL Communication with HiveServer2

In CDH 5.5.x and higher, HiveServer2 is enabled for TLS/SSL communication by default.

By providing a CA certificate, private key, and public certificate, Hue can communicate with HiveServer2 over TLS/SSL. You can now configure the following properties in the `[beeswax]` section under `[[ssl]]` in the Hue configuration file, `hue.ini`.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>enabled</td>
<td>Choose to enable/disable TLS/SSL communication for this server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Default: false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cacerts</td>
<td>Path to Certificate Authority certificates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Default: /etc/hue/cacerts.pem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>validate</td>
<td>Choose whether Hue should validate certificates received from the server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Default: true</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Related Information

- Configuring Encrypted Communication Between HiveServer2 and Client Drivers on page 211

Enabling Hue TLS/SSL Communication with Impala

In CDH 5.5.x and higher, Impala is enabled for TLS/SSL communication by default.
By providing a CA certificate, private key, and public certificate, Hue can communicate with Impala over TLS/SSL. You can configure the following properties in the `impala` section under `[[ssl]]` in the Hue configuration file, `hue.ini`.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>enabled</td>
<td>Choose to enable/disable TLS/SSL communication for this server. Default: false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cacerts</td>
<td>Path to Certificate Authority certificates. Default: <code>/etc/hue/cacerts.pem</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>validate</td>
<td>Choose whether Hue should validate certificates received from the server. Default: true</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Securing Database Connections using TLS/SSL**

Connections vary depending on the database. Hue uses different clients to communicate with each database internally. Client specific options, such as secure connectivity, can be passed through the interface.

For example, for MySQL you can enable TLS/SSL communication by specifying the `options` configuration property under the `desktop` section in `hue.ini`. Here we identify the Certificate Authority (CA) certificate:

```ini
[desktop]
[[databases]]
  ...options={"ssl":{"ca":"/tmp/ca-cert.pem"}}
```

You can also identify public and private keys, for example:

```ini
options={"ssl": {"ca": "/tmp/newcerts2/ca.pem", "key": "/tmp/newcerts2/client-key.pem", 
"cert": "/tmp/newcerts2/client-cert.pem"} }
```

**Storing Hue Passwords in a Script**

In CDH 5.4, Hue added the ability to store passwords in a secure script and pull passwords from `stdout`. On startup, Hue runs one or more passwords scripts and grabs each password from `stdout`.

In `hue_ini`, add the suffix `_script`, to any password property and set it equal to the script name. In Cloudera Manager, set these properties in the configuration field, *Hue Service Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve)* for `hue_safety_valve.ini`. For example:

```ini
[desktop]
ldap_username=hueservice
ldap_password_script="/var/lib/hue/<your_hue_passwords_script.sh> ldap_password"
ssl_password_script="/var/lib/hue/<your_hue_passwords_script.sh> ssl_password"

[[ldap]]
bind_password_script="/var/lib/hue/<your_hue_passwords_script.sh> bind_password"

[[database]]
password_script="/var/lib/hue/<your_hue_passwords_script.sh> database"
```

Store the script in a directory that only the hue user can read, write, and execute. You can have one script per password or one script with parameters for all passwords. Here is an example of a script with parameters for multiple passwords:

```bash
#!/bin/bash
SERVICE=$1
if [[ $SERVICE == "ldap_password" ]]
  then
    echo "password"
fi
if [[ $SERVICE == "ssl_password" ]]
```
then
echo "password"
fi

if [[ ${SERVICE} == "bind_password" ]]
then
echo "Password1"
fi

if [[ ${SERVICE} == "database_password" ]]
then
echo "password"
fi

Note: The bind password parameter was added in CDH 5.4.6.

Configuring TLS/SSL for Impala

Impala supports TLS/SSL network encryption, between Impala and client programs, and between the Impala-related daemons running on different nodes in the cluster. This feature is important when you also use other features such as Kerberos authentication or Sentry authorization, where credentials are being transmitted back and forth.

Important:
- You can use either Cloudera Manager or the following command-line instructions to complete this configuration.
- This information applies specifically to the version of Impala shown in the HTML page header or on the PDF title page. If you use an earlier version of CDH, see the documentation for that version located at Cloudera Documentation.

Using Cloudera Manager

To configure Impala to listen for Beeswax and HiveServer2 requests on TLS/SSL-secured ports:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the Impala service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Impala (Service-Wide).
5. Edit the following properties:

Table 15: Impala SSL Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable TLS/SSL for Impala</td>
<td>Encrypt communication between clients (like ODBC, JDBC, and the Impala shell) and the Impala daemon using Transport Layer Security (TLS) (formerly known as Secure Socket Layer (SSL)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala TLS/SSL Server Certificate File (PEM Format)</td>
<td>Local path to the X509 certificate that identifies the Impala daemon to clients during TLS/SSL connections. This file must be in PEM format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala TLS/SSL Server Private Key File (PEM Format)</td>
<td>Local path to the private key that matches the certificate specified in the Certificate for Clients. This file must be in PEM format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala TLS/SSL Private Key Password</td>
<td>The password for the private key in the Impala TLS/SSL Server Certificate and Private Key file. If left blank, the private key is not protected by a password.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala TLS/SSL CA Certificate</td>
<td>The location on disk of the certificate, in PEM format, used to confirm the authenticity of SSL/TLS servers that the Impala daemons might connect to.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Configuring Encryption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because the Impala daemons connect to each other, this should also include the CA certificate used to sign all the SSL/TLS Certificates. Without this parameter, SSL/TLS between Impala daemons will not be enabled.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSL/TLS Certificate for Impala component Webserver</td>
<td>There are three of these configuration settings, one each for “Impala Daemon”, “Catalog Server”, and “Statestore”. Each of these Impala components has its own internal web server that powers the associated web UI with diagnostic information. The configuration setting represents the local path to the X509 certificate that identifies the web server to clients during TLS/SSL connections. This file must be in PEM format.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.

7. Select each scope, one each for “Impala Daemon”, “Catalog Server”, and “Statestore”, and repeat the above steps.

8. Restart the Impala service.

For information on configuring TLS/SSL communication with the `impala-shell` interpreter, see Configuring TLS/SSL Communication for the Impala Shell on page 218.

### Using the Command Line

To enable SSL for when client applications connect to Impala, add both of the following flags to the `impalad` startup options:

- `--ssl_server_certificate`: the full path to the server certificate, on the local filesystem.
- `--ssl_private_key`: the full path to the server private key, on the local filesystem.

In CDH 5.5.2 and higher, Impala can also use SSL for its own internal communication between the `impalad`, `statestored`, and `catalogd` daemons. To enable this additional SSL encryption, set the `--ssl_server_certificate` and `--ssl_private_key` flags in the startup options for `impalad`, `catalogd`, and `statestored`, and also add the `--ssl_client_ca_certificate` flag for all three of those daemons.

**Warning:** Prior to CDH 5.5.2 / Impala 2.3.2, you could enable Kerberos authentication between Impala internal components, or SSL encryption between Impala internal components, but not both at the same time. This restriction has now been lifted. See IMPALA-2598 to see the maintenance releases for different levels of CDH where the fix has been published.

If either of these flags are set, both must be set. In that case, Impala starts listening for Beeswax and HiveServer2 requests on SSL-secured ports only. (The port numbers stay the same; see Ports Used by Impala for details.)

Since Impala uses passphrase-less certificates in PEM format, you can reuse a host’s existing Java keystore by converting it to the PEM format. For instructions, see Converting JKS Key and Certificate to PEM on page 453.

### Configuring TLS/SSL Communication for the Impala Shell

Typically, a client program has corresponding configuration properties in Cloudera Manager to verify that it is connecting to the right server. For example, with SSL enabled for Impala, you use the following options when starting the `impala-shell` interpreter:

- `--ssl`: enables TLS/SSL for `impala-shell`.
- `--ca_cert`: the local pathname pointing to the third-party CA certificate, or to a copy of the server certificate for self-signed server certificates.

If `--ca_cert` is not set, `impala-shell` enables TLS/SSL, but does not validate the server certificate. This is useful for connecting to a known-good Impala that is only running over TLS/SSL, when a copy of the certificate is not available (such as when debugging customer installations).
Using TLS/SSL with Business Intelligence Tools

You can use Kerberos authentication, TLS/SSL encryption, or both to secure connections from JDBC and ODBC applications to Impala. See Configuring Impala to Work with JDBC and Configuring Impala to Work with ODBC for details.

Prior to CDH 5.7 / Impala 2.5, the Hive JDBC driver did not support connections that use both Kerberos authentication and SSL encryption. If your cluster is running an older release that has this restriction, to use both of these security features with Impala through a JDBC application, use the Cloudera JDBC Connector as the JDBC driver.

Specifying TLS/SSL Minimum Allowed Version and Ciphers

Depending on your cluster configuration and the security practices in your organization, you might need to restrict the allowed versions of TLS/SSL used by Impala. Older TLS/SSL versions might have vulnerabilities or lack certain features. In , you can use startup options for the impalad, catalogd, and statestored daemons to specify a minimum allowed version of TLS/SSL.

Specify one of the following values for the --ssl_minimum_version configuration setting:

- tlsv1: Allow any TLS version of 1.0 or higher. This setting is the default when TLS/SSL is enabled.
- tlsv1.1: Allow any TLS version of 1.1 or higher.
- tlsv1.2: Allow any TLS version of 1.2 or higher.

**Note:**
As of , TLSv1.2 may not work for Impala on RHEL 6 or CentOS 6, even if OpenSSL 1.0.1 is available. The daemons fail to start, with a socket error stating the TLS version is not supported. The underlying cause is related to Red Hat issue 1497859. The issue applies if you build on a RHEL 6 or CentOS 6 system with OpenSSL 1.0.0, and run on a RHEL 6 or CentOS 6 system with OpenSSL 1.0.1.

Along with specifying the version, you can also specify the allowed set of TLS ciphers by using the --ssl_cipher_list configuration setting. The argument to this option is a list of keywords, separated by colons, commas, or spaces, and optionally including other notation. For example:

```
--ssl_cipher_list="RC4-SHA,RC4-MD5"
```

By default, the cipher list is empty, and Impala uses the default cipher list for the underlying platform. See the output of man ciphers for the full set of keywords and notation allowed in the argument string.

Configuring TLS/SSL for Oozie

**Minimum Required Role:** Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

**Before You Begin**

- Keystores for Oozie must be readable by the oozie user. This could be a copy of the Hadoop services' keystore with permissions 0440 and owned by the oozie group.
- Truststores must have permissions 0444 (that is, readable by all).
- Specify absolute paths to the keystore and truststore files. These settings apply to all hosts on which daemon roles of the Oozie service run. Therefore, the paths you choose must be valid on all hosts.
- In case there is a DataNode and an Oozie server running on the same host, they can use the same certificate.

For more information on obtaining signed certificates and creating keystores, see Encrypting Data in Transit on page 192. You can also view the upstream documentation located here.
Important:

- This configuration process can be completed using either Cloudera Manager or the command-line instructions.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. If you use an earlier version of CDH, see the documentation for that version located at Cloudera Documentation.

Using Cloudera Manager

The steps for configuring and enabling Hadoop TLS/SSL for Oozie are as follows:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the Oozie service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > All.
4. Select Category > All.
5. In the Search field, type TLS/SSL to show the Oozie TLS/SSL properties.
6. Edit the following TLS/SSL properties according to your cluster configuration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable TLS/SSL for Oozie</td>
<td>Check this field to enable TLS/SSL for Oozie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oozie TLS/SSL Server Keystore</td>
<td>Location of the keystore file on the local file system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oozie TLS/SSL Server JKS Keystore</td>
<td>Password for the keystore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File Password</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Click Save Changes.
8. Restart the Oozie service.

Using the Command Line

To configure the Oozie server to use TLS/SSL:

1. Stop Oozie by running

```
sudo /sbin/service oozie stop
```

2. To enable TLS/SSL, set the MapReduce version that the Oozie server should work with using the alternatives command.

   ```
   alternatives --set oozie-tomcat-conf /etc/oozie/tomcat-conf.https
   ```

   For RHEL systems, to use YARN with TLS/SSL:

   ```
   alternatives --set oozie-tomcat-conf /etc/oozie/tomcat-conf.https
   ```

   For RHEL systems, to use MapReduce (MRv1) with TLS/SSL:

   ```
   alternatives --set oozie-tomcat-conf /etc/oozie/tomcat-conf.https.mr1
   ```

   Note: The alternatives command is only available on RHEL systems. For SLES, Ubuntu and Debian systems, the command is update-alternatives.
3. Start Oozie by running

```
sudo /sbin/service oozie start
```

Connect to the Oozie Web UI using TLS/SSL (HTTPS)


Additional Considerations when Configuring TLS/SSL for Oozie HA

To allow clients to talk to Oozie servers (the target servers) through the load balancer using TLS/SSL, Configure the load balancer for TLS/SSL pass-through, which means the load balancer does not perform encryption/decryption but simply passes traffic from clients and servers to the appropriate target host. See documentation for your load balancer for details.

Configuring TLS/SSL for Solr

**Minimum Required Role:** Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

Before You Begin

- The Solr service must be running.
- Keystores for Solr must be readable by the solr user. This could be a copy of the Hadoop services' keystore with permissions 0440 and owned by the solr group.
- Truststores must have permissions 0444 (that is, readable by all).
- Specify absolute paths to the keystore and truststore files. These settings apply to all hosts on which daemon roles of the Solr service run. Therefore, the paths you choose must be valid on all hosts.
- In case there is a DataNode and a Solr server running on the same host, they can use the same certificate.

For more information on obtaining signed certificates and creating keystores, see Encrypting Data in Transit on page 192. You can also see the Enabling SSL section in the Apache Solr 4.10 Reference Guide (PDF).

Additional Considerations when Configuring TLS/SSL for Solr HA

To allow clients to talk to Solr servers (the target servers) through the load balancer using TLS/SSL, Configure the load balancer for TLS/SSL pass-through, which means the load balancer does not perform encryption/decryption but simply passes traffic from clients and servers to the appropriate target host. See documentation for your load balancer for details.

Configuring TLS/SSL for Solr Using Cloudera Manager

The steps for configuring and enabling Hadoop TLS/SSL for Search are as follows:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the Solr service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > All.
4. Select Category > All.
5. In the Search field, type TLS/SSL to show the Solr TLS/SSL properties.
6. Edit the following properties according to your cluster configuration.

   Note: These values must be the same for all hosts running the Solr role.

### Table 17: Solr TLS/SSL Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable TLS/SSL for Solr</td>
<td>Check this field to enable SSL for Solr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solr TLS/SSL Server Keystore File Location</td>
<td>The path to the TLS/SSL keystore file containing the server certificate and private key used for TLS/SSL. Used when Solr is acting as a TLS/SSL server. The keystore must be in JKS format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solr TLS/SSL Server JKS Keystore File Password</td>
<td>Password for the Solr JKS keystore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solr TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File</td>
<td>Required in case of self-signed or internal CA signed certificates. The location on disk of the truststore, in JKS format, used to confirm the authenticity of TLS/SSL servers that Solr might connect to. This is used when Solr is the client in a TLS/SSL connection. This truststore must contain the certificate(s) used to sign the service(s) being connected to. If this parameter is not provided, the default list of well-known certificate authorities is used instead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solr TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store Password</td>
<td>The password for the Solr TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File. This password is not required to access the truststore: this field can be left blank. This password provides optional integrity checking of the file. The contents of truststores are certificates, and certificates are public information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
8. Restart the service.

### Additional Considerations When Using a Load Balancer TLS/SSL for Solr HA

To configure a load balancer:

1. Go to the Solr service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Solr.
4. Enter the hostname and port number of the load balancer in the Solr Load Balancer property in the format hostname:port number.

   Note:
   When you set this property, Cloudera Manager regenerates the keytabs for Solr roles. The principal in these keytabs contains the load balancer hostname.

   If there are services that depends on this Solr service, such as Hue, those services use the load balancer to communicate with Solr.

5. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
6. Restart Solr and any dependent services or restart the entire cluster for this configuration to take effect.
Configuring TLS/SSL for Solr Using the Command Line

To configure the Search to use TLS/SSL:

1. Use `solrctl` to modify the `urlScheme` setting to specify https. For example:

   ```bash
   solrctl --zk myZKEnsemble:2181/solr cluster --set-property urlScheme https
   ```

2. Stop Solr by running

   ```bash
   sudo service solr-server stop
   ```

3. Edit `/etc/default/solr` to include the following environment variable settings:

   ```bash
   SOLR_SSL_ENABLED=true
   SOLR_KEYSTORE_PATH=<absolute_path_to_keystore_file>
   SOLR_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD=<keystore_password>
   #Following required only in case of self-signed or internal CA signed certificates
   SOLR_TRUSTSTORE_PATH=<absolute_path_to_truststore_file>
   SOLR_TRUSTSTORE_PASSWORD=<truststore_password>
   ```

4. Start Solr by running

   ```bash
   sudo service solr-server start
   ```

Configuring TLS/SSL for the Key-Value Store Indexer Using Cloudera Manager

The steps for configuring and enabling Hadoop TLS/SSL for the Keystore Indexer are as follows:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the **Key-Value Store Indexer**.
2. Click the **Configuration** tab.
3. Select Scope > All.
4. Select Category > All.
5. In the Search field, type **TLS/SSL** to show the Solr TLS/SSL properties.
6. Edit the following TLS/SSL properties according to your cluster configuration.

   **Note:** These values must be the same for all hosts running the Key-Value Store Indexer role.

### Table 18: Key-Value Store TLS/SSL Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HBase Indexer TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File</td>
<td>The location on disk of the truststore, in .jks format, used to confirm the authenticity of TLS/SSL servers that HBase Indexer might connect to. This is used when HBase Indexer is the client in a TLS/SSL connection. This truststore must contain the certificate(s) used to sign the service(s) being connected to. If this parameter is not provided, the default list of well-known certificate authorities is used instead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBase Indexer TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store Password (Optional)</td>
<td>The password for the HBase Indexer TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File. This password is not required to access the truststore: this field can be left blank. This password provides optional integrity checking of the file. The contents of truststores are certificates, and certificates are public information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Restart the service.
Configuring TLS/SSL for the Key-Value Store Indexer Using the Command Line

For every host running Key-Value Store Indexer server, specify Solr Trust Store details using the **HBASE_INDEXER_OPTS** environmental variable using following Java system properties:

- `-Djavax.net.ssl.trustStore=<absolute_path_to_truststore_file>`
- `-Djavax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword=<truststore_password>` *(Optional)*

Restart the Key-Value Store Indexer servers to apply these changes.

Configuring TLS/SSL for Flume Using Cloudera Manager

The steps for configuring and enabling Hadoop TLS/SSL for Flume are as follows:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to Flume.
2. Click the **Configuration** tab.
3. Select **Scope > All**.
4. Select **Category > All**.
5. In the Search field, type **TLS/SSL** to show the properties.
6. Edit the following SSL properties according to your cluster configuration.

   **Note:** These values must be the same for all hosts running the Flume role.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flume TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File</strong></td>
<td>The location on disk of the truststore, in .jks format, used to confirm the authenticity of TLS/SSL servers that Flume might connect to. This is used when Flume is the client in a TLS/SSL connection. This truststore must contain the certificate(s) used to sign the service(s) being connected to. If this parameter is not provided, the default list of well-known certificate authorities is used instead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flume TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store Password (Optional)</strong></td>
<td>The password for the Flume TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File. This password is not required to access the truststore: this field can be left blank. This password provides optional integrity checking of the file. The contents of truststores are certificates, and certificates are public information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.
8. Restart the service.

Configuring TLS/SSL for Flume Using the Command Line

For every host running Flume agent, specify Solr Trust Store details using the **FLUME_AGENT_JAVA_OPTS** environmental variable using following Java system properties:

- `-Djavax.net.ssl.trustStore=<absolute_path_to_truststore_file>`
- `-Djavax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword=<truststore_password>` *(Optional)*

Restart the Flume agents to apply these changes.

Spark Encryption

Spark supports the following means of encrypting Spark data at rest, and data in transit.

Enabling Spark Encryption Using Cloudera Manager

**Minimum Required Role:** **Configurator** *(also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)*

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the **Spark** service.
2. Click the **Configuration** tab.
3. **(Prerequisite)** Search for the **Spark Authentication** property and make sure it has been enabled. If this property is not set, the following settings to enable encryption will not work.

4. Search for the **Enable Network Encryption** property. Use the checkbox to enable encrypted communication between Spark processes belonging to the same application.

5. Search for the **Enable I/O Encryption** property. Use the checkbox to enable encryption for temporary shuffle and cache files stored by Spark on local disks.

6. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.

7. **Redeploy client configuration.**

8. **Restart stale services** (if indicated by Cloudera Manager).

### Enabling Spark Encryption on an Unmanaged Cluster

**Prerequisite** - Before enabling encryption, make sure `spark.authenticate` is set to `true`. Without authentication enabled, the following settings to enable encryption will not work.

### Enabling Encryption for Shuffle and Cache Files

Configure the following properties to enable encrypted shuffle for Spark on YARN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>spark.shuffle.encryption.enabled</code></td>
<td>Enable encryption of temporary shuffle and cache files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>spark.shuffle.encryption.keySizeBits</code></td>
<td>Shuffle file encryption key size in bits. The valid numbers include 128, 192, and 256.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Enabling Encryption for Spark RPCs

Configure the following property to enable encryption for Spark RPCs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Default Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>spark.authenticate.enableSaslEncryption</code></td>
<td><code>false</code></td>
<td>Enable encryption for Spark RPCs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you are using an external shuffle service, configure the following property in the shuffle service configuration to disable unencrypted connections. Note that the external shuffle service is enabled by default in CDH 5.5 and higher.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Default Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>spark.network.sasl.serverAlwaysEncrypt</code></td>
<td><code>false</code></td>
<td>Disable unencrypted connections for the external shuffle service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Configuring TLS/SSL for HttpFS

**Important:**
- This configuration process can be completed using either Cloudera Manager or the command-line instructions.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. If you use an earlier version of CDH, see the documentation for that version located at Cloudera Documentation.

### Using Cloudera Manager

**Minimum Required Role:** **Configurator** (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)
The steps for configuring and enabling TLS/SSL for HttpFS using Cloudera Manager are as follows:

1. Go to the HDFS service
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > HttpFS.
5. Edit the following TLS/SSL properties according to your cluster configuration:

Table 20: HttpFS TLS/SSL Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use TLS/SSL</td>
<td>Use TLS/SSL for HttpFS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HttpFS Keystore File</td>
<td>Location of the keystore file used by the HttpFS role for TLS/SSL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Default: /var/run/hadoop-httpfs/.keystore. Note that the default location for the keystore file is on non-persistent disk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HttpFS Keystore Password</td>
<td>Password of the keystore used by the HttpFS role for TLS/SSL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If the keystore password has a percent sign, it must be escaped. For example, for a password that is <code>pass%word</code>, use <code>pass%%word</code>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HttpFS TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File</td>
<td>The location on disk of the truststore, in .jks format, used to confirm the authenticity of TLS/SSL servers that HttpFS might connect to. This is used when HttpFS is the client in a TLS/SSL connection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HttpFS TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store Password</td>
<td>The password for the HttpFS TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File. This password is not required to access the truststore; this field can be left blank. If the truststore password has a percent sign, it must be escaped. For example, for a password that is <code>pass%word</code>, use <code>pass%%word</code>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Click Save Changes.
7. Restart the HDFS service.

Connect to the HttpFS Web UI using TLS/SSL (HTTPS)

Use `https://<httpfs_server_hostname>:14000/webhdfs/v1/`, though most browsers should automatically redirect you if you use `http://<httpfs_server_hostname>:14000/webhdfs/v1/`

Using the Command Line

Configure the HttpFS Server to use TLS/SSL (HTTPS)

1. Stop HttpFS by running

   ```sh
   sudo /sbin/service hadoop-httpfs stop
   ```

2. To enable TLS/SSL, change which configuration the HttpFS server should work with using the alternatives command.

   ```sh
   alternatives --set hadoop-httpfs-tomcat-conf /etc/hadoop-httpfs/tomcat-conf.https
   ```

   **Note:** The alternatives command is only available on RHEL systems. For SLES, Ubuntu and Debian systems, the command is `update-alternatives`.

For RHEL systems, to use TLS/SSL:
Important:
The `HTTPFS_TLS/SSL_KEYSTORE_PASS` variable must be the same as the password used when creating the keystore file. If you used a password other than `password`, you'll have to change the value of the `HTTPFS_TLS/SSL_KEYSTORE_PASS` variable in `/etc/hadoop-httpfs/conf/httpfs-env.sh`.

3. Start HttpFS by running

```
sudo /sbin/service hadoop-httpfs start
```

Connect to the HttpFS Web UI using TLS/SSL (HTTPS)

Use `https://<httpfs_server_hostname>:14000/webhdfs/v1/`, though most browsers should automatically redirect you if you use `http://<httpfs_server_hostname>:14000/webhdfs/v1/`

Important:
If using a Self-Signed Certificate, your browser will warn you that it cannot verify the certificate or something similar. You will probably have to add your certificate as an exception.

Encrypted Shuffle and Encrypted Web UIs

Important:
- If you use Cloudera Manager, do not use these command-line instructions. For the Cloudera Manager instructions, see Configuring TLS/SSL for HDFS, YARN and MapReduce on page 205.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.0. If you use a lower version of CDH, see the documentation for that version located at Cloudera Documentation.

CDH 5 supports encryption of the MapReduce shuffle phase for both MapReduce v1 (MRv1) and MapReduce v2 (MRv2), also known as YARN. CDH also supports enabling TLS/SSL for the MRv1 and YARN web UIs, with optional client authentication (also known as bi-directional HTTPS, or HTTPS with client certificates). The configuration properties required to enable these features have been combined. In most cases, these properties are common to both MRv1 and YARN. They include:

- `hadoop.ssl.enabled`:
  - Toggles the shuffle for MRv1 between HTTP and HTTPS.
  - Toggles the MRv1 and YARN web UIs between HTTP and HTTPS.
- `mapreduce.shuffle.ssl.enabled`: Toggles the shuffle for YARN between HTTP and HTTPS.
  
  By default, this property is not specified in `mapred-site.xml`, and YARN encrypted shuffle is controlled by the value of `hadoop.ssl.enabled`. If this property is set to `true`, encrypted shuffle is enabled for YARN. Note that you cannot successfully enable encrypted shuffle for YARN by only setting this property to `true`, if `hadoop.ssl.enabled` is still set to `false`.

- Configuration settings for specifying keystore and truststore properties that are used by the MapReduce shuffle service, the Reducer tasks that fetch shuffle data, and the web UIs.
- `ssl.server.truststore.reload.interval`: A configuration property to reload truststores across the cluster when a node is added or removed.
Important:
When the web UIs are served over HTTPS, you must specify https:// as the protocol. There is no redirection from http://. If you attempt to access an HTTPS resource over HTTP, your browser will show an empty screen with no warning.

Configuring Encrypted Shuffle and Encrypted Web UIs

Configure encryption for the MapReduce shuffle, and the MRv1 and YARN web UIs, as follows:

Enable encrypted shuffle for MRv1, and encryption for the MRv1 and YARN web UIs (core-site.xml)

Set the following properties in the core-site.xml files of all nodes in the cluster.

hadoop.ssl.enabled

Default value: false

For MRv1, set this value to true to enable encryption for both the MapReduce shuffle and the web UI.

For YARN, this property enables encryption for the web UI only. Enable shuffle encryption with a property in the mapred-site.xml file as described here.

hadoop.ssl.require.client.cert

Default value: false

When this property is set to true, client certificates are required for all shuffle operations and all browsers used to access web UIs.

Cloudera recommends that this be set to false. This is because client certificates are easily susceptible to attacks from malicious clients or jobs. For more details, see Client Certificates on page 232.

hadoop.ssl.hostname.verifier

Default value: DEFAULT

The SSLHostnameVerifier interface present inside the hadoop-common security library checks if a hostname matches the name stored inside the server’s X.509 certificate. The value assigned to this property determines how Hadoop verifies hostnames when it establishes new HttpsURLConnection instances. Valid values are:

- DEFAULT: The hostname must match either the first common name (CN) or any of the subjectAltNames (SAN). Wildcards can occur in either the CN or the SANs. For example, a hostname, such as *.example.com, will match all subdomains, including test.cloudera.example.com.
- DEFAULT_AND_LOCALHOST: This verifier mechanism works just like DEFAULT. However, it also allows all hostnames of the type: localhost, localhost.example, or 127.0.0.1.
- STRICT: This verifier works just like DEFAULT with an additional restriction for hostnames with wildcards. For example, a hostname with a wildcard such as *.example.com, will only match subdomains at the same level. Hence, cloudera.example.com will match, but, unlike DEFAULT, test.cloudera.example.com will be rejected.
- STRICT_IE6: This verifier works just like STRICT, however, it will allow hostnames that match any of the common names (CN) within the server’s X.509 certificate, not just the first one.
- ALLOW_ALL: Using this verifier will essentially turn off the hostname verifier mechanism.

hadoop.ssl.keystores.factory.class

Default value: org.apache.hadoop.security.ssl.FileBasedKeyStoresFactory

The KeyStoresFactory implementation to be used. Currently, FileBasedKeyStoresFactory is the only implementation of KeyStoresFactory.
hadoop.ssl.server.conf

**Default value:** ssl-server.xml

Resource file from which TLS/SSL server keystore information is extracted. Typically, it should be in the /etc/hadoop/conf/ directory so that it can be looked up in the CLASSPATH.

hadoop.ssl.client.conf

**Default value:** ssl-client.xml

Resource file from which TLS/SSL client keystore information is extracted. Typically, it should be in the /etc/hadoop/conf/ directory so that it can be looked up in the CLASSPATH.

Set the `<final>` field for all these properties to `true` as in the following sample configuration snippet:

```xml
...  
  <property>
    <name>hadoop.ssl.require.client.cert</name>
    <value>false</value>
    <final>true</final>
  </property>
  
  <property>
    <name>hadoop.ssl.hostname.verifier</name>
    <value>DEFAULT</value>
    <final>true</final>
  </property>
  
  <property>
    <name>hadoop.ssl.keystores.factory.class</name>
    <value>org.apache.hadoop.security.ssl.FileBasedKeyStoresFactory</value>
    <final>true</final>
  </property>
  
  <property>
    <name>hadoop.ssl.server.conf</name>
    <value>ssl-server.xml</value>
    <final>true</final>
  </property>
  
  <property>
    <name>hadoop.ssl.client.conf</name>
    <value>ssl-client.xml</value>
    <final>true</final>
  </property>
  
  <property>
    <name>hadoop.ssl.enabled</name>
    <value>true</value>
  </property>
...
```

Enable encrypted shuffle for YARN (mapred-site.xml)

To enable encrypted shuffle for YARN, set the following property in the mapred-site.xml file on every node in the cluster:

**mapreduce.shuffle.ssl.enabled**

**Default value:** Not specified

By default, this property is not specified in mapred-site.xml, and YARN encrypted shuffle is controlled by the value of hadoop.ssl.enabled. If this property is set to `true`, encrypted shuffle is enabled for YARN. Note that you cannot successfully enable encrypted shuffle for YARN by only setting this property to `true`, if hadoop.ssl.enabled is still set to `false`. 
Set the `<final>` field for this property to `true` as in the following configuration snippet:

```
...<property>
   <name>mapreduce.shuffle.ssl.enabled</name>
   <value>true</value>
   <final>true</final>
</property>
...```

Configure the keystore and truststore for the Shuffle server (ssl-server.xml)

**Note:** To run job tasks so they are prevented from reading the server keystore and gaining access to the shuffle server certificates:

- Configure the [Linux Task Controller for MRv1](https://cloudera.com/hadoop/security/)
- Configure the [Linux Container Executor for YARN](https://cloudera.com/hadoop/security/)

Currently, `FileBasedKeyStoresFactory` is the only implementation of `KeyStoresFactory`. It uses properties in the `ssl-server.xml` and `ssl-client.xml` files to configure the keystores and truststores.

The `ssl-server.xml` should be owned by the `hdfs` or `mapred` Hadoop system user, belong to the `hadoop` group, and it should have 440 permissions. Regular users should not belong to the `hadoop` group.

Use the following settings to configure the keystores and truststores in the `ssl-server.xml` file.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Default Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.server.keystore.type</code></td>
<td>jks</td>
<td>Keystore file type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.server.keystore.location</code></td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Keystore file location. The <code>mapred</code> user must own this file and have exclusive read access to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.server.keystore.password</code></td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Keystore file password</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.server.keystore.keypassword</code></td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Key password</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.server.truststore.type</code></td>
<td>jks</td>
<td>Truststore file type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.server.truststore.location</code></td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Truststore file location. The <code>mapred</code> user must own this file and have exclusive read access to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.server.truststore.password</code></td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Truststore file password</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.server.truststore.reload.interval</code></td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>Truststore reload interval, in milliseconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sample `ssl-server.xml`**

```
<configuration>
   <!-- Server Certificate Store -->
   <property>
      <name>ssl.server.keystore.type</name>
      <value>jks</value>
   </property>
   <property>
      <name>ssl.server.keystore.location</name>
      <value>${user.home}/keystores/server-keystore.jks</value>
   </property>
   <property>
      <name>ssl.server.keystore.password</name>
      <value>serverfoo</value>
   </property>
</configuration>
```
Configure the keystore and truststore for the Reducer/Fetcher (ssl-client.xml)

Use the following settings to configure the keystore and truststore in the `ssl-client.xml` file. This file must be owned by the `mapred` user for MRv1 and by the `yarn` user for YARN. The file permissions should be 444 (read access for all users).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Default Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.client.keystore.type</code></td>
<td>jks</td>
<td>Keystore file type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.client.keystore.location</code></td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Keystore file location. The <code>mapred</code> user must own this file and should have read access to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.client.keystore.password</code></td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Keystore file password</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.client.keystore.keypassword</code></td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Key password</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.client.truststore.type</code></td>
<td>jks</td>
<td>Truststore file type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.client.truststore.location</code></td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Truststore file location. The <code>mapred</code> user must own this file and should have read access to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.client.truststore.password</code></td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>Truststore file password</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>ssl.client.truststore.reload.interval</code></td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>Truststore reload interval, in milliseconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample `ssl-client.xml`

```xml
<configuration>
  <!-- Client Certificate Store -->
  <property>
    <name>ssl.client.keystore.type</name>
    <value>jks</value>
  </property>
  <property>
    <name>ssl.client.keystore.location</name>
    <value>${user.home}/keystores/client-keystore.jks</value>
  </property>
  <property>
    <name>ssl.client.keystore.password</name>
  </property>
</configuration>
```
**Activating Encrypted Shuffle**

**Important:**
Encrypted shuffle has a significant performance impact. You should benchmark this before implementing it in production. In many cases, one or more additional cores are needed to maintain performance.

When you have made the configuration changes described in the previous section, activate Encrypted Shuffle by re-starting all TaskTrackers in MRv1 and all NodeManagers in YARN.

**Client Certificates**

Client Certificates are supported but they do not guarantee that the client is a reducer task for the job. The Client Certificate keystore file that contains the private key must be readable by all users who submit jobs to the cluster, which means that a rogue job could read those keystore files and use the client certificates in them to establish a secure connection with a Shuffle server. The JobToken mechanism that the Hadoop environment provides is a better protector of the data; each job uses its own JobToken to retrieve only the shuffle data that belongs to it. Unless the rogue job has a proper JobToken, it cannot retrieve Shuffle data from the Shuffle server.

However, if your cluster requires client certificates, ensure that browsers connecting to the web UIs are configured with appropriately signed certificates. If your certificates are signed by a certificate authority (CA), make sure you include the complete chain of CA certificates in the server's keystore.

**Reloading Truststores**

By default, each truststore reloads its configuration every 10 seconds. If you bring in a new truststore file to replace an old one, when the truststore is reloaded, the new certificates will be override the previous ones. If a client certificate is added to (or removed from) all the truststore files in the system, both YARN and MRv1 will pick up the new configuration without requiring that the TaskTracker or NodeManager daemons are restarted. This mechanism is useful for adding or removing nodes from the cluster, or for adding or removing trusted clients.

The reload interval is controlled by the `ssl.client.truststore.reload.interval` and `ssl.server.truststore.reload.interval` configuration properties in the `ssl-client.xml` and `ssl-server.xml` files described here.

**Note:** The keystores are not automatically reloaded. To change a keystore for a TaskTracker in MRv1 or a NodeManager in YARN, you must restart the TaskTracker or NodeManager daemon.
Debugging

**Important:** Enable debugging only for troubleshooting, and only for jobs running on small amounts of data. Debugging is very verbose and slows jobs down significantly. You may need to increase the value for the `mapred.task.timeout` property to prevent jobs from failing for taking too long.

To enable TLS/SSL debugging in the reducers, set the `mapred.reduce.child.java.opts` property as follows. You can do this on a per-job basis, or by means of a cluster-wide setting in `mapred-site.xml`:

```xml
<configuration>
  ...
  <property>
    <name>mapred.reduce.child.java.opts</name>
    <value>-Xmx200m -Djavax.net.debug=all</value>
  </property>
  ...
</configuration>
```

To enable debugging for MRv1 TaskTrackers, edit `hadoop-env.sh` as follows:

```
HADOOP_TASKTRACKER_OPTS="-Djavax.net.debug=all $HADOOP_TASKTRACKER_OPTS"
```

To enable debugging for YARN NodeManagers for YARN, edit `yarn-env.sh` as follows:

```
YARN_OPTS="-Djavax.net.debug=all $YARN_OPTS"
```

**Configuring TLS/SSL for Cloudera Navigator Metadata Server**

Cloudera Navigator supports TLS/SSL encryption for network communications between the Navigator Metadata Server and clients, such as the web browser used for Cloudera Navigator console. Typically, TLS/SSL is configured for the entire cluster, so it is possible that the server key and certificate already exist on the specific host running the Navigator Metadata Server role because that role runs on the same host as Cloudera Management Server. See [Configuring Cloudera Manager Clusters for TLS/SSL](#) for more information about configuring TLS/SSL for Cloudera Manager clusters.

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the **Cloudera Management Service**.
2. Click the **Configuration** tab.
3. Select **Scope > Navigator Metadata Server**.
4. Select **Category > Security**.
5. Edit the following properties according to your cluster configuration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable TLS/SSL for Navigator Metadata Server</td>
<td>Encrypt network communications between clients and Navigator Metadata Server using TLS/SSL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS/SSL Keystore File Location</td>
<td>The path to the TLS/SSL keystore file containing the server certificate and private key used for TLS/SSL. Used when Navigator Metadata Server is acting as a TLS/SSL server. The keystore must be in JKS format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS/SSL Keystore File Password</td>
<td>The password for the Navigator Metadata Server JKS keystore file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS/SSL Keystore Key Password</td>
<td>The password that protects the private key contained in the JKS keystore used when Navigator Metadata Server is acting as a TLS/SSL server.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Click **Save Changes**.
7. Restart the Navigator Metadata Server role.
8. Restart Impala.
Note: Once you have enabled TLS/SSL, the Quick Links in Cloudera Manager pointing to the Cloudera Navigator console will not work as they use HTTP, not HTTPS.

Configuring TLS/SSL for Kafka (Navigator Event Broker)

Use the following steps to enable encryption when publishing Cloudera Navigator Audit events to Kafka:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the Kafka service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Kafka Broker.
5. Edit the following properties according to your cluster configuration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable TLS/SSL for Kafka Broker</td>
<td>Encrypt communication between clients and Kafka Broker using Transport Layer Security (TLS) (formerly known as Secure Socket Layer (SSL)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafka Broker TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File</td>
<td>The location on disk of the truststore, in .jks format. This is used to confirm the authenticity of TLS/SSL servers that the Kafka Broker might connect to as a client. If this field is left empty, by default, a list of well-known certificate authorities is used to check the Navigator Audit Server’s identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafka Broker TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store Password</td>
<td>The password for the Kafka Broker TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File. This field can be left blank. A password only provides optional integrity checking for the truststore file. Contents of truststores are certificates, and certificates are already public information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
7. Restart the Kafka service.

Configuring Encrypted HDFS Data Transport

This topic describes how to configure encrypted HDFS data transport using both, Cloudera Manager, and the command line.

You must enable Kerberos before configuring encrypted HDFS data transport. See Configuring Authentication on page 37 for instructions.

Using Cloudera Manager

Minimum Required Role: Full Administrator

To enable encryption of data transferred between Data Nodes and clients, and among Data Nodes, perform the following steps:

1. Enable Hadoop security using Kerberos.
2. Select the HDFS service.
3. Click the Configuration tab.
4. Select Scope > HDFS (Service Wide).
5. Select Category > Security.
6. Configure the following properties: (You can type the property name in the Search box to locate the property.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable Data Transfer Encryption</td>
<td>Check this field to enable wire encryption.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Configuring Encryption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data Transfer Encryption Algorithm</td>
<td>Optionally configure the algorithm used to encrypt data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadoop RPC Protection</td>
<td>Select privacy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Click **Save Changes**.
8. Restart the HDFS service.

### Using the Command Line

**Important:**
- This configuration process can be completed using either Cloudera Manager or the command-line instructions.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. If you use an earlier version of CDH, see the documentation for that version located at [Cloudera Documentation](#).

To enable encrypted data transport using the command line, perform the following steps:

1. Enable Kerberos authentication, following [these instructions](#).
2. Set the optional RPC encryption by setting `hadoop.rpc.protection` to "privacy" in the `core-site.xml` file in both client and server configurations.

**Note:** If RPC encryption is not enabled, transmission of other HDFS data is also insecure.

3. Set `dfs.encrypt.data.transfer` to `true` in the `hdfs-site.xml` file on all server systems.
4. Restart all daemons.

### Configuring Encrypted HBase Data Transport

This topic describes how to configure encrypted HBase data transport using Cloudera Manager and the command line.

**Configuring Encrypted HBase Data Transport Using Cloudera Manager**

**Minimum Required Role:** **Full Administrator**

To enable encryption of data transferred between HBase masters and RegionServers and between RegionServers and clients:

1. [Enable Hadoop security using Kerberos](#).
2. [Configure Kerberos authentication for HBase](#).
3. Select the HBase service.
4. Click the **Configuration** tab.
5. Select **Scope** > **HBase (Service Wide)**.
6. Select **Category** > **Security**.
7. Search for the HBase Transport Security property and select one of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>authentication</td>
<td>Enables simple authentication using Kerberos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrity</td>
<td>Checks the integrity of data received to ensure it was not corrupted in transit. Selecting integrity also enables authentication.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Click **Save Changes**.
9. Restart the HBase service.

### Configuring Encrypted HBase Data Transport Using the Command Line

**Important:**
- This configuration process can be completed using either Cloudera Manager or the command-line instructions.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. If you use an earlier version of CDH, see the documentation for that version located at [Cloudera Documentation](https://cloudera.com/).  

1. Enable **Hadoop Security using Kerberos**.
2. Enable **HBase security using Kerberos**.
3. Enable RPC encryption by setting `hbase.rpc.protection` in the `hbase-site.xml` file to one of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>authentication</strong></td>
<td>Enables simple authentication using Kerberos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>integrity</strong></td>
<td>Checks the integrity of data received to ensure it was not corrupted in transit. Selecting <code>integrity</code> also enables <code>authentication</code>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>privacy</strong></td>
<td>Ensures privacy by encrypting the data in transit using TLS/SSL encryption. Selecting <code>privacy</code> also enables <code>authentication</code> and <code>integrity</code>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Restart all daemons.

### Encrypting Data at Rest

Cloudera clusters can use a combination of data at rest encryption mechanisms, including [HDFS transparent encryption](https://cloudera.com/) and [Cloudera Navigator Encrypt](https://cloudera.com/). Both of these data at rest encryption mechanisms can be augmented with key management using [Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server](https://cloudera.com/) on page 243 and [Cloudera Navigator Key HSM](https://cloudera.com/) on page 261.

Before configuring encryption for data at rest, see [Cloudera Navigator Data Encryption Overview](https://cloudera.com/) for an overview of Cloudera Navigator concepts, architecture, and components.

### Data at Rest Encryption Reference Architecture

The following diagram illustrates the supported architecture for deploying Cloudera Navigator encryption for data at rest:
To isolate Key Trustee Server from other enterprise data hub (EDH) services, you must deploy Key Trustee Server on dedicated hosts in a separate cluster in Cloudera Manager. Deploy Key Trustee KMS on dedicated hosts in the same cluster as the EDH services that require access to Key Trustee Server. This provides the following benefits:

- You can restart your EDH cluster without restarting Key Trustee Server, avoiding interruption to other clusters or clients that use the same Key Trustee Server instance.
- You can manage the Key Trustee Server upgrade cycle independently of other cluster components.
- You can limit access to the Key Trustee Server hosts to authorized key administrators only, reducing the attack surface of the system.
- Resource contention is reduced. Running Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS services on dedicated hosts prevents other cluster services from reducing available resources (such as CPU and memory) and creating bottlenecks.

If you are using virtual machines for the Key Trustee Server or Key Trustee KMS hosts, see Navigator HSM KMS HA Planning on page 243.

Data at Rest Encryption Requirements

Encryption comprises several components, each with its own requirements.

Data at rest encryption protection can be applied at a number of levels within Hadoop:

- OS filesystem-level
- Network-level
- HDFS-level (protects both data at rest and in transit)

For more information on the components, concepts, and architecture for encrypting data at rest, see Encrypting Data at Rest on page 236.

Product Compatibility Matrix

See Product Compatibility Matrix for Cloudera Navigator Encryption for the individual compatibility matrices for each Cloudera Navigator encryption component.

Entropy Requirements

Cryptographic operations require entropy to ensure randomness.
You can check the available entropy on a Linux system by running the following command:

```
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
```

The output displays the entropy currently available. Check the entropy several times to determine the state of the entropy pool on the system. If the entropy is consistently low (500 or less), you must increase it by installing `rng-tools` and starting the `rngd` service. Run the following commands on RHEL 6-compatible systems:

```
$ sudo yum install rng-tools
$ sudo echo 'EXTRAOPTIONS=-r /dev/urandom' >> /etc/sysconfig/rngd
$ sudo service rngd start
$ sudo chkconfig rngd on
```

For RHEL 7, run the following commands:

```
$ sudo yum install rng-tools
$ cp /usr/lib/systemd/system/rngd.service /etc/systemd/system/
$ sed -i -e 's/ExecStart=/sbin/rngd -f/ExecStart=/sbin/rngd -f -r /dev/urandom/'
/etc/systemd/system/rngd.service
$ systemctl daemon-reload
$ systemctl start rngd
$ systemctl enable rngd
```

Make sure that the hosts running Key Trustee Server, Key Trustee KMS, and Navigator Encrypt have sufficient entropy to perform cryptographic operations.

**Key Trustee Server Requirements**

**Recommended Hardware and Supported Distributions**

Key Trustee Server must be installed on a dedicated server or virtual machine (VM) that is not used for any other purpose. The backing PostgreSQL database must be installed on the same host as the Key Trustee Server, and must not be shared with any other services. For high availability, the active and passive Key Trustee Servers must not share physical resources. See Resource Planning for Data at Rest Encryption on page 242 for more information.

The recommended minimum hardware specifications are as follows:

- Processor: 1 GHz 64-bit quad core
- Memory: 8 GB RAM
- Storage: 20 GB on moderate- to high-performance disk drives

Key Trustee Server supports the following Linux distributions:

- RHEL 6.4
- RHEL and CentOS: 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3
- Oracle Enterprise Linux: 6.7, 6.8, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3

**Cloudera Manager Requirements**

Installing and managing Key Trustee Server using Cloudera Manager requires Cloudera Manager 5.4.0 and higher. Key Trustee Server does not require Cloudera Navigator Audit Server or Metadata Server.

**umask Requirements**

Key Trustee Server installation requires the default `umask` of 0022.

**Network Requirements**

For new Key Trustee Server installations (5.4.0 and higher) and migrated upgrades (see Migrate Apache Web Server to CherryPy for more information), Key Trustee Server requires the following TCP ports to be opened for inbound traffic:
11371
Clients connect to this port over HTTPS.

11381 (PostgreSQL)
The passive Key Trustee Server connects to this port for database replication.

For upgrades that are not migrated to the CherryPy web server, the pre-upgrade port settings are preserved:

80
Clients connect to this port over HTTP to obtain the Key Trustee Server public key.

443 (HTTPS)
Clients connect to this port over HTTPS.

5432 (PostgreSQL)
The passive Key Trustee Server connects to this port for database replication.

TLS Certificate Requirements
To ensure secure network traffic, Cloudera recommends obtaining Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates specific to the hostname of your Key Trustee Server. To obtain the certificate, generate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) for the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the Key Trustee Server host. The CSR must be signed by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA). After the certificate has been verified and signed by the CA, the Key Trustee Server TLS configuration requires:

- The CA-signed certificate
- The private key used to generate the original CSR
- The intermediate certificate/chain file (provided by the CA)

Cloudera recommends not using self-signed certificates. If you use self-signed certificates, you must use the `--skip-ssl-check` parameter when registering Navigator Encrypt with the Key Trustee Server. This skips TLS hostname validation, which safeguards against certain network-level attacks. For more information regarding insecure mode, see Table 25: Registration Options on page 270.

Key Trustee KMS Requirements

Recommended Hardware and Supported Distributions
The recommended minimum hardware specifications are as follows:

- Processor: 2 GHz 64-bit quad core
- Memory: 16 GB RAM
- Storage: 40 GB on moderate- to high-performance disk drives

Key Trustee KMS supports the following Linux distributions:

- RHEL and CentOS: 5.7, 5.10, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3
- Oracle Enterprise Linux: 5.7, 5.10, 5.11, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3
- SLES: 11 SP2, 11 SP3, 11 SP4, 12 SP1, 12 SP2
- Debian: 7.1, 7.8, 8.2, 8.4
- Ubuntu: 12.04, 14.04, 16.04

The Key Trustee KMS workload is CPU-intensive. Cloudera recommends using machines with capabilities equivalent to your NameNode hosts, with Intel CPUs that support AES-NI for optimum performance. Also, Cloudera strongly recommends that you enable TLS for both the HDFS and the Key Trustee KMS services to prevent the passage of plain text key material between the KMS and HDFS data nodes.
Key HSM Requirements

The following are prerequisites for installing Navigator Key HSM:

- **Supported operating systems:**
  - RHEL and CentOS: 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 7.1, 7.2
- **Oracle Java Runtime Environment (JRE) 7 or higher with Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction Policy Files:**
  - JCE for Java SE 7
  - JCE for Java SE 8
- **A supported HSM device:**
  - SafeNet Luna
    - HSM firmware version: 6.2.1
    - HSM software version: 5.2.3-1
  - SafeNet KeySecure
    - HSM firmware version: 6.2.1
    - HSM software version: 8.0.1
  - Thales nSolo, nConnect
    - HSM firmware version: 11.4.0
    - Client software version: 2.28.9cam136
- **Key Trustee Server 3.8 or higher**

**Important:** You must install Key HSM on the same host as Key Trustee Server.

Root access is required to install Navigator Key HSM.

Navigator HSM KMS Requirements

**Recommended Hardware and Supported Distributions**

The recommended minimum hardware specifications are as follows:

- Processor: 2 GHz 64-bit quad core
- Memory: 16 GB RAM
- Storage: 40 GB on moderate- to high-performance disk drives

Navigator HSM KMS supports the following Linux distributions:

- RHEL and CentOS: 6.8, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3

Supported HSM devices:

- **SafeNet Luna**
  - HSM software version: 6.2.2-5
  - HSM firmware version: 6.10.9
  - Client: 6.2.2
- **Thales nSolo, nConnect**
  - Server version: 3.67.11cam4
  - Firmware: 2.65.2
Navigator Encrypt Requirements

Operating System Requirements

- Linux kernel 2.6.19 or higher (RHEL and CentOS can use 2.6.18-92 or higher)
- RHEL and CentOS: 5.7, 5.10, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3
- Oracle Enterprise Linux (Red Hat Compatible Kernel): 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 7.1, 7.2
- Oracle Enterprise Linux (Unbreakable Enterprise Kernel 2 or 3): 6.5
- SLES: 11 SP2, 11 SP3, 11 SP4, 12 SP1, 12 SP2

**Note:** SLES 11 does not support the ext4 filesystem.

- Debian: 7.1, 7.8
- Ubuntu: 12.04, 14.04, 14.04.3, 16.04

**Note:** Cloudera Enterprise, with the exception of Cloudera Navigator Encrypt, is supported on platforms with Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) enabled and in enforcing mode. Cloudera is not responsible for SELinux policy development, support, or enforcement. If you experience issues running Cloudera software with SELinux enabled, contact your OS provider for assistance.

If you are using SELinux in enforcing mode, Cloudera Support can request that you disable SELinux or change the mode to permissive to rule out SELinux as a factor when investigating reported issues.

Supported command-line interpreters:

- **sh** (Bourne)
- **bash** (Bash)
- **dash** (Debian)

**Note:** Navigator Encrypt does not support installation or use in chroot environments.

Network Requirements

For new Navigator Key Trustee Server (5.4.0 and higher) installations, Navigator Encrypt initiates TCP traffic over port 11371 (HTTPS) to the Key Trustee Server.

For upgrades and Key Trustee Server versions lower than 5.4.0, Navigator Encrypt initiates TCP traffic over ports 80 (HTTP) and 443 (HTTPS) to the Navigator Key Trustee Server.

Internet Access

You must have an active connection to the Internet to download many package dependencies, unless you have internal repositories or mirrors containing the dependent packages.

Maintenance Window

Data is not accessible during the encryption process. Plan for system downtime during installation and configuration.
Administrative Access

To enforce a high level of security, all Navigator Encrypt commands require administrative (root) access (including installation and configuration). If you do not have administrative privileges on your server, contact your system administrator before proceeding.

Package Dependencies

Navigator Encrypt requires these packages, which are resolved by your distribution package manager during installation:

- dkms
- keyutils
- cryptfs-utils
- libkeytrustee
- navencrypt-kernel-module
- openssl
- lsof
- gcc
- cryptsetup

These packages may have other dependencies that are also resolved by your package manager. Installation works with gcc, gcc3, and gcc4.

Resource Planning for Data at Rest Encryption

For production environments, you must configure high availability for:

- Key Trustee Server
- Key Trustee KMS
- Navigator HSM KMS

Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS HA Planning

For high availability, you must provision two dedicated Key Trustee Server hosts and at least two dedicated Key Trustee KMS hosts, for a minimum of four separate hosts. Do not run multiple Key Trustee Server or Key Trustee KMS services on the same physical host, and do not run these services on hosts with other cluster services. Doing so causes resource contention with other important cluster services and defeats the purpose of high availability. See Data at Rest Encryption Reference Architecture on page 236 for more information.

The Key Trustee KMS workload is CPU intensive. Cloudera recommends using machines with capabilities equivalent to your NameNode hosts, with Intel CPUs that support AES-NI for optimum performance.

Make sure that each host is secured and audited. Only authorized key administrators should have access to them. Red Hat provides security guides for RHEL:

- RHEL 6 Security Guide
- RHEL 7 Security Guide

For hardware sizing information, see Data at Rest Encryption Requirements on page 237 for recommendations for each Cloudera Navigator encryption component.

For Cloudera Manager deployments, deploy Key Trustee Server in its own dedicated cluster. Deploy Key Trustee KMS in each cluster that uses Key Trustee Server. See Data at Rest Encryption Reference Architecture on page 236 for more information.

For information about enabling Key Trustee Server high availability, refer to Configuring Key Trustee Server High Availability Using Cloudera Manager or Configuring Key Trustee Server High Availability Using the Command Line.

For information about enabling Key Trustee KMS high availability, refer to Enabling Key Trustee KMS High Availability.
Navigator HSM KMS HA Planning

For Navigator HSM KMS high availability, you need to provision two dedicated HSM KMS hosts only.

Make sure that each host is secured and audited. Only authorized key administrators should have access to them. Red Hat provides security guides for RHEL:

- RHEL 6 Security Guide
- RHEL 7 Security Guide

For hardware sizing information, see Data at Rest Encryption Requirements on page 237 for recommendations for each Cloudera Navigator encryption component.

For information about enabling HSM KMS high availability, refer to Enabling Navigator HSM KMS High Availability.

Virtual Machine Considerations

If you are using virtual machines, make sure that the resources (such as virtual disks, CPU, and memory) for each Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS host are allocated to separate physical hosts. Hosting multiple services on the same physical host defeats the purpose of high availability, because a single machine failure can take down multiple services.

To maintain the security of the cryptographic keys, make sure that all copies of the virtual disk (including any back-end storage arrays, backups, snapshots, and so on) are secured and audited with the same standards you apply to the live data.

Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server

Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server is an enterprise-grade cryptographic key storage and management system used by Cloudera Navigator Encrypt on page 269 that separates encryption keys from the data, thus ensuring data is protected even if unauthorized users gain access to the storage media. It enables your cluster to meet the strictest data security regulations. Furthermore, Navigator Key Trustee Server can be integrated with a hardware security module (HSM) to provide the highest level of security for your keys. See Cloudera Navigator Key HSM on page 261 for details.

In addition, Navigator Key Trustee Server can be used by other cluster components. For example, HDFS Transparent Encryption on page 293 can use Navigator Key Trustee Server (KTS) as its backing key store (for Hadoop KMS, instead of the default Java KeyStore) for better security and scalability. See Migrating Keys from a Java KeyStore to Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server on page 327 for more information about using Navigator KTS with HDFS encryption.

Important: Cloudera recommends that each cluster use its own KTS instance. Although sharing a single KTS across clusters is technically possible, it is neither approved nor supported for security reasons—specifically, the increased security risks associated with single point of failure for encryption keys used by multiple clusters.

After Installing Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server, follow the steps below to manage the system:

Back up and Restoring Key Trustee Server and Clients

Key Trustee Server high availability applies to read operations only. If either Key Trustee Server fails, the client automatically retries fetching keys from the functioning server. New write operations (for example, creating new encryption keys) are not allowed unless both Key Trustee Servers are operational.

If a Key Trustee Server fails catastrophically, you must restore it from backup to a new host with the same hostname and IP address as the failed host. Cloudera does not support PostgreSQL promotion to convert a passive Key Trustee Server to an active Key Trustee Server.

Cloudera strongly recommends regularly backing up Key Trustee Server databases and configuration files. Because these backups contain encryption keys and encrypted deposits, you must ensure that your backup repository is as secure as the Key Trustee Server.
You must also back up client configuration files and keys for Key Trustee Server clients, such as Key Trustee KMS and Navigator Encrypt clients.

**Note:** In an HA configuration, the backup need only be performed on one of the hosts for Key Trustee Server and the Key Trustee KMS. For Key Trustee Server, run the backup on the *active* server. For Key Trustee KMS, you can run the backup on any instance.

### Backing Up Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS Using Cloudera Manager

Cloudera Manager versions 5.8 and higher, when used with Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS versions 5.7 and higher, allow for backups of the KT Server and KT KMS configurations.

The actions executed in this procedure are equivalent to running the `ktbackup.sh` script on the node in question (see **Backing Up Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS Using the ktbackup.sh Script** on page 244 for additional details).

In addition, when using the HDFS Encryption Wizard in Cloudera Manager 5.8 or higher to install and configure Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS versions 5.7 and higher, a cron job is automatically set up to back up the Key Trustee Server on an ongoing basis. See **Initializing Standalone Key Trustee Server** on page 254 for more detail.

To back up the KT Server or KT KMS service configuration using Cloudera Manager:

1. Select the KT Server or KMS service configuration that you wish to back up.
2. For a KT Server backup, select **Create Backup on Active Server** (or **Create Backup on Passive Server**) from the Actions menu. For a KMS backup, select **Create Backup**.

A successfully completed backup of the KT Server is indicated by the message “Command Create Backup on Active Server finished successfully on service keytrustee_server”.

### Backing Up Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS Using the ktbackup.sh Script

Key Trustee Server releases 5.7 and higher include a script, `ktbackup.sh`, to simplify and automate backing up Key Trustee Server. Key Trustee KMS releases 5.7 and higher include the same script for backing up Key Trustee KMS.

When run on a Key Trustee Server host, the script creates a tarball containing the Key Trustee Server private GPG keys and the PostgreSQL database. When run on a Key Trustee KMS host, the script creates a tarball containing the Key Trustee KMS private GPG keys and configuration file.

To preserve the security of the backup, you must specify a GPG recipient. Because this recipient is the only entity that can decrypt the backup, the recipient must be someone authorized to access the Key Trustee Server database, such as a key administrator.

### Creating and Importing a GPG Key for Encrypting and Decrypting Backups

If the key administrator responsible for backing up and restoring Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS does not already have a GPG key pair, they can create one using the `gpg --gen-key` command. The following example demonstrates this procedure:

**Note:** By default, `gpg --gen-key` fails at the password prompt if you have logged in to your user account with the `su` command. You must log in to the SSH session with the user account for which you want to generate the GPG key pair.

```
[john.doe@backup-host ~]$ gpg --gen-key
```

```plaintext
$ gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.14; Copyright (C) 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Please select what kind of key you want:
(1) RSA and RSA (default)
(2) DSA and Elgamal
(3) DSA (sign only)
(4) RSA (sign only)
```

244 | Cloudera Security
Your selection? 1
RSA keys may be between 1024 and 4096 bits long.
What keysize do you want? (2048)
Requested keysize is 2048 bits
Please specify how long the key should be valid.
0 = key does not expire
<n> = key expires in n days
<n>w = key expires in n weeks
<n>m = key expires in n months
<n>y = key expires in n years
Key is valid for? (0)
Key does not expire at all
Is this correct? (y/N) y
GnuPG needs to construct a user ID to identify your key.
Real name: John Doe
Email address: john.doe@example.com
Comment: Key Trustee Backup
You selected this USER-ID:
"John Doe (Key Trustee Backup) <john.doe@example.com>"
Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? O
You need a Passphrase to protect your secret key.

can't connect to `/home/john.doe/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent': No such file or directory
gpg-agent[10638]: directory `/home/john.doe/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d' created
We need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform
some other action (type on the keyboard, move the mouse, utilize the
disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random number
generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.
We need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform
some other action (type on the keyboard, move the mouse, utilize the
disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random number
generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.
gpg: /home/john.doe/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key 0936CB67 marked as ultimately trusted
public and secret key created and signed.
gpg: checking the trustdb
gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model
gpg: depth: 0  valid: 1  signed: 0  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
pub 2048R/0936CB67 2016-02-10
uid                  John Doe (Key Trustee Backup) <john.doe@example.com>
sub   2048R/52A6FC5C 2016-02-10
Key fingerprint = CE57 FDED 3AFE E67D 2041 9EBF E64B 7D00 0936 CB67

After the GPG key pair is generated, you can export the public key:

[john.doe@backup-host ~]$ gpg --armor --output /path/to/johndoe.pub --export 'John Doe'

Copy the public key (johndoe.pub in this example) to the Key Trustee Server or Key Trustee KMS host, and import it into the service account keyring (keytrustee for Key Trustee Server and kms for Key Trustee KMS):

- On the Key Trustee Server host:

  $ sudo -u keytrustee gpg --import /path/to/johndoe.pub

- On the Key Trustee KMS host:

  $ sudo -u kms gpg --import /path/to/johndoe.pub

Running the ktbackup.sh Script

You must run ktbackup.sh as the service account. The location of the script depends on the service and installation method. See the following table for the script location and default service account for package- and parcel-based installations for Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS.
### Table 21: Backup Script Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Service Account</th>
<th>Parcel-Based Installation</th>
<th>Package-Based Installation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Trustee Server</td>
<td>keytrustee</td>
<td>/usr/bin/ktbackup.sh</td>
<td>/usr/bin/ktbackup.sh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Trustee KMS</td>
<td>kms</td>
<td>/opt/cloudera/parcels/KEYTRUSTEE_KEYTRUSTEE_KMS/ktbackup.sh</td>
<td>/usr/bin/ktbackup.sh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following table lists the command options for `ktbackup.sh`.

### Table 22: Command Options for `ktbackup.sh`

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>-c, --confdir=CONFDIR</code></td>
<td>Specifies the Key Trustee configuration directory. Defaults to <code>/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee</code> for parcel-based Key Trustee Server. For Key Trustee KMS and package-based Key Trustee Server, you must specify this option.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>--database-port=PORT</code></td>
<td>Specifies the Key Trustee Server database port. Defaults to 11381 for parcel-based installations. For package-based Key Trustee Server installations, you must specify this option.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>--gpg-recipient=GPG_RECIPIENT</code></td>
<td>Specifies the GPG recipient. The backup is encrypted with the public key of the specified recipient. The GPG recipient public key must be imported into the service account keyring before running the script. See <a href="#">Creating and Importing a GPG Key</a> for Encrypting and Decrypting Backups on page 244 for more information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>--cleartext</code></td>
<td>Outputs an unencrypted tarball. To preserve the security of the cryptographic keys, do not use this option in production environments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>--output=DIR</code></td>
<td>Specifies the output directory for the tarball. Defaults to <code>/var/lib/keytrustee</code> for parcel-based Key Trustee Server. For Key Trustee KMS and package-based Key Trustee Server, you must specify this option.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>--roll=n</code></td>
<td>Deletes backups older than the last <em>n</em> backups from the directory specified by the <code>--output</code> parameter. For example, if you have 10 backups, specifying <code>--roll=10</code> creates a new backup (11 backups total) and then delete the oldest backup. Specifying <code>--roll=1</code> creates a new backup and then deletes all other backups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>-q, --quiet</code></td>
<td>Suppresses console log messages and, if successful, returns only the backup tarball file path. This is useful for automating backups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>--verbose</code></td>
<td>Outputs additional log messages to the console for debugging.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Important: Running the `ktbackup.sh` script on the KMS server creates a backed up copy of the GPG private keys currently being used by the KMS. If this backup is not performed, and the GPG private keys are not saved, then the system cannot be fully restored in the event of a catastrophic failure, and access to both keys and data may be lost. It is therefore imperative that you perform a manual backup after the KMS starts successfully for the first time, and on all KMS instances whenever a new Key Trustee High Availability instance is added. Running this backup ensures that the most recent backup contains a copy of the GPG private keys currently in use.

The following examples demonstrate the command usage for different scenarios:

- **To back up a parcel-based Key Trustee Server, specifying the GPG recipient by name:**
  
  ```
  $ sudo -u keytrustee /opt/cloudera/parcels/KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER/bin/ktbackup.sh --gpg-recipient='John Doe'
  ```

- **To back up a parcel-based Key Trustee KMS, specifying the GPG recipient by email:**
  
  ```
  $ sudo -u kms /opt/cloudera/parcels/KEYTRUSTEE/bin/ktbackup.sh -c /var/lib/kms-keytrustee/keytrustee/.keytrustee --output=/var/lib/kms-keytrustee --gpg-recipient=john.doe@example.com
  ```

- **To back up a package-based Key Trustee Server with the database running on a non-default port (12345 in this example):**
  
  ```
  $ sudo -u keytrustee ktbackup.sh --database-port=12345 --gpg-recipient=john.doe@example.com
  ```

- **To back up a package-based Key Trustee KMS, specifying the GPG recipient by email:**
  
  ```
  $ sudo -u kms /usr/share/keytrustee-keyprovider/bin/ktbackup.sh -c /var/lib/kms-keytrustee/keytrustee/.keytrustee --output=/var/lib/kms-keytrustee --gpg-recipient=john.doe@example.com
  ```

### Automating Backups Using cron

You can schedule automatic backups of Key Trustee Server using the `cron` scheduling utility.

Create a `crontab` entry using the following commands:

1. **Edit the `crontab` by running the following command:**
   
   ```
   $ sudo -u keytrustee crontab -e
   ```

2. **Add the following entry to run the backup script every 30 minutes. This example is for a parcel-based installation of Key Trustee Server.** See the Backup Script Locations table for the package-based script location.
   
   ```
   */30 * * * * /opt/cloudera/parcels/KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER/bin/ktbackup.sh --gpg-recipient='John Doe' --quiet --output=/tmp/backups --roll=10
   ```

Run `man 5 crontab` to see the `crontab` man page for details on using `cron` to schedule backups at different intervals.

### Backing Up Key Trustee Server Manually

Use this procedure for both parcel-based and package-based installations.

If you have deployed Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server High Availability, perform these steps on both the active and passive Key Trustee Servers. The following procedure references the default database port and location; if you modified these settings during installation, replace the database and port with your values.
1. Back up the Key Trustee Server database:
   - For Key Trustee Server 3.8:
     
     ```
     $ su - postgres
     $ pg_dump -c -p 5432 keytrustee | zip --encrypt keytrustee-db.zip -
     ```
   - For Key Trustee Server 5.4 and higher:
     
     ```
     $ su - keytrustee
     $ pg_dump -c -p 11381 keytrustee | zip --encrypt keytrustee-db.zip -
     ```

   The `--encrypt` option prompts you to create a password used to encrypt the zip file. This password is required to decrypt the file.

   For parcel-based installations, you must set environment variables after switching to the `keytrustee` user:

     ```
     $ su - keytrustee
     $ export PATH=$PATH:/opt/cloudera/parcels/KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER/PG_DB/opt/postgres/9.3/bin
     $ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/cloudera/parcels/KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER/PG_DB/opt/postgres/9.3/lib
     $ pg_dump -c -p 11381 keytrustee | zip --encrypt keytrustee-db.zip -
     ```

2. Back up the Key Trustee Server configuration directory (`/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee`):

   ```
   $ zip -r --encrypt keytrustee-conf.zip /var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee
   ```

   The `--encrypt` option prompts you to create a password used to encrypt the zip file. This password is required to decrypt the file.

3. Move the backup files (`keytrustee-db.zip` and `keytrustee-conf.zip`) to a secure location.

### Backing Up Key Trustee Server Clients

Cryptographic keys stored in Key Trustee Server are encrypted by clients before they are sent to Key Trustee Server. The primary clients for Key Trustee Server are Key Trustee KMS and Navigator Encrypt. Cloudera strongly recommends backing up regularly the configuration files and GPG keys for Key Trustee Server clients. See [Backing Up Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS Using the kbackup.sh Script](page 244) for instructions on backing up Key Trustee KMS using the provided backup script.

**Warning:** Failure to back up these files can result in irretrievable data loss. For example, encryption zone keys used for [HDFS Transparent Encryption](page 293) are encrypted by the KMS before being stored in Key Trustee Server. A catastrophic failure of the KMS with no backup causes all HDFS data stored in encryption zones to become permanently irretrievable.

To prevent permanent data loss, regularly back up the following directories on each client that stores objects in Key Trustee Server:

**Table 23: Key Trustee Server Client Configuration Directories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Trustee Server Client</th>
<th>Directories to Back Up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Trustee KMS</td>
<td>/var/lib/kms-keytrustee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigator Encrypt</td>
<td>/etc/navencrypt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Restoring Key Trustee Server

When restoring the Key Trustee Server database from backup, keep in mind that any keys or deposits created after the backup are not restored. If you are using Key Trustee Server high availability, you can restore the Active Key Trustee...
Server from the Passive Key Trustee Server. This restores all keys that were successfully written to the Passive Key Trustee Server before the failure.

The procedure to restore Key Trustee Server is different for parcel-based than for package-based installations. For more information about parcels, see Parcels.

Restoring Key Trustee Server in Parcel-Based Installations

Note: These instructions apply to Key Trustee Servers deployed using parcels. For package-based deployments, skip to the Restoring Key Trustee Server in Package-Based Installations on page 250 section.

If you have deployed Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server High Availability, perform these steps on both the active and passive Key Trustee Servers. The following procedures assume the default database port and location; if you modified these settings during installation, replace the database and port with your custom values.

If the Key Trustee Server host has failed completely, remove the host from the cluster and add a new host using Cloudera Manager:

1. Remove the failed host from the cluster. See Deleting Hosts for instructions.
2. Add a new host with the same hostname and IP address as the failed host to the cluster. See Adding a Host to the Cluster for instructions.

Important: Make sure that the replacement host uses the same operating system version as the failed host.

3. Install Key Trustee Server on the new host. See Installing Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server for instructions. Make sure to install the same Key Trustee Server version as the failed host.

After you have provisioned a new host and installed Key Trustee Server (or if you are restoring the database or configuration on the original host), restore the database and configuration directory. If your backups were created using the ktbackup.sh script, skip to Restoring Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS from ktbackup.sh Backups on page 250. If you need to restore the Active Key Trustee Server from the Passive Key Trustee Server, skip to Restoring Active Key Trustee Server from Passive Key Trustee Server on page 252.

If your backups were created manually using the pg_dump command, do the following:

1. Copy or move the backup files (keytrustee-db.zip and keytrustee-conf.zip) to the Key Trustee Server host.
2. Start the PostgreSQL server:

   ```
   $ sudo ktadmin db --start --pg-rootdir /var/lib/keytrustee/db --background
   ```

3. Restore the Key Trustee Server database:

   ```
   $ su - keytrustee
   $ export PATH=$PATH:/opt/cloudera/parcels/KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER/PG_DB/opt/postgres/9.3/bin
   $ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/cloudera/parcels/KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER/PG_DB/opt/postgres/9.3/lib
   $ unzip -p /path/to/keytrustee-db.zip | psql -p 11381 -d keytrustee
   ```

   If the zip file is encrypted, you are prompted for the password to decrypt the file.

4. Restore the Key Trustee Server configuration directory:

   ```
   $ su - keytrustee
   $ cd /var/lib/keytrustee
   $ unzip /path/to/keytrustee-conf.zip
   ```

   If the zip file is encrypted, you are prompted for the password to decrypt the file.
5. Stop the PostgreSQL server:

```
$ sudo ktadmin db --stop --pg-rootdir /var/lib/keytrustee/db
```

6. Start the Key Trustee Server service in Cloudera Manager (Key Trustee Server service > Actions > Start).

7. Restart the Key Trustee KMS service in Cloudera Manager (Key Trustee KMS service > Actions > Restart).

8. Remove the backup files (keytrustee-db.zip and keytrustee-conf.zip) from the Key Trustee Server host.

Restoring Key Trustee Server in Package-Based Installations

If you have deployed Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server High Availability, perform these steps on both the active and passive Key Trustee Servers. The following procedures assume the default database port and location; if you modified these settings during installation, replace the database and port with your custom values.

If the Key Trustee Server host has failed completely, provision a new host with the same hostname and IP address as the failed host, and re-install Key Trustee Server. See Installing Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server for instructions.

**Important:** Make sure to install the same operating system and Key Trustee Server versions as the failed host.

After you have provisioned a new host and installed Key Trustee Server (or if you are restoring the database or configuration on the original host), restore the database and configuration directory. If your backups were created using the `ktbackup.sh` script, skip to Restoring Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS from ktbackup.sh Backups on page 250. If you need to restore the Active Key Trustee Server from the Passive Key Trustee Server, skip to Restoring Active Key Trustee Server from Passive Key Trustee Server on page 252.

If your backups were created manually using the `pg_dump` command, do the following:

1. Copy or move the backup files (keytrustee-db.zip and keytrustee-conf.zip) to the Key Trustee Server host.

2. Change the file ownership on the backup files to keytrustee:keytrustee:

   ```
   $ sudo chown keytrustee:keytrustee /path/to/keytrustee*.zip
   ```

3. Restore the Key Trustee Server database:

   ```
   $ su - keytrustee
   $ unzip -p /path/to/keytrustee-db.zip | psql -p 11381 -d keytrustee
   ```

   If the zip file is encrypted, you are prompted for the password to decrypt the file.

4. Restore the Key Trustee Server configuration directory:

   ```
   $ cd /var/lib/keytrustee
   $ unzip /path/to/keytrustee-conf.zip
   ```

   If the zip file is encrypted, you are prompted for the password to decrypt the file.

5. Start the Key Trustee Server service:

   - RHEL 6-compatible: $ sudo service keytrusteed start
   - RHEL 7-compatible: $ sudo systemctl start keytrusteed

6. Remove the backup files (keytrustee-db.zip and keytrustee-conf.zip) from the Key Trustee Server host.

Restoring Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS from ktbackup.sh Backups

After installing Key Trustee Server or Key Trustee KMS on a new host after a failure, or if you need to restore accidentally deleted keys on the same host, use the following procedure to restore Key Trustee Server or Key Trustee KMS from backups generated by the `ktbackup.sh` script.
1. Decrypt the backup tarball using the private key of the GPG recipient specified in the backup command by running the following command as the GPG recipient user account. The GPG recipient private key must be available on the Key Trustee Server or Key Trustee KMS host on which you run this command.

```
$ gpg -d -o /path/to/decrypted/backup.tar /path/to/encrypted/tarball
```

2. Verify the decrypted tarball using the `tar tvf` command. For example:

```
$ tar tvf kts_bak_kts01_example_com_2016-02-10_11-14-37.tar
```

3. Restore the files to their original locations, using this command for both Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS backups:

```
$ tar xvf /path/to/decrypted/backup.tar -C /
```

4. (Key Trustee Server Only) Drop and re-create the `keytrustee` PostgreSQL database, and restore the database from the backup.

- For parcel-based installations:

```
$ su - keytrustee
$ source /opt/cloudera/parcels/KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER/meta/keytrustee_env.sh
$ /opt/cloudera/parcels/KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER/PG_DB/opt/postgres/9.3/bin/psql -p 11381
psql (9.3.6)
Type "help" for help.
keytrustee=# \list
List of databases
+---+---+---+----------+---------------------------------------------+
| Name | Owner | Encoding | Collate | Ctype | Access privileges |
|-----|------|----------+---------|-------|------------------|
| keytrustee | keytrustee | UTF8 | en_US.UTF-8 | en_US.UTF-8 | =c/keytrustee |
| postgres | keytrustee | UTF8 | en_US.UTF-8 | en_US.UTF-8 | =c/keytrustee |
| template0 | keytrustee | UTF8 | en_US.UTF-8 | en_US.UTF-8 | | |
| + | | | | | |
| keytrustee=CTc/keytrustee | | | | | |
| template1 | keytrustee | UTF8 | en_US.UTF-8 | en_US.UTF-8 | =c/keytrustee |
| + | | | | | |
| keytrustee=CTc/keytrustee | | | | | (4 rows) |
| + | | | | | |
keytrustee=# \c postgres;
```
You are now connected to database "postgres" as user "keytrustee".

postgres=# drop database keytrustee;
DROP DATABASE

postgres=# create database keytrustee;
CREATE DATABASE

postgres=# \q
$ sudo -u keytrustee
/opt/cloudera/parcels/KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER/PG_DB/opt/postgres/9.3/bin/psql -p 11381 -f
/var/lib/keytrustee/kts_bak_kts01_example_com_2016-02-10_11-14-37.sql

• For package-based installations:

$ su - keytrustee
$ psql -p 11381
psql (9.3.6)
Type "help" for help.
keytrustee=# \list
List of databases
Name    |   Owner    | Encoding |   Collate   |    Ctype    |     Access privileges
------------+------------+----------+-------------+-------------+---------------------------
keytrustee | keytrustee | UTF8     | en_US.UTF-8 | en_US.UTF-8 |
postgres   | keytrustee | UTF8     | en_US.UTF-8 | en_US.UTF-8 |
template0  | keytrustee | UTF8     | en_US.UTF-8 | en_US.UTF-8 | =c/keytrustee
|            |          |          |             |             |
keytrustee=CTc/keytrustee
template1  | keytrustee | UTF8     | en_US.UTF-8 | en_US.UTF-8 | =c/keytrustee
|            |          |          |             |             |
keytrustee=CTc/keytrustee
(4 rows)
keytrustee=# \c postgres;
You are now connected to database "postgres" as user "keytrustee".

postgres=# drop database keytrustee;
DROP DATABASE

postgres=# create database keytrustee;
CREATE DATABASE

postgres=# \q
$ sudo -u keytrustee psql -p 11381 -f
/var/lib/keytrustee/kts_bak_kts01_example_com_2016-02-10_11-14-37.sql

5. Restart Key Trustee Server.
   • Using Cloudera Manager: Key Trustee Server service > Actions > Restart
   • Using the Command Line: Run the following command on the Key Trustee Server hosts:

   $ sudo service keytrusteed restart    #RHEL 6-compatible
   $ sudo systemctl restart keytrusteed  #RHEL 7-compatible

6. Restart the Key Trustee KMS service in Cloudera Manager (Key Trustee KMS service > Actions > Restart).

Restoring Active Key Trustee Server from Passive Key Trustee Server

If the Active Key Trustee Server fails, and you do not have a backup, you can restore it from the Passive Key Trustee Server using the following procedure. You can also use this procedure if you need to restore keys that were successfully written to the Passive Key Trustee Server, but are not included in the most recent backup.

The following procedure assumes you have installed Key Trustee Server on the replacement host and (if you are using Cloudera Manager) added the Key Trustee Server service. For instructions on installing Key Trustee Server, see Installing Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server.
1. Copy the Key Trustee Server database from the Passive Key Trustee Server host to the new Active Key Trustee Server host. Run the following command on the Passive Key Trustee Server host:

```
$ sudo rsync --exclude recovery.conf -a /var/lib/keytrustee/db root@kts01.example.com:/var/lib/keytrustee/
```

Replace `kts01.example.com` with the hostname of the new Active Key Trustee Server.

2. Make sure that the `recovery.conf` file did not get copied to the Active Key Trustee Server (for example, if there was a typo in your `rsync` command). Run the following command on the Active Key Trustee Server host:

```
$ sudo ls -l /var/lib/keytrustee/db/recovery.conf
```

If the file exists on the Active Key Trustee Server host, delete it. Make sure you are on the Active Key Trustee Server host before deleting the file. Do not delete the `recovery.conf` file on the Passive Key Trustee Server host.

3. Copy the configuration directory from the Passive Key Trustee Server host to the new Active Key Trustee Server host. Run the following command on the Passive Key Trustee Server host:

```
$ sudo rsync --exclude .ssl --exclude '*.*' -a /var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee root@kts01.example.com:/var/lib/keytrustee/
```

Replace `kts01.example.com` with the hostname of the new Active Key Trustee Server.

4. Create the `logs` directory and make sure it is owned by the `keytrustee` user and group:

```
$ sudo mkdir /var/lib/keytrustee/logs
$ sudo chown keytrustee:keytrustee /var/lib/keytrustee/logs
```

5. (Cloudera Manager only) Generate the Key Trustee Server keyring:

```
Key Trustee Server service > Actions > Generate Key Trustee Server Keyring
```

6. Set up the database on the Active Key Trustee Server host.

- Using Cloudera Manager: Key Trustee Server service > Actions > Set Up Key Trustee Server Database
- Using the Command Line:

```
$ sudo ktadmin --confdir /var/lib/keytrustee db --port 11381 --pg-rootdir /var/lib/keytrustee/db --bootstrap --slave kts02.example.com
```

Replace `kts02.example.com` with the hostname of the Passive Key Trustee Server.

7. Start the database.

- Using Cloudera Manager: Key Trustee Server service > Instances > Active Database > Actions > Start this Active Database
- Using the Command Line: Run the following command on the Active Key Trustee Server host:

```
$ sudo ktadmin --confdir /var/lib/keytrustee db --port 11381 --pg-rootdir /var/lib/keytrustee/db --bootstrap --slave kts02.example.com
```

Replace `kts02.example.com` with the hostname of the Passive Key Trustee Server.

8. Enable synchronous replication.

- Using Cloudera Manager: Key Trustee Server service > Actions > Setup Enable Synchronous Replication in HA mode
- Using the Command Line: Run the following command on the Active Key Trustee Server host:

```
$ sudo ktadmin --confdir /var/lib/keytrustee enable-synchronous-replication
```
9. Restart the Active Key Trustee Server.
   
   • Using Cloudera Manager: Key Trustee Server service > Actions > Restart
   • Using the Command Line: Run the following command on the Active Key Trustee Server host:

     ```
     $ sudo service keytrusteed restart #RHEL 6-compatible
     $ sudo systemctl restart keytrusteed    #RHEL 7-compatible
     ```

10. Restart the Key Trustee KMS service in Cloudera Manager (Key Trustee KMS service > Actions > Restart).

Initializing Standalone Key Trustee Server

If you are configuring high availability Key Trustee Server, skip this step and proceed to Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server High Availability. Cloudera strongly recommends configuring high availability for Key Trustee Server.

Initializing Standalone Key Trustee Server Using Cloudera Manager

**Important:** If you are using SSH software other than OpenSSH, the initialization fails. To prevent this, pre-create the SSH key before continuing:

```
$ sudo -u keytrustee ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /var/lib/keytrustee/.ssh/id_rsa
```

For new installations, use the Set up HDFS Data At Rest Encryption wizard and follow the instructions in Enabling HDFS Encryption Using the Wizard on page 299. When prompted, deselect the Enable High Availability option to proceed in standalone mode.

To set up Key Trustee Server manually, add the Key Trustee Server service to your cluster, following the instructions in Adding a Service. When customizing role assignments, assign only the Active Key Trustee Server and Active Database roles.

**Important:** You must assign the Key Trustee Server and Database roles to the same host. Key Trustee Server does not support running the database on a different host.

For parcel-based Key Trustee Server releases 5.8 and higher, Cloudera Manager automatically backs up Key Trustee Server (using the `ktbackup.sh` script) after adding the Key Trustee Server service. It also schedules automatic backups using `cron`. For package-based installations, you must manually back up Key Trustee Server and configure a `cron` job.

Cloudera Manager configures `cron` to run the backup script hourly. The latest 10 backups are retained in `/var/lib/keytrustee` in cleartext. For information about using the backup script and configuring the `cron` job (including how to encrypt backups), see Backing Up Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS Using the `ktbackup.sh` Script on page 244.

Initializing Standalone Key Trustee Server Using the Command Line

To initialize a standalone Key Trustee Server, run the following commands on the Key Trustee Server:

**Important:** For Key Trustee Server 5.4.0 and higher, the `ktadmin init-master` command is deprecated. Use the `ktadmin init` command instead. If you are using SSH software other than OpenSSH, the initialization fails. To prevent this, pre-create the SSH key before continuing:

```
$ sudo -u keytrustee ssh-keygen -t rsa /var/lib/keytrustee/.ssh/id_rsa
```

```
$ sudo ktadmin init --external-address keytrustee.example.com
$ sudo ktadmin db --bootstrap --port 11381 --pg-rootdir /var/lib/keytrustee/db
## For RHEL/CentOS 7, use 'sudo systemctl [stop|start] <service_name>' instead of 'sudo service <service_name> [stop|start]' ##
```
$ sudo service keytrustee-db stop
$ sudo service keytrustee-db start
$ sudo service keytrusteed start
$ sudo chkconfig keytrustee-db on
$ sudo chkconfig keytrusteed on

Replace `keytrustee.example.com` with the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the Key Trustee Server. Cloudera recommends using the default `/var/lib/keytrustee/db` directory for the PostgreSQL database.

To use a different port for the database, modify the `ktadmin init` and `ktadmin db` commands as follows:

```
$ sudo ktadmin init --external-address keytrustee.example.com --db-connect postgresql://localhost:<port>/keytrustee?host=/tmp
$ sudo ktadmin db --bootstrap --port <port> --pg-rootdir /var/lib/keytrustee/db
```

If you specify a database directory other than `/var/lib/keytrustee/db`, create or edit the `/etc/sysconfig/keytrustee-db` file and add the following line:

```
ARGS="--pg-rootdir /path/to/db"
```

The `ktadmin init` command initializes the Key Trustee configuration directory (`/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee` by default) and generates a self-signed certificate that Key Trustee Server uses for HTTPS communication.

The `ktadmin db --bootstrap` command initializes the database in the directory specified by the `--pg-rootdir` parameter.

The `sudo service keytrustee-db stop` and `sudo service keytrustee-db start` commands restart the Key Trustee Server database.

The `sudo service keytrusteed start` command starts Key Trustee Server.

Note: The `/etc/init.d/postgresql` script does not work when the PostgreSQL database is started by Key Trustee Server, and cannot be used to monitor the status of the database. Use `/etc/init.d/keytrustee-db` instead.

(Optional) Replace Self-Signed Certificate with CA-Signed Certificate

Important: Key Trustee Server certificates must be issued to the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the Key Trustee Server host. If you are using CA-signed certificates, ensure that the generated certificates use the FQDN, and not the short name.

If you have a CA-signed certificate for Key Trustee Server, see Managing Key Trustee Server Certificates on page 259 for instructions on how to replace the self-signed certificate.

Configuring a Mail Transfer Agent for Key Trustee Server

The Key Trustee Server requires a mail transfer agent (MTA) to send email. Cloudera recommends Postfix, but you can use any MTA that meets your needs.

To configure Postfix for local delivery, run the following commands:

```
export KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER_PK="/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/.ssl/ssl-cert-keytrustee-pk.pem"
export KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER_CERT="/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/.ssl/ssl-cert-keytrustee.pem"
export KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER_CA="/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/.ssl/ssl-cert-keytrustee-ca.pem"
export KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER_HOSTNAME="$(hostname -f)"
postconf -e 'mailbox_command ='
postconf -e 'smtpd_sasl_local_domain ='
```


```bash
postconf -e 'smtpd_sasl_auth_enable = yes'
postconf -e 'smtpd_sasl_security_options = noanonymous'
postconf -e 'broken_sasl_auth_clients = yes'
postconf -e 'smtpd_recipient_restrictions = permit_sasl_authenticated, permit_mynetworks, reject_unauth_destination'
postconf -e 'inet_interfaces = localhost'
postconf -e 'smtp_tls_security_level = may'
postconf -e 'smtpd_tls_security_level = may'
```

Start the Postfix service and ensure that it starts at boot:

```bash
$ service postfix restart
$ sudo chkconfig --level 235 postfix on
```

For information on installing Postfix or configuring a relay host, see the Postfix documentation.

### Verifying Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server Operations

Verify that the installation was successful by running the following command on all Key Trustee Servers.

```bash
curl -k https://keytrustee.example.com:11371/?a=fingerprint
```

Replace `keytrustee.example.com` with the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of each Key Trustee Server you are validating. This command outputs a fingerprint similar to the following:

```
4096R/4EDC4682366C827EE20DDEA2D850ACA33BEBB0D1
```

If high availability is enabled, the output should be identical for all Key Trustee Servers.

### Managing Key Trustee Server Organizations

Organizations allow you to configure Key Trustee for use in a multi-tenant environment. Using the `keytrustee-orgtool` utility, you can create organizations and administrators for multiple organizations. Organization administrators can then approve or deny the registration of clients, depending on the registration method.

**The keytrustee-orgtool Utility**

`keytrustee-orgtool` is a command-line utility for administering organizations. The `keytrustee-orgtool` command must be run as the root user.

The following table explains the various `keytrustee-orgtool` commands and parameters. Run `keytrustee-orgtool --help` to view this information at the command line.

**Table 24: Usage for keytrustee-orgtool**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Add</td>
<td>keytrustee-orgtool add [-h] -n name -c contacts</td>
<td>Adds a new organization and administrators for the organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List</td>
<td>keytrustee-orgtool list</td>
<td>Lists current organizations, including the authorization secret, all administrators, the organization creation date, and the organization expiration date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disable client</td>
<td>keytrustee-orgtool disable-client [-h] --fingerprint fingerprint</td>
<td>Disables a client that has already been activated by the organization administrator.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Description

### Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable client</td>
<td>keytrustee-orgtool enable-client [-h] --fingerprint fingerprint</td>
<td>Enables a client that has requested activation but has not yet been approved by the organization administrator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set authorization Code</td>
<td>keytrustee-orgtool set-auth [-h] -n name -s secret</td>
<td>Sets the authorization code to a new string, or to blank to allow automatic approvals without the code.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Create Organizations

Each new Key Trustee tenant needs its own organization. You can create new organizations using the `keytrustee-orgtool add` command. For example, to create a new organization for the Disaster Recovery group and add two administrators, Finn and Jake:

```
$ keytrustee-orgtool add -n disaster-recov -c finn@example.com,jake@example.com
```

When adding organizations:

- Do not use spaces or special characters in the organization name. Use hyphens or underscores instead.
- Do not use spaces between email addresses (when adding multiple administrators to an organization). Use a comma to separate email addresses, without any space (as shown in the example above).

Each contact email address added when creating the organization receives a notification email, as detailed below.

Once an organization exists, use the `keytrustee-orgtool add` command to add new administrators to the organization. For example, to add an administrator to the `disaster-recov` organization:

```
keytrustee-orgtool add -n disaster-recov -c marceline@example.com
```

**Note:** You cannot remove contacts from an organization with the `keytrustee-orgtool` utility.

### List Organizations

After creating an organization, verify its existence with the `keytrustee-orgtool list` command. This command lists details for all existing organizations. The following is the entry for the `disaster-recov` organization created in the example:

```
"disaster-recov": {
  "auth_secret": "/qF1CsyYqMLhdTznNY3Nw==",
  "contacts": [
    "finn@example.com",
    "jake@example.com"
  ],
  "creation": "2013-12-02T09:55:21",
  "expiration": "9999-12-31T15:59:59",
  "key_info": null,
  "name": "disaster-recov",
  "state": 0,
  "uuid": "xY3Z8xCwMuKZMiTYJa0mZ0dhMVdxyCUOc6vSNC9I8X"
}
```

### Change the Authorization Code

When an organization is created, an authorization code is automatically generated. When you run the `keytrustee-orgtool list` command, the code is displayed in the `auth_secret` field. To register with a Key...
Trustee Server, the client must have the authorization code along with the organization name. To set a new auth_secret, run the following command:

```bash
$ keytrustee-orgtool set-auth -n disaster-recov -s ThisISAS3cr3t!
```

Run the `keytrustee-orgtool list` command again, and confirm the updated auth_secret field:

```json
"disaster-recov": {
    "auth_secret": "ThisISAS3cr3t!",
    "contacts": ["finn@example.com", "jake@example.com"],
    "creation": "2013-12-02T09:55:21",
    "expiration": "9999-12-31T15:59:59",
    "key_info": null,
    "name": "disaster-recov",
    "state": 0,
    "uuid": "xY328xCwMuKZMiTYJa0mZ0dhMVdxhyCUOc6vSNc9I8X"
},
```

If you do not want to use an authorization code, set the auth_secret field to an empty string:

```bash
$ keytrustee-orgtool set-auth -n disaster-recov -s ""
```

Cloudera recommends requiring an authorization code.

**Notification Email and GPG Keys**

Whenever an administrator is added to an organization, the Key Trustee Server sends an automated email message (subject: "KeyTrustee Contact Registration") to the newly added administrator:

```plaintext
Hello, this is an automated message from your Cloudera keytrustee Server.
Welcome to Cloudera keytrustee! You have been listed as an administrator contact for keytrustee services at your organization [test-org]. As an administrator, you may be contacted to authorize the activation of new keytrustee clients.

We recommend that you register a GPG public key for secure administration of your clients. To do so, visit the link below and follow the instructions.

https://keytrustee01.example.com:11371/?q=CnRV6u0nbm7zB07BQEpXCSxNQQFxBz684uC0lcHMoWL

This link will expire in 12 hours, at Thu Sep 3 00:08:25 2015 UTC.
```

Cloudera recommends that an organization’s administrators:

- Register the GPG public key by following the link contained in the notification email. Registering the GPG public key is optional, but if you choose to register your public key:
  - Complete the process within 12 hours, before the link expires.
  - Upload the entire key, including the BEGIN and END strings, as shown here:

  ```plaintext
  -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
  Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux)
  Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org

  mQGiBDkHF3URBACkWGSyYh43pkXUw9wj/X1G67K8/DSr185r7dNtHNFLL/ewi110k2
  q8saWjz2QPl6DvdqUjMOdHfJ6kQq/tat9NzQhgcVrxfYNfgeBsvkHF/POthYc2RgL
  tZ6syBBW8jB4xt5V0j1JSGAMP0QEB8Jp2n2aRXPpodoDw179LM8Rq6r+gwCg52zA
  
  -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
  ```

- Import the Key Trustee Server’s public GPG key to verify that the server is the sender.
The organization's administrators are notified by email when new clients are registered to the Key Trustee Server using the mail transfer agent (as discussed in Configuring a Mail Transfer Agent for Key Trustee Server on page 255). However, if the server does not have access to email, you can use a local system mail address, such as username@hostname, where hostname is the system hostname and username is a valid system user. If you use a local system email address, be sure to regularly monitor the email box.

Managing Key Trustee Server Certificates

Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates are used to secure communication with Key Trustee Server. By default, Key Trustee Server generates self-signed certificates when it is first initialized. Cloudera strongly recommends using certificates signed by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA).

Generating a New Certificate

1. Generate a new certificate signing request (CSR):

   ```
   $ openssl req -new -key keytrustee_private_key.pem -out new.csr
   ```

   Replace `keytrustee_private_key.pem` with the filename of the private key. You can reuse the existing private key or generate a new private key in accordance with your company policies. For existing auto-generated self-signed certificates, the private key file is located at


2. Generate a new certificate from the CSR:

   • For a CA-signed certificate, submit the CSR to the CA, and they will provide a signed certificate.

   • To generate a new self-signed certificate, run the following command:

   ```
   $ openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in new.csr -signkey keytrustee_private_key.pem \
   -out new_keytrustee_certificate.pem
   ```

Replacing Key Trustee Server Certificates

Use the following procedure if you need to replace an existing certificate for the Key Trustee Server. For example, you can use this procedure to replace the auto-generated self-signed certificate with a CA-signed certificate, or to replace an expired certificate.

Note: Key Trustee Server supports password-protected private keys, but not password-protected certificates.

1. After Generating a New Certificate on page 259, back up the original certificate and key files:

   ```
   $ sudo cp -r /var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/.ssl /var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/.ssl.bak
   ```

2. (CA-Signed Certificates Only) Provide either the root or intermediate CA certificate:

   ```
   $ mv /path/to/rootca.pem \
   /var/lib/keytrustee/.ssl/ssl-cert-keytrustee-ca.pem
   ```

Important: If you have separate root CA and intermediate CA certificate files, then you must concatenate them into a single file. If you need to convert from a JKS with combined certificate and private key file to a PEM file and separate private key file, refer to Converting JKS Key and Certificate to PEM on page 453.
3. Make sure that the certificate and key files are owned by the keytrustee user and group, with file permissions set to 600:

```
$ sudo chown keytrustee:keytrustee /path/to/new/certificate.pem
$ sudo chown keytrustee:keytrustee /path/to/new/private_key.pem
$ sudo chmod 600 /path/to/new/certificate.pem
$ sudo chmod 600 /path/to/new/private_key.pem
```

4. Update the Key Trustee Server configuration with the location of the new certificate and key files:

- **Using Cloudera Manager:**
  1. Go to the Key Trustee Server service.
  2. Click the **Configuration** tab.
  3. Select **Category > Security**.
  4. Edit the following properties to specify the location of the new certificate and key files. If the private keys are not password protected, leave the password fields empty.
     - **Active Key Trustee Server TLS/SSL Server Private Key File (PEM Format)**
     - **Active Key Trustee Server TLS/SSL Server Certificate File (PEM Format)**
     - **Active Key Trustee Server TLS/SSL Private Key Password**
     - **Passive Key Trustee Server TLS/SSL Server Private Key File (PEM Format)**
     - **Passive Key Trustee Server TLS/SSL Server Certificate File (PEM Format)**
     - **Passive Key Trustee Server TLS/SSL Private Key Password**
  5. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.

- **Using the command line:**
  1. Edit `/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/keytrustee.conf` on the active and passive Key Trustee Server hosts and modify the `SSL_CERTIFICATE` and `SSL_PRIVATE_KEY` parameters as follows:

```
"SSL_CERTIFICATE": "/path/to/new/certificate.pem",
"SSL_PRIVATE_KEY": "/path/to/new/private_key.pem"
```

If the private key is password protected, add the following entry:

```
"SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_SCRIPT": "/path/to/password_script [arguments]"
```

Replace `/path/to/password_script [arguments]` with the path to a script (and any necessary command arguments) that returns the password for the private key file. If you do not want to create a script, you can use a simple command, such as `echo -n password`. For example:

```
"SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD_SCRIPT": "/bin/echo -n password"
```

Keep in mind that this method can expose the private key password in plain text to anyone who can view the `/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/keytrustee.conf` file.

5. Restart Key Trustee Server:

- **Using Cloudera Manager:** Restart the Key Trustee Server service (Key Trustee Server service > Actions > Restart).
- **Using the Command Line:** Restart the Key Trustee Server daemon:
  - RHEL 6-compatible: `sudo service keytrusteed restart`
  - RHEL 7-compatible: `sudo systemctl restart keytrusteed`

6. If you are using the Key Trustee KMS service in Cloudera Manager for HDFS Transparent Encryption on page 293, update the Java KeyStore (JKS) used on the Key Trustee KMS host:
a. Download the new certificate to the Key Trustee KMS host:

```
$ echo -n | openssl s_client -connect keytrustee01.example.com:11371 \   | sed -ne '/-BEGIN CERTIFICATE-/,/-END CERTIFICATE-/p' > /tmp/keytrustee_certificate.pem
```

b. Delete the existing keystore entry for `keytrustee01.example.com`:

```
$ keytool -delete -alias key_trustee_alias_name -keystore /path/to/truststore -v
```

c. Add the new keystore entry for `keytrustee01.example.com`:

```
$ keytool -import -trustcacerts -alias keytrustee01.example.com \   -file /tmp/keytrustee_certificate.pem -keystore /path/to/truststore
```

d. Restart the Key Trustee KMS service in Cloudera Manager.

7. If you are using Key HSM, update the Key Trustee Server and Key HSM configuration:

   a. Run the `keyhsm trust` command, using the path to the new certificate:

```
$ sudo keyhsm trust /path/to/new/key_trustee_server/cert
```

   b. Run the `ktadmin keyhsm` command, using the `--client-certfile` and `--client-keyfile` options to specify the location of the new certificate file and private key:

```
$ sudo ktadmin keyhsm --server https://keyhsm01.example.com:9090 --client-certfile /path/to/new/key_trustee_server/cert --client-keyfile /path/to/new/key_trustee_server/private_key
```

### Cloudera Navigator Key HSM

Cloudera Navigator Key HSM allows Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server to seamlessly integrate with a hardware security module (HSM). Key HSM enables Key Trustee Server to use an HSM as a root of trust for cryptographic keys, taking advantage of Key Trustee Server’s policy-based key and security asset management capabilities while at the same time satisfying existing, internal security requirements regarding treatment of cryptographic materials.

For instructions on installing Key HSM, see [Installing Cloudera Navigator Key HSM](#).

For instructions on configuring Key HSM, continue reading:

#### Initializing Navigator Key HSM

Before initializing Navigator Key HSM, verify that the HSM is properly configured and accessible from the Key HSM host, and that the HSM client libraries are installed on the Key HSM host:

- **SafeNet Luna**
  
  Install the SafeNet Luna client. No additional configuration is needed.

- **SafeNet KeySecure**
  
  Extract the KeySecure client tarball in the Key HSM library directory (`/usr/share/keytrustee-server-keyhsm/`).

- **Thales**
  
  Install the Thales client service. Copy `nCipherKM.jar, jce tools.jar, and rsaprinvc.jar` from the installation media (usually located in `opt/nfast/java/classes` relative to the installation media mount point) to the Key HSM library directory (`/usr/share/keytrustee-server-keyhsm/`).
See your HSM product documentation for more information on installing and configuring your HSM and client libraries.

Note: When using an HSM with Key Trustee Server and Navigator Encrypt, encrypting many block devices may exceed the capacity of the HSM. A key is created in the HSM for each encrypted block device, so be sure that your HSM can support your encryption requirements.

To initialize Key HSM, use the `service keyhsm setup` command in conjunction with the name of the target HSM distribution:

```
$ sudo service keyhsm setup [keysecure|thales|luna]
```

For all HSM distributions, this first prompts for the IP address and port number that Key HSM listens on.

Important: If you have implemented Key Trustee Server high availability, initialize Key HSM on each Key Trustee Server.

Cloudera recommends using the loopback address (127.0.0.1) for the listener IP address and 9090 as the port number:

```
-- Configuring keyHsm General Setup --
Cloudera Recommends to use 127.0.0.1 as the listener port for Key HSM
Please enter Key HSM SSL listener IP address: [127.0.0.1]
Will attempt to setup listener on 127.0.0.1
Please enter Key HSM SSL listener PORT number: 9090
validate Port:                                    :
```

If the setup utility successfully validates the listener IP address and port, you are prompted for additional information specific to your HSM. For HSM-specific instructions, continue to the HSM-Specific Setup for Cloudera Navigator Key HSM on page 262 section for your HSM.

The Key HSM keystore defaults to a strong, randomly-generated password. However, you can change the keystore password in the `application.properties` file:

```
keyhsm.keystore.password.set=yes
```

Then, run the `service keyhsm setup` command with the name of the HSM to which the keystore password applies. You will be prompted to enter the new keystore password, which must be a minimum of six characters in length:

```
$ sudo service keyhsm setup [keysecure|thales|luna]
```

After initial setup, the configuration is stored in the `/usr/share/keytrustee-server-keyhsm/application.properties` file, which contains human-readable configuration information for the Navigator Key HSM server.

Important: The truststore file created during Key HSM initialization must be stored at `/usr/share/keytrustee-server-keyhsm/`. There is no way to change the default location.

For additional details about keystores and truststores, see Understanding Keystores and Truststores on page 194.

HSM-Specific Setup for Cloudera Navigator Key HSM

SafeNet KeySecure

Note: KeySecure was previously named DataSecure, but the Key HSM configuration process is the same for both.
Prerequisites

Before setting up SafeNet KeySecure, be sure to:

- Set the protocol to NAE-XML
- Set Allow Key and Policy Configuration Operations to enabled
- Set Password Authentication to required
- Disable Client Certificate Authentication
- Set KeySecure Crypto Operations to activated

For additional details about SafeNet KeySecure settings, see the SafeNet KeySecure product documentation.

After entering the Key HSM listener IP address and port, the HSM setup for SafeNet KeySecure prompts for login credentials, the IP address of the KeySecure HSM, and the port number:

```
-- Ingrian HSM Credential Configuration --
Please enter HSM login USERNAME: keyhsm
Please enter HSM login PASSWORD: *******
Please enter HSM IP Address or Hostname: 172.19.1.135
Please enter HSM Port number: 9020
```

If the connection is successful, the following message is displayed:

```
Valid address:    |[ Successful ]|
```

The KeySecure setup utility then prompts you whether to use SSL:

```
Use SSL? [Y/n] Y
```

If you choose to use SSL, Key HSM attempts to resolve the server certificate, and prompts you to trust the certificate:

```
[0] 
Version: 3 
SerialNumber: 0 
IssuerDN: C=US,ST=TX,L=Austin,O=ACME,OU=Dev, 
CN=172.19.1.135,E=webadmin@example.com 
Start Date: Thu Jan 29 09:55:57 EST 2015 
Final Date: Sat Jan 30 09:55:57 EST 2016 
SubjectDN: C=US,ST=TX,L=Austin,O=ACME,OU=Dev, 
CN=172.19.1.135,E=webadmin@example.com 
Public Key: RSA Public Key 
modulus: 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
public exponent: 10001
Signature Algorithm: SHA256WithRSAEncryption
Signature: 235168c68567b27a30b14ab443388039ff12357f99ba439c6214e4529120d6cb4a9b95ab25f81b47de9354608df45525184e75e80eb0948eae3e15c25cd58c4f86c9b616dc5c68dfef3f718a0b6b5f65f20317eb5b96b30cd9d027a0e42f60de6d245598df1ceaa62b2405266f484143a74274922884ed3b18e4f6417643a2d6d1a5386d5921e78e20a14e29ca1bb2b57c0200fa4907bd9f3c890adae8380cb04d6c8710deeaef41576c0f767879a790f30a4b64a6afbb3a1ace0f3ced17ae142ee6f185eff64e8b71060b28563dd99e8367a0d3cbab33
```

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Thales HSM

By default, the Thales HSM client process listens on ports 9000 and 9001. The Cloudera Manager agent also listens on port 9000. To prevent a port conflict, you must change the Thales client ports. Cloudera recommends using ports 11500 and 11501.

To change the Thales client ports, run the following commands:

```
$ sudo /opt/nfast/bin/config-serverstartup --enable-tcp --enable-privileged-tcp --port=11500 --privport=11501
$ sudo /opt/nfast/sbin/init.d-ncipher restart
```

To configure Key HSM to use the modified port, edit the `/usr/share/keytrustee-server-keyhsm/start.sh` file and add the `-DNFAST_SERVER_PORT=11500` Java system property. For example:

```
java -classpath "/usr/safenet/lunaclient/jsp/lib/:/opt/nfast/java/classes/*" -Djava.library.path=/usr/safenet/lunaclient/jsp/lib/ -DNFAST_SERVER_PORT=11500 com.cloudera.app.run.Program $@
```

Before completing the Thales HSM setup, run the `nfkminfo` command to verify that the Thales HSM is properly configured:

```
$ sudo /opt/nfast/bin/nfkminfo
World generation  2
state       0x17270000 Initialised Usable Recovery !PINRecovery !ExistingClient
RTC  NVRAM FTO !AlwaysUseStrongPrimes SEEDebug
```

If `state` reports `!Usable` instead of `Usable`, configure the Thales HSM before continuing. See the Thales product documentation for instructions.

After entering the Key HSM listener IP address and port, the HSM setup for Thales prompts for the OCS card password:

```
Please enter the OCS Card Password (input suppressed):
```

Configuration saved in 'application.properties' file
Configuration stored in: 'application.properties'. (Note: You can also use service keyHsm settings to quickly view your current configuration)

Luna HSM

Important: If you have implemented Key Trustee Server high availability, ensure that the Luna client on each Key Trustee Server is configured with access to the same partition. See the Luna product documentation for instructions on configuring the Luna client.

Before completing the Luna HSM setup, run the `vtl verify` command (usually located at `/usr/safenet/lunaclient/bin/vtl`) to verify that the Luna HSM is properly configured.
After entering the Key HSM listener IP address and port, the HSM setup for Luna prompts for the slot number and password:

```
-- Configuring SafeNet Luna HSM --
Please enter SafeNetHSM Slot Number: 1
Please enter SafeNet HSM password (input suppressed):
Configuration stored in: 'application.properties'. (Note: You can also use service keyHsm settings to quickly view your current configuration)
Configuration saved in 'application.properties' file
```

See the Luna product documentation for instructions on configuring your Luna HSM if you do not know what values to enter here.

**Validating Key HSM Settings**

After the setup completes, the Key HSM configuration is stored in
/usr/share/keytrustee-server-keyhsm/application.properties.

You can view these settings using the `service keyhsm settings` command:

```bash
$ sudo service keyhsm settings
# keyHsm Server Configuration information:
keyhsm.management.address : 172.19.1.2
keyhsm.server.port : 9090
keyhsm.management.port : 9899
keyhsm.service.port : 19791
keyhsm.hardware : ncipher

# Module OCS Password
thales.ocs_password :
GIqhXDuZsjlOet137Lb+f+tqkYvKYDm/8StefpNg2Ww1B+LfsY1B4eHd
endidTJio8gLjjbT+e7j2th5xf809t8fwfVguuyFW+6wdD
uNGvse1LY/itCwqFOscM1BlMnz4010xqcC6y1PW71+0JjjkkgqmqMsJb18lsQFFaIGVM/pY=
```

These settings can be manually configured by modifying the `application.properties` file, with the exception of any passwords. These are encrypted by design, and can only be changed by re-running the setup utility.

**Verifying Key HSM Connectivity to HSM**

To verify Hardware Security Module (HSM) operations using Key HSM, run the following command on the Key Trustee Server host (which should also be the Key HSM host as described in Installing Cloudera Navigator Key HSM):

```bash
$ curl -k https://keytrustee01.example.com:11371/test_hsm
```

If Key HSM operations to the HSM are successful, the command returns output similar to the following:

```
"Sample Key TEST_HELLO_DEPOSIT2016-06-03-072718 has been created"
```

You must run this command from the Key Trustee Server host. If you run it from a different host, the command returns an HTTP 403 error code.

If the command returns an HTTP 405 error code, restart Key Trustee Server and try again.

**Note:** If you are using the `test_hsm` script to verify that the Key Hardware Security Module (Key HSM) has successfully integrated with the Key HSM Server, or to verify that the Key HSM is connected to HSM, and the Key Trustee Server private key file is password-protected, then the verification may fail. This can occur even if the integration is successful or connected.

If this occurs, then create a key through Hadoop for the test.
Managing the Navigator Key HSM Service

Use the `keyhsm` service for all basic server operations:

```
$ sudo service keyhsm
keyhsm service usage:
  setup <hsm name> - setup a new connection to an HSM
  trust <path>    - add a trusted client certificate
  validate        - validate that keyHSM is properly configured
  settings        - display the current server configuration
  start           - start the keyHSM proxy server
  status          - show the current keyHSM server status
  shutdown        - force keyHSM server to shut down
  reload          - reload the server (without shutdown)
```

The `reload` command causes the application to restart internal services without ending the process itself. If you want to stop and start the process, use the `restart` command.

Logging and Audits

The Navigator Key HSM logs contain all log and audit information, and by default are stored in the `/var/log/keyhsm` directory.

You can configure the maximum log size (in bytes) and maximum number of log files to retain by adding or editing the following entries in `/usr/share/keytrustee-server-keyhsm/application.properties`:

```
keyhsm.log.size = 100000000
keyhsm.roll.size = 3
```

The values used in this example are the default values, and are used if these parameters are not set.

To enable debug logging, add the `debug` parameter to the start command:

```
$ sudo service keyhsm start debug
```

**Note:** You cannot start Key HSM in debug mode using the `systemctl` command on RHEL 7-compatible OS. You must use the `service` command.

This enables debug logging until the service is restarted without the `debug` parameter.

Key Naming Convention

To ensure you can manage keys (for example, delete a key), you need to understand the naming convention for keys. Keys adhere to the following naming convention: `handle name-uuid-date`, which means if you know the key name and date, you can make modifications to it.

The following example shows the key nomenclature in the context of a key list query on Luna HSM:

```
[root@user 64]# cmu list
Please enter password for token in slot 1 : **********
handle=220 label=_=+[{]}\]|;\"<.>/?Migration__3T1-YYd__2015-07-23-120656
handle=806 label=user-keytrustee.vpc.company.com__CMY-8Sy__2015-07-23-135557
handle=108 label=_=+[{]}\]|;\"<.>/?Migration__qo6-XQf__2015-07-23-120406
handle=908 label=user-keytrustee.vpc.company.com__CMY-8Sy__2015-07-23-135557--cert0
handle=614 label=_=+[{]}\]|;\"<.>/?Migration__qo6-RWz__2015-07-23-120406--cert0
handle=825 label=_=+[{]}\]|;\"<.>/?Migration__3T1-YYd__2015-07-23-120656--cert0
```

Integrating Key HSM with Key Trustee Server

Using a hardware security module with Navigator Key Trustee Server requires Key HSM. This service functions as a driver to support interactions between Navigator Key Trustee Server and the hardware security module, and it must be installed on the same host system as Key Trustee Server. The steps below assume that both Key HSM and Key
Trustee Server are set up and running. See Installing Cloudera Navigator Key HSM for details. Integrating Key HSM and Key Trustee Server involves the following steps:

1. Check Existing Key Names (for existing Key Trustee Server users only)
2. Establish Trust from Key HSM to Key Trustee Server
3. Integrate Key HSM and Key Trustee Server

Check Existing Key Names

During the process detailed below, you are prompted to migrate any existing keys from the Key Trustee Server to the HSM.

**Warning:** Migration fails if any existing keys do not adhere to the constraints.

Successful migration depends on the existing keys conforming to the following constraints:

- Key names can begin with alpha-numeric characters only
- Key names can include only these special characters:
  - Hyphen –
  - Period .
  - Underscore _

If any existing key names in Key Trustee Server do not meet the requirements listed above, the migration fails. To prepare for migration, check your key names and do the following if any of them are non-conforming:

- Decrypt any data using the non-conforming key
- Create a new key, named per the requirements
- Re-encrypt the data using the new key

After this, the migration from Key Trustee Server to the HSM will succeed during the process below.

**Important:** Keys are not available during migration, so you should perform these tasks during a maintenance window.

Establish Trust from Key HSM to Key Trustee Server

This step assumes that Key Trustee Server has a certificate for TLS (wire) encryption as detailed in Managing Key Trustee Server Certificates on page 259. Before you can run the commands in the steps below, Key HSM service must explicitly trust the Key Trustee Server certificate (presented during TLS handshake). To establish this trust, run the following command:

```
$ sudo keyhsm trust /path/to/key_trustee_server/cert
```

The `/path/to/key_trustee_server/cert` in this command (and in the commands below) depends on whether the Key Trustee Server uses the default certificate (created by default during install), or uses a custom certificate (obtained from a commercial or internal CA). The two alternate paths are shown in the table below. The custom path is a common example but may differ from that shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Default</th>
<th>Custom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/.ssl-cert-keytrustee.pem</code></td>
<td><code>/etc/pki/cloudera/certs/cert-file.crt</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/.ssl-cert-keytrustee-pk.pem</code></td>
<td><code>/etc/pki/cloudera/private/private-key.key</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Integrate Key HSM and Key Trustee Server

The steps below assume that both Key HSM and the Key Trustee Server are on the same host system, as detailed in Installing Cloudera Navigator Key HSM. These steps invoke commands on the Key HSM service and the Key Trustee Server, and they must be run on the host—they cannot be run remotely from another host.

1. Ensure the Key HSM service is running:

   $ sudo service keyhsm start

2. Establish trust from Key Trustee Server to Key HSM specifying the path to the private key and certificate (Key Trustee Server is a client to Key HSM). This example shows how to use the --client-certfile and --client-keyfile options to specify the path to non-default certificate and key:

   $ sudo ktadmin keyhsm --server https://keyhsm01.example.com:9090 
   --client-certfile /etc/pki/cloudera/certs/mycert.crt 
   --client-keyfile /etc/pki/cloudera/certs/mykey.key --trust

   For a password-protected Key Trustee Server private key, add the --passphrase argument to the command and enter the password when prompted:

   $ sudo ktadmin keyhsm --passphrase 
   --server https://keyhsm01.example.com:9090 
   --client-certfile /etc/pki/cloudera/certs/mycert.crt 
   --client-keyfile /etc/pki/cloudera/certs/mykey.key --trust

   **Note:** The preceding commands also create a certificate file for the Key HSM that is used by the Key Trustee Server. This certificate file is stored in /var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/ssl/ssl-cert-keyhsm.pem.

3. Restart Key Trustee Server:
   - **Using Cloudera Manager:** Restart the Key Trustee Server service (Key Trustee Server service > Actions > Restart).
   - **Using the Command Line:** Restart the Key Trustee Server daemon:
     - RHEL 6-compatible: $ sudo service keytrusteed restart
     - RHEL 7-compatible: $ sudo systemctl restart keytrusteed

4. Verify connectivity between the Key HSM service and the HSM:

   $ curl -k https://keytrustee01.example.com:11371/test_hsm

   **Important:** You must perform the connection verification between Key HSM and the HSM for all Key Trustee Server hosts.

   Successful connection and test of operations returns output like the following:

   "Sample Key TEST_HELLO_DEPOSIT2016-06-03-072718 has been created"
**Note:** If you are using the `test_hsm` script to verify that the Key Hardware Security Module (Key HSM) has successfully integrated with the Key Trustee Server, or to verify that the Key HSM is connected to HSM, *and* the Key Trustee Server private key file is password-protected, then the verification may fail. This can occur even if the integration is successful or connected. If this occurs, then create a key through Hadoop for the test.

See [Verifying Key HSM Connectivity to HSM](#) on page 265 for more information about the validation process.

---

**Cloudera Navigator Encrypt**

Cloudera Navigator Encrypt transparently encrypts and secures data at rest without requiring changes to your applications and ensures there is minimal performance lag in the encryption or decryption process. Advanced key management with [Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server](#) on page 243 and process-based access controls in Navigator Encrypt enable organizations to meet compliance regulations and ensure unauthorized parties or malicious actors never gain access to encrypted data.

For instructions on installing Navigator Encrypt, see [Installing Cloudera Navigator Encrypt](#).

For instructions on configuring Navigator Encrypt, continue reading:

**Registering Cloudera Navigator Encrypt with Key Trustee Server**

**Prerequisites**

**Functioning Navigator Key Trustee Server**

After [Installing Cloudera Navigator Encrypt](#) on a host, you must register the host with Navigator Key Trustee Server. If you have not yet installed Navigator Key Trustee Server, see [Installing Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server](#) for instructions.

**Key Trustee Server Organization**

To register with Key Trustee Server, you must have an existing organization. See [Managing Key Trustee Server Organizations](#) on page 256 for information on creating and viewing organizations on a Key Trustee Server.

**Master Password**

The Master Key is the primary Navigator Encrypt administrator access code and is configured by the Navigator Encrypt administrator during installation. The Master Key can take any one of three different forms:

- If you choose a passphrase (single), it must be between 15 and 32 characters long.
- If you choose passphrase (dual), both must be between 15 and 32 characters long.
- If you choose the RSA option, enter a path to the RSA key file, and if it has RSA passphrase, enter it for this private key.

**Warning:** It is **extremely** important that you keep your master password secret and safe. In the event that you lose your master password, you **will never be able to recover** it, leaving your encrypted data **irretrievably locked away**.

**Registering with Key Trustee Server**

After [Installing Cloudera Navigator Encrypt](#) on a host, you must register the host with Navigator Key Trustee Server to be able to encrypt and decrypt data. The following section lists the command options for registering your Navigator Encrypt client.
Note: Do not run Navigator Encrypt commands with the `screen` utility.

If the TLS certificate is signed by an internal CA that is not publicly recognized, then you must add the root certificate to the host certificate truststore of each Navigator Encrypt client. For details, see the Example command:

```
$ sudo navencrypt register --server=https://keytrustee01.example.com:11371
--passive-server=https://keytrustee02.example.com:11371
--org=your_keytrustee_org
--auth=org_auth_token
```

Table 25: Registration Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Option</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--clientname=my_client_name</td>
<td>User-defined unique name for this client to be used for administration and reports. You can verify your client name in the <code>/etc/navencrypt/keytrustee/clientname</code> file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--server=<a href="https://keytrustee01.example.com:11371">https://keytrustee01.example.com:11371</a></td>
<td>Target Active Key Trustee Server for key storage. Replace <code>keytrustee01.example.com:11371</code> with the hostname and port of the Active Key Trustee Server. The default port is 11371.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--passive-server=<a href="https://keytrustee02.example.com:11371">https://keytrustee02.example.com:11371</a></td>
<td>Target Passive Key Trustee Server for key storage. Replace <code>keytrustee02.example.com:11371</code> with the hostname and port of the Passive Key Trustee Server. The default port is 11371.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--org=your_keytrustee_org</td>
<td>Key Trustee organization name configured by the Key Trustee Server administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--auth=org_auth_token</td>
<td>Organization authorization token, a pre-shared secret by the Navigator Key Trustee Server administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--skip-ssl-check</td>
<td>Skip SSL certificate verification. Use with self-signed certificates on the Navigator Key Trustee Server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--trustee</td>
<td>Add trustees for retrieval of the master key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--votes</td>
<td>Configure voting policy for trustees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--recoverable</td>
<td>Master Key will be uploaded without encrypting it with your local GPG Navigator Key Trustee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--scheme &quot;&lt;scheme&gt;&quot;</td>
<td>Key Trustee Server scheme that Navigator Encrypt uses for public key operations. Specify &quot;http&quot; or &quot;https&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--port</td>
<td>Key Trustee Server port that Navigator Encrypt uses for public key operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Registering with Previous Versions of Key Trustee Server

By default, new installations of Navigator Key Trustee Server 5.4.0 use a single HTTPS port for key storage and public key operations. Previous versions and upgrades use separate ports for key storage and public key operations. For backward compatibility, Navigator Encrypt 3.7.0 introduces the `--scheme` and `--port` parameters for the `navencrypt register` command.
For example, to register a version 3.7.0 Navigator Encrypt client with a version 3.8.0 Key Trustee Server using HTTPS over port 443 for key storage and HTTP over port 80 for public key operations, run the following command:

```bash
$ sudo navencrypt register --server=https://keytrustee.example.com:443 --org=key_trustee_org --auth=auth_token --scheme "http" --port 80
```

Navigator Encrypt versions lower than 3.7.0 do not support the `--scheme` and `--port` parameters. For these versions of Navigator Encrypt, you must ensure that the Key Trustee Server is configured to use port 443 (HTTPS) for key storage and port 80 (HTTP) for public key operations.

Navigator Encrypt versions lower than 3.8.0 do not support the `--passive-server` parameter.

### Updating Key Trustee Server Ports

The `navencrypt register` command does not provide the ability to change the ports for existing registrations. If the Key Trustee Server ports are changed, you must update `/etc/navencrypt/keytrustee/ztrustee.conf` with the new port and scheme parameters (`HKP_PORT` and `HKP_SCHEME`, respectively).

For example, see the following `ztrustee.conf` excerpt from a registered client that has been upgraded to Navigator Encrypt 3.7.0:

```json
{
    "LOCAL_FINGERPRINT": "2048R/182AAA838DC300AC334258D8E7F299BFB68A6F6F",
    "REMOTES": {
        "kts01.example.com": {
            "REMOTE_FINGERPRINT": "4096R/AF6400E12DC149799C8A8CE6BF1604C34D830DE20",
            "REMOTE_SERVER": "https://kts01.example.com",
            "DEFAULT": true,
            "SSL_INSECURE": false,
            "PROTOCOL": "json-encrypt"
        }
    }
}
```

In this example, the Key Trustee Server (`keytrustee.example.com`) is using the default configuration of port 443 (HTTPS) for key storage and port 80 (HTTP) for public key operations.

If the Key Trustee Server is then updated to use port 11371 (HTTPS) for both key storage and public key operations, you must update `ztrustee.conf` as follows (changes in **bold**):

```json
{
    "LOCAL_FINGERPRINT": "2048R/182AAA838DC300AC334258D8E7F299BFB68A6F6F",
    "REMOTES": {
        "kts01.example.com": {
            "REMOTE_FINGERPRINT": "4096R/AF6400E12DC149799C8A8CE6BF1604C34D830DE20",
            "REMOTE_SERVER": "https://kts01.example.com:11371",
            "HKP_PORT": 11371,
            "HKP_SCHEME": "https",
            "DEFAULT": true,
            "SSL_INSECURE": false,
            "PROTOCOL": "json-encrypt"
        }
    }
}
```

### Updating Navigator Encrypt for High Availability Key Trustee Server

If you registered a Navigator Encrypt client with a standalone Key Trustee Server, and then configured **high availability** for Key Trustee Server, you can edit `/etc/navencrypt/keytrustee/ztrustee.conf` to enable the client to take
advantage of the high availability features. The following example shows the contents of `ztrustee.conf` after adding the required `REMOTE_SERVERS` entry (changes in bold):

```json
{
    "LOCAL_FINGERPRINT": "2048R/182AAA838DC300AC334258D8E7F299BF68A6F6F",
    "REMOTES": {
        "kts01.example.com": {
            "REMOTE_FINGERPRINT": "4096R/AF6400E12DC14979CC8CE6BF1604C34D8360E20",
            "REMOTE_SERVER": "https://kts01.example.com:11371",
            "HKP_PORT": 11371,
            "HKP_SCHEME": "https",
            "DEFAULT": true,
            "REMOTE_SERVERS": ["https://kts01.example.com:11371",
                                "https://kts02.example.com:11371"],
            "SSL_INSECURE": true,
            "PROTOCOL": "json-encrypt"
        }
    }
}
```

Configuration Files

The installer creates the `/etc/navencrypt` directory. All configuration settings are saved in this directory. Do not delete any file from `/etc/navencrypt`. These files provide the necessary information for the Navigator Encrypt application to function properly.

⚠️ **Warning:** Perform backups of encrypted data, mount-points, and Navigator Encrypt configuration directories on a regular basis. To do this, ensure you have a backup of `/etc/navencrypt`. Failure to backup this directory will make your backed up encrypted data unrecoverable in the event of data loss.

Change Master Key by UUID

It is possible to re-use a previously used Master Key by its UUID. For example, if you currently have a Master key with a single passphrase, you can see the corresponding Navigator Key Trustee UUID in the `/etc/navencrypt/control` file:

```
$ cat /etc/navencrypt/control
{
    "app": {
        "name": "navencrypt",
        "version": "3.5"
    },
    "keys": {
        "master": {
            "type": "single-passphrase",
            "uuid": "qMAKRMdk4HVbfzR79cp9w92YBMNHJ5nSLhfdd82Vo6L"
        },
        "targets": []
    }
}
```

Note: If the control file is accidentally deleted, you can restore it using the `navencrypt control --restore-control-file` command.

You can copy the UUID (qMAKRMdk4HVbfzR79cp9w92YBMNHJ5nSLhfdd82Vo6L in this example) and run `navencrypt key --change` with option `--new-master-key-uuid` to change a Master Key by using its UUID only:

```
$ sudo navencrypt key --change
--new-master-key-uuid=qMAKRMdk4HVbfzR79cp9w92YBMNHJ5nSLhfdd82Vo6L
>> Type your OLD Master key
```
Type MASTER passphrase 1:
Type MASTER passphrase 2:
Verifying Master Key against Navigator Key Trustee (wait a moment)... OK
Changing Master key (wait a moment)... * Setting up EXISTING MASTER key...
* Uploading CONTROL content...
* Re-encrypting local keys...
Master key successfully changed.

Note: The `navencrypt key` command fails if no volumes are encrypted or the kernel module is not loaded.

Preparing for Encryption Using Cloudera Navigator Encrypt

Before you can encrypt data, you must prepare a storage repository to hold the encrypted data and a mount point through which to access the encrypted data. The storage repository and mount point must exist before encrypting data using the `navencrypt-move` command.

Data stored and retrieved from the repository is encrypted and decrypted transparently.

Cloudera Navigator Encrypt does not support:

- Encrypting a directory that contains or is contained within a mount point for another service (including Navigator Encrypt and NFS). See Encrypting Data on page 280 for more information.
- Encrypting immutable files or directories containing immutable files.
- Installation or use in chroot environments, including creating chroot environments within an encrypted directory.
- Encrypting HDFS data files.

Navigator Encrypt Commands

Note: Do not run Navigator Encrypt commands with the `screen` utility.

The following table lists the commands used to encrypt data:

**Table 26: Navigator Encrypt Commands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>navencrypt</td>
<td>Manage, update, and verify your data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>navencrypt-prepare</td>
<td>Prepare your system for encryption by creating mount-points and specifying storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>navencrypt-prepare --undo</td>
<td>Remove a mountpoint that is no longer in use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>navencrypt-move</td>
<td>Encrypt/decrypt your data to/from the encrypted filesystem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>navencrypt-profile</td>
<td>Generate process profile information in JSON format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>navencrypt-module-setup</td>
<td>Build or rebuild the Navigator Encrypt kernel module.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Preparing for Encryption

Note: When using an HSM with Key Trustee Server and Navigator Encrypt, encrypting many block devices may exceed the capacity of the HSM. A key is created in the HSM for each encrypted block device, so be sure that your HSM can support your encryption requirements.
To get an in-depth look at the details behind the `navencrypt-prepare` command, or to use a unique configuration, use the interactive prompt by executing `navencrypt-prepare` with no options. This launches an interactive console that guides you through the following operations:

- Creating internal encryption keys
- Registering internal keys in Navigator Key Trustee
- Registering mount point in `/etc/navencrypt/ztab`
- Mounting current mount point
- Establishing encryption method (`dm-crypt` for devices, `ecryptfs` for directories)

Using the console, you can choose how you want your data stored and accessed. Navigator Encrypt offers two different types of encryption:

- Block-level encryption with `dm-crypt`: Protect your data by encrypting the entire device. This option enables full disk encryption and is optimized for some system configurations. Block-level encryption can be used with logical devices such as a loop device.
- File-level encryption with `ecryptfs`: Protect your data by mounting an encrypted filesystem on top of an existing one. Enables transparent access to encrypted data without modifying your storage.

**Note:** As of August 2015, Filesystem-level encryption using eCryptfs is deprecated. For new installations, use block-level encryption. For existing installations using eCryptfs, see [Migrating eCryptfs-Encrypted Data to dm-crypt](#) on page 281 for instructions on migrating data encrypted using eCryptfs to use dm-crypt.

See [Block-Level Encryption with dm-crypt](#) on page 275 and [Filesystem-Level Encryption with eCryptfs](#) on page 278 for more information.

To prepare for encryption, you must set a location to store the encrypted data and a mount point through which to access the data. The storage location and mount point must be created before encrypting data.

**Note:** If you are performing a file system check as part of your preparation work, then note that the crypto device must be mapped and active. Also, be aware that if you execute `fsck` in force mode (`-f`), there is a risk of data loss. If the force operation fails, it could cause file system corruption at the device header.

In the following example, we will use the directory `/navencrypt/encrypted-storage` for the encrypted storage and `/navencrypt/mount-point` for the mount point. If you have specific space/partition requirements, you can select a different directory, although Cloudera highly recommends that you place the encrypted directory on the same partition as the data you are planning to encrypt.

The syntax for the prepare command is as follows:

```
$ sudo navencrypt-prepare <data_storage_directory> <mount_point>
```

When specifying the storage path and the mount point path, do not use a trailing `/` in the path names. Both directories must exist prior to running the `navencrypt-prepare` command. They are not automatically created.

To create the encrypted partition, create the mount point and storage directories, and then use the `navencrypt-prepare` utility:

```
$ sudo mkdir -p /navencrypt/encrypted-storage /navencrypt/mount-point
$ sudo navencrypt-prepare /navencrypt/encrypted-storage /navencrypt/mount-point
```

For RHEL 7, run the following command after the `navencrypt-prepare` command completes:

```
$ sudo systemctl start navencrypt-mount
```
To demonstrate the difference between the two directories, this example uses different directories for the encrypted storage and the mount point. It is also possible to store and access the data using the same directory.

To see the effects of these commands, run `df -h`. This command displays the partition information about your system. You should see an `ecryptfs` partition located at `/navencrypt/encrypted-storage`, and mounted at `/navencrypt/mount-point`.

After you have successfully prepared a client for encryption, you can encrypt and decrypt data using the commands described in Encrypting and Decrypting Data Using Cloudera Navigator Encrypt on page 279.

**Navigator Encrypt and Device UUIDs**

Navigator Encrypt has always prepared and identified devices simply using a device name, such as `/dev/sdb1` or `/dev/loop0`. However, we know that using a device name or label could lead to a conflict and impact system operations.

Navigator Encrypt also supports preparing devices using a UUID, in addition to device name. This UUID is simply a symbolic link to the actual device, and is created when preparing a device with Navigator Encrypt during a `navencrypt-prepare` operation.

The advantage of using a device UUID is that if a device's name changes, the UUID associated with that device does not change. To ensure that Navigator Encrypt recognizes devices even when the device name changes, enter the command:

```
navencrypt-prepare --use-uuid /dev/sda1 /mountpoint
```

To unprepare (ensure the device UUID is included), enter either of the following commands:

```
navencrypt-prepare --undo-force /dev/disk/by-uuid/3a602a15-11f7-46ac-ae98-0a51e1b25cf9
navencrypt-prepare --undo /dev/disk/by-uuid/3a602a15-11f7-46ac-ae98-0a51e1b25cf9
```

**Note:** While the device name is still used in the `navencrypt-prepare` statement, rest assured that Navigator Encrypt handles the device by the UUID, which is calculated and used for mount during boot. The device name is used for convenience so that you do not have to explicitly input the UUID in the command. Ultimately, Navigator Encrypt handles the device via the device UUID rather than the device name.

**Important:** UUID device support does not include loop devices; rather, it only applies to physical devices. When preparing loop devices with Navigator Encrypt, always use the device name.

**Block-Level Encryption with dm-crypt**

**Note:** For best performance, Cloudera strongly recommends using block encryption with dm-crypt. See Migrating eCryptfs-Encrypted Data to dm-crypt on page 281 for instructions on migrating data encrypted using eCryptfs to use dm-crypt.

When choosing block-level encryption during the interactive console, you must specify two parameters:

1. The first parameter is the block device that you want to store the encrypted file system in. Because this device stores all of the encrypted data, it must be as large as or larger than the target data. The device must exist and be empty. Supported storage devices are:
   - Physical block devices (for example, a disk device)
   - Virtual block devices (for example, a block device created by LVM)
   - Loop devices (see Block-Level Encryption with a Loop Device on page 276 for instructions on creating a loop device)
Important: If the block device to be used for encryption was previously used by the host, entries for it must be removed from the file /etc/fstab before running the navencrypt-prepare command.

2. The second parameter is the mount point for the encrypted file system. This is the location where you can access the encrypted data stored in the first parameter. The mount point must already exist. It is not created by the navencrypt-prepare command.

The entire device in the first parameter is used for encrypted data.

Note: Do not manually unmount the encryption mount point (for example, using umount). If you do so, you must manually close the dm-crypt device using the following procedure:

1. Run dmsetup table to list the dm-crypt devices.
2. Run cryptsetup luksClose <device_name> to close the device for the unmounted mount point.

After choosing these two parameters and following the interactive console (discussed further in Preparing for Encryption on page 273), you are ready to encrypt your data. The following example shows successful output from a navencrypt-prepare command using dm-crypt for block-level encryption:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt-prepare /dev/sda1 /mnt/dm_encrypted
Type MASTER passphrase: 
Encryption Type: dmCrypt (LUKS)
Cipher: aes
Key Size: 256
Random Interface: /dev/urandom
Filesystem: ext4
Verifying MASTER key against Navigator Key Trustee (wait a moment) ... OK
Generation Encryption Keys with /dev/urandom ... OK
Preparing dmCrypt device (--use-urandom) ... OK
Creating ext4 filesystem ... OK
Registering Encryption Keys (wait a moment) ... OK
Mounting /dev/sda1 ... OK
```

Block-Level Encryption with a Loop Device

A block-level encrypted device can be a physical device or a storage space treated as a device. See Migrating eCryptfs-Encrypted Data to dm-crypt on page 281 for instructions on migrating data encrypted using eCryptfs to use dm-crypt with a loop device.

To configure a loop device, use the dd command to create a storage space:

```
$ sudo dd if=/dev/zero of=/dmcrypt/storage bs=1G count=500
```

The dd command above creates a 500 GB file. Modify the bs and count values to generate the required file size.

After generating the file, run losetup -f to view unused loop devices. Use the available loop device with the navencrypt-prepare -d command, demonstrated below.
Specifically for loop devices, the `-d` parameter enables Navigator Encrypt to manage the loop device association. You no longer need to use the `losetup` command to associate the file with the loop device, and the loop device is automatically prepared at boot. For RHEL 7-compatible OS, you must run the following commands to ensure that a loop device is available at boot:

```bash
$ sudo bash -c 'echo "loop" > /etc/modules-load.d/loop.conf'
$ sudo bash -c 'echo "options loop max_loop=8" > /etc/modprobe.d/loop_options.conf'
```

**Warning:** Loop devices are not created by Navigator Encrypt. Instead, Navigator Encrypt assigns a datastore to a loop device when the `navencrypt-prepare --datastore` option is used. So, it is up to the system administrator to create persistent `/dev/loopX` devices, which are required to prepare a virtual block device. If the loop device being prepared is not persistent, then Navigator Encrypt will not mount the device upon a reboot.

The data storage directory name (`/dmcrypt/storage` in the previous example) must contain only alphanumeric characters, spaces, hyphens (`-`), or underscores (`_`). Other special characters are not supported.

The following example shows the output from a successful command:

```bash
$ losetup -f
/dev/loop0
$ sudo navencrypt-prepare -d /dmcrypt/storage /dev/loop0 /dmcrypt/mountpoint
```

```
Type MASTER passphrase:

Encryption Type:  dmCrypt (LUKS)
Cipher:           aes
Key Size:         256
Random Interface: OpenSSL
Filesystem:       ext4
Options:
  Verifying MASTER key against KeyTrustee (wait a moment)   ... OK
  Generation Encryption Keys with OpenSSL                   ... OK
  Assigning '/dev/loop0'->'dmcrypt/storage'                ... OK
  Preparing dmCrypt device                                  ... OK
  Creating ext4 filesystem                                  ... OK
  Registering Encryption Keys (wait a moment)               ... OK
  Mounting /dev/loop0                                       ... OK
```

For upgraded Navigator Encrypt clients that already use loop devices, you can enable Navigator Encrypt to manage the loop device file association (instead of configuring the system to run the `losetup` command at boot) by adding the `nav_datastore` option to the entry in `/etc/navencrypt/ztab`. For example:

```bash
# <target mount-dir>        <source device>      <type>    <options>
/dmcrypt/mountpoint     /dev/loop0      luks
key=keytrustee,nav_datastore='/dmcrypt/storage'
```

**Important:** Use caution when editing the `/etc/navencrypt/ztab` file. Entries are tab-separated (not space-separated). The `ztab` file must not contain empty lines.

After you have created the loop device, continue with the instructions in Block-Level Encryption with `dm-crypt` on page 275.
Filesystem-Level Encryption with eCryptfs

**Note:** As of August 2015, Filesystem-level encryption using eCryptfs is deprecated. For best performance, Cloudera strongly recommends using Block-Level Encryption with dm-crypt on page 275 where possible. See Migrating eCryptfs-Encrypted Data to dm-crypt on page 281 for instructions on migrating data encrypted using eCryptfs to use dm-crypt.

RHEL 7 does not support eCryptfs. For new installations on RHEL 7, you must use Block-Level Encryption with dm-crypt on page 275. If you are planning on upgrading to RHEL 7 and are currently using eCryptfs, migrate to dm-crypt before upgrading.

When choosing file-level encryption during the interactive console, you must specify two parameters:

1. The first parameter is the storage directory you want to store the encrypted file system in. Because this directory will hold all of the encrypted data, it must be as large as or larger than the target data.
2. The second parameter is the mount point for the encrypted file system. This is the location where you can access the encrypted data stored in the location identified by the first parameter.

While the data is technically stored at the location identified by the first parameter, you can only access the data from the mount point identified by the second parameter. Consider this when choosing where to mount your data.

After choosing these two parameters and following the interactive console (discussed further in Preparing for Encryption on page 273), you are ready to encrypt your data.

**Undo Operation**

Navigator Encrypt 3.5 and higher supports a new command option, `navencrypt-prepare --undo`. This command reverses the operations from the regular `navencrypt-prepare` command by removing the device from Navigator Encrypt control and removing registered encryption keys.

The only parameter of the undo operation is the storage device used to store the encrypted file system (not the mount point). Here is an example showing `navencrypt-prepare` and `navencrypt-prepare --undo` operations:

```
$ sudo navencrypt-prepare /path/to/storage /path/to/mountpoint
Type MASTER passphrase:
Encryption Type: eCryptfs
Cipher: aes
Key Size: 256
Random Interface: OpenSSL
Filesystem: ext4
Options:
Verifying MASTER key against Navigator Key Trustee (wait a moment) ... OK
Generation Encryption Keys with OpenSSL ... OK
Registering Encryption Keys (wait a moment) ... OK
Mounting /path/to/mountpoint ... OK
$ sudo navencrypt-prepare --undo /path/to/storage
Type MASTER passphrase:
Verifying MASTER key against Navigator Key Trustee (wait a moment) ... OK
Unmounting /path/to/mountpoint ... OK
```

**Pass-through Mount Options for** `navencrypt-prepare`

Navigator Encrypt 3.5 and higher provides the ability to specify options to pass to the `mount` command that is executed during `/etc/init.d/navencrypt-mounter start` on RHEL 7. These options are specified with the `-o` option when preparing a mountpoint with the `navencrypt-prepare` command.

The following shows an example `navencrypt-prepare` command output when passing mount options with the `-o` option:

```
$ sudo navencrypt-prepare -o discard,resize /mnt/t2 /mnt/t2
Type MASTER passphrase:
```
Encryption Type: eCryptfs
Cipher: aes
Key Size: 256
Random Interface: OpenSSL
Filesystem: ext4
Options: discard, resize

Verifying MASTER key against Navigator Key Trustee (wait a moment) ... OK
Generation Encryption Keys with OpenSSL ... OK
Registering Encryption Keys (wait a moment) ... OK
Mounting /mnt/t2 ... OK

You can verify the results by viewing the /etc/navencrypt/ztab file:

$ cat /etc/navencrypt/ztab
/mnt/t2 /mnt/t2 eCryptfs key=keytrustee,cipher=aes,keysize=256,discard,resize

Options can be added or removed to existing mount points prepared with versions of Navigator Encrypt prior to 3.5 by editing the /etc/navencrypt/ztab file and adding the comma-separated options (no spaces) to the end of each line as seen in the previous example above.

Important: Use caution when editing the /etc/navencrypt/ztab file. Entries are tab-separated (not space-separated). The ztab file must not contain empty lines.

To see the mounted filesystems and options, run mount:

$ mount
/mnt/t2 on /mnt/t2 type eCryptfs
(rw,ecryptfs_sig=6de3db1e87077adb,ecryptfs_unlink_sigs,noauto,\
 ecryptfs_cipher=aes,ecryptfs_key_bytes=32,discard,resize)

Pass-through mount options work for both dm-crypt and eCryptfs. For a list of available mount options, see the man pages for cryptsetup and eCryptfs respectively.

Encrypting and Decrypting Data Using Cloudera Navigator Encrypt

Warning: Before encrypting or decrypting any data, stop all processes (for example, MySQL, MongoDB, PostgreSQL, and so on) that have access to the target data. Failure to do so could lead to data corruption.

After the encrypted file system is created and initialized, it is ready to hold data. All encryption and decryption functionality is performed with a single command: navencrypt-move.

Do not manually create directories or files under a Cloudera Navigator Encrypt mount point; use only the navencrypt-move command to encrypt and decrypt data. See Preparing for Encryption Using Cloudera Navigator Encrypt on page 273 for more information about mount points.

After encrypting a file or directory, all data written and read through the mount point is transparently encrypted and decrypted.

Before You Begin

Navigator Encrypt does not support encrypting data in certain environments, including the following:

- Do not attempt to encrypt a directory that contains or is contained within a mount point for another service (including Navigator Encrypt and NFS). For example:
  - If your encryption mount point is /var/lib/navencrypt/mount, do not attempt to encrypt /var, /var/lib, /var/lib/navencrypt, /var/lib/navencrypt/mount, or anything under /var/lib/navencrypt/mount/.
Configuring Encryption

- If you have mounted an NFS filesystem at /mnt/home, do not attempt to encrypt /mnt, /mnt/home, or anything under /mnt/home.

- Do not attempt to encrypt immutable files or directories containing immutable files.
- Do not use Navigator Encrypt within a chroot environment, or create a chroot environment within an encrypted directory.
- If your Key Trustee Server is managed by Cloudera Manager, do not encrypt the Cloudera Manager database with Navigator Encrypt; doing so prevents Cloudera Manager from starting.

Encrypting Data

Do not manually create directories or files under a Navigator Encrypt mount point; use only the navencrypt-move command to encrypt data.

Here is an example command to encrypt data, with an explanation for each option:

```
$ sudo navencrypt-move encrypt @<category> <directory_or_file_to_encrypt> <encrypted_mount_point>
```

**Important:** Do not run navencrypt-move commands simultaneously in multiple terminals. Doing so results in failure to encrypt or decrypt all of the specified data. No data is lost, as the source data is not removed, but you must re-run the failed operations sequentially.

Table 27: navencrypt-move Command Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Option</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>navencrypt-move</td>
<td>Main command interface for all actions that require moving data either to or from the encrypted file system. For more information see the navencrypt-move man page (man navencrypt-move).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encrypt</td>
<td>Identifies the cryptographic operation, in this case, encrypting data. The decrypt option is described later in Decrypting Data on page 281.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@&lt;category&gt;</td>
<td>The access category that is applied to the data being encrypted. Encrypted data is protected by process-based access controls that restrict access to only the processes that you allow. You can use any naming convention you want (the @ symbol is required), but Cloudera recommends keeping it simple and memorable. For example, you can use a name referencing the data type being encrypted, such as @mysql for a MySQL deployment. See Listing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: By default, all Navigator Encrypt encryption commands require free space equal to twice the size of the encrypted data. If your environment does not have enough free space, add --per-file to the end of the command. This moves each file individually. Per-file encryption only requires free space equal to twice the size of the largest individual file, but is a slower operation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Option</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;directory_or_file_to_encrypt&gt;</td>
<td>The data that you want to encrypt. This can be a single file or an entire directory. Navigator Encrypt starts after the system boots, so do not encrypt required system files and directories (such as the root partition, /var, and so on). Some examples of recommended data directories to encrypt are /var/lib/mysql/data, /db/data, and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;encrypted_mount_point&gt;</td>
<td>Where you want to store the data. This is the path to the mount point specified during the navencrypt-prepare command.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When a file is encrypted, a symbolic link (symlink) is created which points to a mount point @<category> directory. The navencrypt-move command moves all specified data to the encrypted filesystem and replaces it with a symlink to the mount point for that encrypted filesystem.

Encrypting a directory is similar to encrypting a file. The following command encrypts a directory:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt-move encrypt @mycategory /path/to/directory_to_encrypt/ /path/to/mount
```

In this command, a directory is specified instead of a filename, and a symlink is created for that particular directory. To see the effects of this command, run:

```
$ ls -l <directory_to_encrypt>
$ du -h <encrypted_storage_directory>
```

The output demonstrates the new filesystem layout. Everything that was in the target directory is now securely stored in the encrypted filesystem.

**Decrypting Data**

The decryption command requires only the path to the original data, which is now a symbolic link, as an argument. The following example demonstrates how to decrypt a file using the navencrypt-move command:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt-move decrypt /path/to/encrypted/directory_or_file
```

**Important:** *Do not* run navencrypt-move commands simultaneously in multiple terminals. Doing so results in failure to encrypt or decrypt all of the specified data. No data is lost, as the source data is not removed, but you must re-run the failed operations sequentially.

As with encryption, you can specify a directory instead of a file:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt-move decrypt /path/to/encrypted/directory
```

**Migrating eCryptfs-Encrypted Data to dm-crypt**

As of August 2015, Filesystem-level encryption using eCryptfs is deprecated. Use this procedure to migrate to dm-crypt.

RHEL 7 does not support eCryptfs. For new installations on RHEL 7, you must use Block-Level Encryption with dm-crypt on page 275. If you are planning on upgrading to RHEL 7 and are currently using eCryptfs, migrate to dm-crypt before upgrading.
**Warning:** Before encrypting or decrypting any data, stop all processes (for example, MySQL, MongoDB, PostgreSQL, and so on) that have access to the target data. **Failure to do so could lead to data corruption.**

1. Prepare an empty block device. This can be a physical block device (such as an unused disk) or a virtual block device (for example, a logical block device created by **LVM**, or a loop device). For instructions on creating a loop device, see **Block-Level Encryption with a Loop Device** on page 276.

2. Stop any services which depend on the encrypted data to be moved.

3. Prepare a block-level encrypted mount point. See **Preparing for Encryption Using Cloudera Navigator Encrypt** on page 273 for details about the procedure.

4. **Add ACL rules** for the new encrypted mount point that match the ACL rules for the mount point you are migrating from. To view existing ACL rules, run `sudo navencrypt acl --print`.

5. Add an ACL rule for your preferred shell (for example, `/bin/bash`) to enable command-line utilities such as `mv` and `cp`:

   ```sh
   $ sudo navencrypt acl --add --rule="ALLOW @category * /bin/bash"
   ```

6. Copy the encrypted data from the eCryptfs mount point to the dm-crypt mount point:

   ```sh
   $ sudo cp -rp /ecryptfs/mountpoint/path/to/data /dmcrypt/mountpoint/path/to/data
   ```

7. Update any symbolic links referencing the encrypted data. The following example demonstrates updating a symbolic link for a PostgreSQL database that was originally encrypted using eCryptfs, but has been migrated to dm-crypt:

   ```sh
   $ sudo ls -l /var/lib/db/data/base/16385
   lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 72 Jul 22 15:33 /var/lib/db/data/base/16385 -> /ecryptfs/mountpoint/postgres/var/lib/db/data/base/16385
   $ sudo ln -sif /dmcrypt/mountpoint/postgres/var/lib/db/data/base/16385 /var/lib/db/data/base/16385
   $ sudo ls -l /var/lib/db/data/base/16385
   lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 72 Jul 22 15:33 /var/lib/db/data/base/16385 -> /dmcrypt/mountpoint/postgres/var/lib/db/data/base/16385
   ```

8. Remove the ACL rule enabling command-line utilities:

   ```sh
   $ sudo navencrypt acl --del --rule="ALLOW @category * /bin/bash"
   ```

9. Restart any services which depend on the encrypted data. **Verify that the data was successfully copied, then delete the original eCryptfs-encrypted data. Do not delete any data until you are certain that you no longer need the original data.**

   a. Stop the **navencrypt-mount** service:

      ```sh
      $ sudo service navencrypt-mount stop
      ```

   b. Remove the original mountpoint directory and the storage directory with the original encrypted data.

   c. Edit `/etc/navencrypt/ztab` and remove entries for the original encrypted directory where eCryptfs is listed as the `<type>`.

   ```sh
   $ sudo ls -l /var/lib/db/data/base/16385
   lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 72 Jul 22 15:33 /var/lib/db/data/base/16385 -> /ecryptfs/mountpoint/postgres/var/lib/db/data/base/16385
   $ sudo ln -sif /dmcrypt/mountpoint/postgres/var/lib/db/data/base/16385 /var/lib/db/data/base/16385
   $ sudo ls -l /var/lib/db/data/base/16385
   lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 72 Jul 22 15:33 /var/lib/db/data/base/16385 -> /dmcrypt/mountpoint/postgres/var/lib/db/data/base/16385
   ```

   d. Start the **navencrypt-mount** service:

      ```sh
      $ sudo service navencrypt-mount start
      ```
Navigator Encrypt Access Control List

Managing the Access Control List

Cloudera Navigator Encrypt manages file system permissions with an access control list (ACL). This ACL is a security access control created by Cloudera that enables a predefined Linux process to access a file or directory managed by Navigator Encrypt.

The ACL uses rules to control process access to files. The rules specify whether a Linux process has access permissions to read from or write to a specific Navigator Encrypt path.

A rule is defined in the following order:

```
# TYPE @CATEGORY PATH PROCESS PARAMETERS
```

The following table defines the ACL rule components:

**Table 28: ACL Rule Components**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TYPE</td>
<td>Specifies whether to allow or deny a process. It can have either of the following values: ALLOW or DENY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@CATEGORY</td>
<td>This is a user-defined shorthand, or container, for the encrypted dataset that the process will have access to. For example, if you are encrypting the directory /var/lib/mysql, you could use the category @mysql to indicate that this rule is granting access to a process on the MySQL data. See Listing Categories on page 290 for instructions on viewing existing categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATH</td>
<td>Specifies the rights permissions of a specific path. For example: <em>, www/</em>, *.htaccess. Omit the leading slash (/).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROCESS</td>
<td>Specifies the process or command name for the rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAMETERS</td>
<td>Tells the process the parent-child process to be executed: --shell defines the script for Navigator Encrypt to allow for executable process. Supported shells are /usr/bin/bash, /bin/bash, /usr/bin/dash, and /bin/bash. --children defines for Navigator Encrypt which child processes to allow that are executed by a process/script. Example: --shell=/bin/bash, --children=/bin/df, /bin/ls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All rules are stored in an encrypted policy file together with a set of process signatures that are used by Navigator Encrypt to authenticate each Linux process. This file is encrypted with the Navigator Encrypt key you defined during installation.

Cloudera recommends using permissive mode to assist with the initial ACL rule creation for your environment. In permissive mode, Navigator Encrypt allows full access to the encrypted data by all processes, but logs them in dmesg as action="denied" messages. Consult these messages to identify required ACL rules. To set Navigator Encrypt to permissive mode, use the following command:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt set --mode=permissive
```

To view the current mode, run navencrypt status -d. For more information on access modes, see Access Modes.
After you generate the `action="denied"` messages, use the `navencrypt deny2allow` command to show which ACL rules are required, based on the `action="denied"` messages in `dmesg`. To show which ACL rules are required, perform the following steps:

1. Save the `dmesg` content to a file:

   ```
   $ sudo dmesg > /tmp/dmesg.txt
   ```

2. Use the `dmesg.txt` file content as input to the `deny2allow` command to analyze the `action="denied"` messages and display a list of required ACL rules based on the `action="denied"` messages. Here is an example command and output:

   ```
   $ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt deny2allow /tmp/dmesg.txt
   ALLOW @mysql employees/* /usr/sbin/mysqld
   ALLOW @mysql * /bin/bash
   ALLOW @mysql * /bin/ls
   ```

If you need to clear the `dmesg` log and start fresh, run `dmesg -c`.

If a rule is displayed in the output from the command, it does not automatically mean the ACL rule must be added. You must determine which rules are actually needed. For example, the rule for `ls` would not typically be added as an ACL rule.

After the initial ACL rules are created, disable permissive mode with the following command:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt set --mode=enforcing
```

### Adding ACL Rules

Rules can be added one at a time using the command line or by specifying a policy file containing multiple rules. The following example shows how to add a single rule using the `navencrypt acl --add` command:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --add --rule="ALLOW @mysql * /usr/sbin/mysqld"
```

See [Listing Categories](#) on page 290 for instructions on viewing existing categories.

The following example shows how to add multiple rules using a policy file:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --add --file=/mnt/private/acl_rules
```

The contents of the policy file should contain one rule per line. For example:

```
ALLOW @mysql * /usr/sbin/mysqld
ALLOW @log * /usr/sbin/mysqld
ALLOW @apache * /usr/lib/apache2/mpm-prefork/apache2
```

Navigator Encrypt releases 3.10 and higher support comments in the policy file. Comments begin with the hash (`#`) symbol. You can use comments to annotate the policy file, or to temporarily disable a rule for testing. For example:

```
# Cloudera Navigator Encrypt policy file
# Allow mysqld to access all database files
ALLOW @mysql * /usr/sbin/mysqld
# Allow mysqld to write logs
ALLOW @log * /usr/sbin/mysqld
# ALLOW @apache * /usr/lib/apache2/mpm-prefork/apache2
```

Using a policy file is the fastest way to add multiple rules because it only requires the security key one time.
It is also possible to overwrite the entire current rules set with the option \texttt{--overwrite}. When this command is executed, all current rules are replaced by the ones specified in the file that contains the new set of rules. Cloudera recommends to save a copy of your current set of rules by printing it with the option \texttt{--print}.

Here is an example command using the \texttt{--overwrite} option:

\begin{verbatim}
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --overwrite --file=/mnt/private/acl_rules
\end{verbatim}

Adding ACL Rules by Profile

If your environment requires more granular controls on the processes that can access the data, you can add extra controls by using profiles. Profiles set requirements on a process other than just having the correct fingerprint. They can include such things as process owner and group, required open files, and the current working directory. To see more about adding rules by profile, see ACL Profile Rules on page 286.

Deleting ACL Rules

Rules can be deleted in one of two ways:

1. Manually specifying the rule to delete using the command line.
2. Specifying the line number of the rule to delete.

The following example shows how to delete a rule by passing it as a parameter:

\begin{verbatim}
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --del --rule="ALLOW @mysql * /usr/sbin/mysqld"
\end{verbatim}

If you remove a MySQL ALLOW rule, the MySQL cache must be cleaned by executing the \texttt{FLUSH TABLES; MySQL} statement. Otherwise, it will still be possible to view data from encrypted table.

The following example shows how to delete a rule by specifying a line number:

\begin{verbatim}
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --del --line 3
\end{verbatim}

It is also possible to delete multiple ACL rules in a single command:

\begin{verbatim}
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --del --line=1,3
\end{verbatim}

See Printing ACL Rules on page 285 for information on determining line numbers.

Deleting ACL Rules by Profile

See ACL Profile Rules on page 286 for instructions on deleting rules by profile.

Printing ACL Rules

You can print the current Access Control List using the following command:

\begin{verbatim}
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --print
\end{verbatim}

Save the ACL to a file with the \texttt{--file} option:

\begin{verbatim}
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --print --file=policy-backup
\end{verbatim}

To display additional information about the organization of the policy file, use the \texttt{--list} option:

\begin{verbatim}
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --list
\end{verbatim}

Universal ACL Rules

Universal ACLs will allow or deny a process access to all files or directories encrypted with Navigator Encrypt.
The rule `ALLOW @* * /process` allows the designated process to access anything from all encrypted categories.

The rule `ALLOW @data * *` allows all processes access to any path under the @data category.

The rule `ALLOW @* * *` allows all processes access to all encrypted categories. Cloudera does not recommend using this rule. Use it only in test environments.

Here is an example adding a universal ACL rule and then displaying it:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --add --rule="ALLOW @* * /usr/sbin/mysqld"
Type MASTER passphrase:
1 rule(s) were added
# navencrypt acl --listType MASTER passphrase:
#  - Type Category Path Profile Process
# 1  ALLOW @* * * /usr/sbin/mysqld
```

### Enabling Shell Scripts to Be Detected by ACL

All of the previous rules work for binary files. There may be times a script, such as a shell script, must be allowed to access the encrypted directory.

You can add the script as a rule by indicating the executable binary process of this script using the `--shell` option, for example:

```
ALLOW @scripts * /root/script.sh --shell=/bin/bash
```

The `--shell` option identifies which executable process is used to execute the script. Supported shells are `/usr/bin/bash`, `/bin/bash`, `/usr/bin/dash`, and `/bin/bash`.

If the script is altered, it will no longer be trusted by the ACL because the fingerprint has changed. If you edit the script, you must invoke the update option to update the ACL with the new fingerprint.

In some cases, it may be necessary to grant permissions to sub-processes invoked by scripts. For example, it may be necessary to grant permissions to `/bin/bash` that also allow running the `/bin/df` command to allow the system administrator to check disk capacity through a script run using a crontab entry. By using the `--children` option, you can specify these permissions. For example:

```
ALLOW @scripts * /root/script.sh --shell=/bin/bash --children=/bin/df
```

The `--children` option tells Navigator Encrypt to allow the `/bin/df` binary process if it is executed by `/root/script.sh`.

To allow more than one sub-process, identify them with the `--children` option as comma-separated values. For example:

```
ALLOW @scripts * /root/script.sh --shell=/bin/bash --children=/bin/df,/bin/ls
```

To add shell-children sub-processes, execute the `navencrypt acl --add` command, for example:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --add --rule="ALLOW @mysql * /usr/bin/mysqld_safe \--shell=/bin/bash --children=/bin/df,/bin/ls"
```

### ACL Profile Rules

If your environment requires more granular controls on the processes that can access the data, you can add extra controls by using profiles. Profiles set requirements on a process other than just having the correct fingerprint. They can include such things as process owner and group, required open files, and the current working directory.

A profile is generated by using the following command:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt-profile --pid=<pid>
```
The output, by default, will be displayed on the screen. You can redirect the output to a file using the > or >> redirect operators. You can then edit the JSON output in the file to remove lines you do not want. By default, the profile includes the UID, the short name of the binary or script (identified as comm), and the full command line of the running process (including any parameters passed). You can generate information by using one of these flags:

- `-c`, `--with-cwd`
  Output the current working directory
- `-e`, `--with-egid`
  Output the egid
- `-g`, `--with-gid`
  Output the gid
- `-u`, `--with-euid`
  Output the euid

Example output from the `navencrypt-profile` command:

```json
{
    "uid": "0",
    "comm": "NetworkManager",
    "cmdline": "NetworkManager -pid-file=/var/run/NetworkManager/NetworkManager.pid",
    "gid": "0",
    "cwd": "/",
    "fd0": "/dev/null",
    "fd1": "/dev/null",
    "fd2": "/dev/null"
}
```

Some distributions do not support `euid` and `gid`. Make sure that your profile file is correct by executing the following command to verify the expected IDs:

```
$ ps -p <pid_of_process> -o euid,egid
```

If `cmdline` parameters are variable, such as appending a process start timestamp to a filename, then the process profile will not match on subsequent restarts of the process because the current profile will have an updated timestamp and access will be denied by the ACL. You can mark those parameters as variable inside the profile file. For example, if the `cmdline` of a process is something like this:

```
"cmdline": "NetworkManager -pid-file=/var/run/NetworkManager/NetworkManager.pid \ 
-logfile=/var/log/NetworkManager/log-20130808152300.log"
```

Where `log-20130505122300.log` is a variable `cmdline` parameter, before adding the process profile to the ACL, edit the process profile file and use `##` to specify that a particular parameter is variable:

```
"cmdline": "NetworkManager -pid-file=/var/run/NetworkManager/NetworkManager.pid \ 
-logfile=##"
```

With the above configuration, the ACL will allow any value for the `-logfile` `cmdline` parameter.

To enable a profile in the ACL, use the additional parameter `--profile-file=<filename>` when adding the rule to the ACL:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --add --rule="ALLOW @mysql * /usr/sbin/mysqld" \ 
--profile-file=/path/to/profile/file
```
To display the profile portion of the rules, use the `--all` parameter with `navencrypt acl --list`:

```bash
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --list --all
Type MASTER passphrase:
# - Type Category Path Profile Process
1 ALLOW @mysql * YES /usr/sbin/mysqld
PROFILE:
{"uid":"120","comm":"mysqld","cmdline":"mysqld"}
```

### Maintaining Cloudera Navigator Encrypt

#### Manually Backing Up Navigator Encrypt

It is recommended that you back up Navigator Encrypt configuration directory after installation, and again after any configuration updates.

1. To manually back up the Navigator Encrypt configuration directory (`/etc/navencrypt`):

```bash
$ zip -r --encrypt nav-encrypt-conf.zip /etc/navencrypt
```

The `--encrypt` option prompts you to create a password used to encrypt the zip file. This password is also required to decrypt the file. Ensure that you protect the password by storing it in a secure location.

2. Move the backup file (`nav-encrypt-conf.zip`) to a secure location.

**Warning:** Failure to back up the configuration directory makes your backed-up encrypted data unrecoverable in the event of data loss.

#### Validating Navigator Encrypt Configuration

To validate the Navigator Encrypt deployment, run the following command:

```bash
$ sudo navencrypt status --integrity
```

This command verifies that:

- The mount encryption key (MEK) exists for each mount point.
- Each mount point in `/etc/navencrypt/ztab` has a corresponding entry in the control file (`/etc/navencrypt/control`).
- Each mount point directory exists.
- For **loop devices**, the file used for encrypted storage exists.

The output is similar to the following:

```bash
$ sudo navencrypt status --integrity
Checking MEKs integrity
  Mountpoint: /dev/loop0
    MEK file exist: ..................   [YES]
  Mountpoint: /dev/loop1
    MEK file exist: ..................   [YES]

Checking Ztab Mountpoints integrity
  Mountpoint: /dev/loop0
    ztab vs control correspondence: ...... [YES]
    Mountpoint directory exists: ....... [YES]
  Mountpoint: /dev/loop1
    ztab vs control correspondence: ...... [YES]
    Mountpoint directory exists: ....... [YES]

Checking Datastore backend files
```
Datastore: '/root/my_storage_test'
Backend file exist: .................   [YES]

Restoring Mount Encryption Keys (MEKS) and Control File

Navigator Encrypt deposits its mount encryption keys (MEKS) and control file (/etc/navencrypt/control) in Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server. If these files are accidentally deleted, they can be restored from Key Trustee Server using the following commands:

- To restore MEKS:
  ```
  $ sudo navencrypt key --restore-keys
  ```

- To restore the control file:
  ```
  $ sudo navencrypt control --restore-control-file
  ```

Access Modes

Navigator Encrypt provides three different access modes:

- **Enforcing** is the default mode in which Navigator Encrypt validates access from all processes against the ACL. To protect your data, enforcing mode must be enabled.
- **Permissive** mode causes action="denied" messages to be logged in dmesg. It does not prevent access to the encrypted data. This mode is a dry-run feature to run and build ACL rules.
- **Admin** mode, as well as permissive mode, does not prevent access to the encrypted data. It allows any process to access the information because the ACL rules are not validated against the process. Admin mode does not cause action="denied" messages to be logged in dmesg.

To view the current access mode, run the following command:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt status -d
```

**Note:** The `navencrypt status` command reports that the navencrypt module is not running if no volumes are encrypted or the kernel module is not loaded.

To change the access mode, use the following command:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt set --mode={enforcing|permissive|admin}
```

You cannot change the Navigator Encrypt access mode unless the Navigator Encrypt module is running. To view the status of the Navigator Encrypt module, run `navencrypt status --module`.

To start the Navigator Encrypt module there must be at least one active mount-point. To verify the mount-points status, run the following command:

```
$ sudo /etc/init.d/navencrypt-mount status
```

For RHEL 7, use `systemctl` instead:

```
$ sudo systemctl status navencrypt-mount
```

Changing and Verifying the Master Key

You can perform two operations with the `navencrypt key` command: change and verify.
You can verify a key against the Navigator Encrypt module, the Navigator Key Trustee server, or both. For example:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt key --verify
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt key --verify --only-module
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt key --verify --only-keytrustee
```

**Note:** The `navencrypt key` command fails if no volumes are encrypted or the kernel module is not loaded.

The master key can be changed in the event that another key-type authentication mechanism or a new master key is required. Valid master key types are single-passphrase, dual-passphrase, and RSA key files. To change the master key type, issue the following command and follow the interactive console:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt key --change
```

You can use the `--trustees`, `--votes`, and `--recoverable` options for the new key as described in Table 25: Registration Options on page 270.

### Listing Categories

To list the existing categories for each mount point, run the command `navencrypt-move --list-categories`. For example:

```
$ sudo navencrypt-move --list-categories
Navigator Encrypt Categories found per Mountpoint:

/dmcrypt-storage
   @mysql
   @keytabs

/home/jdoe/secrets
   @moms_recipes
   @world_domination_plan
```

### Updating ACL Fingerprints

All rules reference a process fingerprint (a SHA256 digest) that is used to authenticate the process into the file system. If the filesystem detects a fingerprint that is different from the one stored in the ACL, the Linux process is denied access and treated as an untrusted process.

Occasionally this process fingerprint must be updated, such as when software is upgraded. When the fingerprint must be updated, the Navigator Encrypt administrator re-authenticates the process on the ACL by executing the command `navencrypt acl --update`.

The following example demonstrates how to determine when a process fingerprint has been changed and must be updated:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt acl --list
Type MASTER passphrase:
  # -  Type Category    Path         Profile  Process
1 !! ALLOW @mysql * /usr/sbin/mysqld
2 ALLOW @log * /usr/sbin/mysqld
3 !! ALLOW @apache * /usr/lib/apache2/mpm-prefork/
```

In the example above, the double exclamation (!!) characters indicate that a process fingerprint has changed and must be updated. Similarly, double E (EE) characters indicate a process read error. This error can be caused by a process that does not exist or that has permission issues.
Note:
For RHEL-compatible OSes, the `prelink` application may also be responsible for ACL fingerprint issues. Prelinking is intended to speed up a system by reducing the time a program needs to begin. Cloudera highly recommends disabling any automated `prelink` jobs, which are enabled by default in some systems. As an alternative, Cloudera recommends that you integrate a manual `prelink` run into your existing change control policies to ensure minimal downtime for applications accessing encrypted data.

To disable prelinking, modify the `/etc/sysconfig/prelink` file and change `PRELINKING=yes` to `PRELINKING=no`. Then, run the `/etc/cron.daily/prelink` script as root. Once finished, automatic prelinking is disabled.

For more information about how prelinking affects your system, see `prelink`.

Managing Mount Points

The `/etc/init.d/navencrypt-mount` command mounts all mount points that were registered with the `navencrypt-prepare` command and are listed in the `/etc/navencrypt/ztab` file. The possible operations are:

- start
- stop
- status
- restart

For RHEL 7, use `systemctl [start|stop|status|restart] navencrypt-mount`.

Note: Do not manually unmount the encryption mount point (for example, using `umount`). If you do so, you must manually close the `dm-crypt` device using the following procedure:

1. Run `dmsetup table` to list the `dm-crypt` devices.
2. Run `cryptsetup luksClose <device_name>` to close the device for the unmounted mount point.

When executing the `stop` operation, the encrypted mount point is unmounted, and your data becomes inaccessible.

The following example shows how to execute `navencrypt-mount status` with some inactive mount points:

```
$ sudo /etc/init.d/navencrypt-mount status
```

The following example shows how to execute the `navencrypt-mount stop` command:

```
$ sudo /etc/init.d/navencrypt-mount stop
```

The following example shows how to execute the `navencrypt-mount start` command:

```
$ sudo /etc/init.d/navencrypt-mount start
```

Here is an example command used to manually mount a directory:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/mount.navencrypt /path/to_encrypted_data/ /path/to/mountpoint
```

This command can be executed only if the `navencrypt-prepare` command was previously executed.
Allowing Access to a Single Operation

Sometimes running a single operation on encrypted data is required, such as listing the encrypted files or copying a particular file. The `navencrypt exec` command provides an efficient method to accomplish this. In the following command example, permission is denied when the command is run without `navencrypt exec`:

```
$ ls /mnt/db_encrypted/mysql/
ls: cannot open directory /mnt/db_encrypted/mysql/: Permission denied
```

If the `ls` command is executed with `navencrypt exec`, access is allowed one time only:

```
$ sudo /usr/sbin/navencrypt exec "ls -l /mnt/db_encrypted/mysql/"
```

Navigator Encrypt Kernel Module Setup

If the kernel headers were not installed on your host, or if the wrong version of the kernel headers were installed, the Navigator Encrypt module was not built at installation time. To avoid reinstalling the system, install the correct headers and execute the `navencrypt-module-setup` command. This attempts to build the module and install it.

This method is also an efficient way to install any new Navigator Encrypt module feature or fix without otherwise modifying your current Navigator Encrypt environment.

Navigator Encrypt Configuration Directory Structure

The file and directory structure of `/etc/navencrypt` is as follows:

```
$ tree /etc/navencrypt/
/etc/navencrypt/
    control -> /etc/navencrypt/jSpi9SM65xUIIhrau1Nn8ZXmQhrrQ9e363EUs8HKiRs
    jSpi9SM65xUIIhrau1Nn8ZXmQhrrQ9e363EUs8HKiRs
    rules
    ztab
    locust
      keytrustee
      clientname
      deposits
        dev.loop0
        media.31E5-79B9locustlocust[system ~]
        . /etc/*release[system ~]
        . /etc/*release
        mnt.a
        mnt.encrypted
        mnt.tomount
        pubring.gpg
        pubring.gpg~
        random_seed
        secring.gpg
        trustdb.gpg
        ztrustee.conf
```

The following files and folders are part of the created file structure:

- **control**
  
  File that saves information about the mount points and corresponding Navigator Key Trustee keys. If this file is accidentally deleted, you can restore it using the `navencrypt control --restore-control-file` command.

- **rules**
  
  File that contains the ACL rules. It is encrypted with the user-provided master key.

- **ztab**
  
  File that contains information about all the mount points and their encryption type.

**Important:** Use caution when editing the `/etc/navencrypt/ztab` file. Entries are tab-separated (not space-separated). The `ztab` file must not contain empty lines.
• **keytrustee**
  Directory where Navigator Key Trustee GPG keys are stored. These are generated during `navencrypt register` operations.

• **keytrustee/deposits**
  Directory where the Navigator Encrypt mount encryption keys (MEKs) are saved. These are encrypted with the user-provided master key. If these are accidentally deleted, you can restore them from Key Trustee Server using the `navencrypt key --restore-keys` command.

Every mount point has an internal randomly-generated encryption passphrase.

**Collecting Navigator Encrypt Environment Information**

When troubleshooting problems with Navigator Encrypt, it is helpful to gather information about the installation and environment. Navigator Encrypt provides a command to facilitate this:

```
$ sudo navencrypt-collect
```

This command collects and outputs to the console the following information:

- Information about the system on which Navigator Encrypt is installed
- Entries from `/etc/navencrypt/ztab`
- The contents of the `keytrustee.conf` file
- Recent entries from the Navigator Encrypt log file
- Configured software repositories
- Checksums of all `/usr/src/navencrypt*` and `/usr/sbin/navencrypt*` files

You can use this information to compare Navigator Encrypt installations and to provide to Cloudera Support for troubleshooting. The `navencrypt-collect` command only outputs this information on the console, and does not generate any files or upload to Cloudera.

To save the information to a file, use the redirect operator (`>`). For example:

```
$ sudo navencrypt-collect > navencrypt.info
```

**Upgrading Navigator Encrypt Hosts**

See [Best Practices for Upgrading Navigator Encrypt Hosts](#) for considerations when upgrading operating systems (OS) and kernels on hosts that have Navigator Encrypt installed.

**HDFS Transparent Encryption**

Data encryption is mandatory for many government, financial, and regulatory entities, worldwide, to meet privacy and other security requirements. For example, the card payment industry has adopted the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) for information security. Other examples include requirements imposed by United States government’s Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Encrypting data stored in HDFS can help your organization comply with such regulations.

Introduced in [CDH 5.3](#), transparent encryption for HDFS implements transparent, end-to-end encryption of data read from and written to HDFS blocks across your cluster. *Transparent* means that end-users are unaware of the encryption/decryption processes, and *end-to-end* means that data is encrypted at-rest and in-transit (see the [Cloudera Engineering Blog post](#) for complete details).
Note: HDFS Transparent Encryption is not the same as TLS encryption. Clusters configured TLS/SSL encrypt network communications throughout the cluster. Depending on the type of services your cluster supports, you may want to configure both HDFS Transparent Encryption and TLS/SSL for the cluster. See Configuring Encryption for more information.

HDFS encryption has these capabilities:

- Only HDFS clients can encrypt or decrypt data.
- Key management is external to HDFS. HDFS cannot access unencrypted data or encryption keys. Administration of HDFS and administration of keys are separate duties encompassed by distinct user roles (HDFS administrator, Key Administrator), thus ensuring that no single user has unrestricted access to both data and keys.
- The operating system and HDFS interact using encrypted HDFS data only, mitigating threats at the OS- and file-system-level.
- HDFS uses the Advanced Encryption Standard-Counter mode (AES-CTR) encryption algorithm. AES-CTR supports a 128-bit encryption key (default), or can support a 256-bit encryption key when Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) unlimited strength JCE is installed.
- HDFS encryption has been designed to take advantage of the AES-NI instruction set, a hardware-based encryption acceleration technique, so your cluster performance should not adversely affected by configuring encryption. (The AES-NI instruction set can be an order of magnitude faster than software implementations of AES.) However, you may need to update cryptography libraries on your HDFS and MapReduce client hosts to use the acceleration mechanism. See Optimizing Performance for HDFS Transparent Encryption on page 298 for details.

Key Concepts and Architecture

Keystores and the Hadoop Key Management Server

Integrating HDFS with an external, enterprise-level keystore is the first step to deploying transparent encryption. This is because separation of duties between a key administrator and an HDFS administrator is a very important aspect of this feature. However, most keystores are not designed for the encrypt/decrypt request rates seen by Hadoop workloads. This led to the development of a new service, called the Hadoop Key Management Server (KMS), which serves as a proxy between HDFS clients and the backing keystore. Both the keystore and Hadoop KMS must use Hadoop’s KeyProvider API to interact with each other and with HDFS clients.

While HDFS encryption can be used with a local Java KeyStore for key management, Cloudera does not recommend this for production environments where a more robust and secure key management solution should be used. Cloudera offers the following two options for enterprise-grade key management:

- Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server is a key store for managing encryption keys. To integrate with the Navigator Key Trustee Server, Cloudera provides a custom KMS service, Key Trustee KMS.
- Hardware security modules (HSM) are third-party appliances that provide the highest level of security for keys. To integrate with a list of supported HSMs, Cloudera provides a custom KMS service, Navigator HSM KMS (see Installing Navigator HSM KMS Backed by Thales HSM and Installing Navigator HSM KMS Backed by Luna HSM).

The diagram below illustrates how HDFS clients and the NameNode interact with an enterprise keystore through the Hadoop Key Management Server. The keystore can be either the Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server or a support HSM.
To get started with deploying the KMS and a keystore, see Enabling HDFS Encryption Using the Wizard on page 299.

For information on configuring and securing the KMS, see Configuring the Key Management Server (KMS) on page 312 and Securing the Key Management Server (KMS) on page 316.

**Encryption Zones and Keys**

HDFS transparent encryption introduces the concept of an **encryption zone** (EZ), which is a directory in HDFS whose contents will be automatically encrypted on write and decrypted on read. Encryption zones always start off as empty directories, and tools such as `distcp` with the `-skipcrccheck -update` flags can be used to add data to a zone. (These flags are required because encryption zones are being used.) Every file and subdirectory copied to an encryption zone will be encrypted.

**Note:** An encryption zone cannot be created on top of an existing directory.

Each encryption zone is associated with a key (EZ Key) specified by the key administrator when the zone is created. EZ keys are stored on a backing keystore external to HDFS. Each file within an encryption zone has its own encryption key, called the Data Encryption Key (DEK). These DEKs are encrypted with their respective encryption zone's EZ key, to form an Encrypted Data Encryption Key (EDEK).

The following diagram illustrates how encryption zone keys (EZ keys), data encryption keys (DEKs), and encrypted data encryption keys (EDEKs) are used to encrypt and decrypt files.
EDEKs are stored persistently on the NameNode as part of each file's metadata, using HDFS extended attributes (implemented as of Cloudera CDH 5.2). EDEKs can be safely stored and handled by the NameNode because the hdfs user does not have access to the EDEK's encryption keys (EZ keys). Even if HDFS is compromised (for example, by gaining unauthorized access to a superuser account), a malicious user only gains access to the encrypted text and EDEKs. EZ keys are controlled by a separate set of permissions on the KMS and the keystore.

An EZ key can have multiple key versions, where each key version has its own distinct key material (that is, the portion of the key used during encryption and decryption). Key rotation is achieved by bumping up the version for an EZ key. Per-file key rotation is then achieved by re-encrypting the file's DEK with the new version of the EZ key to create new EDEKs. HDFS clients can identify an encryption key either by its key name, which returns the latest version of the key, or by a specific key version.

For more information on creating and managing encryption zones, see Managing Encryption Keys and Zones on page 309.

Accessing Files Within an Encryption Zone

To encrypt a new file, the HDFS client requests a new EDEK from the NameNode. The NameNode then asks the KMS to decrypt it with the encryption zone's EZ key. This decryption results in a DEK, which is used to encrypt the file.
The diagram above depicts the process of writing a new encrypted file. Note that the EDEK cache on the NameNode is populated in the background. Since it is the responsibility of KMS to create EDEKs, using a cache avoids having to call the KMS for each create request. The client can request new EDEKs directly from the NameNode.

To decrypt a file, the HDFS client provides the NameNode with the file's EDEK and the version number of the EZ key that was used to generate the EDEK. The NameNode requests the KMS to decrypt the file's EDEK with the encryption zone's EZ key, which involves checking that the requesting client has permission to access that particular version of the EZ key. Assuming decryption of the EDEK is successful, the client then uses this DEK to decrypt the file.

Encryption and decryption of EDEKs takes place entirely on the KMS. More importantly, the client requesting creation or decryption of an EDEK never handles the EZ key. Only the KMS can use EZ keys to create and decrypt EDEKs as requested. It is important to note that the KMS does not store any keys, other than temporarily in its cache. It is up to the enterprise keystore to be the authoritative storage for keys, and to ensure that keys are never lost, as a lost key is equivalent to introducing a security hole. For production use, Cloudera recommends you deploy two or more redundant enterprise key stores.
Optimizing Performance for HDFS Transparent Encryption

**Warning:** To ensure that HDFS encryption functions as expected, the steps described in this section are mandatory for production use.

CDH implements the *Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions* (AES-NI), which provide substantial performance improvements. To get these improvements, you need a recent version of `libcrypto.so` on HDFS and MapReduce client hosts — that is, any host from which you originate HDFS or MapReduce requests. Many OS versions have an older version of the library that does not support AES-NI. The instructions that follow tell you what you need to do for each OS version that CDH supports.

**RHEL/CentOS 6.5 or later**

The installed version of `libcrypto.so` supports AES-NI, but you need to install the `openssl-devel` package on all clients:

```
$ sudo yum install openssl-devel
```

**RHEL/CentOS 6.4 or earlier 6.x versions, or SLES 11**

Download and extract a newer version of `libcrypto.so` from a CentOS 6.5 repository and install it on all clients in `/var/lib/hadoop/extra/native/`:

1. Download the latest version of the `openssl` package. For example:

   ```
   $ wget http://mirror.centos.org/centos/6/os/x86_64/Packages/openssl-1.0.1e-30.el6.x86_64.rpm
   ```

   The `libcrypto.so` file in this package can be used on SLES 11 as well as RHEL/CentOS.

2. Decompress the files in the package, but do **not** install it:

   ```
   $ rpm2cpio openssl-1.0.1e-30.el6.x86_64.rpm | cpio -idmv
   ```

3. If you are using parcels, create the `/var/lib/hadoop/extra/native/` directory:

   ```
   $ sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/hadoop/extra/native
   ```

4. Copy the shared library into `/var/lib/hadoop/extra/native/`. Name the target file `libcrypto.so`, with no suffix at the end, exactly as in the command that follows.

   ```
   $ sudo cp ./usr/lib64/libcrypto.so.1.0.1e /var/lib/hadoop/extra/native/libcrypto.so
   ```

**RHEL/CentOS 5**

In this case, you need to build `libcrypto.so` and copy it to all clients:

1. On one client, compile and install `openssl` from source:

   ```
   $ wget http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.0.1j.tar.gz
   $ cd openssl-1.0.1j
   $ ./config --shared --prefix=/opt/openssl-1.0.1j
   $ sudo make install
   ```

2. If you are using parcels, create the `/var/lib/hadoop/extra/native/` directory:

   ```
   $ sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/hadoop/extra/native
   ```

3. Copy the files into `/var/lib/hadoop/extra/native/`:

   ```
   $ sudo cp /opt/openssl-1.0.1j/lib/libcrypto.so /var/lib/hadoop/extra/native
   ```
Copy the files to the remaining clients using a utility such as rsync

Debian Wheezy

The installed version of libcrypto.so supports AES-NI, but you need to install the libssl-devel package on all clients:

```
$ sudo apt-get install libssl-dev
```

Ubuntu Precise and Ubuntu Trusty

Install the libssl-devel package on all clients:

```
$ sudo apt-get install libssl-dev
```

Testing if encryption optimization works

To verify that a client host is ready to use the AES-NI instruction set optimization for HDFS encryption at rest, use the following command:

```
hadoop checknative
```

You should see a response such as the following:

```
Native library checking:
hadoop: true /usr/lib/hadoop/lib/native/libhadoop.so.1.0.0
zlib: true /lib64/libz.so.1
snappy: true /usr/lib64/libsnappy.so.1
lz4: true revision:99
bzip2: true /lib64/libbz2.so.1
openssl: true /usr/lib64/libcrypto.so
```

If you see `true` in the `openssl` row, Hadoop has detected the right version of `libcrypto.so` and optimization will work. If you see `false` in this row, you do not have the right version.

Enabling HDFS Encryption Using the Wizard

To accommodate the security best practice of separation of duties, enabling HDFS encryption using the wizard requires different Cloudera Manager user roles for different steps.

Launch the Set up HDFS Data At Rest Encryption wizard in one of the following ways:

- **Cluster > Set up HDFS Data At Rest Encryption**
  - Minimum Required Role: **Key Administrator** or **Cluster Administrator** (also provided by Full Administrator)

- **Administration > Security > Set up HDFS Data At Rest Encryption**
  - Minimum Required Role: **Key Administrator** or **Cluster Administrator** (also provided by Full Administrator)

- **HDFS service > Actions > Set up HDFS Data At Rest Encryption**
  - Minimum Required Role: **Cluster Administrator** (also provided by Full Administrator)

On the first page of the wizard, select the root of trust for encryption keys:

- Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server
- Navigator HSM KMS backed by Thales HSM
- Navigator HSM KMS backed by Luna HSM
- A file-based password-protected Java KeyStore
Cloudera strongly recommends using Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server as the root of trust for production environments. The file-based Java KeyStore root of trust is insufficient to provide the security, scalability, and manageability required by most production systems. More specifically, the Java KeyStore KMS does not provide:

- Scalability, so you are limited to only one KMS, which can result in bottlenecks
- High Availability (HA)
- Recoverability, so if you lose the node where the Java KeyStore is stored, then you can lose access to all the encrypted data

Ultimately, the Java KeyStore does not satisfy the stringent security requirements of most organizations for handling master encryption keys.

Choosing a root of trust displays a list of steps required to enable HDFS encryption using that root of trust. Each step can be completed independently. The **Status** column indicates whether the step has been completed, and the **Notes** column provides additional context for the step. If your Cloudera Manager user account does not have sufficient privileges to complete a step, the **Notes** column indicates the required privileges.

Available steps contain links to wizards or documentation required to complete the step. If a step is unavailable due to insufficient privileges or a prerequisite step being incomplete, no links are present and the **Notes** column indicates the reason the step is unavailable.

Continue to the section for your selected root of trust for further instructions:

### Enabling HDFS Encryption Using Navigator Key Trustee Server

Enabling HDFS encryption using Key Trustee Server as the key store involves multiple components. For an overview of the components involved in encrypting data at rest, see [Cloudera Navigator Data Encryption Overview](#). For guidelines on deploying the Navigator Key Trustee Server in production environments, see [Resource Planning for Data at Rest Encryption](#) on page 242.

Before continuing, make sure the Cloudera Manager server host has access to the internal repository hosting the Key Trustee Server software. See [Setting Up an Internal Repository](#) for more information.

After selecting **Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server** as the root of trust, the following steps are displayed:

1. **Enable Kerberos**
   
   **Minimum Required Role:** [Cluster Administrator](#) (also provided by [Full Administrator](#))
   
   For more information about enabling Kerberos, see [Enabling Kerberos Authentication Using the Wizard](#) on page 49.

2. **Enable TLS/SSL**
   
   **Minimum Required Role:** [Cluster Administrator](#) (also provided by [Full Administrator](#))
   
   For more information about enabling TLS, see [Configuring TLS/SSL Encryption for CDH Services](#) on page 205.

3. **Add a dedicated cluster for the Key Trustee Server**
   
   **Minimum Required Role:** [Cluster Administrator](#) (also provided by [Full Administrator](#))
   
   This step creates a new cluster in Cloudera Manager for the Key Trustee Server hosts to isolate them from other enterprise data hub (EDH) services for increased security and durability. For more information, see [Data at Rest Encryption Reference Architecture](#) on page 236.

   To complete this step:
   
   1. Click **Add a dedicated cluster for the Key Trustee Server**.
   2. Leave **Enable High Availability** checked to add two hosts to the cluster. For production environments, you must enable high availability for Key Trustee Server. Failure to enable high availability can result in complete data loss in the case of catastrophic failure of a standalone Key Trustee Server. Click **Continue**.
   3. Search for new hosts to add to the cluster, or select the **Currently Managed Hosts** tab to add existing hosts to the cluster. After selecting the hosts, click **Continue**.
4. Select the KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER parcel to install Key Trustee Server using parcels, or select None if you want to use packages. If you do not see a parcel available, click More Options and add the repository URL to the Remote Parcel Repository URLs list. After selecting a parcel or None, click Continue.

   If you selected None, click Continue again, and skip to 4. Install Key Trustee Server binary using packages or parcels on page 301.

5. After the KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER parcel is successfully downloaded, distributed, unpacked, and activated, click Continue.

6. Click Continue to complete this step and return to the main page of the wizard.

4. Install Key Trustee Server binary using packages or parcels

Minimum Required Role: Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

Note: If you selected None on the parcel selection page in step 3. Add a dedicated cluster for the Key Trustee Server on page 300, the step title is changed to Install Parcel for Key Trustee Server. If you are using packages, skip this step and see Installing Key Trustee Server Using the Command Line for package-based installation instructions. After installing Key Trustee Server using packages, continue to 5. Install Parcel for Key Trustee KMS on page 301.

This step is completed automatically during 3. Add a dedicated cluster for the Key Trustee Server on page 300 if you are using parcels. If the step is incomplete for any reason (such as the wizard being interrupted or a failure installing the parcel), complete it manually:

1. Click Install Key Trustee Server binary using packages or parcels.
2. Select the KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER parcel to install Key Trustee Server, or select None if you need to install Key Trustee Server manually using packages. If you do not see a parcel available, click More Options and add the repository URL to the Remote Parcel Repository URLs list. After selecting a parcel, click Continue.
3. After the KEYTRUSTEE_SERVER parcel is successfully downloaded, distributed, unpacked, and activated, click Finish to complete this step and return to the main page of the wizard.

5. Install Parcel for Key Trustee KMS

Minimum Required Role: Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

This step installs the Key Trustee KMS parcel. If you are using packages, skip this step and see Installing Key Trustee KMS Using Packages for instructions. After installing Key Trustee KMS using packages, continue to 6. Add a Key Trustee Server Service on page 301.

To complete this step for parcel-based installations:

1. Click Install Parcel for Key Trustee KMS.
2. Select the KEYTRUSTEE parcel to install Key Trustee KMS. If you do not see a parcel available, click More Options and add the repository URL to the Remote Parcel Repository URLs list. After selecting a parcel, click Continue.
3. After the KEYTRUSTEE parcel is successfully downloaded, distributed, unpacked, and activated, click Finish to complete this step and return to the main page of the wizard.

6. Add a Key Trustee Server Service

Minimum Required Role: Key Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

This step adds the Key Trustee Server service to Cloudera Manager. To complete this step:

1. Click Add a Key Trustee Server Service.
2. Click Continue.
3. On the Customize Role Assignments for Key Trustee Server page, select the hosts for the Active Key Trustee Server and Passive Key Trustee Server roles. Make sure that the selected hosts are not used for other services (see Resource Planning for Data at Rest Encryption on page 242 for more information), and click Continue.
4. The **Entropy Considerations** page provides commands to install the `rng-tools` package to increase available entropy for cryptographic operations. For more information, see **Entropy Requirements** on page 237. After completing these commands, click **Continue**.

5. The **Synchronize Active and Passive Key Trustee Server Private Keys** page provides instructions for generating and copying the Active Key Trustee Server private key to the Passive Key Trustee Server. Cloudera recommends following security best practices and transferring the private key using offline media, such as a removable USB drive. For convenience (for example, in a development or testing environment where maximum security is not required), you can copy the private key over the network using the provided `rsync` command.

   After you have synchronized the private keys, run the `ktadmin init` command on the Passive Key Trustee Server as described in the wizard. After the initialization is complete, check the box to indicate you have synchronized the keys and click **Continue** in the wizard.

6. The **Setup TLS for Key Trustee Server** page provides instructions on replacing the auto-generated self-signed certificate with a production certificate from a trusted Certificate Authority (CA). For more information, see **Managing Key Trustee Server Certificates** on page 259. Click **Continue** to view and modify the default certificate settings.

7. On the **Review Changes** page, you can view and modify the following settings:

   - **Database Storage Directory** (`db_root`)
     - Default value: `/var/lib/keytrustee/db`
     - The directory on the local filesystem where the Key Trustee Server database is stored. Modify this value to store the database in a different directory.

   - **Active Key Trustee Server TLS/SSL Server Private Key File (PEM Format)** (`ssl.privatekey.location`)
     - Default value: `/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/.ssl/ssl-cert-keytrustee-pk.pem`
     - The path to the Active Key Trustee Server TLS certificate private key. Accept the default setting to use the auto-generated private key. If you have a CA-signed certificate, change this path to the CA-signed certificate private key file. This file must be in **PEM** format.

   - **Active Key Trustee Server TLS/SSL Server Certificate File (PEM Format)** (`ssl.cert.location`)
     - Default value: `/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/.ssl/ssl-cert-keytrustee.pem`
     - The path to the Active Key Trustee Server TLS certificate. Accept the default setting to use the auto-generated self-signed certificate. If you have a CA-signed certificate, change this to the path to the CA-signed certificate. This file must be in **PEM** format.

   - **Active Key Trustee Server TLS/SSL Server CA Certificate (PEM Format)** (`ssl.cacert.location`)
     - Default value: (none)
     - The path to the file containing the CA certificate and any intermediate certificates used to sign the Active Key Trustee Server certificate. If you have a CA-signed certificate, set this value to the path to the CA certificate or certificate chain file. This file must be in **PEM** format.

   - **Active Key Trustee Server TLS/SSL Private Key Password** (`ssl.privatekey.password`)
     - Default value: (none)
     - The password for the Active Key Trustee Server private key file. Leave this blank if the file is not password-protected.

   - **Passive Key Trustee Server TLS/SSL Server Private Key File (PEM Format)** (`ssl.privatekey.location`)
     - Default value: `/var/lib/keytrustee/.keytrustee/.ssl/ssl-cert-keytrustee-pk.pem`
     - The path to the Passive Key Trustee Server TLS certificate private key. Accept the default setting to use the auto-generated private key. If you have a CA-signed certificate, change this path to the CA-signed certificate private key file. This file must be in **PEM** format.
8. After all commands complete successfully, click **Continue**. If the **Generate Key Trustee Server Keyring** appears stuck, make sure that the Key Trustee Server host has enough entropy. See **Entropy Requirements** on page 237 for more information.

9. Click **Finish** to complete this step and return to the main page of the wizard.

For parcel-based Key Trustee Server releases 5.8 and higher, Cloudera Manager automatically backs up Key Trustee Server (using the `ktbackup.sh` script) after adding the Key Trustee Server service. It also schedules automatic backups using **cron**. For package-based installations, you must manually back up Key Trustee Server and configure a **cron** job.

Cloudera Manager configures **cron** to run the backup script hourly. The latest 10 backups are retained in `/var/lib/keytrustee` in cleartext. For information about using the backup script and configuring the **cron** job (including how to encrypt backups), see **Backing Up Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS Using the ktbackup.sh Script** on page 244.

7. Add a Key Trustee KMS Service

**Minimum Required Role:** **Key Administrator** (also provided by **Full Administrator**)  

This step adds a Key Trustee KMS service to the cluster. The Key Trustee KMS service is required to enable HDFS encryption to use Key Trustee Server for cryptographic key management. Key Trustee KMS high availability uses ZooKeeper to automatically configure load balancing. If you do not have a ZooKeeper service in your cluster, add one using the instructions in **Adding a Service**.

To complete this step:

1. Click **Add a Key Trustee KMS Service**.

2. Select an existing Key Trustee Server pair or specify an external Key Trustee Server pair. If you have an existing Key Trustee Server pair outside of Cloudera Manager control, select the **External Key Trustee Server** option and specify the fully-qualified domain names (FQDNs) of the Key Trustee Server pair. Click **Continue**.

3. Select cluster hosts for the Key Trustee KMS service. For production environments, select at least two hosts for high availability. If you proceed with only one host, you can enable high availability later. See **Enabling Key Trustee KMS High Availability** for more information.

Make sure that the selected hosts are not used for other services (see **Resource Planning for Data at Rest Encryption** on page 242 for more information), and click **Continue**.
4. The **Entropy Considerations** page provides commands to install the `rng-tools` package to increase available entropy for cryptographic operations. For more information, see [Entropy Requirements](#) on page 237. After completing these commands, click **Continue**.

5. The **Setup Organization and Auth Secret** page generates the necessary commands to create an organization in Key Trustee Server. An organization is required to be able to register the Key Trustee KMS with Key Trustee Server. See [Managing Key Trustee Server Organizations](#) on page 256 for more information.

Enter an organization name and click **Generate Instruction**. Run the displayed commands to generate an organization and obtain the `auth_secret` value for the organization. Enter the secret in the `auth_secret` field and click **Continue**.

6. The **Setup Access Control List (ACL)** page allows you to generate ACLs for the Key Trustee KMS or to provide your own ACLs. To generate the recommended ACLs, enter the username and group responsible for managing cryptographic keys and click **Generate ACLs**. To specify your own ACLs, select the **Use Your Own kms-acls.xml File** option and enter the ACLs. For more information on the KMS Access Control List, see [Configuring KMS Access Control Lists](#) on page 319.

After generating or specifying the ACL, click **Continue**.

7. The **Setup TLS for Key Trustee KMS** page provides high-level instructions for configuring TLS communication between the Key Trustee KMS and the Key Trustee Server, as well as between the EDH cluster and the Key Trustee KMS. See [Configuring TLS/SSL for the KMS](#) on page 318 for more information.

Click **Continue**.

8. The **Review Changes** page lists all of the settings configured in this step. Click the icon next to any setting for information about that setting. Review the settings and click **Continue**.

9. After the **First Run** commands have successfully completed, click **Continue**.

10. The **Synchronize Private Keys and HDFS Dependency** page provides instructions for copying the private key from one Key Management Server Proxy role to all other roles.

    **Warning:** It is *very important* that you perform this step. Failure to do so leaves Key Trustee KMS in a state where keys are intermittently inaccessible, depending on which Key Trustee KMS host a client interacts with, because cryptographic key material encrypted by one Key Trustee KMS host cannot be decrypted by another. If you are already running multiple Key Trustee KMS hosts with different private keys, immediately back up all Key Trustee KMS hosts, and contact Cloudera Support for assistance correcting the issue.

To determine whether the Key Trustee KMS private keys are different, compare the MD5 hash of the private keys. On each Key Trustee KMS host, run the following command:

```bash
$ md5sum /var/lib/kms-keytrustee/keytrustee/.keytrustee/secring.gpg
```

If the outputs are different, contact Cloudera Support for assistance. Do not attempt to synchronize existing keys. If you overwrite the private key and do not have a backup, any keys encrypted by that private key are permanently inaccessible, and any data encrypted by those keys is permanently irretrievable. If you are configuring Key Trustee KMS high availability for the first time, continue synchronizing the private keys.

Cloudera recommends following security best practices and transferring the private key using offline media, such as a removable USB drive. For convenience (for example, in a development or testing environment where maximum security is not required), you can copy the private key over the network using the provided `rsync` command.

After you have synchronized the private keys, check the box to indicate you have done so and click **Continue**.

11. After the Key Trustee KMS service starts, click **Finish** to complete this step and return to the main page of the wizard.
For parcel-based Key Trustee KMS releases 5.8 and higher, Cloudera Manager automatically backs up Key Trustee KMS (using the `ktbackup.sh` script) after adding the Key Trustee KMS service. It does not schedule automatic backups using `cron`. For package-based installations, you must manually back up Key Trustee Server and configure a `cron` job.

The backup is stored in `/var/lib/kms-keytrustee` in cleartext. For more information about using the backup script and configuring the `cron` job (including how to encrypt backups), see Backing Up Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS Using the `ktbackup.sh` Script on page 244.

### 8. Restart stale services and redeploy client configuration

**Minimum Required Role:** Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

This step restarts all services which were modified while enabling HDFS encryption. To complete this step:

1. Click Restart stale services and redeploy client configuration.
2. Click Restart Stale Services.
3. Ensure that Re-deploy client configuration is checked, and click Restart Now.
4. After all commands have completed, click Finish.

### 9. Validate Data Encryption

**Minimum Required Role:** Key Administrator or Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

This step launches a tutorial with instructions on creating an encryption zone and putting data into it to verify that HDFS encryption is enabled and working.

Enabling HDFS Encryption Using Navigator HSM KMS Backed by Thales HSM

1. **Enable Kerberos**

   **Minimum Required Role:** Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

   For more information about enabling Kerberos, see Enabling Kerberos Authentication Using the Wizard on page 49.

2. **Enable TLS/SSL**

   **Minimum Required Role:** Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

   For more information about enabling TLS, see Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager on page 196.

3. **Install the Thales HSM Client**

   Before installing the Navigator HSM KMS backed by Thales HSM, you must install the Thales HSM client on the host. Attempts to install the HSM KMS service before installing the Thales HSM client will fail.

   For details about how to install the Thales HSM client, refer to the Thales HSM product documentation.

4. **Install Key Trustee KMS binary using parcels**

   **Minimum Required Role:** Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

   This step completes automatically when you download the parcel. If the step is incomplete for any reason (such as the wizard being interrupted or a failure installing the parcel), complete it manually:

   1. Click Install Key Trustee KMS binary using parcels.
   2. Select the KEYTRUSTEE parcel to install Key Trustee KMS, or select None if you need to install Key Trustee KMS manually using packages. If you do not see a parcel available, click More Options and add the repository URL to the Remote Parcel Repository URLs list. After selecting a parcel, click Continue.
   3. After the KEYTRUSTEE parcel is successfully downloaded, distributed, unpacked, and activated, click Finish to complete this step and return to the main page of the wizard.
Configuring Encryption

5. Add the HSM KMS backed by Thales Service

1. Click **Add Navigator HSM KMS Services backed by Thales HSM**.
2. In the **Thales HSM KMS Proxy** field, select the hosts to which you want to assign a new or existing role. Click **OK**, and then click **Continue**.
3. To set up the ACL for the cluster, specify a comma-separated list of users and groups, and then click **Generate ACLs**. Click **Continue**.
4. Click **Continue**.
5. Review your selections and specify the:
   - **Thales HSM Password**
     Contact your HSM administrator for the Thales HSM password.
   - **Keystore Password**

   ! Warning: Specify a unique password to protect the KMS metadata. *Safely store this password for future use.* In the event that the service is deleted, you *must* provide this password to re-add the service with the same metastore.

   ! Note: It is a good practice to review the Thales HSM Server port at this point, because it could have changed during configuration.

   Then click **Continue**.

6. Upon notification that you have successfully added the Thales KMS Service, click **Continue** and **Finish**.

6. Restart stale services and redeploy client configuration

   **Minimum Required Role:** **Cluster Administrator** (also provided by Full Administrator)

   This step restarts all services that were modified while enabling HDFS encryption. To complete this step:

   1. Click **Restart stale services and redeploy client configuration**.
   2. Click **Restart Stale Services**.
   3. Ensure that **Re-deploy client configuration** is checked, and click **Restart Now**.
   4. After all commands have completed, click **Finish**.

7. Validate Data Encryption

   **Minimum Required Role:** **Key Administrator** or **Cluster Administrator** (also provided by Full Administrator)

   This step launches a Validate Data Encryption tutorial with instructions describing how to create an encryption zone and place data into it to verify that HDFS encryption is enabled and working.

   *Enabling HDFS Encryption Using Navigator HSM KMS Backed by Luna HSM*

   1. Enable Kerberos

      **Minimum Required Role:** **Cluster Administrator** (also provided by Full Administrator)

      For more information about enabling Kerberos, see [Enabling Kerberos Authentication Using the Wizard](#) on page 49.

   2. Enable TLS/SSL

      **Minimum Required Role:** **Cluster Administrator** (also provided by Full Administrator)

      For more information about enabling TLS, see [Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager](#) on page 196.
3. Install Luna HSM Client

Before installing the Navigator HSM KMS backed by Luna HSM, you must install the Luna HSM client on the host. Attempts to install the Navigator HSM KMS backed by Luna HSM before installing the Luna HSM client will fail.

For details about how to install the Luna HSM client, refer to the Luna HSM product documentation.

4. Install Parcel for Cloudera Key Providers

Minimum Required Role: Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

This step completed automatically when you downloaded the parcel. If the step is incomplete for any reason (such as the wizard being interrupted or a failure installing the parcel), complete it manually:

1. Click Install Key Trustee KMS binary using packages or parcels.
2. Select the KEYTRUSTEE parcel to install Key Trustee KMS, or select None if you need to install Key Trustee KMS manually using packages. If you do not see a parcel available, click More Options and add the repository URL to the Remote Parcel Repository URLs list. After selecting a parcel, click Continue.
3. After the KEYTRUSTEE parcel is successfully downloaded, distributed, unpacked, and activated, click Finish to complete this step and return to the main page of the wizard.

5. Add the Navigator HSM KMS backed by SafeNet Luna HSM

1. Click Add Navigator HSM KMS backed by Safenet Luna HSM.
2. In the Luna HSM-backed KMS Proxy field, select the hosts to which you want to assign a new or existing role. Click OK, and then click Continue.
3. To set up the ACL for the cluster, specify a comma-separated list of users and groups, and then click Generate ACLs. Click Continue.
4. Click Continue.
5. Review your selections and specify the:
   - Luna HSM Password
     Contact your HSM administrator for the Luna HSM Partition password.
   - Keystore Password
     Important: Specify a unique password to protect the KMS metadata. Safely store this password for future use. In the event that the service is deleted, you must provide this password to re-add the service with the same metastore.
   - Luna HSM Server Slot
     Identification number of the Luna HSM Server slot/device to use. If you do not know what value(s) to enter here, see the Luna product documentation for instructions on configuring your Luna HSM. Alternatively, run the /usr/safenet/lunaclient/bin/vtl verify command on the Luna HSM client host to view the slot value.

Then click Continue.
6. Upon notification that you have successfully added the Navigator Safenet Luna KMS Service, click Continue and Finish.

6. Restart stale services and redeploy client configuration

Minimum Required Role: Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

This step restarts all services that were modified while enabling HDFS encryption. To complete this step:

1. Click Restart stale services and redeploy client configuration.
2. Click Restart Stale Services.
3. Ensure that Re-deploy client configuration is checked, and click Restart Now.
4. After all commands have completed, click Finish.

7. Validate Data Encryption

Minimum Required Role: Key Administrator or Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

This step launches a Validate Data Encryption tutorial with instructions describing how to create an encryption zone and place data into it to verify that HDFS encryption is enabled and working.

Enabling HDFS Encryption Using a Java KeyStore

Note: Cloudera strongly recommends using Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server as the root of trust for production environments. The file-based Java KeyStore root of trust is insufficient to provide the security, scalability, and manageability required by most production systems.

After selecting A file-based password-protected Java KeyStore as the root of trust, the following steps are displayed:

1. Enable Kerberos

Minimum Required Role: Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

For more information on enabling Kerberos, see Enabling Kerberos Authentication Using the Wizard on page 49.

2. Enable TLS/SSL

Minimum Required Role: Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

For more information on enabling TLS, see Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager on page 196.

3. Add a Java KeyStore KMS Service

Minimum Required Role: Key Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

This step adds the Java KeyStore KMS service to the cluster. The Java KeyStore KMS service uses a password-protected Java KeyStore for cryptographic key management. To complete this step:

1. Click Add a Java KeyStore KMS Service.
2. Select a cluster host for the Java KeyStore KMS service. Click Continue.
3. The Setup TLS for Java KeyStore KMS page provides high-level instructions for configuring TLS communication between the EDH cluster and the Java KeyStore KMS. See Configuring TLS/SSL for the KMS on page 318 for more information.
   Click Continue.
4. The Review Changes page lists the Java KeyStore settings. Click the  icon next to any setting for information about that setting. Enter the location and password for the Java KeyStore and click Continue.
5. Click Continue to automatically configure the HDFS service to depend on the Java KeyStore KMS service.
6. Click Finish to complete this step and return to the main page of the wizard.

4. Restart stale services and redeploy client configuration

Minimum Required Role: Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

This step restarts all services which were modified while enabling HDFS encryption. To complete this step:

1. Click Restart stale services and redeploy client configuration.
2. Click Restart Stale Services.
3. Ensure that Re-deploy client configuration is checked, and click Restart Now.
4. After all commands have completed, click Finish.
5. Validate Data Encryption

**Minimum Required Role:** Key Administrator or Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

This step launches a tutorial with instructions on creating an encryption zone and putting data into it to verify that HDFS encryption is enabled and working.

**Hints and Tips**

This section includes hints and tips that can help simplify the HSM KMS installation when using the HDFS Encryption Wizard.

**Limit the Number of ZooKeeper DEBUG Messages**

When setting the KMS log level to DEBUG, there can be a lot of ZooKeeper DEBUG messages that clutter the log. To prevent this, in the Logging Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) field, enter:

```
log4j.category.org.apache.zookeeper=INFO
```

**Limit Encryption Zone Timeouts**

When creating encryption zones, there can be client timeouts due to the time it takes to fill the encrypted data encryption key (EDEK) cache. To avoid this, adjust the low watermark threshold settings as follows.

On the server side, in the field HSM KMS Proxy Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for kms-site.xml:

```
<property>
    <name>hadoop.security.kms.encrypted.key.cache.low.watermark</name>
    <value>.03</value>
</property>
```

On the client side, in the field HDFS Cluster-wide Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for core-site.xml:

```
<property>
    <name>hadoop.security.kms.client.encrypted.key.cache.low-watermark</name>
    <value>.02</value>
</property>
```

**Increase KMS Client Timeout Value**

Due to potential latency during installation, it is recommended that you increase the KMS client timeout value.

Change from the default of 60 seconds to a value between 100 and 120 seconds in the field HDFS Cluster-wide Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for core-site.xml:

```
<property>
    <name>hadoop.security.kms.client.timeout</name>
    <value>110</value>
</property>
```

**Managing Encryption Keys and Zones**

Interacting with the KMS and creating encryption zones requires the use of two new CLI commands: hadoop key and hdfs crypto. The following sections will help you get started with creating encryption keys and setting up encryption zones.

Before continuing, make sure that your KMS ACLs have been set up according to best practices. For more information, see Configuring KMS Access Control Lists on page 319.
Validating Hadoop Key Operations

**Warning:** If you are using or plan to use Cloudera Navigator Key HSM in conjunction with Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server, ensure that key names begin with alphanumeric characters and do not use special characters other than hyphen (-), period (.), or underscore (_). Using other special characters can prevent you from migrating your keys to an HSM. See [Integrating Key HSM with Key Trustee Server](#) on page 266 for more information.

Use `hadoop key create` to create a test key, and then use `hadoop key list` to retrieve the key list:

```
$ sudo -u <key_admin> hadoop key create keytrustee_test
$ hadoop key list
```

Creating Encryption Zones

**Important:** Cloudera does not currently support configuring the root directory as an encryption zone. Nested encryption zones are also not supported.

**Important:** The Java Keystore KMS default Truststore (for example, `org.apache.hadoop.crypto.key.JavaKeyStoreProvider`) does not support uppercase key names.

Once a KMS has been set up and the NameNode and HDFS clients have been correctly configured, use the `hadoop key` and `hdfs crypto` command-line tools to create encryption keys and set up new encryption zones.

- Create an encryption key for your zone as the `keyadmin` for the user/group (regardless of the application that will be using the encryption zone):

  ```
  $ sudo -u hdfs hadoop key create <key_name>
  ```

- Create a new empty directory and make it an encryption zone using the key created above.

  ```
  $ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -mkdir /encryption_zone
  $ sudo -u hdfs hdfs crypto -createZone -keyName <key_name> -path /encryption_zone
  
  You can verify creation of the new encryption zone by running the `-listZones` command. You should see the encryption zone along with its key listed as follows:
  ```
  $ sudo -u hdfs hdfs crypto -listZones /encryption_zone <key_name>
  ```

**Warning:** Do not delete an encryption key as long as it is still in use for an encryption zone. This results in loss of access to data in that zone. Also, do not delete the KMS service, as your encrypted HDFS data will be inaccessible. To prevent data loss, first copy the encrypted HDFS data to a non-encrypted zone using the `distcp` command.

For more information and recommendations on creating encryption zones for each CDH component, see [Configuring CDH Services for HDFS Encryption](#) on page 328.

Adding Files to an Encryption Zone

You can add files to an encryption zone by copying them to the encryption zone using `distcp`. For example:

```
sudo -u hdfs hadoop distcp /user/dir /encryption_zone
```
**Important:** Starting with CDH 5.7.1, you can delete files or directories that are part of an HDFS encryption zone. For CDH 5.7.0 and lower, you will need to manually configure HDFS trash to allow deletions. For details on how to configure trash in HDFS, see Trash Behavior with HDFS Transparent Encryption Enabled.

### DistCp Considerations

A common use case for DistCp is to replicate data between clusters for backup and disaster recovery purposes. This is typically performed by the cluster administrator, who is an HDFS superuser. To retain this workflow when using HDFS encryption, a new virtual path prefix has been introduced, `/.reserved/raw/`, that gives superusers direct access to the underlying block data in the filesystem. This allows superusers to distcp data without requiring access to encryption keys, and avoids the overhead of decrypting and re-encrypting data. It also means the source and destination data will be byte-for-byte identical, which would not have been true if the data was being re-encrypted with a new EDEK.

**Warning:**

When using `/.reserved/raw/` to distcp encrypted data, make sure you preserve extended attributes with the `-px` flag. This is because encrypted attributes such as the EDEK are exposed through extended attributes and must be preserved to be able to decrypt the file.

This means that if the distcp is initiated at or above the encryption zone root, it will automatically create a new encryption zone at the destination if it does not already exist. Hence, Cloudera recommends you first create identical encryption zones on the destination cluster to avoid any potential mishaps.

### Copying data from unencrypted locations

By default, distcp compares checksums provided by the filesystem to verify that data was successfully copied to the destination. When copying from an encrypted location, the file system checksums will not match because the underlying block data is different. This is true whether or not the destination location is encrypted or unencrypted.

In this case, you can specify the `-skipcrccheck` and `-update` flags to avoid verifying checksums. When you use `-skipcrccheck`, distcp checks the file integrity by performing a file size comparison, right after the copy completes for each file.

### Deleting Encryption Zones

To remove an encryption zone, delete the encrypted directory:

**Warning:** This command deletes the entire directory and all of its contents. Ensure that the data is no longer needed before running this command.

```bash
$ sudo -u hdfs hadoop fs -rm -r -skipTrash /encryption_zone
```

**Important:** The Key Trustee KMS does not directly execute a key deletion (for example, it may perform a soft delete instead, or delay the actual deletion to prevent mistakes). In these cases, errors may occur when creating or deleting a key using the same name after it has already been deleted.

### Backing Up Encryption Keys

**Warning:** It is very important that you regularly back up your encryption keys. Failure to do so can result in irretrievable loss of encrypted data.
If you are using the Java KeyStore KMS, make sure you regularly back up the Java KeyStore that stores the encryption keys. If you are using the Key Trustee KMS and Key Trustee Server, see Backing Up and Restoring Key Trustee Server and Clients on page 243 for instructions on backing up Key Trustee Server and Key Trustee KMS.

Configuring the Key Management Server (KMS)

Hadoop Key Management Server (KMS) is a cryptographic key management server based on the Hadoop KeyProvider API. It provides a KeyProvider implementation client that interacts with the KMS using the HTTP REST API. Both the KMS and its client support HTTP SPNEGO Kerberos authentication and TLS/SSL-secured communication. The KMS is a Java-based web application that uses a preconfigured Tomcat server bundled with the Hadoop distribution.

For instructions on securing the KMS, see Securing the Key Management Server (KMS) on page 316.

Cloudera provides the following implementations of the Hadoop KMS:

- **Java KeyStore KMS** - The default Hadoop KMS included in CDH that uses a file-based Java KeyStore (JKS) for its backing keystore. For parcel-based installations, no additional action is required to install or upgrade the KMS. For package-based installations, you must install additional packages. For more information, see Installing and Upgrading Java KeyStore KMS. Cloudera strongly recommends not using Java KeyStore KMS in production environments.

- **Key Trustee KMS** - A custom KMS that uses Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server for its backing keystore instead of the file-based Java KeyStore (JKS) used by the default Hadoop KMS. Cloudera strongly recommends using Key Trustee KMS in production environments to improve the security, durability, and scalability of your cryptographic key management. For more information about the architecture and components involved in encrypting data at rest for production environments, see Cloudera Navigator Data Encryption Overview and Data at Rest Encryption Reference Architecture on page 236. For instructions on installing and upgrading Key Trustee KMS, see:
  - Installing Key Trustee KMS
  - Upgrading Key Trustee KMS

Also, integrating Key Trustee Server with Cloudera Navigator Key HSM provides an additional layer of protection.

- **Navigator KMS Services backed by Thales HSM** - A custom KMS that uses a supported Thales Hardware Security Module (HSM) as its backing keystore. This KMS service provides the highest level of key isolation to customers who require it.

- **Navigator KMS Services backed by Luna HSM** - A custom KMS that uses a supported Luna Hardware Security Module (HSM) as its backing keystore. This KMS provides the highest level of key isolation to customers who require it.

Configuring KMS High Availability

For Key Trustee KMS high availability, see Enabling Key Trustee KMS High Availability. Java KeyStore KMS does not support high availability.

Configuring the KMS Using Cloudera Manager

If you are using Cloudera Manager, you can view and edit the KMS configuration by navigating to the following pages, depending on the KMS implementation you are using:

- Key Trustee KMS service > Configuration
- Java KeyStore KMS service > Configuration

For more information on using Cloudera Manager to find and change configuration parameters, see Modifying Configuration Properties Using Cloudera Manager.

For instructions about configuring the KMS and its clients using the command line for package-based installations, continue reading:

Configuring the KMS Cache Using Cloudera Manager

By default, the KMS caches keys to reduce the number of interactions with the key provider. You can disable the cache by setting the hadoop.kms.cache.enable property to false.

The cache is only used with the getCurrentKey(), getKeyVersion() and getMetadata() methods.
For the `getCurrentKey()` method, entries are cached for a maximum of 30000 milliseconds to prevent stale keys.

For the `getKeyVersion()` method, entries are cached with a default inactivity timeout of 600000 milliseconds (10 minutes).

You can configure the cache and its timeout values by adding the following properties to **KMS service > Configuration > Advanced > Key Management Server Proxy Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve)** for `kms-site.xml`:

```xml
<property>
   <name>hadoop.kms.cache.enable</name>
   <value>true</value>
</property>

<property>
   <name>hadoop.kms.cache.timeout.ms</name>
   <value>600000</value>
</property>

<property>
   <name>hadoop.kms.current.key.cache.timeout.ms</name>
   <value>30000</value>
</property>
```

See **Custom Configuration** for more information on adding custom properties using the **Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve)** feature.

**Configuring the Audit Log Aggregation Interval Using the Command Line**

Audit logs are generated for `GET_KEY_VERSION`, `GET_CURRENT_KEY`, `DECRYPT_EEK`, and `GENERATE_EEK` operations.

Entries are aggregated by user, key, and operation for a configurable interval, after which the number of aggregated operations by the user for a given key is written to the audit log.

The interval is configured in milliseconds by adding the `hadoop.kms.aggregation.delay.ms` property to **KMS service > Configuration > Advanced > Key Management Server Proxy Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve)** for `kms-site.xml`:

```xml
<property>
   <name>hadoop.kms.aggregation.delay.ms</name>
   <value>10000</value>
</property>
```

For more information about adding custom properties using the **Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve)** feature, see **Custom Configuration**.

**Configuring the Java KeyStore KMS Using the Command Line**

**Note:** Because Key Trustee KMS is supported only in Cloudera Manager deployments, the following command line instructions apply only to Java KeyStore KMS. For instructions about configuring Key Trustee KMS, see **Configuring the KMS Using Cloudera Manager** on page 312.

For instructions about configuring the Java KeyStore KMS and its clients using the command line for package-based installations, continue reading:

**Configuring the Java KeyStore KMS KeyProvider Using the Command Line**

**Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See **Cloudera Documentation** for information specific to other releases.
Configure the KMS backing KeyProvider properties in the `/etc/hadoop-kms/conf/kms-site.xml` configuration file:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.key.provider.uri</name>
  <value>jceks://file@/${user.home}/kms.keystore</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.keystore.java-keystore-provider.password-file</name>
  <value>keystore_password_file</value>
</property>
```

If you do not specify the absolute path to the password file, you must include it in the Hadoop CLASSPATH.

Restart the KMS for configuration changes to take effect. See Starting and Stopping the Java KeyStore KMS Using the Command Line on page 315 for instructions.

Configuring the Java KeyStore KMS Cache Using the Command Line

⚠️ **Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See Cloudera Documentation for information specific to other releases.

By default, the KMS caches keys to reduce the number of interactions with the key provider. You can disable the cache by setting the `hadoop.kms.cache.enable` property to `false`.

The cache is only used with the `getCurrentKey()`, `getKeyVersion()` and `getMetadata()` methods.

For the `getCurrentKey()` method, entries are cached for a maximum of 30000 milliseconds to prevent stale keys.

For the `getKeyVersion()` method, entries are cached with a default inactivity timeout of 600000 milliseconds (10 minutes).

The cache and its timeout values are configured using the following properties in the `/etc/hadoop-kms/conf/kms-site.xml` configuration file:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.cache.enable</name>
  <value>true</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.cache.timeout.ms</name>
  <value>600000</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.current.key.cache.timeout.ms</name>
  <value>30000</value>
</property>
```

Configuring KMS Clients Using the Command Line

⚠️ **Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See Cloudera Documentation for information specific to other releases.

To configure KMS clients, set the `hadoop.security.key.provider.path` property in `core-site.xml` or `hdfs-site.xml`. Specify the value in the format `kms://<scheme>@<kms_hosts>:<port>/kms`. Replace `<scheme>`
with http or https, depending on whether you have configured TLS. Replace <kms_hosts> with a semicolon-separated list of the KMS hosts. Replace <port> with the port number on which the KMS is running (16000 by default).

For example, for a KMS running on http://localhost:16000/kms, the KeyProvider URI is kms://http@localhost:16000/kms. For high availability KMS (Key Trustee KMS only) running on https://kms01.example.com:16000/kms and https://kms02.example.com:16000/kms, the KeyProvider URI is kms://https@kms01.example.com;kms02.example.com:16000/kms.

See the following for an excerpt from core-site.xml:

```
<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.key.provider.path</name>
  <value>kms://https@kms01.example.com;kms02.example.com:16000/kms</value>
</property>
```

Starting and Stopping the Java KeyStore KMS Using the Command Line

**Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See Cloudera Documentation for information specific to other releases.

To start or stop KMS use the kms.sh script. For example, to start the KMS:

```
$ sudo /usr/lib/hadoop-kms/sbin/kms.sh start
```

Running the script without parameters lists all possible parameters.

To use an init script to manage the KMS service, use your package manager to install the hadoop-kms-server package from the CDH repository. For example, for RHEL 6:

```
$ sudo yum install hadoop-kms-server
```

After installation, use the service hadoop-kms-server command to manage the KMS service.

Configuring the Audit Log Aggregation Interval Using the Command Line

**Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See Cloudera Documentation for information specific to other releases.

Audit logs are generated for GET_KEY_VERSION, GET_CURRENT_KEY, DECRYPT_EEK, and GENERATE_EEK operations. Entries are aggregated by user, key, and operation for a configurable interval, after which the number of aggregated operations by the user for a given key is written to the audit log.

The interval is configured in milliseconds using the hadoop.kms.aggregation.delay.ms property:

```
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.aggregation.delay.ms</name>
  <value>10000</value>
</property>
```
You can configure the embedded Tomcat server by using the
/etc/hadoop-kms/tomcat-conf/conf/server.xml.conf file.

The following environment variables can be set in KMS /etc/hadoop-kms/conf/kms-env.sh script and can be used to alter the default ports and log directory:

- KMS_HTTP_PORT
- KMS_ADMIN_PORT
- KMS_LOG

Restart the KMS for the configuration changes to take effect.

Securing the Key Management Server (KMS)

Cloudera provides the following implementations of the Hadoop KMS:

- **Java KeyStore KMS** - The default Hadoop KMS included in CDH that uses a file-based Java KeyStore (JKS) for its backing keystore. For parcel-based installations, no additional action is required to install or upgrade the KMS. For package-based installations, you must install additional packages. For more information, see Installing and Upgrading Java KeyStore KMS. Cloudera strongly recommends not using Java KeyStore KMS in production environments.

- **Key Trustee KMS** - A custom KMS that uses Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server for its backing keystore instead of the file-based Java KeyStore (JKS) used by the default Hadoop KMS. Cloudera strongly recommends using Key Trustee KMS in production environments to improve the security, durability, and scalability of your cryptographic key management. For more information about the architecture and components involved in encrypting data at rest for production environments, see Cloudera Navigator Data Encryption Overview and Data at Rest Encryption Reference Architecture on page 236. For instructions on installing and upgrading Key Trustee KMS, see:
  - Installing Key Trustee KMS
  - Upgrading Key Trustee KMS

Also, integrating Key Trustee Server with Cloudera Navigator Key HSM provides an additional layer of protection.

- **Navigator KMS Services backed by Thales HSM** - A custom KMS that uses a supported Thales Hardware Security Module (HSM) as its backing keystore. This KMS service provides the highest level of key isolation to customers who require it.

- **Navigator KMS Services backed by Luna HSM** - A custom KMS that uses a supported Luna Hardware Security Module (HSM) as its backing keystore. This KMS provides the highest level of key isolation to customers who require it.

This topic contains information on securing the KMS using Kerberos, TLS/SSL communication, and access control lists (ACLs) for operations on encryption keys. Cloudera Manager instructions can be performed for both Key Trustee KMS and Java KeyStore KMS deployments. Command-line instructions apply only to Java KeyStore KMS deployments. Key Trustee KMS is not supported outside of Cloudera Manager. For more information, see Installing Key Trustee KMS.

Enabling Kerberos Authentication for the KMS

**Minimum Required Role:** **Full Administrator**

To enable Kerberos for the KMS using Cloudera Manager:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the KMS service.
2. Click Configuration.
3. Set the Authentication Type property to kerberos.
4. Click Save Changes.
5. Because Cloudera Manager does not automatically create the principal and keytab file for the KMS, you must run the Generate Credentials command manually. On the top navigation bar, go to Administration > Security > Kerberos Credentials and click Generate Missing Credentials.

   **Note:** This does not create a new Kerberos principal if an existing HTTP principal exists for the KMS host.

6. Return to the Home page by clicking the Cloudera Manager logo.
7. Click ☰ to invoke the cluster restart wizard.
8. Click Restart Stale Services.
9. Click Restart Now.
10. Click Finish.

Enabling Kerberos Authentication for the Java KeyStore KMS Using the Command Line

**Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See Cloudera Documentation for information specific to other releases.

Configure /etc/krb5.conf with information for your KDC server. Create an HTTP principal and keytab file for the KMS.

Configure /etc/hadoop-kms/conf/kms-site.xml with the following properties:

```xml
<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.authentication.type</name>
    <value>kerberos</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.authentication.kerberos.keytab</name>
    <value>${user.home}/kms.keytab</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.authentication.kerberos.principal</name>
    <value>HTTP/localhost</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.authentication.kerberos.name.rules</name>
    <value>DEFAULT</value>
</property>

Restart the KMS service for the configuration changes to take effect.

Configuring the Java KeyStore KMS Proxyuser Using the Command Line

**Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See Cloudera Documentation for information specific to other releases.
Each proxyuser must be configured in /etc/hadoop-kms/conf/kms-site.xml using the following properties:

```
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.proxyuser.#USER#.users</name>
  <value>*</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.proxyuser.#USER#.groups</name>
  <value>*</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.proxyuser.#USER#.hosts</name>
  <value>*</value>
</property>
```

where #USER# is the username of the proxyuser to be configured.

The `hadoop.kms.proxyuser.#USER#.users` property indicates the users that can be impersonated. The `hadoop.kms.proxyuser.#USER#.groups` property indicates the groups to which the users being impersonated must belong. At least one of these properties must be defined. If both are defined, the configured proxyuser can impersonate any user in the users list and any user belonging to a group listed in the groups list.

The `hadoop.kms.proxyuser.#USER#.hosts` property indicates the host from which the proxyuser can make impersonation requests. "*" means there are no restrictions for the #USER# regarding users, groups, or hosts.

### Configuring TLS/SSL for the KMS

**Configuring TLS/SSL for the KMS Using Cloudera Manager**

**Minimum Required Role:** Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

The steps for configuring and enabling Hadoop TLS/SSL for the KMS are as follows:

1. Go to the KMS service.
2. Click Configuration.
3. In the Search field, type TLS/SSL to show the KMS TLS/SSL properties (in the Key Management Server Default Group > Security category).
4. Edit the following TLS/SSL properties according to your cluster configuration.

**Table 29: KMS TLS/SSL Properties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable TLS/SSL for Key Management Server</td>
<td>Encrypt communication between clients and Key Management Server using Transport Layer Security (TLS) (formerly known as Secure Socket Layer (TLS/SSL)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Management Server TLS/SSL Server JKS Keystore File Location</td>
<td>The path to the TLS/SSL keystore file containing the server certificate and private key used for TLS/SSL. Used when Key Management Server is acting as a TLS/SSL server. The keystore must be in JKS format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Management Server TLS/SSL Server JKS Keystore File Password</td>
<td>The password for the Key Management Server JKS keystore file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Management Server Proxy TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File</td>
<td>The location on disk of the truststore, in .jks format, used to confirm the authenticity of TLS/SSL servers that Key Management Server Proxy might connect to. This is used when Key Management Server Proxy is the client in a TLS/SSL connection. This truststore must contain the certificates used to sign the services connected to. If this parameter is not provided, the default list of well-known certificate authorities is used instead.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Click Save Changes.
6. Return to the Home page by clicking the Cloudera Manager logo.
7. Click to invoke the cluster restart wizard.
8. Click Restart Stale Services.
9. Click Restart Now.
10. Click Finish.

For help troubleshooting TLS/SSL for KMS configuration issues, see Troubleshooting TLS/SSL Issues in Cloudera Manager on page 497.

### Configuring TLS/SSL for the Java KeyStore KMS Using the Command Line

**Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See Cloudera Documentation for information specific to other releases.

To configure KMS to work over HTTPS, set the following properties in the `/etc/hadoop-kms/conf/kms_env.sh` script:

- `KMS_SSL_KEYSTORE_FILE`
- `KMS_SSL_KEYSTORE_PASS`
- `KMS_SSL_TRUSTSTORE_FILE`
- `KMS_SSL_TRUSTSTORE_PASS`

In the `/etc/hadoop-kms/tomcat-conf/conf/` directory, replace the `server.xml` file with the provided `ssl-server.xml` file.

Create a TLS/SSL certificate for the KMS. As the `kms` user, use the Java `keytool` command to create the TLS/SSL certificate:

```
$ keytool -genkey -alias tomcat -keyalg RSA
```

You are asked a series of questions in an interactive prompt. It creates the keystore file, which is named `.keystore` and located in the `kms` user home directory. The password you enter for the keystore must match the value of the `KMS_SSL_KEYSTORE_PASS` environment variable set in the `kms-env.sh` script in the configuration directory.

The answer to "What is your first and last name?" (CN) must be the hostname of the machine where the KMS will be running.

**Note:** Restart the KMS for the configuration changes to take effect.

### Configuring KMS Access Control Lists

Hadoop KMS supports a range of ACLs that control access to keys and key operations on a granular basis. ACLs can be used, for instance, to only grant users access to certain keys. Restricting HDFS superusers from access to key material is an important design requirement. This prevents a malicious superuser from having access to all the key material and all the encrypted data, and thus being able to decrypt everything.
There are two categories of KMS ACLs:

1. **KMS-wide**: These ACLs specify the types of operations a user can perform. They are configured using the hadoop.kms.acl.<OPERATION> and hadoop.kms.blacklist.<OPERATION> parameters. The operations are as follows:
   - CREATE
   - DELETE
   - ROLLOVER
   - GET
   - GET_KEY
   - GET_METADATA
   - SET_KEY_MATERIAL
   - GENERATE_EEK
   - DECRYPT_EEK

2. **Key-specific**: These ACLs are set in a per-key basis. They are configured using the default.key.acl.<OPERATION>, whitelist.key.acl.<OPERATION>, and key.acl.<key_name>.<OPERATION> parameters. The operations and their programmatic equivalents are as follows:
   - READ - getKeyVersion, getKeyVersions, getMetadata, getKeysMetadata, getCurrentKey
   - MANAGEMENT - createKey, deleteKey, rolloverNewVersion
   - GENERATE_EEK - generateEncryptedKey, warmUpEncryptedKeys
   - DECRYPT_EEK - decryptEncryptedKey
   - ALL - All of the above

   The default.key.acl.<OPERATION> ACL applies to all keys for which an ACL has not been explicitly configured. If no ACL is configured for a specific key, and no default ACL is configured for the requested operation, access is denied.

   **Note:** The default ACL does not support the ALL operation qualifier.

The KMS supports both whitelist and blacklist ACLs. Blacklist entries override whitelist entries. A user or group accessing the KMS is first checked for inclusion in the ACL for the requested operation and then checked for exclusion in the blacklist for the operation before access is granted.

The group membership used by ACL entries relies on the configured group mapping mechanism for HDFS. By default, group membership is determined on the local Linux system running the KMS service. If you have configured HDFS to use LDAP for group mapping, the group membership for the ACL entries is determined using the configured LDAP settings. For more information about LDAP-based group membership, see Configuring LDAP Group Mappings on page 347.

The ACL syntax for both blacklist and whitelist entries is as follows:

- **Users only:**
  - user1,user2,userN

  **Note:** There are no spaces following the commas separating the users in the list.
- **Groups only:**
  ```
  nobody group1,group2,groupN
  ```

  **Note:** There is a space between `nobody` and the comma-separated group list. The `nobody` user, if it exists, must not have privileges to log in to or interact with the system. If you are uncertain about its access privileges, specify a different nonexistent user in its place.

- **Users and Groups:**
  ```
  user1,user2,userN group1,group2,groupN
  ```

  **Note:** The comma-separated user list is separated from the comma-separated group list by a space.

---

### Configuring KMS Access Control Lists Using Cloudera Manager

**Minimum Required Role:** Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

**Important:** See related Known Issue and listed workaround: KMS and Key Trustee ACLs do not work in Cloudera Manager 5.3.

The KMS installation wizard includes an option to generate the recommended ACLs. To view or edit the ACLs:

1. Go to the KMS service.
2. Click **Configuration**.
3. In the Search field, type `acl` to show the Key Management Server Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for `kms-acls.xml` (in the Key Management Server Default Group category).
4. Add or edit the ACL properties according to your cluster configuration. See [Recommended KMS Access Control List](#) on page 321 for example ACL entries.
5. Click **Save Changes**.
6. Return to the Home page by clicking the Cloudera Manager logo.
7. Click ⚙️ to invoke the cluster restart wizard.
8. Click **Restart Stale Services**.
9. Click **Restart Now**.
10. Click **Finish**.

### Configuring Java KeyStore KMS Access Control Lists Using the Command Line

**Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See [Cloudera Documentation](#) for information specific to other releases.

KMS ACLs are defined in the `/etc/hadoop-kms/conf/kms-acls.xml` configuration file. This file is hot-reloaded when it changes. See [Recommended KMS Access Control List](#) on page 321 for recommended ACL entries.

**Recommended KMS Access Control List**

Cloudera recommends the following ACL definition for secure production settings. Replace `keyadmin` and `keyadmingroup` with the user and group responsible for maintaining encryption keys.
KMS ACLs control which users can perform various actions on the KMS, and which users and groups have access to which keys.

This file has the following sections:
* ACLs for KMS operations
  ** Access to specific KMS operations
  ** Blacklists for those specific operations
* ACLs for keys
  ** Default ACLs for keys
  ** Whitelist ACLs for keys
  ** Key-specific ACLs

KMS ACLs that govern access to specific key operations. If access is not granted for an operation here, then the operation is forbidden, even if a key ACL allows it.

The ACL value should be either a username or a username and group name separated by whitespace.

A value of "*" (for the username or groupname) indicates that all users are granted access to that operation. Any operation for which there is no ACL or an empty (zero-length) ACL is treated as having an ACL with a value of "*". To disallow all users, add an ACL with a value of " ", a single space.

Note: This convention applies only to the KMS-level ACLs beginning with 'hadoop.kms.acl'.

ACL for create-key operations.
If the user is not in the GET ACL, the key material is not returned as part of the response.

ACL for delete-key operations.

ACL for rollover-key operations.
If the user does is not in the GET ACL, the key material is not returned as part of the response.

ACL for get-key-version and get-current-key operations.
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.acl.GET_KEYS</name>
    <value>keyadmin keyadmingroup</value>
    <description>
        ACL for get-keys operations.
    </description>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.acl.SET_KEY_MATERIAL</name>
    <value></value>
    <description>
        Complementary ACL for CREATE and ROLLOVER operations to allow the client to provide the key material when creating or rolling a key.
    </description>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.acl.GENERATE_EEK</name>
    <value>hdfs supergroup</value>
    <description>
        ACL for generateEncryptedKey CryptoExtension operations.
    </description>
</property>

<!--
KMS blacklists to prevent access to operations. These settings override the permissions granted by the KMS ACLs above.

The blacklist value should be either a username or a username and group name separated by whitespace.

A blank value indicates that no user is blacklisted from the operation. A value of "*" (for either the username or groupname) indicates that all users are blacklisted from the operation. Any operation for which there is no blacklist will be treated as having a blacklist with an empty value.
-->

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.CREATE</name>
    <value>hdfs supergroup</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.DELETE</name>
    <value>hdfs supergroup</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.ROLLOVER</name>
    <value>hdfs supergroup</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.GET</name>
    <value>*</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.GET_KEYS</name>
    <value></value>
</property>

<!--
In this template the hdfs user is blacklisted for everything except GET_METADATA, GET_KEYS, and GENERATE_EEK. The GET and SET_KEY_MATERIAL operations are blacklisted for all users since Hadoop users should not need to perform those operations, and access to the key material should be as restricted as possible.
-->

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.CREATE</name>
    <value>hdfs supergroup</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.DELETE</name>
    <value>hdfs supergroup</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.ROLLOVER</name>
    <value>hdfs supergroup</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.GET</name>
    <value>*</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.GET_KEYS</name>
    <value></value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.SET_KEY_MATERIAL</name>
  <value>*</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.blacklist.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>hdfs supergroup</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>keytrustee.kms.acl.UNDELETE</name>
  <value></value>
  <description>
    ACL that grants access to the UNDELETE operation on all keys.
    Only used by Key Trustee KMS.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>keytrustee.kms.acl.PURGE</name>
  <value></value>
  <description>
    ACL that grants access to the PURGE operation on all keys.
    Only used by Key Trustee KMS.
  </description>
</property>

<!--
Default key ACLs that govern access to key operations for key-operation pairs
that do not have a specific key ACL already. Specific key ACLs will override
the default key ACLs

The ACL value should be either a username or a username and group name
separated by whitespace.

An empty value for an ACL indicates that no user is granted access to that
operation. A value of "*" (for the username or groupname) indicates that
all users are granted access to that operation. Any operation for which
there is no ACL will be treated as having an ACL with an empty value.

-->}

<property>
  <name>default.key.acl.MANAGEMENT</name>
  <value></value>
  <description>
    Default ACL that grants access to the MANAGEMENT operation on all keys.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>default.key.acl.GENERATE_EEK</name>
  <value></value>
  <description>
    Default ACL that grants access to the GENERATE_EEK operation on all keys.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>default.key.acl.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value></value>
  <description>
    Default ACL that grants access to the DECRYPT_EEK operation on all keys.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>default.key.acl.READ</name>
  <value></value>
  <description>
    Default ACL that grants access to the READ operation on all keys.
  </description>
</property>
Whitelist key ACLs that grant access to specific key operations. Any permissions granted here will be added to whatever permissions are granted by the specific key ACL or the default key ACL. Note that these whitelist ACLs grant access to operations on specific keys. If the operations themselves are not allowed because of the KMS ACLs/blacklists, then the operation will not be permitted, regardless of the whitelist settings.

The ACL value should be either a username or a username and group name separated by whitespace.

An empty value for an ACL indicates that no user is granted access to that operation. A value of "*" (for the username or groupname) indicates that all users are granted access to that operation. Any operation for which there is no ACL will be treated as having an ACL with an empty value.

```xml
<property>
  <name>whitelist.key.acl.MANAGEMENT</name>
  <value>keyadmin keyadmingroup</value>
  <description>
    Whitelist ACL for MANAGEMENT operations for all keys.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>whitelist.key.acl.READ</name>
  <value>hdfs supergroup</value>
  <description>
    Whitelist ACL for READ operations for all keys.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>whitelist.key.acl.GENERATE_EEK</name>
  <value>hdfs supergroup</value>
  <description>
    Whitelist ACL for GENERATE_EEK operations for all keys.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>whitelist.key.acl.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>keyadmin keyadmingroup</value>
  <description>
    Whitelist ACL for DECRYPT_EEK operations for all keys.
  </description>
</property>
```

Key ACLs that grant access to specific key operations. Any permissions granted here are added to whatever permissions are granted by the whitelists. The key ACL name should be key.acl.<keyname>.<OPERATION>.

The ACL value should be either a username or a username and group name separated by whitespace.

An empty value for an ACL indicates that no user is granted access to that operation. A value of "*" (for the username or groupname) indicates that all users are granted access to that operation. Any key operation for which there is no ACL will default to the default ACL for the operation.

Normally adding users or groups for a specific key and DECRYPT_EEK is sufficient to allow access to data protected with HDFS data at rest encryption.

The following ACLs are required for proper functioning of services. CM does not create keys or encryption zones, however our best practices recommend encryption zones on certain directories. Below we assume that the user has followed our recommended naming scheme and named the keys...
according to our best practices: "hive-key" for the hive service, "hbase-key" for the hbase service, etc. If the key names are different, none of this will work out of the box, and you will need to edit these ACLs to match your key names.

<!--

<property>
  <name>key.acl.hive-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>hive hive</value>
  <description>
  Gives the hive user and the hive group access to the key named "hive-key".
  This allows the hive service to read and write files in /user/hive/.
  Also note that the impala user ought to be a member of the hive group
  in order to enjoy this same access.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>key.acl.hive-key.READ</name>
  <value>hive hive</value>
  <description>
  Required because hive compares key strengths when joining tables.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>key.acl.hbase-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>hbase hbase</value>
  <description>
  Gives the hbase user and hbase group access to the key named "hbase-key".
  This allows the hbase service to read and write files in /hbase.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>key.acl.solr-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>solr solr</value>
  <description>
  Gives the solr user and solr group access to the key named "solr-key".
  This allows the solr service to read and write files in /solr.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>key.acl.mapred-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>mapred,yarn hadoop</value>
  <description>
  Gives the mapred user and mapred group access to the key named "mapred-key".
  This allows mapreduce to read and write files in /user/history.
  This is required by YARN.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>key.acl.hue-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>oozie,hue oozie,hue</value>
  <description>
  Gives the appropriate users and groups access to the key named "hue-key".
  This allows hue and oozie to read and write files in /user/hue.
  Oozie is required here because it will attempt to access workflows in/
  /user/hue/oozie/workspaces.
  </description>
</property>

<!-- This example is required if there are encryption zones on user’s home
  directories. -->

<!--

<property>
  <name>key.acl.username-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>username username,hive,hbase,solr,oozie,hue,yarn</value>
  <description>
  </description>
</property>


Configuring Java KeyStore KMS Delegation Tokens Using the Command Line

Important:
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See Cloudera Documentation for information specific to other releases.

Configure KMS delegation token secret manager using the following properties:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.authentication.delegation-token.update-interval.sec</name>
  <value>86400</value>
  <description>
    How often the master key is rotated, in seconds. Default value 1 day.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.authentication.delegation-token.max-lifetime.sec</name>
  <value>604800</value>
  <description>
    Maximum lifetime of a delegation token, in seconds. Default value 7 days.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.authentication.delegation-token.renew-interval.sec</name>
  <value>86400</value>
  <description>
    Renewal interval of a delegation token, in seconds. Default value 1 day.
  </description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.authentication.delegation-token.removal-scan-interval.sec</name>
  <value>3600</value>
  <description>
    Scan interval to remove expired delegation tokens.
  </description>
</property>
```

Migrating Keys from a Java KeyStore to Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee Server

You can migrate keys from an existing Java KeyStore (JKS) to Key Trustee Server to improve security, durability, and scalability. If you are using the Java KeyStore KMS service, and want to use Key Trustee Server as the backing key store for HDFS Transparent Encryption on page 293, use the following procedure.

This procedure assumes that the Java KeyStore (JKS) is on the same host as the new Key Trustee KMS service.

1. Stop the Java KeyStore KMS service.
2. Add and configure the Key Trustee KMS service, and configure HDFS to use it for its KMS Service setting. For more information about how to install Key Trustee KMS, see Installing Key Trustee KMS.
3. Restart the HDFS service and redeploy client configuration for this to take effect:
   a. Home > Cluster-wide > Deploy Client Configuration
4. Add the following to the Key Management Server Proxy Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for kms-site.xml:

```
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.key.provider.uri</name>
  <value>keytrustee://file@/var/lib/kms-keytrustee/keytrustee/.keytrustee/,jceks://file@/path/to/kms.keystore</value>
  <description>URI of the backing KeyProvider for the KMS</description>
</property>
```

5. Click Save Changes and restart the Key Trustee KMS service. If the Java KeyStore is not password protected, skip to step 7.

6. Create the file
   `/var/lib/keytrustee-kms/tomcat-deployment/webapps/kms/WEB-INF/classes/tmp/password.txt`
   and add the Java KeyStore password to it.

7. Change the ownership of
   `/var/lib/keytrustee-kms/tomcat-deployment/webapps/kms/WEB-INF/classes/tmp/password.txt`
to `kms:kms`:
   ```
   $ sudo chown kms:kms
   /var/lib/keytrustee-kms/tomcat-deployment/webapps/kms/WEB-INF/classes/tmp/password.txt
   ```

8. From the host running the Key Trustee KMS service, if you have not configured Kerberos and TLS/SSL, run the following command:
   ```
   $ curl -L -d "trusteeOp=migrate"
   "http://kms01.example.com:16000/kms/v1/trustee/key/migrate?user.name=username&trusteeOp=migrate"
   ```
   If you have configured Kerberos and TLS/SSL, use the following command instead:
   ```
   $ curl --negotiate -u : -L -d "trusteeOp=migrate"
   "https://kms01.example.com:16000/kms/v1/trustee/key/migrate?user.name=username&trusteeOp=migrate"
   --cacert /path/to/kms/cert
   ```

9. Monitor `/var/log/kms-keytrustee/kms.log` and `/var/log/kms-keytrustee/kms-catalina.<date>.log` to verify that the migration is successful. You can also run `sudo -u <key_admin> hadoop key list` to verify that the keys are listed.

10. After you have verified that the migration is successful, remove the safety valve entry used in step 3 and restart the Key Trustee KMS service.

## Configuring CDH Services for HDFS Encryption

This page contains recommendations for setting up HDFS Transparent Encryption on page 293 with various CDH services.

### Important: HDFS encryption does not support file transfer (reading, writing files) between zones through WebHDFS. For web-based file transfer between encryption zones managed by HDFS, use HttpFS with a load balancer instead.
Important: Encrypting /tmp using HDFS encryption is not supported.

HBase

Recommendations

Make /hbase an encryption zone. Do not create encryption zones as subdirectories under /hbase, because HBase may need to rename files across those subdirectories. When you create the encryption zone, name the key hbase-key to take advantage of auto-generated KMS ACLs.

Steps

On a cluster without HBase currently installed, create the /hbase directory and make that an encryption zone.

On a cluster with HBase already installed, perform the following steps:

1. Stop the HBase service.
2. Move data from the /hbase directory to /hbase-tmp.
3. Create an empty /hbase directory and make it an encryption zone.
4. Distcp all data from /hbase-tmp to /hbase, preserving user-group permissions and extended attributes.
5. Start the HBase service and verify that it is working as expected.
6. Remove the /hbase-tmp directory.

KMS ACL Configuration for HBase

In the KMS ACLs, grant the hbase user and group DECRYPT_EEK permission for the HBase key:

```xml
<property>
  <name>key.acl.hbase-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>hbase hbase</value>
</description>
</property>
```

Hive

HDFS encryption has been designed so that files cannot be moved from one encryption zone to another or from encryption zones to unencrypted directories. Therefore, the landing zone for data when using the LOAD DATA INPATH command must always be inside the destination encryption zone.

To use HDFS encryption with Hive, ensure you are using one of the following configurations:

Single Encryption Zone

With this configuration, you can use HDFS encryption by having all Hive data inside the same encryption zone. In Cloudera Manager, configure the Hive Scratch Directory (hive.exec.scratchdir) to be inside the encryption zone.

Recommended HDFS Path: /user/hive

To use the auto-generated KMS ACLs, make sure you name the encryption key hive-key.

For example, to configure a single encryption zone for the entire Hive warehouse, you can rename /user/hive to /user/hive-old, create an encryption zone at /user/hive, and then distcp all the data from /user/hive-old to /user/hive.

In Cloudera Manager, configure the Hive Scratch Directory (hive.exec.scratchdir) to be inside the encryption zone by setting it to /user/hive/tmp, ensuring that permissions are 1777 on /user/hive/tmp.
Multiple Encryption Zones

With this configuration, you can use encrypted databases or tables with different encryption keys. To read data from read-only encrypted tables, users must have access to a temporary directory that is encrypted at least as strongly as the table.

For example:

1. Configure two encrypted tables, ezTbl1 and ezTbl2.
2. Create two new encryption zones, /data/ezTbl1 and /data/ezTbl2.
3. Load data to the tables in Hive using LOAD statements.

For more information, see Changed Behavior after HDFS Encryption is Enabled on page 330.

Other Encrypted Directories

- **LOCALSCRATCHDIR**: The MapJoin optimization in Hive writes HDFS tables to a local directory and then uploads them to the distributed cache. To ensure these files are encrypted, either disable MapJoin by setting hive.auto.convert.join to false, or encrypt the local Hive Scratch directory (hive.exec.local.scratchdir) using Cloudera Navigator Encrypt.

- **DOWNLOADED_RESOURCES_DIR**: JARs that are added to a user session and stored in HDFS are downloaded to hive.downloaded.resources.dir on the HiveServer2 local filesystem. To encrypt these JAR files, configure Cloudera Navigator Encrypt to encrypt the directory specified by hive.downloaded.resources.dir.

- **NodeManager Local Directory List**: Hive stores JARs and MapJoin files in the distributed cache. To use MapJoin or encrypt JARs and other resource files, the yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs YARN configuration property must be configured to a set of encrypted local directories on all nodes.

Changed Behavior after HDFS Encryption is Enabled

- Loading data from one encryption zone to another results in a copy of the data. Distcp is used to speed up the process if the size of the files being copied is higher than the value specified by HIVE_EXEC_COPYFILE_MAXSIZE. The minimum size limit for HIVE_EXEC_COPYFILE_MAXSIZE is 32 MB, which you can modify by changing the value for the hive.exec.copyfile.maxsize configuration property.

- When loading data to encrypted tables, Cloudera strongly recommends using a landing zone inside the same encryption zone as the table.

  - **Example 1: Loading unencrypted data to an encrypted table** - Use one of the following methods:
    - If you are loading new unencrypted data to an encrypted table, use the LOAD DATA ... statement. Because the source data is not inside the encryption zone, the LOAD statement results in a copy. For this reason, Cloudera recommends landing data that you need to encrypt inside the destination encryption zone. You can use distcp to speed up the copying process if your data is inside HDFS.
    - If the data to be loaded is already inside a Hive table, you can create a new table with a LOCATION inside an encryption zone as follows:

      ```
      CREATE TABLE encrypted_table [STORED AS] LOCATION ... AS SELECT * FROM <unencrypted_table>
      ```

      The location specified in the CREATE TABLE statement must be inside an encryption zone. Creating a table pointing LOCATION to an unencrypted directory does not encrypt your source data. You must copy your data to an encryption zone, and then point LOCATION to that zone.

  - **Example 2: Loading encrypted data to an encrypted table** - If the data is already encrypted, use the CREATE TABLE statement pointing LOCATION to the encrypted source directory containing the data. This is the fastest way to create encrypted tables.

      ```
      CREATE TABLE encrypted_table [STORED AS] LOCATION ... AS SELECT * FROM <encrypted_source_directory>
      ```

- Users reading data from encrypted tables that are read-only must have access to a temporary directory which is encrypted with at least as strong encryption as the table.

- Temporary data is now written to a directory named .hive-staging in each table or partition.
• Previously, an INSERT OVERWRITE on a partitioned table inherited permissions for new data from the existing partition directory. With encryption enabled, permissions are inherited from the table.

**KMS ACL Configuration for Hive**

When Hive joins tables, it compares the encryption key strength for each table. For this operation to succeed, you must configure the KMS ACLs to allow the hive user and group READ access to the Hive key:

```xml
<property>
  <name>key.acl.hive-key.READ</name>
  <value>hive hive</value>
</property>
```

If you have restricted access to the GET_METADATA operation, you must grant permission for it to the hive user or group:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.acl.GET_METADATA</name>
  <value>hive hive</value>
</property>
```

If you have disabled HiveServer2 Impersonation on page 130 (for example, to use Apache Sentry), you must configure the KMS ACLs to grant DECRYPT_EEK permissions to the hive user, as well as any user accessing data in the Hive warehouse.

Cloudera recommends creating a group containing all Hive users, and granting DECRYPT_EEK access to that group.

For example, suppose user jdoe (home directory /user/jdoe) is a Hive user and a member of the group hive-users. The encryption zone (EZ) key for /user/jdoe is named jdoe-key, and the EZ key for /user/hive is hive-key. The following ACL example demonstrates the required permissions:

```xml
<property>
  <name>key.acl.hive-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>hive hive-users</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>key.acl.jdoe-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>jdoe,hive</value>
</property>
```

If you have enabled HiveServer2 impersonation, data is accessed by the user submitting the query or job, and the user account (jdoe in this example) may still need to access data in their home directory. In this scenario, the required permissions are as follows:

```xml
<property>
  <name>key.acl.hive-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>nobody hive-users</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>key.acl.jdoe-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>jdoe</value>
</property>
```

**Hue**

**Recommendations**

Make /user/hue an encryption zone because Oozie workflows and other Hue-specific data are stored there by default. When you create the encryption zone, name the key hue-key to take advantage of auto-generated KMS ACLs.
Steps

On a cluster without Hue currently installed, create the /user/hue directory and make it an encryption zone.

On a cluster with Hue already installed:

1. Create an empty /user/hue-tmp directory.
2. Make /user/hue-tmp an encryption zone.
3. DistCp all data from /user/hue into /user/hue-tmp.
4. Remove /user/hue and rename /user/hue-tmp to /user/hue.

KMS ACL Configuration for Hue

In the KMS ACLs, grant the hue and oozie users and groups DECRYPT_EEK permission for the Hue key:

```
<property>
  <name>key.acl.hue-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>oozie,hue oozie,hue</value>
</property>
```

Impala

Recommendations

- If HDFS encryption is enabled, configure Impala to encrypt data spilled to local disk.
- In releases lower than Impala 2.2.0 / CDH 5.4.0, Impala does not support the LOAD DATA statement when the source and destination are in different encryption zones. If you are running an affected release and need to use LOAD DATA with HDFS encryption enabled, copy the data to the table’s encryption zone prior to running the statement.
- Use Cloudera Navigator to lock down the local directory where Impala UDFs are copied during execution. By default, Impala copies UDFs into /tmp, and you can configure this location through the --local_library_dir startup flag for the impalad daemon.
- Limit the rename operations for internal tables once encryption zones are set up. Impala cannot do an ALTER TABLE RENAME operation to move an internal table from one database to another, if the root directories for those databases are in different encryption zones. If the encryption zone covers a table directory but not the parent directory associated with the database, Impala cannot do an ALTER TABLE RENAME operation to rename an internal table, even within the same database.
- Avoid structuring partitioned tables where different partitions reside in different encryption zones, or where any partitions reside in an encryption zone that is different from the root directory for the table. Impala cannot do an INSERT operation into any partition that is not in the same encryption zone as the root directory of the overall table.
- If the data files for a table or partition are in a different encryption zone than the HDFS trashcan, use the PURGE keyword at the end of the DROP TABLE or ALTER TABLE DROP PARTITION statement to delete the HDFS data files immediately. Otherwise, the data files are left behind if they cannot be moved to the trashcan because of differing encryption zones. This syntax is available in Impala 2.3 / CDH 5.5 and higher.

Steps

Start every impalad process with the --disk_spill_encryption=true flag set. This encrypts all spilled data using AES-256-CFB. Set this flag by selecting the Disk Spill Encryption checkbox in the Impala configuration (Impala service > Configuration > Category > Security).

⚠️ Important: Impala does not selectively encrypt data based on whether the source data is already encrypted in HDFS. This results in at most 15 percent performance degradation when data is spilled.
KMS ACL Configuration for Impala

Cloudera recommends making the `impala` user a member of the `hive` group, and following the ACL recommendations in [KMS ACL Configuration for Hive](#) on page 331.

MapReduce and YARN

MapReduce v1

Recommendations

MRv1 stores both history and logs on local disks by default. Even if you do configure history to be stored on HDFS, the files are not renamed. Hence, no special configuration is required.

MapReduce v2 (YARN)

Recommendations

Make `/user/history` a single encryption zone, because history files are moved between the `intermediate` and `done` directories, and HDFS encryption does not allow moving encrypted files across encryption zones. When you create the encryption zone, name the key `mapred-key` to take advantage of auto-generated KMS ACLs.

Steps

On a cluster with MRv2 (YARN) installed, create the `/user/history` directory and make that an encryption zone.

If `/user/history` already exists and is not empty:

1. Create an empty `/user/history-tmp` directory.
2. Make `/user/history-tmp` an encryption zone.
3. DistCp all data from `/user/history` into `/user/history-tmp`.
4. Remove `/user/history` and rename `/user/history-tmp` to `/user/history`.

KMS ACL Configuration for MapReduce

In the KMS ACLs, grant `DECRYPT_EEK` permission for the MapReduce key to the `mapred` and `yarn` users and the `hadoop` group:

```xml
<property>
  <name>key.acl.mapred-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
  <value>mapred,yarn hadoop</value>
</property>
```

Search

Recommendations

Make `/solr` an encryption zone. When you create the encryption zone, name the key `solr-key` to take advantage of auto-generated KMS ACLs.

Steps

On a cluster without Solr currently installed, create the `/solr` directory and make that an encryption zone.

On a cluster with Solr already installed:

1. Create an empty `/solr-tmp` directory.
2. Make `/solr-tmp` an encryption zone.
3. DistCp all data from `/solr` into `/solr-tmp`.
4. Remove `/solr`, and rename `/solr-tmp` to `/solr`. 
KMS ACL Configuration for Search

In the KMS ACLs, grant the solr user and group DECRYPT_EEK permission for the Solr key:

```xml
<property>
    <name>key.acl.solr-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
    <value>solr solr</value>
</property>
```

Spark

Recommendations

- By default, application event logs are stored at /user/spark/applicationHistory, which can be made into an encryption zone.
- Spark also optionally caches its JAR file at /user/spark/share/lib (by default), but encrypting this directory is not required.
- Spark does not encrypt shuffle data. To do so, configure the Spark local directory, spark.local.dir (in Standalone mode), to reside on an encrypted disk. For YARN mode, make the corresponding YARN configuration changes.

KMS ACL Configuration for Spark

In the KMS ACLs, grant DECRYPT_EEK permission for the Spark key to the spark user and any groups that can submit Spark jobs:

```xml
<property>
    <name>key.acl.spark-key.DECRYPT_EEK</name>
    <value>spark spark-users</value>
</property>
```

Sqoop

Recommendations

- **For Hive support:** Ensure that you are using Sqoop with the --target-dir parameter set to a directory that is inside the Hive encryption zone. For more details, see Hive on page 329.
- **For append/incremental support:** Make sure that the sqoop.test.import.rootDir property points to the same encryption zone as the --target-dir argument.
- **For HCatalog support:** No special configuration is required.

Configuring Encryption for Data Spills

Some CDH services can encrypt data stored temporarily on the local filesystem outside HDFS. For example, data may spill to disk during memory-intensive operations, or when a service exceeds its allotted memory on a host. You can enable on-disk spill encryption for the following services.

MapReduce v2 (YARN)

MapReduce v2 can encrypt intermediate files generated during encrypted shuffle and data spilled to disk during the map and reduce stages. To enable encryption on these intermediate files, use Cloudera Manager to specify settings for the **MapReduce Client Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve)** for the mapred-site.xml associated with a gateway node.

From the Cloudera Manager Admin Console:

1. Select Clusters > YARN.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. In the Search field, enter **MapReduce Client Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve)** to find the safety valve on one of YARN’s gateway nodes:

![MapReduce Client Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for mapred-site.xml]

4. Enter the XML in the field (or switch to Editor mode and enter each property and its value in the fields provided). A complete example of the XML is shown here:

```xml
<property>
  <name>mapreduce.job.encrypted-intermediate-data</name>
  <value>true</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>mapreduce.job.encrypted-intermediate-data-key-size-bits</name>
  <value>128</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>mapreduce.job.encrypted-intermediate-data.buffer.kb</name>
  <value>128</value>
</property>
```

5. Click **Save Changes**.

The table provides descriptions of the properties used for data-spill encryption:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Default</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mapreduce.job.encrypted-intermediate-data</td>
<td>false</td>
<td>Enables (true) and disables (false) encryption for intermediate MapReduce spills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mapreduce.job.encrypted-intermediate-data-key-size-bits</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Length of key (bits) used for encryption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mapreduce.job.encrypted-intermediate-data.buffer.kb</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Buffer size (Kb) for the stream written to disk after encryption.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Enabling encryption for intermediate data spills limits the number of attempts for a job to 1.

**HBase**

HBase does not write data outside HDFS, and does not require spill encryption.

**Impala**

Impala allows certain memory-intensive operations to be able to write temporary data to disk in case these operations approach their memory limit on a host. For details, read [SQL Operations that Spill to Disk](#). To enable disk spill encryption in Impala:

1. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Click the **Configuration** tab.
3. Select **Scope** > **Impala Daemon**.
4. Select **Category** > **Security**.
5. Check the checkbox for the **Disk Spill Encryption** property.
6. Click **Save Changes**.
Hive

Hive jobs occasionally write data temporarily to local directories. If you enable HDFS encryption, you must ensure that the following intermediate local directories are also protected:

- **LOCALSCRATCHDIR**: The MapJoin optimization in Hive writes HDFS tables to a local directory and then uploads them to the distributed cache. To ensure these files are encrypted, either disable MapJoin by setting `hive.auto.convert.join` to `false`, or encrypt the `local` Hive Scratch directory (`hive.exec.local.scratchdir`) using Cloudera Navigator Encrypt.

- **DOWNLOADED_RESOURCES_DIR**: JARs that are added to a user session and stored in HDFS are downloaded to `hive.downloaded.resources.dir` on the HiveServer2 local filesystem. To encrypt these JAR files, configure Cloudera Navigator Encrypt to encrypt the directory specified by `hive.downloaded.resources.dir`.

- **NodeManager Local Directory List**: Hive stores JARs and MapJoin files in the distributed cache. To use MapJoin or encrypt JARs and other resource files, the `yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs` YARN configuration property must be configured to a set of encrypted local directories on all nodes.

For more information on Hive behavior with HDFS encryption enabled, see Using HDFS Encryption with Hive.

Flume

Flume supports on-disk encryption for log files written by the Flume file channels. See Configuring Encrypted On-disk File Channels for Flume on page 336.

Configuring Encrypted On-disk File Channels for Flume

Flume supports on-disk encryption of data on the local disk. To implement this:

- Generate an encryption key to use for the Flume Encrypted File Channel
- Configure on-disk encryption by setting parameters in the `flume.conf` file

**Important:**

Flume on-disk encryption operates with a maximum strength of 128-bit AES encryption unless the JCE unlimited encryption cryptography policy files are installed. Please see this Oracle document for information about enabling strong cryptography:

http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javase/downloads/jce-6-download-429243.html

Consult your security organization for guidance on the acceptable strength of your encryption keys. Cloudera has tested with AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256.

Generating Encryption Keys

Use the `keytool` program included with the Oracle JDK to create the AES encryption keys for use with Flume.

The command to generate a 128-bit key that uses the same password as the key store password is:

```
keytool -genseckey -alias key-1 -keyalg AES -keysize 128 -validity 9000 \
-keystore test.keystore -storetype jceks \
-storepass keyStorePassword
```

The command to generate a 128-bit key that uses a different password from that used by the key store is:

```
keytool -genseckey -alias key-0 -keypass keyPassword -keyalg AES \
-keysize 128 -validity 9000 -keystore test.keystore \
-storetype jceks -storepass keyStorePassword
```

The key store and password files can be stored anywhere on the file system; both files should have `flume` as the owner and 0600 permissions.

Please note that `-keysize` controls the strength of the AES encryption key, in bits; 128, 192, and 256 are the allowed values.
Configuration

Flume on-disk encryption is enabled by setting parameters in the `/etc/flume-ng/conf/flume.conf` file.

Basic Configuration

The first example is a basic configuration with an alias called `key-0` that uses the same password as the key store:

```
agent.channels.ch-0.type = file
agent.channels.ch-0.capacity = 10000
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.cipherProvider = AESCTRNOPADDING
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.activeKey = key-0
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider = JCEKSFILE
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keyStoreFile = /path/to/my.keystore
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keyStorePasswordFile = /path/to/my.keystore.password
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keys = key-0
```

In the next example, `key-0` uses its own password which may be different from the key store password:

```
agent.channels.ch-0.type = file
agent.channels.ch-0.capacity = 10000
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.cipherProvider = AESCTRNOPADDING
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.activeKey = key-0
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider = JCEKSFILE
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keyStoreFile = /path/to/my.keystore
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keyStorePasswordFile = /path/to/my.keystore.password
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keys = key-0
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keys.key-0.passwordFile = /path/to/key-0.password
```

Changing Encryption Keys Over Time

To modify the key, modify the configuration as shown below. This example shows how to change the configuration to use `key-1` instead of `key-0`:

```
agent.channels.ch-0.type = file
agent.channels.ch-0.capacity = 10000
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.cipherProvider = AESCTRNOPADDING
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.activeKey = key-1
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider = JCEKSFILE
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keyStoreFile = /path/to/my.keystore
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keyStorePasswordFile = /path/to/my.keystore.password
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keys = key-0 key-1
```

The same scenario except that `key-0` and `key-1` have their own passwords is shown here:

```
agent.channels.ch-0.type = file
agent.channels.ch-0.capacity = 10000
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.cipherProvider = AESCTRNOPADDING
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.activeKey = key-1
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider = JCEKSFILE
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keyStoreFile = /path/to/my.keystore
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keyStorePasswordFile = /path/to/my.keystore.password
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keys = key-0 key-1
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keys.key-0.passwordFile = /path/to/key-0.password
agent.channels.ch-0.encryption.keyProvider.keys.key-1.passwordFile = /path/to/key-1.password
```
**Troubleshooting**

If the unlimited strength JCE policy files are not installed, an error similar to the following is printed in the flume.log:

```
07 Sep 2012 23:22:42,232 ERROR [lifecycleSupervisor-1-0] (org.apache.flume.channel.file.encryption.AESCTRNoPaddingProvider.getCipher:137) - Unable to load key using transformation: AES/CTR/NoPadding; Warning: Maximum allowed key length = 128 with the available JCE security policy files. Have you installed the JCE unlimited strength jurisdiction policy files?
java.security.InvalidKeyException: Illegal key size
at javax.crypto.Cipher.a(DashoA13*..)
at javax.crypto.Cipher.a(DashoA13*..)
at javax.crypto.Cipher.a(DashoA13*..)
at javax.crypto.Cipher.init(DashoA13*..)
at javax.crypto.Cipher.init(DashoA13*..)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.encryption.AESCTRNoPaddingProvider.getCipher(AESCTRNoPaddingProvider.java:120)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.encryption.AESCTRNoPaddingProvider.access$200(AESCTRNoPaddingProvider.java:35)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.encryption.AESCTRNoPaddingProvider$AESCTRNoPaddingDecryptor.<init>(AESCTRNoPaddingProvider.java:94)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.encryption.AESCTRNoPaddingProvider$AESCTRNoPaddingDecryptor.<init>(AESCTRNoPaddingProvider.java:91)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.encryption.AESCTRNoPaddingProvider$DecryptorBuilder.build(AESCTRNoPaddingProvider.java:66)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.encryption.AESCTRNoPaddingProvider$DecryptorBuilder.build(AESCTRNoPaddingProvider.java:62)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.encryption.CipherProviderFactory.getDecrypter(CipherProviderFactory.java:47)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.LogFileV3$SequentialReader.<init>(LogFileV3.java:257)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.LogFileFactory.getSequentialReader(LogFileFactory.java:110)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.ReplayHandler.replayLog(ReplayHandler.java:258)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.Log.replay(Log.java:339)
at org.apache.flume.channel.file.FileChannel.start(FileChannel.java:260)
at org.apache.flume.lifecycle.LifecycleSupervisor$MonitorRunnable.run(LifecycleSupervisor.java:236)
at java.util.concurrent.Executors$RunnableAdapter.call(Executors.java:441)
at java.util.concurrent.FutureTask$Sync.innerRunAndReset(FutureTask.java:317)
at java.util.concurrent.FutureTask.runAndReset(FutureTask.java:150)
at java.util.concurrent.ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor$ScheduledFutureTask.access$101(ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor.java:98)
at java.util.concurrent.ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor$ScheduledFutureTask.runPeriodic(ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor.java:180)
at java.util.concurrent.ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor$ScheduledFutureTask.run(ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor.java:204)
at java.util.concurrent.ThreadPoolExecutor$Worker.runTask(ThreadPoolExecutor.java:886)
at java.util.concurrent.ThreadPoolExecutor$Worker.run(ThreadPoolExecutor.java:908)
at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:662)
```
Configuring Authorization

Authorization is concerned with who or what has access or control over a given resource or service. Since Hadoop merges together the capabilities of multiple varied, and previously separate IT systems as an enterprise data hub that stores and works on all data within an organization, it requires multiple authorization controls with varying granularities. In such cases, Hadoop management tools simplify setup and maintenance by:

- Tying all users to groups, which can be specified in existing LDAP or AD directories.
- Providing role-based access control for similar interaction methods, like batch and interactive SQL queries. For example, Apache Sentry permissions apply to Hive (HiveServer2) and Impala.

CDH currently provides the following forms of access control:

- Traditional POSIX-style permissions for directories and files, where each directory and file is assigned a single owner and group. Each assignment has a basic set of permissions available; file permissions are simply read, write, and execute, and directories have an additional permission to determine access to child directories.
- Extended Access Control Lists (ACLs) for HDFS that provide fine-grained control of permissions for HDFS files by allowing you to set different permissions for specific named users or named groups.
- Apache HBase uses ACLs to authorize various operations (READ, WRITE, CREATE, ADMIN) by column, column family, and column family qualifier. HBase ACLs are granted and revoked to both users and groups.
- Role-based access control with Apache Sentry. As of Cloudera Manager 5.1.x, Sentry permissions can be configured using either policy files or the database-backed Sentry service.
  - The Sentry service is the preferred way to set up Sentry permissions. See the Sentry Managing the Sentry Service on page 356 documentation for more information.
  - For the policy file approach to configuring Sentry, see Sentry Policy File Authorization on page 394.

Important: Cloudera does not support Apache Ranger or Hive’s native authorization frameworks for configuring access control in Hive. Use Cloudera-supported Apache Sentry instead.

Cloudera Manager User Roles

Access to Cloudera Manager features is controlled by user accounts that specify an authentication mechanism and one or more user roles. User roles determine the tasks that an authenticated user can perform and the features visible to the user in the Cloudera Manager Admin Console. Documentation for Cloudera Manager administration and management tasks indicate user roles required to perform the task.

Note: All possible user roles are available with Cloudera Enterprise. Cloudera Express provides Read-Only and Full Administrator user roles only. When a Cloudera Enterprise Data Hub Edition trial license expires, only users with Read-Only and Full Administrator roles can log in to Cloudera Manager. A Full Administrator must change user accounts with other roles to Read-Only or Full Administrator before such users can log in.

Displaying Roles for Current User Account Login

The user roles associated with a given login session are available at any time from the Cloudera Manager Admin Console menu. Assuming you are logged in to Cloudera Manager Admin Console, you can always verify the user roles associated with your current login as follows:

1. Select My Profile from the username drop-down menu, where username is the name of the logged in account (such as admin). The My Profile pop-up window displays the Username, Roles, and the date and time of the Last Successful Login.
2. Click **Close** to dismiss the message page.

### User Roles

A Cloudera Manager user account can be assigned one of the following roles with associated permissions:

- **Auditor**
  - View configuration and monitoring information in Cloudera Manager.
  - View audit events.

- **Read-Only**
  - View configuration and monitoring information in Cloudera Manager.
  - View service and monitoring information.
  - View events and logs.
  - View replication jobs and snapshot policies.
  - View YARN applications and Impala queries.

  The Read-Only role does not allow the user to:
  - Add services or take any actions that affect the state of the cluster.
  - Use the HDFS file browser.
  - Use the HBase table browser.
  - Use the Solr Collection Statistics browser.

- **Limited Operator**
  - View configuration and monitoring information in Cloudera Manager.
  - View service and monitoring information.
  - Decommission hosts (except hosts running Cloudera Management Service roles).
  - Perform the same tasks as the Read-Only role.

  The Limited Operator role does not allow the user to add services or take any other actions that affect the state of the cluster.

- **Operator**
  - View configuration and monitoring information in Cloudera Manager.
  - View service and monitoring information.
  - Stop, start, and restart clusters, services (except the Cloudera Management Service), and roles.
  - Decommission and recommission hosts (except hosts running Cloudera Management Service roles).
  - Decommission and recommission roles (except Cloudera Management Service roles).
  - Start, stop, and restart KMS.
  - Perform the same tasks as the Read-Only role.

  The Operator role does not allow the user to add services, roles, or hosts, or take any other actions that affect the state of the cluster.

- **Configurator**
  - View configuration and monitoring information in Cloudera Manager.
  - Perform all Operator operations.
  - Configure services (except the Cloudera Management Service).
  - Enter and exit maintenance mode.
  - Manage dashboards (including Cloudera Management Service dashboards).
  - Start, stop, and restart KMS
  - Perform the same tasks as the Read-Only role.
• **Cluster Administrator** - Use all of the functionality available in Cloudera Manager and perform all actions except the following:
  – Administer Cloudera Navigator.
  – View replication schedules and snapshot policies.
  – View audit events.
  – Manage user accounts and configuration of external authentication.
  – Manage Full Administrator accounts.
  – Configure HDFS encryption, administer Key Trustee Server, and manage encryption keys.
  – Use the HDFS file browser, the HBase table browser, and the Solr Collection browser.
  – View the Directory Usage Report
  – View the HBase Statistics Page

Unless otherwise noted above, the Cluster Administrator can view the data related to Cloudera Manager, such as file metadata. The Cluster Administrator cannot see things like the content of files stored by HDFS and other components.

• **BDR Administrator**
  – View configuration and monitoring information in Cloudera Manager.
  – View service and monitoring information.
  – Perform replication and define snapshot operations.
  – Use the HDFS file browser, the HBase table browser, and the Solr Collection browser.
  – View the Directory Usage Report
  – View the HBase Table Statistics Page
  – Perform the same tasks as the Read-Only role.

• **Navigator Administrator**
  – View configuration and monitoring information in Cloudera Manager.
  – View service and monitoring information.
  – Administer Cloudera Navigator.
  – View audit events.
  – Use the HDFS file browser, the HBase table browser, and the Solr Collection browser.
  – Perform the same tasks as the Read-Only role.

• **User Administrator**
  – View configuration and monitoring information in Cloudera Manager.
  – View service and monitoring information.
  – Manage user accounts and configuration of external authentication.
  – Use the HDFS file browser, the HBase table browser, and the Solr Collection browser.
  – Perform the same tasks as the Read-Only role.

• **Key Administrator**
  – View configuration and monitoring information in Cloudera Manager.
  – Configure HDFS encryption, administer Key Trustee Server, and manage encryption keys.
  – Start, stop, and restart KMS
  – Configure KMS ACLs
  – Use the HDFS file browser, the HBase table browser, and the Solr Collection browser.
  – Perform the same tasks as the Read-Only role.

• **Full Administrator** - Full Administrators have permissions to use all of the functionality available in Cloudera Manager and perform all actions on all clusters. Additionally, the Full Administrator can view the data related to Cloudera Manager, such as file metadata, snapshots, quotas, and file size. The Full Administrator cannot see things like the content of files stored by HDFS or other components.
Removing the Full Administrator User Role

**Minimum Required Role:** **User Administrator** (also provided by Full Administrator)

In some organizations, security policies may prohibit the use of the Full Administrator role. The Full Administrator role is created during Cloudera Manager installation, but you can remove it as long as you have at least one remaining user account with User Administrator privileges.

To remove the Full Administrator user role, perform the following steps.

1. Add at least one user account with User Administrator privileges, or ensure that at least one such user account already exists.
2. Ensure that there is only a single user account with Full Administrator privileges.
3. While logged in as the single remaining Full Administrator user, select your own user account and either delete it or assign it a new user role.

**Warning:** After you delete the last Full Administrator account, you will be logged out immediately and will not be able to log in unless you have access to another user account. Also, it will no longer be possible to create or assign Full Administrators.

A consequence of removing the Full Administrator role is that some tasks may require collaboration between two or more users with different user roles. For example:

- If the machine that the Cloudera Navigator roles are running on needs to be replaced, the Cluster Administrator will want to move all the roles running on that machine to a different machine. The Cluster Administrator can move any non-Navigator roles by deleting and re-adding them, but would need a Navigator Administrator to perform the stop, delete, add, and start actions for the Cloudera Navigator roles.
- In order to take HDFS snapshots, snapshots must be enabled on the cluster by a Cluster Administrator, but the snapshots themselves must be taken by a BDR Administrator.

Cloudera Navigator Data Management User Roles

User roles determine the Cloudera Navigator capabilities that the user can perform and the features visible to the user in the Cloudera Navigator console. In the Cloudera Navigator

The menus displayed in the upper right indicate the user's access to Cloudera Navigator features, as determined by the roles associated with the **user's LDAP or Active Directory groups**. For example, a user that belongs to a group with the Full Administrator role sees the **Search**, **Audits**, **Analytics**, **Policies**, and **Administration** tabs. A user that belongs to a group with the Policy Administrator role sees only the **Search**, **Analytics** (metadata), and **Policies** tabs.

**User Roles**

A Cloudera Navigator user account can be assigned one of the following user roles with associated permissions:

- **Metadata & Lineage Viewer** - Search for entities, view metadata, and view lineage and metadata analytics.
- **Auditing Viewer** - View audit events and audit analytics and create audit reports.
- **Policy Viewer** - View metadata policies.
- **Managed & Custom Metadata Editor** - Search for entities, view metadata, view lineage, edit custom and managed metadata, define managed business metadata models.
- **Policy Editor** - View, create, update, and delete metadata policies.
- **User Administrator** - Administer role assignments to groups.
- **Full Administrator** - Full access, including role assignments to groups.
- **Custom Metadata Administrator** - Search for entities, view metadata, view lineage, view metadata analytics, edit custom metadata, edit managed metadata.

**Managing Roles**

To manage roles for groups in Navigator:
1. In Navigator Administration, click the Role Management tab.
2. Select the group for which you want to manage roles.
3. On the group description page, click Actions, and then click Manage role assignment.

The Applied roles area changes to a list of available roles and checkboxes. Select or deselect the roles you want to assign or remove for that group.

4. Click Save.

Determining the Roles of the Logged-in User

To display the Cloudera Navigator user roles for the logged-in user:

1. In the upper right, select username > My Roles. The Roles pop-up window displays all roles assigned to the LDAP or Active Directory groups to which the current user belongs.
2. Click Close to dismiss the window.

HDFS Extended ACLs

HDFS supports POSIX Access Control Lists (ACLs), as well as the traditional POSIX permissions model already supported. ACLs control access of HDFS files by providing a way to set different permissions for specific named users or named groups. They enhance the traditional permissions model by allowing users to define access control for arbitrary combinations of users and groups instead of a single owner/user or a single group.

Enabling HDFS Access Control Lists

By default, HDFS access control lists (ACLs) are disabled on a cluster. You can enable them using either Cloudera Manager or the command line.

The default ACL applies only to a directory, and all subdirectories and files created in that directory inherit the default ACL of the parent directory.

For example, if a directory has a default ACL entry of default:group:analysts:rwx, then all files created in the directory get a group:analysts:rwx entry, and subdirectories get both the default ACL and the access ACL copied over. To set a default ACL, simply prepend default: to the user or group entry in the setfacl command (see HDFS Extended ACL Example on page 345).

There is a maximum number/limit of 32 entries in a single HDFS extended ACL. If you attempt to add ACL entries exceeding the maximum of 32, you will get an error. An excessive number of ACL entries indicates that the requirements are better implemented by defining additional groups or users. ACLs with a very high number of entries also require additional memory and storage, and take longer to evaluate upon each permission check.

Important: Ensure that all users and groups resolve on the NameNode for ACLs to work as expected.
Enabling HDFS ACLs Using Cloudera Manager

1. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and navigate to the HDFS service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Service_name (Service-Wide)
4. Select Category > Security
5. Locate the Enable Access Control Lists property and select its checkbox to enable HDFS ACLs.
6. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.

Enabling HDFS ACLs Using the Command Line

To enable ACLs using the command line, set the dfs.namenode.acls.enabled property to true in the NameNode’s hdfs-site.xml.

```xml
<property>
  <name>dfs.namenode.acls.enabled</name>
  <value>true</value>
</property>
```

Commands

To set and get file access control lists (ACLs), use the file system shell commands, `setfacl` and `getfacl`.

**getfacl**

```
hdfs dfs -getfacl [-R] <path>
```

Examples:

```
<!-- To list all ACLs for the file located at /user/hdfs/file -->
hdfs dfs -getfacl /user/hdfs/file

<!-- To recursively list ACLs for /user/hdfs/file -->
hdfs dfs -getfacl -R /user/hdfs/file
```

**setfacl**

```
hdfs dfs -setfacl [-R] [-b|-k|-m|-x <acl_spec>] <path> | [--set <acl_spec>] <path>
```

Examples:

```
<!-- To give user ben read & write permission over /user/hdfs/file -->
hdfs dfs -setfacl -m user:ben:rw- /user/hdfs/file

<!-- To remove user alice's ACL entry for /user/hdfs/file -->
hdfs dfs -setfacl -x user:alice /user/hdfs/file
```
To give user hadoop read & write access, and group or others read-only access ->

```
hdfs dfs -setfacl --set user::rw-,user:hadoop:rw-,group::r--,other::r-- /user/hdfs/file
```

For more information on using HDFS ACLs, see the [HDFS Permissions Guide](#) on the Apache website.

**HDFS Extended ACL Example**

This example demonstrates how a user ("alice"), shares folder access with colleagues from another team ("hadoopdev"), so that the hadoopdev team can collaborate on the content of that folder; this is accomplished by updating the default extended ACL of that directory:

1. Make the files and sub-directories created within the content directory readable by team "hadoopdev":
   ```
   $ hdfs dfs -setfacl -m group:hadoopdev:r-x /project
   ```
2. Set the default ACL setting for the parent directory:
   ```
   $ hdfs dfs -setfacl -m default:group:hadoopdev:r-x /project
   ```
3. Create a sub-directory for the content you wish to share:
   ```
   $ hdfs dfs -mkdir /project/dev
   ```
4. Inspect the new sub-directory ACLs to verify that HDFS has applied the new default values:
   ```
   $ hdfs dfs -getfacl -R /project
   ```

   ```
   file: /project
   owner: alice
   group: appdev
   user::rwx
   group::r-x
   other::r-x
   default:user::rwx
   default:group::r-x
   default:group:hadoopdev:r-x
   default:mask::r-x
   default:other::r-x
   
   file: /project/dev
   owner: alice
   group: appdev
   user::rwx
   group::r-x
   group:hadoopdev:r-x
   mask::r-x
   other::r-x
   default:user::rwx
   default:group::r-x
   default:group:hadoopdev:r-x
   default:mask::r-x
   default:other::r-x
   ```

**Note:** At the time it is created, the default ACL is copied from the parent directory to the child directory. Subsequent changes to the parent directory default ACL do not change the ACLs of the existing child directories.

**Enabling Authorization for HDFS Web UIs**

You can enforce authorization for the following HDFS web UIs: the NameNode, DataNode, and JournalNode. To do so, you must have Kerberos authentication for HTTP web consoles and Hadoop Secure Authorization enabled. When both
configurations are set, only the hdfs user can access the HDFS web UIs by default. Any other user who attempts to access the web UI will encounter an HTTP 403 error because the user is not authorized to access the page.

For users and groups other than hdfs to access the web UIs, you must add them to hdfs-site.xml with an HDFS Service Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve).

Perform the following steps to enforce authorization for the HDFS web UIs:

1. In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, go to Clusters > <HDFS service>.
2. Navigate to the Configurations tab and search for the following property: HDFS Service Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for hdfs-site.xml.
3. Add the following property:
   
   - Name: dfs.cluster.administrators
   - Value: comma separated list of user names and/or group names

   For example, a sample property might look like this:

   - Name: dfs.cluster.administrators
   - Value: hdfs,admin_user_milton,HTTP,hue,admin_group

   These values would allow the users hdfs, admin_user_milton, HTTP, and hue as well as the group admin_group to the following web UIs: NameNode, DataNode, and JournalNode.

   If you perform the steps under Additional Configuration on page 346 to restrict access to the /jmx, /stack, /conf, and /metrics servlets, you must add the HTTP user and the Service Monitor Kerberos Principal so that Cloudera Manager can access the /jmx and /metrics servlets.

   You can view the Service Monitor Kerberos Principal by navigating to Cloudera Management Service > Configuration and searching for Role-Specific Kerberos Principal. The default Service Monitor Kerberos Principal is hue.

4. Save the configuration.
5. Restart all stale HDFS services.

### Additional Configuration

For a higher level of security, you can enforce authorization for the following HDFS web UI servlets, which may contain sensitive data: /jmx, /stack, /conf, and /metrics. When you enforce authorization for the servlets, only the users listed in the dfs.cluster.administrators property can access them.

Cloudera Manager requires access to the /jmx and /metrics servlets and uses the HTTP user as well as the Service Monitor Kerberos Principal to access them. Make sure to add both users to dfs.cluster.administrators as described in Enabling Authorization for HDFS Web UIs on page 345.

Perform the following steps to enforce authorization for the servlets:

1. In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, go to Clusters > <HDFS service>.
2. Navigate to the Configurations tab and search for the following property: HDFS Service Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for hdfs-site.xml.
3. Add the following property:

   - Name: hadoop.security.instrumentation.requires.admin
   - Value: true

4. Save the configuration.
5. Restart all stale HDFS services.
Configuring LDAP Group Mappings

**Important:**
- Cloudera strongly recommends *against* using Hadoop’s LdapGroupsMapping provider. LdapGroupsMapping should only be used in cases where OS-level integration is not possible. Production clusters require an identity provider that works well with all applications, not just Hadoop. Hence, often the preferred mechanism is to use tools such as SSSD, VAS or Centrify to replicate LDAP groups.
- Cloudera does not support the use of Winbind in production environments. Winbind uses an inefficient approach to user/group mapping, which may lead to low performance or cluster failures as the size of the cluster, and the number of users and groups increases.

Irrespective of the mechanism used, user/group mappings must be applied consistently across all cluster hosts for ease with maintenance.

When configuring LDAP for group mappings in Hadoop, you must create the users and groups for your Hadoop services in LDAP. When using the default shell-based group mapping provider (org.apache.hadoop.security.ShellBasedUnixGroupsMapping), the requisite user and group relationships already exist because they are created during the installation procedure. When you switch to LDAP as the group mapping provider, you must re-create these relationships within LDAP.

Note that if you have modified the System User or System Group setting within Cloudera Manager for any service, you must use those custom values to provision the users and groups in LDAP.

The table below lists users and their group members for CDH services:

> **Note:** Cloudera Manager 5.3 introduces a new *single user mode*. In single user mode, the Cloudera Manager Agent and all the processes run by services managed by Cloudera Manager are started as a single configured user and group. See Configuring Single User Mode for more information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component (Version)</th>
<th>Unix User ID</th>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cloudera Manager (all versions)</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>cloudera-scm</td>
<td>Cloudera Manager processes such as the Cloudera Manager Server and the monitoring roles run as this user. The Cloudera Manager keytab file must be named cmf.keytab since that name is hard-coded in Cloudera Manager.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Accumulo (Accumulo 1.4.3 and higher)</td>
<td>accumulo</td>
<td>accumulo</td>
<td>Accumulo processes run as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Avro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No special users.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Flume (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>flume</td>
<td>flume</td>
<td>The sink that writes to HDFS as this user must have write privileges.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Applicable to clusters managed by Cloudera Manager only.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component (Version)</th>
<th>Unix User ID</th>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apache HBase (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>hbase</td>
<td>hbase</td>
<td>The Master and the RegionServer processes run as this user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDFS (CDH 4, CDH 5)</td>
<td>hdfs</td>
<td>hdfs, hadoop</td>
<td>The NameNode and DataNodes run as this user, and the HDFS root directory as well as the directories used for edit logs should be owned by it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Apache Hive (CDH 4, CDH 5) | hive | hive | The HiveServer2 process and the Hive Metastore processes run as this user.  
A user must be defined for Hive access to its Metastore DB (for example, MySQL or Postgres) but it can be any identifier and does not correspond to a Unix uid. This is `javax.jdo.option.ConnectionUserName` in `hive-site.xml`. |
| Apache HCatalog (CDH 4.2 and higher, CDH 5) | hive | hive | The WebHCat service (for REST access to Hive functionality) runs as the hive user. |
| HttpFS (CDH 4, CDH 5) | httpfs | httpfs | The HttpFS service runs as this user. See [HttpFS Security Configuration](#) for instructions on how to generate the merged `httpfs-http.keytab` file. |
| Hue (CDH 4, CDH 5) | hue | hue | Hue services run as this user. |
| Hue Load Balancer (Cloudera Manager 5.5 and higher) | apache | apache | The Hue Load balancer has a dependency on the apache2 package that uses the apache user name. Cloudera Manager does not run processes using this user ID. |
| Impala | impala | impala, hive | Impala services run as this user. |
| Apache Kafka (Cloudera Distribution of Kafka 1.2.0) | kafka | kafka | Kafka brokers and mirror makers run as this user. |
| Java KeyStore KMS (CDH 5.2.1 and higher) | kms | kms | The Java KeyStore KMS service runs as this user. |
| Key Trustee KMS (CDH 5.3 and higher) | kms | kms | The Key Trustee KMS service runs as this user. |
| Key Trustee Server (CDH 5.4 and higher) | keytrustee | keytrustee | The Key Trustee Server service runs as this user. |
| Kudu | kudu | kudu | Kudu services run as this user. |
| Llama (CDH 5) | llama | llama | Llama runs as this user. |
| Apache Mahout | llama | llama | No special users. |
Without Kerberos, the JobTracker and tasks run as this user. The LinuxTaskController binary is owned by this user for Kerberos.

Apache Oozie (CDH 4, CDH 5)

The Oozie service runs as this user.

Parquet

No special users.

Apache Pig

No special users.

Cloudera Search (CDH 4.3 and higher, CDH 5)

The Solr processes run as this user.

Apache Spark (CDH 5)

The Spark History Server process runs as this user.

Apache Sentry (CDH 5.1 and higher)

The Sentry service runs as this user.

Apache Sqoop (CDH 4, CDH 5)

This user is only for the Sqoop1 Metastore, a configuration option that is not recommended.

Apache Sqoop2 (CDH 4.2 and higher, CDH 5)

The Sqoop2 service runs as this user.

Apache Whirr

No special users.

YARN (CDH 4, CDH 5)

Without Kerberos, all YARN services and applications run as this user. The LinuxContainerExecutor binary is owned by this user for Kerberos.

Apache ZooKeeper (CDH 4, CDH 5)

The ZooKeeper processes run as this user. It is not configurable.

---

**Important:**

- This configuration process can be completed using either Cloudera Manager or the command-line instructions.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. If you use an earlier version of CDH, see the documentation for that version located at [Cloudera Documentation](https://cloudera.com/).

---

**Using Cloudera Manager**

**Minimum Required Role:** [Configurator](https://cloudera.com/) (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

Make the following changes to the HDFS service’s security configuration:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the HDFS service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > HDFS (Service Wide)
5. Modify the following configuration properties using values from the table below:
Although the above changes are sufficient to configure group mappings for Active Directory, some changes to the remaining default configurations might be required for OpenLDAP.

### Using the Command Line

Add the following properties to the `core-site.xml` on the NameNode:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.group.mapping</name>
  <value>org.apache.hadoop.security.LdapGroupsMapping</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.group.mapping.ldap.url</name>
  <value>ldap://<server></value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.group.mapping.ldap.bind.user</name>
  <value>Administrator@example.com</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.group.mapping.ldap.bind.password</name>
  <value>****</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.group.mapping.ldap.base</name>
  <value>dc=example,dc=com</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.group.mapping.ldap.search.filter.user</name>
  <value>(&amp;{(objectClass=user)(sAMAccountName={0}))</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.group.mapping.ldap.search.filter.group</name>
  <value>(objectClass=group)</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.group.mapping.ldap.search.attr.member</name>
  <value>member</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hadoop.security.group.mapping.ldap.search.attr.group.name</name>
  <value>cn</value>
</property>
```
Authorization With Apache Sentry

Apache Sentry is a granular, role-based authorization module for Hadoop. Sentry provides the ability to control and enforce precise levels of privileges on data for authenticated users and applications on a Hadoop cluster. Sentry currently works out of the box with Apache Hive, Hive Metastore/HCatalog, Apache Solr, Impala, and HDFS (limited to Hive table data).

Sentry is designed to be a pluggable authorization engine for Hadoop components. It allows you to define authorization rules to validate a user or application’s access requests for Hadoop resources. Sentry is highly modular and can support authorization for a wide variety of data models in Hadoop.

Architecture Overview

Sentry Components

There are three components involved in the authorization process:

- **Sentry Server**
  The Sentry RPC server manages the authorization metadata. It supports interfaces to securely retrieve and manipulate the metadata.

- **Data Engine**
  This is a data processing application, such as Hive or Impala, that needs to authorize access to data or metadata resources. The data engine loads the Sentry plugin and all client requests for accessing resources are intercepted and routed to the Sentry plugin for validation.

- **Sentry Plugin**
  The Sentry plugin runs in the data engine. It offers interfaces to manipulate authorization metadata stored in the Sentry Server, and includes the authorization policy engine that evaluates access requests using the authorization metadata retrieved from the server.

Key Concepts

- **Authentication** - Verifying credentials to reliably identify a user
- **Authorization** - Limiting the user’s access to a given resource
- **User** - Individual identified by underlying authentication system
- **Group** - A set of users, maintained by the authentication system
- **Privilege** - An instruction or rule that allows access to an object
- **Role** - A set of privileges; a template to combine multiple access rules

Note: In addition:

- If you are using Sentry with Hive, you will also need to add these properties on the HiveServer2 node.
- If you are using Sentry with Impala, add these properties on all hosts

See [Users and Groups in Sentry](#) for more information.
Configuring Authorization

- Authorization models - Defines the objects to be subject to authorization rules and the granularity of actions allowed. For example, in the SQL model, the objects can be databases or tables, and the actions are SELECT, INSERT, and CREATE. For the Search model, the objects are indexes, configs, collections, documents; the access modes include query and update.

User Identity and Group Mapping

Sentry relies on underlying authentication systems, such as Kerberos or LDAP, to identify the user. It also uses the group mapping mechanism configured in Hadoop to ensure that Sentry sees the same group mapping as other components of the Hadoop ecosystem.

Consider a sample organization with users Alice and Bob who belong to an Active Directory (AD) group called finance-department. Bob also belongs to a group called finance-managers. In Sentry, you first create roles and then grant privileges to these roles. For example, you can create a role called Analyst and grant SELECT on tables Customer and Sales to this role.

The next step is to join these authentication entities (users and groups) to authorization entities (roles). This can be done by granting the Analyst role to the finance-department group. Now Bob and Alice who are members of the finance-department group get SELECT privilege to the Customer and Sales tables.

Role-Based Access Control

Role-based access control (RBAC) is a powerful mechanism to manage authorization for a large set of users and data objects in a typical enterprise. New data objects get added or removed, users join, move, or leave organisations all the time. RBAC makes managing this a lot easier. Hence, as an extension of the sample organization discussed previously, if a new employee Carol joins the Finance Department, all you need to do is add her to the finance-department group in AD. This will give Carol access to data from the Sales and Customer tables.

Unified Authorization

Another important aspect of Sentry is the unified authorization. The access control rules once defined, work across multiple data access tools. For example, being granted the Analyst role in the previous example will allow Bob, Alice, and others in the finance-department group to access table data from SQL engines such as Hive and Impala, as well as using MapReduce, Pig applications or metadata access using HCatalog.
As illustrated above, Apache Sentry works with multiple Hadoop components. At the heart, you have the Sentry Server which stores authorization metadata and provides APIs for tools to retrieve and modify this metadata securely.

Note that the Sentry Server only facilitates the metadata. The actual authorization decision is made by a policy engine that runs in data processing applications such as Hive or Impala. Each component loads the Sentry plugin, which includes the service client for dealing with the Sentry service and the policy engine to validate the authorization request.

**Hive and Sentry**

Consider an example where Hive gets a request to access an object in a certain mode by a client. If Bob submits the following Hive query:

```
select * from production.sales
```

Hive will identify that user Bob is requesting `SELECT` access to the Sales table. At this point Hive will ask the Sentry plugin to validate Bob’s access request. The plugin will retrieve Bob’s privileges related to the Sales table and the policy engine will determine if the request is valid.
Hive works with both the Sentry service and policy files. Cloudera recommends you use the Sentry service, which makes it easier to manage user privileges. For more details and instructions, see Managing the Sentry Service on page 356.

Impala and Sentry

Authorization processing in Impala is similar to that in Hive. The main difference is caching of privileges. Impala’s Catalog server manages caching schema metadata and propagating it to all Impala server nodes. This Catalog server caches Sentry metadata as well. As a result, authorization validation in Impala happens locally and much faster.

For detailed documentation, see Enabling Sentry Authorization for Impala on page 416.

Sentry-HDFS Synchronization

Sentry-HDFS authorization is focused on Hive warehouse data - that is, any data that is part of a table in Hive or Impala. The real objective of this integration is to expand the same authorization checks to Hive warehouse data being accessed.
from any other components such as Pig, MapReduce or Spark. At this point, this feature does not replace HDFS ACLs. Tables that are not associated with Sentry will retain their old ACLs.

The mapping of Sentry privileges to HDFS ACL permissions is as follows:

- SELECT privilege -> Read access on the file.
- INSERT privilege -> Write access on the file.
- ALL privilege -> Read and Write access on the file.

The NameNode loads a Sentry plugin that caches Sentry privileges as well Hive metadata. This helps HDFS to keep file permissions and Hive tables privileges in sync. The Sentry plugin periodically polls Sentry to keep the metadata changes in sync.

For example, if Bob runs a Pig job that is reading from the Sales table data files, Pig will try to get the file handle from HDFS. At that point the Sentry plugin on the NameNode will figure out that the file is part of Hive data and overlay Sentry privileges on top of the file ACLs. As a result, HDFS will enforce the same privileges for this Pig client that Hive would apply for a SQL query.

For HDFS-Sentry synchronization to work, you must use the Sentry service, not policy file authorization. See Synchronizing HDFS ACLs and Sentry Permissions on page 388, for more details.

Search and Sentry

Sentry can apply restrictions to various Search tasks including accessing data and creating collections. These restrictions are consistently applied, regardless of the way users attempt to complete actions. For example, restricting access to data in a collection restricts that access whether queries come from the command line, from a browser, or through the admin console.

With Search, Sentry restrictions can be stored in the database-backed Sentry service or in a policy file (for example, sentry-provider.ini) which is stored in an HDFS location such as hdfs://ha-nn-uri/user/solr/sentry/sentry-provider.ini.

Sentry with Search does not support multiple policy files for multiple databases. If you choose to use policy files rather than database-backed Sentry service, you must use a separate policy file for each Sentry-enabled service. For example, if Hive and Search were using policy file authorization, using a combined Hive and Search policy file would result in an invalid configuration and failed authorization on both services.

Search works with both the Sentry service and policy files. Cloudera recommends you use the Sentry service, which makes it easier to manage user privileges. For more details and instructions, see Managing the Sentry Service on page 356.

For detailed documentation, see Configuring Sentry Authorization for Cloudera Search on page 427.

Authorization Administration

The Sentry Server supports APIs to securely manipulate roles and privileges. Both Hive and Impala support SQL statements to manage privileges natively. Sentry assumes that HiveServer2 and Impala run as superusers, usually called
To initiate top-level permissions for Sentry, an admin must login as a superuser. You can use either Beeline or the Impala shell to execute the following sample statement:

```
grant role analyst to group finance_managers
```

### Disabling Hive CLI

To execute Hive queries, you must use Beeline. Hive CLI is not supported with Sentry and therefore its access to the Hive Metastore must be disabled. This is especially necessary if the Hive metastore has sensitive metadata. To do this, set the **Hive Metastore Access Control and Proxy User Groups Override** property for the Hive service in Cloudera Manager. For example, to give the `hive` user permission to impersonate only members of the `hive` and `hue` groups, set the property to: `hive, hue`

If other user groups require access to the Hive Metastore, they can be added to the comma-separated list as needed. For example, setting this property to `hive, hue` blocks the Spark shell from accessing the metastore.

### Using Hue to Manage Sentry Permissions

Hue supports a Security app to manage Sentry authorization. This allows users to explore and change table permissions. Here is a [video blog](#) that demonstrates its functionality.

### Managing the Sentry Service

**Important:** This is the documentation for the Sentry service introduced in CDH 5.1. If you want to use Sentry's previous policy file approach to secure your data, see [Sentry Policy File Authorization](#) on page 394.

The Sentry service is a RPC server that stores the authorization metadata in an underlying relational database and provides RPC interfaces to retrieve and manipulate privileges. It supports secure access to services using Kerberos. The service serves authorization metadata from the database backed storage; it does not handle actual privilege validation. The Hive, Impala, and Solr services are clients of this service and will enforce Sentry privileges when configured to use Sentry.

The motivation behind introducing a new Sentry service is to make it easier to handle user privileges than the existing policy file approach. Providing a service instead of a file allows you to use the more traditional `GRANT/REVOKE` statements to modify privileges.

The rest of this topic will walk you through the prerequisites for Sentry, basic terminology, and the Sentry privilege model.

For more information on installing, upgrading and configuring the Sentry service, see:

**Prerequisites**

- CDH 5.1.x (or higher) managed by Cloudera Manager 5.1.x (or higher). See the [Cloudera Manager Administration Guide](#) and [Cloudera Installation](#) for instructions.
- HiveServer2 and the Hive Metastore running with strong authentication. For HiveServer2, strong authentication is either Kerberos or LDAP. For the Hive Metastore, only Kerberos is considered strong authentication (to override, see [Securing the Hive Metastore](#) on page 380).
- Impala 1.4.0 (or higher) running with strong authentication. With Impala, either Kerberos or LDAP can be configured to achieve strong authentication.
- Cloudera Search for CDH 5.1.0 or higher. Solr supports using Sentry beginning with CDH 5.1.0. Different functionality is added at different releases:
  - Sentry with policy files is added in CDH 5.1.0.
  - Sentry with config support is added in CDH 5.5.0.
  - Sentry with database-backed Sentry service is added with CDH 5.8.0.
• Implement Kerberos authentication on your cluster. For instructions, see Enabling Kerberos Authentication Using the Wizard on page 49.

Terminology
• An object is an entity protected by Sentry’s authorization rules. The objects supported in the current release are server, database, table, URI, collection, and config.
• A role is a collection of rules for accessing a given object.
• A privilege is granted to a role to govern access to an object. With CDH 5.5, Sentry allows you to assign the SELECT privilege to columns (only for Hive and Impala). Supported privileges are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Privilege</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>SERVER, TABLE, DB, URI, COLLECTION, CONFIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td>DB, TABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>DB, TABLE, COLUMN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** In Beeline, you can also grant SELECT and INSERT on SERVER.

• A user is an entity that is permitted by the authentication subsystem to access the service. This entity can be a Kerberos principal, an LDAP userid, or an artifact of some other supported pluggable authentication system.
• A group connects the authentication system with the authorization system. It is a collection of one or more users who have been granted one or more authorization roles. Sentry allows a set of roles to be configured for a group.
• A configured group provider determines a user’s affiliation with a group. The current release supports HDFS-backed groups and locally configured groups.

Privilege Model
Sentry uses a role-based privilege model with the following characteristics.
• Allows any user to execute show function, desc function, and show locks.
• Allows the user to see only those tables, databases, collections, configs for which the user has privileges.
• Requires a user to have the necessary privileges on the URI to execute HiveQL operations that specify a location. Examples of such operations include LOAD, IMPORT, and EXPORT.
• Privileges granted on URIs are recursively applied to all subdirectories. That is, privileges only need to be granted on the parent directory.
• In Beeline, you can grant privileges on an object that doesn’t exist. For example, you can grant role1 on table1 and then create table1.

**Important:**
• When Sentry is enabled, you must use Beeline to execute Hive queries. Hive CLI is not supported with Sentry and must be disabled.
• When Sentry is enabled, a user with no privileges on a database will not be allowed to connect to HiveServer2. This is because the use <database> command is now executed as part of the connection to HiveServer2, which is why the connection fails. See HIVE-4256.

For more information, see Authorization Privilege Model for Hive and Impala.

User to Group Mapping
Minimum Required Role: Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)
You can configure Sentry to use Hadoop groups. By default, Sentry looks up groups locally, but it can be configured to look up Hadoop groups using LDAP (for Active Directory). User/group information for Sentry, Hive and Impala must be made available for lookup on the following hosts:

- Sentry - Groups are looked up on the host the Sentry Server runs on.
- Hive - Groups are looked up on the hosts running HiveServer2 and the Hive Metastore.
- Impala - Groups are looked up on the Catalog Server and on all of the Impala daemon hosts.

Group mappings in Sentry can be summarized as in the figure below.

The Sentry service only uses HadoopUserGroup mappings. See Configuring LDAP Group Mappings on page 347 for details on configuring LDAP group mappings in Hadoop.

Authorization Privilege Model for Hive and Impala

Privileges can be granted on different objects in the Hive warehouse. Any privilege that can be granted is associated with a level in the object hierarchy. If a privilege is granted on a container object in the hierarchy, the base object automatically inherits it. For instance, if a user has ALL privileges on the database scope, then (s)he has ALL privileges on all of the base objects contained within that scope.

**Important:**

Note that because of this object hierarchy, it is possible for a user to read data from a database that the user does not have access to. For example, you have two roles:

- **role1** - full access to `database1` and `database2`
- **role2** - full access to `database1`, no access to `database2`

A user with **role1** can create a view in `database1` based on a table in `database2`. Because **role2** has access to `database1`, a user with **role2** can read the data in that view from `database2`. 
Object Hierarchy

| Server | URI | Database | Table | Partition | Columns | View |

Table 32: Valid privilege types and objects they apply to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Privilege</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td>DB, TABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>DB, TABLE, VIEW, COLUMN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>SERVER, TABLE, DB, URI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that when you grant ALL on a URI, those permissions extend into the subdirectories in that path. For example, if a role has ALL on the following URI:

- hdfs://host:port/directory_A/directory_B

That role will also have ALL on these directories:

- hdfs://host:port/directory_A/directory_B/directory_C
- hdfs://host:port/directory_A/directory_B/directory_C/directory_D
- hdfs://host:port/directory_A/directory_B/directory_E

URI permissions do not affect HDFS ACL's.

Table 33: Privilege hierarchy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base Object</th>
<th>Granular privileges on object</th>
<th>Container object that contains the base object</th>
<th>Privileges on container object that implies privileges on the base object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLUMN</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIEW</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 34: Privilege table for Hive & Impala operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Privileges Required</th>
<th>URI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CREATE DATABASE</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP DATABASE</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE TABLE</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE VIEW</td>
<td>DATABASE; SELECT on TABLE;</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Privileges Required</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-This operation is allowed if you have column-level SELECT access to the columns being used.</td>
<td>VIEW/TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER VIEW</td>
<td>VIEW/TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP VIEW</td>
<td>VIEW/TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. ADD COLUMNS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. REPLACE COLUMNS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. CHANGE column</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. RENAME</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. SET TBLPROPERTIES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. SET FILEFORMAT</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. SET LOCATION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. ADD PARTITION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. DROP PARTITION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. PARTITION SET FILEFORMAT</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW CREATE TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW PARTITIONS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW TABLES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW GRANT ROLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESCRIBE TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOAD DATA</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-Output includes all the tables for which the user has table-level privileges and all the tables for which the user has some column-level privileges.

-Output includes an additional field for any column-level privileges.

-Output shows all columns if the user has table level-privileges or SELECT privilege on at least one table column.
You can grant the SELECT privilege on a view to give users access to specific columns of a table they do not otherwise have access to. See Column-level Authorization on page 382 for details on allowed column-level operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Privileges Required</th>
<th>URI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>VIEW/TABLE; COLUMN</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSERT OVERWRITE TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE TABLE .. AS SELECT</td>
<td>DATABASE; SELECT on TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USE &lt;dbName&gt;</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE FUNCTION</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. SET SERDEPROPERTIES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. PARTITION SET SERDEPROPERTIES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 35: Privilege table for Hive-only operations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Privileges Required</th>
<th>URI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Output for this operation filters columns to which the user does not have explicit SELECT access</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE INDEX</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP INDEX</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW INDEXES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRANT PRIVILEGE</td>
<td>Allowed only for Sentry admin users</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVOKE PRIVILEGE</td>
<td>Allowed only for Sentry admin users</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW GRANT</td>
<td>Allowed only for Sentry admin users</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW TBLPROPERTIES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESCRIBE TABLE .. PARTITION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADD ARCHIVE[S]</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADD FILE[S]</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADD JAR[S]</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELETE JAR[S]</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST JAR[S]</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW CREATE VIEW</td>
<td>VIEW</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 36: Privilege table for Impala-only operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Privileges Required</th>
<th>URI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXPLAIN INSERT</td>
<td>TABLE; COLUMN</td>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPLAIN SELECT</td>
<td>TABLE; COLUMN</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalidate metadata</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalidate metadata &lt;table name&gt;</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refresh &lt;table name&gt; or</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refresh &lt;table name&gt; PARTITION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP FUNCTION</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compute stats</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show create view</td>
<td>VIEW / TABLE(S)</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Authorization Privilege Model for Solr**

The tables below refer to the request handlers defined in the generated `solrconfig.xml.secure`. If you are not using this configuration file, the below may not apply.
admin is a special collection in Sentry used to represent administrative actions. A non-administrative request may only require privileges on the collection or config on which the request is being performed. This is called either collection1 or config1 in these tables. An administrative request may require privileges on both the admin collection and collection1. This is denoted as admin, collection1 in the tables below.

Note: If no privileges are granted, no access is possible. For example, accessing the Solr Admin UI requires the QUERY privilege. If no users are granted the QUERY privilege, no access to the Solr Admin UI is possible.

Table 37: Privilege table for non-administrative request handlers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request Handler</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>select</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>get</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>browse</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tvrh</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clustering</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terms</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elevate</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analysis/field</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analysis/document</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>update</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>update/json</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>update/csv</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 38: Privilege table for collections admin actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collection Action</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>create</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delete</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reload</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>createAlias</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: collection1 here refers to the name of the alias, not the underlying collection(s). For example, http://YOUR-HOST:8983/solr/admin/collections?action=CRAETALIAS&name=collection1&collections=underlyingCollection
### Configuring Authorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collection Action</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deleteAlias</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>syncShard</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>splitShard</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deleteShard</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** collection1 here refers to the name of the alias, not the underlying collection(s). For example, 
http://YOUR-HOST:8983/solr/admin/collections?action=DELETEALIAS&name=collection1

### Table 39: Privilege table for core admin actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collection Action</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>create</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rename</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>load</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unload</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persist</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reload</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swap</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mergeIndexes</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>split</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prepRecover</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requestRecover</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requestSyncShard</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requestApplyUpdates</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 40: Privilege table for Info and AdminHandlers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request Handler</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LukeRequestHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SystemInfoHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SolrInfoMBeanHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PluginInfoHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThreadDumpHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 41: Privilege table for Config Admin actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Config Action</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
<th>Required Config Privilege</th>
<th>Configs that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CREATE</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>config1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELETE</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>config1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Installing and Upgrading the Sentry Service**

This topic describes how to install and upgrade the Sentry service. If you are migrating from Sentry policy files to the database-backed Sentry service, see [Migrating from Sentry Policy Files to the Sentry Service](#) on page 368.

**Adding the Sentry Service**

Use one of the following sections to add/install the Sentry service:

**Adding the Sentry Service Using Cloudera Manager**

**Minimum Required Role:** **Cluster Administrator** (also provided by **Full Administrator**)

1. On the **Home > Status** tab, click ![dropdown](#) to the right of the cluster name and select **Add a Service**. A list of service types display. You can add one type of service at a time.

2. Select the **Sentry** service and click **Continue**.

3. Customize role assignments for Sentry. The wizard evaluates the hardware configurations of the available hosts and selects the best hosts for each role. If you are happy with the preselected hosts, click **Continue** and move to the next step. Otherwise, you can change the hosts that are assigned to the roles. The **View By Host** button allows you to view a list of hosts.

   To change the host for a role, click the hostname under the role. A window appears with a list of hosts to choose from. Note that you can only select one host for the Sentry Server. You can search for a host in the Search field or you can filter the list by entering a range of hosts in the Search field. You can search for hosts in the following ways:

   - **Range of hostnames (without the domain portion)**

     | Range Definition | Matching Hosts                          |
     |------------------|----------------------------------------|
     | 10.1.1.[1-4]     | 10.1.1.1, 10.1.1.2, 10.1.1.3, 10.1.1.4 |
     | host[1-3].company.com | host1.company.com, host2.company.com, host3.company.com |
     | host[07-10].company.com | host07.company.com, host08.company.com, host09.company.com, host10.company.com |

   - **IP addresses**
   - **Rack name**

Click **Search** to filter the list and click a hostname to select the host. Click **OK** to close the window. The hostname that you selected appears under the role.
Click **Continue** to move to the next page in the wizard.

4. Configure database settings. You can use either an embedded or a custom database.
   a. Choose the database type:
      - Leave the default setting of **Use Embedded Database** to have Cloudera Manager create and configure required databases. Make a note of the auto-generated passwords.
      - Select **Use Custom Databases** to specify external databases.
         1. Enter the database host, database type, database name, username, and password for the database that you created when you set up the database. See the [Creating Databases](#) documentation for Sentry Server database requirements.
   b. Click **Test Connection** to confirm that Cloudera Manager can communicate with the database using the information you have supplied. If the test succeeds in all cases, click **Continue**. Otherwise check and correct the information you have provided for the database and then try the test again. (For some servers, if you are using the embedded database, you will see a message saying the database will be created at a later step in the installation process.) The Review Changes page displays.

5. Click **Continue** then click **Finish**. You are returned to the **Home** page.

6. Verify the new service is started properly by checking the health status for the new service. If the Health Status is **Good**, then the service started properly.

7. To use the Sentry service, begin by enabling **Hive Impala**, and **Search** for the service.

### Installing Sentry Using the Command Line

**Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See [Cloudera Documentation](#) for information specific to other releases.

Use the following the instructions, depending on your operating system, to install the latest version of Sentry.

**Important: Configuration files**
- If you install a newer version of a package that is already on the system, configuration files that you have modified will remain intact.
- If you uninstall a package, the package manager renames any configuration files you have modified from `<file>` to `<file>.rpm`. If you then re-install the package (probably to install a new version) the package manager creates a new `<file>` with applicable defaults. You are responsible for applying any changes captured in the original configuration file to the new configuration file. In the case of Ubuntu and Debian upgrades, you will be prompted if you have made changes to a file for which there is a new version. For details, see [Automatic handling of configuration files by dpkg](#).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OS</th>
<th>Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RHEL</td>
<td><code>$ sudo yum install sentry</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLES</td>
<td><code>$ sudo zypper install sentry</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Ubuntu or Debian | `$ sudo apt-get update;`  
                     | `$ sudo apt-get install sentry`              |

### Starting the Sentry Service
Perform the following steps to start the Sentry service on your cluster.

1. Set the `SENTRY_HOME` and `HADOOP_HOME` parameters.
2. Create the Sentry database schema using the Sentry schematool. Sentry, by default, does not initialize the schema. The schematool is a built-in way for you to deploy the backend schema required by the Sentry service. For example, the following command uses the schematool to initialize the schema for a MySQL database.

   ```shell
   bin/sentry --command schema-tool --conffile <sentry-site.xml> --dbType mysql --initSchema
   ```

   Alternatively, you can set the `sentry.verify.schema.version` configuration property to `false`. However, this is not recommended.

3. Start the Sentry service.

   ```shell
   bin/sentry --command service --conffile <sentry-site.xml>
   ```

**Upgrading the Sentry Service**

Use one of the following sections to upgrade the Sentry service:

**Upgrading the Sentry Service Using Cloudera Manager**

If you have a cluster managed by Cloudera Manager, go to Upgrading CDH and Managed Services Using Cloudera Manager and follow the instructions depending on the version of CDH you are upgrading to. If you are upgrading from CDH 5.1, you will notice an extra step in the procedure to upgrade the Sentry database schema.

**Upgrading the Sentry Service Using the Command Line**

1. Stop the Sentry service by identifying the PID of the Sentry Service and use the `kill` command to end the process:

   ```shell
   ps -ef | grep sentry
   kill -9 <PID>
   
   Replace `<PID>` with the PID of the Sentry Service.
   ```

2. Remove the previous version of Sentry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OS</th>
<th>Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RHEL</td>
<td><code>$ sudo yum remove sentry</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLES</td>
<td><code>$ sudo zypper remove sentry</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubuntu or Debian</td>
<td><code>$ sudo apt-get remove sentry</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Install the new version of Sentry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OS</th>
<th>Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RHEL</td>
<td><code>$ sudo yum install sentry</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLES</td>
<td><code>$ sudo zypper install sentry</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubuntu or Debian</td>
<td><code>$ sudo apt-get update;</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><code>$ sudo apt-get install sentry</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (From CDH 5.1 to CDH 5.x) Upgrade Sentry Database Schema

   Use the Sentry schematool to upgrade the database schema as follows:

   ```shell
   bin/sentry --command schema-tool --conffile <sentry-site.xml> --dbType <db-type> --upgradeSchema
   ```

   Where `<db-type>` should be either `mysql`, `postgres` or `oracle`. 
5. Start the Sentry Service
   a. Set the `SENTRY_HOME` and `HADOOP_HOME` parameters.
   b. Run the following command:

```
bin/sentry --command service --conffile <sentry-site.xml>
```

Migrating from Sentry Policy Files to the Sentry Service

**Minimum Required Role:** Cluster Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

The following steps describe how you can upgrade from Sentry's policy file-based approach to the new database-backed Sentry service.

1. If you haven't already done so, upgrade your cluster to the latest version of CDH and Cloudera Manager. Refer the Cloudera Manager Administration Guide for instructions.
2. Disable the existing Sentry policy file for any Hive, Impala, or Solr services on the cluster. To do this:
   a. Go to the Hive, Impala, or Solr service.
   b. Click the Configuration tab.
   c. Select Scope > Service Name (Service-Wide).
   d. Select Category > Policy File Based Sentry.
   e. Clear Enable Sentry Authorization using Policy Files. Cloudera Manager throws a validation error if you attempt to configure the Sentry service while this property is checked.
   f. Repeat for any remaining Hive, Impala, or Solr services.
3. Add the new Sentry service to your cluster. For instructions, see Adding the Sentry Service on page 365.
4. To begin using the Sentry service, see Enabling the Sentry Service Using Cloudera Manager on page 368 and Configuring Impala as a Client for the Sentry Service on page 376.
5. (Optional) Use command line tools to migrate existing policy file grants.
   - If you want to migrate existing Sentry configurations for Solr, use the `solrctl sentry --convert-policy-file` command, described in solrctl Reference.
   - For Hive and Impala, use the command-line interface Beeline to issue grants to the Sentry service to match the contents of your old policy file(s). For more details on the Sentry service and examples on using Grant/Revoke statements to match your policy file, see Hive SQL Syntax for Use with Sentry on page 382.
6. Restart the affected services as described in Restarting Services and Instances after Configuration Changes to apply the changes.

Configuring the Sentry Service

This topic describes how to enable the Sentry service for Hive and Impala, and configuring the Hive metastore to communicate with the Sentry service.

Enabling the Sentry Service Using Cloudera Manager

**Minimum Required Role:** Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

Before Enabling the Sentry Service

- Ensure you satisfy all the Prerequisites on page 356 for the Sentry service.
- Setting Hive Warehouse Directory Permissions

**Important:** If you are going to enable HDFS/Sentry synchronization, you do not need to perform the following step to explicitly set permissions for the Hive warehouse directory. With synchronization enabled, all Hive databases and tables will automatically be owned by `hive:hive`, and Sentry permissions on tables are translated to HDFS ACLs for the underlying table files.
The Hive warehouse directory (/user/hive/warehouse or any path you specify as hive.metastore.warehouse.dir in your hive-site.xml) must be owned by the Hive user and group.

- **Using the default Hive warehouse directory** - Permissions on the warehouse directory must be set as follows (see following Note for caveats):
  - **771** on the directory itself (by default, /user/hive/warehouse)
  - **771** on all subdirectories (for example, /user/hive/warehouse/mysubdir)
  - All files and subdirectories should be owned by hive:hive

For example:

```
$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chmod -R 771 /user/hive/warehouse
$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chown -R hive:hive /user/hive/warehouse
```

If you have enabled Kerberos on your cluster, you must kinit as the hdfs user before you set permissions. For example:

```
sudo -u hdfs kinit -kt <hdfs.keytab> hdfs
$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chmod -R 771 /user/hive/warehouse
$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chown -R hive:hive /user/hive/warehouse
```

- **Using a non-default Hive warehouse**: If you would like to use a different directory as the Hive warehouse, update the hive.metastore.warehouse.dir property, and make sure you set the required permissions on the new directory. For example, if the new warehouse directory is /data, set the permissions as follows:

```
$ hdfs dfs -chown hive:hive /data
$ hdfs dfs -chmod 771 /data
```

Note that when you update the default Hive warehouse, previously created tables will not be moved over automatically. Therefore, tables created before the update will remain at /user/hive/warehouse/<old_table>. However, after the update, any new tables created in the default location will be found at /data/<new_table>.

For Sentry/HDFS sync to work as expected, add the new warehouse URL to the list of Sentry Synchronization Path Prefixes.

**Note:**
- If you set hive.warehouse.subdir.inherit.perms to `true` in hive-site.xml, the permissions on the subdirectories will be set when you set permissions on the warehouse directory.
- If a user has access to any object in the warehouse, that user will be able to execute `use default`. This ensures that `use default` commands issued by legacy applications work when Sentry is enabled.
- The instructions described above for modifying permissions on the Hive warehouse directory override the recommendations in the Hive section of the CDH 5 Installation Guide.

- Disable impersonation for HiveServer2 in the Cloudera Manager Admin Console. Impersonation in HiveServer2 allows users to execute queries and access HDFS files as the connected user rather than the super user who started the HiveServer2 daemon. This enforces an access control policy at the file level using HDFS file permissions or ACLs. Keeping impersonation enabled means Sentry does not have end-to-end control over the authorization process. While Sentry can enforce access control policies on tables and views in the Hive warehouse, it has no control over permissions on the underlying table files in HDFS. Hence, even if users do not have the Sentry privileges required to access a table in the warehouse, as long as they have permission to access the corresponding table file in HDFS, any jobs or queries submitted will bypass Sentry authorization checks and execute successfully. Use the following instructions to disable impersonation:
1. Go to the Hive service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
4. Select Category > Main.
5. Uncheck the HiveServer2 Enable Impersonation checkbox.
6. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.

- If you are using MapReduce, enable the Hive user to submit MapReduce jobs.
  1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the MapReduce service.
  2. Click the Configuration tab.
  3. Select Scope > TaskTracker.
  5. Set the Minimum User ID for Job Submission property to zero (the default is 1000).
  6. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
  7. Repeat steps 1-6 for every TaskTracker role group for the MapReduce service that is associated with Hive.
  8. Restart the MapReduce service.

- If you are using YARN, enable the Hive user to submit YARN jobs.
  1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the YARN service.
  2. Click the Configuration tab.
  3. Select Scope > NodeManager.
  5. Ensure the Allowed System Users property includes the hive user. If not, add hive.
  6. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
  7. Repeat steps 1-6 for every NodeManager role group for the YARN service that is associated with Hive.
  8. Restart the YARN service.

- Block the external applications from accessing the Hive metastore:
  1. In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, select the Hive service.
  2. On the Hive service page, click the Configuration tab.
  3. In the search well on the right half of the Configuration page, search for Hive Metastore Access Control and Proxy User Groups Override to locate the hadoop.proxyuser.hive.groups parameter and click the plus sign.
  4. Enter hive into the text box and click the plus sign again.
  5. Enter hue into the text box.
  6. Click Save Changes.

Setting this parameter blocks access to the Hive metastore for non-service users. This effectively disables Hive CLI, Spark, and Sqoop applications from interacting with the Hive service. These application will still run, but after setting this parameter as described here, they will no longer be able to access the Hive metastore and all Hive queries will fail. Users running these tools must be part of the hive or hue groups to access the Hive service. To allow greater access, additional user groups must be added to the proxy list.

**Important:** Ensure you have unchecked the Enable Sentry Authorization using Policy Files configuration property for both Hive and Impala under the Policy File Based Sentry category before you proceed.

### Enabling the Sentry Service for Hive

1. Go to the Hive service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Hive (Service-Wide).
4. Select Category > Main.
5. Locate the Sentry Service property and select Sentry.
6. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
7. Restart the Hive service.

Enabling Sentry on Hive service places several HiveServer2 properties on a restricted list properties that cannot be modified at runtime by clients. See HiveServer2 Restricted Properties on page 380.

Enabling the Sentry Service for Impala

1. Enable the Sentry service for Hive (as instructed above).
2. Go to the Impala service.
3. Click the Configuration tab.
4. Select Scope > Impala (Service-Wide).
5. Select Category > Main.
6. Locate the Sentry Service property and select Sentry.
7. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
8. Restart Impala.

Enabling the Sentry Service for Solr

Enable the Sentry service as follows:

1. Go to the Solr service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Solr (Service-Wide).
4. Select Category > Main.
5. Locate the Sentry Service property and select Sentry.
6. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
7. Restart Solr.

After enabling Sentry for Solr, you may want to configure authorization as described in Configuring Sentry Authorization for Cloudera Search on page 427.

Enabling the Sentry Service for Hue

Hue uses a Security app to make it easier to interact with Sentry. When you set up Hue to manage Sentry permissions, make sure that users and groups are set up correctly. Every Hue user connecting to Sentry must have an equivalent OS-level user account on all hosts so that Sentry can authenticate Hue users. Each OS-level user should also be part of an OS-level group with the same name as the corresponding user’s group in Hue.

For more information on using the Security app, see the related blog post.

Enable the Sentry service as follows:

1. Enable the Sentry service for Hive and Impala (as instructed above).
2. Go to the Hue service.
3. Click the Configuration tab.
4. Select Scope > Hue (Service-Wide).
5. Select Category > Main.
6. Locate the Sentry Service property and select Sentry.
7. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
8. Restart Hue.

Add the Hive, Spark, and Hue Groups to Sentry’s Admin Groups

Add the user groups that need administrative privileges on the Sentry Server.
1. Go to the Sentry service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Sentry (Service-Wide).
4. Select Category > Main.
5. Locate the Admin Groups property and add the hive, spark, and hue groups to the list. If an end user is in one of these admin groups, that user has administrative privileges on the Sentry Server.
6. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.

Enabling the Sentry Service Using the Command Line

**Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See Cloudera Documentation for information specific to other releases.

**Before Enabling the Sentry Service**

- Setting Hive Warehouse Directory Permissions

**Important:** If you are going to enable HDFS/Sentry synchronization, you do not need to perform the following step to explicitly set permissions for the Hive warehouse directory. With synchronization enabled, all Hive databases and tables will automatically be owned by hive:hive, and Sentry permissions on tables are translated to HDFS ACLs for the underlying table files.

The Hive warehouse directory (/user/hive/warehouse or any path you specify as hive.metastore.warehouse.dir in your hive-site.xml) must be owned by the Hive user and group.

- **Using the default Hive warehouse directory** - Permissions on the warehouse directory must be set as follows (see following Note for caveats):
  - 771 on the directory itself (by default, /user/hive/warehouse)
  - 771 on all subdirectories (for example, /user/hive/warehouse/mysubdir)
  - All files and subdirectories should be owned by hive:hive

For example:

```
$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chmod -R 771 /user/hive/warehouse
$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chown -R hive:hive /user/hive/warehouse
```

If you have enabled Kerberos on your cluster, you must kinit as the hdfs user before you set permissions. For example:

```
sudo -u hdfs kinit -kt <hdfs.keytab> hdfs
sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chmod -R 771 /user/hive/warehouse
$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chown -R hive:hive /user/hive/warehouse
```

- **Using a non-default Hive warehouse:** If you would like to use a different directory as the Hive warehouse, update the hive.metastore.warehouse.dir property, and make sure you set the required permissions on the new directory. For example, if the new warehouse directory is /data, set the permissions as follows:

```
$ hdfs dfs -chown hive:hive /data
$ hdfs dfs -chmod 771 /data
```

Note that when you update the default Hive warehouse, previously created tables will not be moved over automatically. Therefore, tables created before the update will remain at /user/hive/warehouse/<old_table>. However, after the update, any new tables created in the default location will be found at /data/<new_table>.
For Sentry/HDFS sync to work as expected, add the new warehouse URL to the list of Sentry Synchronization Path Prefixes.

**Note:**
- If you set `hive.warehouse.subdir.inherit.perms` to `true` in `hive-site.xml`, the permissions on the subdirectories will be set when you set permissions on the warehouse directory.
- If a user has access to any object in the warehouse, that user will be able to execute `use default`. This ensures that `use default` commands issued by legacy applications work when Sentry is enabled.
- The instructions described above for modifying permissions on the Hive warehouse directory override the recommendations in the Hive section of the CDH 5 Installation Guide.

- HiveServer2 impersonation must be turned off. Impersonation in HiveServer2 allows users to execute queries and access HDFS files as the connected user rather than the super user who started the HiveServer2 daemon. This enforces an access control policy at the file level using HDFS file permissions or ACLs. Keeping impersonation enabled means Sentry does not have end-to-end control over the authorization process. While Sentry can enforce access control policies on tables and views in the Hive warehouse, it has no control over permissions on the underlying table files in HDFS. Hence, even if users do not have the Sentry privileges required to access a table in the warehouse, as long as they have permission to access the corresponding table file in HDFS, any jobs or queries submitted will bypass Sentry authorization checks and execute successfully.
- If you are using MapReduce, you must enable the Hive user to submit MapReduce jobs. You can ensure that this is true by setting the minimum user ID for job submission to 0. Edit the `taskcontroller.cfg` file and set `min.user.id=0`.

  If you are using YARN, you must enable the Hive user to submit YARN jobs, add the user `hive` to the `allowed.system.users` configuration property. Edit the `container-executor.cfg` file and add `hive` to the `allowed.system.users` property. For example,

```
allowed.system.users = nobody,impala,hive,hbase
```

**Important:** You must restart the cluster and HiveServer2 after changing these values.

- Block the Hive CLI user from accessing the Hive metastore by setting the following property in the cluster's `core-site.xml` file:

```
<property>
  <name>hadoop.proxyuser.hive.groups</name>
  <value>hive,hue</value>
  <description>Sets groups from which the hive user can impersonate other users.</description>
</property>
```

Setting this parameter blocks access to the Hive metastore for the user running the Hive CLI if they are not part of the `hive` or the `hue` groups. The Hive CLI can still run, but after setting this parameter as described here, the `hive` user can impersonate only members of the `hive` or the `hue` groups. If you are using Sqoop, the Sqoop user must also have access to the Hive metastore.
• Add the hive, impala and hue groups to Sentry’s sentry.service.admin.group in the sentry-site.xml file. If an end user is in one of these admin groups, that user has administrative privileges on the Sentry Server.

```xml
<property>
  <name>sentry.service.admin.group</name>
  <value>hive,impala,hue</value>
</property>
```

**Configuring the Sentry Server**

Configure the following properties in sentry-site.xml on the Sentry Server host.

```xml
<property>
  <name>sentry.verify.schema.version</name>
  <value></value>
  <description>
  value: true, false
  true Sentry store will verify the schema version in backed DB with expected version in jar.
  The service won't start if there's a mismatch
  </description>
</property>
```

```xml
<property>
  <name>sentry.service.server-max-threads</name>
  <value></value>
  <description> Number of threads 500 Max worker threads to serve client requests</description>
</property>
```

```xml
<property>
  <name>sentry.service.server-min-threads</name>
  <value></value>
  <description>Number of threads 10 Min worker threads to serve client requests</description>
</property>
```

```xml
<property>
  <name>sentry.service.server-keytab</name>
  <value></value>
  <description>Keytab for service principal</description>
</property>
```

```xml
<property>
  <name>sentry.service.server-rpcport</name>
  <value>8038</value>
  <description> TCP port number for service</description>
</property>
```
Configuring Authorization

Configuring HiveServer2 for the Sentry Service

Configure the following properties in `sentry-site.xml` on the HiveServer2 host.
Add the following properties to `hive-site.xml` to allow the Hive service to communicate with the Sentry service.

```xml
<property>
  <name>hive.security.authorization.task.factory</name>
  <value>org.apache.sentry.binding.hive.SentryHiveAuthorizationTaskFactoryImpl</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.session.hook</name>
  <value>org.apache.sentry.binding.hive.HiveAuthzBindingSessionHook</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hive.sentry.conf.url</name>
  <value>file:///{{PATH/TO/DIR}}/sentry-site.xml</value>
</property>
```

Enabling Sentry on Hive service places several HiveServer2 properties on a restricted list properties that cannot be modified at runtime by clients. See [HiveServer2 Restricted Properties](#) on page 380.

### Configuring the Hive Metastore for the Sentry Service

Add the following properties to `hive-site.xml` to allow the Hive metastore to communicate with the Sentry service.

```xml
<property>
  <name>hive.metastore.filter.hook</name>
  <value>org.apache.sentry.binding.metastore.SentryMetaStoreFilterHook</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hive.metastore.pre.event.listeners</name>
  <value>org.apache.sentry.binding.metastore.MetastoreAuthzBinding</value>
  <description>list of comma separated listeners for metastore events.</description>
</property>
<property>
  <name>hive.metastore.event.listeners</name>
  <value>org.apache.sentry.binding.metastore.SentryMetastorePostEventListener</value>
  <description>list of comma separated listeners for metastore, post events.</description>
</property>
```

### Configuring Impala as a Client for the Sentry Service

Set the following configuration properties in `../impala-conf/sentry-site.xml` on the Catalog Server.

```xml
<property>
  <name>sentry.service.client.server.rpc-address</name>
  <value>example.cloudera.com</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>sentry.service.client.server.rpc-port</name>
  <value>8038</value>
</property>
<property>
  <name>sentry.service.client.server.rpc-address</name>
  <value>hostname</value>
</property>
```
You must also add the following configuration properties to Impala's /etc/default/impala file. For more information, see Configuring Impala Startup Options through the Command Line.

- On the catalogd and the impalad.
  ```
  --sentry_config=<absolute path to sentry service configuration file>
  ```

- On the impalad.
  ```
  --server_name=<server name>
  ```

If the `--authorization_policy_file` flag is set, Impala will use the policy file-based approach. Otherwise, the database-backed approach will be used to implement authorization.

Enabling Solr as a Client for the Sentry Service Using the Command Line

You can enable Sentry using Cloudera Manager or by manually modifying files. For more information on enabling Sentry using Cloudera Manager, see Configuring Sentry Policy File Authorization Using Cloudera Manager on page 408 and Enabling Sentry Policy File Authorization for Solr on page 412.

Sentry is enabled with addition of two properties to /etc/default/solr or /opt/cloudera/parcels/CDH-*/etc/default/solr.

- In a Cloudera Manager deployment, required properties are added automatically when you click Enable Sentry Authorization in the Solr configuration page in Cloudera Manager.
- If you are using configs, you must configure the proper `config=myConfig` permissions as described in Using Roles and Privileges with Sentry on page 427.
- In a deployment not managed by Cloudera Manager, you must make these changes yourself. The variable `SOLR_AUTHORIZATION_SENTRY_SITE` specifies the path to `sentry-site.xml`. The variable `SOLR_AUTHORIZATION_SUPERUSER` specifies the first part of `SOLR_KERBEROS_PRINCIPAL`. This is `solr` for the majority of users, as `solr` is the default. Settings are of the form:

```
SOLR_AUTHORIZATION_SENTRY_SITE=/location/to/sentry-site.xml
SOLR_AUTHORIZATION_SUPERUSER=solr
```

To enable Sentry collection-level authorization checking on a new collection, the instancedir for the collection must use a modified version of `solrconfig.xml` with Sentry integration. Each collection has a separate `solrconfig.xml` file, meaning you can define different behavior for each collection. The command `solrctl instancedir --generate` generates two versions of `solrconfig.xml`: the standard `solrconfig.xml` without Sentry configuration and the Sentry-integrated version named `solrconfig.xml.secure`. To use the Sentry-integrated version, overwrite `solrconfig.xml` with `solrconfig.xml.secure` before creating the instancedir.

To enforce Sentry authorization, you must also modify `solrconfig.xml` as follows (after overwriting it with `solrconfig.xml.secure`):

Change this line:

```
<updateRequestProcessorChain name="updateIndexAuthorization">
```

To this:

```
<updateRequestProcessorChain name="updateIndexAuthorization" default="true">
```
You can enable Sentry on an existing collection. The process varies depending on whether you are using a config or instancedir.

### Enabling Sentry on Collections using configs

If you have a collection that is using a non-secured config, you can enable Sentry security on that collection by modifying the collection to use a secure config. The config in use must not be immutable, otherwise it cannot be changed. To update an existing non-immutable config:

1. **Delete the existing config using the `solrctl config --delete` command.** For example:
   ```bash
   solrctl config --delete myManaged
   ```

2. **Create a new non-immutable config using the `solrctl config --create` command.** Use a sentry-enabled template such as `managedTemplateSecure`. The new config must have the same name as the config being replaced. For example:
   ```bash
   solrctl config --create myManaged managedTemplateSecure -p immutable=false
   ```

3. **Reload the collection using the `solrctl collection --reload` command.**
   ```bash
   solrctl collection --reload myCollection
   ```

For a list of all available config templates, see [Included Immutable Config Templates](#).

### Enabling Sentry on Collections using instancedirs

If you have a collection that is using a non-secured instancedir configuration, you can enable Sentry security on that collection by modifying the settings that are stored in `instancedir`. For example, you might have an existing collection named `foo` and a standard `solrconfig.xml`. By default, collections are stored in instancedirs that use the collection's name, which is `foo` in this case.

If your collection uses an unmodified `solrconfig.xml` file, you can enable Sentry by replacing the existing `solrconfig.xml` file. If your collection uses a `solrconfig.xml` that contains modifications you want to preserve, you can attempt to use a diff tool to find and integrate changes in to the secure template.

#### To enable Sentry on an existing collection without preserving customizations

**Warning:** Running the following commands replaces your existing `solrconfig.xml` file. Any customizations to this file will be lost.

1. **Generate a new instancedir:**
   ```bash
   solrctl instancedir --generate foosecure
   ```

2. **Download the existing instancedir from ZooKeeper into subdirectory `foo`:**
   ```bash
   solrctl instancedir --get foo foo
   ```

3. **Replace the existing `solrconfig.xml` with the Sentry-enabled one:**
   ```bash
   cp foosecure/conf/solrconfig.xml.secure foo/conf/solrconfig.xml
   ```

4. **Edit `solrconfig.xml` as follows:**
   ```xml
   Change this line:
   </updateRequestProcessorChain name="updateIndexAuthorization">
   ```
5. Update the instancedir in ZooKeeper:

    solrctl instancedir --update foo foo

6. Reload the collection:

    solrctl collection --reload foo

**To enable Sentry on an existing collection and preserve customizations**

Generate a new instancedir, compare the differences between the default `solrconfig.xml` and `solrconfig.xml.secure` files, and then add the elements that are unique to `solrconfig.xml.secure` to the file that your environment is using.

1. Generate a new instancedir:

    solrctl instancedir --generate foo

2. Compare the `solrconfig.xml` and `solrconfig.xml.secure`:

    diff foo/conf/solrconfig.xml foo/conf/solrconfig.xml.secure

3. Add the elements that are unique to `solrconfig.xml.secure` to your existing `solrconfig.xml` file. You might complete this process by manually editing your existing `solrconfig.xml` file or by using a merge tool.

   **Note:** If you have modified or specified additional request handlers, consider that Sentry:

   - Supports protecting additional query request handlers by adding a search component, which should be shown in the diff.
   - Supports protecting additional update request handlers with Sentry by adding an `updateRequestProcessorChain`, which should be shown in the diff.
   - Does not support protecting modified or specified additional "special" request handlers like analysis handlers or admin handlers.

4. Edit `solrconfig.xml` as follows:

    Change this line:

    `<updateRequestProcessorChain name="updateIndexAuthorization">`

    to this:

    `<updateRequestProcessorChain name="updateIndexAuthorization" default="true">`

5. Reload the collection:

    solrctl collection --reload foo

After enabling Sentry for Solr, you may want to configure authorization as described in *Configuring Sentry Authorization for Cloudera Search* on page 427.
HiveServer2 Restricted Properties

Enabling Sentry on Hive service places several HiveServer2 properties on a restricted list properties that cannot be modified at runtime by clients. This list is denoted by the `hive.conf.restricted.list` property and these properties are only configurable on the server side. The list includes:

- hive.enable.spark.execution.engine
- hive.semantic.analyzer.hook
- hive.exec.pre.hooks
- hive.exec.scratchdir
- hive.exec.local.scratchdir
- hive.metastore.uris
- javax.jdo.option.ConnectionURL
- hadoop.bin.path
- hive.session.id
- hive.aux.jars.path
- hive.stats.dbconnectionstring
- hive.scratch.dir.permission
- hive.security.authorization.task.factory
- hive.entity.capture.transform
- hive.access.conf.url
- hive.sentry.conf.url
- hive.access.subject.name
- hive.sentry.subject.name
- hive.sentry.active.role.set

Configuring Pig and HCatalog for the Sentry Service

Once you have the Sentry service up and running, and Hive has been configured to use the Sentry service, there are some configuration changes you must make to your cluster to allow Pig, MapReduce (using HCatLoader, HCatStorer) and WebHCat queries to access Sentry-secured data stored in Hive.

Since the Hive warehouse directory is owned by `hive:hive`, with its permissions set to 771, with these settings, other user requests such as commands coming through Pig jobs, WebHCat queries, and MapReduce jobs, may fail. To give these users access, perform the following configuration changes:

- Use HDFS ACLs to define permissions on a specific directory or file of HDFS. This directory/file is generally mapped to a database, table, partition, or a data file.
- Users running these jobs should have the required permissions in Sentry to add new metadata or read metadata from the Hive Metastore Server. For instructions on how to set up the required permissions, see Hive SQL Syntax for Use with Sentry on page 382. You can use HiveServer2’s command line interface, Beeline to update the Sentry database with the user privileges.

Examples:

- A user who is using Pig HCatLoader will require read permissions on a specific table or partition. In such a case, you can `GRANT read access to the user in Sentry and set the ACL to read and run, on the file being accessed`.
- A user who is using Pig HCatStorer will require ALL permissions on a specific table. In this case, you `GRANT ALL access to the user in Sentry and set the ACL to write and run on the table being used`.

Securing the Hive Metastore

It’s important that the Hive metastore be secured. If you want to override the Kerberos prerequisite for the Hive metastore, set the `sentry.hive.testing.mode` property to `true` to allow Sentry to work with weaker authentication mechanisms. Add the following property to the HiveServer2 and Hive metastore's `sentry-site.xml`:

```xml
<property>
  <name>sentry.hive.testing.mode</name>
  <value>true</value>
</property>
```

Impala does not require this flag to be set.
You can also set the property in Cloudera Manager. Go to the Hive service and open the Configuration tab. Search for the Hive Service Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for sentry-site.xml. Click the plus sign (+) to add a new property with the following values:

- **Name**: sentry.hive.testing.mode
- **Value**: true

You can turn on Hive metastore security using the instructions in Cloudera Security. To secure the Hive metastore; see Hive Metastore Server Security Configuration on page 132.

Using User-Defined Functions with HiveServer2

The `ADD JAR` command does not work with HiveServer2 and the Beeline client when Beeline runs on a different host. As an alternative to `ADD JAR`, Hive's `auxiliary paths` functionality should be used. There are some differences in the procedures for creating permanent functions and temporary functions when Sentry is enabled. For detailed instructions, see:

- Using Cloudera Manager to Create User-Defined Functions (UDFs) with HiveServer2
  OR
- Using the Command Line to Create User-Defined Functions (UDFs) with HiveServer2

Sentry Debugging and Failure Scenarios

This topic explains how Sentry deals with policy conflicts and how different CDH components respond when the Sentry service fails. It also shows you how to debug Sentry authorization request failures. Always first review the CDH Release Notes and the list of Known Issues for Sentry when you have issues.

Resolving Policy Conflicts

Sentry treats all policies independently. That means that for any operation, if Sentry finds an policy that allows it, that operation will be allowed. Consider an example with a table, `test_db.test_tbl`, whose HDFS directory is located at `hdfs://user/hive/warehouse/test_db.db/test_tbl`, and grant the following conflicting privileges to a user with the role, `test_role`. That is, you are granting ALL privilege to the role `test_role` on the URI, but only the SELECT privilege on the table itself.

```
GRANT ALL ON URI 'hdfs:///user/hive/warehouse/test_db.db/test_tbl' to role test_role;
USE test_db;
GRANT SELECT ON TABLE test_tbl to role test_role;
```

With these privileges, all users with the role `test_role` will be able to carry out the `EXPORT TABLE` operation even though they should only have SELECT privileges on `test_db.test_tbl`:

```
EXPORT TABLE <another-table-user-can-read> TO 'hdfs:///user/hive/warehouse/test_db.db/test_tbl'
```

Debugging Failed Sentry Authorization Requests

To figure out why Sentry has denied access in a specific instance, you can temporarily enable Sentry's debug level logging:

- In Cloudera Manager, add `log4j.logger.org.apache.sentry=DEBUG` to the logging settings for your service through the corresponding Logging Safety Valve field for Impala or HiveServer2.
- On systems not managed by Cloudera Manager, add `log4j.logger.org.apache.sentry=DEBUG` to the `log4j.properties` file on each host in the cluster, in the appropriate configuration directory for each service.
In the logs, look for exceptions and messages such as:

FilePermission server..., RequestPermission server..., result [true|false]

which indicate each evaluation Sentry makes. The FilePermission is from the policy file, while RequestPermission is the privilege required for the query. A RequestPermission will iterate over all appropriate FilePermission settings until a match is found. If no matching privilege is found, Sentry returns false indicating “Access Denied”.

Symptoms of Sentry Service Failure

If the Sentry service fails and you attempt to access the Hive warehouse, Hive, Impala and HDFS will behave as follows:

- **Hive**: Queries to the Hive warehouse fail with an authentication error.
- **Impala**: The Impala Catalog server caches Sentry privileges, so if Sentry goes down, Impala queries continue to work because they are authorized against this cached copy of the metadata. However, authorization DDLs such as CREATE ROLE or GRANT ROLE will fail.
- **HDFS/Sentry Synchronized Permissions**: Affected HDFS files will continue to use a cached copy of the synchronized ACLs for a configurable period of time, after which they will fall back to the Hive System User and the Hive System Group (for example, hive:hive). The timeout value can be modified by adding the `sentry.authorization-provider.cache-stale-threshold.ms` parameter to the `hdfs-site.xml` Safety Valve in Cloudera Manager. The default timeout value is 60 seconds, but you can increase this value from several minutes to a few hours, as needed to accommodate large clusters.

Hive SQL Syntax for Use with Sentry

Sentry permissions can be configured through GRANT and REVOKE statements issued either interactively or programmatically through the HiveServer2 SQL command line interface, Beeline (documentation available here). The syntax described below is very similar to the GRANT and REVOKE commands that are available in well-established relational database systems.

In HUE, the Sentry Admin that creates roles and grants privileges must belong to a group that has ALL privileges on the server. For example, you can create a role for the group that contains the hive or impala user, and grant ALL ON SERVER .. WITH GRANT OPTION to that role:

```
CREATE ROLE <admin role>;
GRANT ALL ON SERVER <server1> TO ROLE <admin role> WITH GRANT OPTION;
GRANT ROLE <admin role> TO GROUP <hive>;
```

Important:

- When Sentry is enabled, you must use Beeline to execute Hive queries. Hive CLI is not supported with Sentry and must be disabled. See Disabling Hive CLI for information on how to disable the Hive CLI.
- There are some differences in syntax between Hive and the corresponding Impala SQL statements. For Impala syntax, see SQL Statements.
- No privilege is required to drop a function. Any user can drop a function.

Sentry supports column-level authorization with the SELECT privilege. Information about column-level authorization is in the Column-level Authorization on page 382 section of this page.

See the sections below for details about the supported statements and privileges:

Column-level Authorization

Sentry allows you to assign the SELECT privilege on a subset of columns in a table.

The following command grants a role the SELECT privilege on a column:

```
GRANT SELECT <column name> ON TABLE <table name> TO ROLE <role name>;
```
The following command can be used to revoke the SELECT privilege on a column:

```
REVOKE SELECT <column name> ON TABLE <table name> FROM ROLE <role name>;
```

Any new columns added to a table will be inaccessible by default, until explicitly granted access.

**Actions allowed for users with SELECT privilege on a column:**

Users whose roles have been granted the SELECT privilege on columns only, can perform operations which explicitly refer to those columns. Some examples are:

```
SELECT <column name> FROM TABLE <table name>;
```

In this case, Sentry will first check to see if the user has the required privileges to access the table. It will then further check to see whether the user has the SELECT privilege to access the column(s).

```
SELECT COUNT <column name> FROM TABLE <table name>;
```

Users are also allowed to use the COUNT function to return the number of values in the column.

```
SELECT <column name> FROM TABLE <table name> WHERE <column name> <operator> GROUP BY <column name>;
```

The above command will work as long as you refer only to columns to which you already have access.

- To list the column(s) to which the current user has SELECT access:

```
SHOW COLUMNS (FROM IN) <table name> [(FROM IN) <database name>];
```

**Exceptions:**

- If a user has SELECT access to all columns in a table, the following command will work. Note that this is an exception, not the norm. In all other cases, SELECT on all columns does not allow you to perform table-level operations.

```
SELECT * FROM TABLE <table name>;
```

**Limitations:**

- Column-level privileges can only be applied to tables, not partitions or views.
- **HDFS-Sentry Sync:** With HDFS-Sentry sync enabled, even if a user has been granted access to all columns of a table, they will not have access to the corresponding HDFS data files. This is because Sentry does not consider SELECT on all columns equivalent to explicitly being granted SELECT on the table.
- Column-level access control for access from Spark SQL is not supported by the HDFS-Sentry plug-in.

**CREATE ROLE Statement**

The `CREATE ROLE` statement creates a role to which privileges can be granted. Privileges can be granted to roles, which can then be assigned to users. A user that has been assigned a role will only be able to exercise the privileges of that role.

Only users that have administrative privileges can create or drop roles. By default, the `hive, impala` and `hue` users have admin privileges in Sentry.

```
CREATE ROLE <role name>;
```

Note that role names are case-insensitive.

**DROP ROLE Statement**

The `DROP ROLE` statement can be used to remove a role from the database. Once dropped, the role will be revoked for all users to whom it was previously assigned. Queries that are already executing will not be affected. However,
since Hive checks user privileges before executing each query, active user sessions in which the role has already been enabled will be affected.

```sql
DROP ROLE <role name>;
```

**GRANT ROLE Statement**

The `GRANT ROLE` statement can be used to grant roles to groups. Only Sentry admin users can grant roles to a group.

```
GRANT ROLE <role name> [, <role name>] TO GROUP <group name> [,GROUP <group name>]
```

Sentry only allows you to grant roles to groups that have alphanumeric characters and underscores (_) in the group name. If the group name contains a non-alphanumeric character that is not an underscore, you can put the group name in backticks (`) to execute the command. For example, Sentry will return an error for the following command:

```
GRANT ROLE test TO GROUP test-group;
```

To grant a role to this group, put the group name in backticks:

```
GRANT ROLE test TO GROUP `test-group`;
```

The following command, which contains an underscore, is also acceptable:

```
GRANT ROLE test TO GROUP test_group;
```

Operating system group names must be in lowercase letters. Although group names are case-insensitive to Sentry, Sentry modifies capital letters within group names to be lowercase. For example, Sentry will change TestGroup to testgroup. It is not possible to disable this normalization. Therefore, group information within the environment must be in lowercase letters.

**REVOKE ROLE Statement**

The `REVOKE ROLE` statement can be used to revoke roles from groups. Only Sentry admin users can revoke the role from a group.

```
REVOKE ROLE <role name> [, <role name>] FROM GROUP <group name> [,GROUP <group name>]
```

**GRANT <Privilege> Statement**

Use the `GRANT <Privilege>` statement to grant privileges on an object to a role. The statement uses the following syntax:

```
GRANT <privilege> [, <privilege>] ON <object type> <object name> TO ROLE <role name> [,ROLE <role name>]
```

You can grant the `SELECT` privilege on specific columns of a table. For example:

```
GRANT SELECT <column name> ON TABLE <table name> TO ROLE <role name>;
```

**GRANT <Privilege> ON URIs (HDFS and S3A)**

If the `GRANT` for Sentry URI does not specify the complete scheme, or the URI mentioned in Hive DDL statements does not have a scheme, Sentry automatically completes the URI by applying the default scheme based on the HDFS configuration provided in the `fs.defaultFS` property. Using the same HDFS configuration, Sentry can also auto-complete URIs in case the URI is missing a scheme and an authority component.

When a user attempts to access a URI, Sentry will check to see if the user has the required privileges. During the authorization check, if the URI is incomplete, Sentry will complete the URI using the default HDFS scheme. Note that
Sentry does not check URI schemes for completion when they are being used to grant privileges. This is because users can GRANT privileges on URIs that do not have a complete scheme or do not already exist on the filesystem.

For example, in CDH 5.8 and later, the following CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE statement works even though the statement does not include the URI scheme.

```
GRANT ALL ON URI 'hdfs://namenode:XXX/path/to/table' TO ROLE <role name>;
CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE foo LOCATION 'namenode:XXX/path/to/table' TO ROLE <role name>;
```

Similarly, the following CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE statement works even though it is missing scheme and authority components.

```
GRANT ALL ON URI 'hdfs://namenode:XXX/path/to/table' TO ROLE <role name>;
CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE foo LOCATION '/path/to/table'
```

Since Sentry supports both HDFS and Amazon S3, in CDH 5.8 and later, Cloudera recommends that you specify the fully qualified URI in GRANT statements to avoid confusion. If the underlying storage is a mix of S3 and HDFS, the risk of granting the wrong privileges increases. The following are examples of fully qualified URIs:

- **HDFS**: `hdfs://host:port/path/to/hdfs/table`
- **S3**: `s3a://host:port/path/to/s3/table`

### REVOKE <Privilege> Statement

You can use the REVOKE <Privilege> statement to revoke previously-granted privileges that a role has on an object.

```
REVOKE <privilege> [, <privilege> ]
ON <object type> <object name>
FROM ROLE <role name> [,ROLE <role name>]
```

For example, you can revoke previously-granted SELECT privileges on specific columns of a table with the following statement:

```
REVOKE SELECT <column name> ON TABLE <table name> FROM ROLE <role name>;
```

### GRANT <Privilege> ... WITH GRANT OPTION

You can delegate granting and revoking privileges to other roles. For example, a role that is granted a privilege WITH GRANT OPTION can GRANT/REVOKE the same privilege to/from other roles. Hence, if a role has the ALL privilege on a database and the WITH GRANT OPTION set, users granted that role can execute GRANT/REVOKE statements only for that database or child tables of the database.

```
GRANT <privilege>
ON <object type> <object name>
TO ROLE <role name>
WITH GRANT OPTION
```

Only a role with GRANT option on a specific privilege or its parent privilege can revoke that privilege from other roles. Once the following statement is executed, all privileges with and without grant option are revoked.

```
REVOKE <privilege>
ON <object type> <object name>
FROM ROLE <role name>
```

Hive does not currently support revoking only the WITH GRANT OPTION from a privilege previously granted to a role. To remove the WITH GRANT OPTION, revoke the privilege and grant it again without the WITH GRANT OPTION flag.
SET ROLE Statement

Sentry enforces restrictions on queries based on the roles and privileges that the user has. A user can have multiple roles and a role can have multiple privileges.

The `SET ROLE` command enforces restrictions at the role level, not at the user level. When you use the `SET ROLE` command to make a role active, the role becomes current for the session. If a role is not current for the session, it is inactive and the user does not have the privileges assigned to that role. A user can only use the `SET ROLE` command for roles that have been granted to the user.

To list the roles that are current for the user, use the `SHOW CURRENT ROLES` command. By default, all roles that are assigned to the user are current.

You can use the following `SET ROLE` commands:

**SET ROLE NONE**

Makes all roles for the user inactive. When no role is current, the user does not have any privileges and cannot execute a query.

**SET ROLE ALL**

Makes all roles that have been granted to the user active. All privileges assigned to those roles are applied. When the user executes a query, the query is filtered based on those privileges.

**SET ROLE role name**

Makes a single role active. The privileges assigned to that role are applied. When the user executes a query, the query is filtered based on the privileges assigned to that role.

SHOW Statement

- To list the database(s) for which the current user has database, table, or column-level access:
  ```sql
  SHOW DATABASES;
  ```

- To list the table(s) for which the current user has table or column-level access:
  ```sql
  SHOW TABLES;
  ```

- To list the column(s) to which the current user has `SELECT` access:
  ```sql
  SHOW COLUMNS (FROM|IN) <table name> [(FROM|IN) <database name>];
  ```

- To list all the roles in the system (only for Sentry admin users):
  ```sql
  SHOW ROLES;
  ```

- To list all the roles in effect for the current user session:
  ```sql
  SHOW CURRENT ROLES;
  ```

- To list all the roles assigned to the given `group name` (only allowed for Sentry admin users and others users that are part of the group specified by `group name`):
  ```sql
  SHOW ROLE GRANT GROUP group name;
  ```

- The `SHOW` statement can also be used to list the privileges that have been granted to a role or all the grants given to a role for a particular object.

To list all the grants for the given `<role name>` (only allowed for Sentry admin users and other users that have been granted the role specified by `<role name>`). The following command will also list any column-level privileges:

```sql
SHOW GRANT ROLE <role name>;
```
• To list all the grants for a role on the given `<object name>` (only allowed for Sentry admin users and other users that have been granted the role specified by `<role name>`). The following command will also list any column-level privileges:

```
SHOW GRANT ROLE <role name> on <object type> <object name>;
```

Example: Using Grant/Revoke Statements to Match an Existing Policy File

**Note:** In the following example(s), `server1` refers to an alias Sentry uses for the associated Hive service. It does not refer to any physical server. This alias can be modified using the `hive.sentry.server` property in `hive-site.xml`. If you are using Cloudera Manager, modify the Hive property, **Server Name for Sentry Authorization**, in the **Service-Wide > Advanced** category.

Here is a sample policy file:

```
[generic]
# Assigns each Hadoop group to its set of roles
manager = analyst_role, junior_analyst_role
analyst = analyst_role
jranalyst = junior_analyst_role
customers_admin = customers_admin_role
admin = admin_role

[roles] # The UIRs below define a landing skid which
# the user can use to import or export data from the system.
# Since the server runs as the user "hive" files in that directory
# must either have the group hive and read/write set or
# be world read/write.
analyst_role = server=server1->db=analyst1, server=server1->db=jranalyst1->table=*
junior_analyst_role = server=server1->db=jranalyst1
admin_role = server=server1

# Implies everything on server1.

The following sections show how you can use the new `GRANT` statements to assign privileges to roles (and assign roles to groups) to match the sample policy file above.

**Grant privileges to analyst_role:**

```
CREATE ROLE analyst_role;
GRANT ALL ON DATABASE analyst1 TO ROLE analyst_role;
GRANT SELECT ON DATABASE jranalyst1 TO ROLE analyst_role;
GRANT ALL ON URI 'hdfs://ha-nn-uri/landing/analyst1' TO ROLE analyst_role;
```

**Grant privileges to junior_analyst_role:**

```
CREATE ROLE junior_analyst_role;
GRANT ALL ON DATABASE jranalyst1 TO ROLE junior_analyst_role;
GRANT ALL ON URI 'hdfs://ha-nn-uri/landing/jranalyst1' TO ROLE junior_analyst_role;
```

**Grant privileges to admin_role:**

```
CREATE ROLE admin_role;
GRANT ALL ON SERVER server1 TO ROLE admin_role;
```
Grant roles to groups:

```
GRANT ROLE admin_role TO GROUP admin;
GRANT ROLE analyst_role TO GROUP analyst;
GRANT ROLE jranalyst_role TO GROUP jranalyst;
```

Synchronizing HDFS ACLs and Sentry Permissions

The HDFS-Sentry plugin allows you to configure synchronization of Sentry privileges with HDFS ACLs for specific HDFS directories.

Introduction

The integration of Sentry and HDFS permissions automatically keeps HDFS ACLs in sync with the privileges configured with Sentry. This feature offers the easiest way to share data between Hive, Impala and other components such as MapReduce, Spark, and Pig, while setting permissions for that data with just one set of rules through Sentry. It maintains the ability of Hive and Impala to set permissions on views, in addition to tables, while access to data outside of Hive and Impala (for example, reading files off HDFS) requires table permissions. HDFS permissions for some or all of the files that are part of tables defined in the Hive Metastore will now be controlled by Sentry.

This consists of three components:

- An HDFS NameNode plugin
- A Sentry-Hive Metastore plugin
- A Sentry Service plugin

With synchronization enabled, Sentry will translate permissions on databases and tables to the appropriate corresponding HDFS ACL on the underlying files in HDFS. For example, if a user group is assigned to a Sentry role that has SELECT permissions on a particular table, that user group will also have read access to the HDFS files that are part of that table. When you list those files in HDFS, this permission will be listed as an HDFS ACL. Or if a user group is assigned to a Sentry role that has SELECT permissions on a database, that user group will also have read access to the HDFS files that are part of that database. When you list those files in HDFS, those permissions will also be listed as an HDFS ACL.

Note that when Sentry was enabled, the hive user/group was given ownership of all files/directories in the Hive warehouse (/user/hive/warehouse). Hence, the resulting synchronized Sentry permissions will reflect this fact. If you skipped that step, Sentry permissions will be based on the existing Hive warehouse ACLs. Sentry will not automatically grant ownership to the hive user.

The mapping of Sentry privileges to HDFS ACLs is as follows:

- SELECT privilege -> Read access on the file.
- INSERT privilege -> Write access on the file.
- ALL privilege -> Read and Write access on the file.

Note that you must explicitly specify the path prefix to the Hive warehouse (default: /user/hive/warehouse) and any other directories that must be managed by Sentry. This procedure is described in the Enabling the HDFS-Sentry Plugin Using Cloudera Manager on page 390 section below.
Important:

- With synchronization enabled, your ability to set HDFS permissions for those files is disabled. Permissions for those particular files can be set only through Sentry, and when examined through HDFS these permissions appear as HDFS ACLs. A configurable set of users, such as hive and impala, will have full access to the files automatically. This ensures that a key requirement of using Sentry with Hive and Impala — giving these processes full access to regulate permissions on underlying data files — is met automatically.

- Tables and databases that are not associated with Sentry, that is, have no user with Sentry privileges to access them, will retain their old ACLs.

- Synchronized privileges are not persisted to HDFS. This means that when this feature is disabled, HDFS privileges will return to their original values.

- Setting HDFS ACLs on Sentry-managed paths will not affect the original HDFS ACLs. That is, if you set an ACL for a Hive object that also falls under the Sentry-managed path prefixes, no action will be taken. If the path does not point to a Hive object managed by Sentry, HDFS ACLs will be set as expected.

Removing HDFC ACLs from paths will work the same way. If you attempt to remove an ACL associated with a Hive object managed by Sentry, no action will be taken. In all other cases, the ACL will be removed as is expected behavior.

- With HDFS-Sentry sync enabled, if the NameNode plugin is unable to communicate with the Sentry Service, affected HDFS files will continue to use a cached copy of the synchronized ACLs for a configurable period of time, after which they will fall back to the Hive System User and the Hive System Group (for example, hive:hive). The timeout value can be modified by adding the sentry.authorization-provider.cache-stale-threshold.ms parameter to the hdfs-site.xml Safety Valve in Cloudera Manager. The default timeout value is 60 seconds, but you can increase this value from several minutes to a few hours, as needed to accommodate large clusters.

- Column-level access control for access from Spark SQL is not supported by the HDFS-Sentry plug-in.

Prompting HDFS ACL Changes

URIs do not have an impact on the HDFS-Sentry plugin. Therefore, you cannot manage all of your HDFS ACLs with the HDFS-Sentry plugin and you must continue to use standard HDFS ACLs for data outside of Hive.

HDFS ACL changes are triggered on:

- Hive DATABASE object LOCATION (HDFS) when a role is granted to the object
- Hive TABLE object LOCATION (HDFS) when a role is granted to the object

HDFS ACL changes are not triggered by:

- Hive URI LOCATION (HDFS) when a role is granted to a URI
- Hive SERVER object when a role is granted to the object. HDFS ACLs are not updated if a role is assigned to the SERVER. The privileges are inherited by child objects in standard Sentry interactions, but the plugin does not trickle the privileges down.
- Permissions granted on views. Views are not synchronized as objects in the HDFS file system.

Prerequisites

- CDH 5.3.0 or higher
- (Strongly Recommended) Implement Kerberos authentication on your cluster.

The following conditions must be also be true when enabling Sentry-HDFS synchronization. Failure to comply with any of these will result in validation errors.
**Enabling the HDFS-Sentry Plugin Using Cloudera Manager**

1. Go to the HDFS service.
2. Click the **Configuration** tab.
3. Select **Scope > HDFS (Service-Wide)**.
4. Type **Check HDFS Permissions** in the Search box.
5. Select **Check HDFS Permissions**.
6. Select **Enable Sentry Synchronization**.
7. Locate the **Sentry Synchronization Path Prefixes** property or search for it by typing its name in the Search box.
8. Edit the **Sentry Synchronization Path Prefixes** property to list HDFS path prefixes where Sentry permissions should be enforced. Multiple HDFS path prefixes can be specified. By default, this property points to `/user/hive/warehouse` and must always be non-empty. If you are using a non-default location for the Hive warehouse, make sure you add it to the list of path prefixes. HDFS privilege synchronization will not occur for tables and databases located outside the HDFS regions listed here.

**Important:** Sentry will only manage paths that store Hive objects. If a path is listed under the **Sentry Synchronization Path Prefixes**, but there is no Hive object there, Sentry will not manage permissions for that path.

9. Click **Save Changes**.
10. Restart the cluster. Note that it may take an additional two minutes after cluster restart for privilege synchronization to take effect.

**Enabling the HDFS-Sentry Plugin Using the Command Line**

**Important:**
- This configuration process can be completed using either Cloudera Manager or the command-line instructions.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. If you use an earlier version of CDH, see the documentation for that version located at Cloudera Documentation.

To enable the Sentry plugins on an unmanaged cluster, you must explicitly allow the `hdfs` user to interact with Sentry, and install the plugin packages as described in the following sections.

**Allowing the hdfs user to connect with Sentry**

For an unmanaged cluster, add `hdfs` to the `sentry.service.allow.connect` property in `sentry-site.xml`.

```xml
<property>
  <name>sentry.service.allow.connect</name>
  <value>impala,hive,hue,hdfs</value>
</property>
```
Installing the HDFS-Sentry Plugin

Note: Install Cloudera Repository

Before using the instructions on this page to install the package, install the Cloudera yum, zypper/YaST or apt repository, and install or upgrade CDH 5 and make sure it is functioning correctly. For instructions, see Installing the Latest CDH 5 Release.

Use the following the instructions, depending on your operating system, to install the sentry-hdfs-plugin package. The package must be installed (at a minimum) on the following hosts:

- The host running the NameNode and Secondary NameNode
- The host running the Hive Metastore
- The host running the Sentry Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OS</th>
<th>Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RHEL-compatible</td>
<td>$ sudo yum install sentry-hdfs-plugin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLES</td>
<td>$ sudo zypper install sentry-hdfs-plugin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubuntu or Debian</td>
<td>$ sudo apt-get install sentry-hdfs-plugin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Configuring the HDFS NameNode Plugin

Add the following properties to the hdfs-site.xml file on the NameNode host.

```xml
<property>
<name>dfs.namenode.acls.enabled</name>
<value>true</value>
</property>

<property>
<name>dfs.namenode.authorization.provider.class</name>
<value>org.apache.sentry.hdfs.SentryAuthorizationProvider</value>
</property>

<property>
<name>dfs.permissions</name>
<value>true</value>
</property>

<!-- Comma-separated list of HDFS path prefixes where Sentry permissions should be enforced. -->
<!-- Privilege synchronization will occur only for tables located in HDFS regions specified here. -->

<property>
<name>sentry.authorization-provider.hdfs-path-prefixes</name>
<value>/user/hive/warehouse</value>
</property>

<property>
<name>sentry.hdfs.service.security.mode</name>
<value>kerberos</value>
</property>

<property>
<name>sentry.hdfs.service.server.principal</name>
<value>SENTRY_SERVER_PRINCIPAL (for eg : sentry/_HOST@VPC.CLOUDERA.COM )</value>
</property>

<property>
<name>sentry.hdfs.service.client.server.rpc-port</name>
<value>SENTRY_SERVER_PORT</value>
</property>

<property>
<name>sentry.hdfs.service.client.server.rpc-address</name>
```
**Configuring the Hive Metastore Plugin**

Add the following properties to `hive-site.xml` on the Hive Metastore Server host.

```xml
<property>
    <name>sentry.metastore.plugins</name>
    <value>org.apache.sentry.hdfs.MetastorePlugin</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>sentry.hdfs.service.client.server.rpc-port</name>
    <value>SENTRY_SERVER_PORT</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>sentry.hdfs.service.client.server.rpc-address</name>
    <value>SENTRY_SERVER_HOSTNAME</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>sentry.hdfs.service.client.server.rpc-connection-timeout</name>
    <value>200000</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>sentry.hdfs.service.security.mode</name>
    <value>kerberos</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>sentry.hdfs.service.server.principal</name>
    <value>SENTRY_SERVER_PRINCIPAL (for eg: sentry/_HOST@VPC.CLOUDERA.COM)</value>
</property>
```

**Configuring the Sentry Service Plugin**

Add the following properties to the `sentry-site.xml` file on the NameNode host.

```xml
<property>
    <name>sentry.service.processor.factories</name>
    <value>org.apache.sentry.provider.db.service.thrift.SentryPolicyStoreProcessorFactory,
            org.apache.sentry.hdfs.SentryHDFSServiceProcessorFactory</value>
</property>

<property>
    <name>sentry.policy.store.plugins</name>
    <value>org.apache.sentry.hdfs.SentryPlugin</value>
</property>
```

**Important:** Once all the configuration changes are complete, restart your cluster. Note that it may take an additional two minutes after cluster restart for privilege synchronization to take effect.

**Testing the Sentry Synchronization Plugins**

The following tasks will help you ensure that Sentry-HDFS synchronization has been enabled and configured correctly:

For a folder that has been enabled for the plugin, such as the Hive warehouse, try accessing the files in that folder outside Hive and Impala. For this, you should know what tables and databases those HDFS files belong to and the Sentry permissions on those tables. Attempt to view or modify the Sentry permissions settings over those tables using one of the following tools:

- **(Recommended) Hue's Security application**
- HiveServer2 CLI
- Impala CLI
• Access the tables and databases directly in HDFS. For example:
  – List files inside the folder and verify that the file permissions shown in HDFS (including ACLs) match what was
    configured in Sentry.
  – Run a MapReduce, Pig or Spark job that accesses those files. Pick any tool besides HiveServer2 and Impala

Using the Sentry Web Server

The Sentry web server can be used to view reported metrics which can prove useful for debugging. You can also enable
Kerberos authentication to secure the web server.

To enable the Sentry web server, perform the following steps:

1. In Cloudera Manager, open the Sentry service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Search for sentry.service.web.enable and select Enable Web UI.
4. Restart the Sentry web server.

To configure the Sentry web server for reporting metrics and secure it using Kerberos authentication, perform the
following steps:

1. In Cloudera Manager, open the Sentry service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Search for the Sentry Service Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for sentry-site.xml property and
   add the following properties:
   a. Metrics for the Sentry service can now be reported using either JMX or console. To obtain the metrics in JSON
      format, you can use the Sentry web server which by default, listens on port 29000. To enable reporting of
      metrics:

      ```xml
      <property>
        <name>sentry.service.web.port</name>
        <value>51000</value>
      </property>
      <property>
        <name>sentry.service.reporter</name>
        <value>jmx</value>
      </property>
      ```
   b. Kerberos authentication must be enabled for the Sentry web server to restrict who can access the debug
      web page for the Sentry service. To enable:

      ```xml
      <property>
        <name>sentry.service.web.authentication.type</name>
        <value>KERBEROS</value>
      </property>
      <property>
        <name>sentry.service.web.authentication.kerberos.principal</name>
        <value>HTTP/<fully.qualified.domain.name>@YOUR-REALM</value>
      </property>
      <property>
        <name>sentry.service.web.authentication.kerberos.keytab</name>
        <value>/path/to/keytab/file</value>
      </property>
      <property>
        <name>sentry.service.web.authentication.allow.connect.users</name>
        <value>user_a,user_b</value>
      </property>
      ```
4. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.
5. Restart the Sentry web server.

**Sentry Policy File Authorization**

**Important:** This is the documentation for configuring Sentry using the policy file approach. Cloudera recommends you use the database-backed Sentry service introduced in CDH 5.1 to secure your data. See the Sentry **Managing the Sentry Service** on page 356 documentation for more information.

Sentry enables role-based, fine-grained authorization for HiveServer2, Impala, and Cloudera Search.

The following topics provide instructions on how to install, upgrade, and configure policy file authorization.

**Prerequisites**

Sentry depends on an underlying authentication framework to reliably identify the requesting user. It requires:

- CDH 4.3.0 or higher.
- HiveServer2 and the Hive Metastore running with strong authentication. For HiveServer2, strong authentication is either Kerberos or LDAP. For the Hive Metastore, only Kerberos is considered strong authentication (to override, see **Securing the Hive Metastore** on page 416).
- Impala 1.2.1 (or higher) running with strong authentication. With Impala, either Kerberos or LDAP can be configured to achieve strong authentication. Auditing of authentication failures is supported only with CDH 4.4.0 and Impala 1.2.1 or higher.
- Cloudera Search for CDH 5.1.0 or higher. Solr supports using Sentry beginning with CDH 5.1.0. Different functionality is added at different releases:
  - Sentry with policy files is added in CDH 5.1.0.
  - Sentry with config support is added in CDH 5.5.0.
  - Sentry with database-backed Sentry service is added with CDH 5.8.0.
- Kerberos authentication on your cluster. Kerberos prevent a user from bypassing the authorization system and gaining direct access to the underlying data.

**Terminology**

- An **object** is an entity protected by Sentry’s authorization rules. The objects supported in the current release are server, database, table, URI, collection, and config.
- A **role** is a collection of rules for accessing a given object.
- A **privilege** is granted to a role to govern access to an object. With CDH 5.5, Sentry allows you to assign the **SELECT** privilege to columns (only for Hive and Impala). Supported privileges are:

  **Table 42: Valid privilege types and the objects they apply to**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Privilege</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>SERVER, TABLE, DB, URI, COLLECTION, CONFIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td>DB, TABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>DB, TABLE, COLUMN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** In Beeline, you can also grant SELECT and INSERT on SERVER.

- A **user** is an entity that is permitted by the authentication subsystem to access the service. This entity can be a Kerberos principal, an LDAP **userid**, or an artifact of some other supported pluggable authentication system.
• A **group** connects the authentication system with the authorization system. It is a collection of one or more users who have been granted one or more authorization roles. Sentry allows a set of roles to be configured for a group.

• A **configured group provider** determines a user’s affiliation with a group. The current release supports HDFS-backed groups and locally configured groups.

**Privilege Model**

Sentry uses a role-based privilege model with the following characteristics.

• **Allows any user to execute** `show function`, `desc function`, and `show locks`.

• Allows the user to see only those tables, databases, collections, configs for which the user has privileges.

• Requires a user to have the necessary privileges on the URI to execute HiveQL operations that specify a location. Examples of such operations include `LOAD`, `IMPORT`, and `EXPORT`.

• Privileges granted on URIs are recursively applied to all subdirectories. That is, privileges only need to be granted on the parent directory.

• In Beeline, you can grant privileges on an object that doesn’t exist. For example, you can grant `role1` on `table1` and then create `table1`.

**Important:**

• When Sentry is enabled, you must use Beeline to execute Hive queries. Hive CLI is not supported with Sentry and must be disabled.

• When Sentry is enabled, a user with no privileges on a database will not be allowed to connect to HiveServer2. This is because the `use <database>` command is now executed as part of the connection to HiveServer2, which is why the connection fails. See HIVE-4256.

For more information, see Authorization Privilege Model for Hive and Impala on page 401 and Authorization Privilege Model for Solr on page 405.

**Granting Privileges**

**Note:** In the following example(s), `server1` refers to an alias Sentry uses for the associated Hive service. It does not refer to any physical server. This alias can be modified using the `hive.sentry.server` property in `hive-site.xml`. If you are using Cloudera Manager, modify the Hive property, Server Name for Sentry Authorization, in the Service-Wide > Advanced category.

For example, a rule for the **Select** privilege on table `customers` from database `sales` is formulated as follows:

```
sale_read = server=server1->db=sales->table=customers->column=Id->action=select
```

To assign the **Select** privilege to the `sales_read` role on the `Id` column from the `customers` table, the rule would be as follows:

```
sales_read = server=server1->db=sales->table=customers->column=Id->action=select
```

Each object must be specified as a hierarchy of the containing objects, from server to table, followed by the privilege granted for that object. A role can contain multiple such rules, separated by commas. For example, a role might contain the Select privilege for the `customer` and `items` tables in the `sales` database, and the Insert privilege for the `sales_insights` table in the `reports` database. You would specify this as follows:

```
sales_reporting = server=server1->db=sales->table=customer->action=Select, server=server1->db=sales->table=items->action=Select, server=server1->db=reports->table=sales_insights->action=Insert
```
User to Group Mapping

You can configure Sentry to use either Hadoop groups or groups defined in the policy file. By default, Sentry looks up groups locally, but it can be configured to look up Hadoop groups using LDAP (for Active Directory). User/group information for Sentry, Hive and Impala must be made available for lookup on the following hosts:

- Sentry - Groups are looked up on the host the Sentry Server runs on.
- Hive - Groups are looked up on the hosts running HiveServer2 and the Hive Metastore.
- Impala - Groups are looked up on the Catalog Server and on all of the Impala daemon hosts.

Group mappings in Sentry can be summarized as in the figure below:

![Group Mapping Diagram]

**Important:** You can use either Hadoop groups or local groups, but not both at the same time. Local groups are traditionally used for a quick proof-of-concept, while Hadoop groups are more commonly used in production. Refer [Configuring LDAP Group Mappings](#) on page 347 for details on configuring LDAP group mappings in Hadoop.

Policy File

The sections that follow contain notes on creating and maintaining the policy file, and using URIs to load external data and JARs.

**Warning:** An invalid policy file will be ignored while logging an exception. This will lead to a situation where users will lose access to all Sentry-protected data, since default Sentry behavior is *deny* unless a user has been explicitly granted access. (Note that if only the per-DB policy file is invalid, it will invalidate only the policies in that file.)
Storing the Policy File

Considerations for storing the policy file(s) in HDFS include:

1. Replication count - Because the file is read for each query in Hive and read once every five minutes by all Impala daemons, you should increase this value; since it is a small file, setting the replication count equal to the number of client nodes in the cluster is reasonable.

2. Updating the file - Updates to the file are reflected immediately, so you should write them to a temporary copy of the file first, and then replace the existing file with the temporary one after all the updates are complete. This avoids race conditions caused by reads on an incomplete file.

Defining Roles

Keep in mind that role definitions are not cumulative; the definition that is further down in the file replaces the older one. For example, the following results in \texttt{role1} having \texttt{privilege2}, not \texttt{privilege1} and \texttt{privilege2}.

\begin{verbatim}
role1 = privilege1
role1 = privilege2
\end{verbatim}

Role names are scoped to a specific file. For example, if you give \texttt{role1} the \texttt{ALL} privilege on \texttt{db1} in the global policy file and give \texttt{role1} \texttt{ALL} on \texttt{db2} in the per-db \texttt{db2} policy file, the user will be given both privileges.

URIs

Any command which references a URI such as \texttt{CREATE TABLE EXTERNAL}, \texttt{LOAD}, \texttt{IMPORT}, \texttt{EXPORT}, and more, in addition to \texttt{CREATE TEMPORARY FUNCTION} requires the \texttt{URI} privilege. This is an important security control because without this users could simply create an external table over an existing table they do not have access to and bypass Sentry.

URIs must start with either \texttt{hdfs://} or \texttt{file://}. If a URI starts with anything else, it will cause an exception and the policy file will be invalid.

When defining URIs for HDFS, you must also specify the NameNode. For example:

\begin{verbatim}
data_read = server=server1->uri=file:///path/to/dir,\
server=server1->uri=hdfs://ha-nn-uri/data/landing-skid
\end{verbatim}

\begin{warning}
Important: Because the NameNode host and port must be specified, Cloudera strongly recommends you use High Availability (HA). This ensures that the URI will remain constant even if the NameNode changes.
\end{warning}

Loading Data

Data can be loaded using a landing skid, either in HDFS or using a local/NFS directory where HiveServer2/Impala run. The following privileges can be used to grant a role access to a loading skid:

- \texttt{Load data from a local/NFS directory}:

\begin{verbatim}
server=server1->uri=file:///path/to/nfs/local/to/nfs
\end{verbatim}

- \texttt{Load data from HDFS (MapReduce, Pig, and so on)}:

\begin{verbatim}
server=server1->uri=hdfs://ha-nn-uri/data/landing-skid
\end{verbatim}

In addition to the privilege in Sentry, the \texttt{hive} or \texttt{impala} user will require the appropriate file permissions to access the data being loaded. Groups can be used for this purpose. For example, create a group \texttt{hive-users}, and add the \texttt{hive} and \texttt{impala} users along with the users who will be loading data, to this group.
Configuring Authorization

The example `usermod` and `groupadd` commands below are only applicable to locally defined groups on the NameNode, JobTracker, and ResourceManager. If you use another system for group management, equivalent changes should be made in your group management system.

```
$ groupadd hive-users
$ usermod -G someuser,hive-users someuser
$ usermod -G hive,hive-users hive
```

External Tables

External tables require the `ALL@database` privilege in addition to the `URI` privilege. When data is being inserted through the `EXTERNAL TABLE` statement, or is referenced from an HDFS location outside the normal Hive database directories, the user needs appropriate permissions on the URIs corresponding to those HDFS locations. This means that the URI location must either be owned by the `hive:hive` user OR the `hive/impala` users must be members of the group that owns the directory.

You can configure access to the directory using a URI as follows:

```
[roles]
someuser_home_dir_role = server=server1->uri=hdfs://ha-nn-uri/user/someuser
```

You should now be able to create an external table:

```
CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE ... 
LOCATION 'hdfs://ha-nn-uri/user/someuser/mytable';
```

Sample Sentry Configuration Files

This section provides a sample configuration.

Note: In the following example(s), `server1` refers to an alias Sentry uses for the associated Hive service. It does not refer to any physical server. This alias can be modified using the `hive.sentry.server` property in `hive-site.xml`. If you are using Cloudera Manager, modify the Hive property, `Server Name for Sentry Authorization`, in the Service-Wide > Advanced category.

Policy Files

The following is an example of a policy file with a per-DB policy file. In this example, the first policy file, `sentry-provider.ini` would exist in HDFS; `hdfs://ha-nn-uri/etc/sentry/sentry-provider.ini` might be an appropriate location. The per-DB policy file is for the customer’s database. It is located at `hdfs://ha-nn-uri/etc/sentry/customers.ini`.

```
sentry-provider.ini

[databases]
# Defines the location of the per DB policy file for the customers DB/schema
customers = hdfs://ha-nn-uri/etc/sentry/customers.ini

[groups]
# Assigns each Hadoop group to its set of roles
manager = analyst_role, junior_analyst_role
analyst = analyst_role
jranalyst = junior_analyst_role
customers_admin = customers_admin_role
admin = admin_role

[roles]
# The uris below define a define a landing skid which
# the user can use to import or export data from the system.
# Since the server runs as the user "hive" files in that directory
# must either have the group hive and read/write set or
# be world read/write.
```
analyst_role = server=server1->db=analyst1, \
server=server1->db=jranalyst1->table=*->action=select
server=server1->uri=hdfs://ha-nn-uri/landing/analyst1
junior_analyst_role = server=server1->db=jranalyst1, \
server=server1->uri=hdfs://ha-nn-uri/landing/jranalyst1

# Implies everything on server1 -> customers. Privileges for
# customers can be defined in the global policy file even though
# customers has its only policy file. Note that the Privileges from
# both the global policy file and the per-DB policy file
# are merged. There is no overriding.
customers_admin_role = server=server1->db=customers

# Implies everything on server1.
admin_role = server=server1

customers.ini

[groups]
manager = customers_insert_role, customers_select_role
analyst = customers_select_role

[roles]
customers_insert_role = server=server1->db=customers->table=*->action=insert
customers_select_role = server=server1->db=customers->table=*->action=select

Important: Sentry does not support using the view keyword in policy files. If you want to define a
role against a view, use the keyword table instead. For example, to define the role analyst_role
against the view col_test_view:

[roles]
analyst_role = server=server1->db=default->table=col_test_view->action=select

Sentry Configuration File

The following is an example of a sentry-site.xml file.

Important: If you are using Cloudera Manager 4.6 (or lower), make sure you do not store
sentry-site.xml in /etc/hive/conf; that directory is regenerated whenever the Hive client
configurations are redeployed. Instead, use a directory such as /etc/sentry to store the sentry
file.

If you are using Cloudera Manager 4.7 (or higher), Cloudera Manager will create and deploy
sentry-site.xml for you. See Managing the Sentry Service on page 356 for more details on configuring
Sentry with Cloudera Manager.

sentry-site.xml

<configuration>
<property>
  <name>hive.sentry.provider</name>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hive.sentry.provider.resource</name>
  <value>/path/to/authz-provider.ini</value>
</property>

If the hdfs-site.xml points to HDFS, the path will be in HDFS;
Accessing Sentry-Secured Data Outside Hive/Impala

When Sentry is enabled, the hive user owns all data within the Hive warehouse. However, unlike traditional database systems the enterprise data hub allows for multiple engines to execute over the same dataset.

**Note:** Cloudera strongly recommends you use Hive/Impala SQL queries to access data secured by Sentry, as opposed to accessing the data files directly.

However, there are scenarios where fully vetted and reviewed jobs will also need to access the data stored in the Hive warehouse. A typical scenario would be a secured MapReduce transformation job that is executed automatically as an application user. In such cases it's important to know that the user executing this job will also have full access to the data in the Hive warehouse.

**Scenario One: Authorizing Jobs**

**Problem**
A reviewed, vetted, and automated job requires access to the Hive warehouse and cannot use Hive/Impala to access the data.

**Solution**
Create a group which contains hive, impala, and the user executing the automated job. For example, if the etl user is executing the automated job, you can create a group called hive-users which contains the hive, impala, and etl users.

The example usermod and groupadd commands below are only applicable to locally defined groups on the NameNode, JobTracker, and ResourceManager. If you use another system for group management, equivalent changes should be made in your group management system.

```bash
$ groupadd hive-users
$ usermod -G hive,impala,hive-users hive
$ usermod -G hive,impala,hive-users impala
$ usermod -G etl,hive-users etl
```

Once you have added users to the hive-users group, change directory permissions in the HDFS:

```bash
$ hadoop fs -chgrp -R hive:hive-users /user/hive/warehouse
$ hadoop fs -chmod -R 770 /user/hive/warehouse
```

**Scenario Two: Authorizing Group Access to Databases**

**Problem**
One group of users, grp1 should have full access to the database, db1, outside of Sentry. The database, db1 should not be accessible to any other groups, outside of Sentry. Sentry should be used for all other authorization needs.

**Solution**
Place the hive and impala users in grp1.

```
$ usermod -G hive,impala,grp1 hive
$ usermod -G hive,impala,grp1 impala
```

Then change group ownerships of all directories and files in db1 to grp1, and modify directory permissions in the HDFS. This example is only applicable to local groups on a single host.

```
$ hadoop fs -chgrp -R hive:grp1 /user/hive/warehouse/db1.db
$ hadoop fs -chmod -R 770 /user/hive/warehouse/db1.db
```

Debugging Failed Sentry Authorization Requests

Sentry logs all facts that lead up to authorization decisions at the debug level. If you do not understand why Sentry is denying access, the best way to debug is to temporarily turn on debug logging:

- In Cloudera Manager, add `log4j.logger.org.apache.sentry=DEBUG` to the logging settings for your service through the corresponding Logging Safety Valve field for the Impala, Hive Server 2, or Solr Server services.
- On systems not managed by Cloudera Manager, add `log4j.logger.org.apache.sentry=DEBUG` to the `log4j.properties` file on each host in the cluster, in the appropriate configuration directory for each service.

Specifically, look for exceptions and messages such as:

```
FilePermission server..., RequestPermission server...., result [true|false]
```

which indicate each evaluation Sentry makes. The `FilePermission` is from the policy file, while `RequestPermission` is the privilege required for the query. A `RequestPermission` will iterate over all appropriate `FilePermission` settings until a match is found. If no matching privilege is found, Sentry returns `false` indicating “Access Denied”.

Authorization Privilege Model for Hive and Impala

Privileges can be granted on different objects in the Hive warehouse. Any privilege that can be granted is associated with a level in the object hierarchy. If a privilege is granted on a container object in the hierarchy, the base object automatically inherits it. For instance, if a user has `ALL` privileges on the database scope, then (s)he has `ALL` privileges on all of the base objects contained within that scope.

Object Hierarchy in Hive

```
Server
  URI
Database
  Table
    Partition
      Columns
    View
```

Table 43: Valid privilege types and objects they apply to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Privilege</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td>DB, TABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>DB, TABLE, VIEW, COLUMN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>SERVER, TABLE, DB, URI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 44: Privilege hierarchy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base Object</th>
<th>Granular privileges on object</th>
<th>Container object that contains the base object</th>
<th>Privileges on container object that implies privileges on the base object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLUMN</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIEW</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 45: Privilege table for Hive & Impala operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Privileges Required</th>
<th>URI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CREATE DATABASE</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP DATABASE</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE TABLE</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE VIEW</td>
<td>DATABASE; SELECT on TABLE;</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER VIEW</td>
<td>VIEW/TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP VIEW</td>
<td>VIEW/TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. ADD COLUMNS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. REPLACE COLUMNS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. CHANGE column</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. RENAME</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. SET TBLPROPERTIES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. SET FILEFORMAT</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. SET LOCATION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. ADD PARTITION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. ADD PARTITION location</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. DROP PARTITION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Privileges Required</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. PARTITION SET FILEFORMAT</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW CREATE TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW PARTITIONS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW TABLES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Output includes all the tables for which the user has table-level privileges and all the tables for which the user has some column-level privileges.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW GRANT ROLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Output includes an additional field for any column-level privileges.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESCRIBE TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Output shows all columns if the user has table level-privileges or SELECT privilege on at least one table column</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOAD DATA</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>VIEW/TABLE; COLUMN</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-You can grant the SELECT privilege on a view to give users access to specific columns of a table they do not otherwise have access to.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-See Column-level Authorization on page 382 for details on allowed column-level operations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSERT OVERWRITE TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE TABLE .. AS SELECT</td>
<td>DATABASE; SELECT on TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-This operation is allowed if you have column-level SELECT access to the columns being used.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USE &lt;dbName&gt;</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE FUNCTION</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. SET SERDEPROPERTIES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. PARTITION SET SERDEPROPERTIES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hive-Only Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSERT OVERWRITE DIRECTORY</th>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>INSERT</th>
<th>URI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Privileges Required</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT + INSERT</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPORT TABLE</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPORT TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE TOUCH</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE TOUCH PARTITION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. CLUSTERED BY SORTED BY</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. PARTITION ENABLE/DISABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. PARTITION.. RENAME TO PARTITION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSCK REPAIR TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER DATABASE</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESCRIBE DATABASE</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW COLUMNS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Output for this operation filters columns to which the user does not have explicit SELECT access</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE INDEX</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP INDEX</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW INDEXES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRANT PRIVILEGE</td>
<td>Allowed only for Sentry admin users</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVOKE PRIVILEGE</td>
<td>Allowed only for Sentry admin users</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW GRANT</td>
<td>Allowed only for Sentry admin users</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW TBLPROPERTIES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESCRIBE TABLE .. PARTITION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADD ARCHIVE[S]</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADD FILE[S]</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADD JAR[S]</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELETE JAR[S]</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST JAR[S]</td>
<td>Not Allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impala-Only Operations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPLAIN SELECT</td>
<td>TABLE; COLUMN</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Authorization Privilege Model for Solr

The tables below refer to the request handlers defined in the generated solrconfig.xml.secure template.

The `admin` collection is a special collection in Sentry used to represent administrative actions. A non-administrative request may only require privileges on the collection or config on which the request is being performed. This is called `collection1` or `config1` in this appendix. An administrative request may require privileges on both the `admin` collection and `collection1`. This is denoted as `admin, collection1` in the tables below.

*Note:* If no privileges are granted, no access is possible. For example, accessing the Solr Admin UI requires the `QUERY` privilege. If no users are granted the `QUERY` privilege, no access to the Solr Admin UI is possible.

Table 46: Privilege table for non-administrative request handlers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request Handler</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>select</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>get</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>browse</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tvrh</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clustering</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terms</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elevate</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analysis/field</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analysis/document</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>update</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>update/json</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>update/csv</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>collection1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 47: Privilege table for collections admin actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collection Action</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>create</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Collections that Require Privilege

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collection Action</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>delete</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reload</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>createAlias</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deleteAlias</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>syncShard</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>splitShard</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deleteShard</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** collection1 here refers to the name of the alias, not the underlying collection(s). For example, http://YOUR-HOST:8983/solr/admin/collections?action=CREATEALIAS&name=collection1&collections=underlyingCollection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collection Action</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>create</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rename</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>load</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unload</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persist</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reload</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swap</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mergeIndexes</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>split</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prepRecover</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requestRecover</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 48: Privilege table for core admin actions**
### Collections that Require Privilege

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collection Action</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>requestSyncShard</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requestApplyUpdates</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin, collection1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 49: Privilege table for Info and AdminHandlers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request Handler</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LukeRequestHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SystemInfoHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SolrInfoMBeanHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PluginInfoHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThreadDumpHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PropertiesRequestHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LoginHandler</td>
<td>QUERY, UPDATE (or *)</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ShowFileRequestHandler</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 50: Privilege table for Config Admin actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Config Action</th>
<th>Required Collection Privilege</th>
<th>Collections that Require Privilege</th>
<th>Required Config Privilege</th>
<th>Configs that Require Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CREATE</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>config1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELETE</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>admin</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>config1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Installing and Upgrading Sentry for Policy File Authorization

Sentry stores the configuration as well as privilege policies in files. The `sentry-site.xml` file contains configuration options such as group association provider, privilege policy file location. The policy file contains the privileges and groups. It has a `.ini` file format and can be stored on a local file system or HDFS.

Sentry is plugged into Hive as session hooks, which you configure in `hive-site.xml`. The `sentry` package must be installed. It contains the required JAR files. You must also configure properties in the Sentry Configuration File on page 399.

**Important:**

Install the Cloudera `yum`, `zypper/YaST` or `apt` repository before using the following commands. For instructions, see Installing the Latest CDH 5 Release.

### Installing Sentry

Use the following the instructions, depending on your operating system, to install the latest version of Sentry.
Important: Configuration files

- If you install a newer version of a package that is already on the system, configuration files that you have modified will remain intact.
- If you uninstall a package, the package manager renames any configuration files you have modified from `<file>` to `<file>.rmpssave`. If you then re-install the package (probably to install a new version) the package manager creates a new `<file>` with applicable defaults. You are responsible for applying any changes captured in the original configuration file to the new configuration file. In the case of Ubuntu and Debian upgrades, you will be prompted if you have made changes to a file for which there is a new version. For details, see Automatic handling of configuration files by dpkg.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OS</th>
<th>Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RHEL</td>
<td>$ sudo yum install sentry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLES</td>
<td>$ sudo zypper install sentry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubuntu or Debian</td>
<td>$ sudo apt-get update; $ sudo apt-get install sentry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Upgrading Sentry

If you are upgrading from CDH 5.x to the latest CDH release, see Installing Sentry on page 407 to install the latest version.

Configuring Sentry Policy File Authorization Using Cloudera Manager

This topic describes how to configure Sentry policy files and enable policy file authorization for CDH services using Cloudera Manager.

Configuring User to Group Mappings

Minimum Required Role: Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

Hadoop Groups

1. Go to the Hive service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Hive (Service-Wide).
4. Select Category > Policy File Based Sentry.
5. Locate the Sentry User to Group Mapping Class property or search for it by typing its name in the Search box.
7. Click Save Changes.
8. Restart the Hive service.

Local Groups

**Note:** You can use either Hadoop groups or local groups, but not both at the same time. Use local groups if you want to do a quick proof-of-concept. For production, use Hadoop groups.

1. Define local groups in the `[users]` section of the Policy File on page 396. For example:

```ini
[users]
user1 = group1, group2, group3
user2 = group2, group3
```

2. Modify Sentry configuration as follows:
Go to the Hive service.

a. Click the Configuration tab.
b. Select Scope > Hive (Service-Wide).
c. Select Category > Policy File Based Sentry.
d. Locate the Sentry User to Group Mapping Class property or search for it by typing its name in the Search box.
e. Set the Sentry User to Group Mapping Class property to org.apache.sentry.provider.file.LocalGroupResourceAuthorizationProvider.
f. Click Save Changes.
g. Restart the Hive service.

Enabling URIs for Per-DB Policy Files

The ADD JAR command does not work with HiveServer2 and the Beeline client when Beeline runs on a different host. As an alternative to ADD JAR, Hive's auxiliary paths functionality should be used as described in the following steps.

Important: Enabling URIs in per-DB policy files introduces a security risk by allowing the owner of the db-level policy file to grant himself/herself load privileges to anything the hive user has read permissions for in HDFS (including data in other databases controlled by different db-level policy files).

Add the following string to the Java configuration options for HiveServer2 during startup.

-Dsentry.allow.uri.db.policyfile=true

Using User-Defined Functions with HiveServer2

Minimum Required Role: Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

The ADD JAR command does not work with HiveServer2 and the Beeline client when Beeline runs on a different host. As an alternative to ADD JAR, Hive's auxiliary paths functionality should be used. There are some differences in the procedures for creating permanent functions and temporary functions. For detailed instructions, see Using Cloudera Manager to Create User-Defined Functions (UDFs) with HiveServer2.

Enabling Policy File Authorization for Hive

Minimum Required Role: Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

1. Ensure the Prerequisites on page 394 have been satisfied.
2. Setting Hive Warehouse Directory Permissions

Important: If you are going to enable HDFS/Sentry synchronization, you do not need to perform the following step to explicitly set permissions for the Hive warehouse directory. With synchronization enabled, all Hive databases and tables will automatically be owned by hive:hive, and Sentry permissions on tables are translated to HDFS ACLs for the underlying table files.

The Hive warehouse directory (/user/hive/warehouse or any path you specify as hive.metastore.warehouse.dir in your hive-site.xml) must be owned by the Hive user and group.

• Using the default Hive warehouse directory - Permissions on the warehouse directory must be set as follows (see following Note for caveats):
  – 771 on the directory itself (by default, /user/hive/warehouse)
  – 771 on all subdirectories (for example, /user/hive/warehouse/mysubdir)
  – All files and subdirectories should be owned by hive:hive

For example:

$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chmod -R 771 /user/hive/warehouse
$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chown -R hive:hive /user/hive/warehouse
If you have enabled Kerberos on your cluster, you must `kinit` as the `hdfs` user before you set permissions.

For example:

```
sudo -u hdfs kinit -kt <hdfs.keytab> hdfs
$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chmod -R 771 /user/hive/warehouse
$ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chown -R hive:hive /user/hive/warehouse
```

- **Using a non-default Hive warehouse**: If you would like to use a different directory as the Hive warehouse, update the `hive.metastore.warehouse.dir` property, and make sure you set the required permissions on the new directory. For example, if the new warehouse directory is `/data`, set the permissions as follows:

```
$ hdfs dfs -chown hive:hive /data
$ hdfs dfs -chmod 771 /data
```

Note that when you update the default Hive warehouse, previously created tables will not be moved over automatically. Therefore, tables created before the update will remain at `/user/hive/warehouse/<old_table>`. However, after the update, any new tables created in the default location will be found at `/data/<new_table>`.

For Sentry/HDFS sync to work as expected, add the new warehouse URL to the list of Sentry Synchronization Path Prefixes.

**Note:**

- If you set `hive.warehouse.subdir.inherit.perms` to `true` in `hive-site.xml`, the permissions on the subdirectories will be set when you set permissions on the warehouse directory.
- If a user has access to any object in the warehouse, that user will be able to execute `use default`. This ensures that `use default` commands issued by legacy applications work when Sentry is enabled.
- The instructions described above for modifying permissions on the Hive warehouse directory override the recommendations in the Hive section of the CDH 5 Installation Guide.

3. **Disable impersonation for HiveServer2**:

   a. Go to the Hive service.
   b. Click the **Configuration** tab.
   c. Select **Scope > HiveServer2**.
   d. Select **Category > All**.
   e. Locate the **HiveServer2 Enable Impersonation** property or search for it by typing its name in the Search box.
   f. Under the **HiveServer2** role group, clear the **HiveServer2 Enable Impersonation** property.
   g. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.

4. **Create the Sentry policy file**, `sentry-provider.ini`, as an HDFS file.

5. **Enable the Hive user to submit MapReduce jobs**.

   a. Go to the MapReduce service.
   b. Click the **Configuration** tab.
   c. Select **Scope > TaskTracker**.
   d. Select **Category > Security**.
   e. Locate the **Minimum User ID for Job Submission** property or search for it by typing its name in the Search box.
   f. Set the **Minimum User ID for Job Submission** property to **0** (the default is **1000**).
   g. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.
   h. Repeat steps 5.a-5.d for **every** TaskTracker role group for the MapReduce service that is associated with Hive, if more than one exists.
i. Restart the MapReduce service.

6. Enable the Hive user to submit YARN jobs.
   a. Go to the YARN service.
   b. Click the Configuration tab.
   c. Select Scope > NodeManager.
   d. Select Category > Security.
   e. Ensure the Allowed System Users property includes the hive user. If not, add hive.
   f. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
   g. Repeat steps 6.a-6.d for every NodeManager role group for the YARN service that is associated with Hive, if more than one exists.
   h. Restart the YARN service.

7. Go to the Hive service.
8. Click the Configuration tab.
9. Select Scope > Hive (Service-Wide).
10. Select Category > Policy File Based Sentry.
12. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
13. Add the Hive user group to Sentry's admin groups.
   a. Go to the Sentry service.
   b. Click the Configuration tab.
   c. Select Scope > Sentry (Service-Wide).
   d. Select Category > Main.
   e. Locate the Admin Groups property and add the hive group to the list. If an end user is in one of these admin groups, that user has administrative privileges on the Sentry Server.
   f. Click Save Changes to commit the changes.
14. Restart the cluster and HiveServer2 after changing these values, whether you use Cloudera Manager or not.

Configuring Group Access to the Hive Metastore

Minimum Required Role: Configurator (also provided by Cluster Administrator, Full Administrator)

You can configure the Hive Metastore to reject connections from users not listed in the Hive group proxy list (in HDFS). If you do not configure this override, the Hive Metastore will use the value in the core-site HDFS configuration. To configure the Hive group proxy list:

1. Go to the Hive service.
2. Click the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > Hive (Service-Wide).
4. Select Category > Proxy.
5. In the Hive Metastore Access Control and Proxy User Groups Override property, specify a list of groups whose users are allowed to access the Hive Metastore. If you do not specify "*" (wildcard), you will be warned if the groups do not include hive and impala (if the Impala service is configured) in the list of groups.
6. Click Save Changes.
7. Restart the Hive service.

Enabling Policy File Authorization for Impala

For a cluster managed by Cloudera Manager, perform the following steps to enable policy file authorization for Impala.

2. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to the Impala service.
3. Click the Configuration tab.
4. Select **Scope** > Impala (Service-Wide).
5. Select **Category** > Policy File-Based Sentry.
6. Select **Enable Sentry Authorization Using Policy Files**.
7. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.
8. Restart the Impala service.
9. Add the Impala user group to Sentry’s admin groups.
   a. Go to the Sentry service.
   b. Click the **Configuration** tab.
   c. Select **Scope** > Sentry (Service-Wide).
   d. Select **Category** > Main.
   e. Locate the **Admin Groups** property and add the **impala** group to the list. If an end user is in one of these admin groups, that user has administrative privileges on the Sentry Server.
   f. Click **Save Changes** to commit the changes.

For more details, see [Starting the impalad Daemon with Sentry Authorization Enabled](#) on page 417.

### Enabling Sentry Policy File Authorization for Solr

**Minimum Required Role:** **Full Administrator**

1. Ensure the following requirements are satisfied:
   - Cloudera Search 1.1.1 or higher or CDH 5 or higher.
   - A secure Hadoop cluster.

2. Create the policy file `sentry-provider.ini` as an HDFS file. When you create the policy file `sentry-provider.ini` follow the instructions in the Policy File section in Solr Authentication on page 163. The file must be owned by the `solr` user in the `solr` group, with perms=600. By default Cloudera Manager assumes the policy file is in the HDFS location `/user/solr/sentry`. To configure the location:
   a. Go to the Solr service.
   b. Click the **Configuration** tab.
   c. Select **Scope** > SOLR (Service-Wide).
   d. Select **Category** > Policy File Based Sentry.
   e. Locate the **Sentry Global Policy File** property.
   f. Modify the path in the **Sentry Global Policy File** property.
   g. Select **Enable Sentry Authorization**.
   h. Click **Save Changes**.

3. Restart the Solr service.

For more details, see [Configuring Sentry Authorization for Cloudera Search](#) on page 427.

### Configuring Sentry to Enable BDR Replication

Cloudera recommends the following steps when configuring Sentry and data replication is enabled.

- Group membership should be managed outside of Sentry (as OS and LDAP groups are typically managed) and replication for them also should be handled outside of Cloudera Manager.
- In Cloudera Manager, set up **HDFS replication** for the Sentry files of the databases that are being replicated (separately using Hive/Impala replication).
- On the source cluster:
  - Use a separate Sentry policy file for every database
  - Avoid placing any group or role info (except for server admin info) in the global Sentry policy file (to avoid manual replication/merging with the global file on the target cluster)
  - To avoid manual fix up of URI privileges, ensure that the URIs for the data are the same on both the source and target cluster
• On the target cluster:
  – In the global Sentry policy file, manually add the DB name - DB file mapping entries for the databases being replicated
  – Manually copy the server admin info from the global Sentry policy file on the source to the policy on the target cluster
  – For the databases being replicated, avoid adding more privileges (adding tables specific to target cluster may sometimes require adding extra privileges to allow access to those tables). If any target cluster specific privileges absolutely need to be added for a database, add them to the global Sentry policy file on the target cluster since the per database files would be overwritten periodically with source versions during scheduled replication.

Configuring Sentry Policy File Authorization Using the Command Line

This topic describes how to configure Sentry policy files and enable policy file authorization for unmanaged CDH services using the command line.

Configuring User to Group Mappings

Hadoop Groups

Set the hive.sentry.provider property in sentry-site.xml.

```xml
<property>
  <name>hive.sentry.provider</name>
</property>
```

Local Groups

1. Define local groups in the [users] section of the Policy File on page 396. For example:

   ```
   [users]
   user1 = group1, group2, group3
   user2 = group2, group3
   ```

2. Modify Sentry configuration as follows:

   In sentry-site.xml, set hive.sentry.provider as follows:

   ```xml
   <property>
     <name>hive.sentry.provider</name>
     <value>org.apache.sentry.provider.file.LocalGroupResourceAuthorizationProvider</value>
   </property>
   ```

Enabling URIs for Per-DB Policy Files

The ADD JAR command does not work with HiveServer2 and the Beeline client when Beeline runs on a different host. As an alternative to ADD JAR, Hive’s auxiliary paths functionality should be used as described in the following steps.

**Important:** Enabling URIs in per-DB policy files introduces a security risk by allowing the owner of the db-level policy file to grant himself/herself load privileges to anything the hive user has read permissions for in HDFS (including data in other databases controlled by different db-level policy files).

Add the following string to the Java configuration options for HiveServer2 during startup.

```
-Dsentry.allow.uri.db.policyfile=true
```
Using User-Defined Functions with HiveServer2

The \texttt{ADD JAR} command does not work with HiveServer2 and the Beeline client when Beeline runs on a different host. As an alternative to \texttt{ADD JAR}, Hive's \textit{auxiliary paths} functionality should be used as described in the following steps. There are some differences in the procedures for creating permanent functions and temporary functions. For detailed instructions, see Using the Command Line to Create User-Defined Functions (UDFs) with HiveServer2.

Enabling Policy File Authorization for Hive

Prerequisites

In addition to the Prerequisites on page 394 above, make sure that the following are true:

- Setting Hive Warehouse Directory Permissions

**Important:** If you are going to enable HDFS/Sentry synchronization, you do not need to perform the following step to explicitly set permissions for the Hive warehouse directory. With synchronization enabled, all Hive databases and tables will automatically be owned by hive:hive, and Sentry permissions on tables are translated to HDFS ACLs for the underlying table files.

The Hive warehouse directory (/user/hive/warehouse or any path you specify as hive.metastore.warehouse.dir in your hive-site.xml) must be owned by the Hive user and group.

- **Using the default Hive warehouse directory** - Permissions on the warehouse directory must be set as follows (see following Note for caveats):
  - 771 on the directory itself (by default, /user/hive/warehouse)
  - 771 on all subdirectories (for example, /user/hive/warehouse/mysubdir)
  - All files and subdirectories should be owned by hive:hive

  For example:

  \begin{verbatim}
  $ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chmod -R 771 /user/hive/warehouse
  $ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chown -R hive:hive /user/hive/warehouse
  \end{verbatim}

  If you have enabled Kerberos on your cluster, you must \texttt{kinit} as the hdfs user before you set permissions. For example:

  \begin{verbatim}
  sudo -u hdfs kinit -kt <hdfs.keytab> hdfs
  sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chmod -R 771 /user/hive/warehouse
  $ sudo -u hdfs hdfs dfs -chown -R hive:hive /user/hive/warehouse
  \end{verbatim}

- **Using a non-default Hive warehouse:** If you would like to use a different directory as the Hive warehouse, update the hive.metastore.warehouse.dir property, and make sure you set the required permissions on the new directory. For example, if the new warehouse directory is /data, set the permissions as follows:

  \begin{verbatim}
  $ hdfs dfs -chown hive:hive /data
  $ hdfs dfs -chmod 771 /data
  \end{verbatim}

  Note that when you update the default Hive warehouse, previously created tables will not be moved over automatically. Therefore, tables created before the update will remain at /user/hive/warehouse/<old_table>. However, after the update, any new tables created in the default location will be found at /data/<new_table>.

  For Sentry/HDFS sync to work as expected, add the new warehouse URL to the list of Sentry Synchronization Path Prefixes.
Note:

- If you set `hive.warehouse.subdir.inherit.perms` to `true` in `hive-site.xml`, the permissions on the subdirectories will be set when you set permissions on the warehouse directory.
- If a user has access to any object in the warehouse, that user will be able to execute `use default`. This ensures that `use default` commands issued by legacy applications work when Sentry is enabled.
- The instructions described above for modifying permissions on the Hive warehouse directory override the recommendations in the Hive section of the CDH 5 Installation Guide.

- HiveServer2 impersonation must be turned off.
- The Hive user must be able to submit MapReduce jobs. You can ensure that this is true by setting the minimum user ID for job submission to 0. Edit the `taskcontroller.cfg` file and set `min.user.id=0`.
- To enable the Hive user to submit YARN jobs, add the user `hive` to the `allowed.system.users` configuration property. Edit the `container-executor.cfg` file and add `hive` to the `allowed.system.users` property. For example,

```plaintext
allowed.system.users = nobody, impala, hive, hbase
```

Important:

- You must restart the cluster and HiveServer2 after changing this value, whether you use Cloudera Manager or not.
- These instructions override the instructions under Configuring MRv1 Security on page 101.
- These instructions override the instructions under Configuring YARN Security on page 104

- Add the Hive, Impala, and Hue groups to Sentry's admin groups. If an end user is in one of these admin groups, that user has administrative privileges on the Sentry Server.

```xml
<property>
  <name>sentry.service.admin.group</name>
  <value>hive, impala, hue</value>
</property>
```

Configuration Changes Required

To enable Sentry, add the following properties to `hive-site.xml`:

```xml
<property>
  <name>hive.server2.session.hook</name>
  <value>org.apache.sentry.binding.hive.HiveAuthzBindingSessionHook</value>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hive.sentry.conf.url</name>
  <value></value>
  <description>sentry-site.xml file location</description>
</property>

<property>
  <name>hive.metastore.client.impl</name>
  <value>org.apache.sentry.binding.metastore.SentryHiveMetaStoreClient</value>
  <description>Sets custom Hive Metastore client which Sentry uses to filter out metadata.</description>
</property>
```
Securing the Hive Metastore

It’s important that the Hive metastore be secured. If you want to override the Kerberos prerequisite for the Hive metastore, set the `sentry.hive.testing.mode` property to `true` to allow Sentry to work with weaker authentication mechanisms. Add the following property to the HiveServer2 and Hive metastore’s `sentry-site.xml`:

```xml
<property>
  <name>sentry.hive.testing.mode</name>
  <value>true</value>
</property>
```

Impala does not require this flag to be set.

**Warning:** Cloudera strongly recommends against enabling this property in production. Use Sentry’s testing mode only in test environments.

You can turn on Hive metastore security using the instructions in Cloudera Security. To secure the Hive metastore; see Hive Metastore Server Security Configuration on page 132.

Enabling Policy File Authorization for Impala

First, enable Sentry’s policy file based authorization for Hive. For details, see Enabling Policy File Authorization for Hive on page 414.

See Enabling Sentry Authorization for Impala on page 416 for details on configuring Impala to work with Sentry policy files.

Enabling Sentry in Cloudera Search

See Enabling Solr as a Client for the Sentry Service Using the Command Line on page 377 for details on enabling Sentry for Solr.

See Using Solr with the Sentry Service on page 429 for details on securing Solr data.

Enabling Sentry Authorization for Impala

Authorization determines which users are allowed to access which resources, and what operations they are allowed to perform. In Impala 1.1 and higher, you use the Sentry open source project for authorization. Sentry adds a fine-grained authorization framework for Hadoop. By default (when authorization is not enabled), Impala does all read and write operations with the privileges of the `impala` user, which is suitable for a development/test environment but not for a secure production environment. When authorization is enabled, Impala uses the OS user ID of the user who runs `impala-shell` or other client program, and associates various privileges with each user.

**Note:** Sentry is typically used in conjunction with Kerberos authentication, which defines which hosts are allowed to connect to each server. Using the combination of Sentry and Kerberos prevents malicious users from being able to connect by creating a named account on an untrusted machine. See Enabling Kerberos Authentication for Impala on page 153 for details about Kerberos authentication.

The Sentry Privilege Model

Privileges can be granted on different objects in the schema. Any privilege that can be granted is associated with a level in the object hierarchy. If a privilege is granted on a container object in the hierarchy, the child object automatically inherits it. This is the same privilege model as Hive and other database systems such as MySQL.

The object hierarchy for Impala covers Server, URI, Database, Table, and Column. (The Table privileges apply to views as well; anywhere you specify a table name, you can specify a view name instead.) Column-level authorization is available in and higher, as described in Column-level Authorization on page 382. Previously, you constructed views to query specific columns and assigned privileges based on the views rather than the base tables.

A restricted set of privileges determines what you can do with each object:
SELECT privilege

Lets you read data from a table or view, for example with the SELECT statement, the INSERT...SELECT syntax, or CREATE TABLE...LIKE. Also required to issue the DESCRIBE statement or the EXPLAIN statement for a query against a particular table. Only objects for which a user has this privilege are shown in the output for SHOW DATABASES and SHOW TABLES statements. The REFRESH statement and INVALIDATE METADATA statements only access metadata for tables for which the user has this privilege.

INSERT privilege

Lets you write data to a table. Applies to the INSERT and LOAD DATA statements.

ALL privilege

Lets you create or modify the object. Required to run DDL statements such as CREATE TABLE, ALTER TABLE, or DROP TABLE for a table, CREATE DATABASE or DROP DATABASE for a database, or CREATE VIEW, ALTER VIEW, or DROP VIEW for a view. Also required for the URI of the "location" parameter for the CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE and LOAD DATA statements.

Privileges can be specified for a table or view before that object actually exists. If you do not have sufficient privilege to perform an operation, the error message does not disclose if the object exists or not.

Originally, privileges were encoded in a policy file, stored in HDFS. This mode of operation is still an option, but the emphasis of privilege management is moving towards being SQL-based. Although currently Impala does not have GRANT or REVOKE statements, Impala can make use of privileges assigned through GRANT and REVOKE statements done through Hive. The mode of operation with GRANT and REVOKE statements instead of the policy file requires that a special Sentry service be enabled; this service stores, retrieves, and manipulates privilege information stored inside the metastore database.

Starting the impalad Daemon with Sentry Authorization Enabled

To run the impalad daemon with authorization enabled, you add one or more options to the IMPALA_SERVER_ARGS declaration in the /etc/default/impala configuration file:

- The -server_name option turns on Sentry authorization for Impala. The authorization rules refer to a symbolic server name, and you specify the name to use as the argument to the -server_name option.
- If you specify just -server_name, Impala uses the Sentry service for authorization, relying on the results of GRANT and REVOKE statements issued through Hive. (This mode of operation is available in Impala 1.4.0 and higher.) Prior to Impala 1.4.0, or if you want to continue storing privilege rules in the policy file, also specify the -authorization_policy_file option as in the following item.
- Specifying the -authorization_policy_file option in addition to -server_name makes Impala read privilege information from a policy file, rather than from the metastore database. The argument to the -authorization_policy_file option specifies the HDFS path to the policy file that defines the privileges on different schema objects.

For example, you might adapt your /etc/default/impala configuration to contain lines like the following. To use the Sentry service rather than the policy file:

```
IMPALA_SERVER_ARGS=" \
-server_name=server1 \
...
```

Or to use the policy file, as in releases prior to Impala 1.4:

```
IMPALA_SERVER_ARGS=" \
-authorization_policy_file=/user/hive/warehouse/auth-policy.ini \
-server_name=server1 \
...
```

The preceding examples set up a symbolic name of server1 to refer to the current instance of Impala. This symbolic name is used in the following ways:

- In an environment managed by Cloudera Manager, the server name is specified through Impala (Service-Wide) > Category > Advanced > Sentry Service and Hive > Service-Wide > Advanced > Sentry Service. The values must
be the same for both, so that Impala and Hive can share the privilege rules. Restart the Impala and Hive services after setting or changing this value.

- In an environment not managed by Cloudera Manager, you specify this value for the `sentry.hive.server` property in the `sentry-site.xml` configuration file for Hive, as well as in the `-server_name` option for `impalad`. If the `impalad` daemon is not already running, start it as described in Starting Impala. If it is already running, restart it with the command `sudo /etc/init.d/impala-server restart`. Run the appropriate commands on all the nodes where `impalad` normally runs.

- If you use the mode of operation using the policy file, the rules in the `[roles]` section of the policy file refer to this same `server1` name. For example, the following rule sets up a role `report_generator` that lets users with that role query any table in a database named `reporting_db` on a node where the `impalad` daemon was started up with the `-server_name=server1` option:

```plaintext
[roles]
report_generator = server=server1->db=reporting_db->table=*->action=SELECT
```

When `impalad` is started with one or both of the `-server_name=server1` and `-authorization_policy_file` options, Impala authorization is enabled. If Impala detects any errors or inconsistencies in the authorization settings or the policy file, the daemon refuses to start.

Using Impala with the Sentry Service (or higher only)

When you use the Sentry service rather than the policy file, you set up privileges through `GRANT` and `REVOKE` statements in either Impala or Hive, then both components use those same privileges automatically. (Impala added the `GRANT` and `REVOKE` statements.)

Hive already had `GRANT` and `REVOKE` statements prior to CDH 5.1, but those statements were not production-ready. CDH 5.1 is the first release where those statements use the Sentry framework and are considered GA level. If you used the Hive `GRANT` and `REVOKE` statements prior to CDH 5.1, you must set up these privileges with the CDH 5.1 versions of `GRANT` and `REVOKE` to take advantage of Sentry authorization.

For information about using the updated Hive `GRANT` and `REVOKE` statements, see Sentry service topic in the CDH 5 Security Guide.

Using Impala with the Sentry Policy File

The policy file is a file that you put in a designated location in HDFS, and is read during the startup of the `impalad` daemon when you specify both the `-server_name` and `-authorization_policy_file` startup options. It controls which objects (databases, tables, and HDFS directory paths) can be accessed by the user who connects to `impalad`, and what operations that user can perform on the objects.

**Note:**

In CDH 5 and higher, Cloudera recommends managing privileges through SQL statements, as described in [Using Impala with the Sentry Service (or higher only)](page 418). If you are still using policy files, plan to migrate to the new approach some time in the future.

The location of the policy file is listed in the `auth-site.xml` configuration file. To minimize overhead, the security information from this file is cached by each `impalad` daemon and refreshed automatically, with a default interval of 5 minutes. After making a substantial change to security policies, restart all Impala daemons to pick up the changes immediately.

**Policy File Location and Format**

The policy file uses the familiar `.ini` format, divided into the major sections `[groups]` and `[roles]`. There is also an optional `[databases]` section, which allows you to specify a specific policy file for a particular database, as explained in [Using Multiple Policy Files for Different Databases](page 422). Another optional section, `[users]`, allows you to
override the OS-level mapping of users to groups; that is an advanced technique primarily for testing and debugging, and is beyond the scope of this document.

In the `[groups]` section, you define various categories of users and select which roles are associated with each category. The group and usernames correspond to Linux groups and users on the server where the `impalad` daemon runs.

The group and usernames in the `[groups]` section correspond to Linux groups and users on the server where the `impalad` daemon runs. When you access Impala through the `impalad` interpreter, for purposes of authorization, the user is the logged-in Linux user and the groups are the Linux groups that user is a member of. When you access Impala through the ODBC or JDBC interfaces, the user and password specified through the connection string are used as login credentials for the Linux server, and authorization is based on that username and the associated Linux group membership.

In the `[roles]` section, you specify a set of roles. For each role, you specify precisely the set of privileges is available. That is, which objects users with that role can access, and what operations they can perform on those objects. This is the lowest-level category of security information; the other sections in the policy file map the privileges to higher-level divisions of groups and users. In the `[groups]` section, you specify which roles are associated with which groups. The group and usernames correspond to Linux groups and users on the server where the `impalad` daemon runs. The privileges are specified using patterns like:

```
server=server_name->db=database_name->table=table_name->action=SELECT
server=server_name->db=database_name->table=table_name->action=CREATE
server=server_name->db=database_name->table=table_name->action=ALL
```

For the `server_name` value, substitute the same symbolic name you specify with the `impalad` `-server_name` option. You can use `*` wildcard characters at each level of the privilege specification to allow access to all such objects. For example:

```
server=impala-host.example.com->db=default->table=t1->action=SELECT
server=impala-host.example.com->db=*->table=*->action=CREATE
server=impala-host.example.com->db=*->table=audit_log->action=SELECT
server=impala-host.example.com->db=default->table=t1->action=*
```

When authorization is enabled, Impala uses the policy file as a whitelist, representing every privilege available to any user on any object. That is, only operations specified for the appropriate combination of object, role, group, and user are allowed; all other operations are not allowed. If a group or role is defined multiple times in the policy file, the last definition takes precedence.

To understand the notion of whitelisting, set up a minimal policy file that does not provide any privileges for any object. When you connect to an Impala node where this policy file is in effect, you get no results for `SHOW DATABASES`, and an error when you issue any `SHOW TABLES`, `USE database_name`, `DESCRIBE table_name`, `SELECT`, and or other statements that expect to access databases or tables, even if the corresponding databases and tables exist.

The contents of the policy file are cached, to avoid a performance penalty for each query. The policy file is re-checked by each `impalad` node every 5 minutes. When you make a non-time-sensitive change such as adding new privileges or new users, you can let the change take effect automatically a few minutes later. If you remove or reduce privileges, and want the change to take effect immediately, restart the `impalad` daemon on all nodes, again specifying the `-server_name` and `-authorization_policy_file` options so that the rules from the updated policy file are applied.

Examples of Policy File Rules for Security Scenarios

The following examples show rules that might go in the policy file to deal with various authorization-related scenarios. For illustration purposes, this section shows several very small policy files with only a few rules each. In your environment, typically you would define many roles to cover all the scenarios involving your own databases, tables, and applications, and a smaller number of groups, whose members are given the privileges from one or more roles.

A User with No Privileges

If a user has no privileges at all, that user cannot access any schema objects in the system. The error messages do not disclose the names or existence of objects that the user is not authorized to read.
This is the experience you want a user to have if they somehow log into a system where they are not an authorized Impala user. In a real deployment with a filled-in policy file, a user might have no privileges because they are not a member of any of the relevant groups mentioned in the policy file.

Examples of Privileges for Administrative Users

When an administrative user has broad access to tables or databases, the associated rules in the [roles] section typically use wildcards and/or inheritance. For example, in the following sample policy file, `db=*` refers to all databases and `db=*->table=*` refers to all tables in all databases.

Omitting the rightmost portion of a rule means that the privileges apply to all the objects that could be specified there. For example, in the following sample policy file, the `all_databases` role has all privileges for all tables in all databases, while the `one_database` role has all privileges for all tables in one specific database. The `all_databases` role does not grant privileges on URIs, so a group with that role could not issue a `CREATE TABLE` statement with a `LOCATION` clause. The `entire_server` role has all privileges on both databases and URIs within the server.

[groups]
supergroup = all_databases

[roles]
read_all_tables = server=server1->db=*->table=*
all_tables = server=server1->db=*->table=* 
all_databases = server=server1->db=* 
one_database = server=server1->db=test_db 
entire_server = server=server1

A User with Privileges for Specific Databases and Tables

If a user has privileges for specific tables in specific databases, the user can access those things but nothing else. They can see the tables and their parent databases in the output of `SHOW TABLES` and `SHOW DATABASES`, use the appropriate databases, and perform the relevant actions (`SELECT` and/or `INSERT`) based on the table privileges. To actually create a table requires the `ALL` privilege at the database level, so you might define separate roles for the user that sets up a schema and other users or applications that perform day-to-day operations on the tables.

The following sample policy file shows some of the syntax that is appropriate as the policy file grows, such as the # comment syntax, \ continuation syntax, and comma separation for roles assigned to groups or privileges assigned to roles.

[group]
cloudera = training_sysadmin, instructor
visitor = student

[roles]
training_sysadmin = server=server1->db=training, 
server=server1->db=instructor_private, 
server=server1->db=lesson_development
instructor = server=server1->db=training->table=*
server=server1->db=instructor_private->table=*
server=server1->db=lesson_development->table=lesson*
# This particular course is all about queries, so the students can SELECT but not INSERT or CREATE/DROP.
student = server=server1->db=training->table=lesson_*
action=SELECT

Privileges for Working with External Data Files

When data is being inserted through the `LOAD DATA` statement, or is referenced from an HDFS location outside the normal Impala database directories, the user also needs appropriate permissions on the URIs corresponding to those HDFS locations.

In this sample policy file:

- The `external_table` role lets us insert into and query the Impala table, `external_table.sample`.
- The `staging_dir` role lets us specify the HDFS path `/user/cloudera/external_data` with the `LOAD DATA` statement. Remember, when Impala queries or loads data files, it operates on all the files in that directory, not just a single file, so any Impala `LOCATION` parameters refer to a directory rather than an individual file.
• We included the IP address and port of the Hadoop name node in the HDFS URI of the staging_dir rule. We found those details in /etc/hadoop/conf/core-site.xml, under the fs.default.name element. That is what we use in any roles that specify URIs (that is, the locations of directories in HDFS).

• We start this example after the table external_table.sample is already created. In the policy file for the example, we have already taken away the external_table_admin role from the cloudera group, and replaced it with the lesser-privileged external_table role.

• We assign privileges to a subdirectory underneath /user/cloudera in HDFS, because such privileges also apply to any subdirectories underneath. If we had assigned privileges to the parent directory /user/cloudera, it would be too likely to mess up other files by specifying a wrong location by mistake.

• The cloudera under the [groups] section refers to the cloudera group. (In the demo VM used for this example, there is a cloudera user that is a member of a cloudera group.)

Policy file:

```
[groups]
cloudera = external_table, staging_dir

[roles]
external_table_admin = server=server1->db=external_table
external_table = server=server1->db=external_table->table=sample->action=* 
staging_dir = server=server1->uri=hdfs://127.0.0.1:8020/user/cloudera/external_data->action=* 
```

impala-shell session:

```
[localhost:21000] > use external_table;
Query: use external_table
[localhost:21000] > show tables;
Query: show tables
Query finished, fetching results ...
+--------+
| name   |
+--------+
| sample |
+--------+
Returned 1 row(s) in 0.02s

[localhost:21000] > select * from sample;
Query: select * from sample
Query finished, fetching results ...
+-----+
| x   |
+-----+
| 1   |
| 5   |
| 150 |
+-----+
Returned 3 row(s) in 1.04s

[localhost:21000] > load data inpath '/user/cloudera/external_data' into table sample;
Query: load data inpath '/user/cloudera/external_data' into table sample
Query finished, fetching results ...
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| summary                                                  |
| Loaded 1 file(s). Total files in destination location: 2 |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Returned 1 row(s) in 0.26s

[localhost:21000] > select * from sample;
Query: select * from sample
Query finished, fetching results ...
+-------+
| x     |
+-------+
| 2     |
| 4     |
| 6     |
| 8     |
```
Configuring Authorization

Separating Administrator Responsibility from Read and Write Privileges

Remember that to create a database requires full privilege on that database, while day-to-day operations on tables within that database can be performed with lower levels of privilege on specific table. Thus, you might set up separate roles for each database or application: an administrative one that could create or drop the database, and a user-level one that can access only the relevant tables.

For example, this policy file divides responsibilities between users in 3 different groups:

- Members of the supergroup group have the training_sysadmin role and so can set up a database named training.
- Members of the cloudera group have the instructor role and so can create, insert into, and query any tables in the training database, but cannot create or drop the database itself.
- Members of the visitor group have the student role and so can query those tables in the training database.

```
[group]
   supergroup = training_sysadmin
   cloudera = instructor
   visitor = student

[roles]
   training_sysadmin = server=server1->db=training
   instructor = server=server1->db=training->table=*->action=* 
   student = server=server1->db=training->table=*->action=SELECT
```

Using Multiple Policy Files for Different Databases

For an Impala cluster with many databases being accessed by many users and applications, it might be cumbersome to update the security policy file for each privilege change or each new database, table, or view. You can allow security to be managed separately for individual databases, by setting up a separate policy file for each database:

- Add the optional [databases] section to the main policy file.
- Add entries in the [databases] section for each database that has its own policy file.
- For each listed database, specify the HDFS path of the appropriate policy file.

For example:

```
[databases]
# Defines the location of the per-DB policy files for the 'customers' and 'sales' databases.
   customers = hdfs://ha-nn-uri/etc/access/customers.ini
   sales = hdfs://ha-nn-uri/etc/access/sales.ini
```

To enable URIs in per-DB policy files, add the following string in the Cloudera Manager field Impala Service Environment Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve):

```
JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS="-Dsentry.allow.uri.db.policyfile=true"
```
Important: Enabling URIs in per-DB policy files introduces a security risk by allowing the owner of the db-level policy file to grant himself/herself load privileges to anything the impala user has read permissions for in HDFS (including data in other databases controlled by different db-level policy files).

Setting Up Schema Objects for a Secure Impala Deployment

Remember that in your role definitions, you specify privileges at the level of individual databases and tables, or all databases or all tables within a database. To simplify the structure of these rules, plan ahead of time how to name your schema objects so that data with different authorization requirements is divided into separate databases.

If you are adding security on top of an existing Impala deployment, remember that you can rename tables or even move them between databases using the `ALTER TABLE` statement. In Impala, creating new databases is a relatively inexpensive operation, basically just creating a new directory in HDFS.

You can also plan the security scheme and set up the policy file before the actual schema objects named in the policy file exist. Because the authorization capability is based on whitelisting, a user can only create a new database or table if the required privilege is already in the policy file: either by listing the exact name of the object being created, or a * wildcard to match all the applicable objects within the appropriate container.

Privilege Model and Object Hierarchy

Privileges can be granted on different objects in the schema. Any privilege that can be granted is associated with a level in the object hierarchy. If a privilege is granted on a container object in the hierarchy, the child object automatically inherits it. This is the same privilege model as Hive and other database systems such as MySQL.

The kinds of objects in the schema hierarchy are:

- Server
- URI
- Database
- Table

The server name is specified by the `-server_name` option when `impalad` starts. Specify the same name for all `impalad` nodes in the cluster.

URIs represent the file paths you specify as part of statements such as `CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE` and `LOAD DATA`. Typically, you specify what look like UNIX paths, but these locations can also be prefixed with `hdfs://` to make clear that they are really URIs. To set privileges for a URI, specify the name of a directory, and the privilege applies to all the files in that directory and any directories underneath it.

In and higher, you can specify privileges for individual columns, as described in Column-level Authorization on page 382. Formerly, to specify read privileges at this level, you created a view that queried specific columns and/or partitions from a base table, and gave `SELECT` privilege on the view but not the underlying table.

URIs must start with `hdfs://`, `s3a://`, `adl://`, or `file://`. If a URI starts with an absolute path, the path will be appended to the default filesystem prefix. For example, if you specify:

```
GRANT ALL ON URI '/tmp';
```

The above statement effectively becomes the following where the default filesystem is HDFS.

```
GRANT ALL ON URI 'hdfs://localhost:20500/tmp';
```

When defining URIs for HDFS, you must also specify the NameNode. For example:

```
data_read = server=server1->uri=file:///path/to/dir, 
server=server1->uri=hdfs://namenode:port/path/to/dir
```
Warning:
Because the NameNode host and port must be specified, Cloudera strongly recommends you use High Availability (HA). This ensures that the URI will remain constant even if the NameNode changes.

```
data_read = server=server1->uri=file:///path/to/dir,\n   server=server1->uri=hdfs://ha-nn-uri/path/to/dir
```

**Table 51: Valid privilege types and objects they apply to**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Privilege</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td>DB, TABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>DB, TABLE, COLUMN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>SERVER, TABLE, DB, URI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
Although this document refers to the **ALL** privilege, currently if you use the policy file mode, you do not use the actual keyword **ALL** in the policy file. When you code role entries in the policy file:

- To specify the **ALL** privilege for a server, use a role like `server=server_name`.
- To specify the **ALL** privilege for a database, use a role like `server=server_name->db=database_name`.
- To specify the **ALL** privilege for a table, use a role like `server=server_name->db=database_name->table=table_name->action=`.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Privileges</th>
<th>URI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXPLAIN</td>
<td>TABLE; COLUMN</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOAD DATA</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>INSERT</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE DATABASE</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP DATABASE</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE TABLE</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESCRIBE TABLE</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. ADD COLUMNS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. REPLACE COLUMNS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. CHANGE column</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. RENAME</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE .. SET TBLPROPERTIES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Privileges</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE . SET FILEFORMAT</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE . SET LOCATION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE . ADD PARTITION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE . ADD PARTITION location</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE . DROP PARTITION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE . PARTITION SET FILEFORMAT</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE . SET SERDEPROPERTIES</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE VIEW</td>
<td>DATABASE; SELECT on TABLE;</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-This operation is allowed if you have column-level SELECT access to the columns being used.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP VIEW</td>
<td>VIEW/TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER VIEW</td>
<td>You need ALL privilege on the named view and the parent database, plus SELECT privilege for any tables or views referenced by the view query. Once the view is created or altered by a high-privileged system administrator, it can be queried by a lower-privileged user who does not have full query privileges for the base tables.</td>
<td>ALL, SELECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTER TABLE . SET LOCATION</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL on DATABASE</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE</td>
<td>Database (ALL), URI (SELECT)</td>
<td>ALL, SELECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td>VIEW/TABLE; COLUMN</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-You can grant the SELECT privilege on a view to give users access to specific columns of a table they do not otherwise have access to.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USE &lt;dbName&gt;</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE FUNCTION</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROP FUNCTION</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFRESH &lt;table name&gt; or REFRESH &lt;table name&gt; PARTITION (&lt;partition_spec&gt;)</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVALIDATE METADATA</td>
<td>SERVER</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Privileges</td>
<td>URI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVALIDATE METADATA &lt;table name&gt;</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPUTE STATS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW TABLE STATS, SHOW PARTITIONS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW COLUMN STATS</td>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>SELECT/INSERT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>SELECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW TABLES</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>No special privileges needed to issue the statement, but only shows objects you are authorized for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOW DATABASES, SHOW SCHEMAS</td>
<td>DATABASE</td>
<td>No special privileges needed to issue the statement, but only shows objects you are authorized for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Debugging Failed Sentry Authorization Requests

Sentry logs all facts that lead up to authorization decisions at the debug level. If you do not understand why Sentry is denying access, the best way to debug is to temporarily turn on debug logging:

- In Cloudera Manager, add `log4j.logger.org.apache.sentry=DEBUG` to the logging settings for your service through the corresponding Logging Safety Valve field for the Impala, Hive Server 2, or Solr Server services.
- On systems not managed by Cloudera Manager, add `log4j.logger.org.apache.sentry=DEBUG` to the `log4j.properties` file on each host in the cluster, in the appropriate configuration directory for each service.

Specifically, look for exceptions and messages such as:

```
FilePermission server..., RequestPermission server...., result [true|false]
```

which indicate each evaluation Sentry makes. The `FilePermission` is from the policy file, while `RequestPermission` is the privilege required for the query. A `RequestPermission` will iterate over all appropriate `FilePermission` settings until a match is found. If no matching privilege is found, Sentry returns `false` indicating “Access Denied”.

### Managing Sentry for Impala through Cloudera Manager

To enable the Sentry service for Impala and Hive, set `Hive/Impala > Service-Wide > Sentry Service` parameter to the Sentry service. Then restart Impala and Hive. Simply adding Sentry service as a dependency and restarting enables Impala and Hive to use the Sentry service.

To set the server name to use when granting server level privileges, set the `Hive > Service-Wide > Advanced > Server Name for Sentry Authorization` parameter. When using Sentry with the Hive Metastore, you can specify the list of users that are allowed to bypass Sentry Authorization in Hive Metastore using `Hive > Service-Wide > Security > Bypass Sentry Authorization Users`. These are usually service users that already ensure all activity has been authorized.

### Note:

The `Hive/Impala > Service-Wide > Policy File Based Sentry` tab contains parameters only relevant to configuring Sentry using policy files. In particular, make sure that `Enable Sentry Authorization using Policy Files` parameter is unchecked when using the Sentry service. Cloudera Manager throws a validation error if you attempt to configure the Sentry service and policy file at the same time.
The DEFAULT Database in a Secure Deployment

Because of the extra emphasis on granular access controls in a secure deployment, you should move any important or sensitive information out of the DEFAULT database into a named database whose privileges are specified in the policy file. Sometimes you might need to give privileges on the DEFAULT database for administrative reasons; for example, as a place you can reliably specify with a USE statement when preparing to drop a database.

Configuring Sentry Authorization for Cloudera Search

Sentry enables role-based, fine-grained authorization for Cloudera Search. Sentry can apply a range of restrictions to various actions, such as accessing data, managing configurations through config objects, or creating collections. Restrictions are consistently applied, regardless of how users attempt to complete actions. For example, restricting access to data in a collection restricts that access whether queries come from the command line, a browser, Hue, or through the admin console. For additional information on Sentry, see Authority With Apache Sentry on page 351.

- This configuration process can be completed using either Cloudera Manager or the command-line instructions.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. If you use an earlier version of CDH, see the documentation for that version located at Cloudera Documentation.

Follow the instructions below to configure Sentry for Solr.

Note: Sentry for Search depends on Kerberos authentication. For additional information on using Kerberos with Search, see Solr Authentication on page 163.

Setting Sentry Admins for Solr

If you are using the Sentry service (instead of a Sentry policy file), policies for Solr can be managed using the solrctl sentry command. To use this functionality, you must first designate a Sentry admin.

In Cloudera Manager:

1. Navigate to the Sentry service configuration page (Sentry service > Configuration).
2. In the Admin Groups field, add the name of a group to which you want to grant Sentry admin rights.
3. In the Allowed Connecting Users field, add the users to which you want to grant Sentry admin rights. These users must be members of at least one of the groups specified in the Admin Groups field.
4. Click Save Changes.
5. Restart the Sentry service (Sentry service > Actions > Restart).

If you are using the Sentry service without Cloudera Manager:

1. Edit sentry-site.xml file as follows:
   a. Add the Sentry admin group to the comma-separated list of groups in the sentry.service.admin.group property.
   b. Add the Sentry admin users to the comma-separated list of users in the sentry.service.allow.connect property.
2. Restart the Sentry service:

   bin/sentry --command service --conffile /path/to/sentry-site.xml

Using Roles and Privileges with Sentry

Sentry uses a role-based privilege model. A role is assigned a set of rules for accessing a given Solr collection or Solr config. Access to each collection is controlled by three privileges: Query, Update, and *. The wildcard (*) privilege indicates all privileges.

In contrast, access to config objects is controlled by a single privilege, *, meaning all privileges.

You can also use the wildcard (*) to specify all config objects or collections when granting privileges. The following example syntax applies to both native Sentry privileges and file-based privileges, though native Sentry privileges are
For example:

- A rule for the Query privilege on collection named logs is formulated as follows:
  
  ```
  collection=logs->action=Query
  ```

- A rule for the * privilege, meaning all privileges, on the config named myConfig is formulated as follows:
  
  ```
  config=myConfig->action=*  
  ```

  No action implies *. Because config objects only support the * action, the following config privilege is invalid:
  
  ```
  config=myConfig->action=Update
  ```

- A rule granting all collections the Query privilege is formulated as follows:
  
  ```
  collection=*->action=Query
  ```

  Config objects cannot be combined with collection objects in a single privilege. For example, the following combinations are invalid:

  ```
  config=myConfig->collection=myCollection->action=*  
  collection=myCollection->config=myConfig
  ```

  You must specify these privileges separately. For example:

  ```
  myRole = collection=myCollection->action=QUERY, config=myConfig->action=*  
  ```

  A role can contain multiple such rules, separated by commas. For example, the engineer_role might contain the Query privilege for hive_logs and hbase_logs collections, and the Update privilege for the current_bugs collection. This example is formulated as follows:

  ```
  engineer_role = collection=hive_logs->action=Query, collection=hbase_logs->action=Query, collection=current_bugs->action=Update
  ```

Using Users and Groups with Sentry

- A user is an entity that is permitted by the Kerberos authentication system to access the Search service.
- A group connects the authentication system with the authorization system. It is a set of one or more users who have been granted one or more authorization roles. Sentry allows a set of roles to be configured for a group.
- A configured group provider specifies how group membership is determined. Sentry supports HDFS-backed groups and locally configured groups. For example,

  ```
  dev_ops = dev_role, ops_role
  ```

  Here the group dev_ops is granted the roles dev_role and ops_role. The members of this group can perform the actions that are allowed by these roles.

User to Group Mapping

You can configure Sentry to use either Hadoop groups or groups defined in the policy file.
Important: You can not use both Hadoop groups and local groups at the same time. Local groups are useful for proof-of-concept testing. For production environments, use Hadoop groups.

To configure Hadoop groups:


By default, this uses local shell groups. See the Group Mapping section of the HDFS Permissions Guide for more information.

In this case, Sentry uses the Hadoop configuration described in Configuring LDAP Group Mappings on page 347. Cloudera Manager automatically uses this configuration. In a deployment not managed by Cloudera Manager, manually set these configuration parameters in the `hadoop-conf` file that is passed to Solr.

OR

To configure local groups:

1. Define local groups in a `[users]` section of the Sentry Policy file. For example:

   ```
   [users]
   user1 = group1, group2, group3
   user2 = group2, group3
   ```

2. In `sentry-site.xml`, set `search.sentry.provider` as follows:

   ```
   <property>
   <name>sentry.provider</name>
   <value>org.apache.sentry.provider.file.LocalGroupResourceAuthorizationProvider</value>
   </property>
   ```

Sample Sentry Configuration

This section provides sample configurations.

Using Solr with the Sentry Service

In CDH 5.8, Cloudera Search adds support for storing permissions in the Sentry service. You can enable storing permissions in the Sentry service by Enabling the Sentry Service for Solr on page 371. If you have already configured Sentry’s policy file-based approach, you can migrate existing authorization settings as described in Migrating from Sentry Policy Files to the Sentry Service on page 368. `solrctl` has been extended to support:

- Migrating existing policy files to the Sentry service
- Managing managing permissions in the Sentry service

The following is an example of the commands used to configure Sentry for Solr using `solrctl` `sentry` command. These commands should be run on a host with a Solr Gateway role.

These sample commands that follow illustrate establishing two different roles, each of which have different access requirements. The process of creating roles, adding roles to groups, and granting privileges to roles is a typical workflow used to provide different groups varied degrees of access to resources. For reference information, see `solrctl Reference`.

Begin by creating roles. The following command creates `ops_role` and `dev_ops_role`:

```
solrctl sentry --create-role ops_role
solrctl sentry --create-role dev_ops_role
```
Next, add existing Hadoop groups to the roles you created. The following command adds `ops_role` to the existing `ops_group` Hadoop group and adds `dev_ops_role` to the existing `dev_ops_group` Hadoop group:

```
solrctl sentry --add-role-group ops_role ops_group
solrctl sentry --add-role-group dev_ops_role dev_ops_group
```

Finally, add privileges to collections and configs to roles. The following command adds the `QUERY` privilege to `ops_role` for the `logs` collection and all privileges (meaning `QUERY` and `UPDATE`) to the `dev_ops_role` for all (`*`) collections:

```
solrctl sentry --grant-privilege ops_role 'collection=logs->action=Query'
solrctl sentry --grant-privilege dev_ops_role 'collection=*->action=*
```

Using Solr with a Policy File

Use separate policy files for each Sentry-enabled service. Using one file for multiple services results in each service failing on the other services' entries. For example, with a combined Hive and Search file, Search would fail on Hive entries and Hive would fail on Search entries.

Sentry with Search does not support multiple policy files. Other implementations of Sentry such as Sentry for Hive do support different policy files for different databases, but Sentry for Search has no such support for multiple policies.

The following is an example of a Search policy file. The This location must be readable by Solr.

```
sentry-provider.ini

[groups]
# Assigns each Hadoop group to its set of roles
engineer = engineer_role
ops = ops_role
dev_ops = engineer_role, ops_role
hbase_admin = hbase_admin_role

[roles]
# The following grants all access to source_code.
# "collection = source_code" can also be used as syntactic
# sugar for "collection = source_code->action="
engineer_role = collection = source_code->action="

# The following imply more restricted access.
ops_role = collection = hive_logs->action=Query
dev_ops_role = collection = hbase_logs->action=Query

give hbase_admin_role the ability to create/delete/modify the hbase_logs collection
as well as to update the config for the hbase_logs collection, called hbase_logs_config.
hbase_admin_role = collection=admin->action=*, collection=hbase_logs->action=*,
config=hbase_logs_config->action="
```

Sentry Configuration File

Sentry can store configuration as well as privilege policies in files. The `sentry-site.xml` file contains configuration options such as privilege policy file location. The policy files contains the privileges and groups. It has a `.ini` file format and should be stored on HDFS.

The following is an example of a `sentry-site.xml` file.

```
sentry-site.xml

<configuration>
<property>
  <name>hive.sentry.provider</name>
</property>

<property>
  <name>sentry.solr.provider.resource</name>
  <value>/path/to/authz-provider.ini</value>
</property>
</configuration>
```
Using Policy Files with Sentry

This section contains notes on creating and maintaining the policy file.

Storing the Policy File

Considerations for storing the policy file(s) include:

1. Replication count - Because Sentry reads the file for each query, you should increase this. 10 is a reasonable value.
2. Updating the file - Updates to the file are only reflected when the Solr process is restarted.

Defining Roles

Keep in mind that role definitions are not cumulative. The newer definition replaces the older one. For example, consider the following definition:

```
role1 = privilege1
role1 = privilege2
```

This definition results in `role1` having `privilege2`, not `privilege1` and `privilege2`.

Providing Document-Level Security Using Sentry

For role-based access control of a collection, an administrator modifies a Sentry role so it has query, update, or administrative access.

Collection-level authorization is useful when the access control requirements for the documents in the collection are the same, but users may want to restrict access to a subset of documents in a collection. This finer-grained restriction can be achieved by defining separate collections for each subset, but this is difficult to manage, requires duplicate documents for each collection, and requires that these documents be kept synchronized.

Document-level access control solves this issue by associating authorization tokens with each document in the collection. This enables granting Sentry roles access to sets of documents in a collection.

Document-Level Security Model

Document-level security depends on a chain of relationships between users, groups, roles, and documents.

- Users are assigned to groups.
- Groups are assigned to roles.
- Roles are stored as "authorization tokens" in a specified field in the documents.

Document-level security supports restricting which documents can be viewed by which users. Access is provided by adding roles as "authorization tokens" to a specified document field. Conversely, access is implicitly denied by omitting roles from the specified field. In other words, in a document-level security enabled environment, a user might submit a query that matches a document; if the user is not part of a group that has a role that has been granted access to the document, the result is not returned.

For example, Alice might belong to the administrators group. The administrators group may belong to the doc-mgmt role. A document could be ingested and the doc-mgmt role could be added at ingest time. In such a case, if Alice submitted a query that matched the document, Search would return the document, since Alice is then allowed to see any document with the "doc-mgmt" authorization token.

Similarly, Bob might belong to the guests group. The guests group may belong to the public-browser role. If Bob tried the same query as Alice, but the document did not have the public-browser role, Search would not return the result because Bob does not belong to a group that is associated with a role that has access.
Note that collection-level authorization rules still apply, if enabled. Even if Alice is able to view a document given document-level authorization rules, if she is not allowed to query the collection, the query will fail.

Roles are typically added to documents when those documents are ingested, either using the standard Solr APIs or, if using morphlines, the `setValues` morphline command.

### Enabling Document-Level Security

Cloudera Search supports document-level security in Search for CDH 5.1 and higher. Document-level security requires collection-level security. Configuring collection-level security is described earlier in this topic.

Document-level security is disabled by default, so the first step in using document-level security is to enable the feature by modifying the `solrconfig.xml` file. Remember to copy this file to `solrconfig.xml`, as described in Enabling Solr as a Client for the Sentry Service Using the Command Line on page 377.

To enable document-level security, change `solrconfig.xml`. The default file contents are as follows:

```xml
<searchComponent name="queryDocAuthorization">
  <!-- Set to true to enabled document-level authorization -->
  <bool name="enabled">false</bool>

  <!-- Field where the auth tokens are stored in the document -->
  <str name="sentryAuthField">sentry_auth</str>

  <!-- Auth token defined to allow any role to access the document. Uncomment to enable. -->
  <!--<str name="allRolesToken">*</str>-->  
</searchComponent>
```

- **The `enabled`** Boolean determines whether document-level authorization is enabled. To enable document level security, change this setting to `true`.
- **The `sentryAuthField`** string specifies the name of the field that is used for storing authorization information. You can use the default setting of `sentry_auth` or you can specify some other string to be used for assigning values during ingest.

**Note:** This field must exist as an explicit or dynamic field in the schema for the collection you are creating with document-level security. `sentry_auth` exists in the default `schema.xml`, which is automatically generated and can be found in the same directory as `solrconfig.xml`. for the collection you are creating with document-level security. `schema.xml` is in the generated configuration in the same directory as the `solrconfig.xml`.

- **The `allRolesToken`** string represents a special token defined to allow any role access to the document. By default, this feature is disabled. To enable this feature, uncomment the specification and specify the token. This token should be different from the name of any sentry role to avoid collision. By default it is `"*"`. This feature is useful when first configuring document level security or it can be useful in granting all roles access to a document when the set of roles may change. See Best Practices on page 432 for additional information.

### Best Practices

**Using `allRolesToken`**

You may want to grant every user that belongs to a role access to certain documents. One way to accomplish this is to specify all known roles in the document, but this requires updating or re-indexing the document if you add a new role. Alternatively, an `allUser` role, specified in the Sentry `.ini` file, could contain all valid groups, but this role would need to be updated every time a new group was added to the system. Instead, specifying `allRolesToken` allows any user that belongs to a valid role to access the document. This access requires no updating as the system evolves.
In addition, allRolesToken may be useful for transitioning a deployment to use document-level security. Instead of having to define all the roles upfront, all the documents can be specified with allRolesToken and later modified as the roles are defined.

**Consequences of Document-Level Authorization Only Affecting Queries**

Document-level security does not prevent users from modifying documents or performing other update operations on the collection. Update operations are only governed by collection-level authorization.

Document-level security can be used to prevent documents being returned in query results. If users are not granted access to a document, those documents are not returned even if that user submits a query that matches those documents. This does not have affect attempted updates.

Consequently, it is possible for a user to not have access to a set of documents based on document-level security, but to still be able to modify the documents using their collection-level authorization update rights. This means that a user can delete all documents in the collection. Similarly, a user might modify all documents, adding their authorization token to each one. After such a modification, the user could access any document using querying. Therefore, if you are restricting access using document-level security, consider granting collection-level update rights only to those users you trust and assume they will be able to access every document in the collection.

**Limitations on Query Size**

By default queries support up to 1024 Boolean clauses. As a result, queries containing more that 1024 clauses may cause errors. Because authorization information is added by Sentry as part of a query, using document-level security can increase the number of clauses. In the case where users belong to many roles, even simple queries can become quite large. If a query is too large, an error of the following form occurs:

```
org.apache.lucene.search.BooleanQuery$TooManyClauses: maxClauseCount is set to 1024
```

To change the supported number of clauses, edit the maxBooleanClauses setting in solrconfig.xml. For example, to allow 2048 clauses, you would edit the setting so it appears as follows:

```
<maxBooleanClauses>2048</maxBooleanClauses>
```

For maxBooleanClauses to be applied as expected, make any change to this value to all collections and then restart the service. You must make this change to all collections because this option modifies a global Lucene property, affecting all Solr cores. If different solrconfig.xml files have different values for this property, the effective value is determined per host, based on the first Solr core to be initialized.

**Enabling Secure Impersonation**

Secure impersonation allows a user to make requests as another user in a secure way. The user who has been granted impersonation rights receives the same access as the user being impersonated.

Configure custom security impersonation settings using the Solr Service Environment Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve). For example, to allow the following impersonations:

- User hue can make requests as any user from any host.
- User foo can make requests as any member of group bar, from host1 or host2.

Enter the following values into the Solr Service Environment Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve):

```
SOLR_SECURITY_ALLOWED_PROXYUSERS=hue,foo
SOLR_SECURITY_PROXYUSER_hue_HOSTS=*
SOLR_SECURITY_PROXYUSER_hue_GROUPS=*  
SOLR_SECURITY_PROXYUSER_foo_HOSTS=host1,host2
SOLR_SECURITY_PROXYUSER_foo_GROUPS=bar
```

SOLR_SECURITY_ALLOWED_PROXYUSERS lists all of the users allowed to impersonate. For a user x in SOLR_SECURITY_ALLOWED_PROXYUSERS, SOLR_SECURITY_PROXYUSER_x_HOSTS list the hosts x is allowed to connect from to impersonate, and SOLR_SECURITY_PROXYUSERS_x_GROUPS lists the groups that the users is allowed
to impersonate members of. Both **GROUPS** and **HOSTS** support the wildcard * and both **GROUPS** and **HOSTS** must be defined for a specific user.

**Note:** Cloudera Manager has its own management of secure impersonation for Hue. To add additional users for Secure Impersonation, use the environment variable safety value for Solr to set the environment variables as above. Be sure to include `hue` in `SOLR_SECURITY_ALLOWED_PROXYUSERS` if you want to use secure impersonation for hue.

### Configuring HBase Authorization

After configuring HBase authentication (as detailed in **HBase Configuration**), you must define rules on resources that is allowed to access. HBase rules can be defined for individual tables, columns, and cells within a table. Cell-level authorization is fully supported since CDH 5.2.

**Important:** In a cluster managed by Cloudera Manager, HBase authorization is disabled by default. You have to enable HBase authorization (as detailed in **Enable HBase Authorization** on page 436) to use any kind of authorization method.

### Understanding HBase Access Levels

HBase access levels are granted independently of each other and allow for different types of operations at a given scope.

- **Read (R)** - can read data at the given scope
- **Write (W)** - can write data at the given scope
- **Execute (X)** - can execute coprocessor endpoints at the given scope
- **Create (C)** - can create tables or drop tables (even those they did not create) at the given scope
- **Admin (A)** - can perform cluster operations such as balancing the cluster or assigning regions at the given scope

The possible scopes are:

- **Superuser** - superusers can perform any operation available in HBase, to any resource. The user who runs HBase on your cluster is a superuser, as are any principals assigned to the configuration property `hbase.superuser` in `hbase-site.xml` on the HMaster.
- **Global** - permissions granted at **global** scope allow the admin to operate on all tables of the cluster.
- **Namespace** - permissions granted at **namespace** scope apply to all tables within a given namespace.
- **Table** - permissions granted at **table** scope apply to data or metadata within a given table.
- **ColumnFamily** - permissions granted at **ColumnFamily** scope apply to cells within that ColumnFamily.
- **Cell** - permissions granted at **Cell** scope apply to that exact cell coordinate. This allows for policy evolution along with data. To change an ACL on a specific cell, write an updated cell with new ACL to the precise coordinates of the original. If you have a multi-versioned schema and want to update ACLs on all visible versions, you'll need to write new cells for all visible versions. The application has complete control over policy evolution. The exception is append and increment processing. Appends and increments can carry an ACL in the operation. If one is included in the operation, then it will be applied to the result of the append or increment. Otherwise, the ACL of the existing cell being appended to or incremented is preserved.

The combination of access levels and scopes creates a matrix of possible access levels that can be granted to a user. In a production environment, it is useful to think of access levels in terms of what is needed to do a specific job. The following list describes appropriate access levels for some common types of HBase users. It is important not to grant more access than is required for a given user to perform their required tasks.

- **Superusers** - In a production system, only the HBase user should have superuser access. In a development environment, an administrator might need superuser access to quickly control and manage the cluster. However, this type of administrator should usually be a **Global Admin** rather than a superuser.
• **Global Admins** - A global admin can perform tasks and access every table in HBase. In a typical production environment, an admin should not have Read or Write permissions to data within tables.
  
  – A global admin with Admin permissions can perform cluster-wide operations on the cluster, such as balancing, assigning or unassigning regions, or calling an explicit major compaction. This is an operations role.
  
  – A global admin with Create permissions can create or drop any table within HBase. This is more of a DBA-type role.

In a production environment, it is likely that different users will have only one of Admin and Create permissions.

**Warning:**

In the current implementation, a Global Admin with Admin permission can grant himself Read and Write permissions on a table and gain access to that table's data. For this reason, only grant Global Admin permissions to trusted user who actually need them.

Also be aware that a Global Admin with Create permission can perform a Put operation on the ACL table, simulating a grant or revoke and circumventing the authorization check for Global Admin permissions. This issue (but not the first one) is fixed in CDH 5.3 and higher, as well as CDH 5.2.1.

Due to these issues, be cautious with granting Global Admin privileges.

• **Namespace Admin** - a namespace admin with Create permissions can create or drop tables within that namespace, and take and restore snapshots. A namespace admin with Admin permissions can perform operations such as splits or major compactions on tables within that namespace. Prior to CDH 5.4, only global admins could create namespaces. In CDH 5.4, any user with Namespace Create privileges can create namespaces.

• **Table Admins** - A table admin can perform administrative operations only on that table. A table admin with Create permissions can create snapshots from that table or restore that table from a snapshot. A table admin with Admin permissions can perform operations such as splits or major compactions on that table.

• **Users** - Users can read or write data, or both. Users can also execute coprocessor endpoints, if given Executable permissions.

**Important:**

If you are using Kerberos principal names when setting ACLs for users, Hadoop uses only the first part (short) of the Kerberos principal when converting it to the username. Hence, for the principal ann/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM, HBase ACLs should only be set for user ann.

The following table shows some typical job descriptions at a hypothetical company and the permissions they might require to get their jobs done using HBase.

**Table 52: Real-World Example of Access Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Title</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Administrator</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Admin, Create</td>
<td>Manages the cluster and gives access to Junior Administrators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Administrator</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Create</td>
<td>Creates tables and gives access to Table Administrators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table Administrator</td>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td>Maintains a table from an operations point of view.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Configuring Authorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Title</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data Analyst</td>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Read</td>
<td>Creates reports from HBase data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web Application</td>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Read, Write</td>
<td>Puts data into HBase and uses HBase data to perform operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Further Reading
- Access Control Matrix
- Security - Apache HBase Reference Guide

### Enable HBase Authorization

HBase authorization is built on top of the Coprocessors framework, specifically AccessController Coprocessor.

**Note:** Once the Access Controller coprocessor is enabled, any user who uses the HBase shell will be subject to access control. Access control will also be in effect for native (Java API) client access to HBase.

#### Enable HBase Authorization Using Cloudera Manager

1. Go to Clusters and select the HBase cluster.
2. Select Configuration.
4. Search for HBase Service Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for hbase-site.xml and enter the following into it to enable hbase.security.exec.permission.checks. Without this option, all users will continue to have access to execute endpoint coprocessors. This option is not enabled when you enable HBase Secure Authorization for backward compatibility.
   ```xml
   <property>
   <name>hbase.security.exec.permission.checks</name>
   <value>true</value>
   </property>
   ```
5. Optionally, search for and configure HBase Coprocessor Master Classes and HBase Coprocessor Region Classes.

#### Enable HBase Authorization Using the Command Line

**Important:**
- Follow these command-line instructions on systems that do not use Cloudera Manager.
- This information applies specifically to CDH 5.12.x. See Cloudera Documentation for information specific to other releases.

To enable HBase authorization, add the following properties to the hbase-site.xml file on every HBase server host (Master or RegionServer):

```xml
<property>
   <name>hbase.security.authorization</name>
   <value>true</value>
</property>
<property>
   <name>hbase.security.exec.permission.checks</name>
   <value>true</value>
</property>
```
Configure Access Control Lists for Authorization

Now that HBase has the security coprocessor enabled, you can set ACLs using the HBase shell. Start the HBase shell as usual.

Important:
The host running the shell must be configured with a keytab file as described in Configuring Kerberos Authentication for HBase.

The commands that control ACLs take the following form. Group names are prefixed with the @ symbol.

```
hbase> grant <user> <permissions> [ @<namespace> [ <table>[ <column family>[ <column qualifier> ] ] ] ] ]   # grants permissions
hbase> revoke <user> <permissions> [ @<namespace> [ <table> [ <column family> [ <column qualifier> ] ] ] ] ]   # revokes permissions
hbase> user_permission <table>
    # displays existing permissions
```

In the above commands, fields encased in <> are variables, and fields in [] are optional. The permissions variable must consist of zero or more character from the set "RWCA".

- R denotes read permissions, which is required to perform Get, Scan, or Exists calls in a given scope.
- W denotes write permissions, which is required to perform Put, Delete, LockRow, UnlockRow, IncrementColumnValue, CheckAndDelete, CheckAndPut, Flush, or Compact in a given scope.
- X denotes execute permissions, which is required to execute coprocessor endpoints.
- C denotes create permissions, which is required to perform Create, Alter, or Drop in a given scope.
- A denotes admin permissions, which is required to perform Enable, Disable, Snapshot, Restore, Clone, Split, MajorCompact, Grant, Revoke, and Shutdown in a given scope.

Access Control List Example Commands

```
grant 'user1', 'RWC'
grant 'user2', 'RW', 'tableA'
grant 'user3', 'C', '@my_namespace'
```

Be sure to review the information in Understanding HBase Access Levels on page 434 to understand the implications of the different access levels.
Overview of Impala Security

Impala includes a fine-grained authorization framework for Hadoop, based on the Sentry open source project. Sentry authorization was added in Impala 1.1.0. Together with the Kerberos authentication framework, Sentry takes Hadoop security to a new level needed for the requirements of highly regulated industries such as healthcare, financial services, and government. Impala also includes an auditing capability; Impala generates the audit data, the Cloudera Navigator product consolidates the audit data from all nodes in the cluster, and Cloudera Manager lets you filter, visualize, and produce reports. The auditing feature was added in Impala 1.1.1.

The Impala security features have several objectives. At the most basic level, security prevents accidents or mistakes that could disrupt application processing, delete or corrupt data, or reveal data to unauthorized users. More advanced security features and practices can harden the system against malicious users trying to gain unauthorized access or perform other disallowed operations. The auditing feature provides a way to confirm that no unauthorized access occurred, and detect whether any such attempts were made. This is a critical set of features for production deployments in large organizations that handle important or sensitive data. It sets the stage for multi-tenancy, where multiple applications run concurrently and are prevented from interfering with each other.

The material in this section presumes that you are already familiar with administering secure Linux systems. That is, you should know the general security practices for Linux and Hadoop, and their associated commands and configuration files. For example, you should know how to create Linux users and groups, manage Linux group membership, set Linux and HDFS file permissions and ownership, and designate the default permissions and ownership for new files. You should be familiar with the configuration of the nodes in your Hadoop cluster, and know how to apply configuration changes or run a set of commands across all the nodes.

The security features are divided into these broad categories:

authorization

Which users are allowed to access which resources, and what operations are they allowed to perform? Impala relies on the open source Sentry project for authorization. By default (when authorization is not enabled), Impala does all read and write operations with the privileges of the impala user, which is suitable for a development/test environment but not for a secure production environment. When authorization is enabled, Impala uses the OS user ID of the user who runs impala-shell or other client program, and associates various privileges with each user. See Enabling Sentry Authorization for Impala on page 416 for details about setting up and managing authorization.

authentication

How does Impala verify the identity of the user to confirm that they really are allowed to exercise the privileges assigned to that user? Impala relies on the Kerberos subsystem for authentication. See Enabling Kerberos Authentication for Impala on page 153 for details about setting up and managing authentication.

auditing

What operations were attempted, and did they succeed or not? This feature provides a way to look back and diagnose whether attempts were made to perform unauthorized operations. You use this information to track down suspicious activity, and to see where changes are needed in authorization policies. The audit data produced by this feature is collected by the Cloudera Manager product and then presented in a user-friendly form by the Cloudera Manager product. See Auditing Impala Operations for details about setting up and managing auditing.

These other topics in the Security Guide cover how Impala integrates with security frameworks such as Kerberos, LDAP, and Sentry:

- Impala Authentication on page 152
- Enabling Sentry Authorization for Impala on page 416

Security Guidelines for Impala

The following are the major steps to harden a cluster running Impala against accidents and mistakes, or malicious attackers trying to access sensitive data:
• Secure the root account. The root user can tamper with the impalad daemon, read and write the data files in HDFS, log into other user accounts, and access other system services that are beyond the control of Impala.

• Restrict membership in the sudoers list (in the /etc/sudoers file). The users who can run the sudo command can do many of the same things as the root user.

• Ensure the Hadoop ownership and permissions for Impala data files are restricted.

• Ensure the Hadoop ownership and permissions for Impala log files are restricted.

• Ensure that the Impala web UI (available by default on port 25000 on each Impala node) is password-protected. See Impala Web User Interface for Debugging for details.

• Create a policy file that specifies which Impala privileges are available to users in particular Hadoop groups (which by default map to Linux OS groups). Create the associated Linux groups using the groupadd command if necessary.

• The Impala authorization feature makes use of the HDFS file ownership and permissions mechanism; for background information, see the HDFS Permissions Guide. Set up users and assign them to groups at the OS level, corresponding to the different categories of users with different access levels for various databases, tables, and HDFS locations (URIs). Create the associated Linux users using the useradd command if necessary, and add them to the appropriate groups with the usermod command.

• Design your databases, tables, and views with database and table structure to allow policy rules to specify simple, consistent rules. For example, if all tables related to an application are inside a single database, you can assign privileges for that database and use the * wildcard for the table name. If you are creating views with different privileges than the underlying base tables, you might put the views in a separate database so that you can use the * wildcard for the database containing the base tables, while specifying the precise names of the individual views. (For specifying table or database names, you either specify the exact name or * to mean all the databases on a server, or all the tables and views in a database.)

• Enable authorization by running the impalad daemons with the -server_name and -authorization_policy_file options on all nodes. (The authorization feature does not apply to the statestored daemon, which has no access to schema objects or data files.)

• Set up authentication using Kerberos, to make sure users really are who they say they are.

Securing Impala Data and Log Files

One aspect of security is to protect files from unauthorized access at the filesystem level. For example, if you store sensitive data in HDFS, you specify permissions on the associated files and directories in HDFS to restrict read and write permissions to the appropriate users and groups.

If you issue queries containing sensitive values in the WHERE clause, such as financial account numbers, those values are stored in Impala log files in the Linux filesystem and you must secure those files also. For the locations of Impala log files, see Using Impala Logging.

All Impala read and write operations are performed under the filesystem privileges of the impala user. The impala user must be able to read all directories and data files that you query, and write into all the directories and data files for INSERT and LOAD DATA statements. At a minimum, make sure the impala user is in the hive group so that it can access files and directories shared between Impala and Hive. See User Account Requirements for more details.

Setting file permissions is necessary for Impala to function correctly, but is not an effective security practice by itself:

• The way to ensure that only authorized users can submit requests for databases and tables they are allowed to access is to set up Sentry authorization, as explained in Enabling Sentry Authorization for Impala on page 416. With authorization enabled, the checking of the user ID and group is done by Impala, and unauthorized access is blocked by Impala itself. The actual low-level read and write requests are still done by the impala user, so you must have appropriate file and directory permissions for that user ID.
Overview of Impala Security

- You must also set up Kerberos authentication, as described in Enabling Kerberos Authentication for Impala on page 153, so that users can only connect from trusted hosts. With Kerberos enabled, if someone connects a new host to the network and creates user IDs that match your privileged IDs, they will be blocked from connecting to Impala at all from that host.

Installation Considerations for Impala Security

Impala 1.1 comes set up with all the software and settings needed to enable security when you run the `impalad` daemon with the new security-related options (`--server_name` and `--authorization_policy_file`). You do not need to change any environment variables or install any additional JAR files. In a cluster managed by Cloudera Manager, you do not need to change any settings in Cloudera Manager.

Securing the Hive Metastore Database

It is important to secure the Hive metastore, so that users cannot access the names or other information about databases and tables the through the Hive client or by querying the metastore database. Do this by turning on Hive metastore security, using the instructions in the CDH 5 Security Guide for securing different Hive components:

- Secure the Hive Metastore.
- In addition, allow access to the metastore only from the HiveServer2 server, and then disable local access to the HiveServer2 server.

Securing the Impala Web User Interface

The instructions in this section presume you are familiar with the `.htpasswd` mechanism commonly used to password-protect pages on web servers.

Password-protect the Impala web UI that listens on port 25000 by default. Set up a `.htpasswd` file in the `$IMPALA_HOME` directory, or start both the `impalad` and `statestored` daemons with the `--webserver_password_file` option to specify a different location (including the filename).

This file should only be readable by the Impala process and machine administrators, because it contains (hashed) versions of passwords. The username / password pairs are not derived from Unix usernames, Kerberos users, or any other system. The `domain` field in the password file must match the domain supplied to Impala by the new command-line option `--webserver_authentication_domain`. The default is `mydomain.com`.

Impala also supports using HTTPS for secure web traffic. To do so, set `--webserver_certificate_file` to refer to a valid `.pem` TLS/SSL certificate file. Impala will automatically start using HTTPS once the TLS/SSL certificate has been read and validated. A `.pem` file is basically a private key, followed by a signed TLS/SSL certificate; make sure to concatenate both parts when constructing the `.pem` file.

If Impala cannot find or parse the `.pem` file, it prints an error message and quits.

**Note:**

If the private key is encrypted using a passphrase, Impala will ask for that passphrase on startup, which is not useful for a large cluster. In that case, remove the passphrase and make the `.pem` file readable only by Impala and administrators.

When you turn on TLS/SSL for the Impala web UI, the associated URLs change from `http://` prefixes to `https://`. Adjust any bookmarks or application code that refers to those URLs.
Configuring Secure Access for Impala Web Servers

Cloudera Manager supports two methods of authentication for secure access to the Impala Catalog Server, Daemon, and StateStore web servers: password-based authentication and TLS/SSL certificate authentication.

Authentication for the three types of daemons can be configured independently.

Configuring Password Authentication

1. Navigate to Clusters > Impala Service > Configuration.
2. Search for "password" using the Search box in the Configuration tab. This should display the password-related properties (Username and Password properties) for the Impala Daemon, StateStore, and Catalog Server. If there are multiple role groups configured for Impala Daemon instances, the search should display all of them.
3. Enter a username and password into these fields.
4. Click Save Changes, and restart the Impala service.

Now when you access the Web UI for the Impala Daemon, StateStore, or Catalog Server, you are asked to log in before access is granted.

Configuring TLS/SSL Certificate Authentication

1. Create or obtain an TLS/SSL certificate.
2. Place the certificate, in .pem format, on the hosts where the Impala Catalog Server and StateStore are running, and on each host where an Impala Daemon is running. It can be placed in any location (path) you choose. If all the Impala Daemons are members of the same role group, then the .pem file must have the same path on every host.
3. Navigate to Clusters > Impala Service > Configuration.
4. Search for "certificate" using the Search box in the Configuration tab. This should display the certificate file location properties for the Impala Catalog Server, Impala Daemon, and StateStore. If there are multiple role groups configured for Impala Daemon instances, the search should display all of them.
5. In the property fields, enter the full path name to the certificate file.
6. Click Save Changes, and restart the Impala service.

Important: If Cloudera Manager cannot find the .pem file on the host for a specific role instance, that role will fail to start.

When you access the Web UI for the Impala Catalog Server, Impala Daemon, and StateStore, https will be used.
Security How-To Guides

Configuring security for clusters can be complex and time-consuming. Here are some start-to-finish guides and single-focused instruction sets aimed at simplifying various tasks.

Administrative Basics

- Check Cluster Security Settings
- Configure Antivirus Software on CDH Hosts
- Log a Security Support Case

Cloud Security

Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Amazon S3

- Amazon Web Services (AWS) Security on page 443
- How to Configure AWS Credentials on page 460
- How to Configure Authentication for Amazon S3
- How to Configure Encryption for Amazon S3

Microsoft Azure

- How To Set Up Access to Cloudera EDH or Cloudera Director (Microsoft Azure Marketplace) on page 472

Client Access

- Configure Browsers for Kerberos Authentication (SPNEGO)
- Set Up a Gateway Node to Restrict Access to the Cluster

Data Privacy

- Enable Sensitive Data Redaction

Encryption (TLS/SSL)

- Add Root and Intermediate CAs to Truststore for TLS/SSL
- Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager on page 196
- Convert DER, JKS, PEM for TLS/SSL Clients and Services
- Obtain and Deploy Keys and Certificates for TLS/SSL
- Use Self-Signed Certificates for TLS

How to Add Root and Intermediate CAs to Truststore for TLS/SSL

If a signed certificate is from a certificate authority (CA) that does not have certificates in the truststore for whatever reason (internal CA or a public CA not included in the Java truststore, for example), you must explicitly establish trust for the CA, as detailed below. The content of the truststore for the Cloudera Manager Server cluster can be modified
Explicit Trust for Certificates

Before importing the certificate into the keystore of the host system, you must load the root CAs and any intermediate CAs into the truststore.

1. Copy the root and intermediate CA certificates to these locations on the Cloudera Manager Server host:

```
/opt/cloudera/security/pki/rootca.cert.pem
/opt/cloudera/security/pki/intca.cert.pem
```

   a. For concatenated files containing root CA and intermediate CA certificates, split the file between the `END CERTIFICATE` and `BEGIN CERTIFICATE` boundaries that separate each certificate in the file and make individual files instead.

   b. When extracting multiple intermediate CA certificates from a concatenated file, use unique file names such as `intca-1.cert.pem`, `intca-1.cert.pem`, and so on.

2. Import the root CA certificate into the JDK truststore. If you do not have the `JAVA_HOME` variable set, replace it with the path to the Oracle JDK.

   ```
   $ sudo keytool -importcert -alias rootca -keystore $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts
   \ -file /opt/cloudera/security/pki/rootca.cert.pem -storepass changeit
   ```

   The default password for the `cacerts` file is `changeit` (as shown in the above command). Cloudera recommends changing this password by running the `keytool` command:

   ```
   keytool -storepasswd -keystore $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts
   ```

3. Copy the `jssecacerts` file from the Cloudera Manager Server host to all other cluster hosts. Copy the file to the same location on each host using the path required by Oracle JDK, which is as follows:

   ```
   $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts
   ```

4. On the Cloudera Manager Server host, append the intermediate CA certificate to the signed server certificate. Be sure to use the `append` (>>) operator—not overwrite (>)—when executing the statement:

   ```
   $ sudo cat /opt/cloudera/security/pki/intca.cert.pem >> \
   /opt/cloudera/security/pki/$(hostname -f)-server.cert.pem
   ```

Amazon Web Services (AWS) Security

Amazon Web Services (AWS) is Amazon's cloud solution that offers compute, storage, networking, and other infrastructure services that can be used for Cloudera cluster deployments, whether completely cloud-based or in combination with on-premises clusters.

For example, Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) can be used for the instances that make-up the nodes of a Cloudera cluster deployed to the AWS cloud. Amazon's cloud-based storage solution, Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3), can be used by both on-premises and AWS-cloud-based clusters in various ways, including as storage for Impala tables for direct use by Hue and Hive, and other CDH components such as HDFS client, Hive, Impala, MapReduce.

As of release 5.11, Cloudera Manager supports Amazon's IAM-role based access to Amazon S3 storage, in addition to its prior support of AWS access key and secret key. See How to Configure AWS Credentials on page 460 for details.
For any AWS service, including Amazon S3, you must obtain an Amazon Web Services account and have appropriate access to the AWS Management Console to set up the various services you want, including Amazon S3. Assuming you have an account for AWS, to provide access from your Cloudera cluster to Amazon S3 storage you must configure AWS credentials.

- Configuring Authentication
- Configuring Encryption

Getting Started with Amazon Web Services

To get started with AWS, including Amazon S3, you must have:

1. An Amazon Web Services account. Both Amazon and Cloudera recommend that you do not use your primary Amazon account—known as the root account—for working with Amazon S3 and other AWS services. See the AWS IAM documentation for details about how to set up your AWS account.

2. Access to the AWS Management Console and appropriate permissions to create and configure the AWS services needed for your use case, such as the following:
   - AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) to deploy your cluster to the AWS cloud.
   - AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) to set up users and groups, or to set up an IAM role.
   - Amazon S3 and the specific storage bucket (or buckets) for use with your cluster.
   - Amazon DynamoDB to enable the database needed by Cloudera S3Guard, if you plan to enable S3Guard for your cluster. Cloudera S3Guard augments Amazon S3 with a database to track metadata changes so that the ‘eventual consistency’ model inherent to Amazon S3 does not pose a problem for transactions or other use cases in which changes may not be apparent to each other in real time. See Configuring and Managing S3Guard in Cloudera Administration for details. To use S3Guard, you will also need to set up the appropriate access policy (create table, read, write) to DynamoDB for the same AWS identity that owns the Amazon S3 storage.
   - AWS Key Management Services (KMS) (AWS KMS) to create encryption keys for your Amazon S3 bucket if you plan to use SSE-KMS for server-side encryption (not necessary for SSE-S3 encryption. See How to Configure Encryption for Amazon S3 for details).

Configuration Properties Reference

This table provides reference documentation for the core-site.xml properties relevant for use with AWS and Amazon S3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fs.s3a.server-side-encryption-algorithm</td>
<td>Enable server-side encryption for the Amazon S3 storage bucket associated with the cluster. Allowable values:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• AES256 Specifies SSE-S3 server-side encryption for Amazon S3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• SSE-KMS Specifies SSE-KMS server-side encryption for Amazon S3. Requires adding the fs.s3a.server-side-encryption-key property with a valid value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fs.s3a.server-side-encryption-key</td>
<td>Specify the ARN, ARN plus alias, Alias, or globally unique ID of the key created in AWS Key Management Service for use with SSE-KMS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fs.s3a.awsAccessKeyId</td>
<td>Specify the AWS access key ID. This property is irrelevant and not used to access Amazon S3 storage from a cluster launched using an IAM role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fs.s3a.awsSecretAccessKey</td>
<td>Specify the AWS secret key provided by Amazon. This property is irrelevant and not used to access Amazon S3 storage from a cluster launched using an IAM role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fs.s3a.endpoint</td>
<td>Use this property only if the endpoint is outside the standard region (s3.amazonaws.com), such as regions and endpoints in China or in the US GovCloud. See AWS regions and endpoints documentation for details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fs.s3a.connection.ssl.enabled</td>
<td>Enables (true) and disables (false) TLS/SSL connections to Amazon S3. Default is true.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Connecting to Amazon S3 Using TLS

The boolean parameter `fs.s3a.connection.ssl.enabled` in `core-site.xml` controls whether the hadoop-aws connector uses TLS when communicating with Amazon S3. Because this parameter is set to `true` by default, you do not need to configure anything to enable TLS. If you are not using TLS on Amazon S3, the connector will automatically fall back to a plaintext connection.

The root Certificate Authority (CA) certificate that signed the Amazon S3 certificate is trusted by default. If you are using custom truststores, make sure that the configured truststore for each service trusts the root CA certificate.

To import the root CA certificate into your custom truststore, run the following command:

```bash
$JAVA_HOME/bin/keytool -importkeystore -srckeystore $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts -destkeystore /path/to/custom/truststore -srcalias baltimorecybertrustca
```

If you are using `S3Guard`, you must import an additional CA certificate:

```bash
$JAVA_HOME/bin/keytool -importkeystore -srckeystore $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts -destkeystore /path/to/custom/truststore -srcalias verisignclass3g5ca
```

If you are using JDK 1.7.0_131 or higher, or JDK 1.8.0_131 or higher, the aliases are appended with `jdk` as follows:

```bash
$JAVA_HOME/bin/keytool -importkeystore -srckeystore $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts -destkeystore /path/to/custom/truststore -srcalias "baltimorecybertrustca [jdk]"
$JAVA_HOME/bin/keytool -importkeystore -srckeystore $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts -destkeystore /path/to/custom/truststore -srcalias "verisignclass3g5ca [jdk]"
```

If you do not have the `$JAVA_HOME` variable set, replace it with the path to the Oracle JDK (for example, `/usr/java/jdk1.7.0_67-cloudera/`). When prompted, enter the password for the destination and source truststores. The default password for the Oracle JDK `cacerts` truststore is `changeit`.

The truststore configurations for each service that accesses S3 are as follows:

**hadoop-aws Connector**

All components that can use Amazon S3 storage rely on the hadoop-aws connector, which uses the built-in Java truststore (`$JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts`). To override this truststore, create a truststore named `jssecacerts` in the same directory (`$JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts`) on all cluster nodes. If you are using the `jssecacerts` truststore, make sure that it includes the root CA certificate that signed the Amazon S3 certificate.

**Hive/Beeline CLI**

The Hive and Beeline command line interfaces (CLI) rely on the HiveServer2 truststore. To view or modify the truststore configuration:

1. Go to the Hive service in the Cloudera Manager Admin Interface.
2. Select the Configuration tab.
3. Select Scope > HIVE-1 (Service-Wide).
5. Locate the HiveServer2 TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store File and HiveServer2 TLS/SSL Certificate Trust Store Password properties or search for them by typing Trust in the Search box.

**Impala Shell**

The Impala shell uses the hadoop-aws connector truststore. To override it, create the `$JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts` file, as described in hadoop-aws Connector on page 445.
Hue S3 File Browser

For instructions on enabling the S3 file browser in Hue, see How to Enable S3 Cloud Storage in Hue. The S3 file browser uses TLS if it is enabled, and the S3 File Browser trusts the S3 certificate by default. No additional configuration is necessary.

Impala Query Editor (Hue)

The Impala query editor in Hue uses the hadoop-aws connector truststore. To override it, create the $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts file, as described in hadoop-aws Connector on page 445.

Hive Query Editor (Hue)

The Hive query editor in Hue uses the HiveServer2 truststore. For instructions on viewing and modifying the HiveServer2 truststore, see Hive/Beeline CLI on page 445.

How to Check Security Settings on a Cluster

Quickly perform a high level check of your cluster’s security configuration by doing one of the following:

Check Security for Cloudera Manager Clusters

Use Cloudera Manager to verify security mechanisms for your cluster by simply examining the properties for the cluster. For clusters not managed by Cloudera Manager Server, see Check Security for CDH Clusters on page 447.

To check Kerberos and HDFS encryption:

1. Log into the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select Security from the Administration drop-down selector to display a list of managed clusters:

   Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Kerberos Credentials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cluster</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster 1</td>
<td>Successfully enabled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   HDFS Data At Rest Encryption is enabled  Set up HDFS Data At Rest Encryption

   This shows at a glance that both Kerberos and HDFS transparent encryption have been configured for this cluster.

   To check TLS settings:

   1. Select Settings from the Administration drop-down selector to open a search field.
   2. Enter TLS in the search field to display all TLS related configuration settings.
   3. Scroll through the displayed results, looking for “Use TLS...” for various services and processes. For example, the test system shown below is not using TLS for the Cloudera Manager Admin Console:
See [How to Configure TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager](#) for complete information about configuring TLS for the cluster.

To find all TLS settings, cluster-wide, enter "**TLS enabled**" (or simply, "TLS") in the top-most search field on the Cloudera Manager Admin Console. Then you can easily select from among the display list to examine the actual setting.

### Check Security for CDH Clusters

To check security settings for CDH components not managed by Cloudera Manager, open the configuration file (core-site.xml) in a text editor and examine the property values shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functionality</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TLS</td>
<td>hadoop.ssl.enabled</td>
<td>true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerberos</td>
<td>hadoop.security.authentication</td>
<td>kerberos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hadoop.security.authorization</td>
<td>true</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See [Configuring Authentication in CDH Using the Command Line](#) and [Configuring TLS/SSL Encryption for CDH Services](#) for more information.
How to Use Antivirus Software on CDH Hosts

If you use antivirus software on your servers, consider configuring it to skip scans on certain types of Hadoop-specific resources. It can take a long time to scan large files or directories with a large number of files. In addition, if your antivirus software locks files or directories as it scans them, those resources will be unavailable to your Hadoop processes during the scan, and can cause latency or unavailability of resources in your cluster. Consider skipping scans on the following types of resources:

- Scratch directories used by services such as Impala
- Log directories used by various Hadoop services
- Data directories which can grow to petabytes in size

The specific directory names and locations depend on the services your cluster uses and your configuration. In general, avoid scanning very large directories and filesystems. Instead, limit write access to these locations using security mechanisms such as access controls at the level of the operating system, HDFS, or at the service level.

How to Configure Browsers for Kerberos Authentication

The browser configurations below are required only for those browsers used to connect to component web interfaces with the Require Authentication for HTTP Web Consoles configuration property enabled. The settings below enable the respective browser to use SPNEGO to negotiate Kerberos authentication for the browser. The host running the browser must have a valid TGT to authenticate to Kerberos Web Consoles.

 Mozilla Firefox

1. Open the low level Firefox configuration page by loading the about:config page.
2. In the Search text box, enter: network.negotiate-auth.trusted-uris
3. Double-click the network.negotiate-auth.trusted-uris preference and enter the hostname or the domain of the web server that is protected by Kerberos HTTP SPNEGO. Separate multiple domains and hostnames with a comma.
4. Click OK.
Internet Explorer

Follow the steps below to configure Internet Explorer.

Configuring the Local Intranet Domain

1. Open Internet Explorer and click the Settings gear icon in the top-right corner. Select Internet options.
2. Select the Security tab.
3. Select the Local Intranet zone and click the Sites button.
4. Make sure that the first two options, Include all local (intranet) sites not listed in other zones and Include all sites that bypass the proxy server are checked.
5. Click Advanced and add the names of the domains that are protected by Kerberos HTTP SPNEGO, one at a time, to the list of websites. For example, myhost.example.com. Click Close.
6. Click OK to save your configuration changes.
Configuring Intranet Authentication

1. Click the Settings gear icon in the top-right corner. Select Internet options.
2. Select the Security tab.
3. Select the Local Intranet zone and click the Custom level... button to open the Security Settings - Local Intranet Zone dialog box.
4. Scroll down to the User Authentication options and select Automatic logon only in Intranet zone.
5. Click OK to save these changes.
Verifying Proxy Settings

Perform these steps only if you have a proxy server already enabled.

1. Click the Settings gear icon in the top-right corner. Select **Internet options**.
2. Select the **Connections** tab and click **LAN Settings**.
3. Verify that the proxy server **Address** and **Port** number settings are correct.
4. Click **Advanced** to open the **Proxy Settings** dialog box.
5. Add the Kerberos-protected domains to the **Exceptions** field.
6. Click **OK** to save any changes.
Google Chrome

For Windows:

- Open the Control Panel to access the **Internet Options** dialog. Use the same configuration as detailed in Configuration changes required are the same as those described above for **Internet Explorer**.

For Linux or MacOS:

- Add the **--auth-server-whitelist** parameter to the **google-chrome** command. For example, to run Chrome from a Linux prompt, run the **google-chrome** command as follows:

  ```bash
  > google-chrome --auth-server-whitelist = "hostname/domain"
  ```

How to Convert File Encodings (DER, JKS, PEM) for TLS/SSL Certificates and Keys

Client and server processes require specific file formats for certificates, keys, and other digital artifacts used for TLS/SSL encryption. For example, when TLS is enabled, Cloudera Manager Server presents Java KeyStore (JKS) formatted key and certificate to requesting Cloudera Manager Agent hosts. The Hue client also connects to Cloudera Manager Server, but Hue requires a PEM-formatted key and certificate, rather than JKS. The PEM format used by Cloudera Manager is PKCS #8, which handles certificates and keys as individual Base64-encoded text files.

If you receive binary DER files from your certificate authority, you must convert them to the appropriate format. Since neither Java Keytool nor OpenSSL work directly with **PKCS format**, many of the configuration tasks detailed in **Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager** on page 196 involve converting formats, or extracting keys or certificates from an artifact in one format to another.

Certificates issued by a CA in one format (encoding) can be used to create certificates in a different format using Java Keytool and OpenSSL as detailed below:

- **Converting DER Encoded Certificates to PEM** on page 453
- **Converting JKS Key and Certificate to PEM** on page 453
- **Extracting the Private Key from PKCS Keystore** on page 453
- **Converting PEM Key and Certificate to JKS** on page 454
Converting DER Encoded Certificates to PEM

OpenSSL can be used to convert a DER-encoded certificate to an ASCII (Base64) encoded certificate. Typically, DER-encoded certificates may have file extension of .DER, .CRT, or .CER, but regardless of the extension, a DER encoded certificate is not readable as plain text (unlike PEM encoded certificate).

A PEM-encoded certificate may also have file extension of .CRT or .CER, in which case, you can simply copy the file to a new name using the .PEM extension:

```bash
$ cp hostname.cer hostname.pem
```

To convert a DER-encoded certificate to PEM encoding using OpenSSL:

```bash
$ openssl x509 -inform der -in hostname.cer -out hostname.pem
```

For example:

```bash
$ openssl x509 -inform der -in /opt/cloudera/security/pki/hostname.cer -out /tmp/hostname.pem
```

Converting JKS Key and Certificate to PEM

This process uses both Java keytool and OpenSSL (keytool and openssl, respectively, in the commands below) to export the composite private key and certificate from a Java keystore and then extract each element into its own file.

The PKCS12 file created below is an interim file used to obtain the individual key and certificate files.

Replace hostname-keystore, cmhost, hostname, and password with values from your system.

1. Export the private key and certificate command line:

```bash
```

2. Extract the certificate file from the resulting PKCS12 file:

```bash
```

This extracted certificate can be used, as is, but you can additionally extract the private key from the keystore as detailed in the next section.

Extracting the Private Key from PKCS Keystore

Use OpenSSL to extract the private key from the PKCS keystore when needed. The command shown below extracts the key and saves it to a keystore that is protected using the password you provide:

```bash
```

To generate a key without a password, use this version of the command:

```bash
```
Converting PEM Key and Certificate to JKS

Replace hostname in the commands below with the FQDN of the host whose certificate is being imported.

1. Convert the openssl private key and certificate files into a PKCS12 file.

```
$ openssl pkcs12 -export -in /opt/cloudera/security/pki/hostname.pem \
    -inkey /opt/cloudera/security/pki/hostname.key -out /tmp/hostname.p12 \
    -name hostname -passin pass:password -passout pass:password
```

2. Import the PKCS12 file into the Java keystore.

```
$ keytool -importkeystore -srckeystore /tmp/hostname.p12 -srcstoretype PKCS12 \
    -srcstorepass password -alias hostname -deststorepass password \
    -destkeypass password -destkeystore /opt/cloudera/security/jks/hostname-keystore.jks
```

How To Configure Authentication for Amazon S3

There are several ways to integrate Amazon S3 storage with Cloudera clusters, depending on your use case and other factors, including whether the cluster has been deployed using Amazon EC2 instances and if those instances were deployed using an IAM role, such as might be the case for clusters that have a single-user or small-team with comparable privileges. Clusters deployed to support many different users with various privilege levels to the Amazon S3 need to use AWS Credentials and have privileges to target data set up in Sentry. See How to Configure AWS Credentials on page 460 for details.

Authentication through the S3 Connector Service

Starting with CDH/Cloudera Manager 5.10, integration with Amazon S3 from Cloudera clusters has been simplified. Specifically, the S3 Connector Service automates the authentication process to Amazon S3 for Impala, Hive, and Hue, the components used for business-analytical use cases designed to run on persistent multi-tenant clusters.

The S3 Connector Service transparently and securely distributes AWS credentials needed by the cluster for the Amazon S3 storage. Access to the underlying Impala tables is controlled by Sentry role-based permissions. The S3 Connector Service runs on a secure cluster only, that is, a cluster configured to use:

- Kerberos for authentication, and
- Sentry for role-based authorization.

**Note:** Of the items listed in the screenshot below, only the Sentry service and Kerberos enabled messages are actual requirements. The other messages are for informational purposes only.

Add S3 Connector Service to Cluster 1

Before adding this service, Cloudera Manager has validated the cluster configuration and found the following:

- This cluster has an Impala service installed.
- This cluster has a Hive service installed.
- This cluster has a Sentry service installed.
- This cluster has a HDFS service installed.
- This cluster has Kerberos enabled.
- HiveServer2 Enable Impersonation is disabled.

In Cloudera Manager 5.11, the S3 Connector Service setup wizard is launched automatically during the AWS Credential setup process when you select the path to add the S3 Connector Service.

See Configuring the Amazon S3 Connector for more information about the S3 Connector Service.
Authentication through Advanced Configuration Snippets

Before release 5.10 and the introduction of the S3 Connector Service, using Amazon S3 storage with the cluster involved adding the credentials to the core-site.xml configuration file (through Cloudera Manager’s Advanced Configuration Snippet mechanism). This approach is not recommended. AWS credentials provide read and write access to data stored on Amazon S3, so they should be kept secure at all times.

- Never share the credentials with other cluster users or services.
- Do not store in cleartext in any configuration files. When possible, use Hadoop's credential provider to encrypt and store credentials in the local JCEK (Java Cryptography Extension Keystore).
- Enable Cloudera sensitive data redaction to ensure that passwords and other sensitive information does not appear in log files.

**Important:** Cloudera recommends using this approach for **single-user clusters** on **secure networks** only—networks that allow access only to authorized users, all of whom are also authorized to use the S3 credentials.

To enable CDH services to access Amazon S3, AWS credentials can be specified using the `fs.s3a.access.key` and `fs.s3a.secret.key` properties:

```xml
<property>
    <name>fs.s3a.access.key</name>
    <value>your_access_key</value>
</property>
<property>
    <name>fs.s3a.secret.key</name>
    <value>your_secret_key</value>
</property>
```

The process of adding AWS credentials is generally the same as that detailed in configuring server-side encryption for Amazon S3, that is, using the Cloudera Manager Admin Console to add the properties and values to the core-site.xml configuration file (Advanced Configuration Snippet). However, Cloudera strongly discourages this approach: in general, adding AWS credentials to the core-site.xml is not recommended. A somewhat more secure approach is to use temporary credentials, which include a session token that limits the viability of the credentials to a shorter time-frame within which a key can be stolen and used.

Using Temporary Credentials for Amazon S3

The **AWS Security Token Service (STS)** issues temporary credentials to access AWS services such as Amazon S3. These temporary credentials include an access key, a secret key, and a session token that expires within a configurable amount of time. Temporary credentials are not currently handled transparently by CDH, so administrators must obtain them directly from Amazon STS. For details, see Temporary Security Credentials in the AWS Identity and Access Management Guide.

**Important:** Cloudera recommends using this approach only for **single-user clusters** on **secure networks**—networks that allow access only to authorized users, all of whom are also authorized to use the S3 credentials.

To connect to Amazon S3 using temporary credentials obtained from STS, submit them as command-line arguments with the Hadoop job. For example:

```
-Dfs.s3a.access.key=your_temp_access_key
-Dfs.s3a.secret.key=your_temp_secret_key
-Dfs.s3a.session.token=your_session_token_from_AmazonSTS
-Dfs.s3a.aws.credentials.provider=org.apache.hadoop.fs.s3a.TemporaryAWSCredentialsProvider
```
Creating a Table in a Bucket

To create a table in a bucket, a user must have Sentry permissions on the S3 database and bucket URI. Cloudera recommends that you create a database specifically for the purpose of creating tables. Then, grant the user’s role ALL permissions on the database and the URI.

It is possible to give the user ALL permissions on the server to allow the user to create external tables, but that approach is not recommended because it is not secure.

To allow a user to create tables in a bucket, complete the following steps:

1. Create a database where you want to create the tables.
2. Grant ALL on the database to the user’s role.
3. Grant ALL on the bucket URI to the user’s role.
4. The user must create the table with a reference to the database. For example:

   ```
   CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE
   sentry3demo.your_external_s3_table
   (name STRING, type STRING)
   ROW FORMAT
   DELIMITED FIELDS TERMINATED BY ','
   LOCATION 's3a://your-bucket-name/';
   ```

How to Configure Encryption for Amazon S3

Amazon offers several server-side encryption mechanisms for use with Amazon S3 storage. Cloudera clusters support server-side encryption for Amazon S3 data using either SSE-S3 (CDH 5.10 and later) or SSE-KMS (CDH 5.11 and later). With SSE-S3, keys are completely under the control of Amazon. With SSE-KMS, you have more control over the encryption keys, and can upload your own key material to use for encrypting Amazon S3. With either mechanism, encryption is applied transparently to the Amazon S3 bucket objects after you configure your cluster to use it.

Amazon S3 also supports TLS/SSL (‘wire’ or data-in-transit) encryption by default. Configuring data-at-rest encryption for Amazon S3 for use with your cluster involves some configuration both on Amazon S3 and for the cluster, using the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, as detailed below:

Requirements

Using Amazon S3 assumes that you have an Amazon Web Services account and the appropriate privileges on the AWS Management Console to set up and configure Amazon S3 buckets.

In addition, to configure Amazon S3 storage for use with a Cloudera cluster, you must have privileges as the User Administrator or Full Administrator on the Cloudera Manager Admin Console. See How to Configure AWS Credentials for details.

Amazon S3 and TLS/SSL Encryption

Amazon S3 uses TLS/SSL by default. Cloudera clusters (release 5.9 and later) include in their default configuration file the boolean property, `fs.s3a.connection.ssl.enabled` set to `true`, which activates TLS/SSL. This means that if the cluster has been configured to use TLS/SSL, connections from the cluster to Amazon S3 automatically use TLS wire encryption for the communication. The value of the `fs.s3a.connection.ssl.enabled` property can be confirmed by running `hadoop org.apache.hadoop.conf.Configuration`.

**Important:** Cloudera recommends that clusters always be configured for TLS/SSL. See How to Configure TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager for details.

If the cluster is not configured to use TLS, the connection to Amazon S3 silently reverts to an unencrypted connection.
Amazon S3 and Data at Rest Encryption

Cloudera clusters can use either of these two Amazon S3 mechanisms for data-at-rest encryption:

- **Server-side Encryption with AWS KMS-Managed Keys (SSE-KMS)**, which requires using Amazon Key Management Server (AWS KMS) in conjunction with your Amazon S3. You can have Amazon generate and manage the keys in AWS KMS for you, or you can provide your own key material, but you must configure AWS KMS and create a key before you can use it with your cluster. See Prerequisites for Using SSE-KMS on page 457 for details.

- **Server-side Encryption with S3-Managed Encryption Keys (SSE-S3)**, which is simplest to set up because it uses Amazon-provided and -managed keys and has no requirements beyond setting a single property. See Configuring the Cluster to Use Server-Side Encryption on Amazon S3 on page 458 for details.

Enabling the cluster to use Amazon S3 server-side encryption involves using the Cloudera Manager Admin Console to configure the Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) as detailed in Configuring the Cluster to Use Server-Side Encryption on Amazon S3 on page 458, below.

The steps assume that your cluster has been set up and that you have set up AWS credentials.

![Note: Cloudera clusters can be configured one encryption mode and key at a time for all objects in a given Amazon S3 bucket. However, you can change encryption modes or keys. See Changing Encryption Modes or Keys on page 459 for details.](image)

**Prerequisites for Using SSE-KMS**

To use SSE-KMS with your Amazon S3 bucket, you must log in to the AWS Management Console using the account you set up in step 1 of Getting Started with Amazon Web Services on page 444. For example, the account `lab-iam` has an IAM user named `etl-workload` that has been granted permissions on the Amazon S3 storage bucket to be configured using SSE-KMS.

- Select **My Security Credentials** from the menu.
- Click **Encryption keys** (bottom left-hand on the AWS Management Console that displays at step 1, above).
- Click the **Create key** button to start the 5-step key-creation wizard that leads you through entry pages for giving the key an alias and description; adding tags, defining administrator permissions to the key, and defining usage permissions. The last page of the wizard shows you the policy that will be applied to the key before creating the key.
Configuring the Cluster to Use Server-Side Encryption on Amazon S3

Follow the steps below to enable server-side encryption on Amazon S3. To use SSE-KMS encryption, you will need your KMS key ID at step 7. Using SSE-S3 has no pre-requisites—Amazon generates and manages the keys transparently.

To configure the cluster to encrypt data stored on Amazon S3:

1. Log into the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select Clusters > HDFS.
3. Click the Configuration tab.
4. Select Scope > HDFS (Service-Wide).
5. Select Category > Advanced.
6. Locate the Cluster-wide Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) for core-site.xml property.
7. In the text field, define the properties and values appropriate for the type of encryption you want to use.
   a. To use SSE-S3 encryption:

   <property>
   <name>fs.s3a.server-side-encryption-algorithm</name>
   <value>AES256</value>
   </property>

   b. To use SSE-KMS encryption:

   <property>
   <name>fs.s3a.server-side-encryption-algorithm</name>
   <value>SSE-KMS</value>
   </property>
   <property>
   <name>fs.s3a.server-side-encryption-key</name>
   <value>your_kms_key_id</value>
   </property>

8. Click Save Changes.
9. Restart the HDFS service.

For the value of your_kms_key_id (step 7b., above), you can use any of Amazon’s four different key ID formats. Here are some examples:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key ARN</td>
<td>arn:aws:kms:us-west-1:141229114088:KEY/c914b724-f191-41df-934a-6147f6235983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alias ARN</td>
<td>arn:aws:kms:us-west-1:141229114088:KEY/c914b724-f191-41df-934a-6147f6235983:alias/awsCreatedMasterKey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Changing Encryption Modes or Keys

Cloudera clusters can be configured to use only one type of server-side encryption for Amazon S3 data at a time. However, Amazon S3 does support using different encryption keys for objects on an Amazon S3 bucket, which means that Amazon S3 continues to use whichever key was initially used to encrypt data (to decrypt on reads and re-encrypt on writes), even after a new mechanism and key exists. Your new key is used on new data written to the Amazon S3 bucket, while your ‘old’ key is used on any existing data that was encrypted with it. To summarize the behavior:

- Changing encryption mechanisms or keys on Amazon S3 has no effect on existing encrypted or unencrypted data.
- Data stored on Amazon S3 without encryption remains unencrypted even after you configure encryption for Amazon S3.
- Any existing encrypted data continues using the original mechanism and key to decrypt data (on reads) and re-encrypt data (on writes).
- After changing encryption mode or key, new objects stored on Amazon S3 from the cluster use the new mode and key.

Effect of Changing Encryption Mode or Key

This table shows the effect on existing encrypted or unencrypted data on Amazon S3 (far left column labeled “Data starts as...,” reading down) and the result of “New” and “Existing” data and the keys that would be used after changing encryption-key configuration on the cluster. After changing encryption mode or key, existing data (Existing) and new data (New) use the mode and keys shown in columns 2 (“Unencrypted”) through 5 (“Non-SSE Key”):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data starts as...</th>
<th>Data results after modifying encryption mode or keys...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unencrypted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unencrypted</td>
<td>Existing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSE-S3 encrypted</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSE-KMS [key1]</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-SSE key</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Migrating Encrypted Data to New Encryption Mode or Key

To use a new key with existing data (data stored on Amazon S3 using a different mechanism or key), you must first decrypt the data, and then re-encrypt it using the new key. The process is as follows:

1. Create an Amazon S3 bucket as temporary storage for the unencrypted files.
2. Decrypt the data on the Amazon S3 bucket using the mechanism and key used for encryption (legacy encryption mode or key), moving the unencrypted data to the temporary bucket created in step 1.
3. Configure the Amazon S3 bucket to use the new encryption mechanism and key of your choice (SSE-S3, SSE-KMS).
4. Move the unencrypted data from the temporary bucket back to the Amazon S3 bucket that is now configured using the new mechanism and key.

Deleting an Encryption Key

If you change encryption modes or keys on Amazon S3, do not delete the key. To replace the old key and mode with a completely new mode or key, you must manually migrate the data.

When you delete an encryption key, Amazon puts the key in a Pending Deletion state (as shown in the Status column of the screenshot below) for at least 7 days, allowing you to reinstate a key if you change your mind or realize an error.
The pending time frame is configurable, from 7 up to 30 days. See [AWS Key Management Service Documentation](https://aws.amazon.com/key-management-service/) for complete details.

## How to Configure AWS Credentials

**Minimum Required Role:** [User Administrator](https://aws.amazon.com/identity-access-management/) (also provided by [Full Administrator](https://aws.amazon.com/identity-access-management/))

Amazon S3 (Simple Storage Service) can be used in a CDH cluster managed by Cloudera Manager in the following ways:

- As storage for Impala tables
- As a source or destination for HDFS and Hive/Impala replication and for cluster storage
- To enable Cloudera Navigator to extract metadata from Amazon S3 storage
- To browse S3 data using Hue

You can use the [S3Guard](https://aws.amazon.com/s3guard/) feature to address possible issues with the "eventual consistency" guarantee provided by Amazon for data stored in S3. To use the S3Guard feature, you provision an Amazon DynamoDB that CDH uses as an additional metadata store to improve performance and guarantee that your queries return the most current data. See [Configuring and Managing S3Guard](https://aws.amazon.com/s3guard/).

To provide access to Amazon S3, you configure **AWS Credentials** that specify the authentication type (role-based, for example) and the access and secret keys. Amazon offers two types of authentication you can use with Amazon S3:

**IAM Role-based Authentication**

[Amazon Identity and Access Management (IAM)](https://aws.amazon.com/identity-access-management/) can be used to create users, groups, and roles for use with Amazon Web Services, such as EC2 and Amazon S3. IAM role-based access provides the same level of access to all clients that use the role. All jobs on the cluster will have the same level of access to Amazon S3, so this is better suited for single-user clusters, or where all users of a cluster should have the same privileges to data in Amazon S3.

If you are setting up a peer to copy data to and from Amazon S3, using Cloudera Manager Hive or HDFS replication, select this option.

If you are configuring Amazon S3 access for a cluster deployed to Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instances using the IAM role for the EC2 instance profile, you do not need configure IAM role-based authentication for services such as Impala, Hive, or Spark.

*Note:* IAM role-based authentication does not provide access to Amazon S3 using Cloudera Navigator.

**Access Key Credentials**

This type of authentication requires an AWS Access Key and an AWS Secret key that you obtain from Amazon and is better suited for environments where you have multiple users or multi-tenancy. You must enable the [Sentry service](https://aws.amazon.com/sentry/) and Kerberos when using the [S3 Connector](https://aws.amazon.com/s3connector/) service. Enabling these services allows you to configure selective access for different data paths. (The Sentry service is not required for BDR replication or access by Cloudera Navigator.)
Cloudera Manager stores these values securely and does not store them in world-readable locations. The credentials are masked in the Cloudera Manager Admin console, encrypted in the configurations passed to processes managed by Cloudera Manager, and redacted from the logs.

For more information about Amazon S3, see the Amazon S3 documentation.

The client configuration files generated by Cloudera Manager based on configured services do not include AWS credentials. These clients must manage access to these credentials outside of Cloudera Manager. Cloudera Manager uses credentials stored in Cloudera Manager for trusted clients such as the Impala daemon and Hue. For access from YARN, MapReduce or Spark, see Using S3 Credentials with YARN, MapReduce, or Spark.

**Note:** Isilon storage cannot be used with AWS credentials.

### Adding AWS Credentials

**Minimum Required Role:** User Administrator (also provided by Full Administrator)

To add AWS Credentials for Amazon S3:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Click Administration > AWS Credentials.
3. Select one of the following:

   - **Add Access Key Credentials**
     This authentication mechanism requires you to obtain AWS credentials from Amazon.
     1. Enter a **Name** of your choosing for this account.
     2. Enter the **AWS Access Key ID**.
     3. Enter the **AWS Secret Key**.

   - **Add IAM Role-Based Authentication**
     1. Enter a name for your IAM Role-based authentication.

     **Note:** You cannot use IAM Role-based authentication for Cloudera Navigator access.

4. Click **Add**.

   The Edit S3Guard dialog box displays.

   S3Guard enables a consistent view of data stored in Amazon S3 and requires that you provision a DynamoDB database from Amazon Web Services. S3Guard is optional but can help improve performance and accuracy for certain types of workflows. To configure S3Guard, see Configuring and Managing S3Guard and return to these steps after completing the configuration.

   If you do not want to enable S3Guard, click **Save** to finish adding the AWS Credential.

   The **Connect to Amazon Web Services** dialog box displays.

5. Choose one of the following options:

   - **Cloud Backup and Restore**
     To configure Amazon S3 as the source or destination of a replication schedule (to back up and restore data, for example), click the **Replication Schedules** link. See Data Replication for details.

   - **Cluster Access to S3**
To enable cluster access to S3 using the S3 Connector Service, click the **Enable for Cluster Name** link, which launches a wizard for adding the S3 Connector service. See [Adding the S3 Connector Service](#) for details.

- **Cloudera Navigator Access to S3**

To give Cloudera Navigator access to Amazon S3, click the **Enable for Cloudera Navigator** link. [Restart the Cloudera Navigator Metadata Server](#) to enable access.

**Note:** You cannot enable **Cloudera Navigator Access to S3** when using IAM Role-based Authentication.

## Managing AWS Credentials

### To remove AWS credentials:

**Note:** You cannot remove AWS credentials if they are in use by a service in the cluster. You might need to edit the connectivity of the credential before removing it.

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Click **Administration > AWS Credentials**.
3. Locate the row with the credentials you want to delete and click **Actions > Remove**.

### To edit AWS Access Key credentials:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Click **Administration > AWS Credentials**.
3. Locate the row with the Access Key Credentials you want to delete and click **Actions > Edit Credential**.

The **Edit Credential** dialog box displays.

4. Edit the account fields.
5. Click **Save**.
6. [Restart cluster services](#) that use these credentials. If connectivity is for Cloudera Navigator, [Restart the Cloudera Navigator Metadata server](#).

### To rename the IAM Role-Based Authentication:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Click **Administration > AWS Credentials**.
3. Locate the row with the IAM Role-Based Authentication you want to rename and click **Actions > Rename**.
4. Enter a new name.
5. Click **Save**.

The **Connect to Amazon Web Services** screen displays.

6. Click the links to change any service connections or click **Close** to leave them unchanged.

### To edit the services connected to an AWS Credentials account:

1. Open the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Click **Administration > AWS Credentials**.
3. Locate the row with the credentials you want to edit and click **Actions > Edit Connectivity**.

The **Connect to Amazon Web Services** screen displays.

4. Click one of the following options:

- **Cloud Backup and Restore**
To configure Amazon S3 as the source or destination of a replication schedule (to back up and restore data, for example), click the Replication Schedules link. See Data Replication for details.

- **Cluster Access to S3**
  To enable cluster access to S3 using the S3 Connector Service, click the Enable for Cluster Name link, which launches a wizard for adding the S3 Connector service. See Adding the S3 Connector Service for details.

- **Cloudera Navigator Access to S3**
  To give Cloudera Navigator access to Amazon S3, click the Enable for Cloudera Navigator link. Restart the Cloudera Navigator Metadata Server to enable access.

  **Note:** You cannot enable Cloudera Navigator Access to S3 when using IAM Role-based Authentication.

---

**How to Enable Sensitive Data Redaction**

Redaction is a process that obscures data. It helps organizations comply with government and industry regulations, such as **PCI (Payment Card Industry)** and **HIPAA**, by making personally identifiable information (PII) unreadable except to those whose jobs require such access. For example, in simple terms, HIPAA legislation requires that patient PII is available only to appropriate medical professionals (and the patient), and that any medical or personal information exposed outside the appropriate context cannot be used to associate an individual’s identity with any medical information. Data redaction can help ensure this privacy, by transforming PII to meaningless patterns—for example, transforming U.S. social security numbers to **XXX-XX-XXXX** strings.

Data redaction works separately from Cloudera data encryption techniques. Data encryption alone does not preclude administrators with full access to the cluster from viewing sensitive user data. Redaction ensures that cluster administrators, data analysts, and others cannot see PII or other sensitive data that is not within their job domain. At the same time, it does not prevent users with appropriate permissions from accessing data to which they have privileges.

Cloudera clusters implement some redaction features by default, while some features are configurable and require administrators to specifically enable them. The details are covered below:

**Cloudera Manager and Passwords**

As of Cloudera Manager 5.5 (and later releases) passwords are no longer stored in cleartext, neither through the Cloudera Manager Admin Console nor in the configuration files on disk. Passwords managed by Cloudera Manager and Cloudera Navigator are redacted internally, with the following results:

- **In the Cloudera Manager Admin Console:**
  - In the Processes page for a given role instance, passwords in the linked configuration files are replaced by ******.
  - **Advanced Configuration Snippet (Safety Valve) parameters**, such as passwords and secret keys, are visible to users (such as admins) who have edit permissions on the parameter, while those with read-only access see redacted data. However, the parameter name is visible to anyone. (Data to be redacted from these snippets is identified by a fixed list of key words: *password*, *key*, *aws*, and *secret*.)

- **On all Cloudera Manager Server and Cloudera Manager Agent hosts:**
  - Passwords in the configuration files in /var/run/cloudera-scm-agent/process are replaced by ******.
Cloudera Manager Server Database Password Handling

Unlike the other passwords that are redacted or encrypted by Cloudera Manager, the password used for the Cloudera Manager Server database is stored in plaintext in the configuration file, /etc/cloudera-scm-server/db.properties, as shown in this example:

```conf
# Auto-generated by scm_prepare_database.sh on Mon Jan 30 05:02:18 PST 2017
#
# For information describing how to configure the Cloudera Manager Server
to connect to databases, see the "Cloudera Manager Installation Guide."
#
com.cloudera.cmf.db.type=mysql
com.cloudera.cmf.db.host=localhost
com.cloudera.cmf.db.name=cm
com.cloudera.cmf.db.user=cm
com.cloudera.cmf.db.setupType=EXTERNAL
com.cloudera.cmf.db.password=
```

However, as of Cloudera Manager 5.10 (and higher), rather than using a cleartext password you can use a script or other executable that uses stdout to return a password for use by the system.

During installation of the database, you can pass the script name to the `scm_prepare_database.sh` script with the `--scm-password-script` parameter. See Setting up the Cloudera Manager Server Database and Syntax for `scm_prepare_database.sh` for details.

You can also replace an existing cleartext password in /etc/cloudera-scm-server/db.properties by replacing the `com.cloudera.cmf.db.password` setting with `com.cloudera.cmf.db.password_script` and setting the name of the script or executable:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cleartext Password (5.9 and prior)</th>
<th>Script (5.10 and higher)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>com.cloudera.cmf.db.password=password</code></td>
<td><code>com.cloudera.cmf.db.password_script=script_name_here</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At runtime, if /etc/cloudera-scm-server/db.properties does not include the script identified by `com.cloudera.cmf.db.password_script`, the system looks for the value of `com.cloudera.cmf.db.password`.

Cloudera Manager API Redaction

Cloudera Manager API does not have redaction enabled by default. You can configure redaction of the sensitive items by specifying a JVM parameter for Cloudera Manager. When you set this parameter, API calls to Cloudera Manager for configuration data do not include the sensitive information. For more information, see Redacting Sensitive Information from the Exported Configuration.

Log and Query Redaction

Cloudera Manager provides a configurable log and query redaction feature that lets you redact sensitive data in the CDH cluster as it’s being written to the log files (see the Cloudera Engineering Blog "Sensitive Data Redaction" post for a technical overview), to prevent leakage of sensitive data. Redaction works only on data, not metadata—that is, sensitive data inside files is redacted, but the name, owner, and other metadata about the file is not.

Redaction is enabled for the entire cluster through the Cloudera Manager Admin Console, which also lets you define rules to target sensitive data in SQL data and log files. After enabling data redaction, the following contain replacement strings (such as a series of Xs) for the sensitive data items you define in your rules:

- Logs in HDFS and any dependent cluster services.
- Audit data sent to Cloudera Navigator.
- SQL query strings displayed by Hue, Hive, and Impala.

**Note:** Log redaction is not available in Isilon-based clusters.
See Enabling Log and Query Redaction Using Cloudera Manager on page 465 (below) for information about how to enable and define rules for sensitive data redaction for your cluster’s logs and SQL queries (Hive, Hue, Impala).

How Redaction Rules Work

Cloudera’s redaction process (redactor) uses regular expressions to target data for redaction. Common regular expression patterns for sensitive data include social security numbers, credit card numbers, email addresses, and dates, for example. The redaction rules are specified using the following elements:

- **Search** - Regular expression to compare against the data. For example, the regular expression 
  \d{4}[^\w]\d{4}[^\w]\d{4}[^\w]\d{4} searches for a credit card number pattern. Segments of data that match the regular expression are redacted using the Replace string.

- **Replace** - String used to redact (obfuscate) data, such as a pattern of Xs to replace digits of a credit card number: XXXX–XXXX–XXXX–XXXX.

- **Trigger** - Optional simple string to be searched before applying the regular expression. If the string is found, the redactor searches for matches using the Search regular expression. Using the Trigger field improves performance: simple string matching is faster than regular expression matching.

You can use the following preconfigured redaction rules on your cluster. Rules are applied in the order listed in the table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Regex Pattern</th>
<th>Replacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card numbers (with separator)</td>
<td>\d{4}[^\w]\d{4}[^\w]\d{4}[^\w]\d{4}</td>
<td>XXXX–XXXX–XXXX–XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security numbers (with separator)</td>
<td>\d{3}[^\w]\d{2}[^\w]\d{4}</td>
<td>XXX–XX–XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email addresses</td>
<td>\b(<a href="%5BA-Za-z0-9-%5D*%5BA-Za-z0-9%5D">A-Za-z0-9</a>\b)</td>
<td><a href="mailto:email@redacted.host">email@redacted.host</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostnames</td>
<td>\b([A-Za-z]([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9-]*[A-Za-z0-9])\b)</td>
<td>HOSTNAME.REDACTED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enabling Log and Query Redaction Using Cloudera Manager

To enable redaction, you must use Cloudera Manager’s new layout rather than the classic layout (the Switch to the new layout, Switch to the classic layout links toggle between these two variations of the UI). To enable log and query redaction in Cloudera Manager:

1. Login to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select Clusters > HDFS.
3. Click the Configuration tab.
4. In the Search box, type redaction to find the redaction property settings:
   - Enable Log and Query Redaction
   - Log and Query Redaction Policy List of rules for redacting sensitive information from log files and query strings.

Choose a preconfigured rule or add a custom rule. See How Redaction Rules Work on page 465 for more information about rule pattern definitions.
Test your rules:
– Enter sample text into the Test Redaction Rules text box
– Click Test Redaction.

5. Click Save Changes.
6. Restart the cluster.

If no rules match, the text you entered displays in the Results field, unchanged.

Using Cloudera Navigator Data Management for Data Redaction

**Important:** This approach has been supplanted by Cloudera Manager's cluster-wide log and query redaction feature, and is not recommended.

You can specify credit card number patterns and other PII to be masked in audit events, in the properties of entities displayed in lineage diagrams, and in information retrieved from the Audit Server database and the Metadata Server persistent storage. Redacting data other than credit card numbers is not supported by default with the Cloudera Navigator property. You can use regular expressions to redact social security numbers or other PII. Masking applies only to audit events and lineage entities generated after enabling a mask.

**Required Role:** Navigator Administrator or Full Administrator

1. Log into Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select Clusters > Cloudera Management Service.
3. Click the Configuration tab.
4. Expand the Navigator Audit Server Default Group category.
5. Click the Advanced category.
6. Configure the PII Masking Regular Expression property with a regular expression that matches the credit card number formats to be masked. The default expression is:

\[(4[0-9]{12})|(5[1-5][0-9]{14})|(3[47][0-9]{13})|(3(?:0[0-5]|[68][0-9])[0-9]{11})|(6(?:011|5[0-9]{2})[0-9]{12})\]

which consolidates these regular expressions:

- Visa - \((4[0-9]{12})\)
- MasterCard - \((5[1-5][0-9]{14})\)
- American Express - \((3[47][0-9]{13})\)
How to Log a Security Support Case

Here are some items to gather before logging a support case:

- If possible, gather a diagnostic bundle.
- Note specific details about the issue, including these:
  - Is this a new install, or did you upgrade a working cluster? For upgrades, identify release numbers ("trying to upgrade from Cloudera Manager 5.5.6 to Cloudera Manager 5.8.1," for example).
  - Is this a production deployment, development environment, or sandbox environment?
  - Note the severity of the impact and whether it is causing a production outage.
  - Capture error messages (screenshots, command-line capture, and so on) and attach to the case.
  - Note the commands executed and the results, captured to a file if possible.
  - Itemize all changes made to your cluster configuration after the issue arose (possibly, as attempts to resolve the issue).

In addition to the above, here are some specific security-related details:

**Kerberos Issues**

- For Kerberos issues, your krb5.conf and kdc.conf files are valuable for support to be able to understand your configuration.
- If you are having trouble with client access to the cluster, provide the output for klist -ef after kiniting as the user account on the client host in question. Additionally, confirm that your ticket is renewable by running kinit -R after successfully kiniting.
- Specify if you are authenticating (kiniting) with a user outside of the Hadoop cluster's realm (such as Active Directory, or another MIT Kerberos realm).
- If using AES-256 encryption, ensure you have the [Unlimited Strength JCE Policy Files](https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/javase/products/security-policy.html) deployed on all cluster and client nodes.

**TLS/SSL Issues**

- Specify whether you are using a private/commercial CA for your certificates, or if they are self-signed. Note that Cloudera strongly recommends against using self-signed certificates in production clusters.
- Clarify what services you are attempting to setup TLS/SSL for in your description.
- When troubleshooting TLS/SSL trust issues, provide the output of the following openssl command:

  ```
  openssl s_client -connect host.fqdn.name:port
  ```

**LDAP Issues**

- Specify the LDAP service in use (Active Directory, OpenLDAP, one of Oracle Directory Server offerings, OpenDJ, etc)
- Provide a screenshot of the LDAP configuration screen you are working with if you are troubleshooting setup issues.
- Be prepared to troubleshoot using the ldapsearch command (requires the openldap-clients package) on the host where LDAP authentication or authorization issues are being seen.
How To Obtain and Deploy Keys and Certificates for TLS/SSL

Cloudera recommends obtaining certificates from one of the trusted public certificate authorities (CA) such as Symantec or Comodo for TLS/SSL encryption for the cluster. This How To provides a brief overview of the tools used to create the various artifacts followed by the steps in the process. Plan ahead to allow time to receive signed certificates from whichever CA you use.

Note: Always check with your selected public CA before creating any CSRs and follow the CA-specific processes.

If your organization uses its own internal CA, follow your internal process for creating and submitting the CSRs.

Tools Overview

Java Keytool and OpenSSL are key management tools that let you create the security artifacts needed for TLS/SSL. See How to Convert PEM to JKS and JKS to PEM for TLS/SSL Services and Clients for more information beyond the two short overviews below.

Java Keytool

Oracle Java keytool is a utility included with the Oracle JDK for creating and managing cryptographic keys and certificates. During configuring the Cloudera Manager Cluster for TLS/SSL, you create the private key pairs, keystore, certificate signing requests, and create a truststore for specific use by the cluster using this software tool, as detailed in the steps throughout this guide.

Java Keytool Requirements for Cloudera Manager TLS/SSL Configuration

For any steps using the Java Keytool, be sure to:

- Use the Oracle Java keytool rather than tools such as OpenJDK.
- Use the JDK downloaded from Oracle or the Cloudera-provided Oracle JDK located in this default path on a Cloudera Manager Server host:
  
  /usr/java/jdk1.7.0_67-cloudera/bin/jre/lib/security

- Use the same version of the Java keytool for all steps. If the host has multiple JDKs installed, set the PATH variable so that the Oracle JDK is invoked first, as in this example:

  $ export JAVA_HOME=/usr/java/jdk1.7.0_67-cloudera
  $ export PATH=$JAVA_HOME/bin:$PATH

- Use the same password for the -keypass and -storepass in any commands that invoke these two options. Cloudera Manager requires the same password for a key and its keystore.

OpenSSL

OpenSSL is an open source cryptography and TLS/SSL toolkit that has been widely used since its inception ~ 1999. Just as with Java Keytool, OpenSSL lets you create private keys, certificate requests, and keystores, and it provides options for verifying certificates.

Cloudera Manager Agent hosts act as clients of a Cloudera Manager Server host during RPC client and server communications. The Agent hosts, Hue, Impala and other Python-based services require PEM-formatted keys and certificates (PKCS #8), which is why the steps below include converting some of the JKS artifacts using this tool. See How to Convert PEM to JKS and JKS to PEM for TLS/SSL Services and Clients for more information.

Step 1: Create Directory for Security Artifacts

Distributing the certificates, keys, truststore—in short, all security artifacts used for TLS/SSL intra-cluster communications—is part of this and some subsequent processes. To keep things organized, Cloudera recommends
that you create the directory and distribute and store artifacts when you receive them, even though they may not be immediately needed.

The following table shows an example directory structure for the security artifacts created in the steps in this and subsequent sections. Use different names if you like, but for ease of deployment, use the same directory names across all hosts in the cluster.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cmhost.sec.example.com</td>
<td>FQDN of an example Cloudera Manager Server host.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/opt/cloudera/security</td>
<td>Base path for security-related files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/opt/cloudera/security/pki</td>
<td>Path for all security artifacts associated with TLS/SSL, including keys, keystores (keystore.jks), CSR, and root- and intermediate-CA certificates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/usr/java/jdk1.7.0_67-cloudera/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts</td>
<td>Path to the default alternative Java truststore on a Cloudera Manager Server host system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. On the Cloudera Manager Server host, create the /opt/cloudera/security/pki directory:

   ```
   $ sudo mkdir -p /opt/cloudera/security/pki
   ```

2. This directory must be owned by cloudera-scm:cloudera-scm and have its executable bit set correctly so that Cloudera Manager can access the keystore at runtime:

   ```
   $ sudo chown -R cloudera-scm:cloudera-scm /opt/cloudera/security/jks
   $ umask 022
   $ cd /opt/cloudera/security/jks
   ```

Directories and artifacts persist during system upgrades. For security purposes, for any host you remove from a cluster, remove any directories you create and more importantly, remove any security artifacts (keys, certificates, and so on) they may contain.

**Step 2: Create the Java Truststore**

On the Cloudera Manager Server host, copy the JDK cacerts file to jssecacerts:

```
$ sudo cp $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts
```

If you do not have the $JAVA_HOME variable set, replace it with the path to the Oracle JDK. For example, the default path to the Java JDK on a Cloudera Manager Server host is:

```
/usr/java/jdk1.7.0_67-cloudera/
```

**Step 3: Generate Server Key and CSR**

1. On the Cloudera Manager Server host, use the keytool utility to generate a keypair and a keystore named for the server. Replace the OU, O, L, ST, and C entries with the values for your organization name, location, and country code (US, in the example):

   ```
   ```

   Use the same `password` for the key and its keystore (`-keypass` and `-storepass`, respectively): Cloudera Manager does not support using different passwords for the key and keystore.
2. Generate a certificate signing request (CSR) for the public key (contained in the keystore as a result of the command above). In this command below, enter the password that you set for the key and the keystore in the command above:

```
```

**Step 4: Submit the CSR to the CA**

1. Submit the CSR file to your certificate authority using the process and means required by the CA, for example, email or web submission. For the certificate format, specify PEM (base64 ASCII) (see Step 5 below for an example of PEM formatted certificate heading and closing structure).
2. The public CA will request specific details from you, to verify that you own the domain name contained in the CSR, before they issue the certificate.
3. When you receive the signed certificate from the CA, you can proceed with Step 5.

**Step 5: Verify the Certificate**

From the public (or internal) CA, you receive the certificate for the server signed by the CA and several other digital artifacts, including root CA and possibly one (or more) intermediate CA certificates. Before distributing these to the hosts, make sure the certificate is in PEM format. A PEM formatted certificate file looks like this:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
<The encoded certificate is represented by multiple lines of exactly 64 characters, except for the last line, which can contain 64 characters or fewer.>
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

If your issued certificate is in binary (DER) format, convert it to PEM format before continuing. See How to Convert Formats (PEM, JKS) for TLS/SSL Clients and Services for details.

To modify the truststore (jssecacerts) to explicitly trust certificates or certificate chain (as you might for certificates signed by an internal CA), follow the steps in How to Add Root and Intermediate CAs to Truststore for TLS/SSL.

**Step 6: Import the Certificate into the Keystore**

Copy the signed certificate you receive from the CA to the Cloudera Manager Server host. To identity the certificate's functionality, include a suffix such as "-server.cert.pem" in the target name for the copy command, as shown in this example:

```
cp cert-file-recd /opt/cloudera/security/pki/$(hostname -f)-server.cert.pem
```

Import the certificate into the keystore.

```
$ sudo keytool -importcert -alias $(hostname -f)-server -file /opt/cloudera/security/pki/$(hostname -f)-server.cert.pem -keystore /opt/cloudera/security/pki/$(hostname -f)-server.jks
```

Assuming the certificate was obtained from a public CA, you can safely disregard this message about trust, and enter yes to continue:

```
... is not trusted. Install reply anyway? [no]: yes
```

You must see the following response confirming that the certificate has been properly imported and can verify the private key that it certifies.

```
Certificate reply was installed in keystore
```
If you do not see this response, double-check all your steps up to this point: are you working in the correct path? Do you have the proper certificate? and so on. See Getting Support for information about how to contact Cloudera Support and to find out about other sources of help if you cannot successfully import the certificates.

How to Set Up a Gateway Node to Restrict Access to the Cluster

The steps below configure a firewall-protected Hadoop cluster that allows access only through the node configured as the gateway. Clients access the cluster through the gateway using the REST API, for example, using HttpFS (which provides REST access to HDFS) or using Oozie, which allows REST access for submitting and monitoring jobs.

Installing and Configuring the Firewall and Gateway

Follow these steps:

1. Choose a cluster node to be the gateway machine.
2. Install and configure the Oozie server by following the standard directions starting here: Installing Oozie.
3. Install HttpFS.
4. Start the Oozie server:
   ```
   $ sudo service oozie start
   ```
5. Start the HttpFS server:
   ```
   $ sudo service hadoop-httpfs start
   ```
6. Configure firewalls.
   Block all access from outside the cluster.
   - The gateway node should have ports 11000 (oozie) and 14000 (hadoop-httpfs) open.
   - Optionally, to maintain access to the Web UIs for the cluster's JobTrackers and NameNode, open their HTTP ports: see Ports Used by Components of CDH 5.
7. Optionally configure authentication in simple mode (default) or using Kerberos. See HttpFS Authentication on page 133 to configure Kerberos for HttpFS and Oozie Authentication on page 161 to configure Kerberos for Oozie.
8. Optionally encrypt communication using HTTPS for Oozie by following these directions.

Accessing HDFS

With the Hadoop client:

All of the standard hadoop fs commands work; just make sure to specify -fs webhdfs://HOSTNAME:14000. For example (where GATEWAYHOST is the hostname of the gateway machine):

````
$ hadoop fs -fs webhdfs://GATEWAYHOST:14000 -cat /user/me/myfile.txt
Hello World!
```

Without the Hadoop client:

You can run all of the standard hadoop fs commands by using the WebHDFS REST API and any program that can do GET, PUT, POST, and DELETE requests; for example:

````
$ curl "http://GATEWAYHOST:14000/webhdfs/v1/user/me/myfile.txt?op=OPEN&user.name=me"
Hello World!
```

**Important:** The user.name parameter is valid only if security is disabled. In a secure cluster, you must initiate a valid Kerberos session.
Submitting and Monitoring Jobs

The Oozie REST API supports the direct submission of jobs for MapReduce, Pig, and Hive; Oozie automatically creates a workflow with a single action. For any other action types, or to execute anything more complicated than a single job, you must create an actual workflow. Required files (JAR files, input data) must already exist on HDFS; if they do not, you can use HttpFS to upload the files.

With the Oozie client:

All of the standard Oozie commands will work. You can find a full explanation of the commands in the documentation for the command-line utilities.

Without the Oozie client:

You can run all of the standard Oozie commands by using the REST API and any program that can do GET, PUT, and POST requests. You can find a full explanation of the commands in the Oozie Web Services API documentation.

How To Set Up Access to Cloudera EDH or Cloudera Director (Microsoft Azure Marketplace)

The Cloudera Enterprise Data Hub (EDH) and Cloudera Director bundles that are available on the Microsoft Azure Marketplace only support SSH access (port 22). To access Cloudera Manager (port 7180), Cloudera Director (port 7189), or other services, you can:

• Set up a SOCKS (Sockets Secure protocol) proxy on your client machine. Cloudera recommends that you use this option.
• Add inbound rules to the Network Security Group in the Azure instance after you deploy EDH or Director to Azure.

Configure the SOCKS Proxy

The SOCKS5 protocol is implemented as a client and server process that enables traversal of IP network firewalls. After you configure the SOCKS proxy, your browser resolves DNS lookups using the Microsoft Azure network (through the proxy server), and lets you connect to services using internal FQDNs or private IP address.

With this approach, you complete the following tasks:

• Set up a single SSH tunnel to one of the hosts on the network and create a SOCKS proxy on the host.
• Change the browser configuration to perform all lookups through the SOCKS proxy host.

Network Prerequisites

Verify the following prerequisites before you connect to your cluster with a SOCKS proxy:

• You must be able to reach the host that you want to proxy to from the public internet or from the network that you’re connecting from.
• The host that you proxy to must be on the same network as the Cloudera services that you’re connecting to. For example, if you’re using the Cloudera EDH offering, tunnel to the Cloudera Manager host. If you’re using the Cloudera Director offering, tunnel to the Cloudera Director host.

Find the Public IP of the Host

Only one VM is created for the Cloudera Director. Use the public IP of that VM.

For the Cloudera EDH offering, use the public IP of the 0th master node VM: [dnsName]-mn0.
Start the SOCKS Proxy
On Linux

To start a SOCKS proxy over SSH, run the following command:

```
ssh -i your-key-file.pem -CND 1080 the_username_you_specified@publicIP_of_VM
```

The command uses the following parameters:

- `-i your-key-file.pem` Specifies the path to the private key needed to SSH to the Cloudera Director server. Omit if using SSH passwords.
- `C` Sets up compression.
- `N` Suppresses any command execution once established.
- `D` Sets up the SOCKS proxy on a port.
- `1080` The port to set the SOCKS proxy locally.

On Windows

Follow the instructions on Microsoft’s website.

Configure Google Chrome to Use the Proxy

By default, Google Chrome uses system-wide proxy settings on a per-profile basis. To start Chrome without these settings, open Chrome through the command line and specify the following:

- The SOCKS proxy port. This must be the same port that you used when you started the proxy.
- The profile. This examples below create a new profile.

Use one of the following commands to create a profile and launch a new instance of Chrome that does not conflict with any currently running Chrome instances.

Linux

```
/usr/bin/google-chrome \
--user-data-dir="$HOME/chrome-with-proxy" \
--proxy-server="socks5://localhost:1080"
```

Mac OS X

```
"/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome" \
--user-data-dir="$HOME/chrome-with-proxy" \
--proxy-server="socks5://localhost:1080"
```

Microsoft Windows

```
"C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" ^
--user-data-dir="%USERPROFILE%\chrome-with-proxy" ^
--proxy-server="socks5://localhost:1080"
```

In this Chrome session, you can use the private IP address or internal FQDN to connect to any host that is accessible by Cloudera Director. For example, if you proxy to the Cloudera Director server, you can connect to Cloudera Director as if it were local by entering `localhost:7189` in the Chrome URL bar.

Network Security Group

**Warning:** This method is not recommended for any purpose other than a Proof of Concept. If the data is not carefully locked down, it will be accessible to hackers and malicious entities.

On portal.azure.com, find the Network Security Group(s) and add inbound rules for the various services. You may have to create these rules for the services. Refer to Cloudera documentation for more information on ports used by Cloudera Manager, CDH components, managed services, and third-party components.
How to Use Self-Signed Certificates for TLS

Self-signed certificates should not be used for production deployments. Self-signed certificates are created and stored in the keystore specified during the key-generation process, and should be replaced by a signed certificate. Using self-signed certificates requires generating and distributing the certificates and establishing explicit trust for the certificate.

However, using self-signed certificates lets you easily obtain certificates for TLS/SSL configuration and may be appropriate for non-production or test setups. See Encrypting Data in Transit on page 192 and Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager on page 196 for more information.

Replace paths, file names, aliases, and other examples in the commands below for your system.

1. Create the directory for the certificates:

   ```
   $ mkdir -p /opt/cloudera/security/x509/ /opt/cloudera/security/jks/
   ```

   Give Cloudera Manager access to the directory, set the correct permissions, and then change to the directory:

   ```
   $ sudo chown -R cloudera-scm:cloudera-scm /opt/cloudera/security/jks
   $ sudo umask 0700
   $ cd /opt/cloudera/security/jks
   ```

2. Generate the key pair and self-signed certificate, storing everything in the keystore with the same password for keystore and storepass, as shown below. Use the FQDN of the current host for the CN to avoid raising a java.io.IOException: HTTPS hostname wrong exception. Replace values for OU, O, L, ST, and C with entries appropriate for your environment:

   ```
   keytool -genkeypair -alias cmhost -keyalg RSA -keysize 2048 -dname "cn=cm01.example.com, ou=Department, o=Company, l=City, st=State, c=US" -keypass password -keystore example.jks -storepass password
   ```

3. Copy the default Java truststore (cacerts) to the alternate system truststore (jssecacerts):

   ```
   $ sudo cp $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/jssecacerts
   ```

4. Export the certificate from the keystore (example.jks).

   ```
   $ keytool -export -alias cmhost -keystore example.jks -rfc -file selfsigned.cer
   ```

5. Copy the self-signed certificate (selfsigned.cer) to the /opt/cloudera/security/x509/ directory.

   ```
   $ cp selfsigned.cer /opt/cloudera/security/x509/cmhost.pem
   ```

6. Import the public key into the alternate system truststore (jssecacerts), so that any process that runs with Java on this machine will trust the key. The default password for the Java truststore is changeit. Do not use the password created for the keystore in step 2.

   ```
   ```

   **Important:** Repeat this process on each host in the cluster.

7. Rename the keystore:

   ```
   $ mv /opt/cloudera/security/jks/example.jks /opt/cloudera/security/jks/cmhost-keystore.jks
   ```
You can also delete the certificate because it was copied to the appropriate path in step 5.

```bash
$ rm /opt/cloudera/security/jks/selfsigned.cer
```

The self-signed certificate set up is complete.

How to Verify that HDFS ACLs are Synching with Sentry

If you want to verify that your HDFS ACLs are synching with Sentry, this article will show you how to see whether they are. This example will show you how to complete the following tasks:

1. Create a role and grant the role to a group.
2. Grant privileges to the role.
3. Verify that Sentry privileges are synching with HDFS ACLs.
4. Grant privileges on a URI and see that URI privileges do not sync with HDFS ACLs.

**Note:** In short, if you only need to know the command to verify that HDFS ACL synch is working, you can run `kinit` as a user that can run HDFS commands, and then run the following command:

```bash
hdfs dfs -getfacl <object path>
```

The example here will show you the work-flow, start to finish, of how to grant and revoke permissions, and verify that those permissions are synching with HDFS ACLs.

Alternatively, you can see the same example in this video:

[How to Verify that HDFS ACLs are Synching With Sentry](#)

Verify the Prerequisites

Before you start, verify that you have the following prerequisites:

- The Sentry and Hue services must be running on your cluster.
- And you’ll need three users:
  - **Test user** - The test user must belong to an LDAP or UNIX group that you can assign a role to. The test user in this example is `stegosaurus` and his group is `triceratops`.
  - **Sentry Admin user** - This user will login to Hue to grant and revoke privileges. In this example, the Sentry Admin user is `hive`.
  - **HDFS user** - A user that can run HDFS commands in the terminal. In this example, the HDFS user is `hdfs`.

Grant Privileges

This section will show you how to create a role and grant privileges to the role. If you already have a role with privileges on it, you can skip to the next section.

1. In Cloudera Manager, open the Hue service.
2. In the Hue service, click **Web UI > Hue Load Balanced** to open the Hue UI.
3. Login to Hue as a Sentry Admin user. In this example, the Sentry Admin user is `hive`.

**Note:** You can view the Sentry Admin users on your cluster by opening the **Configuration** tab in the Sentry service and searching for the **Admin Groups** property.
4. In the Hue editor, create a role with the following command:

```
create role <role name>
```

The role in this example is `t_rex`, so we entered

```
create role t_rex
```

5. Click the execute button to run the command.

6. Next, grant the role to your group with the following command:

```
grant role <role name> to group <group name>
```

In this example, the group name is `triceratops`, so we entered

```
grant role t_rex to group triceratops
```

7. Finally, grant SELECT privileges to the role with the following command:

```
grant select on table <table name> to role <role name>
```

This example uses the `customers` table, so we entered

```
grant select on table customers to role t_rex
```

Now we have a user that belongs to a group, the group has a role, and the role has select privileges on the `customers` table. The following image illustrates our current status:
Now it's time to move to the terminal to verify that our SELECT privileges have synched with HDFS.

View HDFS Permissions in the Terminal

In this section, we'll SSH into the cluster and view HDFS permissions on the table.

1. In the terminal, SSH into your cluster.
2. Next, run `kinit` with a user that is authorized to run HDFS commands. The HDFS user for this example is `hdfs`, so we ran `kinit hdfs`.
3. To view the permissions on the object, run the following command:

```
  hdfs dfs -getfacl <object path>
```

The command returns a list of permissions on the table. Your group should be listed there.

In this example, we ran this command to view the permissions on the `customers` table:

```
  hdfs dfs -getfacl /user/hive/warehouse/customers
```

The following image shows the commands we ran in the terminal, highlighted in yellow. In the output of the last command, the `triceratops` group is listed with read permissions on the `customers` table.
4. You can go back to Hue to change the permissions for the role and run the same command in the terminal to see how the permissions have changed. For example, you can give your role ALL permissions with the following command:

```
grant all on table <table name> to role <role name>
```

For example:

```
grant all on table customers to role t_rex
```
5. And when you go back to the terminal and run the same command, you can see that the group has write permissions on the customers table, as in the image below:

![Command execution result]

**URIs Don't Sync With HDFS ACLs**

Finally, you can grant permissions to a URI in Hue and see that it is not applied as an ACL in HDFS.

1. First, in Hue remove all permissions from your role. Enter the following command:

   ```
   revoke all on table <table name> from role <role name>
   ```

2. You can run the same command in the terminal to verify that the group does not have any permissions on the table.

3. Then, grant permissions to the role on the URI with the following command:

   ```
   grant all on uri 'user/hive/warehouse/customers' to role <role name>
   ```

   For this example, we entered this command:

   ```
   grant all on uri 'user/hive/warehouse/customers' to role t_rex
   ```

4. And if you run the same command in the terminal, you'll see that the group is still not listed as having permissions because URIs do not sync with HDFS ACLs.
Troubleshooting Security Issues

This section includes troubleshooting for several configurable security related components (Kerberos, TLS/SSL, for example). You will also find some architectural details about the underpinnings of some components, as well as some details about various error codes and messages that may arise.

Troubleshooting Authentication Issues

Typically, if there are problems with security, Hadoop will display generic messages about the cause of the problem. This topic contains solutions to potential problems you might face when configuring a secure cluster:

Common Security Problems and Their Solutions

This troubleshooting section contains sample Kerberos configuration files, *krb5.conf* and *kdc.conf* for your reference. It also has solutions to potential problems you might face when configuring a secure cluster:

Issues with Generate Credentials

Cloudera Manager uses a command called **Generate Credentials** to create the accounts needed by CDH for enabling authentication using Kerberos. The command is triggered automatically when you are using the Kerberos Wizard or making changes to your cluster that will require new Kerberos principals.

When configuring Kerberos, if CDH services do not start, and on the Cloudera Manager Home > Status tab you see a validation error, Role is missing Kerberos keytab, it means the **Generate Credentials** command failed. To see the output of the command, go to the Home > Status tab and click the All Recent Commands tab.

Here are some common error messages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>Possible Causes</th>
<th>Solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>With Active Directory</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ldap_sasl_interactive_bind_s: Can’t contact LDAP server (-1)</td>
<td>The Domain Controller specified is incorrect or LDAPS has not been enabled for it.</td>
<td>Verify the KDC configuration by going to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and go to Administration&gt; Settings&gt; Kerberos. Also check that LDAPS is enabled for Active Directory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ldap_add: Insufficient access (50)</td>
<td>The Active Directory account you are using for Cloudera Manager does not have permissions to create other accounts.</td>
<td>Use the Delegate Control wizard to grant permission to the Cloudera Manager account to create other accounts. You can also login to Active Directory as the Cloudera Manager user to check that it can create other accounts in your Organizational Unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>With MIT KDC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kadmin: Cannot resolve network address for admin server in requested realm while initializing kadmin interface.</td>
<td>The hostname for the KDC server is incorrect.</td>
<td>Check the <em>kdc</em> field for your default realm in <em>krb5.conf</em> and make sure the hostname is correct.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Running any Hadoop command fails after enabling security.

Description:
A user must have a valid Kerberos ticket to interact with a secure Hadoop cluster. Running any Hadoop command (such as `hadoop fs -ls`) will fail if you do not have a valid Kerberos ticket in your credentials cache. If you do not have a valid ticket, you will receive an error such as:

```
11/01/04 12:08:12 WARN ipc.Client: Exception encountered while connecting to the server : javax.security.sasl.SaslException:
GSS initiate failed [Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Failed to find any Kerberos tgt)]
Bad connection to FS. command aborted. exception: Call to nn-host/10.0.0.2:8020 failed
on local exception: java.io.IOException: javax.security.sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate failed [Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Failed to find any Kerberos tgt)]
```

Solution:
You can examine the Kerberos tickets currently in your credentials cache by running the `klist` command. You can obtain a ticket by running the `kinit` command and either specifying a keytab file containing credentials, or entering the password for your principal.

Using the UserGroupInformation class to authenticate Oozie

Secured CDH services mainly use Kerberos to authenticate RPC communication. RPCs are one of the primary means of communication between nodes in a Hadoop cluster. For example, RPCs are used by the YARN NodeManager to communicate with the ResourceManager, or by the HDFS client to communicate with the NameNode.

CDH services handle Kerberos authentication by calling the UGI login method, `UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytab()`, once every time the service starts up. Since Kerberos ticket expiration times are typically short, repeated logins are required to keep the application secure. Long-running CDH applications have to be implemented accordingly to accommodate these repeated logins. If an application is only going to communicate with HDFS, YARN, MRv1, and HBase, then you only need to call the `UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytab()` method at startup, before any actual API activity occurs. The HDFS, YARN, MRv1 and HBase services’ RPC clients have their own built-in mechanisms to automatically re-login when a keytab’s Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) expires. Therefore, such applications do not need to include calls to the UGI re-login method because their RPC client layer performs the re-login task for them.

However, some applications may include other service clients that do not involve the generic Hadoop RPC framework, such as Hive or Oozie clients. Such applications must explicitly call the `UserGroupInformation.getLoginUser().checkTGTAndReloginFromKeytab()` method before every attempt to connect with a Hive or Oozie client. This is because these clients do not have the logic required for automatic re-logins.

This is an example of an infinitely polling Oozie client application:

```java
// App startup
UserGroupInformation.loginFromKeytab(KEYTAB_PATH, PRINCIPAL_STRING);
OozieClient client = loginUser.doAs(new PrivilegedAction<OozieClient>() {
    public OozieClient run() {
        try {
            return new OozieClient(OOZIE_SERVER_URI);
        } catch (Exception e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
            return null;
        }
    }
});

while (true && client != null) {
    // Application's long-running loop

    // Every time, complete the TGT check first
    UserGroupInformation loginUser = UserGroupInformation.getLoginUser();
```
Java is unable to read the Kerberos credentials cache created by versions of MIT Kerberos 1.8.1 or higher.

Description:

If you are running MIT Kerberos 1.8.1 or higher, the following error will occur when you attempt to interact with the Hadoop cluster, even after successfully obtaining a Kerberos ticket using `kinit`:

```java
11/01/04 12:08:12 WARN ipc.Client: Exception encountered while connecting to the server: javax.security.sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate failed [Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Failed to find any Kerberos tgt)]
Bad connection to FS. command aborted. exception: Call to nn-host/10.0.0.2:8020 failed on local exception: java.io.IOException: javax.security.sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate failed [Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Failed to find any Kerberos tgt)]
```

Because of a change [1] in the format in which MIT Kerberos writes its credentials cache, there is a bug [2] in the Oracle JDK 6 Update 26 and earlier that causes Java to be unable to read the Kerberos credentials cache created by versions of MIT Kerberos 1.8.1 or higher. Kerberos 1.8.1 is the default in Ubuntu Lucid and higher releases and Debian Squeeze and higher releases. (On RHEL and CentOS, an older version of MIT Kerberos which does not have this issue, is the default.)

Footnotes:


Solution:

If you encounter this problem, you can work around it by running `kinit -R` after running `kinit` initially to obtain credentials. Doing so will cause the ticket to be renewed, and the credentials cache rewritten in a format which Java can read. To illustrate this:

```
$ klist
klist: No credentials cache found (ticket cache FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_1000)
$ hadoop fs -ls
11/01/04 13:15:51 WARN ipc.Client: Exception encountered while connecting to the server: javax.security.sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate failed [Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Failed to find any Kerberos tgt)]
Bad connection to FS. command aborted. exception: Call to nn-host/10.0.0.2:8020 failed on local exception: java.io.IOException: javax.security.sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate failed [Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Failed to find any Kerberos tgt)]
$ kinit
Password for atm@YOUR-REALM.COM:
$ klist
```
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_10000
Default principal: atm@YOUR-REALM.COM

Valid starting                 Expires                Service principal
01/04/11 13:19:31  01/04/11 23:19:31  krbtgt/YOUR-REALM.COM@YOUR-REALM.COM
renew until 01/05/11 13:19:30

$ hadoop fs -ls
11/01/04 13:15:59 WARN ipc.Client: Exception encountered while connecting to the server
java.security.sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate failed (Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Failed to find any Kerberos tgt))
Bad connection to FS. command aborted. exception: Call to nn-host/10.0.0.2:8020 failed on local exception: java.io.IOException: java.security.sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate failed (Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Failed to find any Kerberos tgt))

$ kinit -R
$ hadoop fs -ls
Found 6 items
drwx------   - atm atm          0 2011-01-02 16:16 /user/atm/.staging

Note:
This workaround for Problem 2 requires the initial ticket to be renewable. Note that whether or not you can obtain renewable tickets is dependent upon a KDC-wide setting, as well as a per-principal setting for both the principal in question and the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) service principal for the realm. A non-renewable ticket will have the same values for its "valid starting" and "renew until" times. If the initial ticket is not renewable, the following error message is displayed when attempting to renew the ticket:

```
kinit: Ticket expired while renewing credentials
```

java.io.IOException: Incorrect permission

Description:
An error such as the following example is displayed if the user running one of the Hadoop daemons has a umask of 0002, instead of 0022:

```
java.io.IOException: Incorrect permission for /var/folders/B3/B3d2vCm4F+mwZVPB89W6E++T1/-Tmp/-/tmpYTil84/dfs/data/data1, expected: rw-r-xr-x, while actual: rw-rwxr-x
at org.apache.hadoop.util.DiskChecker.checkPermission(DiskChecker.java:107)
at org.apache.hadoop.util.DiskChecker.mkdirsWithExistsAndPermissionCheck(DiskChecker.java:144)
at org.apache.hadoop.util.DiskChecker.mkdirsWithExistsAndPermissionCheck(DiskChecker.java:160)
at org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.server.datanode.DataNode.makeInstance(DataNode.java:1484)
at org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.server.datanode.DataNode.instantiateDataNode(DataNode.java:1432)
at org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.server.datanode.DataNode.instantiateDataNode(DataNode.java:1408)
at org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.MiniDFSCluster.startDataNodes(MiniDFSCluster.java:418)
at org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.MiniDFSCluster.<init>(MiniDFSCluster.java:279)
at org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.MiniDFSCluster.<init>(MiniDFSCluster.java:203)
at org.apache.hadoop.test.MiniHadoopClusterManager.start(MiniHadoopClusterManager.java:152)
at org.apache.hadoop.test.MiniHadoopClusterManager.run(MiniHadoopClusterManager.java:129)
at org.apache.hadoop.test.MiniHadoopClusterManager.main(MiniHadoopClusterManager.java:308)
```
Solution:
Make sure that the umask for hdfs and mapred is 0022.

A cluster fails to run jobs after security is enabled.

Description:
A cluster that was previously configured to not use security may fail to run jobs for certain users on certain TaskTrackers (MRv1) or NodeManagers (YARN) after security is enabled due to the following sequence of events:

1. A cluster is at some point in time configured without security enabled.
2. A user X runs some jobs on the cluster, which creates a local user directory on each TaskTracker or NodeManager.
3. Security is enabled on the cluster.
4. User X tries to run jobs on the cluster, and the local user directory on (potentially a subset of) the TaskTrackers or NodeManagers is owned by the wrong user or has overly-permissive permissions.

The bug is that after step 2, the local user directory on the TaskTracker or NodeManager should be cleaned up, but isn't.

If you're encountering this problem, you may see errors in the TaskTracker or NodeManager logs. The following example is for a TaskTracker on MRv1:

```
10/11/03 01:29:55 INFO mapred.JobClient: Task Id : attempt_201011021321_0004_m_000011_0, Status : FAILED
Error initializing attempt_201011021321_0004_m_000011_0:
java.io.IOException: org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell$ExitCodeException:
    at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.LinuxTaskController.runCommand(LinuxTaskController.java:212)
    at org.apache.hadoop.mapreduce.server.tasktracker.Localizer.initializeUserDirs(Localizer.java:272)
```
Solution:
Delete the `mapred.local.dir` or `yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs` directories for that user across the cluster.

The NameNode does not start and KrbException Messages (906) and (31) are displayed.

Description:
When you attempt to start the NameNode, a login failure occurs. This failure prevents the NameNode from starting and the following KrbException messages are displayed:

```
Caused by: KrbException: Integrity check on decrypted field failed (31) - PREAUTH_FAILED}
```

and

```
Caused by: KrbException: Identifier does not match expected value (906)
```

Note:
These KrbException error messages are displayed only if you enable debugging output. See Enabling Debugging Output for the Sun Kerberos Classes.

Solution:
Although there are several possible problems that can cause these two KrbException error messages to display, here are some actions you can take to solve the most likely problems:

- If you are using CentOS/Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.6 or higher, or Ubuntu, which use AES-256 encryption by default for tickets, you must install the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction Policy File on all cluster and Hadoop user machines. For information about how to verify the type of encryption used in your cluster, see Step 3: If you are Using AES-256 Encryption, Install the JCE Policy File on page 89. Alternatively, you can change your `kdc.conf` or `krb5.conf` to not use AES-256 by removing `aes256-cts:normal` from the `supported_enctypes` field of the `kdc.conf` or `krb5.conf` file. Note that after changing the `kdc.conf` file, you'll need to restart both the KDC and the kadmin server for those changes to take affect. You may also need to recreate or change the password of the relevant principals, including potentially the TGT principal (krbtgt/REALM@REALM).

- In the `[realms]` section of your `kdc.conf` file, in the realm corresponding to `HADOOP.LOCALDOMAIN`, add (or replace if it's already present) the following variable:

```
```

- Recreate the `hdfs` keytab file and `mapred` keytab file using the `-norandkey` option in the xst command (for details, see Step 4: Create and Deploy the Kerberos Principals and Keytab Files on page 90).

```
    kadmin.local: xst -norandkey -k hdfs.keytab hdfs/fully.qualified.domain.name HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name
    kadmin.local: xst -norandkey -k mapred.keytab mapred/fully.qualified.domain.name HTTP/fully.qualified.domain.name
```

The NameNode starts but clients cannot connect to it and error message contains enctype code 18.

Description:
The NameNode keytab file does not have an AES256 entry, but client tickets do contain an AES256 entry. The NameNode starts but clients cannot connect to it. The error message does not refer to "AES256", but does contain an enctype code "18".
Troubleshooting Security Issues

Solution:

Make sure the "Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction Policy File" is installed or remove `aes256-cts:normal` from the `supported_enctypes` field of the `kdc.conf` or `krb5.conf` file. For more information, see the first suggested solution above for Problem 5.

For more information about the Kerberos encryption types, see [http://www.iana.org/assignments/kerberos-parameters/kerberos-parameters.xml](http://www.iana.org/assignments/kerberos-parameters/kerberos-parameters.xml).

(MRV1 Only) Jobs won't run and TaskTracker is unable to create a local mapred directory.

Description:

The TaskTracker log contains the following error message:

```
11/08/17 14:44:06 INFO mapred.TaskController: main : user is atm
11/08/17 14:44:06 INFO mapred.TaskController: Failed to create directory /var/log/hadoop/cache/mapred/mapred/local1/taskTracker/atm - No such file or directory
11/08/17 14:44:06 WARN mapred.TaskTracker: Exception while localization
java.io.IOException: Job initialization failed (20)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred_LINUXTaskController.initializeJob(LinuxTaskController.java:191)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker$4.run(TaskTracker.java:1199)
at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
at org.apache.hadoop.security.UserGroupInformation.doAs(UserGroupInformation.java:1127)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker.initializeJob(TaskTracker.java:1174)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker.localizeJob(TaskTracker.java:1089)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker.startNewTask(TaskTracker.java:2257)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker$TaskLauncher.run(TaskTracker.java:2221)
Caused by: org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell$ExitCodeException:
at org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell.runCommand(Shell.java:255)
at org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell.run(Shell.java:182)
at org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell$ShellCommandExecutor.execute(Shell.java:375)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.LinuxTaskController.initializeJob(LinuxTaskController.java:184)
... 8 more
```

Solution:

Make sure the value specified for `mapred.local.dir` is identical in `mapred-site.xml` and `taskcontroller.cfg`. If the values are different, the error message above is returned.

(MRV1 Only) Jobs will not run and TaskTracker is unable to create a Hadoop logs directory.

Description:

The TaskTracker log contains an error message similar to the following:

```
11/08/17 14:48:23 INFO mapred.TaskController: main : user is atm
11/08/17 14:48:23 INFO mapred.TaskController: Failed to create directory /home/atm/src/cloudera/hadoop/build/hadoop-0.23.2-cdh5u1-SNAPSHOT/logs/userlogs/job_201108171441_0004 - No such file or directory
11/08/17 14:48:23 WARN mapred.TaskTracker: Exception while localization
java.io.IOException: Job initialization failed (255)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred/LinuxTaskController.initializeJob(LinuxTaskController.java:191)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker$4.run(TaskTracker.java:1199)
at java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged(Native Method)
at org.apache.hadoop.security.UserGroupInformation.doAs(UserGroupInformation.java:1127)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker.initializeJob(TaskTracker.java:1174)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker.localizeJob(TaskTracker.java:1089)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker.startNewTask(TaskTracker.java:2257)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker$TaskLauncher.run(TaskTracker.java:2221)
```

Solution:

Make sure the value specified for `mapred.local.dir` is identical in `mapred-site.xml` and `taskcontroller.cfg`. If the values are different, the error message above is returned.
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker.startNewTask(TaskTracker.java:2257)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker$TaskLauncher.run(TaskTracker.java:2221)
Caused by: org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell$ExitCodeException:
at org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell.runCommand(Shell.java:255)
at org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell.run(Shell.java:182)
at org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell$ShellCommandExecutor.execute(Shell.java:375)
at org.apache.hadoop.mapred.LinuxTaskController.initializeJob(LinuxTaskController.java:184)
... 8 more

Solution:

In MRv1, the default value specified for hadoop.log.dir in mapred-site.xml is /var/log/hadoop-0.20-mapreduce. The path must be owned and be writable by the mapred user. If you change the default value specified for hadoop.log.dir, make sure the value is identical in mapred-site.xml and taskcontroller.cfg. If the values are different, the error message above is returned.

After you enable cross-realm trust, you can run Hadoop commands in the local realm but not in the remote realm.

Description:

After you enable cross-realm trust, authenticating as a principal in the local realm will allow you to successfully run Hadoop commands, but authenticating as a principal in the remote realm will not allow you to run Hadoop commands. The most common cause of this problem is that the principals in the two realms either do not have the same encryption type, or the cross-realm principals in the two realms do not have the same password. This issue manifests itself because you are able to get Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) from both the local and remote realms, but you are unable to get a service ticket to allow the principals in the local and remote realms to communicate with each other.

Solution:

On the local MIT KDC server host, type the following command in the kadmin.local or kadmin shell to add the cross-realm krbtgt principal:

```
[kadmin]: addprinc -e "<enc_type_list>" krbtgt/YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COMPANY.COM
```

where the `<enc_type_list>` parameter specifies the types of encryption this cross-realm krbtgt principal will support: AES, DES, or RC4 encryption. You can specify multiple encryption types using the parameter in the command above, what's important is that at least one of the encryption types parameters corresponds to the encryption type found in the tickets granted by the KDC in the remote realm. For example:

```
[kadmin]: addprinc -e "aes256-cts:normal rc4-hmac:normal des3-hmac-sha1:normal" krbtgt/YOUR-LOCAL-REALM.COMPANY.COM@AD-REALM.COMPANY.COM
```

(MRv1 Only) Jobs won't run and cannot access files in mapred.local.dir

Description:

The TaskTracker log contains the following error message:

```
WARN org.apache.hadoop.mapred.TaskTracker: Exception while localization
java.io.IOException: Job initialization failed (1)
```

Solution:

1. Add the mapred user to the mapred and hadoop groups on all hosts.
2. Restart all TaskTrackers.
Users are unable to obtain credentials when running Hadoop jobs or commands.

Description:

This error occurs because the ticket message is too large for the default UDP protocol. An error message similar to the following may be displayed:

```
13/01/15 17:44:48 DEBUG ipc.Client: Exception encountered while connecting to the server
  java.security.sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate failed [Caused by GSSException: No valid credentials provided (Mechanism level: Fail to create credential.
(63) - No service creds)]
```

Solution:

Force Kerberos to use TCP instead of UDP by adding the following parameter to `libdefaults` in the `krb5.conf` file on the client(s) where the problem is occurring.

```
[libdefaults]
udp_preference_limit = 1
```

If you choose to manage `krb5.conf` through Cloudera Manager, this will automatically get added to `krb5.conf`

Note:

When sending a message to the KDC, the library will try using TCP before UDP if the size of the ticket message is larger than the setting specified for the `udp_preference_limit` property. If the ticket message is smaller than `udp_preference_limit` setting, then UDP will be tried before TCP. Regardless of the size, both protocols will be tried if the first attempt fails.

Request is a replay exceptions in the logs.

Description:

The root cause of this exception is that Kerberos uses a second-resolution timestamp to protect against replay attacks (where an attacker can record network traffic, and play back recorded requests later to gain elevated privileges). That is, incoming requests are cached by Kerberos for a little while, and if there are similar requests within a few seconds, Kerberos will be able to detect them as replay attack attempts. However, if there are multiple valid Kerberos requests coming in at the same time, these may also be misjudged as attacks for the following reasons:

- **Multiple services in the cluster are using the same Kerberos principal.** All secure clients that run on multiple machines should use unique Kerberos principals for each machine. For example, rather than connecting as a service principal `myservice@EXAMPLE.COM`, services should have per-host principals such as `myservice/host123.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM`.
- **Clocks not in sync:** All hosts should run NTP so that clocks are kept in sync between clients and servers.

While having different principals for each service, and clocks in sync helps mitigate the issue, there are, however, cases where even if all of the above are implemented, the problem still persists. In such a case, disabling the cache (and the replay protection as a consequence), will allow parallel requests to succeed. This compromise between usability and security can be applied by setting the `KRB5RCACHETYPE` environment variable to `none`.

Note that the `KRB5RCACHETYPE` is not automatically detected by Java applications. For Java-based components:

- Ensure that the cluster runs on JDK 8.
- To disable the replay cache, add `-Dsun.security.krb5.rcache=none` to the Java Opts/Arguments of the targeted JVM. For example, HiveServer2 or the Sentry service.

For more information, refer the MIT KDC documentation.
**Symptom:** The following exception shows up in the logs for one or more of the Hadoop daemons:

```
2013-02-28 22:49:03,152 INFO  ipc.Server (Server.java:doRead(571)) - IPC Server listener on 8020: readAndProcess threw exception javax.security.sasl.SaslException: GSS initiate failed [Caused by GSSException: Failure unspecified at GSS-API level (Mechanism level: Request is a replay (34))]
at com.sun.security.sasl.gsskerb.GssKrb5Server.evaluateResponse(GssKrb5Server.java:159)
at org.apache.hadoop.ipc.Server$Connection.saslReadAndProcess(Server.java:1040)
at org.apache.hadoop.ipc.Server$Connection.readAndProcess(Server.java:1213)
at org.apache.hadoop.ipc.Server$Listener.doRead(Server.java:566)
at org.apache.hadoop.ipc.Server$Listener$Reader.run(Server.java:363)
Caused by: GSSException: Failure unspecified at GSS-API level (Mechanism level: Request is a replay (34))
at sun.security.jgss.krb5.Krb5Context.acceptSecContext(Krb5Context.java:741)
at sun.security.jgss.GSSContextImpl.acceptSecContext(GSSContextImpl.java:323)
at sun.security.jgss.GSSContextImpl.acceptSecContext(GSSContextImpl.java:267)
at com.sun.security.sasl.gsskerb.GssKrb5Server.evaluateResponse(GssKrb5Server.java:137)
... 4 more
Caused by: KrbException: Request is a replay (34)
at sun.security.jgss.krb5.InitSecContextToken.<init>(InitSecContextToken.java:79)
at sun.security.jgss.krb5.Krb5Context.acceptSecContext(Krb5Context.java:724)
... 7 more
```

In addition, this problem can manifest itself as performance issues for all clients in the cluster, including dropped connections, timeouts attempting to make RPC calls, and so on.

**Cloudera Manager cluster services fail to start**

**Possible Causes and Solutions:**

- Check that the encryption types are matched between your KDC and krb5.conf on all hosts.

  **Solution:** If you are using AES-256, follow the instructions at Step 2: If You are Using AES-256 Encryption, Install the JCE Policy File on page 51 to deploy the JCE policy file on all hosts.

- If the version of the JCE policy files does not match the version of Java installed on a node, then services will not start. This is because the cryptographic signatures of the JCE policy files cannot be verified if the wrong version is installed. For example, if a DataNode does not start, you will see the following error in the logs to show that verification of the cryptographic signature within the JCE policy files failed.

```
Exception in secureMain
java.lang.ExceptionInInitializerError
at javax.crypto.KeyGenerator.nextSpi(KeyGenerator.java:324)
at javax.crypto.KeyGenerator.<init>(KeyGenerator.java:157)
.
.
Caused by: java.lang.SecurityException: The jurisdiction policy files are not signed by a trusted signer!
at javax.crypto.JarVerifier.verifyPolicySigned(JarVerifier.java:289)
```

**Solution:** Download the correct JCE policy files for the version of Java you are running:

- **Java 6**
- **Java 7**

Download and unpack the zip file. Copy the two JAR files to the $JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security directory on each node within the cluster.
HDFS Encryption Issues

This topic contains HDFS Encryption-specific troubleshooting information in the form of issues you might face when encrypting HDFS files/directories and their workarounds.

KMS server jute buffer exception

Description
You see the following error when the KMS (for example, as a ZooKeeper client) jute buffer size is insufficient to hold all the tokens:

```
2017-01-31 21:23:56,416 WARN org.apache.zookeeper.ClientCnxn: Session 0x259f5fb3c1000fb for server example.cloudera.com/10.172.0.1:2181, unexpected error, closing socket connection and attempting reconnect
java.io.IOException: Packet len4196356 is out of range!
```

Solution
Increase the jute buffer size and restart the KMS. In Cloudera Manager, go to the KMS Configuration page, and in the Additional Java Configuration Options for KMS (kms_java_opts) field, enter 

```
-Djute.maxbuffer=<number_of_bytes>
```

Restart the KMS.

Retrieval of encryption keys fails

Description
You see the following error when trying to list encryption keys

```
user1@example-sles-4:~> hadoop key list
Cannot list keys for KeyProvider: KMSClientProvider[https://example-sles-2.example.com:16000/kms/v1/]: Retrieval of all keys failed.
```

Solution
Make sure your truststore has been updated with the relevant certificate(s), such as the Key Trustee server certificate.

DistCp between unencrypted and encrypted locations fails

Description
By default, DistCp compares checksums provided by the filesystem to verify that data was successfully copied to the destination. However, when copying between unencrypted and encrypted locations, the filesystem checksums will not match since the underlying block data is different.

Solution
Specify the `-skipcrccheck` and `-update` distcp flags to avoid verifying checksums.

(CDH 5.6 and lower) Cannot move encrypted files to trash

Note: Starting with CDH 5.7, you can delete files or directories that are part of an HDFS encryption zone. For details, see Trash Behavior with HDFS Transparent Encryption Enabled.

Description
In CDH 5.6 and lower, with HDFS encryption enabled, you cannot move encrypted files or directories to the trash directory.
Solution

To remove encrypted files/directories, use the following command with the -skipTrash flag specified to bypass trash.

```
rm -r -skipTrash /testdir
```

NameNode - KMS communication fails after long periods of inactivity

Description

Encrypted files and encryption zones cannot be created if a long period of time (by default, 20 hours) has passed since the last time the KMS and NameNode communicated.

Solution

**Important:** Upgrading your cluster to the latest CDH 5 release will fix this problem. For instructions, see Upgrading from an Earlier CDH 5 Release to the Latest Release.

For lower CDH 5 releases, there are two possible workarounds to this issue:

- You can increase the KMS authentication token validity period to a very high number. Since the default value is 10 hours, this bug will only be encountered after 20 hours of no communication between the NameNode and the KMS. Add the following property to the `kms-site.xml`:

```
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.authentication.token.validity</name>
  <value>SOME VERY HIGH NUMBER</value>
</property>
```

- You can switch the KMS signature secret provider to the string secret provider by adding the following property to the `kms-site.xml`:

```
<property>
  <name>hadoop.kms.authentication.signature.secret</name>
  <value>SOME VERY SECRET STRING</value>
</property>
```

HDFS Trash Behaviour with Transparent Encryption Enabled

The Hadoop trash feature helps prevent accidental deletion of files and directories. When you delete a file in HDFS, the file is not immediately expelled from HDFS. Deleted files are first moved to the `/user/<username>/Trash/Current` directory, with their original filesystem path being preserved. After a user-configurable period of time (`fs.trash.interval`), a process known as trash checkpointing renames the `Current` directory to the current timestamp, that is, `/user/<username>/Trash/<timestamp>`. The checkpointing process also checks the rest of the `.Trash` directory for any existing timestamp directories and removes them from HDFS permanently. You can restore files and directories in the trash simply by moving them to a location outside the `.Trash` directory.

Trash Behaviour with HDFS Transparent Encryption Enabled

Starting with CDH 5.7, you can delete files or directories that are part of an HDFS encryption zone. As is evident from the procedure described above, moving and renaming files or directories is an important part of trash handling in HDFS. However, currently HDFS transparent encryption only supports renames within an encryption zone. To accommodate this, HDFS creates a local `.Trash` directory every time a new encryption zone is created. For example, when you create an encryption zone, `enc_zone`, HDFS will also create the `/enc_zone/.Trash/` subdirectory. Files deleted from `enc_zone` are moved to `/enc_zone/.Trash/<username>/Current/`. After the checkpoint, the `Current` directory is renamed to the current timestamp, `/enc_zone/.Trash/<username>/<timestamp>`.

If you delete the entire encryption zone, it will be moved to the `.Trash` directory under the user's home directory, `/users/<username>/Trash/Current/enc_zone`. Trash checkpointing will occur only after the entire zone has
Troubleshooting Security Issues

been moved to /users/<username>/../Trash. However, if the user's home directory is already part of an encryption zone, then attempting to delete an encryption zone will fail because you cannot move or rename directories across encryption zones.

Troubleshooting Kerberos Issues

This topic describes the steps you can take to investigate problems with Kerberos authentication. It contains some sample KDC configuration scripts that you can use to make sure your cluster was configured correctly. The following sections also have instructions on using the Kerberos command-line tools, `kinit` and `klist`, to investigate the KDC and cluster setup. Finally, you can use the instructions described below to enable debugging for Kerberos using either the command-line or Cloudera Manager.

Verifying Kerberos Configuration

When you’re faced with a Kerberos-related issue, first try to pinpoint the cause of failure. A Kerberized deployment has several potential points of failure. These include the KDC itself, missing Kerberos or OS packages, incorrect mapping of Kerberos realms, among others. For example, you could start by investigating whether the issue is with a user with faulty credentials, or with the service that is failing to authenticate users. Another good starting point is to make sure that the Kerberos configuration files have been configured correctly and are being deployed consistently across all cluster hosts.

If the issue you are diagnosing is not already obvious to you, Cloudera recommends you begin with auditing your Kerberos deployment. Use this audit to confirm that you have followed the Kerberos steps as listed in the Cloudera Security Guide, and that your cluster has been configured correctly. Make sure you perform the following configuration checks:

- Confirm that your `/etc/hosts` file conforms to Cloudera Manager’s installation requirements. Verify forward and reverse name resolution for all cluster hosts, including the KDC hosts, MIT or AD.
- Ensure the required Kerberos server and workstation packages based on the version of the OS you are using.
- Check whether the `hadoop.security.auth_to_local` property in `core-site.xml` has the proper mappings for all trusted Kerberos realms, especially the HDFS trusted realms. Do this for every service that is using Kerberos.
- Verify your Kerberos configuration using the sample `krb5.conf` and `kdc.conf` files provided below.
- Review the configuration of all the KDC, REALM, and domain hosts referenced in the `krb5.conf` and `kdc.conf` files. The KDC host in particular, is a common point-of-failure and you may have to begin troubleshooting there. Ensure that the `REALM` set in `krb5.conf` has the correct hostname listed for the KDC. If you are using cross-realm authentication, see Reviewing Service Ticket Credentials in Cross Realm Deployments on page 496.
- Check whether the services using Kerberos are running and responding properly with `kinit/klist`.
- Attempt to authenticate to Cloudera Manager using cluster service credentials specific to the issue or affected service. Examine the issued credentials if you are able to successfully authenticate with the service keytab.
- Use `klist` to list the principals present within a service keytab to ensure each service has one.
- Enabling debugging using either the command line or Cloudera Manager.

Sample Kerberos Configuration Files

`/etc/krb5.conf`

The `/etc/krb5.conf` file is the configuration a client uses to access a realm through its configured KDC. The `krb5.conf` maps the realm to the available servers supporting those realms. It also defines the host-specific configuration rules for how tickets are requested and granted.

```
[logging]
default = FILE:/var/log/krb5libs.log
kdc = FILE:/var/log/krb5kdc.log
admin_server = FILE:/var/log/kadmind.log

[libdefaults]
default_realm = EXAMPLE.COM
```
dns_lookup_realm = false
dns_lookup_kdc = false
ticket_lifetime = 24h
renew_lifetime = 7d
forwardable = true
# udp_preference_limit = 1

# set udp_preference_limit = 1 when TCP only should be used. Consider using in complex network environments when troubleshooting or when dealing with inconsistent client behavior or GSS (63) messages.

# uncomment the following if AD cross realm auth is ONLY providing DES encrypted tickets
# allow-weak-crypto = true

[realms]
AD-REALM.EXAMPLE.COM = {
kdc = AD1.ad-realm.example.com:88
kdc = AD2.ad-realm.example.com:88
admin_server = AD1.ad-realm.example.com:749
admin_server = AD2.ad-realm.example.com:749
default_domain = ad-realm.example.com
}
EXAMPLE.COM = {
kdc = kdc1.example.com:88
admin_server = kdc1.example.com:749
default_domain = example.com
}

# The domain_realm is critical for mapping your host domain names to the kerberos realms that are servicing them. Make sure the lowercase left hand portion indicates any domains or subdomains that will be related to the kerberos REALM on the right hand side of the expression. REALMS will always be UPPERCASE. For example, if your actual DNS domain was test.com but your kerberos REALM is EXAMPLE.COM then you would have,

[domain_realm]
test.com = EXAMPLE.COM
ad-domain.example.com = AD-REALM.EXAMPLE.COM
ad-realm.example.com = AD-REALM.EXAMPLE.COM

/var/kerberos/krb5kdc

The kdc.conf file only needs to be configured on the actual cluster-dedicated KDC, and should be located at /var/kerberos/krb5kdc. Only primary and secondary KDCs need access to this configuration file. The contents of this file establish the configuration rules which are enforced for all client hosts in the REALM.

[kdcdefaults]
kdc_ports = 88
kdc_tcp_ports = 88

[realms]
EXAMPLE.COM = {
#master_key_type = aes256-cts
max_renewable_life = 7d 0h 0m 0s
acl_file = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
dict_file = /usr/share/dict/words
admin_keytab = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab
# note that aes256 is ONLY supported in Active Directory in a domain / forest operating at a 2008 or greater functional level.
# aes256 requires that you download and deploy the JCE Policy files for your JDK release level to provide
# strong java encryption extension levels like AES256. Make sure to match based on the encryption configured within AD for
# cross realm auth, note that RC4 = arcfour when comparing windows and linux enctypes supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal arcfour-hmac:normal
default_principal_flags = +renewable, +forwardable
}
Authenticate to Kerberos using the `kinit` command line tool

The `kinit` command line tool is used to authenticate a user, service, system, or device to a KDC. The most basic example is a user authenticating to Kerberos with a username (principal) and password. In the following example, the first attempt uses a wrong password, followed by a second successful attempt.

```
[alice@host1 ~]$ kinit alice@TEST.ORG.LAB
Password for alice@TEST.ORG.LAB: (wrong password)
kinit: Preauthentication failed while getting initial credentials

[alice@host1 ~]$ kinit alice@TEST.ORG.LAB
Password for alice@TEST.ORG.LAB: (correct password)
(note silent return on successful auth)

[alice@host1 ~]$ klist
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_10001
Default principal: alice@TEST.ORG.LAB
Valid starting      Expires      Service principal
03/11/14 11:55:39  03/11/14 21:54:55  krbtgt/TEST.ORG.LAB@TEST.ORG.LAB
renew until 03/18/14 11:55:39
```

Another method of authentication is using keytabs with the `kinit` command. You can verify whether authentication was successful by using the `klist` command to show the credentials issued by the KDC. The following example attempts to authenticate the hdfs service to the KDC by using the hdfs keytab file.

```
[root@host1 312-hdfs-DATANODE]# kinit -kt hdfs.keytab hdfs/host1.test.lab@TEST.LAB
[root@host1 312-hdfs-DATANODE]# klist
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_0
Default principal: hdfs/host1.test.lab@TEST.LAB
Valid starting      Expires      Service principal
03/11/14 11:18:34 03/12/14 11:18:34  krbtgt/TEST.LAB@TEST.LAB
renew until 03/18/14 11:18:34
```

Troubleshooting using service keytabs maintained by Cloudera Manager

Every service managed by Cloudera Manager has a keytab file that is provided at startup by the Cloudera Manager Agent. The most recent keytab files can be examined by navigating to the path, `/var/run/cloudera-scm-agent/process` with an `ls -ltr` command.

As you can see in the example below, Cloudera Manager service directory names have the form: `###-service-ROLE`. Therefore, if you are troubleshooting the HDFS service, the service directory may be called, `326-hdfs-NAMENODE`.
If you have root access to the `/var/run/cloudera-scm-agent/process` path, you can use any service’s keytab file to log in as root or a sudo user to verify whether basic Kerberos authentication is working.

Once you have located a service keytab file, examine its contents using the `klist` command (more on this, later). The `klist` command can show you the credentials stored in a keytab file. For example, to list the credentials stored in the `hdfs.keytab` file, use the following command:

```
[root@host1 326-hdfs-DATANODE]# klist -kt hdfs.keytab
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keytab name: WRFILE:hdfs.keytab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KVNO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, attempt to authenticate using the keytab file and a principal within it. In this case, we use the `hdfs.keytab` file with the `hdfs/host1.test.lab@TEST.LAB` principal. Then use the `klist` command without any arguments to see the current user session’s credentials.

```
[root@host1 326-hdfs-DATANODE]# kinit -kt hdfs.keytab hdfs/host1.test.lab@TEST.LAB
[root@host1 326-hdfs-DATANODE]# klist
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid starting</th>
<th>Expires</th>
<th>Service principal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03/11/14 11:18:34</td>
<td>03/12/14 11:18:34</td>
<td>krbtgt/TEST.LAB@TEST.LAB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that Kerberos credentials have an expiry date and time. This means, to make sure Kerberos credentials are valid uniformly over a cluster, all hosts and clients within the cluster should be using NTP and must never drift more than 5 minutes apart from each other. Kerberos session tickets have a limited lifespan, but can be renewed (as indicated in the sample `krb5.conf` and `kdc.conf`). CDH requires renewable tickets for cluster principals. Check whether renewable tickets have been enabled by using a klist command with the `–e` (list key encryption types) and `–f` (list flags set) switches when examining Kerberos sessions and credentials.

Examining Kerberos credentials with `klist`

So far we’ve only seen basic usage examples of the `klist` command to list the contents of a keytab file, or to examine a user’s credentials. To get more information from the `klist` command, such as the encryption types being negotiated, or the flags being set for credentials being issued by the KDC, use the `klist –ef` command. The output for this command will show you the negotiated encryption types for a user or service principal. This is useful information because you may troubleshoot errors caused (especially in cross-realm trust deployments) because an AD or MIT KDC...
server may not support a particular encryption type. Look for the encryption types under the "Etype" section of the output.

Flags indicate options supported by Kerberos that extend the features of a set of issued credentials. As discussed previously, CDH requires renewable as well as forwardable tickets for successful authentication, especially in cross realm environments. Look for these settings in the "Flags:" section of the \texttt{klist -ef} output shown below where, F = Forwardable, and, R = renewable.

For example, if you use the \texttt{klist -ef} command in an ongoing user session:

```bash
$ klist -ef
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_10001
Default principal: alice@TEST.ORG.LAB
Valid starting Expires Service principal
03/11/14 11:55:39 03/11/14 21:54:55 krbtgt/TEST.ORG.LAB@TEST.ORG.LAB
renew until 03/18/14 11:55:39, Flags: FRIA
Etype (skey, tkt): aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96,
aes256-cts-hmac-shal-96
```

### Reviewing Service Ticket Credentials in Cross Realm Deployments

When you examine your cluster configuration, make sure you haven’t violated any of the following integration rules:

- When negotiating encryption types, follow the realm with the most specific limitations on supported encryption types.
- All realms should be known to one another through the \texttt{/etc/krb5.conf} file deployed on the cluster.
- When you make configuration decisions for Active Directory environments, you must evaluate the Domain Functional Level or Forrest Functional Level that is present.

Kerberos will typically negotiate the strongest form of encryption possible between a client and server for authentication into the realm. However, the encryption types for TGTs may sometimes end up being negotiated downward towards the weaker encryption types, which is not desirable. To investigate such issues, check the \texttt{kvno} of the cross-realm trust principal (\texttt{krbtgt}) as described in the following steps. Replace \texttt{CLUSTER.REALM} and \texttt{AD.REALM} (or \texttt{MIT.REALM}) with the appropriate values for your configured realm. This scenario assumes cross-realm authentication with Active Directory.

1. Once trust has been configured (see sample files in previous section), \texttt{kinit} as a system user by authenticating to the AD Kerberos realm.
2. From the command line, perform a \texttt{kvno} check of the local and cross-realm \texttt{krbtgt} entry. The local representation of this special \texttt{REALM service principal} is in the form, \texttt{krbtgt/CLUSTER.REALM@CLUSTER.REALM}. The cross-realm principal is named after the trusted realm in the form, \texttt{krbtgt/AD.REALM}.

If the \texttt{kvno} check fails, this means cross-realm trust was not set up correctly. Once again review the encryption types in use to make sure there are no incompatibilities or unsupported encryption types being used across realms.

### Enabling Debugging in Cloudera Manager for CDH Services

The following instructions are specific to a Cloudera Manager managed-HDFS service and must be modified based on the Kerberized service you are troubleshooting.

1. Go to the Cloudera Manager Admin Console and navigate to the HDFS service.
2. Click \texttt{Configuration}.
3. Search for properties specific to the different role types for which you want to enable debugging. For example, if you want to enable debugging for the HDFS NameNode, search for the \texttt{NameNode Logging Threshold} property and select at least \texttt{DEBUG} level logging.
4. Enable Kerberos debugging by using the HDFS service's Advanced Configuration Snippet. Once again, this may be different for each specific role type or service. For the HDFS NameNode, add the following properties to the HDFS Service Environment Safety Valve:

```
HADOOP_JAAS_DEBUG=true
HADOOP_OPTS="-Dsun.security.krb5.debug=true"
```

5. Click Save Changes.
6. Restart the HDFS service.

The output will be seen in the process logs: `stdout.log` and `stderr.log`. These can be found in the runtime path of the instance: `/var/run/cloudera-scm-agent/process/###-service-ROLE`. Once Cloudera Manager services have been restarted, the most recent instance of the `###-service-ROLE` directory will have debug logs. Use `ls -ltr` in the `/var/run/cloudera-scm-agent/process` path to determine the most current path.

**Enabling Debugging for Command Line Troubleshooting**

Set the following properties in your environment to produce detailed debugging output of the Kerberos authentication process.

```
# export HADOOP_ROOT_LOGGER=TRACE,console; export HADOOP_JAAS_DEBUG=true; export HADOOP_OPTS="-Dsun.security.krb5.debug=true"
```

You can then use the following command to copy the console output to the user (with the debugging), along with all output from `STDOUT` and `STDERR` to a file.

```
# hadoop fs -ls / > >(tee fsls-logfile.txt) 2>&1
```

**Troubleshooting TLS/SSL Issues in Cloudera Manager**

To diagnose and resolve issues related to TLS/SSL configuration, verify configuration tasks appropriate for the cluster by verifying the steps in [How to Configure TLS for Cloudera Manager](#).

After checking your settings and finding no obvious misconfiguration, you can take some of the actions detailed below.

**Test Connectivity with OpenSSL**

From the host that has connectivity issues, run `openssl` as shown below. You can also check that the certificate used by the host is recognized by a trusted CA during the TLS/SSL negotiation.

To check the connection:

```
$ openssl s_client -connect [host.fqdn.name]:[port]
```

For example:

```
$ openssl s_client -connect test1.sec.cloudera.com:7183
```

A return code 0 means `openssl` was able to follow trust server chain of trust through its library of trusted public CAs.

For certificates signed by your organization's internal CA or self-signed certificates, you may need to add the certificate to the truststore using the `openssl` command. Use the `-CAfile` option to specify the path to the root CA so `openssl` can verify the self-signed or internal-CA-signed certificate as follows:

```
$ openssl s_client -connect test1.sec.cloudera.com:7183 -CAfile /opt/cloudera/security/CAs/Certificates/RootCA.pem
```
Only the Root CA certificate is needed to establish trust for this test. The result from the command is successful when you see the return code 0 as follows:

```
Verify return code: 0 (ok)
---
```

By default, Cloudera Manager Server writes logs to the `/etc/cloudera-scm-server/cloudera-scm-server.log` file on startup. Successful server start-up using the certificate looks similar to the following log example:

```
SslSelectChannelConnector@0.0.0.0:7183
SelectChannelConnector@0.0.0.0:7180
Jetty server.
```

Upload Diagnostic Bundles to Cloudera Support

By default, Cloudera Manager uploads diagnostic bundles over HTTPS to the Cloudera Support server at `cops.cloudera.com`. However, the upload can fail if the Cloudera Manager truststore cannot verify the authenticity of the Cloudera Support server certificate, and that verification process can fail due to Cloudera Manager truststore configuration issues.

To ensure the Cloudera Manager Server truststore contains the public CAs needed to verify Cloudera Support's certificate, you can explicitly establish trust by **importing Cloudera Support's certificate into Cloudera Manager's truststore**.

**Note:** Cloudera Support servers use certificates signed by a commercial CA, so this step is typically not needed, unless the default truststore has been altered. Before downloading or adding any certificates, **test the connection and verify that the certificate is the source** of the connection issue.

**Importing Cloudera Support's Certificate into the Cloudera Manager Server Truststore**

To obtain Cloudera's public key certificate from the Cloudera Support server:

```
$ openssl s_client -connect cops.cloudera.com:443 | openssl x509 -text -out /path/to/cloudera-cert.pem
```

To import this certificate into the Cloudera Manager truststore (use paths for your own system):

```
$ keytool -import -keystore /path/to/cm/truststore.jks -file /path/to/cloudera-cert.pem
```

After importing the certificate, confirm that Cloudera Manager is configured for this truststore file, as detailed in **Configuring Cloudera Manager Truststore Properties** on page 498.

**Note:** Alternatively, you can use the default Java truststore for your Cloudera Manager cluster deployment, as described in **Configuring TLS Encryption for Cloudera Manager** on page 196.

**Configuring Cloudera Manager Truststore Properties**

After installing the Cloudera Support server certificate into the Cloudera Manager truststore, you must configure Cloudera Manager to use the truststore, as follows:

1. Log into the Cloudera Manager Admin Console.
2. Select **Administration > Settings**.
3. Click the **Security** category.
4. Enter the path to the truststore and the password (if necessary):
5. Click **Save Changes** to save the settings.

Note: See Oracle’s [JSSE Reference Guide](#) for more information about the JSSE trust mechanism.

### YARN, MRv1, and Linux OS Security

Several subsystems are fundamental to Hadoop clusters, specifically, the Jsvc, Task Controller, and Container Executor Programs, documented below.

#### MRv1 and YARN: The Jsvc Program

A set of libraries designed to make Java applications run better on Linux, the `jsvc` program is part of the `bigtop-jsvc` package and installed in either `/usr/lib/bigtop-utils/jsvc` or `/usr/libexec/bigtop-utils/jsvc` depending on the particular Linux flavor.

In particular, `jsvc` ([more info](#)) is used to start the DataNode listening on low port numbers. Its entry point is the `SecureDataNodeStarter` class, which implements the Daemon interface that `jsvc` expects. `jsvc` is run as root, and calls the `SecureDataNodeStarter.init(...)` method while running as root. Once the `SecureDataNodeStarter` class has finished initializing, `jsvc` sets the effective UID to be the `hdfs` user, and then calls `SecureDataNodeStarter.start(...)`. `SecureDataNodeStarter` then calls the regular DataNode entry point, passing in a reference to the privileged resources it previously obtained.

#### MRv1 Only: The Linux TaskController

A setuid binary called `task-controller` is part of the `hadoop-0.20-mapreduce` package and is installed in either `/usr/lib/hadoop-0.20-mapreduce/sbin/Linux-amd64-64/task-controller` or `/usr/lib/hadoop-0.20-mapreduce/sbin/Linux-i386-32/task-controller`.

This `task-controller` program, which is used on MRv1 only, allows the TaskTracker to run tasks under the Unix account of the user who submitted the job in the first place. It is a setuid binary that must have a very specific set of permissions and ownership to function correctly. In particular, it must:

1. Be owned by root
2. Be owned by a group that contains only the user running the MapReduce daemons
3. Be setuid
4. Be group readable and executable

This corresponds to the ownership `root:mapred` and the permissions 4754.

Here is the output of `ls` on a correctly-configured Task-controller:

```bash
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root mapred 30888 Mar 18 13:03 task-controller
```

The TaskTracker will check for this configuration on start up, and fail to start if the Task-controller is not configured correctly.
YARN Only: The Linux Container Executor

A setuid binary called `container-executor` is part of the hadoop-yarn package and is installed in `/usr/lib/hadoop-yarn/bin/container-executor`.

This `container-executor` program, which is used on YARN only and supported on GNU/Linux only, runs the containers as the user who submitted the application. It requires all user accounts to be created on the cluster hosts where the containers are launched. It uses a setuid executable that is included in the Hadoop distribution. The NodeManager uses this executable to launch and kill containers. The setuid executable switches to the user who has submitted the application and launches or kills the containers. For maximum security, this executor sets up restricted permissions and user/group ownership of local files and directories used by the containers such as the shared objects, jars, intermediate files, and log files. As a result, only the application owner and NodeManager can access any of the local files/directories including those localized as part of the distributed cache.

Parcel Deployments

In a parcel deployment the `container-executor` file is located inside the parcel at `/opt/cloudera/parcels/CDH/lib/hadoop-yarn/bin/container-executor`. For the `/usr/lib` mount point, setuid should not be a problem. However, the parcel could easily be located on a different mount point. If you are using a parcel, make sure the mount point for the parcel directory is without the nosuid option.

The `container-executor` program must have a very specific set of permissions and ownership to function correctly. In particular, it must:

1. Be owned by root
2. Be owned by a group that contains only the user running the YARN daemons
3. Be setuid
4. Be group readable and executable. This corresponds to the ownership `root:yarn` and the permissions `6050`.

---Sr-s--- 1 root yarn 91886 2012-04-01 19:54 container-executor

**Important:** Configuration changes to the Linux container executor could result in local NodeManager directories (such as `usercache`) being left with incorrect permissions. To avoid this, when making changes using either Cloudera Manager or the command line, first manually remove the existing NodeManager local directories from all configured local directories (yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs), and let the NodeManager recreate the directory structure.

Troubleshooting

When you set up a secure cluster for the first time and debug problems with it, the `task-controller` or `container-executor` may encounter errors. These programs communicate these errors to the TaskTracker or NodeManager daemon via numeric error codes that appear in the TaskTracker or NodeManager logs respectively (`/var/log/hadoop-mapreduce` or `/var/log/hadoop-yarn`). The following sections list the possible numeric error codes with descriptions of what they mean:

- [TaskController Error Codes (MRv1)](page) on page 500
- [ContainerExecutor Error Codes (YARN)](page) on page 502

TaskController Error Codes (MRv1)

The following table applies to the task-controller in MRv1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numeric Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1            | INVALID_ARGUMENT_NUMBER     | • Incorrect number of arguments provided for the given task-controller command  
<pre><code>               | • Failure to initialize the job localizer                                   |
</code></pre>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numeric Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>INVALID_USER_NAME</td>
<td>The user passed to the task-controller does not exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>INVALID_COMMAND_PROVIDED</td>
<td>The task-controller does not recognize the command it was asked to execute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SUPER_USER_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_RUN_TASKS</td>
<td>The user passed to the task-controller was the super user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>INVALID_TT_ROOT</td>
<td>The passed TaskTracker root does not match the configured TaskTracker root (mapred.local.dir), or does not exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SETUID_OPER_FAILED</td>
<td>Either could not read the local groups database, or could not set UID or GID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>UNABLE_TO_EXECUTE_TASK_SCRIPT</td>
<td>The task-controller could not execute the task launcher script.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>UNABLE_TO_KILL_TASK</td>
<td>The task-controller could not kill the task it was passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>INVALID_TASK_PID</td>
<td>The PID passed to the task-controller was negative or 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>ERROR_RESOLVING_FILE_PATH</td>
<td>The task-controller could not resolve the path of the task launcher script file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>RELATIVE_PATH_COMPONENTS_IN_FILE_PATH</td>
<td>The path to the task launcher script file contains relative components (for example, &quot;.&quot;.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>UNABLE_TO_STAT_FILE</td>
<td>The task-controller did not have permission to stat a file it needed to check the ownership of.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>FILE_NOT_OWNED_BY_TASKTRACKER</td>
<td>A file which the task-controller must change the ownership of has the wrong ownership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>PREPARE_ATTEMPT_DIRECTORIES_FAILED</td>
<td>The mapred.local.dir is not configured, could not be read by the task-controller, or could not have its ownership secured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>INITIALIZE_JOB_FAILED</td>
<td>The task-controller could not get, stat, or secure the job directory or job working directory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>PREPARE_TASK_LOGS_FAILED</td>
<td>The task-controller could not find or could not change the ownership of the task log directory to the passed user.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>INVALID_TT_LOG_DIR</td>
<td>The hadoop.log.dir is not configured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>OUT_OF_MEMORY</td>
<td>The task-controller could not determine the job directory path or the task launcher script path.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>INITIALIZE_DISTCACHEFILE_FAILED</td>
<td>Could not get a unique value for, stat, or the local distributed cache directory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ContainerExecutor Error Codes (YARN)

The codes in the table apply to the container-executor in YARN, but are used by the LinuxContainerExecutor only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numeric Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>INVALID_ARGUMENT_NUMBER</td>
<td>• Incorrect number of arguments provided for the given task-controller command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Failure to initialize the container localizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>INVALID_USER_NAME</td>
<td>The user passed to the task-controller does not exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>INVALID_COMMAND_PROVIDED</td>
<td>The container-executor does not recognize the command it was asked to run.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numeric Code</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>INVALID_NM_ROOT</td>
<td>The passed NodeManager root does not match the configured NodeManager root (yarn.nodemanager.local-dirs), or does not exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SETUID_OPER_FAILED</td>
<td>Either could not read the local groups database, or could not set UID or GID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>UNABLE_TO_EXECUTE_CONTAINER_SCRIPT</td>
<td>The container-executor could not run the container launcher script.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>UNABLE_TO_SIGNAL_CONTAINER</td>
<td>The container-executor could not signal the container it was passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>INVALID_CONTAINER_PID</td>
<td>The PID passed to the container-executor was negative or 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>OUT_OF_MEMORY</td>
<td>The container-executor couldn't allocate enough memory while reading the container-executor.cfg file, or while getting the paths for the container launcher script or credentials files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>INITIALIZE_USER_FAILED</td>
<td>Couldn't get, stat, or secure the per-user NodeManager directory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>UNABLE_TO_BUILD_PATH</td>
<td>The container-executor couldn't concatenate two paths, most likely because it ran out of memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>INVALID_CONTAINER_EXEC_PERMISSIONS</td>
<td>The container-executor binary does not have the correct permissions set. See Information about Other Hadoop Security Programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>INVALID_CONFIG_FILE</td>
<td>The container-executor.cfg file is missing, malformed, or has incorrect permissions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>SETSID_OPER_FAILED</td>
<td>Could not set the session ID of the forked container.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>WRITE_PIDFILE_FAILED</td>
<td>Failed to write the value of the PID of the launched container to the PID file of the container.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255</td>
<td>Unknown Error</td>
<td>This error has several possible causes. Some common causes are:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- User accounts on your cluster have a user ID less than the value specified for the min.user.id property in the container-executor.cfg file. The default value is 1000 which is appropriate on Ubuntu systems, but may not be valid for your operating system. For information about setting min.user.id in the container-executor.cfg file, see this step.
- This error is often caused by previous errors; look earlier in the log file for possible causes.
The following exit status codes apply to all containers in YARN. These exit status codes are part of the YARN framework and are in addition to application specific exit codes that can be set:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numeric Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>SUCCESS</td>
<td>Container has finished successfully.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1000</td>
<td>INVALID</td>
<td>Initial value of the container exit code. A container that does not have a COMPLETED state will always return this status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-100</td>
<td>ABORTED</td>
<td>Containers killed by the framework, either due to being released by the application or being 'lost' due to node failures, for example.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-101</td>
<td>DISKS_FAILED</td>
<td>Container exited due to local disks issues in the NodeManager node. This occurs when the number of good nodemanager-local-directories or nodemanager-log-directories drops below the health threshold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-102</td>
<td>PREEMPTED</td>
<td>Containers preempted by the framework. This does not count towards a container failure in most applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-103</td>
<td>KILLED_EXCEEDED_VMEM</td>
<td>Container terminated because of exceeding allocated virtual memory limit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-104</td>
<td>KILLED_EXCEEDED_PMEM</td>
<td>Container terminated because of exceeding allocated physical memory limit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-105</td>
<td>KILLED_BY_APPMASTER</td>
<td>Container was terminated on request of the application master.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-106</td>
<td>KILLED_BY_RESourcemanager</td>
<td>Container was terminated by the resource manager.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-107</td>
<td>KILLED_AFTER_APP_COMPLETION</td>
<td>Container was terminated after the application finished.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SPDX short identifier: Apache-2.0

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